samples/bpf: improve xdpsock application#36
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samples/bpf: improve xdpsock application#36kernel-patches-bot wants to merge 4 commits intobpf-nextfrom
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Master branch: 2f7de98 patch https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/patch/1599726666-8431-2-git-send-email-magnus.karlsson@gmail.com/ applied successfully |
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Master branch: e3b9626 patch https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/patch/1599726666-8431-2-git-send-email-magnus.karlsson@gmail.com/ applied successfully |
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Master branch: d66423f patch https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/patch/1599726666-8431-2-git-send-email-magnus.karlsson@gmail.com/ applied successfully |
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Fix the sending of a single packet (or small burst) in xdpsock when executing in copy mode. Currently, the l2fwd application in xdpsock only transmits the packets after a batch of them has been received, which might be confusing if you only send one packet and expect that it is returned pronto. Fix this by calling sendto() more often and add a comment in the code that states that this can be optimized if needed. Signed-off-by: Magnus Karlsson <magnus.karlsson@intel.com> Reported-by: Tirthendu Sarkar <tirthendu.sarkar@intel.com> --- samples/bpf/xdpsock_user.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
Fix a possible deadlock in the l2fwd application in xdpsock that can occur when there is no space in the Tx ring. There are two ways to get the kernel to consume entries in the Tx ring: calling sendto() to make it send packets and freeing entries from the completion ring, as the kernel will not send a packet if there is no space for it to add a completion entry in the completion ring. The Tx loop in l2fwd only used to call sendto(). This patches adds cleaning the completion ring in that loop. Signed-off-by: Magnus Karlsson <magnus.karlsson@intel.com> --- samples/bpf/xdpsock_user.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
Add a quiet option (-Q) that disables the statistics print outs of xdpsock. This is good to have when measuring 0% loss rate performance as it will be quite terrible if the application uses printfs. Signed-off-by: Magnus Karlsson <magnus.karlsson@intel.com> --- samples/bpf/xdpsock_user.c | 19 ++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
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Master branch: d72714c patch https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/patch/1599726666-8431-2-git-send-email-magnus.karlsson@gmail.com/ applied successfully |
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At least one diff in series https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/list/?series=200757 irrelevant now. Closing PR. |
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Use buffer allocated with kmalloc instead of with stack to fix kernel crash due to Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffffc0095cbce8. [ 156.977349] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffffc0095cbce8 [ 156.985270] Mem abort info: [ 156.988059] ESR = 0x96000045 [ 156.991104] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 156.997013] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 157.000057] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 157.003190] Data abort info: [ 157.006061] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000045 [ 157.009887] CM = 0, WnR = 1 [ 157.012850] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp = 0000000042adcba2 [ 157.019715] [ffffffc0095cbce8] pgd=0000000000000000, pud=0000000000000000 [ 157.026499] Internal error: Oops: 96000045 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 157.032065] Modules linked in: mt7663s mt7663_usb_sdio_common mt7615_common ... [ 157.073007] Process CompositorTileW (pid: 1625, stack limit = 0x000000003f2389fc) [ 157.080484] CPU: 0 PID: 1625 Comm: CompositorTileW Not tainted 4.19.137 #36 [ 157.092219] pstate: 80000085 (Nzcv daIf -PAN -UAO) [ 157.097012] pc : __memcpy+0xc0/0x180 [ 157.100585] lr : swiotlb_tbl_unmap_single+0x84/0x14c [ 157.105540] sp : ffffff8008003cb0 [ 157.108845] x29: ffffff8008003cb0 x28: ffffff9c1a211f60 [ 157.114149] x27: ffffff9c19ecc018 x26: 0000000000001000 [ 157.119452] x25: ffffff9c1a378000 x24: 0000000000000001 [ 157.124755] x23: ffffff9c1a378000 x22: 00000000000001ff [ 157.130058] x21: 0000000000000000 x20: 00000000fbefe800 [ 157.135360] x19: 0000000000000070 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 157.140663] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 157.145965] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 [ 157.151267] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 000000000000000d [ 157.156569] x11: 000000000000000c x10: 0000000a7befe800 [ 157.161873] x9 : fffffff680000000 x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 157.167175] x7 : 0000000100000003 x6 : ffffffc0095cbce8 [ 157.172479] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 [ 157.177781] x3 : 0000000000000002 x2 : fffffffffffffff0 [ 157.183085] x1 : ffffffca7befe810 x0 : ffffffc0095cbce8 [ 157.188389] Call trace: [ 157.190832] __memcpy+0xc0/0x180 [ 157.194053] swiotlb_unmap_sg_attrs+0xa8/0xb0 [ 157.198406] __swiotlb_unmap_sg_attrs+0x8c/0xa4 [ 157.202931] msdc_unprepare_data+0x6c/0x84 [ 157.207019] msdc_request_done+0x58/0x98 [ 157.210934] msdc_data_xfer_done+0x1a8/0x1d0 [ 157.215195] msdc_irq+0x12c/0x17c [ 157.218505] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0xd8/0x298 [ 157.223202] handle_irq_event+0x60/0xdc [ 157.227031] handle_fasteoi_irq+0xa4/0x1d4 [ 157.231120] __handle_domain_irq+0x84/0xc4 [ 157.235210] gic_handle_irq+0x124/0x1a4 [ 157.239038] el0_irq_naked+0x4c/0x54 [ 157.242608] Code: 14000028 f1020042 5400024a a8c12027 (a88120c7) [ 157.248693] ---[ end trace 28b8090135b0a2e1 ]--- [ 157.265589] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt [ 157.271944] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs [ 157.275865] Kernel Offset: 0x1c10e00000 from 0xffffff8008000000 [ 157.281779] CPU features: 0x0,2188200c [ 157.285519] Memory Limit: none Fixes: a66cbdd ("mt76: mt7615: introduce mt7663s support") Co-developed-by: YN Chen <YN.Chen@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: YN Chen <YN.Chen@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Wang <sean.wang@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
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…me PM
The ch->lock is used to protect the whole enable() and read() of
sh_cmt's implementation of struct clocksource. The enable()
implementation calls pm_runtime_get_sync() which may result in the clock
source to be read() triggering a cyclic lockdep warning for the
ch->lock.
The sh_cmt driver implement its own balancing of calls to
sh_cmt_{enable,disable}() with flags in sh_cmt_{start,stop}(). It does
this to deal with that start and stop are shared between the clock
source and clock event providers. While this could be improved on
verifying corner cases based on any substantial rework on all devices
this driver supports might prove hard.
As a first step separate the PM handling for clock event and clock
source. Always put/get the device when enabling/disabling the clock
source but keep the clock event logic unchanged. This allows the sh_cmt
implementation of struct clocksource to call PM without holding the
ch->lock and avoiding the deadlock.
Triggering and log of the deadlock warning,
# echo e60f0000.timer > /sys/devices/system/clocksource/clocksource0/current_clocksource
[ 46.948370] ======================================================
[ 46.954730] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[ 46.961094] 5.10.0-rc6-arm64-renesas-00001-g0e5fd7414e8b #36 Not tainted
[ 46.967985] ------------------------------------------------------
[ 46.974342] migration/0/11 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 46.979543] ffff0000403ed220 (&dev->power.lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: __pm_runtime_resume+0x40/0x74
[ 46.988445]
[ 46.988445] but task is already holding lock:
[ 46.994441] ffff000040ad0298 (&ch->lock){....}-{2:2}, at: sh_cmt_start+0x28/0x210
[ 47.002173]
[ 47.002173] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[ 47.002173]
[ 47.010573]
[ 47.010573] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[ 47.018262]
[ 47.018262] -> #3 (&ch->lock){....}-{2:2}:
[ 47.024033] lock_acquire.part.0+0x120/0x330
[ 47.028970] lock_acquire+0x64/0x80
[ 47.033105] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x7c/0xc4
[ 47.038130] sh_cmt_start+0x28/0x210
[ 47.042352] sh_cmt_clocksource_enable+0x28/0x50
[ 47.047644] change_clocksource+0x9c/0x160
[ 47.052402] multi_cpu_stop+0xa4/0x190
[ 47.056799] cpu_stopper_thread+0x90/0x154
[ 47.061557] smpboot_thread_fn+0x244/0x270
[ 47.066310] kthread+0x154/0x160
[ 47.070175] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 47.074390]
[ 47.074390] -> #2 (tk_core.seq.seqcount){----}-{0:0}:
[ 47.081136] lock_acquire.part.0+0x120/0x330
[ 47.086070] lock_acquire+0x64/0x80
[ 47.090203] seqcount_lockdep_reader_access.constprop.0+0x74/0x100
[ 47.097096] ktime_get+0x28/0xa0
[ 47.100960] hrtimer_start_range_ns+0x210/0x2dc
[ 47.106164] generic_sched_clock_init+0x70/0x88
[ 47.111364] sched_clock_init+0x40/0x64
[ 47.115853] start_kernel+0x494/0x524
[ 47.120156]
[ 47.120156] -> #1 (hrtimer_bases.lock){-.-.}-{2:2}:
[ 47.126721] lock_acquire.part.0+0x120/0x330
[ 47.136042] lock_acquire+0x64/0x80
[ 47.144461] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x7c/0xc4
[ 47.153721] hrtimer_start_range_ns+0x68/0x2dc
[ 47.163054] rpm_suspend+0x308/0x5dc
[ 47.171473] rpm_idle+0xc4/0x2a4
[ 47.179550] pm_runtime_work+0x98/0xc0
[ 47.188209] process_one_work+0x294/0x6f0
[ 47.197142] worker_thread+0x70/0x45c
[ 47.205661] kthread+0x154/0x160
[ 47.213673] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 47.221957]
[ 47.221957] -> #0 (&dev->power.lock){-...}-{2:2}:
[ 47.236292] check_noncircular+0x128/0x140
[ 47.244907] __lock_acquire+0x13b0/0x204c
[ 47.253332] lock_acquire.part.0+0x120/0x330
[ 47.262033] lock_acquire+0x64/0x80
[ 47.269826] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x7c/0xc4
[ 47.278430] __pm_runtime_resume+0x40/0x74
[ 47.286758] sh_cmt_start+0x84/0x210
[ 47.294537] sh_cmt_clocksource_enable+0x28/0x50
[ 47.303449] change_clocksource+0x9c/0x160
[ 47.311783] multi_cpu_stop+0xa4/0x190
[ 47.319720] cpu_stopper_thread+0x90/0x154
[ 47.328022] smpboot_thread_fn+0x244/0x270
[ 47.336298] kthread+0x154/0x160
[ 47.343708] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 47.351445]
[ 47.351445] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 47.351445]
[ 47.370225] Chain exists of:
[ 47.370225] &dev->power.lock --> tk_core.seq.seqcount --> &ch->lock
[ 47.370225]
[ 47.392003] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 47.392003]
[ 47.405314] CPU0 CPU1
[ 47.413569] ---- ----
[ 47.421768] lock(&ch->lock);
[ 47.428425] lock(tk_core.seq.seqcount);
[ 47.438701] lock(&ch->lock);
[ 47.447930] lock(&dev->power.lock);
[ 47.455172]
[ 47.455172] *** DEADLOCK ***
[ 47.455172]
[ 47.471433] 3 locks held by migration/0/11:
[ 47.479099] #0: ffff8000113c9278 (timekeeper_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: change_clocksource+0x2c/0x160
[ 47.491834] #1: ffff8000113c8f88 (tk_core.seq.seqcount){----}-{0:0}, at: multi_cpu_stop+0xa4/0x190
[ 47.504727] #2: ffff000040ad0298 (&ch->lock){....}-{2:2}, at: sh_cmt_start+0x28/0x210
[ 47.516541]
[ 47.516541] stack backtrace:
[ 47.528480] CPU: 0 PID: 11 Comm: migration/0 Not tainted 5.10.0-rc6-arm64-renesas-00001-g0e5fd7414e8b #36
[ 47.542147] Hardware name: Renesas Salvator-X 2nd version board based on r8a77965 (DT)
[ 47.554241] Call trace:
[ 47.560832] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x190
[ 47.568670] show_stack+0x14/0x30
[ 47.576144] dump_stack+0xe8/0x130
[ 47.583670] print_circular_bug+0x1f0/0x200
[ 47.592015] check_noncircular+0x128/0x140
[ 47.600289] __lock_acquire+0x13b0/0x204c
[ 47.608486] lock_acquire.part.0+0x120/0x330
[ 47.616953] lock_acquire+0x64/0x80
[ 47.624582] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x7c/0xc4
[ 47.633114] __pm_runtime_resume+0x40/0x74
[ 47.641371] sh_cmt_start+0x84/0x210
[ 47.649115] sh_cmt_clocksource_enable+0x28/0x50
[ 47.657916] change_clocksource+0x9c/0x160
[ 47.666165] multi_cpu_stop+0xa4/0x190
[ 47.674056] cpu_stopper_thread+0x90/0x154
[ 47.682308] smpboot_thread_fn+0x244/0x270
[ 47.690560] kthread+0x154/0x160
[ 47.697927] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 47.708447] clocksource: Switched to clocksource e60f0000.timer
Signed-off-by: Niklas Söderlund <niklas.soderlund+renesas@ragnatech.se>
Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201205021921.1456190-2-niklas.soderlund+renesas@ragnatech.se
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…r tcpm port A pending hrtimer may expire after the kthread_worker of tcpm port is destroyed, see below kernel dump when do module unload, fix it by cancel the 2 hrtimers. [ 111.517018] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff8000118cb880 [ 111.518786] blk_update_request: I/O error, dev sda, sector 60061185 op 0x0:(READ) flags 0x0 phys_seg 1 prio class 0 [ 111.526594] Mem abort info: [ 111.526597] ESR = 0x96000047 [ 111.526600] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 111.526604] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 111.526607] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 111.526610] Data abort info: [ 111.526612] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000047 [ 111.526615] CM = 0, WnR = 1 [ 111.526619] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000041d75000 [ 111.526623] [ffff8000118cb880] pgd=10000001bffff003, p4d=10000001bffff003, pud=10000001bfffe003, pmd=10000001bfffa003, pte=0000000000000000 [ 111.526642] Internal error: Oops: 96000047 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 111.526647] Modules linked in: dwc3_imx8mp dwc3 phy_fsl_imx8mq_usb [last unloaded: tcpci] [ 111.526663] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc4-00927-gebbe9dbd802c-dirty #36 [ 111.526670] Hardware name: NXP i.MX8MPlus EVK board (DT) [ 111.526674] pstate: 800000c5 (Nzcv daIF -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) [ 111.526681] pc : queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x1a0/0x390 [ 111.526695] lr : _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x88/0xb4 [ 111.526703] sp : ffff800010003e20 [ 111.526706] x29: ffff800010003e20 x28: ffff00017f380180 [ 111.537156] buffer_io_error: 6 callbacks suppressed [ 111.537162] Buffer I/O error on dev sda1, logical block 60040704, async page read [ 111.539932] x27: ffff00017f3801c0 [ 111.539938] x26: ffff800010ba2490 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000001 [ 111.543025] blk_update_request: I/O error, dev sda, sector 60061186 op 0x0:(READ) flags 0x0 phys_seg 7 prio class 0 [ 111.548304] [ 111.548306] x23: 00000000000000c0 x22: ffff0000c2a9f184 x21: ffff00017f380180 [ 111.551374] Buffer I/O error on dev sda1, logical block 60040705, async page read [ 111.554499] [ 111.554503] x20: ffff0000c5f14210 x19: 00000000000000c0 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 111.557391] Buffer I/O error on dev sda1, logical block 60040706, async page read [ 111.561218] [ 111.561222] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000 [ 111.564205] Buffer I/O error on dev sda1, logical block 60040707, async page read [ 111.570887] x14: 00000000000000f5 x13: 0000000000000001 x12: 0000000000000040 [ 111.570902] x11: ffff0000c05ac6d8 [ 111.583420] Buffer I/O error on dev sda1, logical block 60040708, async page read [ 111.588978] x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000040000 [ 111.588988] x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 111.597173] Buffer I/O error on dev sda1, logical block 60040709, async page read [ 111.605766] x7 : ffff00017f384880 x6 : ffff8000118cb880 [ 111.605777] x5 : ffff00017f384880 [ 111.611094] Buffer I/O error on dev sda1, logical block 60040710, async page read [ 111.617086] x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffff0000c2a9f184 [ 111.617096] x2 : ffff8000118cb880 [ 111.622242] Buffer I/O error on dev sda1, logical block 60040711, async page read [ 111.626927] x1 : ffff8000118cb880 x0 : ffff00017f384888 [ 111.626938] Call trace: [ 111.626942] queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x1a0/0x390 [ 111.795809] kthread_queue_work+0x30/0xc0 [ 111.799828] state_machine_timer_handler+0x20/0x30 [ 111.804624] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x140/0x1e0 [ 111.808990] hrtimer_interrupt+0xec/0x2c0 [ 111.813004] arch_timer_handler_phys+0x38/0x50 [ 111.817456] handle_percpu_devid_irq+0x88/0x150 [ 111.821991] __handle_domain_irq+0x80/0xe0 [ 111.826093] gic_handle_irq+0xc0/0x140 [ 111.829848] el1_irq+0xbc/0x154 [ 111.832991] arch_cpu_idle+0x1c/0x2c [ 111.836572] default_idle_call+0x24/0x6c [ 111.840497] do_idle+0x238/0x2ac [ 111.843729] cpu_startup_entry+0x2c/0x70 [ 111.847657] rest_init+0xdc/0xec [ 111.850890] arch_call_rest_init+0x14/0x20 [ 111.854988] start_kernel+0x508/0x540 [ 111.858659] Code: 910020e0 8b0200c2 f861d884 aa0203e1 (f8246827) [ 111.864760] ---[ end trace 308b9a4a3dcb73ac ]--- [ 111.869381] Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception in interrupt [ 111.876258] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs [ 111.880185] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 111.883673] CPU features: 0x00001001,20000846 [ 111.888031] Memory Limit: none [ 111.891090] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception in interrupt ]--- Fixes: 3ed8e1c ("usb: typec: tcpm: Migrate workqueue to RT priority for processing events") Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Li Jun <jun.li@nxp.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1622627829-11070-1-git-send-email-jun.li@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Sep 4, 2025
After hid_hw_start() is called hidinput_connect() will eventually be called to set up the device with the input layer since the HID_CONNECT_DEFAULT connect mask is used. During hidinput_connect() all input and output reports are processed and corresponding hid_inputs are allocated and configured via hidinput_configure_usages(). This process involves slot tagging report fields and configuring usages by setting relevant bits in the capability bitmaps. However it is possible that the capability bitmaps are not set at all leading to the subsequent hidinput_has_been_populated() check to fail leading to the freeing of the hid_input and the underlying input device. This becomes problematic because a malicious HID device like a ASUS ROG N-Key keyboard can trigger the above scenario via a specially crafted descriptor which then leads to a user-after-free when the name of the freed input device is written to later on after hid_hw_start(). Below, report 93 intentionally utilises the HID_UP_UNDEFINED Usage Page which is skipped during usage configuration, leading to the frees. 0x05, 0x0D, // Usage Page (Digitizer) 0x09, 0x05, // Usage (Touch Pad) 0xA1, 0x01, // Collection (Application) 0x85, 0x0D, // Report ID (13) 0x06, 0x00, 0xFF, // Usage Page (Vendor Defined 0xFF00) 0x09, 0xC5, // Usage (0xC5) 0x15, 0x00, // Logical Minimum (0) 0x26, 0xFF, 0x00, // Logical Maximum (255) 0x75, 0x08, // Report Size (8) 0x95, 0x04, // Report Count (4) 0xB1, 0x02, // Feature (Data,Var,Abs) 0x85, 0x5D, // Report ID (93) 0x06, 0x00, 0x00, // Usage Page (Undefined) 0x09, 0x01, // Usage (0x01) 0x15, 0x00, // Logical Minimum (0) 0x26, 0xFF, 0x00, // Logical Maximum (255) 0x75, 0x08, // Report Size (8) 0x95, 0x1B, // Report Count (27) 0x81, 0x02, // Input (Data,Var,Abs) 0xC0, // End Collection Below is the KASAN splat after triggering the UAF: [ 21.672709] ================================================================== [ 21.673700] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in asus_probe+0xeeb/0xf80 [ 21.673700] Write of size 8 at addr ffff88810a0ac000 by task kworker/1:2/54 [ 21.673700] [ 21.673700] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 54 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc4-g9773391cf4dd-dirty kernel-patches#36 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 21.673700] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014 [ 21.673700] Call Trace: [ 21.673700] <TASK> [ 21.673700] dump_stack_lvl+0x5f/0x80 [ 21.673700] print_report+0xd1/0x660 [ 21.673700] kasan_report+0xe5/0x120 [ 21.673700] __asan_report_store8_noabort+0x1b/0x30 [ 21.673700] asus_probe+0xeeb/0xf80 [ 21.673700] hid_device_probe+0x2ee/0x700 [ 21.673700] really_probe+0x1c6/0x6b0 [ 21.673700] __driver_probe_device+0x24f/0x310 [ 21.673700] driver_probe_device+0x4e/0x220 [...] [ 21.673700] [ 21.673700] Allocated by task 54: [ 21.673700] kasan_save_stack+0x3d/0x60 [ 21.673700] kasan_save_track+0x18/0x40 [ 21.673700] kasan_save_alloc_info+0x3b/0x50 [ 21.673700] __kasan_kmalloc+0x9c/0xa0 [ 21.673700] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x139/0x340 [ 21.673700] input_allocate_device+0x44/0x370 [ 21.673700] hidinput_connect+0xcb6/0x2630 [ 21.673700] hid_connect+0xf74/0x1d60 [ 21.673700] hid_hw_start+0x8c/0x110 [ 21.673700] asus_probe+0x5a3/0xf80 [ 21.673700] hid_device_probe+0x2ee/0x700 [ 21.673700] really_probe+0x1c6/0x6b0 [ 21.673700] __driver_probe_device+0x24f/0x310 [ 21.673700] driver_probe_device+0x4e/0x220 [...] [ 21.673700] [ 21.673700] Freed by task 54: [ 21.673700] kasan_save_stack+0x3d/0x60 [ 21.673700] kasan_save_track+0x18/0x40 [ 21.673700] kasan_save_free_info+0x3f/0x60 [ 21.673700] __kasan_slab_free+0x3c/0x50 [ 21.673700] kfree+0xcf/0x350 [ 21.673700] input_dev_release+0xab/0xd0 [ 21.673700] device_release+0x9f/0x220 [ 21.673700] kobject_put+0x12b/0x220 [ 21.673700] put_device+0x12/0x20 [ 21.673700] input_free_device+0x4c/0xb0 [ 21.673700] hidinput_connect+0x1862/0x2630 [ 21.673700] hid_connect+0xf74/0x1d60 [ 21.673700] hid_hw_start+0x8c/0x110 [ 21.673700] asus_probe+0x5a3/0xf80 [ 21.673700] hid_device_probe+0x2ee/0x700 [ 21.673700] really_probe+0x1c6/0x6b0 [ 21.673700] __driver_probe_device+0x24f/0x310 [ 21.673700] driver_probe_device+0x4e/0x220 [...] Fixes: 9ce12d8 ("HID: asus: Add i2c touchpad support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Qasim Ijaz <qasdev00@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250810181041.44874-1-qasdev00@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <bentiss@kernel.org>
kuba-moo
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Oct 4, 2025
Patch series "mm: remove nth_page()", v2. As discussed recently with Linus, nth_page() is just nasty and we would like to remove it. To recap, the reason we currently need nth_page() within a folio is because on some kernel configs (SPARSEMEM without SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP), the memmap is allocated per memory section. While buddy allocations cannot cross memory section boundaries, hugetlb and dax folios can. So crossing a memory section means that "page++" could do the wrong thing. Instead, nth_page() on these problematic configs always goes from page->pfn, to the go from (++pfn)->page, which is rather nasty. Likely, many people have no idea when nth_page() is required and when it might be dropped. We refer to such problematic PFN ranges and "non-contiguous pages". If we only deal with "contiguous pages", there is not need for nth_page(). Besides that "obvious" folio case, we might end up using nth_page() within CMA allocations (again, could span memory sections), and in one corner case (kfence) when processing memblock allocations (again, could span memory sections). So let's handle all that, add sanity checks, and remove nth_page(). Patch kernel-patches#1 -> kernel-patches#5 : stop making SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP user-selectable + cleanups Patch kernel-patches#6 -> kernel-patches#13 : disallow folios to have non-contiguous pages Patch kernel-patches#14 -> kernel-patches#20 : remove nth_page() usage within folios Patch kernel-patches#22 : disallow CMA allocations of non-contiguous pages Patch kernel-patches#23 -> kernel-patches#33 : sanity+check + remove nth_page() usage within SG entry Patch kernel-patches#34 : sanity-check + remove nth_page() usage in unpin_user_page_range_dirty_lock() Patch kernel-patches#35 : remove nth_page() in kfence Patch kernel-patches#36 : adjust stale comment regarding nth_page Patch kernel-patches#37 : mm: remove nth_page() A lot of this is inspired from the discussion at [1] between Linus, Jason and me, so cudos to them. This patch (of 37): In an ideal world, we wouldn't have to deal with SPARSEMEM without SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP, but in particular for 32bit SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP is considered too costly and consequently not supported. However, if an architecture does support SPARSEMEM with SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP, let's forbid the user to disable VMEMMAP: just like we already do for arm64, s390 and x86. So if SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP is supported, don't allow to use SPARSEMEM without SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP. This implies that the option to not use SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP will now be gone for loongarch, powerpc, riscv and sparc. All architectures only enable SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP with 64bit support, so there should not really be a big downside to using the VMEMMAP (quite the contrary). This is a preparation for not supporting (1) folio sizes that exceed a single memory section (2) CMA allocations of non-contiguous page ranges in SPARSEMEM without SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP configs, whereby we want to limit possible impact as much as possible (e.g., gigantic hugetlb page allocations suddenly fails). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250901150359.867252-1-david@redhat.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250901150359.867252-2-david@redhat.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHk-=wiCYfNp4AJLBORU-c7ZyRBUp66W2-Et6cdQ4REx-GyQ_A@mail.gmail.com/T/#u [1] Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com> Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org> Acked-by: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com> Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org> Cc: WANG Xuerui <kernel@xen0n.name> Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu> Cc: Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Andreas Larsson <andreas@gaisler.com> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com> Cc: Alex Dubov <oakad@yahoo.com> Cc: Alex Willamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com> Cc: Bart van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Cc: Borislav Betkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com> Cc: Brett Creeley <brett.creeley@amd.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter (Ampere) <cl@gentwo.org> Cc: Damien Le Maol <dlemoal@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Airlie <airlied@gmail.com> Cc: Dennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org> Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Doug Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Inki Dae <m.szyprowski@samsung.com> Cc: James Bottomley <james.bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld <jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com> Cc: Jonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com> Cc: Lars Persson <lars.persson@axis.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: "Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Cc: Maxim Levitky <maximlevitsky@gmail.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev> Cc: Niklas Cassel <cassel@kernel.org> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: Robin Murohy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com> Cc: Shameerali Kolothum Thodi <shameerali.kolothum.thodi@huawei.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Cc: Thomas Gleinxer <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin <tursulin@ursulin.net> Cc: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Yishai Hadas <yishaih@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
puranjaymohan
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Jan 7, 2026
BPF VMA iterators and bpf_find_vma() deadlock when BPF programs call bpf_copy_from_user_task() on the same task: ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.19.0-rc1-00129-ga069190b590e kernel-patches#36 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- app/447 is trying to acquire lock: ffff0000c5645910 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: __access_remote_vm+0x5c/0x3d8 but task is already holding lock: ffff0000c5645910 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: bpf_iter_task_vma_new+0x14c/0x278 Solution: Use VMA refcounts without holding locks Per mm_types.h, keeping vm_refcnt > 1 prevents the VMA from being write-locked and modified, providing stable reads of VMA fields. Implementation: 1. lock_vma_under_rcu() - validate VMA + increment refcount + set lock bit 2. vma_refcount_try_get() - take extra refcount (no lock bit) 3. vma_end_read() - release lock bit (refcount remains > 1) 4. Return VMA to BPF with refcount > 1 but no locks held 5. vma_refcount_put_unlocked() - release extra refcount when done Error handling: - lock_vma_under_rcu() fails → -EBUSY (matches original mmap_read_trylock) - vma_refcount_try_get() fails → -EBUSY (refcount limit hit) - VMA doesn't cover address → -ENOENT Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Tropicao
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…mework The test_bpftool_map.sh script tests that maps read/write accesses are being properly allowed/refused by the kernel depending on a specific fmod_ret program being attached on security_bpf_map function. Rewrite this test to integrate it in the test_progs. The new test spawns a few subtests: kernel-patches#36/1 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_unpinned:OK kernel-patches#36/2 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_pinned:OK kernel-patches#36/3 bpftool_maps_access/protected_unpinned:OK kernel-patches#36/4 bpftool_maps_access/protected_pinned:OK kernel-patches#36/5 bpftool_maps_access/nested_maps:OK kernel-patches#36/6 bpftool_maps_access/btf_list:OK kernel-patches#36 bpftool_maps_access:OK Summary: 1/6 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com> Acked-by: Quentin Monnet <qmo@kernel.org> --- Changes in v2: - move the new test in prog_tests directory - collect Quentin's AB
Tropicao
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…mework The test_bpftool_map.sh script tests that maps read/write accesses are being properly allowed/refused by the kernel depending on a specific fmod_ret program being attached on security_bpf_map function. Rewrite this test to integrate it in the test_progs. The new test spawns a few subtests: kernel-patches#36/1 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_unpinned:OK kernel-patches#36/2 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_pinned:OK kernel-patches#36/3 bpftool_maps_access/protected_unpinned:OK kernel-patches#36/4 bpftool_maps_access/protected_pinned:OK kernel-patches#36/5 bpftool_maps_access/nested_maps:OK kernel-patches#36/6 bpftool_maps_access/btf_list:OK kernel-patches#36 bpftool_maps_access:OK Summary: 1/6 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com> Acked-by: Quentin Monnet <qmo@kernel.org> --- Changes in v2: - move the new test in prog_tests directory - collect Quentin's AB
Tropicao
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…mework The test_bpftool_map.sh script tests that maps read/write accesses are being properly allowed/refused by the kernel depending on a specific fmod_ret program being attached on security_bpf_map function. Rewrite this test to integrate it in the test_progs. The new test spawns a few subtests: kernel-patches#36/1 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_unpinned:OK kernel-patches#36/2 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_pinned:OK kernel-patches#36/3 bpftool_maps_access/protected_unpinned:OK kernel-patches#36/4 bpftool_maps_access/protected_pinned:OK kernel-patches#36/5 bpftool_maps_access/nested_maps:OK kernel-patches#36/6 bpftool_maps_access/btf_list:OK kernel-patches#36 bpftool_maps_access:OK Summary: 1/6 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com> Acked-by: Quentin Monnet <qmo@kernel.org> --- Changes in v2: - move the new test in prog_tests directory - collect Quentin's AB
Tropicao
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…mework The test_bpftool_map.sh script tests that maps read/write accesses are being properly allowed/refused by the kernel depending on a specific fmod_ret program being attached on security_bpf_map function. Rewrite this test to integrate it in the test_progs. The new test spawns a few subtests: kernel-patches#36/1 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_unpinned:OK kernel-patches#36/2 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_pinned:OK kernel-patches#36/3 bpftool_maps_access/protected_unpinned:OK kernel-patches#36/4 bpftool_maps_access/protected_pinned:OK kernel-patches#36/5 bpftool_maps_access/nested_maps:OK kernel-patches#36/6 bpftool_maps_access/btf_list:OK kernel-patches#36 bpftool_maps_access:OK Summary: 1/6 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com> Acked-by: Quentin Monnet <qmo@kernel.org> --- Changes in v2: - move the new test in prog_tests directory - collect Quentin's AB
Tropicao
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…mework The test_bpftool_map.sh script tests that maps read/write accesses are being properly allowed/refused by the kernel depending on a specific fmod_ret program being attached on security_bpf_map function. Rewrite this test to integrate it in the test_progs. The new test spawns a few subtests: kernel-patches#36/1 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_unpinned:OK kernel-patches#36/2 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_pinned:OK kernel-patches#36/3 bpftool_maps_access/protected_unpinned:OK kernel-patches#36/4 bpftool_maps_access/protected_pinned:OK kernel-patches#36/5 bpftool_maps_access/nested_maps:OK kernel-patches#36/6 bpftool_maps_access/btf_list:OK kernel-patches#36 bpftool_maps_access:OK Summary: 1/6 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com> Acked-by: Quentin Monnet <qmo@kernel.org> --- Changes in v2: - move the new test in prog_tests directory - collect Quentin's AB
Tropicao
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Jan 21, 2026
…mework The test_bpftool_map.sh script tests that maps read/write accesses are being properly allowed/refused by the kernel depending on a specific fmod_ret program being attached on security_bpf_map function. Rewrite this test to integrate it in the test_progs. The new test spawns a few subtests: kernel-patches#36/1 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_unpinned:OK kernel-patches#36/2 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_pinned:OK kernel-patches#36/3 bpftool_maps_access/protected_unpinned:OK kernel-patches#36/4 bpftool_maps_access/protected_pinned:OK kernel-patches#36/5 bpftool_maps_access/nested_maps:OK kernel-patches#36/6 bpftool_maps_access/btf_list:OK kernel-patches#36 bpftool_maps_access:OK Summary: 1/6 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com> Acked-by: Quentin Monnet <qmo@kernel.org> --- Changes in v2: - move the new test in prog_tests directory - collect Quentin's AB
Tropicao
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Jan 21, 2026
…mework The test_bpftool_map.sh script tests that maps read/write accesses are being properly allowed/refused by the kernel depending on a specific fmod_ret program being attached on security_bpf_map function. Rewrite this test to integrate it in the test_progs. The new test spawns a few subtests: kernel-patches#36/1 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_unpinned:OK kernel-patches#36/2 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_pinned:OK kernel-patches#36/3 bpftool_maps_access/protected_unpinned:OK kernel-patches#36/4 bpftool_maps_access/protected_pinned:OK kernel-patches#36/5 bpftool_maps_access/nested_maps:OK kernel-patches#36/6 bpftool_maps_access/btf_list:OK kernel-patches#36 bpftool_maps_access:OK Summary: 1/6 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com> Acked-by: Quentin Monnet <qmo@kernel.org> --- Changes in v2: - move the new test in prog_tests directory - collect Quentin's AB
Tropicao
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…mework The test_bpftool_map.sh script tests that maps read/write accesses are being properly allowed/refused by the kernel depending on a specific fmod_ret program being attached on security_bpf_map function. Rewrite this test to integrate it in the test_progs. The new test spawns a few subtests: kernel-patches#36/1 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_unpinned:OK kernel-patches#36/2 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_pinned:OK kernel-patches#36/3 bpftool_maps_access/protected_unpinned:OK kernel-patches#36/4 bpftool_maps_access/protected_pinned:OK kernel-patches#36/5 bpftool_maps_access/nested_maps:OK kernel-patches#36/6 bpftool_maps_access/btf_list:OK kernel-patches#36 bpftool_maps_access:OK Summary: 1/6 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com> Acked-by: Quentin Monnet <qmo@kernel.org> --- Changes in v2: - move the new test in prog_tests directory - collect Quentin's AB
Tropicao
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Jan 21, 2026
…mework The test_bpftool_map.sh script tests that maps read/write accesses are being properly allowed/refused by the kernel depending on a specific fmod_ret program being attached on security_bpf_map function. Rewrite this test to integrate it in the test_progs. The new test spawns a few subtests: kernel-patches#36/1 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_unpinned:OK kernel-patches#36/2 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_pinned:OK kernel-patches#36/3 bpftool_maps_access/protected_unpinned:OK kernel-patches#36/4 bpftool_maps_access/protected_pinned:OK kernel-patches#36/5 bpftool_maps_access/nested_maps:OK kernel-patches#36/6 bpftool_maps_access/btf_list:OK kernel-patches#36 bpftool_maps_access:OK Summary: 1/6 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com> Acked-by: Quentin Monnet <qmo@kernel.org> --- Changes in v2: - move the new test in prog_tests directory - collect Quentin's AB
Tropicao
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Jan 21, 2026
…mework The test_bpftool_map.sh script tests that maps read/write accesses are being properly allowed/refused by the kernel depending on a specific fmod_ret program being attached on security_bpf_map function. Rewrite this test to integrate it in the test_progs. The new test spawns a few subtests: kernel-patches#36/1 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_unpinned:OK kernel-patches#36/2 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_pinned:OK kernel-patches#36/3 bpftool_maps_access/protected_unpinned:OK kernel-patches#36/4 bpftool_maps_access/protected_pinned:OK kernel-patches#36/5 bpftool_maps_access/nested_maps:OK kernel-patches#36/6 bpftool_maps_access/btf_list:OK kernel-patches#36 bpftool_maps_access:OK Summary: 1/6 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com> Acked-by: Quentin Monnet <qmo@kernel.org> --- Changes in v2: - move the new test in prog_tests directory - collect Quentin's AB
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…mework The test_bpftool_map.sh script tests that maps read/write accesses are being properly allowed/refused by the kernel depending on a specific fmod_ret program being attached on security_bpf_map function. Rewrite this test to integrate it in the test_progs. The new test spawns a few subtests: #36/1 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_unpinned:OK #36/2 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_pinned:OK #36/3 bpftool_maps_access/protected_unpinned:OK #36/4 bpftool_maps_access/protected_pinned:OK #36/5 bpftool_maps_access/nested_maps:OK #36/6 bpftool_maps_access/btf_list:OK #36 bpftool_maps_access:OK Summary: 1/6 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com> Acked-by: Quentin Monnet <qmo@kernel.org>
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…mework The test_bpftool_map.sh script tests that maps read/write accesses are being properly allowed/refused by the kernel depending on a specific fmod_ret program being attached on security_bpf_map function. Rewrite this test to integrate it in the test_progs. The new test spawns a few subtests: #36/1 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_unpinned:OK #36/2 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_pinned:OK #36/3 bpftool_maps_access/protected_unpinned:OK #36/4 bpftool_maps_access/protected_pinned:OK #36/5 bpftool_maps_access/nested_maps:OK #36/6 bpftool_maps_access/btf_list:OK #36 bpftool_maps_access:OK Summary: 1/6 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com> Acked-by: Quentin Monnet <qmo@kernel.org>
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…mework The test_bpftool_map.sh script tests that maps read/write accesses are being properly allowed/refused by the kernel depending on a specific fmod_ret program being attached on security_bpf_map function. Rewrite this test to integrate it in the test_progs. The new test spawns a few subtests: #36/1 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_unpinned:OK #36/2 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_pinned:OK #36/3 bpftool_maps_access/protected_unpinned:OK #36/4 bpftool_maps_access/protected_pinned:OK #36/5 bpftool_maps_access/nested_maps:OK #36/6 bpftool_maps_access/btf_list:OK #36 bpftool_maps_access:OK Summary: 1/6 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com> Acked-by: Quentin Monnet <qmo@kernel.org>
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…mework The test_bpftool_map.sh script tests that maps read/write accesses are being properly allowed/refused by the kernel depending on a specific fmod_ret program being attached on security_bpf_map function. Rewrite this test to integrate it in the test_progs. The new test spawns a few subtests: #36/1 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_unpinned:OK #36/2 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_pinned:OK #36/3 bpftool_maps_access/protected_unpinned:OK #36/4 bpftool_maps_access/protected_pinned:OK #36/5 bpftool_maps_access/nested_maps:OK #36/6 bpftool_maps_access/btf_list:OK #36 bpftool_maps_access:OK Summary: 1/6 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com> Acked-by: Quentin Monnet <qmo@kernel.org>
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…mework The test_bpftool_map.sh script tests that maps read/write accesses are being properly allowed/refused by the kernel depending on a specific fmod_ret program being attached on security_bpf_map function. Rewrite this test to integrate it in the test_progs. The new test spawns a few subtests: kernel-patches#36/1 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_unpinned:OK kernel-patches#36/2 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_pinned:OK kernel-patches#36/3 bpftool_maps_access/protected_unpinned:OK kernel-patches#36/4 bpftool_maps_access/protected_pinned:OK kernel-patches#36/5 bpftool_maps_access/nested_maps:OK kernel-patches#36/6 bpftool_maps_access/btf_list:OK kernel-patches#36 bpftool_maps_access:OK Summary: 1/6 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com> Acked-by: Quentin Monnet <qmo@kernel.org> --- Changes in v2: - move the new test in prog_tests directory - collect Quentin's AB
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Jan 23, 2026
…mework The test_bpftool_map.sh script tests that maps read/write accesses are being properly allowed/refused by the kernel depending on a specific fmod_ret program being attached on security_bpf_map function. Rewrite this test to integrate it in the test_progs. The new test spawns a few subtests: #36/1 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_unpinned:OK #36/2 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_pinned:OK #36/3 bpftool_maps_access/protected_unpinned:OK #36/4 bpftool_maps_access/protected_pinned:OK #36/5 bpftool_maps_access/nested_maps:OK #36/6 bpftool_maps_access/btf_list:OK #36 bpftool_maps_access:OK Summary: 1/6 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com> Acked-by: Quentin Monnet <qmo@kernel.org>
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…mework The test_bpftool_map.sh script tests that maps read/write accesses are being properly allowed/refused by the kernel depending on a specific fmod_ret program being attached on security_bpf_map function. Rewrite this test to integrate it in the test_progs. The new test spawns a few subtests: #36/1 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_unpinned:OK #36/2 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_pinned:OK #36/3 bpftool_maps_access/protected_unpinned:OK #36/4 bpftool_maps_access/protected_pinned:OK #36/5 bpftool_maps_access/nested_maps:OK #36/6 bpftool_maps_access/btf_list:OK #36 bpftool_maps_access:OK Summary: 1/6 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com> Acked-by: Quentin Monnet <qmo@kernel.org>
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Jan 23, 2026
…mework The test_bpftool_map.sh script tests that maps read/write accesses are being properly allowed/refused by the kernel depending on a specific fmod_ret program being attached on security_bpf_map function. Rewrite this test to integrate it in the test_progs. The new test spawns a few subtests: #36/1 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_unpinned:OK #36/2 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_pinned:OK #36/3 bpftool_maps_access/protected_unpinned:OK #36/4 bpftool_maps_access/protected_pinned:OK #36/5 bpftool_maps_access/nested_maps:OK #36/6 bpftool_maps_access/btf_list:OK #36 bpftool_maps_access:OK Summary: 1/6 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com> Acked-by: Quentin Monnet <qmo@kernel.org>
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Jan 23, 2026
…mework The test_bpftool_map.sh script tests that maps read/write accesses are being properly allowed/refused by the kernel depending on a specific fmod_ret program being attached on security_bpf_map function. Rewrite this test to integrate it in the test_progs. The new test spawns a few subtests: #36/1 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_unpinned:OK #36/2 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_pinned:OK #36/3 bpftool_maps_access/protected_unpinned:OK #36/4 bpftool_maps_access/protected_pinned:OK #36/5 bpftool_maps_access/nested_maps:OK #36/6 bpftool_maps_access/btf_list:OK #36 bpftool_maps_access:OK Summary: 1/6 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com> Acked-by: Quentin Monnet <qmo@kernel.org>
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…mework The test_bpftool_map.sh script tests that maps read/write accesses are being properly allowed/refused by the kernel depending on a specific fmod_ret program being attached on security_bpf_map function. Rewrite this test to integrate it in the test_progs. The new test spawns a few subtests: #36/1 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_unpinned:OK #36/2 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_pinned:OK #36/3 bpftool_maps_access/protected_unpinned:OK #36/4 bpftool_maps_access/protected_pinned:OK #36/5 bpftool_maps_access/nested_maps:OK #36/6 bpftool_maps_access/btf_list:OK #36 bpftool_maps_access:OK Summary: 1/6 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com> Acked-by: Quentin Monnet <qmo@kernel.org>
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…mework The test_bpftool_map.sh script tests that maps read/write accesses are being properly allowed/refused by the kernel depending on a specific fmod_ret program being attached on security_bpf_map function. Rewrite this test to integrate it in the test_progs. The new test spawns a few subtests: #36/1 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_unpinned:OK #36/2 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_pinned:OK #36/3 bpftool_maps_access/protected_unpinned:OK #36/4 bpftool_maps_access/protected_pinned:OK #36/5 bpftool_maps_access/nested_maps:OK #36/6 bpftool_maps_access/btf_list:OK #36 bpftool_maps_access:OK Summary: 1/6 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com> Acked-by: Quentin Monnet <qmo@kernel.org>
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…mework The test_bpftool_map.sh script tests that maps read/write accesses are being properly allowed/refused by the kernel depending on a specific fmod_ret program being attached on security_bpf_map function. Rewrite this test to integrate it in the test_progs. The new test spawns a few subtests: #36/1 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_unpinned:OK #36/2 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_pinned:OK #36/3 bpftool_maps_access/protected_unpinned:OK #36/4 bpftool_maps_access/protected_pinned:OK #36/5 bpftool_maps_access/nested_maps:OK #36/6 bpftool_maps_access/btf_list:OK #36 bpftool_maps_access:OK Summary: 1/6 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com> Acked-by: Quentin Monnet <qmo@kernel.org>
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…mework The test_bpftool_map.sh script tests that maps read/write accesses are being properly allowed/refused by the kernel depending on a specific fmod_ret program being attached on security_bpf_map function. Rewrite this test to integrate it in the test_progs. The new test spawns a few subtests: #36/1 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_unpinned:OK #36/2 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_pinned:OK #36/3 bpftool_maps_access/protected_unpinned:OK #36/4 bpftool_maps_access/protected_pinned:OK #36/5 bpftool_maps_access/nested_maps:OK #36/6 bpftool_maps_access/btf_list:OK #36 bpftool_maps_access:OK Summary: 1/6 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com> Acked-by: Quentin Monnet <qmo@kernel.org>
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…mework The test_bpftool_map.sh script tests that maps read/write accesses are being properly allowed/refused by the kernel depending on a specific fmod_ret program being attached on security_bpf_map function. Rewrite this test to integrate it in the test_progs. The new test spawns a few subtests: #36/1 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_unpinned:OK #36/2 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_pinned:OK #36/3 bpftool_maps_access/protected_unpinned:OK #36/4 bpftool_maps_access/protected_pinned:OK #36/5 bpftool_maps_access/nested_maps:OK #36/6 bpftool_maps_access/btf_list:OK #36 bpftool_maps_access:OK Summary: 1/6 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com> Acked-by: Quentin Monnet <qmo@kernel.org>
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…mework The test_bpftool_map.sh script tests that maps read/write accesses are being properly allowed/refused by the kernel depending on a specific fmod_ret program being attached on security_bpf_map function. Rewrite this test to integrate it in the test_progs. The new test spawns a few subtests: #36/1 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_unpinned:OK #36/2 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_pinned:OK #36/3 bpftool_maps_access/protected_unpinned:OK #36/4 bpftool_maps_access/protected_pinned:OK #36/5 bpftool_maps_access/nested_maps:OK #36/6 bpftool_maps_access/btf_list:OK #36 bpftool_maps_access:OK Summary: 1/6 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com> Acked-by: Quentin Monnet <qmo@kernel.org>
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…mework The test_bpftool_map.sh script tests that maps read/write accesses are being properly allowed/refused by the kernel depending on a specific fmod_ret program being attached on security_bpf_map function. Rewrite this test to integrate it in the test_progs. The new test spawns a few subtests: #36/1 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_unpinned:OK #36/2 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_pinned:OK #36/3 bpftool_maps_access/protected_unpinned:OK #36/4 bpftool_maps_access/protected_pinned:OK #36/5 bpftool_maps_access/nested_maps:OK #36/6 bpftool_maps_access/btf_list:OK #36 bpftool_maps_access:OK Summary: 1/6 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com> Acked-by: Quentin Monnet <qmo@kernel.org>
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…mework The test_bpftool_map.sh script tests that maps read/write accesses are being properly allowed/refused by the kernel depending on a specific fmod_ret program being attached on security_bpf_map function. Rewrite this test to integrate it in the test_progs. The new test spawns a few subtests: #36/1 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_unpinned:OK #36/2 bpftool_maps_access/unprotected_pinned:OK #36/3 bpftool_maps_access/protected_unpinned:OK #36/4 bpftool_maps_access/protected_pinned:OK #36/5 bpftool_maps_access/nested_maps:OK #36/6 bpftool_maps_access/btf_list:OK #36 bpftool_maps_access:OK Summary: 1/6 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com> Acked-by: Quentin Monnet <qmo@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260123-bpftool-tests-v4-3-a6653a7f28e7@bootlin.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Pull request for series with
subject: samples/bpf: improve xdpsock application
version: 1
url: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/list/?series=200757