@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+---
+"@objectstack/plugin-auth": patch
+---
+
+fix(plugin-auth): a 2FA verification echoes the session it INSTALLED, not the one it deleted (#10701)
+
+`POST /api/v1/auth/two-factor/verify-totp` answered `200` with two credentials
+that disagreed. The `Set-Cookie` named the caller's new session; the JSON
+`token` named a session row the same request had just deleted.
+
+The cause is upstream and mechanical. better-auth's `verifyTwoFactor` helper
+resolves the caller's session once, at entry, and closes over it:
+
+```js
+valid: async (ctx) => ctx.json({ token: session.session.token, ... })
+```
+
+On the enrolment lane — a signed-in user confirming a new TOTP factor — the
+route rotates that session before it answers: it mints a new session, installs
+it with `setSessionCookie`, and deletes the caller's original session row. Only
+then does it call `valid(ctx)`, which still holds the pre-rotation session and
+echoes the token of the row that no longer exists. (Measured on the installed
+better-auth 1.7.1: `dist/plugins/two-factor/verify-two-factor.mjs` and
+`dist/plugins/two-factor/totp/index.mjs`.)
+
+Every other auth response in this repo echoes `token` as the unsigned token of
+a live session, and `bearer()` accepts exactly that — presented without a
+signature it signs the value itself before verifying. Measured on
+`/sign-up/email`, the body's `token` resolves to the user as a bearer. So a
+client following that contract after enrolling in 2FA stored a revoked token.
+
+That did not merely fail to authenticate. `bearer()`'s before-hook OVERWRITES
+the request's session cookie with whatever the `Authorization` header carries,
+so a request presenting the still-valid rotated cookie *and* the dead token
+resolved to nobody. Measured before the fix, on one enrolment: the cookie alone
+resolved to the user (`get-totp-uri` `200`); the echoed token alone resolved to
+nobody (`get-session` `200` and empty, `get-totp-uri` `401`); and the two
+together also resolved to nobody (`401`). Fail-closed — no privilege was
+available to gain — but a legitimate user was locked out of a session they
+still held, which is the point of the report.
+
+The echoed value is now read back out of the response's own session cookie, so
+the `token` names the session the response actually installed. This restores
+the contract rather than changing it: the field keeps its shape (the unsigned
+session token) and its meaning ("the session you now hold"), and only the value
+moves, from a deleted row to the live one. Shipped as `patch` for that reason —
+no consumer expression has to be rewritten, and the previous value was not a
+usable credential for anything, so nothing could have depended on it.
+
+The repair is keyed on the mechanism, not on the enrolment branch: it applies
+only when the response staged a session cookie whose token differs from the one
+being echoed. On the sign-in-challenge lane, where the route mints the session
+it echoes, the two agree and this is a no-op — pinned, along with the cookie
+lane, so that fixing the broken lane could not quietly rewrite the others.
+`/two-factor/verify-otp` carries the byte-identical rotate-then-answer block and
+is covered by the same guard; `/two-factor/verify-backup-code` does not rotate
+and is unaffected.
+
+Resolver precedence is deliberately untouched. Having the resolver fall back to
+the cookie when a bearer is unusable was the other repair direction named in the
+report, and it was ruled out of scope: it would stop an invalid credential from
+failing loud. Two pins hold that line — anonymous is still refused, and a bogus
+bearer still overrides a valid cookie and still fails closed — so an attempt to
+loosen the resolver later reddens this suite instead of passing it.
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ import {
   rotateCallerBearerOnImpersonation,
   withBearerAdminSessionRecovery,
 } from './impersonation-bearer-rotation.js';
+import { echoInstalledSessionToken } from './two-factor-rotated-token-echo.js';
 import {
   applyPlatformAdminImpersonation,
 } from './admin-impersonate-endpoint.js';
@@ -1704,6 +1705,17 @@ export class AuthManager {
           // rotating that token, `/admin/impersonate-user` is a 200 no-op.
           await rotateCallerBearerOnImpersonation(ctx);
 
+          // ── #10701: a 2FA verification must echo the session it INSTALLED ─
+          // On the enrolment lane `/two-factor/verify-totp` rotates the
+          // caller's session and then echoes the PRE-rotation token — the row
+          // it just deleted. A client that stores it (the console's
+          // `auth-session-token` pattern) is holding a revoked credential, and
+          // because `bearer()` overwrites the request cookie with whatever the
+          // Authorization header carries, presenting it destroys the valid
+          // rotated cookie too. See `two-factor-rotated-token-echo.ts`. This
+          // corrects the echoed VALUE only; resolver precedence is untouched.
+          await echoInstalledSessionToken(ctx);
+
           // ── ADR-0069 D2: account lockout (counter) ──────────────────
           // better-auth catches an INVALID_EMAIL_OR_PASSWORD APIError and runs
           // the after-hook with it on `ctx.context.returned`; a success leaves