adjustments by jonas

Author: jonasW3F

docs/Polkadot/economics/Combinatorial-candle-auction.png renamed to docs/Polkadot/economics/academic-research/Combinatorial-candle-auction.png

@@ -2,6 +2,10 @@
 title: Non-monetary incentives for collective members
 ---
 
+| Status        | Date       | Link                                                                 |
+|----------------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Stale   | 06.10.2025 | -- |
+
 <!--![](collective-members.png)-->
 
 Behavioral economics has demonstrated that non-monetary incentives can be powerful motivators, offering a viable alternative to financial rewards (see, e.g., [Frey & Gallus, 2015](https://www.bsfrey.ch/articles/C_600_2016.pdf)). This is especially true in environments where intrinsic motivation drives behavior. In such contexts, monetary incentives may even crowd out intrinsic motivation, ultimately reducing engagement ([Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000](https://academic.oup.com/qje/article-abstract/115/3/791/1828156)). 

docs/Polkadot/economics/Experimental-investigations.png renamed to docs/Polkadot/economics/academic-research/Experimental-investigations.png

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+---
+title: Academic Research
+---
+
+import DocCardList from '@theme/DocCardList';
+
+<DocCardList />

docs/Polkadot/economics/collective-members.png renamed to docs/Polkadot/economics/academic-research/collective-members.png

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+---
+title: Approval-Based Committee Voting in Practice
+---
+
+| Status        | Date       | Link                                                                 |
+|----------------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Published as Proceeding of AAAI Conference on AI   | 06.10.2025 | [AAAI](https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/28807) / [ARXIV](https://arxiv.org/abs/2312.11408) |
+
+
+We provide the first large-scale data collection of real-world approval-based committee elections. These elections have been conducted on the Polkadot blockchain as part of their Nominated Proof-of-Stake mechanism and contain around one thousand candidates and tens of thousands of (weighted) voters each. We conduct an in-depth study of application-relevant questions, including a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the outcomes returned by different voting rules. Besides considering proportionality measures that are standard in the multiwinner voting literature, we pay particular attention to less-studied measures of overrepresentation, as these are closely related to the security of the Polkadot network. We also analyze how different design decisions such as the committee size affect the examined measures.

docs/Polkadot/economics/4-gamification.md renamed to docs/Polkadot/economics/academic-research/gamification.md

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 title: Experimental Investigation of Parachain Auctions
 ---
 
+| Status        | Date       | Link                                                                 |
+|----------------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Under Review   | 06.10.2025 | [SSRN Paper](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5109856) |
+
 <!--![](Combinatorial-candle-auction.png)-->
 
 This entry focuses on experimentally examining the combinatorial candle auction as implemented in the Polkadot and Kusama protocol. Specifically, it compares its outcome with those of more traditional dynamic combinatorial auction formats currently in use. 

docs/Polkadot/economics/academic-research/index.md

@@ -2,6 +2,10 @@
 title: Theoretical Analysis of Parachain Auctions
 ---
 
+| Status        | Date       | Link                                                                 |
+|----------------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Under Review   | 06.10.2025 | [SSRN Paper](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3846363) |
+
 <!--![](parachain-auctions.png)-->
 
 Polkadot uses a [candle auction format](https://wiki.polkadot.network/docs/en/learn-auction) to allocate parachain slots. A candle auction is a dynamic auction mechanism characterized by a randomly ending time. Such a random-closing rule affects equilibrium behavior, particularly in scenarios where bidders have front-running opportunities.