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Agora Audit Report

Optimism Governor & Approval Voting Module

Prepared by: Zach Obront, Independent Security Researcher

Date: May 10 to 12, 2023

About Agora

Agora is the hub for Nouns governance participants to view delegates and their past activities, share their views, and more.

The Optimism Governor is the governance contract created by Agora to support the Optimism ecosystem.

The Approval Voting Module is a new mechanism that allows any governor to delegate some of its logic to an external module that can implement additional filtering and logic. In this case, the module allows proposals to contain multiple "options" that can be selectively passed based on specific criteria.

About zachobront

Zach Obront is an independent smart contract security researcher. He serves as a Lead Senior Watson at Sherlock, a Security Researcher at Spearbit, and has identified multiple critical severity bugs in the wild, including in a Top 5 Protocol on Immunefi. You can say hi on Twitter at @zachobront.

Summary & Scope

The voteagora/optimism-gov repository was audited at commit 35f441738bd7864bd37949a40842486bc0ac51b0.

The following contracts were in scope:

  • src/OptimismGovernorV5.sol
  • src/modules/VotingModule.sol
  • src/modules/ApprovalVotingModule.sol

After completion of the fixes, the TK commit was reviewed.

Summary of Findings

Identifier Title Severity Fixed
[H-01] Proposals supported only by a small fraction of the community can be passed using the Approval Module High ✓
[H-02] Budget cap will not account for transfers of approved or permitted ERC20 tokens High ✓
[M-01] New proposals can be DOS'd by frontrunning Medium ✓
[M-02] Any address can be passed as a VotingModule, which could lead to abuse Medium ✓
[M-03] Votes can be arbitrarily extended by Manager until they meet quorum Medium
[L-01] Quorum initialized to 0.03% instead of 30% due to overridden denominator Low ✓
[G-01] Loops in ApprovalVotingModule#propose() can be consolidated Gas ✓
[G-02] Remove checks for inaccessible states Gas ✓

Detailed Findings

[H-01] Proposals supported only by a small fraction of the community can be passed using the Approval Module

When a new proposal is created through OptimismGovernorV5.sol, there are two options for the proposer:

  1. propose(): This uses the usual governor proposal process, which requires quorum to be met (yes votes + abstain votes >= quorum) and the vote to succeed (yes votes > no votes).

  2. proposeWithModule(): This will call out to the passed module with proposer-defined parameters that are required in order for the proposal to pass, with the ability for certain "options" to pass while others fail. It require those parameters to be met, as well as quorum to be met (yes votes + abstain votes >= quorum).

The problem lies in the fact that using proposeWithModule() actually loosens the minimum parameters to get proposals passed because it doesn't allow no votes and replaces that with proposer-defined logic.

The only firm requirement for a proposal as a whole to go ahead is for quorum to be met. Beyond that, decisions are delegated to the logic passed to the module.

Because this logic is defined by the proposer, they can set it up in such a way as to make the proposal pass much more easily than it should, which can allow a small minority of the community to pass proposals the rest of the community does not want.

Proof of Concept

  • There is a controversial issue that 10% of the community supports vehemently, while 90% strongly dislikes.
  • Through the normal proposal process, such an issue would have no hope of passing, because yes votes > no votes could not be accomplished.
  • However, a community member that wants to see such a vote succeed could call proposeWithModule() and set the criteria to "top choices" with this as the only option.
  • Because there is no way to vote "no" on a module proposal, the 90% who disagree are best served by doing nothing.
  • The only requirements on the remaining 10% are that (a) the option gets at least 1 vote and (b) the overall proposal reached quorum.
  • Quorum is currently set to ~3%, so it would easily pass.
  • The result is that a small minority of community members were able to easily pass a proposal.

Of course, at the moment, such an attack could only be performed by the manager, since proposing is restricted. But when the contract opens up to community proposals, this issue would imply that any holder of more than 3% of OP tokens can pass any proposal they would like.

Recommendation

Ensure that the requirements to pass a proposal through the module are always greater than or equal to the normal proposal proposal process.

In this case, that means ensuring there is the ability to vote no on the proposal as a whole, and that the whole proposal will fail if yes votes <= no votes.

Review

Fixed in commit 41d5fd3f460a9fbe3298b967c360795a67de5cfe by refactoring OptimismGovernorV5.sol to continue to use the regular voting logic, and only using the module for additional logic in determining vote success and execution params.

[H-02] Budget cap will not account for transfers of approved or permitted ERC20 tokens

ApprovalVotingModule.sol contains a feature where the governor can input a budgetToken and a budgetAmount, and the module ensures that passed proposals cannot spend more than this amount of this token.

This check occurs in _formatExecuteParams(). In this function, we loop over all of the transaction options that met the criteria, tally up the amount of budget token spent, and break the loop if the amount spent crosses the budget.

It is implemented as follows:

for (n = 0; n < option.targets.length;) {
    // Shortcircuit if `budgetAmount` is exceeded
    if (settings.budgetAmount != 0) {
        if (settings.budgetToken == address(0)) {
            // If `budgetToken` is ETH and value is not zero, add msg value to `totalValue`
            if (option.values[n] != 0) totalValue += option.values[n];
        } else {
            // If `target` is `budgetToken` and calldata is not zero
            if (settings.budgetToken == option.targets[n]) {
                bytes memory data = option.calldatas[n];
                if (data.length != 0) {
                    uint256 amount;
                    // If it's a `transfer` or `transferFrom`, add `amount` to `totalValue`
                    if (bytes4(data) == IERC20.transfer.selector) {
                        assembly {
                            // Load the last 32 bytes of `data` into 'amount'
                            amount := mload(add(data, 0x44))
                        }
                    } else if (bytes4(data) == IERC20.transferFrom.selector) {
                        assembly {
                            // Load the last 32 bytes of `data` into 'amount'
                            amount := mload(add(data, 0x64))
                        }
                    }
                    if (amount != 0) totalValue += amount;
                }
            }
        }

        // Break loop if `budgetAmount` is exceeded
        if (totalValue > settings.budgetAmount) break;
    }

    unchecked {
        executeParams[executeParamsLength + n] =
            ExecuteParams(option.targets[n], option.values[n], option.calldatas[n]);

        ++n;
    }
}

ApprovalVotingModule.sol#L206-L284

For ERC20 tokens, this code increments the totalValue only when the following conditions are met:

  • the target for the transaction is the ERC20 token itself
  • the function selector is transfer() or transferFrom()

However, these conditions do not succeed in accomplishing their goal. Most importantly, they miss two extremely common patterns for ERC20 transfers. Additionally, they may count spent tokens that should not be.

  1. approve() & transferFrom(): The most common way for contracts to interact with other contracts that require ERC20 tokens for payment is to first call approve() and then call a function on the other contract, which calls transferFrom(). In this case, because the first call is using the approve() selector and the second is to another contract, totalValue will not be incremented.

  2. permit(): An alternative rising in popularity is the permit() method, which allows passing a signature to another contract that can be used to first approve transfers on your behalf, and then perform transferFrom(). Such a function call will not interact with the ERC20 directly at all, so will not trigger the budget incrementer.

  3. non-spending transferFrom(): The budget count is currently triggered when the contract calls transferFrom() on the budgetToken, but in many cases, this could be transferring the tokens of another user, not the contract itself. In this case, the totalValue would be incremented by the amount sent, which is most likely not the intended behavior.

Recommendations

  • Check the initial balance of the ERC20 before beginning execution.
  • Have the proposal include a tokenBudget for each action.
  • Tally up these tokenBudget values, and reject any push the total over the budgetAmount.
  • After the proposal has been executed, check the final balance of the ERC20, and ensure that it hasn't fallen by more than it should have based on the sum of tokenBudgets.

Review

Fixed as recommended in 39880bd56c99a83b5df3fafbc3c6d35f104a1cda.

[M-01] New proposals can be DOS'd by frontrunning

To create a new proposal using the ApprovalVotingModule, the Manager of the governor contract calls proposeWithModule():

function proposeWithModule(VotingModule module, bytes memory proposalData, string memory description)
    public
    onlyManager
    returns (uint256)
{
    require(
        getVotes(_msgSender(), block.number - 1) >= proposalThreshold(),
        "Governor: proposer votes below proposal threshold"
    );

    uint256 proposalId = hashProposalWithModule(address(module), proposalData, keccak256(bytes(description)));

    ProposalCore storage proposal = _proposals[proposalId];
    require(proposal.voteStart.isUnset(), "Governor: proposal already exists");

    uint64 snapshot = block.number.toUint64() + votingDelay().toUint64();
    uint64 deadline = snapshot + votingPeriod().toUint64();

    proposal.voteStart.setDeadline(snapshot);
    proposal.voteEnd.setDeadline(deadline);
    proposal.votingModule = address(module);

    emit ProposalCreated(proposalId, _msgSender(), address(module), proposalData, snapshot, deadline, description);

    module.propose(proposalId, proposalData);

    return proposalId;
}

OptimismGovernorV5.sol#L77-L104

The proposalId is set using the hashProposalWithModule() function:

function hashProposalWithModule(address module, bytes memory proposalData, bytes32 descriptionHash)
    public
    view
    virtual
    returns (uint256)
{
    return uint256(keccak256(abi.encode(address(this), module, proposalData, descriptionHash)));
}

OptimismGovernorV5.sol#L279-L286

If we follow the call to module.propose(), we see the following:

function propose(uint256 proposalId, bytes memory proposalData) external override {
    if (_proposals[proposalId].governor != address(0)) revert ExistingProposal();
    ...
}

ApprovalVotingModule.sol#L107-L109

This function allows any address (presumably a governor) to call propose() and confirms that the proposalId has not been used before. Since the hash includes the address of the governor, it is assumed that this hash will be unique across governors using the ApprovalVotingModule.

However, there is no check that the proposalId submitted is actually equal to the output of hashProposalWithModule, nor are there any protections on who can call this function.

As a result, a malicious user can watch the mempool for new calls to proposeWithModule(), calculate the proposalId from the data, and frontrun the call to module.propose() with the same proposalId.

The result is that a proposal will be created on the ApprovalVotingModule with the malicious user set as the governor, and the legitimate call from the governor will revert.

This can be continued endlessly, blocking any proposals from being created.

Recommendation

The uniqueness of the proposalId should be enforced on the ApprovalVotingModule side, rather than on the governor side.

Rather than simply passing the proposalId to the module, the module should take in the underlying data and compute the proposalId itself.

To ensure that proposalIds match between the governor and the module, the safest option is to pass the proposalId as well as all necessary values to compute it and check on the module that they align, as follows:

function propose(uint256 proposalId, bytes memory proposalData, bytes32 descriptionHash) external override {
        if (
            proposalId != uint256(keccak256(abi.encode(msg.sender, address(this), proposalData, descriptionHash)))
        ) revert WrongProposalId();

        if (_proposals[proposalId].governor != address(0)) revert ExistingProposal();

        ...
}

This serves the purpose of ensuring that the msg.sender is equal to the governor address value that should be included in the hash, and blocks the ability for arbitrary users to submit proposalIds they should not be able to create.

[Note that there is also the (very unlikely) case that two governors may use different hash functions to determine their proposalIds and could end up colliding that way, and this fix addresses this risk as well.]

Review

Fixed as recommended in 20e645198d10646c6923e8a9caafb05e536d8fe3.

[M-02] Any address can be passed as a VotingModule, which could lead to abuse

In OptimismGovernorV5.sol, the proposeWithModule() function has the following signature:

function proposeWithModule(VotingModule module, bytes memory proposalData, string memory description);

This allows the caller to input a VotingModule address, and that module will be used to:

  • set up the proposal (module.propose())
  • return the execution data (module._formatExecuteParams())
  • determine if a user has already voted (module.hasVoted())
  • determine if quorum has been reached (module._quorumReached())
  • determine whether a vote succeeded (module._voteSucceeded())

It is assumed that the proposer will enter a valid module that does these things fairly, but there is no check to be sure.

This could be abused in a number of ways, but the most malicious and difficult to catch would be to create a module that operates normally but returns malicious data (unrelated to the proposal) from module._formatExecuteParams(). Then one could pass an innocent looking proposal, and when it was executed, a completely different transaction would be run. This could be used to perform unwanted actions or steal funds.

While this risk is diminished at the moment because proposals can only be created by the manager, it does add some risk at present and will become Critical when governance is opened up to proposals from the community.

Recommendation

Create an allowlist of modules that are permitted to be used by the governor, and check that the module is on that list when new proposals are being created.

Fortunately, because the module address is hashed into the proposalId, once this value is checked once, it will not need to be checked each time the module is passed.

Review

Fixed as recommended in 1152881afcb6272a29e80b0cb17914007a68cd27.

[M-03] Votes can be arbitrarily extended by Manager until they meet quorum

In OptimismGovernorV5.sol, new proposals are created with a snapshot (start time) and deadline (end time):

uint64 snapshot = block.number.toUint64() + votingDelay().toUint64();
uint64 deadline = snapshot + votingPeriod().toUint64();

proposal.voteStart.setDeadline(snapshot);
proposal.voteEnd.setDeadline(deadline);
proposal.votingModule = address(module);

All significant parameters on a proposal are locked once the vote is underway:

  • a proposal's votingModule is immutable and cannot be changed
  • updates to quorum are saved historically, so that updates don't change existing proposals
  • votingPeriod and votingDelay cannot impact timing because calculations are performed up front and saved
  • all settings and options are immutably set and cannot be changed

The one exception is the proposalDeadline, which can be edited by the Manager with this function:

function setProposalDeadline(uint256 proposalId, uint64 deadline) public onlyManager {
    _proposals[proposalId].voteEnd.setDeadline(deadline);
    emit ProposalDeadlineUpdated(proposalId, deadline);
}

This allows the manager to extend the vote for an arbitrary amount of time by continually pushing back the deadline.

This is especially risky when using the ApprovalVotingModule, because there are no Against votes. If many users are against the proposal, there is no way for them to express their opinion except by not voting. However, extending the vote will inevitably lead to more awareness and a vote that is more likely to pass (either by reaching quorum or by individual options reaching their threshold).

In an extreme case, a Manager could even push back the deadline for a completed vote, reopening it after the fact. In fact, failed votes can be moved from Defeated to Active at any time. This breaks a strong user assumptions, as votes should be considered final once they are completed.

Recommendation

Only allow the deadline to be changed before the vote starts:

function setProposalDeadline(uint256 proposalId, uint64 deadline) public onlyManager {
+   require(block.timestamp < _proposals[proposalId].voteStart.getDeadline());
    _proposals[proposalId].voteEnd.setDeadline(deadline);
    emit ProposalDeadlineUpdated(proposalId, deadline);
}

Review

Acknowledged: "Currently leaving this unchanged as setProposalDeadline is intended to be unrestricted in this version."

[L-01] Quorum initialized to 0.03% instead of 30% due to overridden denominator

When OptimismGovernorV5.sol is initialized, the quorumNumerator is set to 30:

function initialize(IVotesUpgradeable _votingToken, address _manager) public initializer {
    __Governor_init("Optimism");
    __GovernorCountingSimple_init();
    __GovernorVotes_init(_votingToken);
    __GovernorVotesQuorumFraction_init({quorumNumeratorValue: 30});
    __GovernorSettings_init({initialVotingDelay: 6575, initialVotingPeriod: 46027, initialProposalThreshold: 0});

    manager = _manager;
}

This value is intended to represent a 30% quorum when the denominator is set to 100, which is the default value set by OpenZeppelin and is represented in GovernorVotesQuorumFractionUpgradeableV2.sol#L68-L70

function quorumDenominator() public view virtual returns (uint256) {
    return 100;
}

However, this value is overriden in OptimismGovernorV5.sol:

function quorumDenominator() public view virtual override returns (uint256) {
    // Configurable to 3 decimal points of percentage
    return 100_000;
}

When quorum is calculated, we perform the following math:

function quorum(uint256 blockNumber) public view virtual override returns (uint256) {
    return (token.getPastTotalSupply(blockNumber) * quorumNumerator(blockNumber)) / quorumDenominator();
}

The result is that the quorum is represented as tokenSupply * 30 / 100_000 = tokenSupply * 0.0003, or 0.03% of supply.

Proof of Concept

The following test can be dropped in to OptimismGovernorV5.t.sol to show the error:

    function testZachQuorumCalculationIncorrect() public {
        uint256 snapshot = block.number + governor.votingDelay();
        vm.roll(snapshot + 1);

        console2.log(op.getPastTotalSupply(snapshot));
        console2.log(governor.quorum(snapshot));
    }
Logs:
  101000000000000000000 // total supply
  30300000000000000 // quorum (= 0.03% of total supply)

Recommendation

Change the value set in in the initialize() function to 30_000 to represent 30%:

```solidity
function initialize(IVotesUpgradeable _votingToken, address _manager) public initializer {
    __Governor_init("Optimism");
    __GovernorCountingSimple_init();
    __GovernorVotes_init(_votingToken);
-   __GovernorVotesQuorumFraction_init({quorumNumeratorValue: 30});
+   __GovernorVotesQuorumFraction_init({quorumNumeratorValue: 30_000});
    __GovernorSettings_init({initialVotingDelay: 6575, initialVotingPeriod: 46027, initialProposalThreshold: 0});

    manager = _manager;
}

Review

Fixed by removing the initialize() function (since the proxy has already been initialized and is just being upgraded) in 6aa306ea5df526bd49e88073daa0da27c5b56e5e

[G-01] Loops in ApprovalVotingModule#propose() can be consolidated

In the propose() function in ApprovalVotingModule.sol, we perform the following two loops:

unchecked {
    // Ensure proposal params of each option have the same length between themselves
    ProposalOption memory option;
    for (uint256 i; i < optionsLength; ++i) {
        option = proposalOptions[i];
        if (option.targets.length != option.values.length || option.targets.length != option.calldatas.length) {
            revert InvalidParams();
        }
    }

    // Push proposal options in storage
    for (uint256 i; i < optionsLength; ++i) {
        _proposals[proposalId].options.push(proposalOptions[i]);
    }
}

Since these two loops are iterating over the same elements, they can be consolidated into one loop.

Proof of Concept

Using the built in test suite's testProposeWithModule() function, we can see the following improvement in gas cost:

CURRENT IMPLEMENTATION
Running 1 test for test/OptimismGovernorV5.t.sol:OptimismGovernorV5Test
[PASS] testProposeWithModule() (gas: 722324)
Test result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; finished in 6.96ms

CONSOLIDATED LOOPS
Running 1 test for test/OptimismGovernorV5.t.sol:OptimismGovernorV5Test
[PASS] testProposeWithModule() (gas: 722048)
Test result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; finished in 2.41ms

Since this test only uses 2 options, the improvement is minor (722324 - 722048 = 276), but this value would be multiplied in proposals with more options.

Recommendation

unchecked {
    // Ensure proposal params of each option have the same length between themselves
    ProposalOption memory option;
    for (uint256 i; i < optionsLength; ++i) {
        option = proposalOptions[i];
        if (option.targets.length != option.values.length || option.targets.length != option.calldatas.length) {
            revert InvalidParams();
        }
        _proposals[proposalId].options.push(option);
    }
}

Review

Fixed as recommended in a89a51559f3b116c60703b2acb2c48bf51121692.

[G-02] Remove checks for inaccessible states

GovernorUpgradeableV2.sol has a simplified state() function that can not reach every possible ProposalState.

Here is the enum with the list of possible states:

enum ProposalState {
    Pending,
    Active,
    Canceled,
    Defeated,
    Succeeded,
    Queued,
    Expired,
    Executed
}

Here is the function, which assigns the state:

function state(uint256 proposalId) public view virtual override returns (ProposalState) {
    ProposalCore storage proposal = _proposals[proposalId];

    if (proposal.executed) {
        return ProposalState.Executed;
    }

    if (proposal.canceled) {
        return ProposalState.Canceled;
    }

    uint256 snapshot = proposalSnapshot(proposalId);

    if (snapshot == 0) {
        revert("Governor: unknown proposal id");
    }

    if (snapshot >= block.number) {
        return ProposalState.Pending;
    }

    uint256 deadline = proposalDeadline(proposalId);

    if (deadline >= block.number) {
        return ProposalState.Active;
    }

    if (_quorumReached(proposalId) && _voteSucceeded(proposalId)) {
        return ProposalState.Succeeded;
    } else {
        return ProposalState.Defeated;
    }
}

As we can see, Pending, Active, Canceled, Defeated, Succeeded, and Executed states are possible to be reached. However, Queued and Expired are not.

Because much of our function logic is borrowed from versions of the contract where these states were reachable, these values are still checked. We can save some gas by removing the checks for these unreachable states from our functions.

Recommendation

In OptimismGovernorV5.sol#executeWithModule(), we can remove the check for Queued:

require(
    status == ProposalState.Succeeded || status == ProposalState.Queued, "Governor: proposal not successful"
);

In OptimismGovernorV5.sol#cancelWithModule(), we can remove the check for Expired:

require(
    status != ProposalState.Canceled && status != ProposalState.Expired && status != ProposalState.Executed,
    "Governor: proposal not active"
);

In GovernorUpgradeableV2.sol#execute(), we can remove the check for Queued:

require(
            status == ProposalState.Succeeded || status == ProposalState.Queued, "Governor: proposal not successful"
        );

In GovernorUpgradeableV2.sol#_cancel(), we can remove the check for Expired:

require(
    status != ProposalState.Canceled && status != ProposalState.Expired && status != ProposalState.Executed,
    "Governor: proposal not active"
);

Review

Fixed as recommended in cf1a0ded961f6c617642bb00ed14e3ca87a7a715.