docs(permissions): the anonymous-deny row lists every narrow public surface, not just the global opt-out

The authorization matrix said public serving 'requires an explicit
api.requireAuth: false opt-out'. That was already only half true — public forms
and share-links never needed it — and #3963 adds the book/doc read surface. Each
of those derives authorization from a declaration rather than from the deployment
posture, which is the distinction the row was flattening.

Surfaced by the docs-drift check on #3995.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TzLE9cw4gZKNyPN2ZP4iTt

Author: claude

content/docs/permissions/authorization.mdx

@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ site — the file you read when behavior surprises you.
 
 | # | Gate | What it decides | Enforcement site | Failure direction |
 |---|---|---|---|---|
-| 1 | **Anonymous deny** | No identity → HTTP 401. **Uniform across every HTTP surface that reaches object data** (#2567): REST `/data`, the metadata endpoints (`/meta`), and the raw-hono standard `/data` routes (the dispatcher GraphQL endpoint left the matrix when the GraphQL surface was removed in v17 — `/graphql` now 404s) — one shared decision, so a caller denied on `/data` can't read the same rows through a sibling door. **Default-on** (ADR-0056 D2): public serving requires an explicit `api.requireAuth: false` opt-out, which logs a boot warning. Control plane (`/auth`, `/health`, `/discovery`) is exempt; share-links validate their token then read as SYSTEM. | `packages/core/src/security/anonymous-deny.ts` `shouldDenyAnonymous` — called by `rest-server.ts` `enforceAuth`, the dispatcher `handleMetadata`/`handleAI`, and `plugin-hono-server` `denyAnonymous` (default in `packages/spec/src/api/rest-server.zod.ts`); a source-enumerating ratchet in `authz-conformance.test.ts` fails CI if a new surface ships ungated | fail-closed |
+| 1 | **Anonymous deny** | No identity → HTTP 401. **Uniform across every HTTP surface that reaches object data** (#2567): REST `/data`, the metadata endpoints (`/meta`), and the raw-hono standard `/data` routes (the dispatcher GraphQL endpoint left the matrix when the GraphQL surface was removed in v17 — `/graphql` now 404s) — one shared decision, so a caller denied on `/data` can't read the same rows through a sibling door. **Default-on** (ADR-0056 D2): serving the whole data plane publicly requires an explicit `api.requireAuth: false` opt-out, which logs a boot warning. Narrower public surfaces do **not** need it — each derives its own authorization from a declaration rather than from the deployment posture: control plane (`/auth`, `/health`, `/discovery`) is allow-listed; public form submission carries a `publicFormGrant` (ADR-0056 Option A); share-links validate their token then read as SYSTEM; and an anonymous **GET** of the book/doc read surface is admitted so `book.audience: 'public'` works under the secure default, with the ADR-0046 §6.7 audience gate — `'public'` only, fail-closed — doing the authorizing (#3963). | `packages/core/src/security/anonymous-deny.ts` `shouldDenyAnonymous` — called by `rest-server.ts` `enforceAuth`, the dispatcher `handleMetadata`/`handleAI`, and `plugin-hono-server` `denyAnonymous` (default in `packages/spec/src/api/rest-server.zod.ts`); a source-enumerating ratchet in `authz-conformance.test.ts` fails CI if a new surface ships ungated | fail-closed |
 | 2 | **Public-form grant** | An anonymous form submission carries a declaration-derived `publicFormGrant` authorizing ONLY create + read-back on the form's declared target object — never anything else (ADR-0056 Option A). No guest-portal configuration needed (anonymous principals hold the `guest` position). | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/security-plugin.ts` (ObjectQL middleware) | scope-limited allow |
 | 3 | **Object CRUD** | `allowRead/Create/Edit/Delete` (+ the destructive lifecycle class `allowTransfer/Restore/Purge`, gated ahead of the M2 operations — #1883) resolved across the caller's permission sets. | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/permission-evaluator.ts` `checkObjectPermission` | fail-closed 403 |
 | 4 | **OWD / sharing** | Org-wide default (`private` / `public_read` / `public_read_write` / `controlled_by_parent`; **unset or unknown ⇒ `private`, fail-closed** — ADR-0090 D1) plus the external dial (`externalSharingModel`, ADR-0090 D11), manual record shares, criteria sharing rules (owner-type rules were removed from the authoring surface in v17 rather than left declared-but-skipped — [Sharing Rules](/docs/permissions/sharing-rules#recipient-types)), business-unit hierarchy widening (ADR-0057 D5: scope-depth hierarchy lives on `sys_business_unit`, not positions). | `packages/plugins/plugin-sharing/src/sharing-service.ts` + `sharing-rule-service.ts` | fail-closed to owner-only |