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cli: fix arbitrary execution of program bug
This fixes a bug only present on Windows that would permit someone to execute an arbitrary program if they crafted an appropriate directory tree. Namely, if someone put an executable named 'xz.exe' in the root of a directory tree and one ran 'rg -z foo' from the root of that tree, then the 'xz.exe' executable in that tree would execute if there are any 'xz' files anywhere in the tree. The root cause of this problem is that 'CreateProcess' on Windows will implicitly look in the current working directory for an executable when it is given a relative path to a program. Rust's standard library allows this behavior to occur, so we work around it here. We work around it by explicitly resolving programs like 'xz' via 'PATH'. That way, we only ever pass an absolute path to 'CreateProcess', which avoids the implicit behavior of checking the current working directory. This fix doesn't apply to non-Windows systems as it is believed to only impact Windows. In theory, the bug could apply on Unix if '.' is in one's PATH, but at that point, you reap what you sow. While the extent to which this is a security problem isn't clear, I think users generally expect to be able to download or clone repositories from the Internet and run ripgrep on them without fear of anything too awful happening. Being able to execute an arbitrary program probably violates that expectation. Therefore, CVE-2021-3013[1] was created for this issue. We apply the same logic to the --pre command, since the --pre command is likely in a user's config file and it would be surprising for something that the user is searching to modify which preprocessor command is used. The --pre and -z/--search-zip flags are the only two ways that ripgrep will invoke external programs, so this should cover any possible exploitable cases of this bug. [1] - https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-3013
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This almost sounds like a bug in Windows or
std::process::Command
to me. Other people that are used to *nix might find this behaviour surprising and introduce similar vulnerabilities. Should this be fixed in the stdlib maybe? Maybe have some method on aCommand
that optionally resolves the path to a command like your resolve_binary, overriding the OS's search path (skipping the current working directory)?