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cert_verify_proc_unittest.cc
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// Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.
#include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc.h"
#include <vector>
#include "base/callback_helpers.h"
#include "base/files/file_path.h"
#include "base/files/file_util.h"
#include "base/logging.h"
#include "base/macros.h"
#include "base/sha1.h"
#include "base/strings/string_number_conversions.h"
#include "crypto/sha2.h"
#include "net/base/net_errors.h"
#include "net/base/test_data_directory.h"
#include "net/cert/asn1_util.h"
#include "net/cert/cert_status_flags.h"
#include "net/cert/cert_verifier.h"
#include "net/cert/cert_verify_result.h"
#include "net/cert/crl_set.h"
#include "net/cert/crl_set_storage.h"
#include "net/cert/test_root_certs.h"
#include "net/cert/x509_certificate.h"
#include "net/test/cert_test_util.h"
#include "net/test/test_certificate_data.h"
#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h"
#if defined(OS_WIN)
#include "base/win/windows_version.h"
#elif defined(OS_ANDROID)
#include "base/android/build_info.h"
#endif
using base::HexEncode;
namespace net {
namespace {
// A certificate for www.paypal.com with a NULL byte in the common name.
// From http://www.gossamer-threads.com/lists/fulldisc/full-disclosure/70363
unsigned char paypal_null_fingerprint[] = {
0x4c, 0x88, 0x9e, 0x28, 0xd7, 0x7a, 0x44, 0x1e, 0x13, 0xf2, 0x6a, 0xba,
0x1f, 0xe8, 0x1b, 0xd6, 0xab, 0x7b, 0xe8, 0xd7
};
// Mock CertVerifyProc that sets the CertVerifyResult to a given value for
// all certificates that are Verify()'d
class MockCertVerifyProc : public CertVerifyProc {
public:
explicit MockCertVerifyProc(const CertVerifyResult& result)
: result_(result) {}
// CertVerifyProc implementation:
bool SupportsAdditionalTrustAnchors() const override { return false; }
bool SupportsOCSPStapling() const override { return false; }
protected:
~MockCertVerifyProc() override {}
private:
int VerifyInternal(X509Certificate* cert,
const std::string& hostname,
const std::string& ocsp_response,
int flags,
CRLSet* crl_set,
const CertificateList& additional_trust_anchors,
CertVerifyResult* verify_result) override;
const CertVerifyResult result_;
DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(MockCertVerifyProc);
};
int MockCertVerifyProc::VerifyInternal(
X509Certificate* cert,
const std::string& hostname,
const std::string& ocsp_response,
int flags,
CRLSet* crl_set,
const CertificateList& additional_trust_anchors,
CertVerifyResult* verify_result) {
*verify_result = result_;
verify_result->verified_cert = cert;
return OK;
}
bool SupportsReturningVerifiedChain() {
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
// Before API level 17, Android does not expose the APIs necessary to get at
// the verified certificate chain.
if (base::android::BuildInfo::GetInstance()->sdk_int() < 17)
return false;
#endif
return true;
}
bool SupportsDetectingKnownRoots() {
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
// Before API level 17, Android does not expose the APIs necessary to get at
// the verified certificate chain and detect known roots.
if (base::android::BuildInfo::GetInstance()->sdk_int() < 17)
return false;
#endif
return true;
}
// Template helper to load a series of certificate files into a CertificateList.
// Like CertTestUtil's CreateCertificateListFromFile, except it can load a
// series of individual certificates (to make the tests clearer).
template <size_t N>
void LoadCertificateFiles(const char* const (&cert_files)[N],
CertificateList* certs) {
certs->clear();
for (size_t i = 0; i < N; ++i) {
SCOPED_TRACE(cert_files[i]);
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert = CreateCertificateChainFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), cert_files[i], X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
certs->push_back(cert);
}
}
} // namespace
class CertVerifyProcTest : public testing::Test {
public:
CertVerifyProcTest()
: verify_proc_(CertVerifyProc::CreateDefault()) {
}
~CertVerifyProcTest() override {}
protected:
bool SupportsAdditionalTrustAnchors() {
return verify_proc_->SupportsAdditionalTrustAnchors();
}
// Returns true if the underlying CertVerifyProc supports integrating CRLSets
// into path building logic, such as allowing the selection of alternatively
// valid paths when one or more are revoked. As the goal is to integrate this
// into all platforms, this is a temporary, test-only flag to centralize the
// conditionals in tests.
bool SupportsCRLSetsInPathBuilding() {
#if defined(OS_WIN) || defined(USE_NSS_CERTS)
return true;
#else
return false;
#endif
}
int Verify(X509Certificate* cert,
const std::string& hostname,
int flags,
CRLSet* crl_set,
const CertificateList& additional_trust_anchors,
CertVerifyResult* verify_result) {
return verify_proc_->Verify(cert, hostname, std::string(), flags, crl_set,
additional_trust_anchors, verify_result);
}
const CertificateList empty_cert_list_;
scoped_refptr<CertVerifyProc> verify_proc_;
};
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, DISABLED_WithoutRevocationChecking) {
// Check that verification without revocation checking works.
CertificateList certs = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(),
"googlenew.chain.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_PEM_CERT_SEQUENCE);
X509Certificate::OSCertHandles intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(certs[1]->os_cert_handle());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> google_full_chain =
X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(certs[0]->os_cert_handle(),
intermediates);
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
EXPECT_EQ(OK,
Verify(google_full_chain.get(),
"www.google.com",
0 /* flags */,
NULL,
empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result));
}
#if defined(OS_ANDROID) || defined(USE_OPENSSL_CERTS)
// TODO(jnd): http://crbug.com/117478 - EV verification is not yet supported.
#define MAYBE_EVVerification DISABLED_EVVerification
#else
// TODO(rsleevi): Reenable this test once comodo.chaim.pem is no longer
// expired, http://crbug.com/502818
#define MAYBE_EVVerification DISABLED_EVVerification
#endif
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, MAYBE_EVVerification) {
CertificateList certs = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(),
"comodo.chain.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_PEM_CERT_SEQUENCE);
ASSERT_EQ(3U, certs.size());
X509Certificate::OSCertHandles intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(certs[1]->os_cert_handle());
intermediates.push_back(certs[2]->os_cert_handle());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> comodo_chain =
X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(certs[0]->os_cert_handle(),
intermediates);
scoped_refptr<CRLSet> crl_set(CRLSet::ForTesting(false, NULL, ""));
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int flags = CertVerifier::VERIFY_EV_CERT;
int error = Verify(comodo_chain.get(),
"comodo.com",
flags,
crl_set.get(),
empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_IS_EV);
}
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, PaypalNullCertParsing) {
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> paypal_null_cert(
X509Certificate::CreateFromBytes(
reinterpret_cast<const char*>(paypal_null_der),
sizeof(paypal_null_der)));
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), paypal_null_cert.get());
const SHA1HashValue& fingerprint =
paypal_null_cert->fingerprint();
for (size_t i = 0; i < 20; ++i)
EXPECT_EQ(paypal_null_fingerprint[i], fingerprint.data[i]);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(paypal_null_cert.get(),
"www.paypal.com",
flags,
NULL,
empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
#if defined(USE_NSS_CERTS) || defined(OS_IOS) || defined(OS_ANDROID)
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_CERT_COMMON_NAME_INVALID, error);
#else
// TOOD(bulach): investigate why macosx and win aren't returning
// ERR_CERT_INVALID or ERR_CERT_COMMON_NAME_INVALID.
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID, error);
#endif
// Either the system crypto library should correctly report a certificate
// name mismatch, or our certificate blacklist should cause us to report an
// invalid certificate.
#if defined(USE_NSS_CERTS) || defined(OS_WIN) || defined(OS_IOS)
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status &
(CERT_STATUS_COMMON_NAME_INVALID | CERT_STATUS_INVALID));
#endif
}
// A regression test for http://crbug.com/31497.
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
// Disabled on Android, as the Android verification libraries require an
// explicit policy to be specified, even when anyPolicy is permitted.
#define MAYBE_IntermediateCARequireExplicitPolicy \
DISABLED_IntermediateCARequireExplicitPolicy
#else
#define MAYBE_IntermediateCARequireExplicitPolicy \
IntermediateCARequireExplicitPolicy
#endif
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, MAYBE_IntermediateCARequireExplicitPolicy) {
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
CertificateList certs = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
certs_dir, "explicit-policy-chain.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(3U, certs.size());
X509Certificate::OSCertHandles intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(certs[1]->os_cert_handle());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert =
X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(certs[0]->os_cert_handle(),
intermediates);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert.get());
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(certs[2].get());
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(cert.get(),
"policy_test.example",
flags,
NULL,
empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
EXPECT_EQ(0u, verify_result.cert_status);
}
// Test for bug 58437.
// This certificate will expire on 2011-12-21. The test will still
// pass if error == ERR_CERT_DATE_INVALID.
// This test is DISABLED because it appears that we cannot do
// certificate revocation checking when running all of the net unit tests.
// This test passes when run individually, but when run with all of the net
// unit tests, the call to PKIXVerifyCert returns the NSS error -8180, which is
// SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE. This indicates a lack of revocation
// status, i.e. that the revocation check is failing for some reason.
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, DISABLED_GlobalSignR3EVTest) {
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> server_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "2029_globalsign_com_cert.pem");
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), server_cert.get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> intermediate_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "globalsign_ev_sha256_ca_cert.pem");
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), intermediate_cert.get());
X509Certificate::OSCertHandles intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(intermediate_cert->os_cert_handle());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert_chain =
X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(server_cert->os_cert_handle(),
intermediates);
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int flags = CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED |
CertVerifier::VERIFY_EV_CERT;
int error = Verify(cert_chain.get(),
"2029.globalsign.com",
flags,
NULL,
empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
if (error == OK)
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_IS_EV);
else
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_CERT_DATE_INVALID, error);
}
// Test that verifying an ECDSA certificate doesn't crash on XP. (See
// crbug.com/144466).
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, ECDSA_RSA) {
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir,
"prime256v1-ecdsa-ee-by-1024-rsa-intermediate.pem");
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", 0, NULL, empty_cert_list_, &verify_result);
// We don't check verify_result because the certificate is signed by an
// unknown CA and will be considered invalid on XP because of the ECDSA
// public key.
}
// Currently, only RSA and DSA keys are checked for weakness, and our example
// weak size is 768. These could change in the future.
//
// Note that this means there may be false negatives: keys for other
// algorithms and which are weak will pass this test.
static bool IsWeakKeyType(const std::string& key_type) {
size_t pos = key_type.find("-");
std::string size = key_type.substr(0, pos);
std::string type = key_type.substr(pos + 1);
if (type == "rsa" || type == "dsa")
return size == "768";
return false;
}
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, RejectWeakKeys) {
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
typedef std::vector<std::string> Strings;
Strings key_types;
// generate-weak-test-chains.sh currently has:
// key_types="768-rsa 1024-rsa 2048-rsa prime256v1-ecdsa"
// We must use the same key types here. The filenames generated look like:
// 2048-rsa-ee-by-768-rsa-intermediate.pem
key_types.push_back("768-rsa");
key_types.push_back("1024-rsa");
key_types.push_back("2048-rsa");
bool use_ecdsa = true;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
use_ecdsa = base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_XP;
#endif
if (use_ecdsa)
key_types.push_back("prime256v1-ecdsa");
// Add the root that signed the intermediates for this test.
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> root_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "2048-rsa-root.pem");
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), root_cert.get());
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root_cert.get());
// Now test each chain.
for (Strings::const_iterator ee_type = key_types.begin();
ee_type != key_types.end(); ++ee_type) {
for (Strings::const_iterator signer_type = key_types.begin();
signer_type != key_types.end(); ++signer_type) {
std::string basename = *ee_type + "-ee-by-" + *signer_type +
"-intermediate.pem";
SCOPED_TRACE(basename);
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> ee_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, basename);
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), ee_cert.get());
basename = *signer_type + "-intermediate.pem";
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> intermediate =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, basename);
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), intermediate.get());
X509Certificate::OSCertHandles intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(intermediate->os_cert_handle());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert_chain =
X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(ee_cert->os_cert_handle(),
intermediates);
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(cert_chain.get(),
"127.0.0.1",
0,
NULL,
empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
if (IsWeakKeyType(*ee_type) || IsWeakKeyType(*signer_type)) {
EXPECT_NE(OK, error);
EXPECT_EQ(CERT_STATUS_WEAK_KEY,
verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_WEAK_KEY);
EXPECT_NE(CERT_STATUS_INVALID,
verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_INVALID);
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
EXPECT_EQ(0U, verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_WEAK_KEY);
}
}
}
}
// Regression test for http://crbug.com/108514.
#if defined(OS_MACOSX) && !defined(OS_IOS)
// Disabled on OS X - Security.framework doesn't ignore superflous certificates
// provided by servers. See CertVerifyProcTest.CybertrustGTERoot for further
// details.
#define MAYBE_ExtraneousMD5RootCert DISABLED_ExtraneousMD5RootCert
#else
#define MAYBE_ExtraneousMD5RootCert ExtraneousMD5RootCert
#endif
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, MAYBE_ExtraneousMD5RootCert) {
if (!SupportsReturningVerifiedChain()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping this test in this platform.";
return;
}
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> server_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "cross-signed-leaf.pem");
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), server_cert.get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> extra_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "cross-signed-root-md5.pem");
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), extra_cert.get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> root_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "cross-signed-root-sha256.pem");
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), root_cert.get());
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root_cert.get());
X509Certificate::OSCertHandles intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(extra_cert->os_cert_handle());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert_chain =
X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(server_cert->os_cert_handle(),
intermediates);
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int flags = 0;
int error = Verify(cert_chain.get(),
"127.0.0.1",
flags,
NULL,
empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
// The extra MD5 root should be discarded
ASSERT_TRUE(verify_result.verified_cert.get());
ASSERT_EQ(1u,
verify_result.verified_cert->GetIntermediateCertificates().size());
EXPECT_TRUE(X509Certificate::IsSameOSCert(
verify_result.verified_cert->GetIntermediateCertificates().front(),
root_cert->os_cert_handle()));
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.has_md5);
}
// Test for bug 94673.
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, GoogleDigiNotarTest) {
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> server_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "google_diginotar.pem");
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), server_cert.get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> intermediate_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "diginotar_public_ca_2025.pem");
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), intermediate_cert.get());
X509Certificate::OSCertHandles intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(intermediate_cert->os_cert_handle());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert_chain =
X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(server_cert->os_cert_handle(),
intermediates);
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int flags = CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED;
int error = Verify(cert_chain.get(),
"mail.google.com",
flags,
NULL,
empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
EXPECT_NE(OK, error);
// Now turn off revocation checking. Certificate verification should still
// fail.
flags = 0;
error = Verify(cert_chain.get(),
"mail.google.com",
flags,
NULL,
empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
EXPECT_NE(OK, error);
}
// Ensures the CertVerifyProc blacklist remains in sorted order, so that it
// can be binary-searched.
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, BlacklistIsSorted) {
// Defines kBlacklistedSPKIs.
#include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_blacklist.inc"
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(kBlacklistedSPKIs) - 1; ++i) {
EXPECT_GT(0, memcmp(kBlacklistedSPKIs[i], kBlacklistedSPKIs[i + 1],
crypto::kSHA256Length))
<< " at index " << i;
}
}
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, DigiNotarCerts) {
static const char* const kDigiNotarFilenames[] = {
"diginotar_root_ca.pem",
"diginotar_cyber_ca.pem",
"diginotar_services_1024_ca.pem",
"diginotar_pkioverheid.pem",
"diginotar_pkioverheid_g2.pem",
NULL,
};
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
for (size_t i = 0; kDigiNotarFilenames[i]; i++) {
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> diginotar_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, kDigiNotarFilenames[i]);
std::string der_bytes;
ASSERT_TRUE(X509Certificate::GetDEREncoded(
diginotar_cert->os_cert_handle(), &der_bytes));
base::StringPiece spki;
ASSERT_TRUE(asn1::ExtractSPKIFromDERCert(der_bytes, &spki));
std::string spki_sha256 = crypto::SHA256HashString(spki.as_string());
HashValueVector public_keys;
HashValue hash(HASH_VALUE_SHA256);
ASSERT_EQ(hash.size(), spki_sha256.size());
memcpy(hash.data(), spki_sha256.data(), spki_sha256.size());
public_keys.push_back(hash);
EXPECT_TRUE(CertVerifyProc::IsPublicKeyBlacklisted(public_keys)) <<
"Public key not blocked for " << kDigiNotarFilenames[i];
}
}
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, NameConstraintsOk) {
CertificateList ca_cert_list =
CreateCertificateListFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(),
"root_ca_cert.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, ca_cert_list.size());
ScopedTestRoot test_root(ca_cert_list[0].get());
CertificateList cert_list = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "name_constraint_good.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, cert_list.size());
X509Certificate::OSCertHandles intermediates;
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> leaf =
X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(cert_list[0]->os_cert_handle(),
intermediates);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(leaf.get(),
"test.example.com",
flags,
NULL,
empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
EXPECT_EQ(0U, verify_result.cert_status);
error = Verify(leaf.get(), "foo.test2.example.com", flags, NULL,
empty_cert_list_, &verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
EXPECT_EQ(0U, verify_result.cert_status);
}
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, NameConstraintsFailure) {
if (!SupportsReturningVerifiedChain()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping this test in this platform.";
return;
}
CertificateList ca_cert_list =
CreateCertificateListFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(),
"root_ca_cert.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, ca_cert_list.size());
ScopedTestRoot test_root(ca_cert_list[0].get());
CertificateList cert_list = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "name_constraint_bad.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, cert_list.size());
X509Certificate::OSCertHandles intermediates;
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> leaf =
X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(cert_list[0]->os_cert_handle(),
intermediates);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(leaf.get(),
"test.example.com",
flags,
NULL,
empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION, error);
EXPECT_EQ(CERT_STATUS_NAME_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION,
verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_NAME_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION);
}
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, TestHasTooLongValidity) {
struct {
const char* const file;
bool is_valid_too_long;
} tests[] = {
{"twitter-chain.pem", false},
{"start_after_expiry.pem", true},
{"pre_br_validity_ok.pem", false},
{"pre_br_validity_bad_121.pem", true},
{"pre_br_validity_bad_2020.pem", true},
{"10_year_validity.pem", false},
{"11_year_validity.pem", true},
{"39_months_after_2015_04.pem", false},
{"40_months_after_2015_04.pem", true},
{"60_months_after_2012_07.pem", false},
{"61_months_after_2012_07.pem", true},
};
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(tests); ++i) {
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> certificate =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, tests[i].file);
SCOPED_TRACE(tests[i].file);
ASSERT_TRUE(certificate);
EXPECT_EQ(tests[i].is_valid_too_long,
CertVerifyProc::HasTooLongValidity(*certificate));
}
}
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, TestKnownRoot) {
if (!SupportsDetectingKnownRoots()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping this test on this platform.";
return;
}
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
CertificateList certs = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
certs_dir, "twitter-chain.pem", X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(3U, certs.size());
X509Certificate::OSCertHandles intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(certs[1]->os_cert_handle());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert_chain =
X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(certs[0]->os_cert_handle(),
intermediates);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
// This will blow up, May 9th, 2016. Sorry! Please disable and file a bug
// against agl. See also PublicKeyHashes.
int error = Verify(cert_chain.get(), "twitter.com", flags, NULL,
empty_cert_list_, &verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.is_issued_by_known_root);
}
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, PublicKeyHashes) {
if (!SupportsReturningVerifiedChain()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping this test in this platform.";
return;
}
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
CertificateList certs = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
certs_dir, "twitter-chain.pem", X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(3U, certs.size());
X509Certificate::OSCertHandles intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(certs[1]->os_cert_handle());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert_chain =
X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(certs[0]->os_cert_handle(),
intermediates);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
// This will blow up, May 9th, 2016. Sorry! Please disable and file a bug
// against agl. See also TestKnownRoot.
int error = Verify(cert_chain.get(), "twitter.com", flags, NULL,
empty_cert_list_, &verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
ASSERT_LE(3U, verify_result.public_key_hashes.size());
HashValueVector sha1_hashes;
for (size_t i = 0; i < verify_result.public_key_hashes.size(); ++i) {
if (verify_result.public_key_hashes[i].tag != HASH_VALUE_SHA1)
continue;
sha1_hashes.push_back(verify_result.public_key_hashes[i]);
}
ASSERT_LE(3u, sha1_hashes.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < 3; ++i) {
EXPECT_EQ(HexEncode(kTwitterSPKIs[i], base::kSHA1Length),
HexEncode(sha1_hashes[i].data(), base::kSHA1Length));
}
HashValueVector sha256_hashes;
for (size_t i = 0; i < verify_result.public_key_hashes.size(); ++i) {
if (verify_result.public_key_hashes[i].tag != HASH_VALUE_SHA256)
continue;
sha256_hashes.push_back(verify_result.public_key_hashes[i]);
}
ASSERT_LE(3u, sha256_hashes.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < 3; ++i) {
EXPECT_EQ(HexEncode(kTwitterSPKIsSHA256[i], crypto::kSHA256Length),
HexEncode(sha256_hashes[i].data(), crypto::kSHA256Length));
}
}
// A regression test for http://crbug.com/70293.
// The Key Usage extension in this RSA SSL server certificate does not have
// the keyEncipherment bit.
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, InvalidKeyUsage) {
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> server_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "invalid_key_usage_cert.der");
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), server_cert.get());
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(server_cert.get(),
"jira.aquameta.com",
flags,
NULL,
empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
#if defined(USE_OPENSSL_CERTS) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)
// This certificate has two errors: "invalid key usage" and "untrusted CA".
// However, OpenSSL returns only one (the latter), and we can't detect
// the other errors.
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID, error);
#else
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_CERT_INVALID, error);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_INVALID);
#endif
// TODO(wtc): fix http://crbug.com/75520 to get all the certificate errors
// from NSS.
#if !defined(USE_NSS_CERTS) && !defined(OS_IOS) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)
// The certificate is issued by an unknown CA.
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_AUTHORITY_INVALID);
#endif
}
// Basic test for returning the chain in CertVerifyResult. Note that the
// returned chain may just be a reflection of the originally supplied chain;
// that is, if any errors occur, the default chain returned is an exact copy
// of the certificate to be verified. The remaining VerifyReturn* tests are
// used to ensure that the actual, verified chain is being returned by
// Verify().
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, VerifyReturnChainBasic) {
if (!SupportsReturningVerifiedChain()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping this test in this platform.";
return;
}
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
CertificateList certs = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
certs_dir, "x509_verify_results.chain.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(3U, certs.size());
X509Certificate::OSCertHandles intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(certs[1]->os_cert_handle());
intermediates.push_back(certs[2]->os_cert_handle());
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(certs[2].get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> google_full_chain =
X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(certs[0]->os_cert_handle(),
intermediates);
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL), google_full_chain.get());
ASSERT_EQ(2U, google_full_chain->GetIntermediateCertificates().size());
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
EXPECT_EQ(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL),
verify_result.verified_cert.get());
int error = Verify(google_full_chain.get(),
"127.0.0.1",
0,
NULL,
empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(NULL),
verify_result.verified_cert.get());
EXPECT_NE(google_full_chain, verify_result.verified_cert);
EXPECT_TRUE(X509Certificate::IsSameOSCert(
google_full_chain->os_cert_handle(),
verify_result.verified_cert->os_cert_handle()));
const X509Certificate::OSCertHandles& return_intermediates =
verify_result.verified_cert->GetIntermediateCertificates();
ASSERT_EQ(2U, return_intermediates.size());
EXPECT_TRUE(X509Certificate::IsSameOSCert(return_intermediates[0],
certs[1]->os_cert_handle()));
EXPECT_TRUE(X509Certificate::IsSameOSCert(return_intermediates[1],
certs[2]->os_cert_handle()));
}
// Test that certificates issued for 'intranet' names (that is, containing no
// known public registry controlled domain information) issued by well-known
// CAs are flagged appropriately, while certificates that are issued by
// internal CAs are not flagged.
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, IntranetHostsRejected) {
if (!SupportsDetectingKnownRoots()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping this test in this platform.";
return;
}
CertificateList cert_list = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "reject_intranet_hosts.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, cert_list.size());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(cert_list[0]);
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = 0;
// Intranet names for public CAs should be flagged:
CertVerifyResult dummy_result;
dummy_result.is_issued_by_known_root = true;
verify_proc_ = new MockCertVerifyProc(dummy_result);
error =
Verify(cert.get(), "intranet", 0, NULL, empty_cert_list_, &verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_NON_UNIQUE_NAME);
// However, if the CA is not well known, these should not be flagged:
dummy_result.Reset();
dummy_result.is_issued_by_known_root = false;
verify_proc_ = new MockCertVerifyProc(dummy_result);
error =
Verify(cert.get(), "intranet", 0, NULL, empty_cert_list_, &verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_NON_UNIQUE_NAME);
}
// Test that a SHA-1 certificate from a publicly trusted CA issued after
// 1 January 2016 is rejected, but those issued before that date, or with
// SHA-1 in the intermediate, is not rejected.
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, VerifyRejectsSHA1AfterDeprecation) {
CertVerifyResult dummy_result;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = 0;
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert;
// Publicly trusted SHA-1 leaf certificates issued before 1 January 2016
// are accepted.
verify_result.Reset();
dummy_result.Reset();
dummy_result.is_issued_by_known_root = true;
dummy_result.has_sha1 = true;
dummy_result.has_sha1_leaf = true;
verify_proc_ = new MockCertVerifyProc(dummy_result);
cert = CreateCertificateChainFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(),
"sha1_dec_2015.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
error = Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", 0, NULL, empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_SHA1_SIGNATURE_PRESENT);
// Publicly trusted SHA-1 leaf certificates issued on/after 1 January 2016
// are rejected.
verify_result.Reset();
dummy_result.Reset();
dummy_result.is_issued_by_known_root = true;
dummy_result.has_sha1 = true;
dummy_result.has_sha1_leaf = true;
verify_proc_ = new MockCertVerifyProc(dummy_result);
cert = CreateCertificateChainFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(),
"sha1_jan_2016.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
error = Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", 0, NULL, empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(ERR_CERT_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM, error);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
// Enterprise issued SHA-1 leaf certificates issued on/after 1 January 2016
// remain accepted until SHA-1 is disabled.
verify_result.Reset();
dummy_result.Reset();
dummy_result.is_issued_by_known_root = false;
dummy_result.has_sha1 = true;
dummy_result.has_sha1_leaf = true;
verify_proc_ = new MockCertVerifyProc(dummy_result);
cert = CreateCertificateChainFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(),
"sha1_jan_2016.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
error = Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", 0, NULL, empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_SHA1_SIGNATURE_PRESENT);
// Publicly trusted SHA-1 intermediates issued on/after 1 January 2016 are,
// unfortunately, accepted. This can arise due to OS path building quirks.
verify_result.Reset();
dummy_result.Reset();
dummy_result.is_issued_by_known_root = true;
dummy_result.has_sha1 = true;
dummy_result.has_sha1_leaf = false;
verify_proc_ = new MockCertVerifyProc(dummy_result);
cert = CreateCertificateChainFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(),
"sha1_jan_2016.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
error = Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", 0, NULL, empty_cert_list_,
&verify_result);
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_SHA1_SIGNATURE_PRESENT);
}
// Test that the certificate returned in CertVerifyResult is able to reorder
// certificates that are not ordered from end-entity to root. While this is
// a protocol violation if sent during a TLS handshake, if multiple sources
// of intermediate certificates are combined, it's possible that order may
// not be maintained.
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, VerifyReturnChainProperlyOrdered) {
if (!SupportsReturningVerifiedChain()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping this test in this platform.";
return;
}
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
CertificateList certs = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
certs_dir, "x509_verify_results.chain.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(3U, certs.size());