Uniformize vocabulary: LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key & LUKS Disk Recovery Key

tlaurion · tlaurion · commit de7e2bb6459d · 2024-01-19T13:08:53.000-05:00
Signed-off-by: Thierry Laurion &lt;insurgo@riseup.net&gt;
diff --git a/FAQ.md b/FAQ.md
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ to deceive you and steal your login password?  Maybe!  It wouldn't get
 your disk password, which is perhaps an improvement.
 
 
-Disk key in TPM (TPM Disk Unlock Key) or user passphrase?
+Disk key in TPM (LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key) or user passphrase?
 ---
 Depends on your threat model.  With the disk key in the TPM an attacker
 would need to have the entire machine (or a backdoor in the TPM)
diff --git a/initrd/bin/kexec-insert-key b/initrd/bin/kexec-insert-key
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ if [ "$unseal_failed" = "y" ]; then
 	confirm_boot="n"
 	read \
 		-n 1 \
-		-p "Do you wish to boot and use the disk recovery key? [Y/n] " \
+		-p "Do you wish to boot and use the LUKS Disk Recovery Key? [Y/n] " \
 		confirm_boot
 
 	if [ "$confirm_boot" != 'y' \
diff --git a/initrd/bin/kexec-save-default b/initrd/bin/kexec-save-default
@@ -189,10 +189,10 @@ save_key="n"
 
 if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ] && [ "$CONFIG_TPM_NO_LUKS_DISK_UNLOCK" != "y" ] && [ "$CONFIG_BASIC" != y ]; then
 	DEBUG "TPM is enabled and TPM_NO_LUKS_DISK_UNLOCK is not set"
-	DEBUG "Checking if a a TPM Disk Unlock Key was previously set up from $KEY_DEVICES"
+	DEBUG "Checking if a a LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key was previously set up from $KEY_DEVICES"
 	#check if $KEY_DEVICES file exists and is not empty
 	if [ -r "$KEY_DEVICES" ] && [ -s "$KEY_DEVICES" ]; then
-		DEBUG "TPM Disk Unlock Key was previously set up from $KEY_DEVICES"
+		DEBUG "LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key was previously set up from $KEY_DEVICES"
 		read \
 			-n 1 \
 			-p "Do you want to reseal a disk key to the TPM [y/N]: " \
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ] && [ "$CONFIG_TPM_NO_LUKS_DISK_UNLOCK" != "y" ] && [
 			save_key="y"
 		fi
 	else
-		DEBUG "No previous TPM Disk Unlock Key was set up for LUKS devices, confirming to add a Disk Encryption Key to the TPM"
+		DEBUG "No previous LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key was set up, confirming to add a Disk Encryption Key to the TPM"
 		read \
 			-n 1 \
 			-p "Do you wish to add a disk encryption to the TPM [y/N]: " \
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ] && [ "$CONFIG_TPM_NO_LUKS_DISK_UNLOCK" != "y" ] && [
 
 	if [ "$save_key" = "y" ]; then
 		if [ -n "$old_key_devices" ] || [ -n "$old_lvm_volume_group" ]; then
-			DEBUG "Previous TPM Disk Unlock Key was set up for LUKS devices $old_key_devices $old_lvm_volume_group"
+			DEBUG "Previous LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key was set up for $old_key_devices $old_lvm_volume_group"
 			read \
 				-n 1 \
 				-p "Do you want to reuse configured Encrypted LVM groups/Block devices? (Y/n):" \
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ] && [ "$CONFIG_TPM_NO_LUKS_DISK_UNLOCK" != "y" ] && [
 				prompt_for_existing_encrypted_lvms_or_disks
 			fi
 		else
-			DEBUG "No previous TPM Disk Unlock Key was set up for LUKS devices, setting up new one"
+			DEBUG "No previous LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key was set up, setting up"
 			prompt_for_existing_encrypted_lvms_or_disks
 		fi
 
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ if [ "$CONFIG_TPM" = "y" ] && [ "$CONFIG_TPM_NO_LUKS_DISK_UNLOCK" != "y" ] && [
 			save_key_params="$save_key_params $key_devices"
 		fi
 		kexec-save-key $save_key_params ||
-			die "Failed to save the TPM Disk Unlock Key"
+			die "Failed to save the LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key"
 	fi
 fi
 
diff --git a/initrd/bin/kexec-save-key b/initrd/bin/kexec-save-key
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ for dev in $key_devices; do
 done
 
 kexec-seal-key $paramsdir ||
-	die "Failed to save and generate TPM Disk Unlock Key"
+	die "Failed to save and generate LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key"
 
 if [ "$skip_sign" != "y" ]; then
 	extparam=
diff --git a/initrd/bin/kexec-seal-key b/initrd/bin/kexec-seal-key
@@ -47,21 +47,21 @@ DEBUG "$(pcrs)"
 # LUKS Key slot 0 is the manual recovery pass phrase
 # that they user entered when they installed OS,
 # key slot 1 is the one that we've generated.
-read -s -p "Enter Disk Recovery Key/passphrase: " disk_password
+read -s -p "Enter LUKS Disk Recovery Key/passphrase: " disk_password
 echo -n "$disk_password" >"$RECOVERY_KEY"
 echo
 
-read -s -p "New TPM Disk Unlock Key passphrase for booting: " key_password
+read -s -p "New LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key passphrase for booting: " key_password
 echo
-read -s -p "Repeat TPM Disk Unlock Key passphrase for booting: " key_password2
+read -s -p "Repeat LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key passphrase for booting: " key_password2
 echo
 
 if [ "$key_password" != "$key_password2" ]; then
 	die "Key passphrases do not match"
 fi
 
 # Generate key file
-echo "++++++ Generating new randomized 128 bytes key file that will be sealed/unsealed by TPM Disk Unlock Key passphrase"
+echo "++++++ Generating new randomized 128 bytes key file that will be sealed/unsealed by LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key passphrase"
 dd \
 	if=/dev/urandom \
 	of="$KEY_FILE" \
@@ -100,29 +100,29 @@ for dev in $(cat "$KEY_DEVICES" | cut -d\  -f1); do
 		# Check if slot 1 is the only one existing
 		if [ "$(cryptsetup luksDump "$dev" | grep -c "Slot 1: ENABLED")" -eq 1 ] || [ "$(cryptsetup luksDump "$dev" | grep -c "1: luks2")" -eq 1 ]; then
 			warn "Slot 1 is the only one existing on $dev LUKS header. Heads cannot use it to store TPM sealed LUKS Disk Unlock Key"
-			warn "Slot 1 should not be the only slot existing on $dev LUKS header. Slot 0 should be used to store Disk Recovery Key/passphrase"
+			warn "Slot 1 should not be the only slot existing on $dev LUKS header. Slot 0 should be used to store LUKS Disk Recovery Key/passphrase"
 			die "You can safely fix this before continuing through Heads recovery shell: cryptsetup luksAddKey $dev"
 		fi
 	else
 		DEBUG "Slot 1 is not the only existing slot on $dev LUKS header."
-		DEBUG "$dev LUKS header's slot 1 will store LUKS Disk Unlock Key that TPM will seal/unseal with TPM Disk Unlock Key passphrase"
+		DEBUG "$dev LUKS header's slot 1 will store LUKS Disk Unlock Key that TPM will seal/unseal with LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key passphrase"
 	fi
 done
 
 # Remove all the old keys from slot 1
 for dev in $(cat "$KEY_DEVICES" | cut -d\  -f1); do
-	echo "++++++ $dev: Removing old TPM Disk Unlock Key in LUKS slot 1"
+	echo "++++++ $dev: Removing old LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key in LUKS slot 1"
 	cryptsetup luksKillSlot \
 		--key-file "$RECOVERY_KEY" \
 		$dev 1 ||
-		warn "$dev: removal of TPM Disk Unlock Key in LUKS slot 1 failed: might not exist. Continuing"
+		warn "$dev: removal of LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key in LUKS slot 1 failed: might not exist. Continuing"
 
-	echo "++++++ $dev: Adding TPM Disk Unlock Key to LUKS slot 1"
+	echo "++++++ $dev: Adding LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key to LUKS slot 1"
 	cryptsetup luksAddKey \
 		--key-file "$RECOVERY_KEY" \
 		--key-slot 1 \
 		$dev "$KEY_FILE" ||
-		die "$dev: Unable to add TPM Disk Unlock Key to LUKS slot 1"
+		die "$dev: Unable to add LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key to LUKS slot 1"
 done
 
 # Now that we have setup the new keys, measure the PCRs
@@ -140,23 +140,23 @@ tpmr pcrread -a 3 "$pcrf"
 # Note that PCR 4 needs to be set with the "normal-boot" path value, read it from event log.
 tpmr calcfuturepcr 4 >>"$pcrf"
 if [ "$CONFIG_USB_KEYBOARD" = "y" -o -r /lib/modules/libata.ko -o -x /bin/hotp_verification ]; then
-	DEBUG "Sealing TPM Disk Unlock key with PCR5 involvement (additional kernel modules are loaded per board config)..."
+	DEBUG "Sealing LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key with PCR5 involvement (additional kernel modules are loaded per board config)..."
 	# Here, we take pcr 5 into consideration if modules are expected to be measured+loaded
 	tpmr pcrread -a 5 "$pcrf"
 else
-	DEBUG "Sealing TPM Disk Unlock Key with PCR5=0 (NO additional kernel modules are loaded per board config)..."
+	DEBUG "Sealing LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key with PCR5=0 (NO additional kernel modules are loaded per board config)..."
 	#no kernel modules are expected to be measured+loaded
 	tpmr calcfuturepcr 5 >>"$pcrf"
 fi
 # Precompute the value for pcr 6
-DEBUG "Precomputing TPM future value for PCR6 sealing/unsealing of TPM Disk Unlock Key..."
+DEBUG "Precomputing TPM future value for PCR6 sealing/unsealing of LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key..."
 tpmr calcfuturepcr 6 "/tmp/luksDump.txt" >>"$pcrf"
 # We take into consideration user files in cbfs
 tpmr pcrread -a 7 "$pcrf"
 
 DO_WITH_DEBUG --mask-position 7 \
 	tpmr seal "$KEY_FILE" "$TPM_INDEX" 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7 "$pcrf" \
-	"$TPM_SIZE" "$key_password" || die "Unable to write TPM Disk Unlock Key to NVRAM"
+	"$TPM_SIZE" "$key_password" || die "Unable to write LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key to NVRAM"
 
 # should be okay if this fails
 shred -n 10 -z -u "$pcrf" 2>/dev/null ||
diff --git a/initrd/bin/kexec-unseal-key b/initrd/bin/kexec-unseal-key
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ DEBUG "$(pcrs)"
 
 failed=0
 for tries in 1 2 3; do
-	read -s -p "Enter LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key passphrase (blank to abort): " tpm_password
+	read -s -p "Enter LUKS LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key passphrase (blank to abort): " tpm_password
 	echo
 	if [ -z "$tpm_password" ]; then
 		die "Aborting unseal disk encryption key"
diff --git a/initrd/bin/oem-factory-reset b/initrd/bin/oem-factory-reset
@@ -626,7 +626,7 @@ generate_checksums() {
         mount -o remount,rw /boot || whiptail_error_die "Unable to mount /boot"
     fi
 
-    #Check if previous TPM Disk unlock Key was set
+    #Check if previous LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key was set
     if [ -e /boot/kexec_key_devices.txt ]; then
         TPM_DISK_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SET=1
     fi
@@ -657,7 +657,7 @@ generate_checksums() {
         fi
     fi
 
-    # set default boot option only if no TPM Disk Unlock Key previously set
+    # set default boot option only if no LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key previously set
     if [ -z "$TPM_DISK_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SET" ]; then
         set_default_boot_option
     fi
@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ if [ "$use_defaults" == "n" -o "$use_defaults" == "N" ]; then
         echo -e "\n"
     fi
 
-    echo -e -n "Would you like to re-encrypt LUKS encrypted container and generate new Disk Recovery key?\n (Highly recommended if you didn't install the operating system yourself: this would prevent any LUKS backed up header to be restored to access encrypted data) [y/N]: "
+    echo -e -n "Would you like to re-encrypt LUKS encrypted container and generate new LUKS Disk Recovery Key?\n (Highly recommended if you didn't install the operating system yourself: this would prevent any LUKS backed up header to be restored to access encrypted data) [y/N]: "
     read -n 1 prompt_output
     echo
     if [ "$prompt_output" == "y" \
@@ -1022,13 +1022,13 @@ if [ "$use_defaults" == "n" -o "$use_defaults" == "N" ]; then
     if [ -n "$luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase_desired" -a -z "$luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase" ]; then
         # We catch here if changing LUKS Disk Recovery Key passphrase was desired
         #  but yet undone. This is if not being covered by the single password
-        echo -e "\nEnter desired replacement for current Disk Recovery Key passphrase (At least 8 characters long):"
+        echo -e "\nEnter desired replacement for current LUKS Disk Recovery Key passphrase (At least 8 characters long):"
         while [[ ${#luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase} -lt 8 ]]; do
             {
                 read -r luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase
             }
         done
-        #We test that current Disk Recovery Key passphrase is known prior of going further
+        #We test that current LUKS Disk Recovery Key passphrase is known prior of going further
         test_luks_current_disk_recovery_key_passphrase
         echo -e "\n"
     fi
@@ -1147,7 +1147,7 @@ if [[ "$SKIP_BOOT" == "n" ]]; then
 fi
 
 if [ -n "$luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_desired" -a -n "$luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase_desired" ]; then
-    #Reencryption of disk, disk recovery key and Disk Recovery Key passphrase change is requested
+    #Reencryption of disk, LUKS Disk Recovery Key and LUKS Disk Recovery Key passphrase change is requested
     luks_change_passphrase
     luks_reencrypt
 elif [ -n "$luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_desired" -a -z "$luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase_desired" ]; then
diff --git a/initrd/etc/functions b/initrd/etc/functions
@@ -82,12 +82,12 @@ confirm_totp() {
 
 reseal_tpm_disk_decryption_key() {
 	TRACE "Under /etc/functions:reseal_tpm_disk_decryption_key"
-	#For robustness, exit early if TPM Disk Unlock Key is prohibited in board configs
+	#For robustness, exit early if LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key is prohibited in board configs
 	if [ "$CONFIG_TPM_DISK_UNLOCK_KEY" == "n" ]; then
-		DEBUG "TPM Disk Unlock Key is prohibited in board configs"
+		DEBUG "LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key is prohibited in board configs"
 		return
 	else
-		DEBUG "TPM Disk Unlock Key is allowed in board configs. Continuing"
+		DEBUG "LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key is allowed in board configs. Continuing"
 	fi
 
 	if ! grep -q /boot /proc/mounts; then
@@ -96,8 +96,8 @@ reseal_tpm_disk_decryption_key() {
 	fi
 
 	if [ -s /boot/kexec_key_devices.txt ] || [ -s /boot/kexec_key_lvm.txt ]; then
-		warn "TPM sealed Disk Unlock Key secret needs to be resealed alongside TOTP/HOTP secret"
-		echo "Resealing TPM LUKS Disk Unlock Key to be unsealed by TPM Disk Unlock Key passphrase"
+		warn "LUKS TPM sealed Disk Unlock Key secret needs to be resealed alongside TOTP/HOTP secret"
+		echo "Resealing LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key to be unsealed by LUKS TPM Disk Unlock Key passphrase"
 		while ! kexec-seal-key /boot; do
 			warn "Recovery Disk Encryption key passphrase/TPM Owner Password may be invalid. Please try again"
 		done
diff --git a/initrd/etc/luks-functions b/initrd/etc/luks-functions
diff --git a/modules/zstd b/modules/zstd
