SmallVec::insert_many is unsound
#96
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Good catch. The proposed solution sounds good to me. |
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Double free is an exploitable security vulnerability. Once the fix is released, please add this issue to the Rust security advisory database. I would also urge you to publish a fixed version ASAP. Despite the fact that the double free only happens on panic, this bug still can be exploited in a multi-threaded application that catches panics. Also, panics are really easy to trigger in many popular crates. |
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Submitted a fix in #103. |
bors-servo
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Panic-safety fixes * Make from_elem panic-safe. Fixes #101. * Make insert_many panic-safe. Fixes #96. r? @SimonSapin or @jdm. cc @Vurich <!-- Reviewable:start --> --- This change is [<img src="https://reviewable.io/review_button.svg" height="34" align="absmiddle" alt="Reviewable"/>](https://reviewable.io/reviews/servo/rust-smallvec/103) <!-- Reviewable:end -->
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For details, see: * servo/rust-smallvec#96 - original bug report * servo/rust-smallvec#103 - fix
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Would you consider yanking vulnerable versions from crates.io? Existing dependencies on them will continue to work, but people won't be able to make new crates depending on vulnerable versions by following e.g. a tutorial that was not updated following this advisory. Edit: nevermind, already answered here |
andresilva
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this makes sure we no longer depend on smallvec 0.2.1 which is affected by servo/rust-smallvec#96
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* version: bump stable to 2.1.7 * Adjust requests costs for light client (#9925) * PIP Table Cost relative to average peers instead of max peers * Add tracing in PIP new_cost_table * Update stat peer_count * Use number of leeching peers for Light serve costs * Fix test::light_params_load_share_depends_on_max_peers (wrong type) * Remove (now) useless test * Remove `load_share` from LightParams.Config Prevent div. by 0 * Add LEECHER_COUNT_FACTOR * PR Grumble: u64 to u32 for f64 casting * Prevent u32 overflow for avg_peer_count * Add tests for LightSync::Statistics * Fix empty steps (#9939) * Don't send empty step twice or empty step then block. * Perform basic validation of locally sealed blocks. * Don't include empty step twice. * prevent silent errors in daemon mode, closes #9367 (#9946) * Fix light client informant while syncing (#9932) * Add `is_idle` to LightSync to check importing status * Use SyncStateWrapper to make sure is_idle gets updates * Update is_major_import to use verified queue size as well * Add comment for `is_idle` * Add Debug to `SyncStateWrapper` * `fn get` -> `fn into_inner` * ci: rearrange pipeline by logic (#9970) * ci: rearrange pipeline by logic * ci: rename docs script * Add readiness check for docker container (#9804) * Update Dockerfile Since parity is built for "mission critical use", I thought other operators may see the need for this. Adding the `curl` and `jq` commands allows for an extremely simple health check to be usable in container orchestrators. For example. Here is a health check for a parity docker container running in Kubernetes. This can be setup as a readiness Probe that would prevent clustered nodes that aren't ready from serving traffic. ```bash #!/bin/bash ETH_SYNCING=$(curl -X POST --data '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"eth_syncing","params":[],"id":1}' http://localhost:8545 -H 'Content-Type: application/json') RESULT=$(echo "$ETH_SYNCING | jq -r .result) if [ "$RESULT" == "false" ]; then echo "Parity is ready to start accepting traffic" exit 0 else echo "Parity is still syncing the blockchain" exit 1 fi ``` * add sync check script * Fix docker script (#9854) * Dockerfile: change source path of the newly added check_sync.sh (#9869) * Do not use the home directory as the working dir in docker (#9834) * Do not create a home directory. * Re-add -m flag * fix docker build (#9971) * bump smallvec to 0.6 in ethcore-light, ethstore and whisper (#9588) * bump smallvec to 0.6 in ethcore-light, ethstore and whisper * bump transaction-pool * Fix test. * patch cargo to use tokio-proto from git repo this makes sure we no longer depend on smallvec 0.2.1 which is affected by servo/rust-smallvec#96 * use patched version of untrusted 0.5.1 * ci: allow audit to fail
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Gist here. A solution to this would be to set
len = indexbefore iterating. Obviously this would cause leaks but we're already leaking data.(Sorry for the very verbose explanation in the linked gist but I wanted to link it as part of an article whose audience might not immediately understand the problem).
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