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- Add /inbox page with iframe embedding and GatewayZ auth passthrough - Add /api/terragon/auth endpoint for HMAC-signed token generation - Update footer to hide on inbox pages - Add comprehensive tests for inbox page and auth bridge API - Update README with inbox page documentation 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add tests for body class manipulation on mount/unmount - Add tests for overflow style handling - Add tests for container classes - Coverage improved to 93% statements 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security improvements: 1. Validate API key against backend before issuing tokens 2. Encrypt token payload with AES-256-GCM instead of base64 encoding 3. Pass auth token via postMessage API instead of URL query params 4. Store keyHash in token instead of full API key This addresses the 3 security concerns raised in the code review: - API key validation now calls backend /api/user/me endpoint - Payload is encrypted, not just encoded (prevents token interception) - Token not exposed in URL (prevents leakage via logs/history/referer) 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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src/app/inbox/page.tsx
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| title="Coding Inbox" | ||
| onLoad={handleIframeLoad} | ||
| allow="clipboard-read; clipboard-write" | ||
| sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-popups allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox" |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox allows the iframe to open windows that escape the sandbox, which could be a security risk if the embedded content is compromised.
Consider if this permission is necessary for your use case.
Prompt To Fix With AI
This is a comment left during a code review.
Path: src/app/inbox/page.tsx
Line: 366:366
Comment:
`allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox` allows the iframe to open windows that escape the sandbox, which could be a security risk if the embedded content is compromised.
Consider if this permission is necessary for your use case.
How can I resolve this? If you propose a fix, please make it concise.
src/app/api/terragon/auth/route.ts
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| * Returns: iv.ciphertext.authTag (all base64url encoded) | ||
| */ | ||
| function encryptPayload(payload: string, secret: string): string { | ||
| const key = Buffer.from(secret.padEnd(32, "0").slice(0, 32)); // Ensure 32 bytes |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Weak key derivation - padding with "0" characters is predictable and weakens the encryption key strength. Use a proper key derivation function like PBKDF2, HKDF, or scrypt instead of simple padding.
Prompt To Fix With AI
This is a comment left during a code review.
Path: src/app/api/terragon/auth/route.ts
Line: 39:39
Comment:
Weak key derivation - padding with "0" characters is predictable and weakens the encryption key strength. Use a proper key derivation function like PBKDF2, HKDF, or scrypt instead of simple padding.
How can I resolve this? If you propose a fix, please make it concise.…-escape-sandbox
- Replace weak key padding with HKDF (SHA-256) for AES-256-GCM encryption key derivation
- Remove allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox from iframe sandbox attribute for improved security
- Update tests to match new key derivation method
Addresses code review security concerns:
- Weak key derivation using padEnd("0") was predictable and weakened encryption
- allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox allowed iframe popups to escape sandbox restrictions
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
![sentry[bot]](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/in/12637?s=60&v=4){kind=small}
| const handleRetry = useCallback(() => { | ||
| setConnectionError(false); | ||
| setIsLoading(true); | ||
| iframeLoadedRef.current = false; | ||
| authSentRef.current = false; | ||
| setIframeKey((prev) => prev + 1); | ||
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| if (loadTimeoutRef.current) { | ||
| clearTimeout(loadTimeoutRef.current); |
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Auto-Fix Status UpdateTriggerPR synchronize event - checking for CI failures and review comments. Review Comments AddressedThe following Greptile review comments were identified and have already been fixed in commit
Local Verification
StatusNo additional changes required - the security fixes from the Greptile review have already been implemented and pushed. The PR is ready for review and merge. Automated by Terragon Agent |
Resolved conflicts by keeping security fixes: - Use HKDF for key derivation instead of weak padding - Remove allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox from iframe sandbox 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Codecov Report✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests. 📢 Thoughts on this report? Let us know! |
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Looks like there are a few issues preventing this PR from being merged!
If you'd like me to help, just leave a comment, like Feel free to include any additional details that might help me get this PR into a better state. You can manage your notification settings |
The handleRetry function was not clearing the authToken and terragonUrl state, which meant the useEffect would not re-fetch a fresh token when the user clicked retry. This could cause persistent authentication failures if the original 1-hour token had expired. Changes: - Clear authToken and terragonUrl in handleRetry - Add iframeKey to useEffect dependencies to trigger fresh fetch - Remove redundant timeout from handleRetry (useEffect handles it) - Add test case verifying fresh token fetch on retry Fixes: Sentry bug report about handleRetry not re-fetching auth token 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Auto-Fix Status UpdateTriggerPR synchronize event - E2E test failures detected from Blacksmith CI report. Issues IdentifiedThe following E2E tests were failing in
Root Cause: All failures were due to Fix AppliedReplaced Local Verification
CommitStatusThe fix has been pushed. CI should now run and pass the E2E tests. If the tests still fail, it may indicate additional issues that require human investigation. Automated by Terragon Agent |
1 participant
Greptile Overview
Greptile Summary
Integrated Terragon inbox feature with secure authentication bridge between Gatewayz and Terragon systems.
Key changes:
/inboxroute with embedded Terragon iframe for AI coding agent capabilities/api/terragon/auth) that generates encrypted tokens using AES-256-GCM with HMAC signaturesSecurity approach:
Architecture:
The auth bridge creates a secure token containing user metadata (userId, email, username, tier, keyHash) that Terragon can decrypt to authenticate users without exposing Gatewayz API keys.
Confidence Score: 3/5
Important Files Changed
Sequence Diagram
sequenceDiagram participant User participant InboxPage as Inbox Page<br/>(Frontend) participant AuthBridge as Auth Bridge API participant Backend as Gatewayz Backend participant Terragon as Terragon Inbox<br/>(iframe) User->>InboxPage: Visit /inbox InboxPage->>InboxPage: Check auth status alt User not authenticated InboxPage->>User: Show login prompt User->>InboxPage: Click Sign In InboxPage->>User: Redirect to Privy login else User authenticated InboxPage->>AuthBridge: POST request with user data AuthBridge->>Backend: Validate credentials Backend-->>AuthBridge: Return validation result alt Credentials valid AuthBridge->>AuthBridge: Generate encrypted token<br/>with HMAC signature AuthBridge-->>InboxPage: Return encrypted token InboxPage->>InboxPage: Build iframe URL<br/>(embed mode, awaitAuth flag) InboxPage->>Terragon: Load iframe Terragon-->>InboxPage: iframe loaded event InboxPage->>Terragon: postMessage with auth token Terragon->>Terragon: Decrypt and validate token Terragon-->>User: Show authenticated inbox else Credentials invalid AuthBridge-->>InboxPage: Return error InboxPage->>Terragon: Load iframe without auth Terragon-->>User: Show Terragon login end end Note over InboxPage,Terragon: Security: Token sent via postMessage<br/>not URL to avoid exposure