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Pull request for series with
subject: samples: bpf: Replace bpf_program__title() with bpf_program__section_name()
version: 1
url: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/list/?series=199436

tsipa and others added 3 commits September 4, 2020 05:40
"title" in favor of "section name""), the term title has been replaced
with section name in libbpf.

Since the bpf_program__title() has been deprecated, this commit
switches this function to bpf_program__section_name(). Due to
this commit, the compilation warning issue has also been resolved.

Fixes: 5210958 ("libbpf: Deprecate notion of BPF program "title" in favor of "section name"")
Signed-off-by: Daniel T. Lee <danieltimlee@gmail.com>
---
 samples/bpf/sockex3_user.c          | 6 +++---
 samples/bpf/spintest_user.c         | 6 +++---
 samples/bpf/tracex5_user.c          | 6 +++---
 samples/bpf/xdp_redirect_cpu_user.c | 2 +-
 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
to samples/bpf.

Signed-off-by: Daniel T. Lee <danieltimlee@gmail.com>
---
 samples/bpf/.gitignore | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
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At least one diff in series https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/list/?series=199436 irrelevant now. Closing PR.

@kernel-patches-bot kernel-patches-bot deleted the series/199435 branch September 15, 2020 17:49
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 16, 2020
This reverts commit 61eee4a ("ALSA: hda: Add support for Loongson
7A1000 controller") to fix the following error on the Loongson LS7A
platform:

rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt self-detected stall on CPU
<SNIP>
NMI backtrace for cpu 0
CPU: 0 PID: 68 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 5.8.0+ #3
Hardware name:  , BIOS
Workqueue: events azx_probe_work [snd_hda_intel]
<SNIP>
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff80211a64>] show_stack+0x9c/0x130
[<ffffffff8065a740>] dump_stack+0xb0/0xf0
[<ffffffff80665774>] nmi_cpu_backtrace+0x134/0x140
[<ffffffff80665910>] nmi_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0x190/0x200
[<ffffffff802b1abc>] rcu_dump_cpu_stacks+0x12c/0x190
[<ffffffff802b08cc>] rcu_sched_clock_irq+0xa2c/0xfc8
[<ffffffff802b91d4>] update_process_times+0x2c/0xb8
[<ffffffff802cad80>] tick_sched_timer+0x40/0xb8
[<ffffffff802ba5f0>] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x118/0x1d0
[<ffffffff802bab74>] hrtimer_interrupt+0x12c/0x2d8
[<ffffffff8021547c>] c0_compare_interrupt+0x74/0xa0
[<ffffffff80296bd0>] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0xa8/0x198
[<ffffffff80296cf0>] handle_irq_event_percpu+0x30/0x90
[<ffffffff8029d958>] handle_percpu_irq+0x88/0xb8
[<ffffffff80296124>] generic_handle_irq+0x44/0x60
[<ffffffff80b3cfd0>] do_IRQ+0x18/0x28
[<ffffffff8067ace4>] plat_irq_dispatch+0x64/0x100
[<ffffffff80209a20>] handle_int+0x140/0x14c
[<ffffffff802402e8>] irq_exit+0xf8/0x100

Because AZX_DRIVER_GENERIC can not work well for Loongson LS7A HDA
controller, it needs some workarounds which are not merged into the
upstream kernel at this time, so it should revert this patch now.

Fixes: 61eee4a ("ALSA: hda: Add support for Loongson 7A1000 controller")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.9-rc1+
Signed-off-by: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1598348388-2518-1-git-send-email-yangtiezhu@loongson.cn
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 16, 2020
I got the following lockdep splat while testing:

  ======================================================
  WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
  5.8.0-rc7-00172-g021118712e59 #932 Not tainted
  ------------------------------------------------------
  btrfs/229626 is trying to acquire lock:
  ffffffff828513f0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: alloc_workqueue+0x378/0x450

  but task is already holding lock:
  ffff889dd3889518 (&fs_info->scrub_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_scrub_dev+0x11c/0x630

  which lock already depends on the new lock.

  the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

  -> #7 (&fs_info->scrub_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
	 __mutex_lock+0x9f/0x930
	 btrfs_scrub_dev+0x11c/0x630
	 btrfs_dev_replace_by_ioctl.cold.21+0x10a/0x1d4
	 btrfs_ioctl+0x2799/0x30a0
	 ksys_ioctl+0x83/0xc0
	 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
	 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x90
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

  -> #6 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
	 __mutex_lock+0x9f/0x930
	 btrfs_run_dev_stats+0x49/0x480
	 commit_cowonly_roots+0xb5/0x2a0
	 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x516/0xa60
	 sync_filesystem+0x6b/0x90
	 generic_shutdown_super+0x22/0x100
	 kill_anon_super+0xe/0x30
	 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20
	 deactivate_locked_super+0x29/0x60
	 cleanup_mnt+0xb8/0x140
	 task_work_run+0x6d/0xb0
	 __prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x1cc/0x1e0
	 do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

  -> #5 (&fs_info->tree_log_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
	 __mutex_lock+0x9f/0x930
	 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x4bb/0xa60
	 sync_filesystem+0x6b/0x90
	 generic_shutdown_super+0x22/0x100
	 kill_anon_super+0xe/0x30
	 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20
	 deactivate_locked_super+0x29/0x60
	 cleanup_mnt+0xb8/0x140
	 task_work_run+0x6d/0xb0
	 __prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x1cc/0x1e0
	 do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

  -> #4 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
	 __mutex_lock+0x9f/0x930
	 btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x43/0x70
	 start_transaction+0xd1/0x5d0
	 btrfs_dirty_inode+0x42/0xd0
	 touch_atime+0xa1/0xd0
	 btrfs_file_mmap+0x3f/0x60
	 mmap_region+0x3a4/0x640
	 do_mmap+0x376/0x580
	 vm_mmap_pgoff+0xd5/0x120
	 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x193/0x230
	 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x90
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

  -> #3 (&mm->mmap_lock#2){++++}-{3:3}:
	 __might_fault+0x68/0x90
	 _copy_to_user+0x1e/0x80
	 perf_read+0x141/0x2c0
	 vfs_read+0xad/0x1b0
	 ksys_read+0x5f/0xe0
	 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x90
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

  -> #2 (&cpuctx_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
	 __mutex_lock+0x9f/0x930
	 perf_event_init_cpu+0x88/0x150
	 perf_event_init+0x1db/0x20b
	 start_kernel+0x3ae/0x53c
	 secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0

  -> #1 (pmus_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
	 __mutex_lock+0x9f/0x930
	 perf_event_init_cpu+0x4f/0x150
	 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0xb1/0x900
	 _cpu_up.constprop.26+0x9f/0x130
	 cpu_up+0x7b/0xc0
	 bringup_nonboot_cpus+0x4f/0x60
	 smp_init+0x26/0x71
	 kernel_init_freeable+0x110/0x258
	 kernel_init+0xa/0x103
	 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

  -> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}:
	 __lock_acquire+0x1272/0x2310
	 lock_acquire+0x9e/0x360
	 cpus_read_lock+0x39/0xb0
	 alloc_workqueue+0x378/0x450
	 __btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x15d/0x200
	 btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x51/0x160
	 scrub_workers_get+0x5a/0x170
	 btrfs_scrub_dev+0x18c/0x630
	 btrfs_dev_replace_by_ioctl.cold.21+0x10a/0x1d4
	 btrfs_ioctl+0x2799/0x30a0
	 ksys_ioctl+0x83/0xc0
	 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
	 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x90
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

  other info that might help us debug this:

  Chain exists of:
    cpu_hotplug_lock --> &fs_devs->device_list_mutex --> &fs_info->scrub_lock

   Possible unsafe locking scenario:

	 CPU0                    CPU1
	 ----                    ----
    lock(&fs_info->scrub_lock);
				 lock(&fs_devs->device_list_mutex);
				 lock(&fs_info->scrub_lock);
    lock(cpu_hotplug_lock);

   *** DEADLOCK ***

  2 locks held by btrfs/229626:
   #0: ffff88bfe8bb86e0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_scrub_dev+0xbd/0x630
   #1: ffff889dd3889518 (&fs_info->scrub_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_scrub_dev+0x11c/0x630

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 15 PID: 229626 Comm: btrfs Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.8.0-rc7-00172-g021118712e59 #932
  Hardware name: Quanta Tioga Pass Single Side 01-0030993006/Tioga Pass Single Side, BIOS F08_3A18 12/20/2018
  Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0x78/0xa0
   check_noncircular+0x165/0x180
   __lock_acquire+0x1272/0x2310
   lock_acquire+0x9e/0x360
   ? alloc_workqueue+0x378/0x450
   cpus_read_lock+0x39/0xb0
   ? alloc_workqueue+0x378/0x450
   alloc_workqueue+0x378/0x450
   ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x52/0x80
   __btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x15d/0x200
   btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x51/0x160
   scrub_workers_get+0x5a/0x170
   btrfs_scrub_dev+0x18c/0x630
   ? start_transaction+0xd1/0x5d0
   btrfs_dev_replace_by_ioctl.cold.21+0x10a/0x1d4
   btrfs_ioctl+0x2799/0x30a0
   ? do_sigaction+0x102/0x250
   ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xca/0x160
   ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x30
   ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0xe0
   ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x30
   ? do_sigaction+0x102/0x250
   ? ksys_ioctl+0x83/0xc0
   ksys_ioctl+0x83/0xc0
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
   do_syscall_64+0x50/0x90
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

This happens because we're allocating the scrub workqueues under the
scrub and device list mutex, which brings in a whole host of other
dependencies.

Because the work queue allocation is done with GFP_KERNEL, it can
trigger reclaim, which can lead to a transaction commit, which in turns
needs the device_list_mutex, it can lead to a deadlock. A different
problem for which this fix is a solution.

Fix this by moving the actual allocation outside of the
scrub lock, and then only take the lock once we're ready to actually
assign them to the fs_info.  We'll now have to cleanup the workqueues in
a few more places, so I've added a helper to do the refcount dance to
safely free the workqueues.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 16, 2020
…s metrics" test

Linux 5.9 introduced perf test case "Parse and process metrics" and
on s390 this test case always dumps core:

  [root@t35lp67 perf]# ./perf test -vvvv -F 67
  67: Parse and process metrics                             :
  --- start ---
  metric expr inst_retired.any / cpu_clk_unhalted.thread for IPC
  parsing metric: inst_retired.any / cpu_clk_unhalted.thread
  Segmentation fault (core dumped)
  [root@t35lp67 perf]#

I debugged this core dump and gdb shows this call chain:

  (gdb) where
   #0  0x000003ffabc3192a in __strnlen_c_1 () from /lib64/libc.so.6
   #1  0x000003ffabc293de in strcasestr () from /lib64/libc.so.6
   #2  0x0000000001102ba2 in match_metric(list=0x1e6ea20 "inst_retired.any",
            n=<optimized out>)
       at util/metricgroup.c:368
   #3  find_metric (map=<optimized out>, map=<optimized out>,
           metric=0x1e6ea20 "inst_retired.any")
      at util/metricgroup.c:765
   #4  __resolve_metric (ids=0x0, map=<optimized out>, metric_list=0x0,
           metric_no_group=<optimized out>, m=<optimized out>)
      at util/metricgroup.c:844
   #5  resolve_metric (ids=0x0, map=0x0, metric_list=0x0,
          metric_no_group=<optimized out>)
      at util/metricgroup.c:881
   #6  metricgroup__add_metric (metric=<optimized out>,
        metric_no_group=metric_no_group@entry=false, events=<optimized out>,
        events@entry=0x3ffd84fb878, metric_list=0x0,
        metric_list@entry=0x3ffd84fb868, map=0x0)
      at util/metricgroup.c:943
   #7  0x00000000011034ae in metricgroup__add_metric_list (map=0x13f9828 <map>,
        metric_list=0x3ffd84fb868, events=0x3ffd84fb878,
        metric_no_group=<optimized out>, list=<optimized out>)
      at util/metricgroup.c:988
   #8  parse_groups (perf_evlist=perf_evlist@entry=0x1e70260,
          str=str@entry=0x12f34b2 "IPC", metric_no_group=<optimized out>,
          metric_no_merge=<optimized out>,
          fake_pmu=fake_pmu@entry=0x1462f18 <perf_pmu.fake>,
          metric_events=0x3ffd84fba58, map=0x1)
      at util/metricgroup.c:1040
   #9  0x0000000001103eb2 in metricgroup__parse_groups_test(
  	evlist=evlist@entry=0x1e70260, map=map@entry=0x13f9828 <map>,
  	str=str@entry=0x12f34b2 "IPC",
  	metric_no_group=metric_no_group@entry=false,
  	metric_no_merge=metric_no_merge@entry=false,
  	metric_events=0x3ffd84fba58)
      at util/metricgroup.c:1082
   #10 0x00000000010c84d8 in __compute_metric (ratio2=0x0, name2=0x0,
          ratio1=<synthetic pointer>, name1=0x12f34b2 "IPC",
  	vals=0x3ffd84fbad8, name=0x12f34b2 "IPC")
      at tests/parse-metric.c:159
   #11 compute_metric (ratio=<synthetic pointer>, vals=0x3ffd84fbad8,
  	name=0x12f34b2 "IPC")
      at tests/parse-metric.c:189
   #12 test_ipc () at tests/parse-metric.c:208
.....
..... omitted many more lines

This test case was added with
commit 218ca91 ("perf tests: Add parse metric test for frontend metric").

When I compile with make DEBUG=y it works fine and I do not get a core dump.

It turned out that the above listed function call chain worked on a struct
pmu_event array which requires a trailing element with zeroes which was
missing. The marco map_for_each_event() loops over that array tests for members
metric_expr/metric_name/metric_group being non-NULL. Adding this element fixes
the issue.

Output after:

  [root@t35lp46 perf]# ./perf test 67
  67: Parse and process metrics                             : Ok
  [root@t35lp46 perf]#

Committer notes:

As Ian remarks, this is not s390 specific:

<quote Ian>
  This also shows up with address sanitizer on all architectures
  (perhaps change the patch title) and perhaps add a "Fixes: <commit>"
  tag.

  =================================================================
  ==4718==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow on address
  0x55c93b4d59e8 at pc 0x55c93a1541e2 bp 0x7ffd24327c60 sp
  0x7ffd24327c58
  READ of size 8 at 0x55c93b4d59e8 thread T0
      #0 0x55c93a1541e1 in find_metric tools/perf/util/metricgroup.c:764:2
      #1 0x55c93a153e6c in __resolve_metric tools/perf/util/metricgroup.c:844:9
      #2 0x55c93a152f18 in resolve_metric tools/perf/util/metricgroup.c:881:9
      #3 0x55c93a1528db in metricgroup__add_metric
  tools/perf/util/metricgroup.c:943:9
      #4 0x55c93a151996 in metricgroup__add_metric_list
  tools/perf/util/metricgroup.c:988:9
      #5 0x55c93a1511b9 in parse_groups tools/perf/util/metricgroup.c:1040:8
      #6 0x55c93a1513e1 in metricgroup__parse_groups_test
  tools/perf/util/metricgroup.c:1082:9
      #7 0x55c93a0108ae in __compute_metric tools/perf/tests/parse-metric.c:159:8
      #8 0x55c93a010744 in compute_metric tools/perf/tests/parse-metric.c:189:9
      #9 0x55c93a00f5ee in test_ipc tools/perf/tests/parse-metric.c:208:2
      #10 0x55c93a00f1e8 in test__parse_metric
  tools/perf/tests/parse-metric.c:345:2
      #11 0x55c939fd7202 in run_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:410:9
      #12 0x55c939fd6736 in test_and_print tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:440:9
      #13 0x55c939fd58c3 in __cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:661:4
      #14 0x55c939fd4e02 in cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:807:9
      #15 0x55c939e4763d in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:313:11
      #16 0x55c939e46475 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:365:8
      #17 0x55c939e4737e in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:409:2
      #18 0x55c939e45f7e in main tools/perf/perf.c:539:3

  0x55c93b4d59e8 is located 0 bytes to the right of global variable
  'pme_test' defined in 'tools/perf/tests/parse-metric.c:17:25'
  (0x55c93b4d54a0) of size 1352
  SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow
  tools/perf/util/metricgroup.c:764:2 in find_metric
  Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
    0x0ab9a7692ae0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x0ab9a7692af0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x0ab9a7692b00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x0ab9a7692b10: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x0ab9a7692b20: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  =>0x0ab9a7692b30: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[f9]f9 f9
    0x0ab9a7692b40: f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9
    0x0ab9a7692b50: f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9
    0x0ab9a7692b60: f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x0ab9a7692b70: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x0ab9a7692b80: f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9
  Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
    Addressable:           00
    Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
    Heap left redzone:	   fa
    Freed heap region:	   fd
    Stack left redzone:	   f1
    Stack mid redzone:	   f2
    Stack right redzone:     f3
    Stack after return:	   f5
    Stack use after scope:   f8
    Global redzone:          f9
    Global init order:	   f6
    Poisoned by user:        f7
    Container overflow:	   fc
    Array cookie:            ac
    Intra object redzone:    bb
    ASan internal:           fe
    Left alloca redzone:     ca
    Right alloca redzone:    cb
    Shadow gap:              cc
</quote>

I'm also adding the missing "Fixes" tag and setting just .name to NULL,
as doing it that way is more compact (the compiler will zero out
everything else) and the table iterators look for .name being NULL as
the sentinel marking the end of the table.

Fixes: 0a507af ("perf tests: Add parse metric test for ipc metric")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Richter <tmricht@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Sumanth Korikkar <sumanthk@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200825071211.16959-1-tmricht@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 16, 2020
syzbot reported twice a lockdep issue in fib6_del() [1]
which I think is caused by net->ipv6.fib6_null_entry
having a NULL fib6_table pointer.

fib6_del() already checks for fib6_null_entry special
case, we only need to return earlier.

Bug seems to occur very rarely, I have thus chosen
a 'bug origin' that makes backports not too complex.

[1]
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
5.9.0-rc4-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
-----------------------------
net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1996 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!

other info that might help us debug this:

rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
4 locks held by syz-executor.5/8095:
 #0: ffffffff8a7ea708 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ppp_release+0x178/0x240 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:401
 #1: ffff88804c422dd8 (&net->ipv6.fib6_gc_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_trylock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:414 [inline]
 #1: ffff88804c422dd8 (&net->ipv6.fib6_gc_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: fib6_run_gc+0x21b/0x2d0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2312
 #2: ffffffff89bd6a40 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __fib6_clean_all+0x0/0x290 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2613
 #3: ffff8880a82e6430 (&tb->tb6_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:359 [inline]
 #3: ffff8880a82e6430 (&tb->tb6_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: __fib6_clean_all+0x107/0x290 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2245

stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 8095 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc4-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x198/0x1fd lib/dump_stack.c:118
 fib6_del+0x12b4/0x1630 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1996
 fib6_clean_node+0x39b/0x570 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2180
 fib6_walk_continue+0x4aa/0x8e0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2102
 fib6_walk+0x182/0x370 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2150
 fib6_clean_tree+0xdb/0x120 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2230
 __fib6_clean_all+0x120/0x290 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2246
 fib6_clean_all net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2257 [inline]
 fib6_run_gc+0x113/0x2d0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2320
 ndisc_netdev_event+0x217/0x350 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:1805
 notifier_call_chain+0xb5/0x200 kernel/notifier.c:83
 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xb5/0x130 net/core/dev.c:2033
 call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2045 [inline]
 call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2059 [inline]
 dev_close_many+0x30b/0x650 net/core/dev.c:1634
 rollback_registered_many+0x3a8/0x1210 net/core/dev.c:9261
 rollback_registered net/core/dev.c:9329 [inline]
 unregister_netdevice_queue+0x2dd/0x570 net/core/dev.c:10410
 unregister_netdevice include/linux/netdevice.h:2774 [inline]
 ppp_release+0x216/0x240 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:403
 __fput+0x285/0x920 fs/file_table.c:281
 task_work_run+0xdd/0x190 kernel/task_work.c:141
 tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:188 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:163 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1e1/0x200 kernel/entry/common.c:190
 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x7e/0x2e0 kernel/entry/common.c:265
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Fixes: 421842e ("net/ipv6: Add fib6_null_entry")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 24, 2020
When compiling with DEBUG=1 on Fedora 32 I'm getting crash for 'perf
test signal':

  Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
  0x0000000000c68548 in __test_function ()
  (gdb) bt
  #0  0x0000000000c68548 in __test_function ()
  #1  0x00000000004d62e9 in test_function () at tests/bp_signal.c:61
  #2  0x00000000004d689a in test__bp_signal (test=0xa8e280 <generic_ ...
  #3  0x00000000004b7d49 in run_test (test=0xa8e280 <generic_tests+1 ...
  #4  0x00000000004b7e7f in test_and_print (t=0xa8e280 <generic_test ...
  #5  0x00000000004b8927 in __cmd_test (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffdce0, ...
  ...

It's caused by the symbol __test_function being in the ".bss" section:

  $ readelf -a ./perf | less
    [Nr] Name              Type             Address           Offset
         Size              EntSize          Flags  Link  Info  Align
    ...
    [28] .bss              NOBITS           0000000000c356a0  008346a0
         00000000000511f8  0000000000000000  WA       0     0     32

  $ nm perf | grep __test_function
  0000000000c68548 B __test_function

I guess most of the time we're just lucky the inline asm ended up in the
".text" section, so making it specific explicit with push and pop
section clauses.

  $ readelf -a ./perf | less
    [Nr] Name              Type             Address           Offset
         Size              EntSize          Flags  Link  Info  Align
    ...
    [13] .text             PROGBITS         0000000000431240  00031240
         0000000000306faa  0000000000000000  AX       0     0     16

  $ nm perf | grep __test_function
  00000000004d62c8 T __test_function

Committer testing:

  $ readelf -wi ~/bin/perf | grep producer -m1
    <c>   DW_AT_producer    : (indirect string, offset: 0x254a): GNU C99 10.2.1 20200723 (Red Hat 10.2.1-1) -mtune=generic -march=x86-64 -ggdb3 -std=gnu99 -fno-omit-frame-pointer -funwind-tables -fstack-protector-all
                                                                                                                                         ^^^^^
                                                                                                                                         ^^^^^
                                                                                                                                         ^^^^^
  $

Before:

  $ perf test signal
  20: Breakpoint overflow signal handler                    : FAILED!
  $

After:

  $ perf test signal
  20: Breakpoint overflow signal handler                    : Ok
  $

Fixes: 8fd34e1 ("perf test: Improve bp_signal")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200911130005.1842138-1-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 24, 2020
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
mlxsw: Derive SBIB from maximum port speed & MTU

Petr says:

Internal buffer is a part of port headroom used for packets that are
mirrored due to triggers that the Spectrum ASIC considers "egress". Besides
ACL mirroring on port egresss this includes also packets mirrored due to
ECN marking.

This patchset changes the way the internal mirroring buffer is reserved.
Currently the buffer reflects port MTU and speed accurately. In the future,
mlxsw should support dcbnl_setbuffer hook to allow the users to set buffer
sizes by hand. In that case, there might not be enough space for growth of
the internal mirroring buffer due to MTU and speed changes. While vetoing
MTU changes would be merely confusing, port speed changes cannot be vetoed,
and such change would simply lead to issues in packet mirroring.

For these reasons, with these patches the internal mirroring buffer is
derived from maximum MTU and maximum speed achievable on the port.

Patches #1 and #2 introduce a new callback to determine the maximum speed a
given port can achieve.

With patches #3 and #4, the information about, respectively, maximum MTU
and maximum port speed, is kept in struct mlxsw_sp_port.

In patch #5, maximum MTU and maximum speed are used to determine the size
of the internal buffer. MTU update and speed update hooks are dropped,
because they are no longer necessary.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 24, 2020
The aliases were never released causing the following leaks:

  Indirect leak of 1224 byte(s) in 9 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7feefb830628 in malloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x107628)
    #1 0x56332c8f1b62 in __perf_pmu__new_alias util/pmu.c:322
    #2 0x56332c8f401f in pmu_add_cpu_aliases_map util/pmu.c:778
    #3 0x56332c792ce9 in __test__pmu_event_aliases tests/pmu-events.c:295
    #4 0x56332c792ce9 in test_aliases tests/pmu-events.c:367
    #5 0x56332c76a09b in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:410
    #6 0x56332c76a09b in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:440
    #7 0x56332c76ce69 in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:695
    #8 0x56332c76ce69 in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:807
    #9 0x56332c7d2214 in run_builtin /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:312
    #10 0x56332c6701a8 in handle_internal_command /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:364
    #11 0x56332c6701a8 in run_argv /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:408
    #12 0x56332c6701a8 in main /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:538
    #13 0x7feefb359cc9 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308

Fixes: 956a783 ("perf test: Test pmu-events aliases")
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200915031819.386559-11-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 24, 2020
The evsel->unit borrows a pointer of pmu event or alias instead of
owns a string.  But tool event (duration_time) passes a result of
strdup() caused a leak.

It was found by ASAN during metric test:

  Direct leak of 210 byte(s) in 70 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7fe366fca0b5 in strdup (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x920b5)
    #1 0x559fbbcc6ea3 in add_event_tool util/parse-events.c:414
    #2 0x559fbbcc6ea3 in parse_events_add_tool util/parse-events.c:1414
    #3 0x559fbbd8474d in parse_events_parse util/parse-events.y:439
    #4 0x559fbbcc95da in parse_events__scanner util/parse-events.c:2096
    #5 0x559fbbcc95da in __parse_events util/parse-events.c:2141
    #6 0x559fbbc28555 in check_parse_id tests/pmu-events.c:406
    #7 0x559fbbc28555 in check_parse_id tests/pmu-events.c:393
    #8 0x559fbbc28555 in check_parse_cpu tests/pmu-events.c:415
    #9 0x559fbbc28555 in test_parsing tests/pmu-events.c:498
    #10 0x559fbbc0109b in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:410
    #11 0x559fbbc0109b in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:440
    #12 0x559fbbc03e69 in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:695
    #13 0x559fbbc03e69 in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:807
    #14 0x559fbbc691f4 in run_builtin /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:312
    #15 0x559fbbb071a8 in handle_internal_command /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:364
    #16 0x559fbbb071a8 in run_argv /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:408
    #17 0x559fbbb071a8 in main /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:538
    #18 0x7fe366b68cc9 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308

Fixes: f0fbb11 ("perf stat: Implement duration_time as a proper event")
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200915031819.386559-6-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 24, 2020
The test_generic_metric() missed to release entries in the pctx.  Asan
reported following leak (and more):

  Direct leak of 128 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f4c9396980e in calloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10780e)
    #1 0x55f7e748cc14 in hashmap_grow (/home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf+0x90cc14)
    #2 0x55f7e748d497 in hashmap__insert (/home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf+0x90d497)
    #3 0x55f7e7341667 in hashmap__set /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/util/hashmap.h:111
    #4 0x55f7e7341667 in expr__add_ref util/expr.c:120
    #5 0x55f7e7292436 in prepare_metric util/stat-shadow.c:783
    #6 0x55f7e729556d in test_generic_metric util/stat-shadow.c:858
    #7 0x55f7e712390b in compute_single tests/parse-metric.c:128
    #8 0x55f7e712390b in __compute_metric tests/parse-metric.c:180
    #9 0x55f7e712446d in compute_metric tests/parse-metric.c:196
    #10 0x55f7e712446d in test_dcache_l2 tests/parse-metric.c:295
    #11 0x55f7e712446d in test__parse_metric tests/parse-metric.c:355
    #12 0x55f7e70be09b in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:410
    #13 0x55f7e70be09b in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:440
    #14 0x55f7e70c101a in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:661
    #15 0x55f7e70c101a in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:807
    #16 0x55f7e7126214 in run_builtin /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:312
    #17 0x55f7e6fc41a8 in handle_internal_command /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:364
    #18 0x55f7e6fc41a8 in run_argv /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:408
    #19 0x55f7e6fc41a8 in main /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:538
    #20 0x7f4c93492cc9 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308

Fixes: 6d432c4 ("perf tools: Add test_generic_metric function")
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200915031819.386559-8-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 24, 2020
The metricgroup__add_metric() can find multiple match for a metric group
and it's possible to fail.  Also it can fail in the middle like in
resolve_metric() even for single metric.

In those cases, the intermediate list and ids will be leaked like:

  Direct leak of 3 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f4c938f40b5 in strdup (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x920b5)
    #1 0x55f7e71c1bef in __add_metric util/metricgroup.c:683
    #2 0x55f7e71c31d0 in add_metric util/metricgroup.c:906
    #3 0x55f7e71c3844 in metricgroup__add_metric util/metricgroup.c:940
    #4 0x55f7e71c488d in metricgroup__add_metric_list util/metricgroup.c:993
    #5 0x55f7e71c488d in parse_groups util/metricgroup.c:1045
    #6 0x55f7e71c60a4 in metricgroup__parse_groups_test util/metricgroup.c:1087
    #7 0x55f7e71235ae in __compute_metric tests/parse-metric.c:164
    #8 0x55f7e7124650 in compute_metric tests/parse-metric.c:196
    #9 0x55f7e7124650 in test_recursion_fail tests/parse-metric.c:318
    #10 0x55f7e7124650 in test__parse_metric tests/parse-metric.c:356
    #11 0x55f7e70be09b in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:410
    #12 0x55f7e70be09b in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:440
    #13 0x55f7e70c101a in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:661
    #14 0x55f7e70c101a in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:807
    #15 0x55f7e7126214 in run_builtin /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:312
    #16 0x55f7e6fc41a8 in handle_internal_command /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:364
    #17 0x55f7e6fc41a8 in run_argv /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:408
    #18 0x55f7e6fc41a8 in main /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:538
    #19 0x7f4c93492cc9 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308

Fixes: 83de0b7 ("perf metric: Collect referenced metrics in struct metric_ref_node")
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200915031819.386559-9-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 24, 2020
The following leaks were detected by ASAN:

  Indirect leak of 360 byte(s) in 9 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7fecc305180e in calloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10780e)
    #1 0x560578f6dce5 in perf_pmu__new_format util/pmu.c:1333
    #2 0x560578f752fc in perf_pmu_parse util/pmu.y:59
    #3 0x560578f6a8b7 in perf_pmu__format_parse util/pmu.c:73
    #4 0x560578e07045 in test__pmu tests/pmu.c:155
    #5 0x560578de109b in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:410
    #6 0x560578de109b in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:440
    #7 0x560578de401a in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:661
    #8 0x560578de401a in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:807
    #9 0x560578e49354 in run_builtin /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:312
    #10 0x560578ce71a8 in handle_internal_command /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:364
    #11 0x560578ce71a8 in run_argv /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:408
    #12 0x560578ce71a8 in main /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:538
    #13 0x7fecc2b7acc9 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308

Fixes: cff7f95 ("perf tests: Move pmu tests into separate object")
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200915031819.386559-12-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 24, 2020
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
mlxsw: Refactor headroom management

Petr says:

On Spectrum, port buffers, also called port headroom, is where packets are
stored while they are parsed and the forwarding decision is being made. For
lossless traffic flows, in case shared buffer admission is not allowed,
headroom is also where to put the extra traffic received before the sent
PAUSE takes effect. Another aspect of the port headroom is the so called
internal buffer, which is used for egress mirroring.

Linux supports two DCB interfaces related to the headroom: dcbnl_setbuffer
for configuration, and dcbnl_getbuffer for inspection. In order to make it
possible to implement these interfaces, it is first necessary to clean up
headroom handling, which is currently strewn in several places in the
driver.

The end goal is an architecture whereby it is possible to take a copy of
the current configuration, adjust parameters, and then hand the proposed
configuration over to the system to implement it. When everything works,
the proposed configuration is accepted and saved. First, this centralizes
the reconfiguration handling to one function, which takes care of
coordinating buffer size changes and priority map changes to avoid
introducing drops. Second, the fact that the configuration is all in one
place makes it easy to keep a backup and handle error path rollbacks, which
were previously hard to understand.

Patch #1 introduces struct mlxsw_sp_hdroom, which will keep port headroom
configuration.

Patch #2 unifies handling of delay provision between PFC and PAUSE. From
now on, delay is to be measured in bytes of extra space, and will not
include MTU. PFC handler sets the delay directly from the parameter it gets
through the DCB interface. For PAUSE, MLXSW_SP_PAUSE_DELAY is converted to
have the same meaning.

In patches #3-#5, MTU, lossiness and priorities are gradually moved over to
struct mlxsw_sp_hdroom.

In patches #6-#11, handling of buffer resizing and priority maps is moved
from spectrum.c and spectrum_dcb.c to spectrum_buffers.c. The API is
gradually adapted so that struct mlxsw_sp_hdroom becomes the main interface
through which the various clients express how the headroom should be
configured.

Patch #12 is a small cleanup that the previous transformation made
possible.

In patch #13, the port init code becomes a boring client of the headroom
code, instead of rolling its own thing.

Patches #14 and #15 move handling of internal mirroring buffer to the new
headroom code as well. Previously, this code was in the SPAN module. This
patchset converts the SPAN module to another boring client of the headroom
code.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 24, 2020
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
mlxsw: Support dcbnl_setbuffer, dcbnl_getbuffer

Petr says:

On Spectrum, port buffers, also called port headroom, is where packets are
stored while they are parsed and the forwarding decision is being made. For
lossless traffic flows, in case shared buffer admission is not allowed,
headroom is also where to put the extra traffic received before the sent
PAUSE takes effect.

Linux supports two DCB interfaces related to the headroom: dcbnl_setbuffer
for configuration, and dcbnl_getbuffer for inspection. This patch set
implements them.

With dcbnl_setbuffer in place, there will be two sources of authority over
the ingress configuration: the DCB ETS hook, because ETS configuration is
mirrored to ingress, and the DCB setbuffer hook. mlxsw is in a similar
situation on the egress side, where there are two sources of the ETS
configuration: the DCB ETS hook, and the TC qdisc hooks. This is a
non-intuitive situation, because the way the ASIC ends up being configured
depends not only on the actual configured bits, but also on the order in
which they were configured.

To prevent these issues on the ingress side, two configuration modes will
exist: DCB mode and TC mode. DCB ETS will keep getting projected to ingress
in the (default) DCB mode. When a qdisc is installed on a port, it will be
switched to the TC mode, the ingress configuration will be done through the
dcbnl_setbuffer callback. The reason is that the dcbnl_setbuffer hook is
not standardized and supported by lldpad. Projecting DCB ETS configuration
to ingress is a reasonable heuristic to configure ingress especially when
PFC is in effect.

In patch #1, the toggle between the DCB and TC modes of headroom
configuration, described above, is introduced.

Patch #2 implements dcbnl_getbuffer and dcbnl_setbuffer. dcbnl_getbuffer
can be always used to determine the current port headroom configuration.
dcbnl_setbuffer is only permitted in the TC mode.

In patch #3, make the qdisc module toggle the headroom mode from DCB to TC
and back, depending on whether there is an offloaded qdisc on the port.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 29, 2020
Andrii Nakryiko says:

====================
This patch set introduces a new set of BTF APIs to libbpf that allow to
conveniently produce BTF types and strings. These APIs will allow libbpf to do
more intrusive modifications of program's BTF (by rewriting it, at least as of
right now), which is necessary for the upcoming libbpf static linking. But
they are complete and generic, so can be adopted by anyone who has a need to
produce BTF type information.

One such example outside of libbpf is pahole, which was actually converted to
these APIs (locally, pending landing of these changes in libbpf) completely
and shows reduction in amount of custom pahole code necessary and brings nice
savings in memory usage (about 370MB reduction at peak for my kernel
configuration) and even BTF deduplication times (one second reduction,
23.7s -> 22.7s). Memory savings are due to avoiding pahole's own copy of
"uncompressed" raw BTF data. Time reduction comes from faster string
search and deduplication by relying on hashmap instead of BST used by pahole's
own code. Consequently, these APIs are already tested on real-world
complicated kernel BTF, but there is also pretty extensive selftest doing
extra validations.

Selftests in patch #3 add a set of generic ASSERT_{EQ,STREQ,ERR,OK} macros
that are useful for writing shorter and less repretitive selftests. I decided
to keep them local to that selftest for now, but if they prove to be useful in
more contexts we should move them to test_progs.h. And few more (e.g.,
inequality tests) macros are probably necessary to have a more complete set.

Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

v2->v3:
  - resending original patches #7-9 as patches #1-3 due to merge conflict;

v1->v2:
  - fixed comments (John);
  - renamed btf__append_xxx() into btf__add_xxx() (Alexei);
  - added btf__find_str() in addition to btf__add_str();
  - btf__new_empty() now sets kernel FD to -1 initially.
====================

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 1, 2020
Move all allocations outside of the regulator_lock()ed section.

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.7.13+ #535 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
f2fs_discard-179:7/702 is trying to acquire lock:
c0e5d920 (regulator_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: regulator_lock_dependent+0x54/0x2c0

but task is already holding lock:
cb95b080 (&dcc->cmd_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __issue_discard_cmd+0xec/0x5f8

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

[...]

-> #3 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}:
       fs_reclaim_acquire.part.11+0x40/0x50
       fs_reclaim_acquire+0x24/0x28
       __kmalloc_track_caller+0x54/0x218
       kstrdup+0x40/0x5c
       create_regulator+0xf4/0x368
       regulator_resolve_supply+0x1a0/0x200
       regulator_register+0x9c8/0x163c

[...]

other info that might help us debug this:

Chain exists of:
  regulator_list_mutex --> &sit_i->sentry_lock --> &dcc->cmd_lock

[...]

Fixes: f8702f9 ("regulator: core: Use ww_mutex for regulators locking")
Signed-off-by: Michał Mirosław <mirq-linux@rere.qmqm.pl>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6eebc99b2474f4ffaa0405b15178ece0e7e4f608.1597195321.git.mirq-linux@rere.qmqm.pl
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 2, 2020
Huazhong Tan says:

====================
net: hns3: updates for -next

To facilitate code maintenance and compatibility, #1 and #2 add
device version to replace pci revision, #3 to #9 adds support for
querying device capabilities and specifications, then the driver
can use these query results to implement corresponding features
(some features will be implemented later).

And #10 is a minor cleanup since too many parameters for
hclge_shaper_para_calc().
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 2, 2020
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
mlxsw: Expose transceiver overheat counter

Amit says:

An overheated transceiver can be the root cause of various network
problems such as link flapping. Counting the number of times a
transceiver's temperature was higher than its configured threshold can
therefore help in debugging such issues.

This patch set exposes a transceiver overheat counter via ethtool. This
is achieved by configuring the Spectrum ASIC to generate events whenever
a transceiver is overheated. The temperature thresholds are queried from
the transceiver (if available) and set to the default otherwise.

Example:

...
transceiver_overheat: 2

Patch set overview:

Patches #1-#3 add required device registers
Patches #4-#5 add required infrastructure in mlxsw to configure and
count overheat events
Patches #6-#9 gradually add support for the transceiver overheat counter
Patch #10 exposes the transceiver overheat counter via ethtool
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 2, 2020
Petr Machata says:

====================
mlxsw: PFC and headroom selftests

Recent changes in the headroom management code made it clear that an
automated way of testing this functionality is needed. This patchset brings
two tests: a synthetic headroom behavior test, which verifies mechanics of
headroom management. And a PFC test, which verifies whether this behavior
actually translates into a working lossless configuration.

Both of these tests rely on mlnx_qos[1], a tool that interfaces with Linux
DCB API. The tool was originally written to work with Mellanox NICs, but
does not actually rely on anything Mellanox-specific, and can be used for
mlxsw as well as for any other NIC-like driver. Unlike Open LLDP it does
support buffer commands and permits a fire-and-forget approach to
configuration, which makes it very handy for writing of selftests.

Patches #1-#3 extend the selftest devlink_lib.sh in various ways. Patch #4
then adds a helper wrapper for mlnx_qos to mlxsw's qos_lib.sh.

Patch #5 adds a test for management of port headroom.

Patch #6 adds a PFC test.

[1] https://github.com/Mellanox/mlnx-tools/
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Apr 2, 2025
v2:
- Created a single error handling unlock and exit in veth_pool_store
- Greatly expanded commit message with previous explanatory-only text

Summary: Use rtnl_mutex to synchronize veth_pool_store with itself,
ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open, preventing multiple calls in a row to
napi_disable.

Background: Two (or more) threads could call veth_pool_store through
writing to /sys/devices/vio/30000002/pool*/*. You can do this easily
with a little shell script. This causes a hang.

I configured LOCKDEP, compiled ibmveth.c with DEBUG, and built a new
kernel. I ran this test again and saw:

    Setting pool0/active to 0
    Setting pool1/active to 1
    [   73.911067][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting
    Setting pool1/active to 1
    Setting pool1/active to 0
    [   73.911367][ T4366] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting
    [   73.916056][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close complete
    [   73.916064][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: open starting
    [  110.808564][  T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification.
    [  230.808495][  T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification.
    [  243.683786][  T123] INFO: task stress.sh:4365 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
    [  243.683827][  T123]       Not tainted 6.14.0-01103-g2df0c02dab82-dirty kernel-patches#8
    [  243.683833][  T123] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
    [  243.683838][  T123] task:stress.sh       state:D stack:28096 pid:4365  tgid:4365  ppid:4364   task_flags:0x400040 flags:0x00042000
    [  243.683852][  T123] Call Trace:
    [  243.683857][  T123] [c00000000c38f690] [0000000000000001] 0x1 (unreliable)
    [  243.683868][  T123] [c00000000c38f840] [c00000000001f908] __switch_to+0x318/0x4e0
    [  243.683878][  T123] [c00000000c38f8a0] [c000000001549a70] __schedule+0x500/0x12a0
    [  243.683888][  T123] [c00000000c38f9a0] [c00000000154a878] schedule+0x68/0x210
    [  243.683896][  T123] [c00000000c38f9d0] [c00000000154ac80] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x30/0x50
    [  243.683904][  T123] [c00000000c38fa00] [c00000000154dbb0] __mutex_lock+0x730/0x10f0
    [  243.683913][  T123] [c00000000c38fb10] [c000000001154d40] napi_enable+0x30/0x60
    [  243.683921][  T123] [c00000000c38fb40] [c000000000f4ae94] ibmveth_open+0x68/0x5dc
    [  243.683928][  T123] [c00000000c38fbe0] [c000000000f4aa20] veth_pool_store+0x220/0x270
    [  243.683936][  T123] [c00000000c38fc70] [c000000000826278] sysfs_kf_write+0x68/0xb0
    [  243.683944][  T123] [c00000000c38fcb0] [c0000000008240b8] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x198/0x2d0
    [  243.683951][  T123] [c00000000c38fd00] [c00000000071b9ac] vfs_write+0x34c/0x650
    [  243.683958][  T123] [c00000000c38fdc0] [c00000000071bea8] ksys_write+0x88/0x150
    [  243.683966][  T123] [c00000000c38fe10] [c0000000000317f4] system_call_exception+0x124/0x340
    [  243.683973][  T123] [c00000000c38fe50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
    ...
    [  243.684087][  T123] Showing all locks held in the system:
    [  243.684095][  T123] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/123:
    [  243.684099][  T123]  #0: c00000000278e370 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x50/0x248
    [  243.684114][  T123] 4 locks held by stress.sh/4365:
    [  243.684119][  T123]  #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150
    [  243.684132][  T123]  kernel-patches#1: c000000041aea888 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0
    [  243.684143][  T123]  kernel-patches#2: c0000000366fb9a8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0
    [  243.684155][  T123]  kernel-patches#3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_enable+0x30/0x60
    [  243.684166][  T123] 5 locks held by stress.sh/4366:
    [  243.684170][  T123]  #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150
    [  243.684183][  T123]  kernel-patches#1: c00000000aee2288 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0
    [  243.684194][  T123]  kernel-patches#2: c0000000366f4ba8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0
    [  243.684205][  T123]  kernel-patches#3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_disable+0x30/0x60
    [  243.684216][  T123]  kernel-patches#4: c0000003ff9bbf18 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __schedule+0x138/0x12a0

From the ibmveth debug, two threads are calling veth_pool_store, which
calls ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open. Here's the sequence:

  T4365             T4366
  ----------------- ----------------- ---------
  veth_pool_store   veth_pool_store
                    ibmveth_close
  ibmveth_close
  napi_disable
                    napi_disable
  ibmveth_open
  napi_enable                         <- HANG

ibmveth_close calls napi_disable at the top and ibmveth_open calls
napi_enable at the top.

https://docs.kernel.org/networking/napi.html]] says

  The control APIs are not idempotent. Control API calls are safe
  against concurrent use of datapath APIs but an incorrect sequence of
  control API calls may result in crashes, deadlocks, or race
  conditions. For example, calling napi_disable() multiple times in a
  row will deadlock.

In the normal open and close paths, rtnl_mutex is acquired to prevent
other callers. This is missing from veth_pool_store. Use rtnl_mutex in
veth_pool_store fixes these hangs.

Signed-off-by: Dave Marquardt <davemarq@linux.ibm.com>
Fixes: 860f242 ("[PATCH] ibmveth change buffer pools dynamically")
Reviewed-by: Nick Child <nnac123@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Apr 3, 2025
v2:
- Created a single error handling unlock and exit in veth_pool_store
- Greatly expanded commit message with previous explanatory-only text

Summary: Use rtnl_mutex to synchronize veth_pool_store with itself,
ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open, preventing multiple calls in a row to
napi_disable.

Background: Two (or more) threads could call veth_pool_store through
writing to /sys/devices/vio/30000002/pool*/*. You can do this easily
with a little shell script. This causes a hang.

I configured LOCKDEP, compiled ibmveth.c with DEBUG, and built a new
kernel. I ran this test again and saw:

    Setting pool0/active to 0
    Setting pool1/active to 1
    [   73.911067][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting
    Setting pool1/active to 1
    Setting pool1/active to 0
    [   73.911367][ T4366] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting
    [   73.916056][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close complete
    [   73.916064][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: open starting
    [  110.808564][  T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification.
    [  230.808495][  T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification.
    [  243.683786][  T123] INFO: task stress.sh:4365 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
    [  243.683827][  T123]       Not tainted 6.14.0-01103-g2df0c02dab82-dirty kernel-patches#8
    [  243.683833][  T123] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
    [  243.683838][  T123] task:stress.sh       state:D stack:28096 pid:4365  tgid:4365  ppid:4364   task_flags:0x400040 flags:0x00042000
    [  243.683852][  T123] Call Trace:
    [  243.683857][  T123] [c00000000c38f690] [0000000000000001] 0x1 (unreliable)
    [  243.683868][  T123] [c00000000c38f840] [c00000000001f908] __switch_to+0x318/0x4e0
    [  243.683878][  T123] [c00000000c38f8a0] [c000000001549a70] __schedule+0x500/0x12a0
    [  243.683888][  T123] [c00000000c38f9a0] [c00000000154a878] schedule+0x68/0x210
    [  243.683896][  T123] [c00000000c38f9d0] [c00000000154ac80] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x30/0x50
    [  243.683904][  T123] [c00000000c38fa00] [c00000000154dbb0] __mutex_lock+0x730/0x10f0
    [  243.683913][  T123] [c00000000c38fb10] [c000000001154d40] napi_enable+0x30/0x60
    [  243.683921][  T123] [c00000000c38fb40] [c000000000f4ae94] ibmveth_open+0x68/0x5dc
    [  243.683928][  T123] [c00000000c38fbe0] [c000000000f4aa20] veth_pool_store+0x220/0x270
    [  243.683936][  T123] [c00000000c38fc70] [c000000000826278] sysfs_kf_write+0x68/0xb0
    [  243.683944][  T123] [c00000000c38fcb0] [c0000000008240b8] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x198/0x2d0
    [  243.683951][  T123] [c00000000c38fd00] [c00000000071b9ac] vfs_write+0x34c/0x650
    [  243.683958][  T123] [c00000000c38fdc0] [c00000000071bea8] ksys_write+0x88/0x150
    [  243.683966][  T123] [c00000000c38fe10] [c0000000000317f4] system_call_exception+0x124/0x340
    [  243.683973][  T123] [c00000000c38fe50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
    ...
    [  243.684087][  T123] Showing all locks held in the system:
    [  243.684095][  T123] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/123:
    [  243.684099][  T123]  #0: c00000000278e370 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x50/0x248
    [  243.684114][  T123] 4 locks held by stress.sh/4365:
    [  243.684119][  T123]  #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150
    [  243.684132][  T123]  kernel-patches#1: c000000041aea888 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0
    [  243.684143][  T123]  kernel-patches#2: c0000000366fb9a8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0
    [  243.684155][  T123]  kernel-patches#3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_enable+0x30/0x60
    [  243.684166][  T123] 5 locks held by stress.sh/4366:
    [  243.684170][  T123]  #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150
    [  243.684183][  T123]  kernel-patches#1: c00000000aee2288 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0
    [  243.684194][  T123]  kernel-patches#2: c0000000366f4ba8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0
    [  243.684205][  T123]  kernel-patches#3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_disable+0x30/0x60
    [  243.684216][  T123]  kernel-patches#4: c0000003ff9bbf18 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __schedule+0x138/0x12a0

From the ibmveth debug, two threads are calling veth_pool_store, which
calls ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open. Here's the sequence:

  T4365             T4366
  ----------------- ----------------- ---------
  veth_pool_store   veth_pool_store
                    ibmveth_close
  ibmveth_close
  napi_disable
                    napi_disable
  ibmveth_open
  napi_enable                         <- HANG

ibmveth_close calls napi_disable at the top and ibmveth_open calls
napi_enable at the top.

https://docs.kernel.org/networking/napi.html]] says

  The control APIs are not idempotent. Control API calls are safe
  against concurrent use of datapath APIs but an incorrect sequence of
  control API calls may result in crashes, deadlocks, or race
  conditions. For example, calling napi_disable() multiple times in a
  row will deadlock.

In the normal open and close paths, rtnl_mutex is acquired to prevent
other callers. This is missing from veth_pool_store. Use rtnl_mutex in
veth_pool_store fixes these hangs.

Signed-off-by: Dave Marquardt <davemarq@linux.ibm.com>
Fixes: 860f242 ("[PATCH] ibmveth change buffer pools dynamically")
Reviewed-by: Nick Child <nnac123@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Apr 3, 2025
v2:
- Created a single error handling unlock and exit in veth_pool_store
- Greatly expanded commit message with previous explanatory-only text

Summary: Use rtnl_mutex to synchronize veth_pool_store with itself,
ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open, preventing multiple calls in a row to
napi_disable.

Background: Two (or more) threads could call veth_pool_store through
writing to /sys/devices/vio/30000002/pool*/*. You can do this easily
with a little shell script. This causes a hang.

I configured LOCKDEP, compiled ibmveth.c with DEBUG, and built a new
kernel. I ran this test again and saw:

    Setting pool0/active to 0
    Setting pool1/active to 1
    [   73.911067][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting
    Setting pool1/active to 1
    Setting pool1/active to 0
    [   73.911367][ T4366] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting
    [   73.916056][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close complete
    [   73.916064][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: open starting
    [  110.808564][  T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification.
    [  230.808495][  T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification.
    [  243.683786][  T123] INFO: task stress.sh:4365 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
    [  243.683827][  T123]       Not tainted 6.14.0-01103-g2df0c02dab82-dirty kernel-patches#8
    [  243.683833][  T123] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
    [  243.683838][  T123] task:stress.sh       state:D stack:28096 pid:4365  tgid:4365  ppid:4364   task_flags:0x400040 flags:0x00042000
    [  243.683852][  T123] Call Trace:
    [  243.683857][  T123] [c00000000c38f690] [0000000000000001] 0x1 (unreliable)
    [  243.683868][  T123] [c00000000c38f840] [c00000000001f908] __switch_to+0x318/0x4e0
    [  243.683878][  T123] [c00000000c38f8a0] [c000000001549a70] __schedule+0x500/0x12a0
    [  243.683888][  T123] [c00000000c38f9a0] [c00000000154a878] schedule+0x68/0x210
    [  243.683896][  T123] [c00000000c38f9d0] [c00000000154ac80] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x30/0x50
    [  243.683904][  T123] [c00000000c38fa00] [c00000000154dbb0] __mutex_lock+0x730/0x10f0
    [  243.683913][  T123] [c00000000c38fb10] [c000000001154d40] napi_enable+0x30/0x60
    [  243.683921][  T123] [c00000000c38fb40] [c000000000f4ae94] ibmveth_open+0x68/0x5dc
    [  243.683928][  T123] [c00000000c38fbe0] [c000000000f4aa20] veth_pool_store+0x220/0x270
    [  243.683936][  T123] [c00000000c38fc70] [c000000000826278] sysfs_kf_write+0x68/0xb0
    [  243.683944][  T123] [c00000000c38fcb0] [c0000000008240b8] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x198/0x2d0
    [  243.683951][  T123] [c00000000c38fd00] [c00000000071b9ac] vfs_write+0x34c/0x650
    [  243.683958][  T123] [c00000000c38fdc0] [c00000000071bea8] ksys_write+0x88/0x150
    [  243.683966][  T123] [c00000000c38fe10] [c0000000000317f4] system_call_exception+0x124/0x340
    [  243.683973][  T123] [c00000000c38fe50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
    ...
    [  243.684087][  T123] Showing all locks held in the system:
    [  243.684095][  T123] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/123:
    [  243.684099][  T123]  #0: c00000000278e370 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x50/0x248
    [  243.684114][  T123] 4 locks held by stress.sh/4365:
    [  243.684119][  T123]  #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150
    [  243.684132][  T123]  kernel-patches#1: c000000041aea888 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0
    [  243.684143][  T123]  kernel-patches#2: c0000000366fb9a8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0
    [  243.684155][  T123]  kernel-patches#3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_enable+0x30/0x60
    [  243.684166][  T123] 5 locks held by stress.sh/4366:
    [  243.684170][  T123]  #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150
    [  243.684183][  T123]  kernel-patches#1: c00000000aee2288 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0
    [  243.684194][  T123]  kernel-patches#2: c0000000366f4ba8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0
    [  243.684205][  T123]  kernel-patches#3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_disable+0x30/0x60
    [  243.684216][  T123]  kernel-patches#4: c0000003ff9bbf18 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __schedule+0x138/0x12a0

From the ibmveth debug, two threads are calling veth_pool_store, which
calls ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open. Here's the sequence:

  T4365             T4366
  ----------------- ----------------- ---------
  veth_pool_store   veth_pool_store
                    ibmveth_close
  ibmveth_close
  napi_disable
                    napi_disable
  ibmveth_open
  napi_enable                         <- HANG

ibmveth_close calls napi_disable at the top and ibmveth_open calls
napi_enable at the top.

https://docs.kernel.org/networking/napi.html]] says

  The control APIs are not idempotent. Control API calls are safe
  against concurrent use of datapath APIs but an incorrect sequence of
  control API calls may result in crashes, deadlocks, or race
  conditions. For example, calling napi_disable() multiple times in a
  row will deadlock.

In the normal open and close paths, rtnl_mutex is acquired to prevent
other callers. This is missing from veth_pool_store. Use rtnl_mutex in
veth_pool_store fixes these hangs.

Signed-off-by: Dave Marquardt <davemarq@linux.ibm.com>
Fixes: 860f242 ("[PATCH] ibmveth change buffer pools dynamically")
Reviewed-by: Nick Child <nnac123@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Apr 3, 2025
v2:
- Created a single error handling unlock and exit in veth_pool_store
- Greatly expanded commit message with previous explanatory-only text

Summary: Use rtnl_mutex to synchronize veth_pool_store with itself,
ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open, preventing multiple calls in a row to
napi_disable.

Background: Two (or more) threads could call veth_pool_store through
writing to /sys/devices/vio/30000002/pool*/*. You can do this easily
with a little shell script. This causes a hang.

I configured LOCKDEP, compiled ibmveth.c with DEBUG, and built a new
kernel. I ran this test again and saw:

    Setting pool0/active to 0
    Setting pool1/active to 1
    [   73.911067][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting
    Setting pool1/active to 1
    Setting pool1/active to 0
    [   73.911367][ T4366] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting
    [   73.916056][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close complete
    [   73.916064][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: open starting
    [  110.808564][  T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification.
    [  230.808495][  T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification.
    [  243.683786][  T123] INFO: task stress.sh:4365 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
    [  243.683827][  T123]       Not tainted 6.14.0-01103-g2df0c02dab82-dirty kernel-patches#8
    [  243.683833][  T123] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
    [  243.683838][  T123] task:stress.sh       state:D stack:28096 pid:4365  tgid:4365  ppid:4364   task_flags:0x400040 flags:0x00042000
    [  243.683852][  T123] Call Trace:
    [  243.683857][  T123] [c00000000c38f690] [0000000000000001] 0x1 (unreliable)
    [  243.683868][  T123] [c00000000c38f840] [c00000000001f908] __switch_to+0x318/0x4e0
    [  243.683878][  T123] [c00000000c38f8a0] [c000000001549a70] __schedule+0x500/0x12a0
    [  243.683888][  T123] [c00000000c38f9a0] [c00000000154a878] schedule+0x68/0x210
    [  243.683896][  T123] [c00000000c38f9d0] [c00000000154ac80] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x30/0x50
    [  243.683904][  T123] [c00000000c38fa00] [c00000000154dbb0] __mutex_lock+0x730/0x10f0
    [  243.683913][  T123] [c00000000c38fb10] [c000000001154d40] napi_enable+0x30/0x60
    [  243.683921][  T123] [c00000000c38fb40] [c000000000f4ae94] ibmveth_open+0x68/0x5dc
    [  243.683928][  T123] [c00000000c38fbe0] [c000000000f4aa20] veth_pool_store+0x220/0x270
    [  243.683936][  T123] [c00000000c38fc70] [c000000000826278] sysfs_kf_write+0x68/0xb0
    [  243.683944][  T123] [c00000000c38fcb0] [c0000000008240b8] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x198/0x2d0
    [  243.683951][  T123] [c00000000c38fd00] [c00000000071b9ac] vfs_write+0x34c/0x650
    [  243.683958][  T123] [c00000000c38fdc0] [c00000000071bea8] ksys_write+0x88/0x150
    [  243.683966][  T123] [c00000000c38fe10] [c0000000000317f4] system_call_exception+0x124/0x340
    [  243.683973][  T123] [c00000000c38fe50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
    ...
    [  243.684087][  T123] Showing all locks held in the system:
    [  243.684095][  T123] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/123:
    [  243.684099][  T123]  #0: c00000000278e370 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x50/0x248
    [  243.684114][  T123] 4 locks held by stress.sh/4365:
    [  243.684119][  T123]  #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150
    [  243.684132][  T123]  kernel-patches#1: c000000041aea888 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0
    [  243.684143][  T123]  kernel-patches#2: c0000000366fb9a8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0
    [  243.684155][  T123]  kernel-patches#3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_enable+0x30/0x60
    [  243.684166][  T123] 5 locks held by stress.sh/4366:
    [  243.684170][  T123]  #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150
    [  243.684183][  T123]  kernel-patches#1: c00000000aee2288 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0
    [  243.684194][  T123]  kernel-patches#2: c0000000366f4ba8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0
    [  243.684205][  T123]  kernel-patches#3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_disable+0x30/0x60
    [  243.684216][  T123]  kernel-patches#4: c0000003ff9bbf18 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __schedule+0x138/0x12a0

From the ibmveth debug, two threads are calling veth_pool_store, which
calls ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open. Here's the sequence:

  T4365             T4366
  ----------------- ----------------- ---------
  veth_pool_store   veth_pool_store
                    ibmveth_close
  ibmveth_close
  napi_disable
                    napi_disable
  ibmveth_open
  napi_enable                         <- HANG

ibmveth_close calls napi_disable at the top and ibmveth_open calls
napi_enable at the top.

https://docs.kernel.org/networking/napi.html]] says

  The control APIs are not idempotent. Control API calls are safe
  against concurrent use of datapath APIs but an incorrect sequence of
  control API calls may result in crashes, deadlocks, or race
  conditions. For example, calling napi_disable() multiple times in a
  row will deadlock.

In the normal open and close paths, rtnl_mutex is acquired to prevent
other callers. This is missing from veth_pool_store. Use rtnl_mutex in
veth_pool_store fixes these hangs.

Signed-off-by: Dave Marquardt <davemarq@linux.ibm.com>
Fixes: 860f242 ("[PATCH] ibmveth change buffer pools dynamically")
Reviewed-by: Nick Child <nnac123@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Apr 3, 2025
v2:
- Created a single error handling unlock and exit in veth_pool_store
- Greatly expanded commit message with previous explanatory-only text

Summary: Use rtnl_mutex to synchronize veth_pool_store with itself,
ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open, preventing multiple calls in a row to
napi_disable.

Background: Two (or more) threads could call veth_pool_store through
writing to /sys/devices/vio/30000002/pool*/*. You can do this easily
with a little shell script. This causes a hang.

I configured LOCKDEP, compiled ibmveth.c with DEBUG, and built a new
kernel. I ran this test again and saw:

    Setting pool0/active to 0
    Setting pool1/active to 1
    [   73.911067][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting
    Setting pool1/active to 1
    Setting pool1/active to 0
    [   73.911367][ T4366] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting
    [   73.916056][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close complete
    [   73.916064][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: open starting
    [  110.808564][  T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification.
    [  230.808495][  T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification.
    [  243.683786][  T123] INFO: task stress.sh:4365 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
    [  243.683827][  T123]       Not tainted 6.14.0-01103-g2df0c02dab82-dirty kernel-patches#8
    [  243.683833][  T123] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
    [  243.683838][  T123] task:stress.sh       state:D stack:28096 pid:4365  tgid:4365  ppid:4364   task_flags:0x400040 flags:0x00042000
    [  243.683852][  T123] Call Trace:
    [  243.683857][  T123] [c00000000c38f690] [0000000000000001] 0x1 (unreliable)
    [  243.683868][  T123] [c00000000c38f840] [c00000000001f908] __switch_to+0x318/0x4e0
    [  243.683878][  T123] [c00000000c38f8a0] [c000000001549a70] __schedule+0x500/0x12a0
    [  243.683888][  T123] [c00000000c38f9a0] [c00000000154a878] schedule+0x68/0x210
    [  243.683896][  T123] [c00000000c38f9d0] [c00000000154ac80] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x30/0x50
    [  243.683904][  T123] [c00000000c38fa00] [c00000000154dbb0] __mutex_lock+0x730/0x10f0
    [  243.683913][  T123] [c00000000c38fb10] [c000000001154d40] napi_enable+0x30/0x60
    [  243.683921][  T123] [c00000000c38fb40] [c000000000f4ae94] ibmveth_open+0x68/0x5dc
    [  243.683928][  T123] [c00000000c38fbe0] [c000000000f4aa20] veth_pool_store+0x220/0x270
    [  243.683936][  T123] [c00000000c38fc70] [c000000000826278] sysfs_kf_write+0x68/0xb0
    [  243.683944][  T123] [c00000000c38fcb0] [c0000000008240b8] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x198/0x2d0
    [  243.683951][  T123] [c00000000c38fd00] [c00000000071b9ac] vfs_write+0x34c/0x650
    [  243.683958][  T123] [c00000000c38fdc0] [c00000000071bea8] ksys_write+0x88/0x150
    [  243.683966][  T123] [c00000000c38fe10] [c0000000000317f4] system_call_exception+0x124/0x340
    [  243.683973][  T123] [c00000000c38fe50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
    ...
    [  243.684087][  T123] Showing all locks held in the system:
    [  243.684095][  T123] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/123:
    [  243.684099][  T123]  #0: c00000000278e370 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x50/0x248
    [  243.684114][  T123] 4 locks held by stress.sh/4365:
    [  243.684119][  T123]  #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150
    [  243.684132][  T123]  kernel-patches#1: c000000041aea888 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0
    [  243.684143][  T123]  kernel-patches#2: c0000000366fb9a8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0
    [  243.684155][  T123]  kernel-patches#3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_enable+0x30/0x60
    [  243.684166][  T123] 5 locks held by stress.sh/4366:
    [  243.684170][  T123]  #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150
    [  243.684183][  T123]  kernel-patches#1: c00000000aee2288 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0
    [  243.684194][  T123]  kernel-patches#2: c0000000366f4ba8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0
    [  243.684205][  T123]  kernel-patches#3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_disable+0x30/0x60
    [  243.684216][  T123]  kernel-patches#4: c0000003ff9bbf18 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __schedule+0x138/0x12a0

From the ibmveth debug, two threads are calling veth_pool_store, which
calls ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open. Here's the sequence:

  T4365             T4366
  ----------------- ----------------- ---------
  veth_pool_store   veth_pool_store
                    ibmveth_close
  ibmveth_close
  napi_disable
                    napi_disable
  ibmveth_open
  napi_enable                         <- HANG

ibmveth_close calls napi_disable at the top and ibmveth_open calls
napi_enable at the top.

https://docs.kernel.org/networking/napi.html]] says

  The control APIs are not idempotent. Control API calls are safe
  against concurrent use of datapath APIs but an incorrect sequence of
  control API calls may result in crashes, deadlocks, or race
  conditions. For example, calling napi_disable() multiple times in a
  row will deadlock.

In the normal open and close paths, rtnl_mutex is acquired to prevent
other callers. This is missing from veth_pool_store. Use rtnl_mutex in
veth_pool_store fixes these hangs.

Signed-off-by: Dave Marquardt <davemarq@linux.ibm.com>
Fixes: 860f242 ("[PATCH] ibmveth change buffer pools dynamically")
Reviewed-by: Nick Child <nnac123@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 3, 2025
When a bio with REQ_PREFLUSH is submitted to dm, __send_empty_flush()
generates a flush_bio with REQ_OP_WRITE | REQ_PREFLUSH | REQ_SYNC,
which causes the flush_bio to be throttled by wbt_wait().

An example from v5.4, similar problem also exists in upstream:

    crash> bt 2091206
    PID: 2091206  TASK: ffff2050df92a300  CPU: 109  COMMAND: "kworker/u260:0"
     #0 [ffff800084a2f7f0] __switch_to at ffff80004008aeb8
     #1 [ffff800084a2f820] __schedule at ffff800040bfa0c4
     #2 [ffff800084a2f880] schedule at ffff800040bfa4b4
     #3 [ffff800084a2f8a0] io_schedule at ffff800040bfa9c4
     #4 [ffff800084a2f8c0] rq_qos_wait at ffff8000405925bc
     #5 [ffff800084a2f940] wbt_wait at ffff8000405bb3a0
     #6 [ffff800084a2f9a0] __rq_qos_throttle at ffff800040592254
     #7 [ffff800084a2f9c0] blk_mq_make_request at ffff80004057cf38
     #8 [ffff800084a2fa60] generic_make_request at ffff800040570138
     #9 [ffff800084a2fae0] submit_bio at ffff8000405703b4
    #10 [ffff800084a2fb50] xlog_write_iclog at ffff800001280834 [xfs]
    #11 [ffff800084a2fbb0] xlog_sync at ffff800001280c3c [xfs]
    #12 [ffff800084a2fbf0] xlog_state_release_iclog at ffff800001280df4 [xfs]
    #13 [ffff800084a2fc10] xlog_write at ffff80000128203c [xfs]
    #14 [ffff800084a2fcd0] xlog_cil_push at ffff8000012846dc [xfs]
    #15 [ffff800084a2fda0] xlog_cil_push_work at ffff800001284a2c [xfs]
    #16 [ffff800084a2fdb0] process_one_work at ffff800040111d08
    #17 [ffff800084a2fe00] worker_thread at ffff8000401121cc
    #18 [ffff800084a2fe70] kthread at ffff800040118de4

After commit 2def284 ("xfs: don't allow log IO to be throttled"),
the metadata submitted by xlog_write_iclog() should not be throttled.
But due to the existence of the dm layer, throttling flush_bio indirectly
causes the metadata bio to be throttled.

Fix this by conditionally adding REQ_IDLE to flush_bio.bi_opf, which makes
wbt_should_throttle() return false to avoid wbt_wait().

Signed-off-by: Jinliang Zheng <alexjlzheng@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: Tianxiang Peng <txpeng@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: Hao Peng <flyingpeng@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 3, 2025
A cache device failing to resume due to mapping errors should not be
retried, as the failure leaves a partially initialized policy object.
Repeating the resume operation risks triggering BUG_ON when reloading
cache mappings into the incomplete policy object.

Reproduce steps:

1. create a cache metadata consisting of 512 or more cache blocks,
   with some mappings stored in the first array block of the mapping
   array. Here we use cache_restore v1.0 to build the metadata.

cat <<EOF >> cmeta.xml
<superblock uuid="" block_size="128" nr_cache_blocks="512" \
policy="smq" hint_width="4">
  <mappings>
    <mapping cache_block="0" origin_block="0" dirty="false"/>
  </mappings>
</superblock>
EOF
dmsetup create cmeta --table "0 8192 linear /dev/sdc 0"
cache_restore -i cmeta.xml -o /dev/mapper/cmeta --metadata-version=2
dmsetup remove cmeta

2. wipe the second array block of the mapping array to simulate
   data degradations.

mapping_root=$(dd if=/dev/sdc bs=1c count=8 skip=192 \
2>/dev/null | hexdump -e '1/8 "%u\n"')
ablock=$(dd if=/dev/sdc bs=1c count=8 skip=$((4096*mapping_root+2056)) \
2>/dev/null | hexdump -e '1/8 "%u\n"')
dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sdc bs=4k count=1 seek=$ablock

3. try bringing up the cache device. The resume is expected to fail
   due to the broken array block.

dmsetup create cmeta --table "0 8192 linear /dev/sdc 0"
dmsetup create cdata --table "0 65536 linear /dev/sdc 8192"
dmsetup create corig --table "0 524288 linear /dev/sdc 262144"
dmsetup create cache --notable
dmsetup load cache --table "0 524288 cache /dev/mapper/cmeta \
/dev/mapper/cdata /dev/mapper/corig 128 2 metadata2 writethrough smq 0"
dmsetup resume cache

4. try resuming the cache again. An unexpected BUG_ON is triggered
   while loading cache mappings.

dmsetup resume cache

Kernel logs:

(snip)
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm-cache-policy-smq.c:752!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 332 Comm: dmsetup Not tainted 6.13.4 #3
RIP: 0010:smq_load_mapping+0x3e5/0x570

Fix by disallowing resume operations for devices that failed the
initial attempt.

Signed-off-by: Ming-Hung Tsai <mtsai@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Apr 3, 2025
v2:
- Created a single error handling unlock and exit in veth_pool_store
- Greatly expanded commit message with previous explanatory-only text

Summary: Use rtnl_mutex to synchronize veth_pool_store with itself,
ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open, preventing multiple calls in a row to
napi_disable.

Background: Two (or more) threads could call veth_pool_store through
writing to /sys/devices/vio/30000002/pool*/*. You can do this easily
with a little shell script. This causes a hang.

I configured LOCKDEP, compiled ibmveth.c with DEBUG, and built a new
kernel. I ran this test again and saw:

    Setting pool0/active to 0
    Setting pool1/active to 1
    [   73.911067][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting
    Setting pool1/active to 1
    Setting pool1/active to 0
    [   73.911367][ T4366] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting
    [   73.916056][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close complete
    [   73.916064][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: open starting
    [  110.808564][  T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification.
    [  230.808495][  T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification.
    [  243.683786][  T123] INFO: task stress.sh:4365 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
    [  243.683827][  T123]       Not tainted 6.14.0-01103-g2df0c02dab82-dirty kernel-patches#8
    [  243.683833][  T123] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
    [  243.683838][  T123] task:stress.sh       state:D stack:28096 pid:4365  tgid:4365  ppid:4364   task_flags:0x400040 flags:0x00042000
    [  243.683852][  T123] Call Trace:
    [  243.683857][  T123] [c00000000c38f690] [0000000000000001] 0x1 (unreliable)
    [  243.683868][  T123] [c00000000c38f840] [c00000000001f908] __switch_to+0x318/0x4e0
    [  243.683878][  T123] [c00000000c38f8a0] [c000000001549a70] __schedule+0x500/0x12a0
    [  243.683888][  T123] [c00000000c38f9a0] [c00000000154a878] schedule+0x68/0x210
    [  243.683896][  T123] [c00000000c38f9d0] [c00000000154ac80] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x30/0x50
    [  243.683904][  T123] [c00000000c38fa00] [c00000000154dbb0] __mutex_lock+0x730/0x10f0
    [  243.683913][  T123] [c00000000c38fb10] [c000000001154d40] napi_enable+0x30/0x60
    [  243.683921][  T123] [c00000000c38fb40] [c000000000f4ae94] ibmveth_open+0x68/0x5dc
    [  243.683928][  T123] [c00000000c38fbe0] [c000000000f4aa20] veth_pool_store+0x220/0x270
    [  243.683936][  T123] [c00000000c38fc70] [c000000000826278] sysfs_kf_write+0x68/0xb0
    [  243.683944][  T123] [c00000000c38fcb0] [c0000000008240b8] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x198/0x2d0
    [  243.683951][  T123] [c00000000c38fd00] [c00000000071b9ac] vfs_write+0x34c/0x650
    [  243.683958][  T123] [c00000000c38fdc0] [c00000000071bea8] ksys_write+0x88/0x150
    [  243.683966][  T123] [c00000000c38fe10] [c0000000000317f4] system_call_exception+0x124/0x340
    [  243.683973][  T123] [c00000000c38fe50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
    ...
    [  243.684087][  T123] Showing all locks held in the system:
    [  243.684095][  T123] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/123:
    [  243.684099][  T123]  #0: c00000000278e370 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x50/0x248
    [  243.684114][  T123] 4 locks held by stress.sh/4365:
    [  243.684119][  T123]  #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150
    [  243.684132][  T123]  kernel-patches#1: c000000041aea888 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0
    [  243.684143][  T123]  kernel-patches#2: c0000000366fb9a8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0
    [  243.684155][  T123]  kernel-patches#3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_enable+0x30/0x60
    [  243.684166][  T123] 5 locks held by stress.sh/4366:
    [  243.684170][  T123]  #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150
    [  243.684183][  T123]  kernel-patches#1: c00000000aee2288 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0
    [  243.684194][  T123]  kernel-patches#2: c0000000366f4ba8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0
    [  243.684205][  T123]  kernel-patches#3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_disable+0x30/0x60
    [  243.684216][  T123]  kernel-patches#4: c0000003ff9bbf18 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __schedule+0x138/0x12a0

From the ibmveth debug, two threads are calling veth_pool_store, which
calls ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open. Here's the sequence:

  T4365             T4366
  ----------------- ----------------- ---------
  veth_pool_store   veth_pool_store
                    ibmveth_close
  ibmveth_close
  napi_disable
                    napi_disable
  ibmveth_open
  napi_enable                         <- HANG

ibmveth_close calls napi_disable at the top and ibmveth_open calls
napi_enable at the top.

https://docs.kernel.org/networking/napi.html]] says

  The control APIs are not idempotent. Control API calls are safe
  against concurrent use of datapath APIs but an incorrect sequence of
  control API calls may result in crashes, deadlocks, or race
  conditions. For example, calling napi_disable() multiple times in a
  row will deadlock.

In the normal open and close paths, rtnl_mutex is acquired to prevent
other callers. This is missing from veth_pool_store. Use rtnl_mutex in
veth_pool_store fixes these hangs.

Signed-off-by: Dave Marquardt <davemarq@linux.ibm.com>
Fixes: 860f242 ("[PATCH] ibmveth change buffer pools dynamically")
Reviewed-by: Nick Child <nnac123@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Apr 4, 2025
v2:
- Created a single error handling unlock and exit in veth_pool_store
- Greatly expanded commit message with previous explanatory-only text

Summary: Use rtnl_mutex to synchronize veth_pool_store with itself,
ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open, preventing multiple calls in a row to
napi_disable.

Background: Two (or more) threads could call veth_pool_store through
writing to /sys/devices/vio/30000002/pool*/*. You can do this easily
with a little shell script. This causes a hang.

I configured LOCKDEP, compiled ibmveth.c with DEBUG, and built a new
kernel. I ran this test again and saw:

    Setting pool0/active to 0
    Setting pool1/active to 1
    [   73.911067][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting
    Setting pool1/active to 1
    Setting pool1/active to 0
    [   73.911367][ T4366] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting
    [   73.916056][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close complete
    [   73.916064][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: open starting
    [  110.808564][  T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification.
    [  230.808495][  T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification.
    [  243.683786][  T123] INFO: task stress.sh:4365 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
    [  243.683827][  T123]       Not tainted 6.14.0-01103-g2df0c02dab82-dirty kernel-patches#8
    [  243.683833][  T123] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
    [  243.683838][  T123] task:stress.sh       state:D stack:28096 pid:4365  tgid:4365  ppid:4364   task_flags:0x400040 flags:0x00042000
    [  243.683852][  T123] Call Trace:
    [  243.683857][  T123] [c00000000c38f690] [0000000000000001] 0x1 (unreliable)
    [  243.683868][  T123] [c00000000c38f840] [c00000000001f908] __switch_to+0x318/0x4e0
    [  243.683878][  T123] [c00000000c38f8a0] [c000000001549a70] __schedule+0x500/0x12a0
    [  243.683888][  T123] [c00000000c38f9a0] [c00000000154a878] schedule+0x68/0x210
    [  243.683896][  T123] [c00000000c38f9d0] [c00000000154ac80] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x30/0x50
    [  243.683904][  T123] [c00000000c38fa00] [c00000000154dbb0] __mutex_lock+0x730/0x10f0
    [  243.683913][  T123] [c00000000c38fb10] [c000000001154d40] napi_enable+0x30/0x60
    [  243.683921][  T123] [c00000000c38fb40] [c000000000f4ae94] ibmveth_open+0x68/0x5dc
    [  243.683928][  T123] [c00000000c38fbe0] [c000000000f4aa20] veth_pool_store+0x220/0x270
    [  243.683936][  T123] [c00000000c38fc70] [c000000000826278] sysfs_kf_write+0x68/0xb0
    [  243.683944][  T123] [c00000000c38fcb0] [c0000000008240b8] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x198/0x2d0
    [  243.683951][  T123] [c00000000c38fd00] [c00000000071b9ac] vfs_write+0x34c/0x650
    [  243.683958][  T123] [c00000000c38fdc0] [c00000000071bea8] ksys_write+0x88/0x150
    [  243.683966][  T123] [c00000000c38fe10] [c0000000000317f4] system_call_exception+0x124/0x340
    [  243.683973][  T123] [c00000000c38fe50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
    ...
    [  243.684087][  T123] Showing all locks held in the system:
    [  243.684095][  T123] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/123:
    [  243.684099][  T123]  #0: c00000000278e370 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x50/0x248
    [  243.684114][  T123] 4 locks held by stress.sh/4365:
    [  243.684119][  T123]  #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150
    [  243.684132][  T123]  kernel-patches#1: c000000041aea888 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0
    [  243.684143][  T123]  kernel-patches#2: c0000000366fb9a8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0
    [  243.684155][  T123]  kernel-patches#3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_enable+0x30/0x60
    [  243.684166][  T123] 5 locks held by stress.sh/4366:
    [  243.684170][  T123]  #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150
    [  243.684183][  T123]  kernel-patches#1: c00000000aee2288 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0
    [  243.684194][  T123]  kernel-patches#2: c0000000366f4ba8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0
    [  243.684205][  T123]  kernel-patches#3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_disable+0x30/0x60
    [  243.684216][  T123]  kernel-patches#4: c0000003ff9bbf18 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __schedule+0x138/0x12a0

From the ibmveth debug, two threads are calling veth_pool_store, which
calls ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open. Here's the sequence:

  T4365             T4366
  ----------------- ----------------- ---------
  veth_pool_store   veth_pool_store
                    ibmveth_close
  ibmveth_close
  napi_disable
                    napi_disable
  ibmveth_open
  napi_enable                         <- HANG

ibmveth_close calls napi_disable at the top and ibmveth_open calls
napi_enable at the top.

https://docs.kernel.org/networking/napi.html]] says

  The control APIs are not idempotent. Control API calls are safe
  against concurrent use of datapath APIs but an incorrect sequence of
  control API calls may result in crashes, deadlocks, or race
  conditions. For example, calling napi_disable() multiple times in a
  row will deadlock.

In the normal open and close paths, rtnl_mutex is acquired to prevent
other callers. This is missing from veth_pool_store. Use rtnl_mutex in
veth_pool_store fixes these hangs.

Signed-off-by: Dave Marquardt <davemarq@linux.ibm.com>
Fixes: 860f242 ("[PATCH] ibmveth change buffer pools dynamically")
Reviewed-by: Nick Child <nnac123@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 4, 2025
Two fixes from the recent logging changes:

bch2_inconsistent(), bch2_fs_inconsistent() be called from interrupt
context, or with rcu_read_lock() held.

The one syzbot found is in
  bch2_bkey_pick_read_device
  bch2_dev_rcu
  bch2_fs_inconsistent

We're starting to switch to lift the printbufs up to higher levels so we
can emit better log messages and print them all in one go (avoid
garbling), so that conversion will help with spotting these in the
future; when we declare a printbuf it must be flagged if we're in an
atomic context.

Secondly, in btree_node_write_endio:

00085 BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at include/linux/sched/mm.h:321
00085 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 618, name: bch-reclaim/fa6
00085 preempt_count: 10001, expected: 0
00085 RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
00085 4 locks held by bch-reclaim/fa6/618:
00085  #0: ffffff80d7ccad68 (&j->reclaim_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: bch2_journal_reclaim_thread+0x84/0x198
00085  #1: ffffff80d7c84218 (&c->btree_trans_barrier){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: __bch2_trans_get+0x1c0/0x440
00085  #2: ffffff80cd3f8140 (bcachefs_btree){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __bch2_trans_get+0x22c/0x440
00085  #3: ffffff80c3823c20 (&vblk->vqs[i].lock){-.-.}-{3:3}, at: virtblk_done+0x58/0x130
00085 irq event stamp: 328
00085 hardirqs last  enabled at (327): [<ffffffc080073a14>] finish_task_switch.isra.0+0xbc/0x2a0
00085 hardirqs last disabled at (328): [<ffffffc080971a10>] el1_interrupt+0x20/0x60
00085 softirqs last  enabled at (0): [<ffffffc08002f920>] copy_process+0x7c8/0x2118
00085 softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
00085 Preemption disabled at:
00085 [<ffffffc08003ada0>] irq_enter_rcu+0x18/0x90
00085 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 618 Comm: bch-reclaim/fa6 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc6-ktest-g04630bde23e8 #18798
00085 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
00085 Call trace:
00085  show_stack+0x1c/0x30 (C)
00085  dump_stack_lvl+0x84/0xc0
00085  dump_stack+0x14/0x20
00085  __might_resched+0x180/0x288
00085  __might_sleep+0x4c/0x88
00085  __kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x34c/0x3e0
00085  krealloc_noprof+0x1a0/0x2d8
00085  bch2_printbuf_make_room+0x9c/0x120
00085  bch2_prt_printf+0x60/0x1b8
00085  btree_node_write_endio+0x1b0/0x2d8
00085  bio_endio+0x138/0x1f0
00085  btree_node_write_endio+0xe8/0x2d8
00085  bio_endio+0x138/0x1f0
00085  blk_update_request+0x220/0x4c0
00085  blk_mq_end_request+0x28/0x148
00085  virtblk_request_done+0x64/0xe8
00085  blk_mq_complete_request+0x34/0x40
00085  virtblk_done+0x78/0x130
00085  vring_interrupt+0x6c/0xb0
00085  __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x8c/0x2e0
00085  handle_irq_event+0x50/0xb0
00085  handle_fasteoi_irq+0xc4/0x250
00085  handle_irq_desc+0x44/0x60
00085  generic_handle_domain_irq+0x20/0x30
00085  gic_handle_irq+0x54/0xc8
00085  call_on_irq_stack+0x24/0x40

Reported-by: syzbot+c82cd2906e2f192410bb@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Apr 4, 2025
v2:
- Created a single error handling unlock and exit in veth_pool_store
- Greatly expanded commit message with previous explanatory-only text

Summary: Use rtnl_mutex to synchronize veth_pool_store with itself,
ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open, preventing multiple calls in a row to
napi_disable.

Background: Two (or more) threads could call veth_pool_store through
writing to /sys/devices/vio/30000002/pool*/*. You can do this easily
with a little shell script. This causes a hang.

I configured LOCKDEP, compiled ibmveth.c with DEBUG, and built a new
kernel. I ran this test again and saw:

    Setting pool0/active to 0
    Setting pool1/active to 1
    [   73.911067][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting
    Setting pool1/active to 1
    Setting pool1/active to 0
    [   73.911367][ T4366] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting
    [   73.916056][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close complete
    [   73.916064][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: open starting
    [  110.808564][  T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification.
    [  230.808495][  T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification.
    [  243.683786][  T123] INFO: task stress.sh:4365 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
    [  243.683827][  T123]       Not tainted 6.14.0-01103-g2df0c02dab82-dirty kernel-patches#8
    [  243.683833][  T123] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
    [  243.683838][  T123] task:stress.sh       state:D stack:28096 pid:4365  tgid:4365  ppid:4364   task_flags:0x400040 flags:0x00042000
    [  243.683852][  T123] Call Trace:
    [  243.683857][  T123] [c00000000c38f690] [0000000000000001] 0x1 (unreliable)
    [  243.683868][  T123] [c00000000c38f840] [c00000000001f908] __switch_to+0x318/0x4e0
    [  243.683878][  T123] [c00000000c38f8a0] [c000000001549a70] __schedule+0x500/0x12a0
    [  243.683888][  T123] [c00000000c38f9a0] [c00000000154a878] schedule+0x68/0x210
    [  243.683896][  T123] [c00000000c38f9d0] [c00000000154ac80] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x30/0x50
    [  243.683904][  T123] [c00000000c38fa00] [c00000000154dbb0] __mutex_lock+0x730/0x10f0
    [  243.683913][  T123] [c00000000c38fb10] [c000000001154d40] napi_enable+0x30/0x60
    [  243.683921][  T123] [c00000000c38fb40] [c000000000f4ae94] ibmveth_open+0x68/0x5dc
    [  243.683928][  T123] [c00000000c38fbe0] [c000000000f4aa20] veth_pool_store+0x220/0x270
    [  243.683936][  T123] [c00000000c38fc70] [c000000000826278] sysfs_kf_write+0x68/0xb0
    [  243.683944][  T123] [c00000000c38fcb0] [c0000000008240b8] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x198/0x2d0
    [  243.683951][  T123] [c00000000c38fd00] [c00000000071b9ac] vfs_write+0x34c/0x650
    [  243.683958][  T123] [c00000000c38fdc0] [c00000000071bea8] ksys_write+0x88/0x150
    [  243.683966][  T123] [c00000000c38fe10] [c0000000000317f4] system_call_exception+0x124/0x340
    [  243.683973][  T123] [c00000000c38fe50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
    ...
    [  243.684087][  T123] Showing all locks held in the system:
    [  243.684095][  T123] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/123:
    [  243.684099][  T123]  #0: c00000000278e370 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x50/0x248
    [  243.684114][  T123] 4 locks held by stress.sh/4365:
    [  243.684119][  T123]  #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150
    [  243.684132][  T123]  kernel-patches#1: c000000041aea888 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0
    [  243.684143][  T123]  kernel-patches#2: c0000000366fb9a8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0
    [  243.684155][  T123]  kernel-patches#3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_enable+0x30/0x60
    [  243.684166][  T123] 5 locks held by stress.sh/4366:
    [  243.684170][  T123]  #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150
    [  243.684183][  T123]  kernel-patches#1: c00000000aee2288 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0
    [  243.684194][  T123]  kernel-patches#2: c0000000366f4ba8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0
    [  243.684205][  T123]  kernel-patches#3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_disable+0x30/0x60
    [  243.684216][  T123]  kernel-patches#4: c0000003ff9bbf18 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __schedule+0x138/0x12a0

From the ibmveth debug, two threads are calling veth_pool_store, which
calls ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open. Here's the sequence:

  T4365             T4366
  ----------------- ----------------- ---------
  veth_pool_store   veth_pool_store
                    ibmveth_close
  ibmveth_close
  napi_disable
                    napi_disable
  ibmveth_open
  napi_enable                         <- HANG

ibmveth_close calls napi_disable at the top and ibmveth_open calls
napi_enable at the top.

https://docs.kernel.org/networking/napi.html]] says

  The control APIs are not idempotent. Control API calls are safe
  against concurrent use of datapath APIs but an incorrect sequence of
  control API calls may result in crashes, deadlocks, or race
  conditions. For example, calling napi_disable() multiple times in a
  row will deadlock.

In the normal open and close paths, rtnl_mutex is acquired to prevent
other callers. This is missing from veth_pool_store. Use rtnl_mutex in
veth_pool_store fixes these hangs.

Signed-off-by: Dave Marquardt <davemarq@linux.ibm.com>
Fixes: 860f242 ("[PATCH] ibmveth change buffer pools dynamically")
Reviewed-by: Nick Child <nnac123@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250402154403.386744-1-davemarq@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 10, 2025
As reported by CVE-2025-29481 [1], it is possible to corrupt a BPF ELF
file such that arbitrary BPF instructions are loaded by libbpf. This can
be done by setting a symbol (BPF program) section offset to a large
(unsigned) number such that <section start + symbol offset> overflows
and points before the section data in the memory.

Consider the situation below where:
- prog_start = sec_start + symbol_offset    <-- size_t overflow here
- prog_end   = prog_start + prog_size

    prog_start        sec_start        prog_end        sec_end
        |                |                 |              |
        v                v                 v              v
    .....................|################################|............

The CVE report in [1] also provides a corrupted BPF ELF which can be
used as a reproducer:

    $ readelf -S crash
    Section Headers:
      [Nr] Name              Type             Address           Offset
           Size              EntSize          Flags  Link  Info  Align
    ...
      [ 2] uretprobe.mu[...] PROGBITS         0000000000000000  00000040
           0000000000000068  0000000000000000  AX       0     0     8

    $ readelf -s crash
    Symbol table '.symtab' contains 8 entries:
       Num:    Value          Size Type    Bind   Vis      Ndx Name
    ...
         6: ffffffffffffffb8   104 FUNC    GLOBAL DEFAULT    2 handle_tp

Here, the handle_tp prog has section offset ffffffffffffffb8, i.e. will
point before the actual memory where section 2 is allocated.

This is also reported by AddressSanitizer:

    =================================================================
    ==1232==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7c7302fe0000 at pc 0x7fc3046e4b77 bp 0x7ffe64677cd0 sp 0x7ffe64677490
    READ of size 104 at 0x7c7302fe0000 thread T0
        #0 0x7fc3046e4b76 in memcpy (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe4b76)
        #1 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__init_prog /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:856
        #2 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__add_programs /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:928
        #3 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__elf_collect /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3930
        #4 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object_open /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8067
        #5 0x00000040f176 in bpf_object__open_file /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8090
        #6 0x000000400c16 in main /poc/poc.c:8
        #7 0x7fc3043d25b4 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x35b4)
        #8 0x7fc3043d2667 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3667)
        #9 0x000000400b34 in _start (/poc/poc+0x400b34)

    0x7c7302fe0000 is located 64 bytes before 104-byte region [0x7c7302fe0040,0x7c7302fe00a8)
    allocated by thread T0 here:
        #0 0x7fc3046e716b in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe716b)
        #1 0x7fc3045ee600 in __libelf_set_rawdata_wrlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xb600)
        #2 0x7fc3045ef018 in __elf_getdata_rdlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xc018)
        #3 0x00000040642f in elf_sec_data /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3740

The problem here is that currently, libbpf only checks that the program
end is within the section bounds. There used to be a check
`while (sec_off < sec_sz)` in bpf_object__add_programs, however, it was
removed by commit 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program
sections to support overriden weak functions").

Put the above condition back to bpf_object__init_prog to make sure that
the program start is also within the bounds of the section to avoid the
potential buffer overflow.

[1] https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md

Reported-by: lmarch2 <2524158037@qq.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions")
Link: https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md
Link: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-29481
Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 10, 2025
As reported by CVE-2025-29481 [1], it is possible to corrupt a BPF ELF
file such that arbitrary BPF instructions are loaded by libbpf. This can
be done by setting a symbol (BPF program) section offset to a large
(unsigned) number such that <section start + symbol offset> overflows
and points before the section data in the memory.

Consider the situation below where:
- prog_start = sec_start + symbol_offset    <-- size_t overflow here
- prog_end   = prog_start + prog_size

    prog_start        sec_start        prog_end        sec_end
        |                |                 |              |
        v                v                 v              v
    .....................|################################|............

The CVE report in [1] also provides a corrupted BPF ELF which can be
used as a reproducer:

    $ readelf -S crash
    Section Headers:
      [Nr] Name              Type             Address           Offset
           Size              EntSize          Flags  Link  Info  Align
    ...
      [ 2] uretprobe.mu[...] PROGBITS         0000000000000000  00000040
           0000000000000068  0000000000000000  AX       0     0     8

    $ readelf -s crash
    Symbol table '.symtab' contains 8 entries:
       Num:    Value          Size Type    Bind   Vis      Ndx Name
    ...
         6: ffffffffffffffb8   104 FUNC    GLOBAL DEFAULT    2 handle_tp

Here, the handle_tp prog has section offset ffffffffffffffb8, i.e. will
point before the actual memory where section 2 is allocated.

This is also reported by AddressSanitizer:

    =================================================================
    ==1232==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7c7302fe0000 at pc 0x7fc3046e4b77 bp 0x7ffe64677cd0 sp 0x7ffe64677490
    READ of size 104 at 0x7c7302fe0000 thread T0
        #0 0x7fc3046e4b76 in memcpy (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe4b76)
        #1 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__init_prog /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:856
        #2 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__add_programs /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:928
        #3 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__elf_collect /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3930
        #4 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object_open /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8067
        #5 0x00000040f176 in bpf_object__open_file /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8090
        #6 0x000000400c16 in main /poc/poc.c:8
        #7 0x7fc3043d25b4 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x35b4)
        #8 0x7fc3043d2667 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3667)
        #9 0x000000400b34 in _start (/poc/poc+0x400b34)

    0x7c7302fe0000 is located 64 bytes before 104-byte region [0x7c7302fe0040,0x7c7302fe00a8)
    allocated by thread T0 here:
        #0 0x7fc3046e716b in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe716b)
        #1 0x7fc3045ee600 in __libelf_set_rawdata_wrlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xb600)
        #2 0x7fc3045ef018 in __elf_getdata_rdlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xc018)
        #3 0x00000040642f in elf_sec_data /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3740

The problem here is that currently, libbpf only checks that the program
end is within the section bounds. There used to be a check
`while (sec_off < sec_sz)` in bpf_object__add_programs, however, it was
removed by commit 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program
sections to support overriden weak functions").

Put the above condition back to bpf_object__init_prog to make sure that
the program start is also within the bounds of the section to avoid the
potential buffer overflow.

[1] https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md

Reported-by: lmarch2 <2524158037@qq.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions")
Link: https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md
Link: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-29481
Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Apr 11, 2025
…cesses

Acquire a lock on kvm->srcu when userspace is getting MP state to handle a
rather extreme edge case where "accepting" APIC events, i.e. processing
pending INIT or SIPI, can trigger accesses to guest memory.  If the vCPU
is in L2 with INIT *and* a TRIPLE_FAULT request pending, then getting MP
state will trigger a nested VM-Exit by way of ->check_nested_events(), and
emuating the nested VM-Exit can access guest memory.

The splat was originally hit by syzkaller on a Google-internal kernel, and
reproduced on an upstream kernel by hacking the triple_fault_event_test
selftest to stuff a pending INIT, store an MSR on VM-Exit (to generate a
memory access on VMX), and do vcpu_mp_state_get() to trigger the scenario.

  =============================
  WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
  6.14.0-rc3-b112d356288b-vmx/pi_lockdep_false_pos-lock kernel-patches#3 Not tainted
  -----------------------------
  include/linux/kvm_host.h:1058 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!

  other info that might help us debug this:

  rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
  1 lock held by triple_fault_ev/1256:
   #0: ffff88810df5a330 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x8b/0x9a0 [kvm]

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 11 UID: 1000 PID: 1256 Comm: triple_fault_ev Not tainted 6.14.0-rc3-b112d356288b-vmx kernel-patches#3
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   dump_stack_lvl+0x7f/0x90
   lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x144/0x190
   kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot+0x156/0x180 [kvm]
   kvm_vcpu_read_guest+0x3e/0x90 [kvm]
   read_and_check_msr_entry+0x2e/0x180 [kvm_intel]
   __nested_vmx_vmexit+0x550/0xde0 [kvm_intel]
   kvm_check_nested_events+0x1b/0x30 [kvm]
   kvm_apic_accept_events+0x33/0x100 [kvm]
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_mpstate+0x30/0x1d0 [kvm]
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x33e/0x9a0 [kvm]
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8b/0xb0
   do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x170
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
   </TASK>

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20250401150504.829812-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 15, 2025
As shown in [1], it is possible to corrupt a BPF ELF file such that
arbitrary BPF instructions are loaded by libbpf. This can be done by
setting a symbol (BPF program) section offset to a large (unsigned)
number such that <section start + symbol offset> overflows and points
before the section data in the memory.

Consider the situation below where:
- prog_start = sec_start + symbol_offset    <-- size_t overflow here
- prog_end   = prog_start + prog_size

    prog_start        sec_start        prog_end        sec_end
        |                |                 |              |
        v                v                 v              v
    .....................|################################|............

The report in [1] also provides a corrupted BPF ELF which can be used as
a reproducer:

    $ readelf -S crash
    Section Headers:
      [Nr] Name              Type             Address           Offset
           Size              EntSize          Flags  Link  Info  Align
    ...
      [ 2] uretprobe.mu[...] PROGBITS         0000000000000000  00000040
           0000000000000068  0000000000000000  AX       0     0     8

    $ readelf -s crash
    Symbol table '.symtab' contains 8 entries:
       Num:    Value          Size Type    Bind   Vis      Ndx Name
    ...
         6: ffffffffffffffb8   104 FUNC    GLOBAL DEFAULT    2 handle_tp

Here, the handle_tp prog has section offset ffffffffffffffb8, i.e. will
point before the actual memory where section 2 is allocated.

This is also reported by AddressSanitizer:

    =================================================================
    ==1232==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7c7302fe0000 at pc 0x7fc3046e4b77 bp 0x7ffe64677cd0 sp 0x7ffe64677490
    READ of size 104 at 0x7c7302fe0000 thread T0
        #0 0x7fc3046e4b76 in memcpy (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe4b76)
        #1 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__init_prog /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:856
        #2 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__add_programs /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:928
        #3 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__elf_collect /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3930
        #4 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object_open /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8067
        #5 0x00000040f176 in bpf_object__open_file /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8090
        #6 0x000000400c16 in main /poc/poc.c:8
        #7 0x7fc3043d25b4 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x35b4)
        #8 0x7fc3043d2667 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3667)
        #9 0x000000400b34 in _start (/poc/poc+0x400b34)

    0x7c7302fe0000 is located 64 bytes before 104-byte region [0x7c7302fe0040,0x7c7302fe00a8)
    allocated by thread T0 here:
        #0 0x7fc3046e716b in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe716b)
        #1 0x7fc3045ee600 in __libelf_set_rawdata_wrlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xb600)
        #2 0x7fc3045ef018 in __elf_getdata_rdlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xc018)
        #3 0x00000040642f in elf_sec_data /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3740

The problem here is that currently, libbpf only checks that the program
end is within the section bounds. There used to be a check
`while (sec_off < sec_sz)` in bpf_object__add_programs, however, it was
removed by commit 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program
sections to support overriden weak functions").

Add a check for detecting the overflow of `sec_off + prog_sz` to
bpf_object__init_prog to fix this issue.

[1] https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md

Reported-by: lmarch2 <2524158037@qq.com>
Link: https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md
Fixes: 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions")
Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 15, 2025
As shown in [1], it is possible to corrupt a BPF ELF file such that
arbitrary BPF instructions are loaded by libbpf. This can be done by
setting a symbol (BPF program) section offset to a large (unsigned)
number such that <section start + symbol offset> overflows and points
before the section data in the memory.

Consider the situation below where:
- prog_start = sec_start + symbol_offset    <-- size_t overflow here
- prog_end   = prog_start + prog_size

    prog_start        sec_start        prog_end        sec_end
        |                |                 |              |
        v                v                 v              v
    .....................|################################|............

The report in [1] also provides a corrupted BPF ELF which can be used as
a reproducer:

    $ readelf -S crash
    Section Headers:
      [Nr] Name              Type             Address           Offset
           Size              EntSize          Flags  Link  Info  Align
    ...
      [ 2] uretprobe.mu[...] PROGBITS         0000000000000000  00000040
           0000000000000068  0000000000000000  AX       0     0     8

    $ readelf -s crash
    Symbol table '.symtab' contains 8 entries:
       Num:    Value          Size Type    Bind   Vis      Ndx Name
    ...
         6: ffffffffffffffb8   104 FUNC    GLOBAL DEFAULT    2 handle_tp

Here, the handle_tp prog has section offset ffffffffffffffb8, i.e. will
point before the actual memory where section 2 is allocated.

This is also reported by AddressSanitizer:

    =================================================================
    ==1232==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7c7302fe0000 at pc 0x7fc3046e4b77 bp 0x7ffe64677cd0 sp 0x7ffe64677490
    READ of size 104 at 0x7c7302fe0000 thread T0
        #0 0x7fc3046e4b76 in memcpy (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe4b76)
        #1 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__init_prog /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:856
        #2 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__add_programs /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:928
        #3 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__elf_collect /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3930
        #4 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object_open /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8067
        #5 0x00000040f176 in bpf_object__open_file /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8090
        #6 0x000000400c16 in main /poc/poc.c:8
        #7 0x7fc3043d25b4 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x35b4)
        #8 0x7fc3043d2667 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3667)
        #9 0x000000400b34 in _start (/poc/poc+0x400b34)

    0x7c7302fe0000 is located 64 bytes before 104-byte region [0x7c7302fe0040,0x7c7302fe00a8)
    allocated by thread T0 here:
        #0 0x7fc3046e716b in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe716b)
        #1 0x7fc3045ee600 in __libelf_set_rawdata_wrlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xb600)
        #2 0x7fc3045ef018 in __elf_getdata_rdlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xc018)
        #3 0x00000040642f in elf_sec_data /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3740

The problem here is that currently, libbpf only checks that the program
end is within the section bounds. There used to be a check
`while (sec_off < sec_sz)` in bpf_object__add_programs, however, it was
removed by commit 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program
sections to support overriden weak functions").

Add a check for detecting the overflow of `sec_off + prog_sz` to
bpf_object__init_prog to fix this issue.

[1] https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md

Reported-by: lmarch2 <2524158037@qq.com>
Link: https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md
Fixes: 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions")
Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 15, 2025
As shown in [1], it is possible to corrupt a BPF ELF file such that
arbitrary BPF instructions are loaded by libbpf. This can be done by
setting a symbol (BPF program) section offset to a large (unsigned)
number such that <section start + symbol offset> overflows and points
before the section data in the memory.

Consider the situation below where:
- prog_start = sec_start + symbol_offset    <-- size_t overflow here
- prog_end   = prog_start + prog_size

    prog_start        sec_start        prog_end        sec_end
        |                |                 |              |
        v                v                 v              v
    .....................|################################|............

The report in [1] also provides a corrupted BPF ELF which can be used as
a reproducer:

    $ readelf -S crash
    Section Headers:
      [Nr] Name              Type             Address           Offset
           Size              EntSize          Flags  Link  Info  Align
    ...
      [ 2] uretprobe.mu[...] PROGBITS         0000000000000000  00000040
           0000000000000068  0000000000000000  AX       0     0     8

    $ readelf -s crash
    Symbol table '.symtab' contains 8 entries:
       Num:    Value          Size Type    Bind   Vis      Ndx Name
    ...
         6: ffffffffffffffb8   104 FUNC    GLOBAL DEFAULT    2 handle_tp

Here, the handle_tp prog has section offset ffffffffffffffb8, i.e. will
point before the actual memory where section 2 is allocated.

This is also reported by AddressSanitizer:

    =================================================================
    ==1232==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7c7302fe0000 at pc 0x7fc3046e4b77 bp 0x7ffe64677cd0 sp 0x7ffe64677490
    READ of size 104 at 0x7c7302fe0000 thread T0
        #0 0x7fc3046e4b76 in memcpy (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe4b76)
        #1 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__init_prog /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:856
        #2 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__add_programs /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:928
        #3 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__elf_collect /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3930
        #4 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object_open /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8067
        #5 0x00000040f176 in bpf_object__open_file /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8090
        #6 0x000000400c16 in main /poc/poc.c:8
        #7 0x7fc3043d25b4 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x35b4)
        #8 0x7fc3043d2667 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3667)
        #9 0x000000400b34 in _start (/poc/poc+0x400b34)

    0x7c7302fe0000 is located 64 bytes before 104-byte region [0x7c7302fe0040,0x7c7302fe00a8)
    allocated by thread T0 here:
        #0 0x7fc3046e716b in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe716b)
        #1 0x7fc3045ee600 in __libelf_set_rawdata_wrlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xb600)
        #2 0x7fc3045ef018 in __elf_getdata_rdlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xc018)
        #3 0x00000040642f in elf_sec_data /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3740

The problem here is that currently, libbpf only checks that the program
end is within the section bounds. There used to be a check
`while (sec_off < sec_sz)` in bpf_object__add_programs, however, it was
removed by commit 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program
sections to support overriden weak functions").

Add a check for detecting the overflow of `sec_off + prog_sz` to
bpf_object__init_prog to fix this issue.

[1] https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md

Reported-by: lmarch2 <2524158037@qq.com>
Link: https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md
Fixes: 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions")
Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 15, 2025
As shown in [1], it is possible to corrupt a BPF ELF file such that
arbitrary BPF instructions are loaded by libbpf. This can be done by
setting a symbol (BPF program) section offset to a large (unsigned)
number such that <section start + symbol offset> overflows and points
before the section data in the memory.

Consider the situation below where:
- prog_start = sec_start + symbol_offset    <-- size_t overflow here
- prog_end   = prog_start + prog_size

    prog_start        sec_start        prog_end        sec_end
        |                |                 |              |
        v                v                 v              v
    .....................|################################|............

The report in [1] also provides a corrupted BPF ELF which can be used as
a reproducer:

    $ readelf -S crash
    Section Headers:
      [Nr] Name              Type             Address           Offset
           Size              EntSize          Flags  Link  Info  Align
    ...
      [ 2] uretprobe.mu[...] PROGBITS         0000000000000000  00000040
           0000000000000068  0000000000000000  AX       0     0     8

    $ readelf -s crash
    Symbol table '.symtab' contains 8 entries:
       Num:    Value          Size Type    Bind   Vis      Ndx Name
    ...
         6: ffffffffffffffb8   104 FUNC    GLOBAL DEFAULT    2 handle_tp

Here, the handle_tp prog has section offset ffffffffffffffb8, i.e. will
point before the actual memory where section 2 is allocated.

This is also reported by AddressSanitizer:

    =================================================================
    ==1232==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7c7302fe0000 at pc 0x7fc3046e4b77 bp 0x7ffe64677cd0 sp 0x7ffe64677490
    READ of size 104 at 0x7c7302fe0000 thread T0
        #0 0x7fc3046e4b76 in memcpy (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe4b76)
        #1 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__init_prog /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:856
        #2 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__add_programs /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:928
        #3 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__elf_collect /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3930
        #4 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object_open /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8067
        #5 0x00000040f176 in bpf_object__open_file /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8090
        #6 0x000000400c16 in main /poc/poc.c:8
        #7 0x7fc3043d25b4 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x35b4)
        #8 0x7fc3043d2667 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3667)
        #9 0x000000400b34 in _start (/poc/poc+0x400b34)

    0x7c7302fe0000 is located 64 bytes before 104-byte region [0x7c7302fe0040,0x7c7302fe00a8)
    allocated by thread T0 here:
        #0 0x7fc3046e716b in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe716b)
        #1 0x7fc3045ee600 in __libelf_set_rawdata_wrlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xb600)
        #2 0x7fc3045ef018 in __elf_getdata_rdlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xc018)
        #3 0x00000040642f in elf_sec_data /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3740

The problem here is that currently, libbpf only checks that the program
end is within the section bounds. There used to be a check
`while (sec_off < sec_sz)` in bpf_object__add_programs, however, it was
removed by commit 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program
sections to support overriden weak functions").

Add a check for detecting the overflow of `sec_off + prog_sz` to
bpf_object__init_prog to fix this issue.

[1] https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md

Fixes: 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions")
Reported-by: lmarch2 <2524158037@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
Link: https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250415155014.397603-1-vmalik@redhat.com
olsajiri pushed a commit to olsajiri/bpf that referenced this pull request Apr 18, 2025
Patch series "kernel/events/uprobes: uprobe_write_opcode() rewrite", v3.

Currently, uprobe_write_opcode() implements COW-breaking manually, which
is really far from ideal.  Further, there is interest in supporting
uprobes on hugetlb pages [1], and leaving at least the COW-breaking to the
core will make this much easier.

Also, I think the current code doesn't really handle some things properly
(see patch kernel-patches#3) when replacing/zapping pages.

Let's rewrite it, to leave COW-breaking to the fault handler, and handle
registration/unregistration by temporarily unmapping the anonymous page,
modifying it, and mapping it again.  We still have to implement zapping of
anonymous pages ourselves, unfortunately.

We could look into not performing the temporary unmapping if we can
perform the write atomically, which would likely also make adding hugetlb
support a lot easier.  But, limited (e.g., only PMD/PUD) hugetlb support
could be added on top of this with some tweaking.

Note that we now won't have to allocate another anonymous folio when
unregistering (which will be beneficial for hugetlb as well), we can
simply modify the already-mapped one from the registration (if any).  When
registering a uprobe, we'll first trigger a ptrace-like write fault to
break COW, to then modify the already-mapped page.

Briefly sanity tested with perf probes and with the bpf uprobes selftest.


This patch (of 3):

Pass VMA instead of MM to remove_breakpoint() and remove the "MM" argument
from install_breakpoint(), because it can easily be derived from the VMA.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250321113713.204682-1-david@redhat.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250321113713.204682-2-david@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <olsajiri@gmail.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@gmail.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Namhyung kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Russel King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: tongtiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Apr 22, 2025
Commit 03df156 ("xdp: double protect netdev->xdp_flags with
netdev->lock") introduces the netdev lock to xdp_set_features_flag().
The change includes a _locked version of the method, as it is possible
for a driver to have already acquired the netdev lock before calling
this helper. However, the same applies to
xdp_features_(set|clear)_redirect_flags(), which ends up calling the
unlocked version of xdp_set_features_flags() leading to deadlocks in
GVE, which grabs the netdev lock as part of its suspend, reset, and
shutdown processes:

[  833.265543] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[  833.270949] 6.15.0-rc1 kernel-patches#6 Tainted: G            E
[  833.276271] --------------------------------------------
[  833.281681] systemd-shutdow/1 is trying to acquire lock:
[  833.287090] ffff949d2b148c68 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: xdp_set_features_flag+0x29/0x90
[  833.295470]
[  833.295470] but task is already holding lock:
[  833.301400] ffff949d2b148c68 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gve_shutdown+0x44/0x90 [gve]
[  833.309508]
[  833.309508] other info that might help us debug this:
[  833.316130]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[  833.316130]
[  833.322142]        CPU0
[  833.324681]        ----
[  833.327220]   lock(&dev->lock);
[  833.330455]   lock(&dev->lock);
[  833.333689]
[  833.333689]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[  833.333689]
[  833.339701]  May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[  833.339701]
[  833.346582] 5 locks held by systemd-shutdow/1:
[  833.351205]  #0: ffffffffa9c89130 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __se_sys_reboot+0xe6/0x210
[  833.360695]  kernel-patches#1: ffff93b399e5c1b8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_shutdown+0xb4/0x1f0
[  833.369144]  kernel-patches#2: ffff949d19a471b8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_shutdown+0xc2/0x1f0
[  833.377603]  kernel-patches#3: ffffffffa9eca050 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gve_shutdown+0x33/0x90 [gve]
[  833.386138]  kernel-patches#4: ffff949d2b148c68 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gve_shutdown+0x44/0x90 [gve]

Introduce xdp_features_(set|clear)_redirect_target_locked() versions
which assume that the netdev lock has already been acquired before
setting the XDP feature flag and update GVE to use the locked version.

Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 03df156 ("xdp: double protect netdev->xdp_flags with netdev->lock")
Tested-by: Mina Almasry <almasrymina@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Harshitha Ramamurthy <hramamurthy@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Joshua Washington <joshwash@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Apr 22, 2025
Commit 03df156 ("xdp: double protect netdev->xdp_flags with
netdev->lock") introduces the netdev lock to xdp_set_features_flag().
The change includes a _locked version of the method, as it is possible
for a driver to have already acquired the netdev lock before calling
this helper. However, the same applies to
xdp_features_(set|clear)_redirect_flags(), which ends up calling the
unlocked version of xdp_set_features_flags() leading to deadlocks in
GVE, which grabs the netdev lock as part of its suspend, reset, and
shutdown processes:

[  833.265543] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[  833.270949] 6.15.0-rc1 kernel-patches#6 Tainted: G            E
[  833.276271] --------------------------------------------
[  833.281681] systemd-shutdow/1 is trying to acquire lock:
[  833.287090] ffff949d2b148c68 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: xdp_set_features_flag+0x29/0x90
[  833.295470]
[  833.295470] but task is already holding lock:
[  833.301400] ffff949d2b148c68 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gve_shutdown+0x44/0x90 [gve]
[  833.309508]
[  833.309508] other info that might help us debug this:
[  833.316130]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[  833.316130]
[  833.322142]        CPU0
[  833.324681]        ----
[  833.327220]   lock(&dev->lock);
[  833.330455]   lock(&dev->lock);
[  833.333689]
[  833.333689]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[  833.333689]
[  833.339701]  May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[  833.339701]
[  833.346582] 5 locks held by systemd-shutdow/1:
[  833.351205]  #0: ffffffffa9c89130 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __se_sys_reboot+0xe6/0x210
[  833.360695]  kernel-patches#1: ffff93b399e5c1b8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_shutdown+0xb4/0x1f0
[  833.369144]  kernel-patches#2: ffff949d19a471b8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_shutdown+0xc2/0x1f0
[  833.377603]  kernel-patches#3: ffffffffa9eca050 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gve_shutdown+0x33/0x90 [gve]
[  833.386138]  kernel-patches#4: ffff949d2b148c68 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gve_shutdown+0x44/0x90 [gve]

Introduce xdp_features_(set|clear)_redirect_target_locked() versions
which assume that the netdev lock has already been acquired before
setting the XDP feature flag and update GVE to use the locked version.

Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 03df156 ("xdp: double protect netdev->xdp_flags with netdev->lock")
Tested-by: Mina Almasry <almasrymina@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Harshitha Ramamurthy <hramamurthy@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Joshua Washington <joshwash@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Apr 22, 2025
Commit 03df156 ("xdp: double protect netdev->xdp_flags with
netdev->lock") introduces the netdev lock to xdp_set_features_flag().
The change includes a _locked version of the method, as it is possible
for a driver to have already acquired the netdev lock before calling
this helper. However, the same applies to
xdp_features_(set|clear)_redirect_flags(), which ends up calling the
unlocked version of xdp_set_features_flags() leading to deadlocks in
GVE, which grabs the netdev lock as part of its suspend, reset, and
shutdown processes:

[  833.265543] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[  833.270949] 6.15.0-rc1 kernel-patches#6 Tainted: G            E
[  833.276271] --------------------------------------------
[  833.281681] systemd-shutdow/1 is trying to acquire lock:
[  833.287090] ffff949d2b148c68 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: xdp_set_features_flag+0x29/0x90
[  833.295470]
[  833.295470] but task is already holding lock:
[  833.301400] ffff949d2b148c68 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gve_shutdown+0x44/0x90 [gve]
[  833.309508]
[  833.309508] other info that might help us debug this:
[  833.316130]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[  833.316130]
[  833.322142]        CPU0
[  833.324681]        ----
[  833.327220]   lock(&dev->lock);
[  833.330455]   lock(&dev->lock);
[  833.333689]
[  833.333689]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[  833.333689]
[  833.339701]  May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[  833.339701]
[  833.346582] 5 locks held by systemd-shutdow/1:
[  833.351205]  #0: ffffffffa9c89130 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __se_sys_reboot+0xe6/0x210
[  833.360695]  kernel-patches#1: ffff93b399e5c1b8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_shutdown+0xb4/0x1f0
[  833.369144]  kernel-patches#2: ffff949d19a471b8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_shutdown+0xc2/0x1f0
[  833.377603]  kernel-patches#3: ffffffffa9eca050 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gve_shutdown+0x33/0x90 [gve]
[  833.386138]  kernel-patches#4: ffff949d2b148c68 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gve_shutdown+0x44/0x90 [gve]

Introduce xdp_features_(set|clear)_redirect_target_locked() versions
which assume that the netdev lock has already been acquired before
setting the XDP feature flag and update GVE to use the locked version.

Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 03df156 ("xdp: double protect netdev->xdp_flags with netdev->lock")
Tested-by: Mina Almasry <almasrymina@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Harshitha Ramamurthy <hramamurthy@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Joshua Washington <joshwash@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Apr 22, 2025
Commit 03df156 ("xdp: double protect netdev->xdp_flags with
netdev->lock") introduces the netdev lock to xdp_set_features_flag().
The change includes a _locked version of the method, as it is possible
for a driver to have already acquired the netdev lock before calling
this helper. However, the same applies to
xdp_features_(set|clear)_redirect_flags(), which ends up calling the
unlocked version of xdp_set_features_flags() leading to deadlocks in
GVE, which grabs the netdev lock as part of its suspend, reset, and
shutdown processes:

[  833.265543] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[  833.270949] 6.15.0-rc1 kernel-patches#6 Tainted: G            E
[  833.276271] --------------------------------------------
[  833.281681] systemd-shutdow/1 is trying to acquire lock:
[  833.287090] ffff949d2b148c68 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: xdp_set_features_flag+0x29/0x90
[  833.295470]
[  833.295470] but task is already holding lock:
[  833.301400] ffff949d2b148c68 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gve_shutdown+0x44/0x90 [gve]
[  833.309508]
[  833.309508] other info that might help us debug this:
[  833.316130]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[  833.316130]
[  833.322142]        CPU0
[  833.324681]        ----
[  833.327220]   lock(&dev->lock);
[  833.330455]   lock(&dev->lock);
[  833.333689]
[  833.333689]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[  833.333689]
[  833.339701]  May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[  833.339701]
[  833.346582] 5 locks held by systemd-shutdow/1:
[  833.351205]  #0: ffffffffa9c89130 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __se_sys_reboot+0xe6/0x210
[  833.360695]  kernel-patches#1: ffff93b399e5c1b8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_shutdown+0xb4/0x1f0
[  833.369144]  kernel-patches#2: ffff949d19a471b8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_shutdown+0xc2/0x1f0
[  833.377603]  kernel-patches#3: ffffffffa9eca050 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gve_shutdown+0x33/0x90 [gve]
[  833.386138]  kernel-patches#4: ffff949d2b148c68 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gve_shutdown+0x44/0x90 [gve]

Introduce xdp_features_(set|clear)_redirect_target_locked() versions
which assume that the netdev lock has already been acquired before
setting the XDP feature flag and update GVE to use the locked version.

Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 03df156 ("xdp: double protect netdev->xdp_flags with netdev->lock")
Tested-by: Mina Almasry <almasrymina@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Harshitha Ramamurthy <hramamurthy@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Joshua Washington <joshwash@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Apr 22, 2025
Commit 03df156 ("xdp: double protect netdev->xdp_flags with
netdev->lock") introduces the netdev lock to xdp_set_features_flag().
The change includes a _locked version of the method, as it is possible
for a driver to have already acquired the netdev lock before calling
this helper. However, the same applies to
xdp_features_(set|clear)_redirect_flags(), which ends up calling the
unlocked version of xdp_set_features_flags() leading to deadlocks in
GVE, which grabs the netdev lock as part of its suspend, reset, and
shutdown processes:

[  833.265543] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[  833.270949] 6.15.0-rc1 kernel-patches#6 Tainted: G            E
[  833.276271] --------------------------------------------
[  833.281681] systemd-shutdow/1 is trying to acquire lock:
[  833.287090] ffff949d2b148c68 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: xdp_set_features_flag+0x29/0x90
[  833.295470]
[  833.295470] but task is already holding lock:
[  833.301400] ffff949d2b148c68 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gve_shutdown+0x44/0x90 [gve]
[  833.309508]
[  833.309508] other info that might help us debug this:
[  833.316130]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[  833.316130]
[  833.322142]        CPU0
[  833.324681]        ----
[  833.327220]   lock(&dev->lock);
[  833.330455]   lock(&dev->lock);
[  833.333689]
[  833.333689]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[  833.333689]
[  833.339701]  May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[  833.339701]
[  833.346582] 5 locks held by systemd-shutdow/1:
[  833.351205]  #0: ffffffffa9c89130 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __se_sys_reboot+0xe6/0x210
[  833.360695]  kernel-patches#1: ffff93b399e5c1b8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_shutdown+0xb4/0x1f0
[  833.369144]  kernel-patches#2: ffff949d19a471b8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_shutdown+0xc2/0x1f0
[  833.377603]  kernel-patches#3: ffffffffa9eca050 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gve_shutdown+0x33/0x90 [gve]
[  833.386138]  kernel-patches#4: ffff949d2b148c68 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gve_shutdown+0x44/0x90 [gve]

Introduce xdp_features_(set|clear)_redirect_target_locked() versions
which assume that the netdev lock has already been acquired before
setting the XDP feature flag and update GVE to use the locked version.

Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 03df156 ("xdp: double protect netdev->xdp_flags with netdev->lock")
Tested-by: Mina Almasry <almasrymina@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Harshitha Ramamurthy <hramamurthy@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Joshua Washington <joshwash@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Apr 22, 2025
Commit 03df156 ("xdp: double protect netdev->xdp_flags with
netdev->lock") introduces the netdev lock to xdp_set_features_flag().
The change includes a _locked version of the method, as it is possible
for a driver to have already acquired the netdev lock before calling
this helper. However, the same applies to
xdp_features_(set|clear)_redirect_flags(), which ends up calling the
unlocked version of xdp_set_features_flags() leading to deadlocks in
GVE, which grabs the netdev lock as part of its suspend, reset, and
shutdown processes:

[  833.265543] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[  833.270949] 6.15.0-rc1 kernel-patches#6 Tainted: G            E
[  833.276271] --------------------------------------------
[  833.281681] systemd-shutdow/1 is trying to acquire lock:
[  833.287090] ffff949d2b148c68 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: xdp_set_features_flag+0x29/0x90
[  833.295470]
[  833.295470] but task is already holding lock:
[  833.301400] ffff949d2b148c68 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gve_shutdown+0x44/0x90 [gve]
[  833.309508]
[  833.309508] other info that might help us debug this:
[  833.316130]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[  833.316130]
[  833.322142]        CPU0
[  833.324681]        ----
[  833.327220]   lock(&dev->lock);
[  833.330455]   lock(&dev->lock);
[  833.333689]
[  833.333689]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[  833.333689]
[  833.339701]  May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[  833.339701]
[  833.346582] 5 locks held by systemd-shutdow/1:
[  833.351205]  #0: ffffffffa9c89130 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __se_sys_reboot+0xe6/0x210
[  833.360695]  kernel-patches#1: ffff93b399e5c1b8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_shutdown+0xb4/0x1f0
[  833.369144]  kernel-patches#2: ffff949d19a471b8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_shutdown+0xc2/0x1f0
[  833.377603]  kernel-patches#3: ffffffffa9eca050 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gve_shutdown+0x33/0x90 [gve]
[  833.386138]  kernel-patches#4: ffff949d2b148c68 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gve_shutdown+0x44/0x90 [gve]

Introduce xdp_features_(set|clear)_redirect_target_locked() versions
which assume that the netdev lock has already been acquired before
setting the XDP feature flag and update GVE to use the locked version.

Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 03df156 ("xdp: double protect netdev->xdp_flags with netdev->lock")
Tested-by: Mina Almasry <almasrymina@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Harshitha Ramamurthy <hramamurthy@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Joshua Washington <joshwash@google.com>
Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@fomichev.me>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Apr 22, 2025
Commit 03df156 ("xdp: double protect netdev->xdp_flags with
netdev->lock") introduces the netdev lock to xdp_set_features_flag().
The change includes a _locked version of the method, as it is possible
for a driver to have already acquired the netdev lock before calling
this helper. However, the same applies to
xdp_features_(set|clear)_redirect_flags(), which ends up calling the
unlocked version of xdp_set_features_flags() leading to deadlocks in
GVE, which grabs the netdev lock as part of its suspend, reset, and
shutdown processes:

[  833.265543] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[  833.270949] 6.15.0-rc1 kernel-patches#6 Tainted: G            E
[  833.276271] --------------------------------------------
[  833.281681] systemd-shutdow/1 is trying to acquire lock:
[  833.287090] ffff949d2b148c68 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: xdp_set_features_flag+0x29/0x90
[  833.295470]
[  833.295470] but task is already holding lock:
[  833.301400] ffff949d2b148c68 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gve_shutdown+0x44/0x90 [gve]
[  833.309508]
[  833.309508] other info that might help us debug this:
[  833.316130]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[  833.316130]
[  833.322142]        CPU0
[  833.324681]        ----
[  833.327220]   lock(&dev->lock);
[  833.330455]   lock(&dev->lock);
[  833.333689]
[  833.333689]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[  833.333689]
[  833.339701]  May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[  833.339701]
[  833.346582] 5 locks held by systemd-shutdow/1:
[  833.351205]  #0: ffffffffa9c89130 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __se_sys_reboot+0xe6/0x210
[  833.360695]  kernel-patches#1: ffff93b399e5c1b8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_shutdown+0xb4/0x1f0
[  833.369144]  kernel-patches#2: ffff949d19a471b8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_shutdown+0xc2/0x1f0
[  833.377603]  kernel-patches#3: ffffffffa9eca050 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gve_shutdown+0x33/0x90 [gve]
[  833.386138]  kernel-patches#4: ffff949d2b148c68 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gve_shutdown+0x44/0x90 [gve]

Introduce xdp_features_(set|clear)_redirect_target_locked() versions
which assume that the netdev lock has already been acquired before
setting the XDP feature flag and update GVE to use the locked version.

Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 03df156 ("xdp: double protect netdev->xdp_flags with netdev->lock")
Tested-by: Mina Almasry <almasrymina@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Harshitha Ramamurthy <hramamurthy@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Joshua Washington <joshwash@google.com>
Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@fomichev.me>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Apr 23, 2025
Commit 03df156 ("xdp: double protect netdev->xdp_flags with
netdev->lock") introduces the netdev lock to xdp_set_features_flag().
The change includes a _locked version of the method, as it is possible
for a driver to have already acquired the netdev lock before calling
this helper. However, the same applies to
xdp_features_(set|clear)_redirect_flags(), which ends up calling the
unlocked version of xdp_set_features_flags() leading to deadlocks in
GVE, which grabs the netdev lock as part of its suspend, reset, and
shutdown processes:

[  833.265543] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[  833.270949] 6.15.0-rc1 kernel-patches#6 Tainted: G            E
[  833.276271] --------------------------------------------
[  833.281681] systemd-shutdow/1 is trying to acquire lock:
[  833.287090] ffff949d2b148c68 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: xdp_set_features_flag+0x29/0x90
[  833.295470]
[  833.295470] but task is already holding lock:
[  833.301400] ffff949d2b148c68 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gve_shutdown+0x44/0x90 [gve]
[  833.309508]
[  833.309508] other info that might help us debug this:
[  833.316130]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[  833.316130]
[  833.322142]        CPU0
[  833.324681]        ----
[  833.327220]   lock(&dev->lock);
[  833.330455]   lock(&dev->lock);
[  833.333689]
[  833.333689]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[  833.333689]
[  833.339701]  May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[  833.339701]
[  833.346582] 5 locks held by systemd-shutdow/1:
[  833.351205]  #0: ffffffffa9c89130 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __se_sys_reboot+0xe6/0x210
[  833.360695]  kernel-patches#1: ffff93b399e5c1b8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_shutdown+0xb4/0x1f0
[  833.369144]  kernel-patches#2: ffff949d19a471b8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_shutdown+0xc2/0x1f0
[  833.377603]  kernel-patches#3: ffffffffa9eca050 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gve_shutdown+0x33/0x90 [gve]
[  833.386138]  kernel-patches#4: ffff949d2b148c68 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gve_shutdown+0x44/0x90 [gve]

Introduce xdp_features_(set|clear)_redirect_target_locked() versions
which assume that the netdev lock has already been acquired before
setting the XDP feature flag and update GVE to use the locked version.

Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 03df156 ("xdp: double protect netdev->xdp_flags with netdev->lock")
Tested-by: Mina Almasry <almasrymina@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Harshitha Ramamurthy <hramamurthy@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Joshua Washington <joshwash@google.com>
Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@fomichev.me>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Apr 23, 2025
Commit 03df156 ("xdp: double protect netdev->xdp_flags with
netdev->lock") introduces the netdev lock to xdp_set_features_flag().
The change includes a _locked version of the method, as it is possible
for a driver to have already acquired the netdev lock before calling
this helper. However, the same applies to
xdp_features_(set|clear)_redirect_flags(), which ends up calling the
unlocked version of xdp_set_features_flags() leading to deadlocks in
GVE, which grabs the netdev lock as part of its suspend, reset, and
shutdown processes:

[  833.265543] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[  833.270949] 6.15.0-rc1 kernel-patches#6 Tainted: G            E
[  833.276271] --------------------------------------------
[  833.281681] systemd-shutdow/1 is trying to acquire lock:
[  833.287090] ffff949d2b148c68 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: xdp_set_features_flag+0x29/0x90
[  833.295470]
[  833.295470] but task is already holding lock:
[  833.301400] ffff949d2b148c68 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gve_shutdown+0x44/0x90 [gve]
[  833.309508]
[  833.309508] other info that might help us debug this:
[  833.316130]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[  833.316130]
[  833.322142]        CPU0
[  833.324681]        ----
[  833.327220]   lock(&dev->lock);
[  833.330455]   lock(&dev->lock);
[  833.333689]
[  833.333689]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[  833.333689]
[  833.339701]  May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[  833.339701]
[  833.346582] 5 locks held by systemd-shutdow/1:
[  833.351205]  #0: ffffffffa9c89130 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __se_sys_reboot+0xe6/0x210
[  833.360695]  kernel-patches#1: ffff93b399e5c1b8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_shutdown+0xb4/0x1f0
[  833.369144]  kernel-patches#2: ffff949d19a471b8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_shutdown+0xc2/0x1f0
[  833.377603]  kernel-patches#3: ffffffffa9eca050 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gve_shutdown+0x33/0x90 [gve]
[  833.386138]  kernel-patches#4: ffff949d2b148c68 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gve_shutdown+0x44/0x90 [gve]

Introduce xdp_features_(set|clear)_redirect_target_locked() versions
which assume that the netdev lock has already been acquired before
setting the XDP feature flag and update GVE to use the locked version.

Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 03df156 ("xdp: double protect netdev->xdp_flags with netdev->lock")
Tested-by: Mina Almasry <almasrymina@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Harshitha Ramamurthy <hramamurthy@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Joshua Washington <joshwash@google.com>
Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@fomichev.me>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Apr 23, 2025
Commit 03df156 ("xdp: double protect netdev->xdp_flags with
netdev->lock") introduces the netdev lock to xdp_set_features_flag().
The change includes a _locked version of the method, as it is possible
for a driver to have already acquired the netdev lock before calling
this helper. However, the same applies to
xdp_features_(set|clear)_redirect_flags(), which ends up calling the
unlocked version of xdp_set_features_flags() leading to deadlocks in
GVE, which grabs the netdev lock as part of its suspend, reset, and
shutdown processes:

[  833.265543] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[  833.270949] 6.15.0-rc1 kernel-patches#6 Tainted: G            E
[  833.276271] --------------------------------------------
[  833.281681] systemd-shutdow/1 is trying to acquire lock:
[  833.287090] ffff949d2b148c68 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: xdp_set_features_flag+0x29/0x90
[  833.295470]
[  833.295470] but task is already holding lock:
[  833.301400] ffff949d2b148c68 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gve_shutdown+0x44/0x90 [gve]
[  833.309508]
[  833.309508] other info that might help us debug this:
[  833.316130]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[  833.316130]
[  833.322142]        CPU0
[  833.324681]        ----
[  833.327220]   lock(&dev->lock);
[  833.330455]   lock(&dev->lock);
[  833.333689]
[  833.333689]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[  833.333689]
[  833.339701]  May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[  833.339701]
[  833.346582] 5 locks held by systemd-shutdow/1:
[  833.351205]  #0: ffffffffa9c89130 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __se_sys_reboot+0xe6/0x210
[  833.360695]  kernel-patches#1: ffff93b399e5c1b8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_shutdown+0xb4/0x1f0
[  833.369144]  kernel-patches#2: ffff949d19a471b8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_shutdown+0xc2/0x1f0
[  833.377603]  kernel-patches#3: ffffffffa9eca050 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gve_shutdown+0x33/0x90 [gve]
[  833.386138]  kernel-patches#4: ffff949d2b148c68 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: gve_shutdown+0x44/0x90 [gve]

Introduce xdp_features_(set|clear)_redirect_target_locked() versions
which assume that the netdev lock has already been acquired before
setting the XDP feature flag and update GVE to use the locked version.

Fixes: 03df156 ("xdp: double protect netdev->xdp_flags with netdev->lock")
Tested-by: Mina Almasry <almasrymina@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Harshitha Ramamurthy <hramamurthy@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Joshua Washington <joshwash@google.com>
Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@fomichev.me>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250422011643.3509287-1-joshwash@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 23, 2025
There is a potential deadlock if we do report zones in an IO context, detailed
in below lockdep report. When one process do a report zones and another process
freezes the block device, the report zones side cannot allocate a tag because
the freeze is already started. This can thus result in new block group creation
to hang forever, blocking the write path.

Thankfully, a new block group should be created on empty zones. So, reporting
the zones is not necessary and we can set the write pointer = 0 and load the
zone capacity from the block layer using bdev_zone_capacity() helper.

 ======================================================
 WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
 6.14.0-rc1 #252 Not tainted
 ------------------------------------------------------
 modprobe/1110 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffff888100ac83e0 ((work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x38f/0xb60

 but task is already holding lock:
 ffff8881205b6f20 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#16){++++}-{0:0}, at: sd_remove+0x85/0x130

 which lock already depends on the new lock.

 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

 -> #3 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#16){++++}-{0:0}:
        blk_queue_enter+0x3d9/0x500
        blk_mq_alloc_request+0x47d/0x8e0
        scsi_execute_cmd+0x14f/0xb80
        sd_zbc_do_report_zones+0x1c1/0x470
        sd_zbc_report_zones+0x362/0xd60
        blkdev_report_zones+0x1b1/0x2e0
        btrfs_get_dev_zones+0x215/0x7e0 [btrfs]
        btrfs_load_block_group_zone_info+0x6d2/0x2c10 [btrfs]
        btrfs_make_block_group+0x36b/0x870 [btrfs]
        btrfs_create_chunk+0x147d/0x2320 [btrfs]
        btrfs_chunk_alloc+0x2ce/0xcf0 [btrfs]
        start_transaction+0xce6/0x1620 [btrfs]
        btrfs_uuid_scan_kthread+0x4ee/0x5b0 [btrfs]
        kthread+0x39d/0x750
        ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70
        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

 -> #2 (&fs_info->dev_replace.rwsem){++++}-{4:4}:
        down_read+0x9b/0x470
        btrfs_map_block+0x2ce/0x2ce0 [btrfs]
        btrfs_submit_chunk+0x2d4/0x16c0 [btrfs]
        btrfs_submit_bbio+0x16/0x30 [btrfs]
        btree_write_cache_pages+0xb5a/0xf90 [btrfs]
        do_writepages+0x17f/0x7b0
        __writeback_single_inode+0x114/0xb00
        writeback_sb_inodes+0x52b/0xe00
        wb_writeback+0x1a7/0x800
        wb_workfn+0x12a/0xbd0
        process_one_work+0x85a/0x1460
        worker_thread+0x5e2/0xfc0
        kthread+0x39d/0x750
        ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70
        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

 -> #1 (&fs_info->zoned_meta_io_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
        __mutex_lock+0x1aa/0x1360
        btree_write_cache_pages+0x252/0xf90 [btrfs]
        do_writepages+0x17f/0x7b0
        __writeback_single_inode+0x114/0xb00
        writeback_sb_inodes+0x52b/0xe00
        wb_writeback+0x1a7/0x800
        wb_workfn+0x12a/0xbd0
        process_one_work+0x85a/0x1460
        worker_thread+0x5e2/0xfc0
        kthread+0x39d/0x750
        ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70
        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
        __lock_acquire+0x2f52/0x5ea0
        lock_acquire+0x1b1/0x540
        __flush_work+0x3ac/0xb60
        wb_shutdown+0x15b/0x1f0
        bdi_unregister+0x172/0x5b0
        del_gendisk+0x841/0xa20
        sd_remove+0x85/0x130
        device_release_driver_internal+0x368/0x520
        bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0
        device_del+0x3bd/0x9c0
        __scsi_remove_device+0x272/0x340
        scsi_forget_host+0xf7/0x170
        scsi_remove_host+0xd2/0x2a0
        sdebug_driver_remove+0x52/0x2f0 [scsi_debug]
        device_release_driver_internal+0x368/0x520
        bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0
        device_del+0x3bd/0x9c0
        device_unregister+0x13/0xa0
        sdebug_do_remove_host+0x1fb/0x290 [scsi_debug]
        scsi_debug_exit+0x17/0x70 [scsi_debug]
        __do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x321/0x520
        do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

 other info that might help us debug this:

 Chain exists of:
   (work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work) --> &fs_info->dev_replace.rwsem --> &q->q_usage_counter(queue)#16

  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

        CPU0                    CPU1
        ----                    ----
   lock(&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#16);
                                lock(&fs_info->dev_replace.rwsem);
                                lock(&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#16);
   lock((work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work));

  *** DEADLOCK ***

 5 locks held by modprobe/1110:
  #0: ffff88811f7bc108 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x8f/0x520
  #1: ffff8881022ee0e0 (&shost->scan_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: scsi_remove_host+0x20/0x2a0
  #2: ffff88811b4c4378 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x8f/0x520
  #3: ffff8881205b6f20 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#16){++++}-{0:0}, at: sd_remove+0x85/0x130
  #4: ffffffffa3284360 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: __flush_work+0xda/0xb60

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1110 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.14.0-rc1 #252
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x6a/0x90
  print_circular_bug.cold+0x1e0/0x274
  check_noncircular+0x306/0x3f0
  ? __pfx_check_noncircular+0x10/0x10
  ? mark_lock+0xf5/0x1650
  ? __pfx_check_irq_usage+0x10/0x10
  ? lockdep_lock+0xca/0x1c0
  ? __pfx_lockdep_lock+0x10/0x10
  __lock_acquire+0x2f52/0x5ea0
  ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx_mark_lock+0x10/0x10
  lock_acquire+0x1b1/0x540
  ? __flush_work+0x38f/0xb60
  ? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10
  ? mark_held_locks+0x94/0xe0
  ? __flush_work+0x38f/0xb60
  __flush_work+0x3ac/0xb60
  ? __flush_work+0x38f/0xb60
  ? __pfx_mark_lock+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx___flush_work+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx___might_resched+0x10/0x10
  ? mark_held_locks+0x94/0xe0
  wb_shutdown+0x15b/0x1f0
  bdi_unregister+0x172/0x5b0
  ? __pfx_bdi_unregister+0x10/0x10
  ? up_write+0x1ba/0x510
  del_gendisk+0x841/0xa20
  ? __pfx_del_gendisk+0x10/0x10
  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x35/0x60
  ? __pm_runtime_resume+0x79/0x110
  sd_remove+0x85/0x130
  device_release_driver_internal+0x368/0x520
  ? kobject_put+0x5d/0x4a0
  bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0
  device_del+0x3bd/0x9c0
  ? __pfx_device_del+0x10/0x10
  __scsi_remove_device+0x272/0x340
  scsi_forget_host+0xf7/0x170
  scsi_remove_host+0xd2/0x2a0
  sdebug_driver_remove+0x52/0x2f0 [scsi_debug]
  ? kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0xc0/0xf0
  device_release_driver_internal+0x368/0x520
  ? kobject_put+0x5d/0x4a0
  bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0
  device_del+0x3bd/0x9c0
  ? __pfx_device_del+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx___mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x10/0x10
  device_unregister+0x13/0xa0
  sdebug_do_remove_host+0x1fb/0x290 [scsi_debug]
  scsi_debug_exit+0x17/0x70 [scsi_debug]
  __do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x321/0x520
  ? __pfx___do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx_slab_free_after_rcu_debug+0x10/0x10
  ? kasan_save_stack+0x2c/0x50
  ? kasan_record_aux_stack+0xa3/0xb0
  ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0xc4/0xfb0
  ? kmem_cache_free+0x3a0/0x590
  ? __x64_sys_close+0x78/0xd0
  do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180
  ? lock_is_held_type+0xd5/0x130
  ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x3c0/0xfb0
  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100
  ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x3c0/0xfb0
  ? __pfx___call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x10/0x10
  ? kmem_cache_free+0x3a0/0x590
  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x16d/0x400
  ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100
  ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
  ? __pfx___x64_sys_openat+0x10/0x10
  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x16d/0x400
  ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100
  ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
 RIP: 0033:0x7f436712b68b
 RSP: 002b:00007ffe9f1a8658 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005559b367fd80 RCX: 00007f436712b68b
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 00005559b367fde8
 RBP: 00007ffe9f1a8680 R08: 1999999999999999 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: 00007f43671a5fe0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007ffe9f1a86b0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
  </TASK>

Reported-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 6.13+
Tested-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota <naohiro.aota@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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3 participants