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| 1 | +use sqlx::{Error, PgPool}; |
| 2 | + |
| 3 | +use std::{cmp, str}; |
| 4 | + |
| 5 | +// https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2024-0363.html |
| 6 | +#[sqlx::test(migrations = false, fixtures("./fixtures/rustsec/2024_0363.sql"))] |
| 7 | +async fn rustsec_2024_0363(pool: PgPool) -> anyhow::Result<()> { |
| 8 | + let overflow_len = 4 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024; // 4 GiB |
| 9 | + |
| 10 | + // These three strings concatenated together will be the first query the Postgres backend "sees" |
| 11 | + // |
| 12 | + // Rather contrived because this already represents an injection vulnerability, |
| 13 | + // but it's easier to demonstrate the bug with a simple `Query` message |
| 14 | + // than the `Prepare` -> `Bind` -> `Execute` flow. |
| 15 | + let real_query_prefix = "INSERT INTO injection_target(message) VALUES ('"; |
| 16 | + let fake_message = "fake_msg') RETURNING id;\0"; |
| 17 | + let real_query_suffix = "') RETURNING id"; |
| 18 | + |
| 19 | + // Our payload is another simple `Query` message |
| 20 | + let real_payload = |
| 21 | + "Q\0\0\0\x4DUPDATE injection_target SET message = 'you''ve been pwned!' WHERE id = 1\0"; |
| 22 | + |
| 23 | + // This is the value we want the length prefix to overflow to (including the length of the prefix itself) |
| 24 | + // This will leave the backend's buffer pointing at our real payload. |
| 25 | + let fake_payload_len = real_query_prefix.len() + fake_message.len() + 4; |
| 26 | + |
| 27 | + // Pretty easy to see that this should overflow to `fake_payload_len` |
| 28 | + let target_payload_len = overflow_len + fake_payload_len; |
| 29 | + |
| 30 | + // This is the length we expect `injected_value` to be |
| 31 | + let expected_inject_len = target_payload_len |
| 32 | + - 4 // Length prefix |
| 33 | + - real_query_prefix.len() |
| 34 | + - (real_query_suffix.len() + 1 /* NUL terminator */); |
| 35 | + |
| 36 | + let pad_to_len = expected_inject_len - 5; // Header for FLUSH message that eats `real_query_suffix` (see below) |
| 37 | + |
| 38 | + let expected_payload_len = 4 // length prefix |
| 39 | + + real_query_prefix.len() |
| 40 | + + expected_inject_len |
| 41 | + + real_query_suffix.len() |
| 42 | + + 1; // NUL terminator |
| 43 | + |
| 44 | + let expected_wrapped_len = expected_payload_len % overflow_len; |
| 45 | + assert_eq!(expected_wrapped_len, fake_payload_len); |
| 46 | + |
| 47 | + // This will be the string we inject into the query. |
| 48 | + let mut injected_value = String::with_capacity(expected_inject_len); |
| 49 | + |
| 50 | + injected_value.push_str(fake_message); |
| 51 | + injected_value.push_str(real_payload); |
| 52 | + |
| 53 | + // The Postgres backend reads the `FLUSH` message but ignores its contents. |
| 54 | + // This gives us a variable-length NOP that lets us pad to the length we want, |
| 55 | + // as well as a way to eat `real_query_suffix` without breaking the connection. |
| 56 | + let flush_fill = "\0".repeat(9996); |
| 57 | + |
| 58 | + let flush_fmt_code = 'H'; // note: 'F' is `FunctionCall`. |
| 59 | + |
| 60 | + 'outer: while injected_value.len() < pad_to_len { |
| 61 | + let remaining_len = pad_to_len - injected_value.len(); |
| 62 | + |
| 63 | + // The max length of a FLUSH message is 10,000, including the length prefix. |
| 64 | + let flush_len = cmp::min( |
| 65 | + remaining_len - 1, // minus format code |
| 66 | + 10000, |
| 67 | + ); |
| 68 | + |
| 69 | + // We need `flush_len` to be valid UTF-8 when encoded in big-endian |
| 70 | + // in order to push it to the string. |
| 71 | + // |
| 72 | + // Not every value is going to be valid though, so we search for one that is. |
| 73 | + 'inner: for flush_len in (4..=flush_len).rev() { |
| 74 | + let flush_len_be = (flush_len as i32).to_be_bytes(); |
| 75 | + |
| 76 | + let Ok(flush_len_str) = str::from_utf8(&flush_len_be) else { |
| 77 | + continue 'inner; |
| 78 | + }; |
| 79 | + |
| 80 | + let fill_len = flush_len - 4; |
| 81 | + |
| 82 | + injected_value.push(flush_fmt_code); |
| 83 | + injected_value.push_str(flush_len_str); |
| 84 | + injected_value.push_str(&flush_fill[..fill_len]); |
| 85 | + |
| 86 | + continue 'outer; |
| 87 | + } |
| 88 | + |
| 89 | + panic!("unable to find a valid encoding/split for {flush_len}"); |
| 90 | + } |
| 91 | + |
| 92 | + assert_eq!(injected_value.len(), pad_to_len); |
| 93 | + |
| 94 | + // The amount of data the last FLUSH message has to eat |
| 95 | + let eat_len = real_query_suffix.len() + 1; // plus NUL terminator |
| 96 | + |
| 97 | + // Push the FLUSH message that will eat `real_query_suffix` |
| 98 | + injected_value.push(flush_fmt_code); |
| 99 | + injected_value.push_str(str::from_utf8(&(eat_len as i32).to_be_bytes()).unwrap()); |
| 100 | + // The value will be in the buffer already. |
| 101 | + |
| 102 | + assert_eq!(expected_inject_len, injected_value.len()); |
| 103 | + |
| 104 | + let query = format!("{real_query_prefix}{injected_value}{real_query_suffix}"); |
| 105 | + |
| 106 | + // The length of the `Query` message we've created |
| 107 | + let final_payload_len = 4 // length prefix |
| 108 | + + query.len() |
| 109 | + + 1; // NUL terminator |
| 110 | + |
| 111 | + assert_eq!(expected_payload_len, final_payload_len); |
| 112 | + |
| 113 | + let wrapped_len = final_payload_len % overflow_len; |
| 114 | + |
| 115 | + assert_eq!(wrapped_len, fake_payload_len); |
| 116 | + |
| 117 | + let res = sqlx::raw_sql(&query) |
| 118 | + // Note: the connection may hang afterward |
| 119 | + // because `pending_ready_for_query_count` will underflow. |
| 120 | + .execute(&pool) |
| 121 | + .await; |
| 122 | + |
| 123 | + if let Err(e) = res { |
| 124 | + // Connection rejected the query; we're happy. |
| 125 | + if matches!(e, Error::Protocol(_)) { |
| 126 | + return Ok(()); |
| 127 | + } |
| 128 | + |
| 129 | + panic!("unexpected error: {e:?}"); |
| 130 | + } |
| 131 | + |
| 132 | + let messages: Vec<String> = |
| 133 | + sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT message FROM injection_target ORDER BY id") |
| 134 | + .fetch_all(&pool) |
| 135 | + .await?; |
| 136 | + |
| 137 | + // If the injection succeeds, `messages` will look like: |
| 138 | + // ["you've been pwned!'.to_string(), "fake_msg".to_string()] |
| 139 | + assert_eq!( |
| 140 | + messages, |
| 141 | + ["existing message".to_string(), "fake_msg".to_string()] |
| 142 | + ); |
| 143 | + |
| 144 | + // Injection didn't affect our database; we're happy. |
| 145 | + Ok(()) |
| 146 | +} |
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