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nsCSPUtils.cpp
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/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "nsAttrValue.h"
#include "nsCharSeparatedTokenizer.h"
#include "nsContentUtils.h"
#include "nsCSPUtils.h"
#include "nsDebug.h"
#include "nsIConsoleService.h"
#include "nsIChannel.h"
#include "nsICryptoHash.h"
#include "nsIScriptError.h"
#include "nsIStringBundle.h"
#include "nsIURL.h"
#include "nsReadableUtils.h"
#include "nsSandboxFlags.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/Document.h"
#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_security.h"
#define DEFAULT_PORT -1
static mozilla::LogModule* GetCspUtilsLog() {
static mozilla::LazyLogModule gCspUtilsPRLog("CSPUtils");
return gCspUtilsPRLog;
}
#define CSPUTILSLOG(args) \
MOZ_LOG(GetCspUtilsLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug, args)
#define CSPUTILSLOGENABLED() \
MOZ_LOG_TEST(GetCspUtilsLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug)
void CSP_PercentDecodeStr(const nsAString& aEncStr, nsAString& outDecStr) {
outDecStr.Truncate();
// helper function that should not be visible outside this methods scope
struct local {
static inline char16_t convertHexDig(char16_t aHexDig) {
if (isNumberToken(aHexDig)) {
return aHexDig - '0';
}
if (aHexDig >= 'A' && aHexDig <= 'F') {
return aHexDig - 'A' + 10;
}
// must be a lower case character
// (aHexDig >= 'a' && aHexDig <= 'f')
return aHexDig - 'a' + 10;
}
};
const char16_t *cur, *end, *hexDig1, *hexDig2;
cur = aEncStr.BeginReading();
end = aEncStr.EndReading();
while (cur != end) {
// if it's not a percent sign then there is
// nothing to do for that character
if (*cur != PERCENT_SIGN) {
outDecStr.Append(*cur);
cur++;
continue;
}
// get the two hexDigs following the '%'-sign
hexDig1 = cur + 1;
hexDig2 = cur + 2;
// if there are no hexdigs after the '%' then
// there is nothing to do for us.
if (hexDig1 == end || hexDig2 == end || !isValidHexDig(*hexDig1) ||
!isValidHexDig(*hexDig2)) {
outDecStr.Append(PERCENT_SIGN);
cur++;
continue;
}
// decode "% hexDig1 hexDig2" into a character.
char16_t decChar =
(local::convertHexDig(*hexDig1) << 4) + local::convertHexDig(*hexDig2);
outDecStr.Append(decChar);
// increment 'cur' to after the second hexDig
cur = ++hexDig2;
}
}
// The Content Security Policy should be inherited for
// local schemes like: "about", "blob", "data", or "filesystem".
// see: https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-csp/#initialize-document-csp
bool CSP_ShouldResponseInheritCSP(nsIChannel* aChannel) {
if (!aChannel) {
return false;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
nsresult rv = aChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
bool isAbout = uri->SchemeIs("about");
if (isAbout) {
nsAutoCString aboutSpec;
rv = uri->GetSpec(aboutSpec);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
// also allow about:blank#foo
if (StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("about:blank")) ||
StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("about:srcdoc"))) {
return true;
}
}
return uri->SchemeIs("blob") || uri->SchemeIs("data") ||
uri->SchemeIs("filesystem") || uri->SchemeIs("javascript");
}
void CSP_ApplyMetaCSPToDoc(mozilla::dom::Document& aDoc,
const nsAString& aPolicyStr) {
if (!StaticPrefs::security_csp_enable() || aDoc.IsLoadedAsData()) {
return;
}
nsAutoString policyStr(
nsContentUtils::TrimWhitespace<nsContentUtils::IsHTMLWhitespace>(
aPolicyStr));
if (policyStr.IsEmpty()) {
return;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityPolicy> csp = aDoc.GetCsp();
if (!csp) {
MOZ_ASSERT(false, "how come there is no CSP");
return;
}
// Multiple CSPs (delivered through either header of meta tag) need to
// be joined together, see:
// https://w3c.github.io/webappsec/specs/content-security-policy/#delivery-html-meta-element
nsresult rv =
csp->AppendPolicy(policyStr,
false, // csp via meta tag can not be report only
true); // delivered through the meta tag
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS_VOID(rv);
if (nsPIDOMWindowInner* inner = aDoc.GetInnerWindow()) {
inner->SetCsp(csp);
}
aDoc.ApplySettingsFromCSP(false);
}
void CSP_GetLocalizedStr(const char* aName, const nsTArray<nsString>& aParams,
nsAString& outResult) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIStringBundle> keyStringBundle;
nsCOMPtr<nsIStringBundleService> stringBundleService =
mozilla::services::GetStringBundleService();
NS_ASSERTION(stringBundleService, "String bundle service must be present!");
stringBundleService->CreateBundle(
"chrome://global/locale/security/csp.properties",
getter_AddRefs(keyStringBundle));
NS_ASSERTION(keyStringBundle, "Key string bundle must be available!");
if (!keyStringBundle) {
return;
}
keyStringBundle->FormatStringFromName(aName, aParams, outResult);
}
void CSP_LogStrMessage(const nsAString& aMsg) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIConsoleService> console(
do_GetService("@mozilla.org/consoleservice;1"));
if (!console) {
return;
}
nsString msg(aMsg);
console->LogStringMessage(msg.get());
}
void CSP_LogMessage(const nsAString& aMessage, const nsAString& aSourceName,
const nsAString& aSourceLine, uint32_t aLineNumber,
uint32_t aColumnNumber, uint32_t aFlags,
const nsACString& aCategory, uint64_t aInnerWindowID,
bool aFromPrivateWindow) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIConsoleService> console(
do_GetService(NS_CONSOLESERVICE_CONTRACTID));
nsCOMPtr<nsIScriptError> error(do_CreateInstance(NS_SCRIPTERROR_CONTRACTID));
if (!console || !error) {
return;
}
// Prepending CSP to the outgoing console message
nsString cspMsg;
cspMsg.AppendLiteral(u"Content Security Policy: ");
cspMsg.Append(aMessage);
// Currently 'aSourceLine' is not logged to the console, because similar
// information is already included within the source link of the message.
// For inline violations however, the line and column number are 0 and
// information contained within 'aSourceLine' can be really useful for devs.
// E.g. 'aSourceLine' might be: 'onclick attribute on DIV element'.
// In such cases we append 'aSourceLine' directly to the error message.
if (!aSourceLine.IsEmpty()) {
cspMsg.AppendLiteral(u" Source: ");
cspMsg.Append(aSourceLine);
cspMsg.AppendLiteral(u".");
}
// Since we are leveraging csp errors as the category names which
// we pass to devtools, we should prepend them with "CSP_" to
// allow easy distincution in devtools code. e.g.
// upgradeInsecureRequest -> CSP_upgradeInsecureRequest
nsCString category("CSP_");
category.Append(aCategory);
nsresult rv;
if (aInnerWindowID > 0) {
rv = error->InitWithWindowID(cspMsg, aSourceName, aSourceLine, aLineNumber,
aColumnNumber, aFlags, category,
aInnerWindowID);
} else {
rv = error->Init(cspMsg, aSourceName, aSourceLine, aLineNumber,
aColumnNumber, aFlags, category.get(), aFromPrivateWindow,
true /* from chrome context */);
}
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return;
}
console->LogMessage(error);
}
/**
* Combines CSP_LogMessage and CSP_GetLocalizedStr into one call.
*/
void CSP_LogLocalizedStr(const char* aName, const nsTArray<nsString>& aParams,
const nsAString& aSourceName,
const nsAString& aSourceLine, uint32_t aLineNumber,
uint32_t aColumnNumber, uint32_t aFlags,
const nsACString& aCategory, uint64_t aInnerWindowID,
bool aFromPrivateWindow) {
nsAutoString logMsg;
CSP_GetLocalizedStr(aName, aParams, logMsg);
CSP_LogMessage(logMsg, aSourceName, aSourceLine, aLineNumber, aColumnNumber,
aFlags, aCategory, aInnerWindowID, aFromPrivateWindow);
}
/* ===== Helpers ============================ */
CSPDirective CSP_ContentTypeToDirective(nsContentPolicyType aType) {
switch (aType) {
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGE:
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGESET:
return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::IMG_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
// BLock XSLT as script, see bug 910139
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XSLT:
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT:
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SCRIPT:
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SCRIPT_PRELOAD:
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_MODULE:
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_MODULE_PRELOAD:
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_WORKER_IMPORT_SCRIPTS:
return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::SCRIPT_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_STYLESHEET:
return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::STYLE_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_FONT:
return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FONT_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_MEDIA:
return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::MEDIA_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_WEB_MANIFEST:
return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::WEB_MANIFEST_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_WORKER:
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SHARED_WORKER:
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SERVICE_WORKER:
return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::WORKER_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT:
return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FRAME_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_WEBSOCKET:
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST:
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_BEACON:
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_PING:
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_FETCH:
return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::CONNECT_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT:
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT_SUBREQUEST:
return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::OBJECT_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XBL:
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DTD:
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OTHER:
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SPECULATIVE:
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_DTD:
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_FORCE_ALLOWED_DTD:
return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::DEFAULT_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
// csp shold not block top level loads, e.g. in case
// of a redirect.
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT:
// CSP can not block csp reports
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_CSP_REPORT:
return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::NO_DIRECTIVE;
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SAVEAS_DOWNLOAD:
return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::NO_DIRECTIVE;
// Fall through to error for all other directives
// Note that we should never end up here for navigate-to
default:
MOZ_ASSERT(false, "Can not map nsContentPolicyType to CSPDirective");
}
return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::DEFAULT_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
}
nsCSPHostSrc* CSP_CreateHostSrcFromSelfURI(nsIURI* aSelfURI) {
// Create the host first
nsCString host;
aSelfURI->GetAsciiHost(host);
nsCSPHostSrc* hostsrc = new nsCSPHostSrc(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(host));
hostsrc->setGeneratedFromSelfKeyword();
// Add the scheme.
nsCString scheme;
aSelfURI->GetScheme(scheme);
hostsrc->setScheme(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(scheme));
// An empty host (e.g. for data:) indicates it's effectively a unique origin.
// Please note that we still need to set the scheme on hostsrc (see above),
// because it's used for reporting.
if (host.EqualsLiteral("")) {
hostsrc->setIsUniqueOrigin();
// no need to query the port in that case.
return hostsrc;
}
int32_t port;
aSelfURI->GetPort(&port);
// Only add port if it's not default port.
if (port > 0) {
nsAutoString portStr;
portStr.AppendInt(port);
hostsrc->setPort(portStr);
}
return hostsrc;
}
bool CSP_IsEmptyDirective(const nsAString& aValue, const nsAString& aDir) {
return (aDir.Length() == 0 && aValue.Length() == 0);
}
bool CSP_IsValidDirective(const nsAString& aDir) {
uint32_t numDirs = (sizeof(CSPStrDirectives) / sizeof(CSPStrDirectives[0]));
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < numDirs; i++) {
if (aDir.LowerCaseEqualsASCII(CSPStrDirectives[i])) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
bool CSP_IsDirective(const nsAString& aValue, CSPDirective aDir) {
return aValue.LowerCaseEqualsASCII(CSP_CSPDirectiveToString(aDir));
}
bool CSP_IsKeyword(const nsAString& aValue, enum CSPKeyword aKey) {
return aValue.LowerCaseEqualsASCII(CSP_EnumToUTF8Keyword(aKey));
}
bool CSP_IsQuotelessKeyword(const nsAString& aKey) {
nsString lowerKey;
ToLowerCase(aKey, lowerKey);
nsAutoString keyword;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < CSP_LAST_KEYWORD_VALUE; i++) {
// skipping the leading ' and trimming the trailing '
keyword.AssignASCII(gCSPUTF8Keywords[i] + 1);
keyword.Trim("'", false, true);
if (lowerKey.Equals(keyword)) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
/*
* Checks whether the current directive permits a specific
* scheme. This function is called from nsCSPSchemeSrc() and
* also nsCSPHostSrc.
* @param aEnforcementScheme
* The scheme that this directive allows
* @param aUri
* The uri of the subresource load.
* @param aReportOnly
* Whether the enforced policy is report only or not.
* @param aUpgradeInsecure
* Whether the policy makes use of the directive
* 'upgrade-insecure-requests'.
* @param aFromSelfURI
* Whether a scheme was generated from the keyword 'self'
* which then allows schemeless sources to match ws and wss.
*/
bool permitsScheme(const nsAString& aEnforcementScheme, nsIURI* aUri,
bool aReportOnly, bool aUpgradeInsecure, bool aFromSelfURI) {
nsAutoCString scheme;
nsresult rv = aUri->GetScheme(scheme);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
// no scheme to enforce, let's allow the load (e.g. script-src *)
if (aEnforcementScheme.IsEmpty()) {
return true;
}
// if the scheme matches, all good - allow the load
if (aEnforcementScheme.EqualsASCII(scheme.get())) {
return true;
}
// allow scheme-less sources where the protected resource is http
// and the load is https, see:
// http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#match-source-expression
if (aEnforcementScheme.EqualsASCII("http")) {
if (scheme.EqualsASCII("https")) {
return true;
}
if ((scheme.EqualsASCII("ws") || scheme.EqualsASCII("wss")) &&
aFromSelfURI) {
return true;
}
}
if (aEnforcementScheme.EqualsASCII("https")) {
if (scheme.EqualsLiteral("wss") && aFromSelfURI) {
return true;
}
}
if (aEnforcementScheme.EqualsASCII("ws") && scheme.EqualsASCII("wss")) {
return true;
}
// Allow the load when enforcing upgrade-insecure-requests with the
// promise the request gets upgraded from http to https and ws to wss.
// See nsHttpChannel::Connect() and also WebSocket.cpp. Please note,
// the report only policies should not allow the load and report
// the error back to the page.
return (
(aUpgradeInsecure && !aReportOnly) &&
((scheme.EqualsASCII("http") &&
aEnforcementScheme.EqualsASCII("https")) ||
(scheme.EqualsASCII("ws") && aEnforcementScheme.EqualsASCII("wss"))));
}
/*
* A helper function for appending a CSP header to an existing CSP
* policy.
*
* @param aCsp the CSP policy
* @param aHeaderValue the header
* @param aReportOnly is this a report-only header?
*/
nsresult CSP_AppendCSPFromHeader(nsIContentSecurityPolicy* aCsp,
const nsAString& aHeaderValue,
bool aReportOnly) {
NS_ENSURE_ARG(aCsp);
// Need to tokenize the header value since multiple headers could be
// concatenated into one comma-separated list of policies.
// See RFC2616 section 4.2 (last paragraph)
nsresult rv = NS_OK;
nsCharSeparatedTokenizer tokenizer(aHeaderValue, ',');
while (tokenizer.hasMoreTokens()) {
const nsAString& policy = tokenizer.nextToken();
rv = aCsp->AppendPolicy(policy, aReportOnly, false);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
{
CSPUTILSLOG(("CSP refined with policy: \"%s\"",
NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(policy).get()));
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
/* ===== nsCSPSrc ============================ */
nsCSPBaseSrc::nsCSPBaseSrc() : mInvalidated(false) {}
nsCSPBaseSrc::~nsCSPBaseSrc() {}
// ::permits is only called for external load requests, therefore:
// nsCSPKeywordSrc and nsCSPHashSource fall back to this base class
// implementation which will never allow the load.
bool nsCSPBaseSrc::permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce,
bool aWasRedirected, bool aReportOnly,
bool aUpgradeInsecure, bool aParserCreated) const {
if (CSPUTILSLOGENABLED()) {
CSPUTILSLOG(
("nsCSPBaseSrc::permits, aUri: %s", aUri->GetSpecOrDefault().get()));
}
return false;
}
// ::allows is only called for inlined loads, therefore:
// nsCSPSchemeSrc, nsCSPHostSrc fall back
// to this base class implementation which will never allow the load.
bool nsCSPBaseSrc::allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword,
const nsAString& aHashOrNonce,
bool aParserCreated) const {
CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPBaseSrc::allows, aKeyWord: %s, a HashOrNonce: %s",
aKeyword == CSP_HASH ? "hash" : CSP_EnumToUTF8Keyword(aKeyword),
NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aHashOrNonce).get()));
return false;
}
/* ====== nsCSPSchemeSrc ===================== */
nsCSPSchemeSrc::nsCSPSchemeSrc(const nsAString& aScheme) : mScheme(aScheme) {
ToLowerCase(mScheme);
}
nsCSPSchemeSrc::~nsCSPSchemeSrc() {}
bool nsCSPSchemeSrc::permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce,
bool aWasRedirected, bool aReportOnly,
bool aUpgradeInsecure, bool aParserCreated) const {
if (CSPUTILSLOGENABLED()) {
CSPUTILSLOG(
("nsCSPSchemeSrc::permits, aUri: %s", aUri->GetSpecOrDefault().get()));
}
MOZ_ASSERT((!mScheme.EqualsASCII("")), "scheme can not be the empty string");
if (mInvalidated) {
return false;
}
return permitsScheme(mScheme, aUri, aReportOnly, aUpgradeInsecure, false);
}
bool nsCSPSchemeSrc::visit(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const {
return aVisitor->visitSchemeSrc(*this);
}
void nsCSPSchemeSrc::toString(nsAString& outStr) const {
outStr.Append(mScheme);
outStr.AppendLiteral(":");
}
/* ===== nsCSPHostSrc ======================== */
nsCSPHostSrc::nsCSPHostSrc(const nsAString& aHost)
: mHost(aHost),
mGeneratedFromSelfKeyword(false),
mIsUniqueOrigin(false),
mWithinFrameAncstorsDir(false) {
ToLowerCase(mHost);
}
nsCSPHostSrc::~nsCSPHostSrc() {}
/*
* Checks whether the current directive permits a specific port.
* @param aEnforcementScheme
* The scheme that this directive allows
* (used to query the default port for that scheme)
* @param aEnforcementPort
* The port that this directive allows
* @param aResourceURI
* The uri of the subresource load
*/
bool permitsPort(const nsAString& aEnforcementScheme,
const nsAString& aEnforcementPort, nsIURI* aResourceURI) {
// If enforcement port is the wildcard, don't block the load.
if (aEnforcementPort.EqualsASCII("*")) {
return true;
}
int32_t resourcePort;
nsresult rv = aResourceURI->GetPort(&resourcePort);
if (NS_FAILED(rv) && aEnforcementPort.IsEmpty()) {
// If we cannot get a Port (e.g. because of an Custom Protocol handler)
// We need to check if a default port is associated with the Scheme
if (aEnforcementScheme.IsEmpty()) {
return false;
}
int defaultPortforScheme =
NS_GetDefaultPort(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aEnforcementScheme).get());
// If there is no default port associated with the Scheme (
// defaultPortforScheme == -1) or it is an externally handled protocol (
// defaultPortforScheme == 0 ) and the csp does not enforce a port - we can
// allow not having a port
return (defaultPortforScheme == -1 || defaultPortforScheme == -0);
}
// Avoid unnecessary string creation/manipulation and don't block the
// load if the resource to be loaded uses the default port for that
// scheme and there is no port to be enforced.
// Note, this optimization relies on scheme checks within permitsScheme().
if (resourcePort == DEFAULT_PORT && aEnforcementPort.IsEmpty()) {
return true;
}
// By now we know at that either the resourcePort does not use the default
// port or there is a port restriction to be enforced. A port value of -1
// corresponds to the protocol's default port (eg. -1 implies port 80 for
// http URIs), in such a case we have to query the default port of the
// resource to be loaded.
if (resourcePort == DEFAULT_PORT) {
nsAutoCString resourceScheme;
rv = aResourceURI->GetScheme(resourceScheme);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
resourcePort = NS_GetDefaultPort(resourceScheme.get());
}
// If there is a port to be enforced and the ports match, then
// don't block the load.
nsString resourcePortStr;
resourcePortStr.AppendInt(resourcePort);
if (aEnforcementPort.Equals(resourcePortStr)) {
return true;
}
// If there is no port to be enforced, query the default port for the load.
nsString enforcementPort(aEnforcementPort);
if (enforcementPort.IsEmpty()) {
// For scheme less sources, our parser always generates a scheme
// which is the scheme of the protected resource.
MOZ_ASSERT(!aEnforcementScheme.IsEmpty(),
"need a scheme to query default port");
int32_t defaultEnforcementPort =
NS_GetDefaultPort(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aEnforcementScheme).get());
enforcementPort.Truncate();
enforcementPort.AppendInt(defaultEnforcementPort);
}
// If default ports match, don't block the load
if (enforcementPort.Equals(resourcePortStr)) {
return true;
}
// Additional port matching where the regular URL matching algorithm
// treats insecure ports as matching their secure variants.
// default port for http is :80
// default port for https is :443
if (enforcementPort.EqualsLiteral("80") &&
resourcePortStr.EqualsLiteral("443")) {
return true;
}
// ports do not match, block the load.
return false;
}
bool nsCSPHostSrc::permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce,
bool aWasRedirected, bool aReportOnly,
bool aUpgradeInsecure, bool aParserCreated) const {
if (CSPUTILSLOGENABLED()) {
CSPUTILSLOG(
("nsCSPHostSrc::permits, aUri: %s", aUri->GetSpecOrDefault().get()));
}
if (mInvalidated || mIsUniqueOrigin) {
return false;
}
// we are following the enforcement rules from the spec, see:
// http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP11/#match-source-expression
// 4.3) scheme matching: Check if the scheme matches.
if (!permitsScheme(mScheme, aUri, aReportOnly, aUpgradeInsecure,
mGeneratedFromSelfKeyword)) {
return false;
}
// The host in nsCSpHostSrc should never be empty. In case we are enforcing
// just a specific scheme, the parser should generate a nsCSPSchemeSource.
NS_ASSERTION((!mHost.IsEmpty()), "host can not be the empty string");
// Before we can check if the host matches, we have to
// extract the host part from aUri.
nsAutoCString uriHost;
nsresult rv = aUri->GetAsciiHost(uriHost);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
nsString decodedUriHost;
CSP_PercentDecodeStr(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(uriHost), decodedUriHost);
// 2) host matching: Enforce a single *
if (mHost.EqualsASCII("*")) {
// The single ASTERISK character (*) does not match a URI's scheme of a type
// designating a globally unique identifier (such as blob:, data:, or
// filesystem:) At the moment firefox does not support filesystem; but for
// future compatibility we support it in CSP according to the spec,
// see: 4.2.2 Matching Source Expressions Note, that whitelisting any of
// these schemes would call nsCSPSchemeSrc::permits().
if (aUri->SchemeIs("blob") || aUri->SchemeIs("data") ||
aUri->SchemeIs("filesystem")) {
return false;
}
// If no scheme is present there also wont be a port and folder to check
// which means we can return early
if (mScheme.IsEmpty()) {
return true;
}
}
// 4.5) host matching: Check if the allowed host starts with a wilcard.
else if (mHost.First() == '*') {
NS_ASSERTION(
mHost[1] == '.',
"Second character needs to be '.' whenever host starts with '*'");
// Eliminate leading "*", but keeping the FULL STOP (.) thereafter before
// checking if the remaining characters match
nsString wildCardHost = mHost;
wildCardHost = Substring(wildCardHost, 1, wildCardHost.Length() - 1);
if (!StringEndsWith(decodedUriHost, wildCardHost)) {
return false;
}
}
// 4.6) host matching: Check if hosts match.
else if (!mHost.Equals(decodedUriHost)) {
return false;
}
// Port matching: Check if the ports match.
if (!permitsPort(mScheme, mPort, aUri)) {
return false;
}
// 4.9) Path matching: If there is a path, we have to enforce
// path-level matching, unless the channel got redirected, see:
// http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP11/#source-list-paths-and-redirects
if (!aWasRedirected && !mPath.IsEmpty()) {
// converting aUri into nsIURL so we can strip query and ref
// example.com/test#foo -> example.com/test
// example.com/test?val=foo -> example.com/test
nsCOMPtr<nsIURL> url = do_QueryInterface(aUri);
if (!url) {
NS_ASSERTION(false, "can't QI into nsIURI");
return false;
}
nsAutoCString uriPath;
rv = url->GetFilePath(uriPath);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
if (mWithinFrameAncstorsDir) {
// no path matching for frame-ancestors to not leak any path information.
return true;
}
nsString decodedUriPath;
CSP_PercentDecodeStr(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(uriPath), decodedUriPath);
// check if the last character of mPath is '/'; if so
// we just have to check loading resource is within
// the allowed path.
if (mPath.Last() == '/') {
if (!StringBeginsWith(decodedUriPath, mPath)) {
return false;
}
}
// otherwise mPath whitelists a specific file, and we have to
// check if the loading resource matches that whitelisted file.
else {
if (!mPath.Equals(decodedUriPath)) {
return false;
}
}
}
// At the end: scheme, host, port and path match -> allow the load.
return true;
}
bool nsCSPHostSrc::visit(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const {
return aVisitor->visitHostSrc(*this);
}
void nsCSPHostSrc::toString(nsAString& outStr) const {
if (mGeneratedFromSelfKeyword) {
outStr.AppendLiteral("'self'");
return;
}
// If mHost is a single "*", we append the wildcard and return.
if (mHost.EqualsASCII("*") && mScheme.IsEmpty() && mPort.IsEmpty()) {
outStr.Append(mHost);
return;
}
// append scheme
outStr.Append(mScheme);
// append host
outStr.AppendLiteral("://");
outStr.Append(mHost);
// append port
if (!mPort.IsEmpty()) {
outStr.AppendLiteral(":");
outStr.Append(mPort);
}
// append path
outStr.Append(mPath);
}
void nsCSPHostSrc::setScheme(const nsAString& aScheme) {
mScheme = aScheme;
ToLowerCase(mScheme);
}
void nsCSPHostSrc::setPort(const nsAString& aPort) { mPort = aPort; }
void nsCSPHostSrc::appendPath(const nsAString& aPath) { mPath.Append(aPath); }
/* ===== nsCSPKeywordSrc ===================== */
nsCSPKeywordSrc::nsCSPKeywordSrc(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword)
: mKeyword(aKeyword) {
NS_ASSERTION((aKeyword != CSP_SELF),
"'self' should have been replaced in the parser");
}
nsCSPKeywordSrc::~nsCSPKeywordSrc() {}
bool nsCSPKeywordSrc::permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce,
bool aWasRedirected, bool aReportOnly,
bool aUpgradeInsecure,
bool aParserCreated) const {
// no need to check for invalidated, this will always return false unless
// it is an nsCSPKeywordSrc for 'strict-dynamic', which should allow non
// parser created scripts.
return ((mKeyword == CSP_STRICT_DYNAMIC) && !aParserCreated);
}
bool nsCSPKeywordSrc::allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword,
const nsAString& aHashOrNonce,
bool aParserCreated) const {
CSPUTILSLOG(
("nsCSPKeywordSrc::allows, aKeyWord: %s, aHashOrNonce: %s, mInvalidated: "
"%s",
CSP_EnumToUTF8Keyword(aKeyword),
NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aHashOrNonce).get(),
mInvalidated ? "yes" : "false"));
if (mInvalidated) {
// only 'self', 'report-sample' and 'unsafe-inline' are keywords that can be
// ignored. Please note that the parser already translates 'self' into a uri
// (see assertion in constructor).
MOZ_ASSERT(mKeyword == CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE || mKeyword == CSP_REPORT_SAMPLE,
"should only invalidate unsafe-inline");
return false;
}
// either the keyword allows the load or the policy contains 'strict-dynamic',
// in which case we have to make sure the script is not parser created before
// allowing the load and also eval should be blocked even if 'strict-dynamic'
// is present. Should be allowed only if 'unsafe-eval' is present.
return ((mKeyword == aKeyword) ||
((mKeyword == CSP_STRICT_DYNAMIC) && !aParserCreated &&
aKeyword != CSP_UNSAFE_EVAL));
}
bool nsCSPKeywordSrc::visit(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const {
return aVisitor->visitKeywordSrc(*this);
}
void nsCSPKeywordSrc::toString(nsAString& outStr) const {
outStr.Append(CSP_EnumToUTF16Keyword(mKeyword));
}
/* ===== nsCSPNonceSrc ==================== */
nsCSPNonceSrc::nsCSPNonceSrc(const nsAString& aNonce) : mNonce(aNonce) {}
nsCSPNonceSrc::~nsCSPNonceSrc() {}
bool nsCSPNonceSrc::permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce,
bool aWasRedirected, bool aReportOnly,
bool aUpgradeInsecure, bool aParserCreated) const {
if (CSPUTILSLOGENABLED()) {
CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPNonceSrc::permits, aUri: %s, aNonce: %s",
aUri->GetSpecOrDefault().get(),
NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aNonce).get()));
}
if (aReportOnly && aWasRedirected && aNonce.IsEmpty()) {
/* Fix for Bug 1505412
* If we land here, we're currently handling a script-preload which got
* redirected. Preloads do not have any info about the nonce assiociated.
* Because of Report-Only the preload passes the 1st CSP-check so the
* preload does not get retried with a nonce attached.
* Currently we're relying on the script-manager to
* provide a fake loadinfo to check the preloads against csp.
* So during HTTPChannel->OnRedirect we cant check csp for this case.
* But as the script-manager already checked the csp,
* a report would already have been send,
* if the nonce didnt match.
* So we can pass the check here for Report-Only Cases.
*/
MOZ_ASSERT(aParserCreated == false,
"Skipping nonce-check is only allowed for Preloads");
return true;
}
// nonces can not be invalidated by strict-dynamic
return mNonce.Equals(aNonce);
}
bool nsCSPNonceSrc::allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword,
const nsAString& aHashOrNonce,
bool aParserCreated) const {
CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPNonceSrc::allows, aKeyWord: %s, a HashOrNonce: %s",
CSP_EnumToUTF8Keyword(aKeyword),
NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aHashOrNonce).get()));
if (aKeyword != CSP_NONCE) {
return false;
}
// nonces can not be invalidated by strict-dynamic
return mNonce.Equals(aHashOrNonce);
}
bool nsCSPNonceSrc::visit(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const {
return aVisitor->visitNonceSrc(*this);
}
void nsCSPNonceSrc::toString(nsAString& outStr) const {
outStr.Append(CSP_EnumToUTF16Keyword(CSP_NONCE));
outStr.Append(mNonce);
outStr.AppendLiteral("'");
}
/* ===== nsCSPHashSrc ===================== */
nsCSPHashSrc::nsCSPHashSrc(const nsAString& aAlgo, const nsAString& aHash)
: mAlgorithm(aAlgo), mHash(aHash) {
// Only the algo should be rewritten to lowercase, the hash must remain the
// same.
ToLowerCase(mAlgorithm);
}
nsCSPHashSrc::~nsCSPHashSrc() {}
bool nsCSPHashSrc::allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword,
const nsAString& aHashOrNonce,
bool aParserCreated) const {
CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPHashSrc::allows, aKeyWord: %s, a HashOrNonce: %s",
CSP_EnumToUTF8Keyword(aKeyword),
NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aHashOrNonce).get()));
if (aKeyword != CSP_HASH) {
return false;
}
// hashes can not be invalidated by strict-dynamic
// Convert aHashOrNonce to UTF-8
NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8 utf8_hash(aHashOrNonce);
nsresult rv;
nsCOMPtr<nsICryptoHash> hasher;
hasher = do_CreateInstance("@mozilla.org/security/hash;1", &rv);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
rv = hasher->InitWithString(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mAlgorithm));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
rv = hasher->Update((uint8_t*)utf8_hash.get(), utf8_hash.Length());
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
nsAutoCString hash;
rv = hasher->Finish(true, hash);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
return NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mHash).Equals(hash);
}
bool nsCSPHashSrc::visit(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const {
return aVisitor->visitHashSrc(*this);
}
void nsCSPHashSrc::toString(nsAString& outStr) const {
outStr.AppendLiteral("'");
outStr.Append(mAlgorithm);
outStr.AppendLiteral("-");
outStr.Append(mHash);
outStr.AppendLiteral("'");
}
/* ===== nsCSPReportURI ===================== */
nsCSPReportURI::nsCSPReportURI(nsIURI* aURI) : mReportURI(aURI) {}