The full design document for this can be found here (join sigstore-dev@googlegroups.com for access).
🚨 🚨 ExPeRiMeNtAl 🚨 🚨
This document explains how the experimental keyless
signatures work in cosign
.
Try it out!
Keyless signing:
$ COSIGN_EXPERIMENTAL=1 cosign sign gcr.io/dlorenc-vmtest2/demo
Generating ephemeral keys...
Retrieving signed certificate...
Your browser will now be opened to:
https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/v2/auth?access_type=offline&client_id=237800849078-rmntmr1b2tcu20kpid66q5dbh1vdt7aj.apps.googleusercontent.com&redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2F127.0.0.1%3A5556%2Fauth%2Fgoogle%2Fcallback&response_type=code&scope=openid+email&state=8slZXeZhwKQofg%3D%3D
Pushing signature to: gcr.io/dlorenc-vmtest2/demo:sha256-97fc222cee7991b5b061d4d4afdb5f3428fcb0c9054e1690313786befa1e4e36.sig
Keyless verifying:
$ COSIGN_EXPERIMENTAL=1 cosign verify gcr.io/dlorenc-vmtest2/demo
The following checks were performed on all of these signatures:
- The cosign claims were validated
- The claims were present in the transparency log
- The signatures were integrated into the transparency log when the certificate was valid
- Any certificates were verified against the Fulcio roots.
Certificate subject: dlorenc@google.com
{"Critical":{"Identity":{"docker-reference":""},"Image":{"Docker-manifest-digest":"sha256:97fc222cee7991b5b061d4d4afdb5f3428fcb0c9054e1690313786befa1e4e36"},"Type":"cosign container image signature"},"Optional":null}
That's it! No keys! The rest of the flags (annotations, claims, tlog, etc.) should all work the same.
This uses ephemeral keys and certificates, which are signed automatically by the fulcio
root CA.
Signatures are stored in the rekor
transparency log, which automatically provides an attestation
as to when the signature was created.
Information on the fulcio
root CA can be found in the fulcio repository.
The root CA keys are hard-coded in cosign
today.
They can only be changed by recompiling the binary.
This will be made more configurable in the future.
Cosign supports two OAuth flows today: the standard flow and the device flow.
When there is no terminal attached (non-interactive mode), cosign
will automatically use the device flow
where a link is printed to stdout.
This link must be opened in a browser to complete the flow.
In automated environments, cosign also supports directly using OIDC Identity Tokens from specific issuers.
These can be supplied on the command line with the --identity-token
flag.
The audiences
field must contain sigstore
.
cosign
also has support for detecting some of these automated environments
and producing an identity token. Currently this supports Google and GitHub.
From a GCE VM, you can use the VM's service account identity to sign an image:
$ cosign sign --identity-token=$(
gcloud auth print-identity-token \
--audiences=sigstore) \
gcr.io/dlorenc-vmtest2/demo
From outside a GCE VM, you can impersonate a GCP IAM service account to sign an image:
$ cosign sign --identity-token=$(
gcloud auth print-identity-token \
--audiences=sigstore \
--include-email \
--impersonate-service-account my-sa@my-project.iam.gserviceaccount.com) \
gcr.io/dlorenc-vmtest2/demo
In order to impersonate an IAM service account, your account must have the
roles/iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator
role.
Note: On Google Cloud Build, standard identity tokens are not supported through the GCE metadata server.
cosign
has a special flow for this case, where you can instruct the Cloud Build service account to impersonate
another service account.
To configure this flow:
- Create a service account to use for signatures (the email address will be present in the certificate subject).
- Grant the Cloud Build service account the
roles/iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator
role for this target account. - Set the
GOOGLE_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_NAME
environment variable to the name of the target account in your cloudbuild.yaml - Sign images in GCB, without keys!
Signature timestamps are checked in the rekor transparency log. Rekor's IntegratedTime
is signed as part of its signedEntryTimestamp
. Cosign verifies the signature over the timestamp and checks that the signature was created while the certificate was valid.
- Root CA hardening: We should use intermediate certs rather than the root, and support chained verification.
- Root CA configuration: We should allow users to change the roots and add their own.
- Other timestamps: We should allow for other timestamp attestations, including attached RFC3161 signatures.
- Probably a lot more: This is very experimental.
- More OIDC providers: Obvious.
If you're running your own sigstore services flags are available to set your own endpoint's, e.g
COSIGN_EXPERIMENTAL=1 go run cmd/cosign/main.go sign -oidc-issuer "https://oauth2.example.com/auth" \
-fulcio-url "https://fulcio.example.com" \
-rekor-url "https://rekor.example.com" \
ghcr.io/jdoe/somerepo/testcosign
You can override the public good instance root CA using the environment variable SIGSTORE_ROOT_FILE
, e.g.
export SIGSTORE_ROOT_FILE="/home/jdoe/myrootCA.pem"