docs(changeset): correct two false mechanism claims in a pending connector-ledger note

`.changeset/18582-connector-analytics-cube-liveness-ledgers.md` line 9 carries two
statements that were false when written. Both re-measured at the parent of the commit
that added the fragment (559041d^), so no later change is involved:

- the key-reach enumeration double-counted `name` (it is itself a
  `ConnectorProviderContext` field), over-included `loadPackageFile` (host-injected by
  the materializer, never authored) and omitted `provider` (read on the authoring door
  to gate the desired set and select the factory, and absent from the context).
- `authentication` was described as "refused outright ... never ignored", while
  `connector.zod.ts` declares it `.optional().default({ type: 'none' })` and the
  cross-field rule rejects only a non-`none` VALUE; the ADR section it names rejects
  inline secrets in stack metadata, not the key.

The dated measurements on the same line - the property counts and the dead-subsystem
list - are deliberately left exactly as written. They were accurate when made; a later
measurement overtaking them is the record working, not a defect in it.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013RDBh5DqXd2xnLwvHLgLFr
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

Author: claude

.changeset/18582-connector-analytics-cube-liveness-ledgers.md

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 
 The ledgers ship inside this package, so these are the files an upgrading reader greps to learn whether a key they are about to author does anything. Both types are authored through real doors — `defineStack({ connectors })` / `defineStack({ analyticsCubes })` and `PUT /api/v1/meta/{connector,analytics_cube}/:name` — and neither had ever been walked: they were in neither `GOVERNED` nor `PENDING_GOVERNANCE` until #18133 widened the denominator, so their silence read as "nothing to report".
 
-- **`connector` — 74 properties: 20 `live`, 1 `planned`, 53 `dead`.** One schema, two doors: the ledger's entry exists for the AUTHORING doors, while the same `ConnectorSchema` is what `AutomationEngine.registerConnector` parses for a def a plugin or an ADR-0097 provider factory builds in code. The keys an authored entry can actually reach are the `ConnectorProviderContext` fields plus `name` and `enabled`; `type` and `icon` reach that context and are dropped by all three shipped provider factories. The 53 dead are four declared subsystems with no engine — `syncConfig`, `fieldMappings`, `retryConfig`, `health` — plus `triggers` (the schema's own docblock already said so, #3197), the connector's nested `webhooks`, `status`, both timeouts, and four `retiredKey` tombstones. `authentication` is `planned`: refused outright by ADR-0097 §3, never ignored.
+- **`connector` — 74 properties: 20 `live`, 1 `planned`, 53 `dead`.** One schema, two doors: the ledger's entry exists for the AUTHORING doors, while the same `ConnectorSchema` is what `AutomationEngine.registerConnector` parses for a def a plugin or an ADR-0097 provider factory builds in code. The keys an authored entry can actually reach are the author-supplied `ConnectorProviderContext` fields plus `provider` and `enabled` — `name` is itself one of those fields, `loadPackageFile` is host-injected rather than authored, and `provider` never reaches the context yet decides on the authoring door whether the entry is materialized at all and which factory does it; `type` and `icon` reach that context and are dropped by all three shipped provider factories. The 53 dead are four declared subsystems with no engine — `syncConfig`, `fieldMappings`, `retryConfig`, `health` — plus `triggers` (the schema's own docblock already said so, #3197), the connector's nested `webhooks`, `status`, both timeouts, and four `retiredKey` tombstones. `authentication` is `planned` because the key is accepted and inert rather than refused: the schema declares `authentication: ConnectorAuthConfigSchema.optional().default({ type: 'none' })`, so it parses and the accepted value reaches no consumer, while the #7990 cross-field rule loudly rejects every non-`none` value and names `auth: { type, credentialRef }` as the mechanism to use instead. ADR-0097 §3 ("Credentials are references") backs that refusal of inline secrets — it does not refuse the key.
 - **`analytics_cube` — 29 properties: 17 `live`, 12 `dead`.** The query path is genuinely consumed (`sql` is both the FROM table and the object whose RLS read scope is injected; `measures.type` picks the aggregate; `joins[].name` the joined table). What is not: the caching block (`refreshKey`), the `public` access flag that gates nothing, `joins[].relationship` and the REQUIRED `joins[].sql` — the ON clause is synthesised as a foreign-key equality and an authored one is never consulted — and the inner `name` on each of `measures`/`dimensions`, where the record key is the identity. #10238 (is cube authoring live end to end?) is a separate measurement and is not prejudged here.
 - **Two prior in-repo claims were falsified and are corrected in the ledgers.** A comment in `src/conversions/registry.ts` says `retryConfig` "and the timeouts beside it are untouched — they are live"; the word does not occur outside `packages/spec` at all. And `bootstrapDeclaredWebhooks` documents itself as materializing each "stack/connector-authored webhook", while its source is `readDeclared(…, 'webhook')` — metadata items the decomposition registers from the top-level `webhooks:` collection, which a connector's nested array never becomes.