@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+---
+'@objectstack/spec': minor
+---
+
+**BREAKING for authored metadata** — a row-level security policy (`RowLevelSecurityPolicySchema`, authored as `rowLevelSecurity[]` on a permission set) whose `operation` is `select` or `delete` may no longer declare a `check`. It is refused at parse, at the `check` path, with a message that names the operation and says what to write instead (#19965).
+
+Clause-②: no
+
+## What changed, and why
+
+`check` judges the post-image of a write: the new row of an insert, the changed row of an update. A `select` or `delete` writes no row, and the runtime's write gate only ever collects the policies whose `operation` is the write's own or `all`. So a `check` on a `select` or `delete` policy was accepted, stored and **never evaluated**. It did not guard any write, and beside a USING-only sibling it did not replace that sibling's `using` default the way a `check` on an `insert`, `update` or `all` policy does. An author who wrote a `check` on a `delete` policy believed deletes were guarded by it (ADR-0049: declared is not enforced).
+
+```
+FROM  RowLevelSecurityPolicySchema.safeParse({
+        name: 'no_archived', object: 'account', operation: 'delete',
+        using: 'owner_id == current_user.id', check: "status != 'archived'" })
+      -> { success: true }            // the check never ran
+
+TO    -> { success: false,
+           issues: [{ code: 'custom', path: ['check'],
+                      message: '`check` is never evaluated on a `delete` policy: it validates the new
+                                row an insert or an update writes, and a delete writes none. Remove
+                                `check` from this policy. …' }] }
+```
+
+Through a permission set the issue lands at `rowLevelSecurity[N].check`; through `defineStack` it is part of the `STACK_SCHEMA_INVALID` refusal (422).
+
+## Migration — FROM → TO
+
+| You wrote | Write instead |
+| --- | --- |
+| `operation: 'select'` with a `check` meant to limit which rows can be read | that predicate as the policy's `using` (AND it into an existing `using` with `&&`), and remove `check` |
+| `operation: 'delete'` with a `check` meant to limit which rows can be deleted | that predicate as the policy's `using` (AND it into an existing `using` with `&&`), and remove `check` |
+| `operation: 'select'` or `'delete'` with a `check` meant to validate written rows | the `check` on a policy whose `operation` is `insert`, `update` or `all` |
+
+**The one-line fix: remove `check` from every `select` / `delete` policy, and write its predicate as that policy's `using` or on an `insert` / `update` / `all` policy, depending on what it was meant to guard.** This cannot be converted automatically: dropping the key would discard the predicate, and moving it would change which rows the policy admits. So it ships as an ADR-0087 D3 structured TODO with **no D2 conversion**.
+
+<!-- adr-0087: registered rls-check-on-select-or-delete-policy-refused -->
+
+## Stored permission sets
+
+Stored rows are not rewritten. A permission set already stored with a `check` on a `select` or `delete` policy is refused the next time it is parsed through `@objectstack/spec`, for example on its next save. Removing the `check` changes nothing at runtime, because it never ran. Moving its predicate into `using` or onto a write policy does change behaviour, so re-check the policy set afterwards.
+
+## What does NOT change
+
+- A `check` on an `insert`, `update` or `all` policy parses and is enforced exactly as before.
+- A `select` or `delete` policy with `using` only parses exactly as before.
+- A blank `check` (empty or whitespace only) declares nothing, and the runtime reads it as absent. It is not refused by this rule.
+- No export is added, removed or renamed.
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ const result = AdminScopeSchema.parse(data);
 | **object** | `string` | ✅ | Target object name |
 | **operation** | `Enum<'select' \| 'insert' \| 'update' \| 'delete' \| 'all'>` | ✅ | Database operation this policy applies to |
 | **using** | `string` | optional | Filter condition for SELECT/UPDATE/DELETE, authored in canonical CEL (ADR-0058 D1). It enforces when the predicate lowers to an ObjectQL filter: a field compared against a literal or a `current_user.*` context value using `==`, `!=`, `<`, `<=`, `>` or `>=`; `in` against a `current_user.*` array or an inline literal list (e.g. status in ['draft', 'pending']); these combined with `&&` / `\|\|`; or the bare allow-all `true`. Anything that does not lower fails closed — the policy matches zero rows. The legacy SQL-ish spellings are still accepted through a transitional bridge that rewrites `=` to `==` and `IN` to `in` (deprecated under ADR-0058 D1); SQL `AND` / `OR` / `NOT IN` / `IS NULL` / `LIKE` are NOT bridged and fail closed. Optional for INSERT-only policies. |
-| **check** | `string` | optional | Validation condition matched against the new row of a single-record INSERT or a by-id UPDATE (enforced at application level); an array insert and a `multi: true` update are not post-image checked. The default to `using` is decided per operation across the applicable policies, not per policy: when any applicable policy for that operation declares `check`, only the declared checks decide (OR-combined) and a USING-only sibling adds nothing; only when none declares `check` does each applicable policy's `using` stand in as its check (OR-combined). Applicable = not `enabled: false`, `object` matches or is '*', `operation` matches or is 'all', and the caller holds one of its `positions` when it lists any. A `check` on a `select` or `delete` policy is never evaluated. |
+| **check** | `string` | optional | Validation condition matched against the new row of a single-record INSERT or a by-id UPDATE (enforced at application level); an array insert and a `multi: true` update are not post-image checked. The default to `using` is decided per operation across the applicable policies, not per policy: when any applicable policy for that operation declares `check`, only the declared checks decide (OR-combined) and a USING-only sibling adds nothing; only when none declares `check` does each applicable policy's `using` stand in as its check (OR-combined). Applicable = not `enabled: false`, `object` matches or is '*', `operation` matches or is 'all', and the caller holds one of its `positions` when it lists any. Refused on a policy whose `operation` is `select` or `delete`, which write no new row to check: limit the rows such a policy admits with `using`, and declare the `check` on an `insert`, `update` or `all` policy. |
 | **positions** | `string[]` | optional | Positions this policy applies to (omit for all) |
 | **enabled** | `boolean` | optional (default: `true`) | Whether this policy is active |
 | **priority** | `never` | optional | [REMOVED] `rowLevelSecurity[].priority` was removed in @objectstack/spec 17.0.0. It never had an effect. Delete the key — policy outcomes are unchanged. Run `os migrate meta --from 16` to list the mechanical edits for existing sources; apply them by hand. |
 
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ const result = RLSEvaluationResultSchema.parse(data);
 | **object** | `string` | ✅ | Target object name |
 | **operation** | `Enum<'select' \| 'insert' \| 'update' \| 'delete' \| 'all'>` | ✅ | Database operation this policy applies to |
 | **using** | `string` | optional | Filter condition for SELECT/UPDATE/DELETE, authored in canonical CEL (ADR-0058 D1). It enforces when the predicate lowers to an ObjectQL filter: a field compared against a literal or a `current_user.*` context value using `==`, `!=`, `<`, `<=`, `>` or `>=`; `in` against a `current_user.*` array or an inline literal list (e.g. status in ['draft', 'pending']); these combined with `&&` / `\|\|`; or the bare allow-all `true`. Anything that does not lower fails closed — the policy matches zero rows. The legacy SQL-ish spellings are still accepted through a transitional bridge that rewrites `=` to `==` and `IN` to `in` (deprecated under ADR-0058 D1); SQL `AND` / `OR` / `NOT IN` / `IS NULL` / `LIKE` are NOT bridged and fail closed. Optional for INSERT-only policies. |
-| **check** | `string` | optional | Validation condition matched against the new row of a single-record INSERT or a by-id UPDATE (enforced at application level); an array insert and a `multi: true` update are not post-image checked. The default to `using` is decided per operation across the applicable policies, not per policy: when any applicable policy for that operation declares `check`, only the declared checks decide (OR-combined) and a USING-only sibling adds nothing; only when none declares `check` does each applicable policy's `using` stand in as its check (OR-combined). Applicable = not `enabled: false`, `object` matches or is '*', `operation` matches or is 'all', and the caller holds one of its `positions` when it lists any. A `check` on a `select` or `delete` policy is never evaluated. |
+| **check** | `string` | optional | Validation condition matched against the new row of a single-record INSERT or a by-id UPDATE (enforced at application level); an array insert and a `multi: true` update are not post-image checked. The default to `using` is decided per operation across the applicable policies, not per policy: when any applicable policy for that operation declares `check`, only the declared checks decide (OR-combined) and a USING-only sibling adds nothing; only when none declares `check` does each applicable policy's `using` stand in as its check (OR-combined). Applicable = not `enabled: false`, `object` matches or is '*', `operation` matches or is 'all', and the caller holds one of its `positions` when it lists any. Refused on a policy whose `operation` is `select` or `delete`, which write no new row to check: limit the rows such a policy admits with `using`, and declare the `check` on an `insert`, `update` or `all` policy. |
 | **positions** | `string[]` | optional | Positions this policy applies to (omit for all) |
 | **enabled** | `boolean` | optional (default: `true`) | Whether this policy is active |
 | **priority** | `never` | optional | [REMOVED] `rowLevelSecurity[].priority` was removed in @objectstack/spec 17.0.0. It never had an effect. Delete the key — policy outcomes are unchanged. Run `os migrate meta --from 16` to list the mechanical edits for existing sources; apply them by hand. |
 
@@ -183,10 +183,12 @@ describe('RESERVED_RLS_MEMBERSHIP_KEYS — refused BY NAME at the compiler merge
       // `compileFilter` is the ONE seam both faces pass through — the read layer
       // compiles `using`, the ADR-0058 D4 write gate compiles `check` — so a
       // repair that held on only one of them would be half a repair.
+      // `insert`: the write gate compiles `check` only for a policy that
+      // writes a row, and the spec refuses a `check` on `select` / `delete`.
       const checkPolicy = {
         name: 'p',
         object: 'o',
-        operation: 'select',
+        operation: 'insert',
         check: cell.using,
       } as never;
       const withBag = compiler.compileFilter([checkPolicy], {
 
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 ObjectStack. Licensed under the Apache-2.0 license.
+
+import type { SemanticMigration } from '../../types.js';
+
+// A row-level policy's `check` is refused where it can never run: on a policy
+// whose `operation` is `select` or `delete`. Recorded as a semantic TODO, not a
+// D2 conversion, because which rewrite is right depends on what the author meant
+// the predicate to guard, and a rewrite made on their behalf would change which
+// rows the policy admits.
+export const entry: SemanticMigration = {
+  id: 'rls-check-on-select-or-delete-policy-refused',
+  // No backticks in `surface` — build-upgrade-guide renders it inside a code
+  // span already, and a nested backtick would close it.
+  surface:
+    'security.PermissionSet rowLevelSecurity[].check (RowLevelSecurityPolicySchema) on a policy whose '
+    + 'operation is select or delete. A blank check (empty or whitespace only) declares nothing and is '
+    + 'not refused',
+  replacement:
+    'what the predicate was meant to guard, written where it runs. To limit which rows a select policy '
+    + 'lets a caller read, or which rows a delete policy lets a caller delete, write the predicate as '
+    + '`using` on that policy (remove `check`; if the policy already has a `using`, AND the two with &&). '
+    + 'To validate rows as they are written, declare the `check` on a policy whose `operation` is '
+    + '`insert`, `update` or `all` instead. The refusal lands at rowLevelSecurity[N].check, names the '
+    + 'operation, and states both rewrites',
+  reason:
+    'ADR-0049 enforce-or-remove and ADR-0058 D4. A `check` judges the post-image of a write: the new '
+    + 'row of an insert, the changed row of an update. A select or delete writes no row, and the '
+    + 'plugin-security write gate collects only the policies whose operation is the write\'s own or '
+    + '`all`, so a `check` on a select or delete policy was accepted, stored and never evaluated. '
+    + 'Measured on main before this change: a policy carrying only check record.status != '
+    + '\'archived\' on select or delete admitted every insert and update of an archived row, and beside '
+    + 'a USING-only `all` sibling it did not replace that sibling\'s `using` default the way a `check` '
+    + 'on an insert, update or all policy does. An author (an AI author above all) who wrote a check '
+    + 'on a delete policy believed deletes were guarded by it. The refusal is a non-transforming '
+    + 'refinement on the policy schema, so it reaches every door that parses a permission set: '
+    + 'defineStack, os validate, and the metadata save path, whose permission type validates '
+    + 'against PermissionSetSchema. Metadata AT REST is not '
+    + 'rewritten and this entry adds no D2 conversion: dropping the key would silently discard the '
+    + 'predicate the author wrote, and moving it to `using` would start filtering reads or deletes '
+    + 'the policy never filtered before — both change which rows the policy admits, which is the '
+    + 'policy author\'s decision. Ships at once, no transition window and no advisory lint phase.',
+  acceptanceCriteria:
+    'Search every authored and stored permission set for a rowLevelSecurity policy whose operation '
+    + 'is select or delete and whose check is non-blank — metadata files, sys_metadata permission '
+    + 'rows, and the row_level_security column of sys_permission_set. For authored metadata the sweep '
+    + 'is mechanical: PermissionSetSchema.safeParse answers one custom issue at '
+    + 'rowLevelSecurity[N].check whose message begins "`check` is never evaluated on a `select` '
+    + 'policy" (or `delete`). For each, decide what the predicate was meant to guard: reads or '
+    + 'deletes ⇒ express it in that policy\'s `using`; writes ⇒ move it to an insert, update or all '
+    + 'policy. Then re-check the policy set\'s behaviour rather than assuming it is unchanged: the '
+    + 'removed check never ran, so dropping it changes nothing, but a predicate moved into `using` '
+    + 'now filters rows it never filtered, and a `check` moved onto an insert, update or all policy '
+    + 'now replaces the `using` default of its USING-only siblings for that write. A policy with '
+    + '`using` only, and a `check` on an insert, update or all policy, parse exactly as before. The '
+    + 'repo, its example apps and the pinned console carried no such policy at the time of the '
+    + 'change; two test fixtures that used select incidentally were moved to all and insert.',
+};