Skip to content
New issue

Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.

By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.

Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account

[5.4] Track PF uksmd patches #5

Closed
wants to merge 2,115 commits into from
Closed

[5.4] Track PF uksmd patches #5

wants to merge 2,115 commits into from

Conversation

kakra
Copy link
Owner

@kakra kakra commented Oct 29, 2020

No description provided.

tehcaster and others added 30 commits January 23, 2020 08:22
commit 8e57f8a upstream.

Commit 96a2b03 ("mm, debug_pagelloc: use static keys to enable
debugging") has introduced a static key to reduce overhead when
debug_pagealloc is compiled in but not enabled.  It relied on the
assumption that jump_label_init() is called before parse_early_param()
as in start_kernel(), so when the "debug_pagealloc=on" option is parsed,
it is safe to enable the static key.

However, it turns out multiple architectures call parse_early_param()
earlier from their setup_arch().  x86 also calls jump_label_init() even
earlier, so no issue was found while testing the commit, but same is not
true for e.g.  ppc64 and s390 where the kernel would not boot with
debug_pagealloc=on as found by our QA.

To fix this without tricky changes to init code of multiple
architectures, this patch partially reverts the static key conversion
from 96a2b03.  Init-time and non-fastpath calls (such as in arch
code) of debug_pagealloc_enabled() will again test a simple bool
variable.  Fastpath mm code is converted to a new
debug_pagealloc_enabled_static() variant that relies on the static key,
which is enabled in a well-defined point in mm_init() where it's
guaranteed that jump_label_init() has been called, regardless of
architecture.

[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: export _debug_pagealloc_enabled_early]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200106164944.063ac07b@canb.auug.org.au
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191219130612.23171-1-vbabka@suse.cz
Fixes: 96a2b03 ("mm, debug_pagelloc: use static keys to enable debugging")
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 045d396 ]

btrfs_unlink_subvol takes the name of the dentry and the root objectid
based on what kind of inode this is, either a real subvolume link or a
empty one that we inherited as a snapshot.  We need to fix how we unlink
in the case for BTRFS_EMPTY_SUBVOL_DIR_OBJECTID in the future, so rework
btrfs_unlink_subvol to just take the dentry and handle getting the right
objectid given the type of inode this is.  There is no functional change
here, simply pushing the work into btrfs_unlink_subvol() proper.

Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit d49d328 upstream.

If we have the following sequence of events

  btrfs sub create A
  btrfs sub create A/B
  btrfs sub snap A C
  mkdir C/foo
  mv A/B C/foo
  rm -rf *

We will end up with a transaction abort.

The reason for this is because we create a root ref for B pointing to A.
When we create a snapshot of C we still have B in our tree, but because
the root ref points to A and not C we will make it appear to be empty.

The problem happens when we move B into C.  This removes the root ref
for B pointing to A and adds a ref of B pointing to C.  When we rmdir C
we'll see that we have a ref to our root and remove the root ref,
despite not actually matching our reference name.

Now btrfs_del_root_ref() allowing this to work is a bug as well, however
we know that this inode does not actually point to a root ref in the
first place, so we shouldn't be calling btrfs_del_root_ref() in the
first place and instead simply look up our dir index for this item and
do the rest of the removal.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 423a716 upstream.

btrfs_del_root_ref() will simply WARN_ON() if the ref doesn't match in
any way, and then continue to delete the reference.  This shouldn't
happen, we have these values because there's more to the reference than
the original root and the sub root.  If any of these checks fail, return
-ENOENT.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6282675 upstream.

[BUG]
There are several different KASAN reports for balance + snapshot
workloads.  Involved call paths include:

   should_ignore_root+0x54/0xb0 [btrfs]
   build_backref_tree+0x11af/0x2280 [btrfs]
   relocate_tree_blocks+0x391/0xb80 [btrfs]
   relocate_block_group+0x3e5/0xa00 [btrfs]
   btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x240/0x4d0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x53/0xf0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_balance+0xc91/0x1840 [btrfs]
   btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x416/0x4e0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_ioctl+0x8af/0x3e60 [btrfs]
   do_vfs_ioctl+0x831/0xb10

   create_reloc_root+0x9f/0x460 [btrfs]
   btrfs_reloc_post_snapshot+0xff/0x6c0 [btrfs]
   create_pending_snapshot+0xa9b/0x15f0 [btrfs]
   create_pending_snapshots+0x111/0x140 [btrfs]
   btrfs_commit_transaction+0x7a6/0x1360 [btrfs]
   btrfs_mksubvol+0x915/0x960 [btrfs]
   btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_transid+0x1d5/0x1e0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0x1d3/0x270 [btrfs]
   btrfs_ioctl+0x241b/0x3e60 [btrfs]
   do_vfs_ioctl+0x831/0xb10

   btrfs_reloc_pre_snapshot+0x85/0xc0 [btrfs]
   create_pending_snapshot+0x209/0x15f0 [btrfs]
   create_pending_snapshots+0x111/0x140 [btrfs]
   btrfs_commit_transaction+0x7a6/0x1360 [btrfs]
   btrfs_mksubvol+0x915/0x960 [btrfs]
   btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_transid+0x1d5/0x1e0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0x1d3/0x270 [btrfs]
   btrfs_ioctl+0x241b/0x3e60 [btrfs]
   do_vfs_ioctl+0x831/0xb10

[CAUSE]
All these call sites are only relying on root->reloc_root, which can
undergo btrfs_drop_snapshot(), and since we don't have real refcount
based protection to reloc roots, we can reach already dropped reloc
root, triggering KASAN.

[FIX]
To avoid such access to unstable root->reloc_root, we should check
BTRFS_ROOT_DEAD_RELOC_TREE bit first.

This patch introduces wrappers that provide the correct way to check the
bit with memory barriers protection.

Most callers don't distinguish merged reloc tree and no reloc tree.  The
only exception is should_ignore_root(), as merged reloc tree can be
ignored, while no reloc tree shouldn't.

[CRITICAL SECTION ANALYSIS]
Although test_bit()/set_bit()/clear_bit() doesn't imply a barrier, the
DEAD_RELOC_TREE bit has extra help from transaction as a higher level
barrier, the lifespan of root::reloc_root and DEAD_RELOC_TREE bit are:

	NULL: reloc_root is NULL	PTR: reloc_root is not NULL
	0: DEAD_RELOC_ROOT bit not set	DEAD: DEAD_RELOC_ROOT bit set

	(NULL, 0)    Initial state		 __
	  |					 /\ Section A
        btrfs_init_reloc_root()			 \/
	  |				 	 __
	(PTR, 0)     reloc_root initialized      /\
          |					 |
	btrfs_update_reloc_root()		 |  Section B
          |					 |
	(PTR, DEAD)  reloc_root has been merged  \/
          |					 __
	=== btrfs_commit_transaction() ====================
	  |					 /\
	clean_dirty_subvols()			 |
	  |					 |  Section C
	(NULL, DEAD) reloc_root cleanup starts   \/
          |					 __
	btrfs_drop_snapshot()			 /\
	  |					 |  Section D
	(NULL, 0)    Back to initial state	 \/

Every have_reloc_root() or test_bit(DEAD_RELOC_ROOT) caller holds
transaction handle, so none of such caller can cross transaction boundary.

In Section A, every caller just found no DEAD bit, and grab reloc_root.

In the cross section A-B, caller may get no DEAD bit, but since reloc_root
is still completely valid thus accessing reloc_root is completely safe.

No test_bit() caller can cross the boundary of Section B and Section C.

In Section C, every caller found the DEAD bit, so no one will access
reloc_root.

In the cross section C-D, either caller gets the DEAD bit set, avoiding
access reloc_root no matter if it's safe or not.  Or caller get the DEAD
bit cleared, then access reloc_root, which is already NULL, nothing will
be wrong.

The memory write barriers are between the reloc_root updates and bit
set/clear, the pairing read side is before test_bit.

Reported-by: Zygo Blaxell <ce3g8jdj@umail.furryterror.org>
Fixes: d2311e6 ("btrfs: relocation: Delay reloc tree deletion after merge_reloc_roots")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ barriers ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 26ef849 upstream.

When running xfstests on the current btrfs I get the following splat from
kmemleak:

unreferenced object 0xffff88821b2404e0 (size 32):
  comm "kworker/u4:7", pid 26663, jiffies 4295283698 (age 8.776s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 ff fd 26 82 88 ff ff  ...........&....
    10 ff fd 26 82 88 ff ff 20 ff fd 26 82 88 ff ff  ...&.... ..&....
  backtrace:
    [<00000000f94fd43f>] ulist_alloc+0x25/0x60 [btrfs]
    [<00000000fd023d99>] btrfs_find_all_roots_safe+0x41/0x100 [btrfs]
    [<000000008f17bd32>] btrfs_find_all_roots+0x52/0x70 [btrfs]
    [<00000000b7660afb>] btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker+0x343/0x680 [btrfs]
    [<0000000058e66778>] btrfs_work_helper+0xac/0x1e0 [btrfs]
    [<00000000f0188930>] process_one_work+0x1cf/0x350
    [<00000000af5f2f8e>] worker_thread+0x28/0x3c0
    [<00000000b55a1add>] kthread+0x109/0x120
    [<00000000f88cbd17>] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40

This corresponds to:

  (gdb) l *(btrfs_find_all_roots_safe+0x41)
  0x8d7e1 is in btrfs_find_all_roots_safe (fs/btrfs/backref.c:1413).
  1408
  1409            tmp = ulist_alloc(GFP_NOFS);
  1410            if (!tmp)
  1411                    return -ENOMEM;
  1412            *roots = ulist_alloc(GFP_NOFS);
  1413            if (!*roots) {
  1414                    ulist_free(tmp);
  1415                    return -ENOMEM;
  1416            }
  1417

Following the lifetime of the allocated 'roots' ulist, it gets freed
again in btrfs_qgroup_account_extent().

But this does not happen if the function is called with the
'BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLED' flag cleared, then btrfs_qgroup_account_extent()
does a short leave and directly returns.

Instead of directly returning we should jump to the 'out_free' in order to
free all resources as expected.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
[ add comment ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b35cf1f upstream.

The fstest btrfs/154 reports

  [ 8675.381709] BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -28)
  [ 8675.383302] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 31900 at fs/btrfs/block-group.c:2038 btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x1e0/0x1f0 [btrfs]
  [ 8675.390925] CPU: 1 PID: 31900 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 5.5.0-rc6-default+ torvalds#935
  [ 8675.392780] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba527-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014
  [ 8675.395452] RIP: 0010:btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x1e0/0x1f0 [btrfs]
  [ 8675.402672] RSP: 0018:ffffb2090888fb00 EFLAGS: 00010286
  [ 8675.404413] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff92026dfa91c8 RCX: 0000000000000001
  [ 8675.406609] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8e100899 RDI: ffffffff8e100971
  [ 8675.408775] RBP: ffff920247c61660 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
  [ 8675.410978] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000ffffffe4
  [ 8675.412647] R13: ffff92026db74000 R14: ffff920247c616b8 R15: ffff92026dfbc000
  [ 8675.413994] FS:  00007fd5e57248c0(0000) GS:ffff92027d800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  [ 8675.416146] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  [ 8675.417833] CR2: 0000564aa51682d8 CR3: 000000006dcbc004 CR4: 0000000000160ee0
  [ 8675.419801] Call Trace:
  [ 8675.420742]  btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups+0x355/0x480 [btrfs]
  [ 8675.422600]  btrfs_commit_transaction+0xc8/0xaf0 [btrfs]
  [ 8675.424335]  reset_balance_state+0x14a/0x190 [btrfs]
  [ 8675.425824]  btrfs_balance.cold+0xe7/0x154 [btrfs]
  [ 8675.427313]  ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x235/0x2c0
  [ 8675.428663]  btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x298/0x350 [btrfs]
  [ 8675.430285]  btrfs_ioctl+0x466/0x2550 [btrfs]
  [ 8675.431788]  ? mem_cgroup_charge_statistics+0x51/0xf0
  [ 8675.433487]  ? mem_cgroup_commit_charge+0x56/0x400
  [ 8675.435122]  ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x4b/0xc0
  [ 8675.436618]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1f/0x30
  [ 8675.438093]  ? __handle_mm_fault+0x499/0x740
  [ 8675.439619]  ? do_vfs_ioctl+0x56e/0x770
  [ 8675.441034]  do_vfs_ioctl+0x56e/0x770
  [ 8675.442411]  ksys_ioctl+0x3a/0x70
  [ 8675.443718]  ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
  [ 8675.445333]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
  [ 8675.446705]  do_syscall_64+0x50/0x210
  [ 8675.448059]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
  [ 8675.479187] BTRFS: error (device vdb) in btrfs_create_pending_block_groups:2038: errno=-28 No space left

We now use btrfs_can_overcommit() to see if we can flip a block group
read only.  Before this would fail because we weren't taking into
account the usable un-allocated space for allocating chunks.  With my
patches we were allowed to do the balance, which is technically correct.

The test is trying to start balance on degraded mount.  So now we're
trying to allocate a chunk and cannot because we want to allocate a
RAID1 chunk, but there's only 1 device that's available for usage.  This
results in an ENOSPC.

But we shouldn't even be making it this far, we don't have enough
devices to restripe.  The problem is we're using btrfs_num_devices(),
that also includes missing devices. That's not actually what we want, we
need to use rw_devices.

The chunk_mutex is not needed here, rw_devices changes only in device
add, remove or replace, all are excluded by EXCL_OP mechanism.

Fixes: e4d8ec0 ("Btrfs: implement online profile changing")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ add stacktrace, update changelog, drop chunk_mutex ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5afe6ce upstream.

If scrub returns an error we are not copying back the scrub arguments
structure to user space. This prevents user space to know how much
progress scrub has done if an error happened - this includes -ECANCELED
which is returned when users ask for scrub to stop. A particular use
case, which is used in btrfs-progs, is to resume scrub after it is
canceled, in that case it relies on checking the progress from the scrub
arguments structure and then use that progress in a call to resume
scrub.

So fix this by always copying the scrub arguments structure to user
space, overwriting the value returned to user space with -EFAULT only if
copying the structure failed to let user space know that either that
copying did not happen, and therefore the structure is stale, or it
happened partially and the structure is probably not valid and corrupt
due to the partial copy.

Reported-by: Graham Cobb <g.btrfs@cobb.uk.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/d0a97688-78be-08de-ca7d-bcb4c7fb397e@cobb.uk.net/
Fixes: 06fe39a ("Btrfs: do not overwrite scrub error with fault error in scrub ioctl")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.1+
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Tested-by: Graham Cobb <g.btrfs@cobb.uk.net>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
…y section

commit 8068df3 upstream.

When we remove an early section, we don't free the usage map, as the
usage maps of other sections are placed into the same page.  Once the
section is removed, it is no longer an early section (especially, the
memmap is freed).  When we re-add that section, the usage map is reused,
however, it is no longer an early section.  When removing that section
again, we try to kfree() a usage map that was allocated during early
boot - bad.

Let's check against PageReserved() to see if we are dealing with an
usage map that was allocated during boot.  We could also check against
!(PageSlab(usage_page) || PageCompound(usage_page)), but PageReserved() is
cleaner.

Can be triggered using memtrace under ppc64/powernv:

  $ mount -t debugfs none /sys/kernel/debug/
  $ echo 0x20000000 > /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/memtrace/enable
  $ echo 0x20000000 > /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/memtrace/enable
   ------------[ cut here ]------------
   kernel BUG at mm/slub.c:3969!
   Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
   LE PAGE_SIZE=3D64K MMU=3DHash SMP NR_CPUS=3D2048 NUMA PowerNV
   Modules linked in:
   CPU: 0 PID: 154 Comm: sh Not tainted 5.5.0-rc2-next-20191216-00005-g0be1dba7b7c0 torvalds#61
   NIP kfree+0x338/0x3b0
   LR section_deactivate+0x138/0x200
   Call Trace:
     section_deactivate+0x138/0x200
     __remove_pages+0x114/0x150
     arch_remove_memory+0x3c/0x160
     try_remove_memory+0x114/0x1a0
     __remove_memory+0x20/0x40
     memtrace_enable_set+0x254/0x850
     simple_attr_write+0x138/0x160
     full_proxy_write+0x8c/0x110
     __vfs_write+0x38/0x70
     vfs_write+0x11c/0x2a0
     ksys_write+0x84/0x140
     system_call+0x5c/0x68
   ---[ end trace 4b053cbd84e0db62 ]---

The first invocation will offline+remove memory blocks.  The second
invocation will first add+online them again, in order to offline+remove
them again (usually we are lucky and the exact same memory blocks will
get "reallocated").

Tested on powernv with boot memory: The usage map will not get freed.
Tested on x86-64 with DIMMs: The usage map will get freed.

Using Dynamic Memory under a Power DLAPR can trigger it easily.

Triggering removal (I assume after previously removed+re-added) of
memory from the HMC GUI can crash the kernel with the same call trace
and is fixed by this patch.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191217104637.5509-1-david@redhat.com
Fixes: 326e1b8 ("mm/sparsemem: introduce a SECTION_IS_EARLY flag")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Pingfan Liu <piliu@redhat.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
…atio()

commit 6d9e8c6 upstream.

Patch series "use div64_ul() instead of div_u64() if the divisor is
unsigned long".

We were first inspired by commit b0ab99e ("sched: Fix possible divide
by zero in avg_atom () calculation"), then refer to the recently analyzed
mm code, we found this suspicious place.

 201                 if (min) {
 202                         min *= this_bw;
 203                         do_div(min, tot_bw);
 204                 }

And we also disassembled and confirmed it:

  /usr/src/debug/kernel-4.9.168-016.ali3000/linux-4.9.168-016.ali3000.alios7.x86_64/mm/page-writeback.c: 201
  0xffffffff811c37da <__wb_calc_thresh+234>:      xor    %r10d,%r10d
  0xffffffff811c37dd <__wb_calc_thresh+237>:      test   %rax,%rax
  0xffffffff811c37e0 <__wb_calc_thresh+240>:      je 0xffffffff811c3800 <__wb_calc_thresh+272>
  /usr/src/debug/kernel-4.9.168-016.ali3000/linux-4.9.168-016.ali3000.alios7.x86_64/mm/page-writeback.c: 202
  0xffffffff811c37e2 <__wb_calc_thresh+242>:      imul   %r8,%rax
  /usr/src/debug/kernel-4.9.168-016.ali3000/linux-4.9.168-016.ali3000.alios7.x86_64/mm/page-writeback.c: 203
  0xffffffff811c37e6 <__wb_calc_thresh+246>:      mov    %r9d,%r10d    ---> truncates it to 32 bits here
  0xffffffff811c37e9 <__wb_calc_thresh+249>:      xor    %edx,%edx
  0xffffffff811c37eb <__wb_calc_thresh+251>:      div    %r10
  0xffffffff811c37ee <__wb_calc_thresh+254>:      imul   %rbx,%rax
  0xffffffff811c37f2 <__wb_calc_thresh+258>:      shr    $0x2,%rax
  0xffffffff811c37f6 <__wb_calc_thresh+262>:      mul    %rcx
  0xffffffff811c37f9 <__wb_calc_thresh+265>:      shr    $0x2,%rdx
  0xffffffff811c37fd <__wb_calc_thresh+269>:      mov    %rdx,%r10

This series uses div64_ul() instead of div_u64() if the divisor is
unsigned long, to avoid truncation to 32-bit on 64-bit platforms.

This patch (of 3):

The variables 'min' and 'max' are unsigned long and do_div truncates
them to 32 bits, which means it can test non-zero and be truncated to
zero for division.  Fix this issue by using div64_ul() instead.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200102081442.8273-2-wenyang@linux.alibaba.com
Fixes: 693108a ("writeback: make bdi->min/max_ratio handling cgroup writeback aware")
Signed-off-by: Wen Yang <wenyang@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 554913f upstream.

Commit 99cb0db ("mm,thp: add read-only THP support for (non-shmem)
FS") introduced a new khugepaged scan result: SCAN_PAGE_HAS_PRIVATE, but
the corresponding description for trace events were not added.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1574793844-2914-1-git-send-email-yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com
Fixes: 99cb0db ("mm,thp: add read-only THP support for (non-shmem) FS")
Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4521de3 upstream.

The vdd3p0 LDO's input should be from external USB VBUS directly, NOT
PMIC's power supply, the vdd3p0 LDO's target output voltage can be
controlled by SW, and it requires input voltage to be high enough, with
incorrect power supply assigned, if the power supply's voltage is lower
than the LDO target output voltage, it will return fail and skip the LDO
voltage adjustment, so remove the power supply assignment for vdd3p0 to
avoid such scenario.

Fixes: 9338554 ("ARM: dts: imx6qdl-sabresd: Assign corresponding power supply for LDOs")
Signed-off-by: Anson Huang <Anson.Huang@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d4918eb upstream.

The vdd3p0 LDO's input should be from external USB VBUS directly, NOT
PMIC's power supply, the vdd3p0 LDO's target output voltage can be
controlled by SW, and it requires input voltage to be high enough, with
incorrect power supply assigned, if the power supply's voltage is lower
than the LDO target output voltage, it will return fail and skip the LDO
voltage adjustment, so remove the power supply assignment for vdd3p0 to
avoid such scenario.

Fixes: 37a4bde ("ARM: dts: imx6sx-sdb: Assign corresponding power supply for LDOs")
Signed-off-by: Anson Huang <Anson.Huang@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b4eb9ef upstream.

The vdd3p0 LDO's input should be from external USB VBUS directly, NOT
PMIC's power supply, the vdd3p0 LDO's target output voltage can be
controlled by SW, and it requires input voltage to be high enough, with
incorrect power supply assigned, if the power supply's voltage is lower
than the LDO target output voltage, it will return fail and skip the LDO
voltage adjustment, so remove the power supply assignment for vdd3p0 to
avoid such scenario.

Fixes: 3feea88 ("ARM: dts: imx6sl-evk: Assign corresponding power supply for LDOs")
Signed-off-by: Anson Huang <Anson.Huang@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3479b28 upstream.

The vdd3p0 LDO's input should be from external USB VBUS directly, NOT
PMIC's power supply, the vdd3p0 LDO's target output voltage can be
controlled by SW, and it requires input voltage to be high enough, with
incorrect power supply assigned, if the power supply's voltage is lower
than the LDO target output voltage, it will return fail and skip the LDO
voltage adjustment, so remove the power supply assignment for vdd3p0 to
avoid such scenario.

Fixes: 96a9169 ("ARM: dts: imx6sll-evk: Assign corresponding power supply for vdd3p0")
Signed-off-by: Anson Huang <Anson.Huang@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4a132f6 upstream.

The EDIMM STARTER KIT i.Core 1.5 MIPI Evaluation is based on
the 1.5 version of the i.Core MX6 cpu module. The 1.5 version
differs from the original one for a few details, including the
ethernet PHY interface clock provider.

With this commit, the ethernet interface works properly:
SMSC LAN8710/LAN8720 2188000.ethernet-1:00: attached PHY driver

While before using the 1.5 version, ethernet failed to startup
do to un-clocked PHY interface:
fec 2188000.ethernet eth0: could not attach to PHY

Similar fix has merged for i.Core MX6Q but missed to update for DL.

Fixes: a8039f2 ("ARM: dts: imx6dl: Add Engicam i.CoreM6 1.5 Quad/Dual MIPI starter kit support")
Cc: Jacopo Mondi <jacopo@jmondi.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Trimarchi <michael@amarulasolutions.com>
Signed-off-by: Jagan Teki <jagan@amarulasolutions.com>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4b0b97e upstream.

Turns out when introducing the eMMC version the gpmi node required for
NAND flash support got enabled exclusively on Colibri iMX7D 512MB.

Fixes: f928a4a ("ARM: dts: imx7: add Toradex Colibri iMX7D 1GB (eMMC) support")
Signed-off-by: Marcel Ziswiler <marcel.ziswiler@toradex.com>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8605131 upstream.

The 16KB RX Buffer must also be 16 byte aligned. Fix it.

Fixes: 7ac6653 ("stmmac: Move the STMicroelectronics driver")
Signed-off-by: Jose Abreu <Jose.Abreu@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b2f3a48 upstream.

XGMAC supports maximum MTU that can go to 16KB. Lets add this check in
the calculation of RX buffer size.

Fixes: 7ac6653 ("stmmac: Move the STMicroelectronics driver")
Signed-off-by: Jose Abreu <Jose.Abreu@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 723c001 upstream.

of_reset_control_array_get() and devm_reset_control_array_get() return
struct reset_control pointers, not internal struct reset_control_array
pointers, just like all other reset control API calls.

Correct the kerneldoc to match the code.

Fixes: 17c82e2 ("reset: Add APIs to manage array of resets")
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Signed-off-by: Philipp Zabel <p.zabel@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit dca4a17 upstream.

In commit c55c8ed ("tipc: smooth change between replicast and
broadcast"), we allow instant switching between replicast and broadcast
by sending a dummy 'SYN' packet on the last used link to synchronize
packets on the links. The 'SYN' message is an object of link congestion
also, so if that happens, a 'SOCK_WAKEUP' will be scheduled to be sent
back to the socket...
However, in that commit, we simply use the same socket 'cong_link_cnt'
counter for both the 'SYN' & normal payload message sending. Therefore,
if both the replicast & broadcast links are congested, the counter will
be not updated correctly but overwritten by the latter congestion.
Later on, when the 'SOCK_WAKEUP' messages are processed, the counter is
reduced one by one and eventually overflowed. Consequently, further
activities on the socket will only wait for the false congestion signal
to disappear but never been met.

Because sending the 'SYN' message is vital for the mechanism, it should
be done anyway. This commit fixes the issue by marking the message with
an error code e.g. 'TIPC_ERR_NO_PORT', so its sending should not face a
link congestion, there is no need to touch the socket 'cong_link_cnt'
either. In addition, in the event of any error (e.g. -ENOBUFS), we will
purge the entire payload message queue and make a return immediately.

Fixes: c55c8ed ("tipc: smooth change between replicast and broadcast")
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien <tuong.t.lien@dektech.com.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit abc9b4e upstream.

When a user message is sent, TIPC will check if the socket has faced a
congestion at link layer. If that happens, it will make a sleep to wait
for the congestion to disappear. This leaves a gap for other users to
take over the socket (e.g. multi threads) since the socket is released
as well. Also, in case of connectionless (e.g. SOCK_RDM), user is free
to send messages to various destinations (e.g. via 'sendto()'), then
the socket's preformatted header has to be updated correspondingly
prior to the actual payload message building.

Unfortunately, the latter action is done before the first action which
causes a condition issue that the destination of a certain message can
be modified incorrectly in the middle, leading to wrong destination
when that message is built. Consequently, when the message is sent to
the link layer, it gets stuck there forever because the peer node will
simply reject it. After a number of retransmission attempts, the link
is eventually taken down and the retransmission failure is reported.

This commit fixes the problem by rearranging the order of actions to
prevent the race condition from occurring, so the message building is
'atomic' and its header will not be modified by anyone.

Fixes: 365ad35 ("tipc: reduce risk of user starvation during link congestion")
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Tuong Lien <tuong.t.lien@dektech.com.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1f26c0d upstream.

Fix missing '*' kernel-doc notation that causes this warning:

../include/linux/netdevice.h:1779: warning: bad line:                                 spinlock

Fixes: ab92d68 ("net: core: add generic lockdep keys")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c44a4ed upstream.

This patch fixes the following sparse warnings:

block/bsg-lib.c:269:19: warning: incorrect type in initializer (different base types)
block/bsg-lib.c:269:19:    expected int sts
block/bsg-lib.c:269:19:    got restricted blk_status_t [usertype]
block/bsg-lib.c:286:16: warning: incorrect type in return expression (different base types)
block/bsg-lib.c:286:16:    expected restricted blk_status_t
block/bsg-lib.c:286:16:    got int [assigned] sts

Cc: Martin Wilck <mwilck@suse.com>
Fixes: d46fe2c ("block: drop device references in bsg_queue_rq()")
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 3b7c597 ]

read_current_link_settings_on_detect() on eDP 1.4+ may use the
edp_supported_link_rates table which is set up by
detect_edp_sink_caps(), so that function needs to be called first.

Reviewed-by: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Mario Kleiner <mario.kleiner.de@gmail.com>
Cc: Martin Leung <martin.leung@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 0af2ffc upstream.

Anatoly has been fuzzing with kBdysch harness and reported a hang in one
of the outcomes:

  0: R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
  0: (85) call bpf_get_socket_cookie#46
  1: R0_w=invP(id=0) R10=fp0
  1: (57) r0 &= 808464432
  2: R0_w=invP(id=0,umax_value=808464432,var_off=(0x0; 0x30303030)) R10=fp0
  2: (14) w0 -= 810299440
  3: R0_w=invP(id=0,umax_value=4294967295,var_off=(0xcf800000; 0x3077fff0)) R10=fp0
  3: (c4) w0 s>>= 1
  4: R0_w=invP(id=0,umin_value=1740636160,umax_value=2147221496,var_off=(0x67c00000; 0x183bfff8)) R10=fp0
  4: (76) if w0 s>= 0x30303030 goto pc+216
  221: R0_w=invP(id=0,umin_value=1740636160,umax_value=2147221496,var_off=(0x67c00000; 0x183bfff8)) R10=fp0
  221: (95) exit
  processed 6 insns (limit 1000000) [...]

Taking a closer look, the program was xlated as follows:

  # ./bpftool p d x i 12
  0: (85) call bpf_get_socket_cookie#7800896
  1: (bf) r6 = r0
  2: (57) r6 &= 808464432
  3: (14) w6 -= 810299440
  4: (c4) w6 s>>= 1
  5: (76) if w6 s>= 0x30303030 goto pc+216
  6: (05) goto pc-1
  7: (05) goto pc-1
  8: (05) goto pc-1
  [...]
  220: (05) goto pc-1
  221: (05) goto pc-1
  222: (95) exit

Meaning, the visible effect is very similar to f54c789 ("bpf: Fix
precision tracking for unbounded scalars"), that is, the fall-through
branch in the instruction 5 is considered to be never taken given the
conclusion from the min/max bounds tracking in w6, and therefore the
dead-code sanitation rewrites it as goto pc-1. However, real-life input
disagrees with verification analysis since a soft-lockup was observed.

The bug sits in the analysis of the ARSH. The definition is that we shift
the target register value right by K bits through shifting in copies of
its sign bit. In adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(), we do first coerce the
register into 32 bit mode, same happens after simulating the operation.
However, for the case of simulating the actual ARSH, we don't take the
mode into account and act as if it's always 64 bit, but location of sign
bit is different:

  dst_reg->smin_value >>= umin_val;
  dst_reg->smax_value >>= umin_val;
  dst_reg->var_off = tnum_arshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val);

Consider an unknown R0 where bpf_get_socket_cookie() (or others) would
for example return 0xffff. With the above ARSH simulation, we'd see the
following results:

  [...]
  1: R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R2_w=invP65535 R10=fp0
  1: (85) call bpf_get_socket_cookie#46
  2: R0_w=invP(id=0) R10=fp0
  2: (57) r0 &= 808464432
    -> R0_runtime = 0x3030
  3: R0_w=invP(id=0,umax_value=808464432,var_off=(0x0; 0x30303030)) R10=fp0
  3: (14) w0 -= 810299440
    -> R0_runtime = 0xcfb40000
  4: R0_w=invP(id=0,umax_value=4294967295,var_off=(0xcf800000; 0x3077fff0)) R10=fp0
                              (0xffffffff)
  4: (c4) w0 s>>= 1
    -> R0_runtime = 0xe7da0000
  5: R0_w=invP(id=0,umin_value=1740636160,umax_value=2147221496,var_off=(0x67c00000; 0x183bfff8)) R10=fp0
                              (0x67c00000)           (0x7ffbfff8)
  [...]

In insn 3, we have a runtime value of 0xcfb40000, which is '1100 1111 1011
0100 0000 0000 0000 0000', the result after the shift has 0xe7da0000 that
is '1110 0111 1101 1010 0000 0000 0000 0000', where the sign bit is correctly
retained in 32 bit mode. In insn4, the umax was 0xffffffff, and changed into
0x7ffbfff8 after the shift, that is, '0111 1111 1111 1011 1111 1111 1111 1000'
and means here that the simulation didn't retain the sign bit. With above
logic, the updates happen on the 64 bit min/max bounds and given we coerced
the register, the sign bits of the bounds are cleared as well, meaning, we
need to force the simulation into s32 space for 32 bit alu mode.

Verification after the fix below. We're first analyzing the fall-through branch
on 32 bit signed >= test eventually leading to rejection of the program in this
specific case:

  0: R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
  0: (b7) r2 = 808464432
  1: R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R2_w=invP808464432 R10=fp0
  1: (85) call bpf_get_socket_cookie#46
  2: R0_w=invP(id=0) R10=fp0
  2: (bf) r6 = r0
  3: R0_w=invP(id=0) R6_w=invP(id=0) R10=fp0
  3: (57) r6 &= 808464432
  4: R0_w=invP(id=0) R6_w=invP(id=0,umax_value=808464432,var_off=(0x0; 0x30303030)) R10=fp0
  4: (14) w6 -= 810299440
  5: R0_w=invP(id=0) R6_w=invP(id=0,umax_value=4294967295,var_off=(0xcf800000; 0x3077fff0)) R10=fp0
  5: (c4) w6 s>>= 1
  6: R0_w=invP(id=0) R6_w=invP(id=0,umin_value=3888119808,umax_value=4294705144,var_off=(0xe7c00000; 0x183bfff8)) R10=fp0
                                              (0x67c00000)          (0xfffbfff8)
  6: (76) if w6 s>= 0x30303030 goto pc+216
  7: R0_w=invP(id=0) R6_w=invP(id=0,umin_value=3888119808,umax_value=4294705144,var_off=(0xe7c00000; 0x183bfff8)) R10=fp0
  7: (30) r0 = *(u8 *)skb[808464432]
  BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] uses reserved fields
  processed 8 insns (limit 1000000) [...]

Fixes: 9cbe1f5 ("bpf/verifier: improve register value range tracking with ARSH")
Reported-by: Anatoly Trosinenko <anatoly.trosinenko@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200115204733.16648-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4da6a19 upstream.

When a sockmap is free'd and a socket in the map is enabled with tls
we tear down the bpf context on the socket, the psock struct and state,
and then call tcp_update_ulp(). The tcp_update_ulp() call is to inform
the tls stack it needs to update its saved sock ops so that when the tls
socket is later destroyed it doesn't try to call the now destroyed psock
hooks.

This is about keeping stacked ULPs in good shape so they always have
the right set of stacked ops.

However, recently unhash() hook was removed from TLS side. But, the
sockmap/bpf side is not doing any extra work to update the unhash op
when is torn down instead expecting TLS side to manage it. So both
TLS and sockmap believe the other side is managing the op and instead
no one updates the hook so it continues to point at tcp_bpf_unhash().
When unhash hook is called we call tcp_bpf_unhash() which detects the
psock has already been destroyed and calls sk->sk_prot_unhash() which
calls tcp_bpf_unhash() yet again and so on looping and hanging the core.

To fix have sockmap tear down logic fixup the stale pointer.

Fixes: 5d92e63 ("net/tls: partially revert fix transition through disconnect with close")
Reported-by: syzbot+83979935eb6304f8cd46@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200111061206.8028-2-john.fastabend@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7e81a35 upstream.

The sock_map_free() and sock_hash_free() paths used to delete sockmap
and sockhash maps walk the maps and destroy psock and bpf state associated
with the socks in the map. When done the socks no longer have BPF programs
attached and will function normally. This can happen while the socks in
the map are still "live" meaning data may be sent/received during the walk.

Currently, though we don't take the sock_lock when the psock and bpf state
is removed through this path. Specifically, this means we can be writing
into the ops structure pointers such as sendmsg, sendpage, recvmsg, etc.
while they are also being called from the networking side. This is not
safe, we never used proper READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE semantics here if we
believed it was safe. Further its not clear to me its even a good idea
to try and do this on "live" sockets while networking side might also
be using the socket. Instead of trying to reason about using the socks
from both sides lets realize that every use case I'm aware of rarely
deletes maps, in fact kubernetes/Cilium case builds map at init and
never tears it down except on errors. So lets do the simple fix and
grab sock lock.

This patch wraps sock deletes from maps in sock lock and adds some
annotations so we catch any other cases easier.

Fixes: 604326b ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface")
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200111061206.8028-3-john.fastabend@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 33bfe20 upstream.

When sockmap sock with TLS enabled is removed we cleanup bpf/psock state
and call tcp_update_ulp() to push updates to TLS ULP on top. However, we
don't push the write_space callback up and instead simply overwrite the
op with the psock stored previous op. This may or may not be correct so
to ensure we don't overwrite the TLS write space hook pass this field to
the ULP and have it fixup the ctx.

This completes a previous fix that pushed the ops through to the ULP
but at the time missed doing this for write_space, presumably because
write_space TLS hook was added around the same time.

Fixes: 95fa145 ("bpf: sockmap/tls, close can race with map free")
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Acked-by: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200111061206.8028-4-john.fastabend@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6562e29 upstream.

In the push, pull, and pop helpers operating on skmsg objects to make
data writable or insert/remove data we use this bounds check to ensure
specified data is valid,

 /* Bounds checks: start and pop must be inside message */
 if (start >= offset + l || last >= msg->sg.size)
     return -EINVAL;

The problem here is offset has already included the length of the
current element the 'l' above. So start could be past the end of
the scatterlist element in the case where start also points into an
offset on the last skmsg element.

To fix do the accounting slightly different by adding the length of
the previous entry to offset at the start of the iteration. And
ensure its initialized to zero so that the first iteration does
nothing.

Fixes: 604326b ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface")
Fixes: 6fff607 ("bpf: sk_msg program helper bpf_msg_push_data")
Fixes: 7246d8e ("bpf: helper to pop data from messages")
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200111061206.8028-5-john.fastabend@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
arndb and others added 8 commits January 26, 2020 10:01
[ Upstream commit 11e299d ]

gcc has a hard time tracking whether BUG_ON(1) ends
execution or not:

drivers/gpio/gpio-aspeed-sgpio.c: In function 'bank_reg':
drivers/gpio/gpio-aspeed-sgpio.c:112:1: error: control reaches end of non-void function [-Werror=return-type]

Use the simpler BUG() that gcc knows cannot continue.

Fixes: f8b410e ("gpio: aspeed-sgpio: Rename and add Kconfig/Makefile")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Andrew Jeffery <andrew@aj.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bgolaszewski@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 4f510aa ]

Commit 287422a ("drm/rockchip: Round up _before_ giving to the clock framework")
changed what rate clk_round_rate() is called with, an additional 999 Hz
added to the requsted mode clock. This has caused a regression on RK3328
and presumably also on RK3228 because the inno-hdmi-phy clock requires an
exact match of the requested rate in the pre pll config table.

When an exact match is not found the parent clock rate (24MHz) is returned
to the clk_round_rate() caller. This cause wrong pixel clock to be used and
result in no-signal when configuring a mode on RK3328.

Fix this by rounding the rate down to closest 1000 Hz in round_rate func,
this allows an exact match to be found in pre pll config table.

Fixes: 287422a ("drm/rockchip: Round up _before_ giving to the clock framework")
Signed-off-by: Jonas Karlman <jonas@kwiboo.se>
Signed-off-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kishon@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 5a769f6 ]

optee_shm_register() expected pages to be passed as an array of page
pointers rather than as an array of contiguous pages. So fix that via
correctly passing pages as per expectation.

Fixes: a249dd2 ("tee: optee: Fix dynamic shm pool allocations")
Reported-by: Vincent Cao <vincent.t.cao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Vincent Cao <vincent.t.cao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Move MADV_MERGEABLE part of ksm_madvise() into a dedicated helper since
it will be further used for marking VMAs to be merged forcibly.

This does not bring any functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@redhat.com>
Move MADV_UNMERGEABLE part of ksm_madvise() into a dedicated helper
since it will be further used for unmerging VMAs forcibly.

This does not bring any functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@redhat.com>
Present a per-process KSM knob to remotely mark anonymous
memory as mergeable.

To mark all the VMAs as mergeable, use:

   # echo merge > /proc/<pid>/ksm

To unmerge them, use:

   # echo unmerge > /proc/<pid>/ksm

Previously introduced ksm_madvise_*() helpers are used here.

Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@redhat.com>
Document respective /proc/<pid>/ksm knob.

Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@redhat.com>
@kakra kakra changed the title Tracking [5.4] Track PF uksmd patches Oct 29, 2020
@kakra kakra closed this Dec 31, 2020
kakra pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 31, 2021
commit 658a337 upstream.

For an LCU update a read unit address configuration IO is required.
This is started using sleep_on(), which has early exit paths in case the
device is not usable for IO. For example when it is in offline processing.

In those cases the LCU update should fail and not be retried.
Therefore lcu_update_work checks if EOPNOTSUPP is returned or not.

Commit 4199534 ("s390/dasd: fix endless loop after read unit address configuration")
accidentally removed the EOPNOTSUPP return code from
read_unit_address_configuration(), which in turn might lead to an endless
loop of the LCU update in offline processing.

Fix by returning EOPNOTSUPP again if the device is not able to perform the
request.

Fixes: 4199534 ("s390/dasd: fix endless loop after read unit address configuration")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org #5.3
Signed-off-by: Stefan Haberland <sth@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Hoeppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
kakra pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 31, 2021
[ Upstream commit d9e4498 ]

Like other tunneling interfaces, the bareudp doesn't need TXLOCK.
So, It is good to set the NETIF_F_LLTX flag to improve performance and
to avoid lockdep's false-positive warning.

Test commands:
    ip netns add A
    ip netns add B
    ip link add veth0 netns A type veth peer name veth1 netns B
    ip netns exec A ip link set veth0 up
    ip netns exec A ip a a 10.0.0.1/24 dev veth0
    ip netns exec B ip link set veth1 up
    ip netns exec B ip a a 10.0.0.2/24 dev veth1

    for i in {2..1}
    do
            let A=$i-1
            ip netns exec A ip link add bareudp$i type bareudp \
		    dstport $i ethertype ip
            ip netns exec A ip link set bareudp$i up
            ip netns exec A ip a a 10.0.$i.1/24 dev bareudp$i
            ip netns exec A ip r a 10.0.$i.2 encap ip src 10.0.$A.1 \
		    dst 10.0.$A.2 via 10.0.$i.2 dev bareudp$i

            ip netns exec B ip link add bareudp$i type bareudp \
		    dstport $i ethertype ip
            ip netns exec B ip link set bareudp$i up
            ip netns exec B ip a a 10.0.$i.2/24 dev bareudp$i
            ip netns exec B ip r a 10.0.$i.1 encap ip src 10.0.$A.2 \
		    dst 10.0.$A.1 via 10.0.$i.1 dev bareudp$i
    done
    ip netns exec A ping 10.0.2.2

Splat looks like:
[   96.992803][  T822] ============================================
[   96.993954][  T822] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[   96.995102][  T822] 5.10.0+ torvalds#819 Not tainted
[   96.995927][  T822] --------------------------------------------
[   96.997091][  T822] ping/822 is trying to acquire lock:
[   96.998083][  T822] ffff88810f753898 (_xmit_NONE#2){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f52/0x2960
[   96.999813][  T822]
[   96.999813][  T822] but task is already holding lock:
[   97.001192][  T822] ffff88810c385498 (_xmit_NONE#2){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f52/0x2960
[   97.002908][  T822]
[   97.002908][  T822] other info that might help us debug this:
[   97.004401][  T822]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[   97.004401][  T822]
[   97.005784][  T822]        CPU0
[   97.006407][  T822]        ----
[   97.007010][  T822]   lock(_xmit_NONE#2);
[   97.007779][  T822]   lock(_xmit_NONE#2);
[   97.008550][  T822]
[   97.008550][  T822]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[   97.008550][  T822]
[   97.010057][  T822]  May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[   97.010057][  T822]
[   97.011594][  T822] 7 locks held by ping/822:
[   97.012426][  T822]  #0: ffff888109a144f0 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: raw_sendmsg+0x12f7/0x2b00
[   97.014191][  T822]  #1: ffffffffbce2f5a0 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x249/0x2020
[   97.016045][  T822]  #2: ffffffffbce2f5a0 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x1fd/0x2960
[   97.017897][  T822]  #3: ffff88810c385498 (_xmit_NONE#2){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f52/0x2960
[   97.019684][  T822]  #4: ffffffffbce2f600 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: bareudp_xmit+0x31b/0x3690 [bareudp]
[   97.021573][  T822]  #5: ffffffffbce2f5a0 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x249/0x2020
[   97.023424][  T822]  #6: ffffffffbce2f5a0 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x1fd/0x2960
[   97.025259][  T822]
[   97.025259][  T822] stack backtrace:
[   97.026349][  T822] CPU: 3 PID: 822 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.10.0+ torvalds#819
[   97.027609][  T822] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[   97.029407][  T822] Call Trace:
[   97.030015][  T822]  dump_stack+0x99/0xcb
[   97.030783][  T822]  __lock_acquire.cold.77+0x149/0x3a9
[   97.031773][  T822]  ? stack_trace_save+0x81/0xa0
[   97.032661][  T822]  ? register_lock_class+0x1910/0x1910
[   97.033673][  T822]  ? register_lock_class+0x1910/0x1910
[   97.034679][  T822]  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x91/0xc0
[   97.035697][  T822]  ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xa0/0xa0
[   97.036690][  T822]  lock_acquire+0x1b2/0x730
[   97.037515][  T822]  ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f52/0x2960
[   97.038466][  T822]  ? check_flags+0x50/0x50
[   97.039277][  T822]  ? netif_skb_features+0x296/0x9c0
[   97.040226][  T822]  ? validate_xmit_skb+0x29/0xb10
[   97.041151][  T822]  _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x70
[   97.041977][  T822]  ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f52/0x2960
[   97.042927][  T822]  __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f52/0x2960
[   97.043852][  T822]  ? netdev_core_pick_tx+0x290/0x290
[   97.044824][  T822]  ? mark_held_locks+0xb7/0x120
[   97.045712][  T822]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x12c/0x3e0
[   97.046824][  T822]  ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa5/0xf0
[   97.047771][  T822]  ? ___neigh_create+0x12a8/0x1eb0
[   97.048710][  T822]  ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x41/0x120
[   97.049626][  T822]  ? ___neigh_create+0x12a8/0x1eb0
[   97.050556][  T822]  ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa5/0xf0
[   97.051509][  T822]  ? ___neigh_create+0x12a8/0x1eb0
[   97.052443][  T822]  ? check_chain_key+0x244/0x5f0
[   97.053352][  T822]  ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0x56/0xa0
[   97.054317][  T822]  ? ip_finish_output2+0x6ea/0x2020
[   97.055263][  T822]  ? pneigh_lookup+0x410/0x410
[   97.056135][  T822]  ip_finish_output2+0x6ea/0x2020
[ ... ]

Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
Fixes: 571912c ("net: UDP tunnel encapsulation module for tunnelling different protocols like MPLS, IP, NSH etc.")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201228152136.24215-1-ap420073@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
kakra pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 31, 2021
commit 3a21777 upstream.

We had kernel panic, it is caused by unload module and last
close confirmation.

call trace:
[1196029.743127]  free_sess+0x15/0x50 [rtrs_client]
[1196029.743128]  rtrs_clt_close+0x4c/0x70 [rtrs_client]
[1196029.743129]  ? rnbd_clt_unmap_device+0x1b0/0x1b0 [rnbd_client]
[1196029.743130]  close_rtrs+0x25/0x50 [rnbd_client]
[1196029.743131]  rnbd_client_exit+0x93/0xb99 [rnbd_client]
[1196029.743132]  __x64_sys_delete_module+0x190/0x260

And in the crashdump confirmation kworker is also running.
PID: 6943   TASK: ffff9e2ac8098000  CPU: 4   COMMAND: "kworker/4:2"
 #0 [ffffb206cf337c30] __schedule at ffffffff9f93f891
 #1 [ffffb206cf337cc8] schedule at ffffffff9f93fe98
 #2 [ffffb206cf337cd0] schedule_timeout at ffffffff9f943938
 #3 [ffffb206cf337d50] wait_for_completion at ffffffff9f9410a7
 #4 [ffffb206cf337da0] __flush_work at ffffffff9f08ce0e
 #5 [ffffb206cf337e20] rtrs_clt_close_conns at ffffffffc0d5f668 [rtrs_client]
 #6 [ffffb206cf337e48] rtrs_clt_close at ffffffffc0d5f801 [rtrs_client]
 #7 [ffffb206cf337e68] close_rtrs at ffffffffc0d26255 [rnbd_client]
 #8 [ffffb206cf337e78] free_sess at ffffffffc0d262ad [rnbd_client]
 #9 [ffffb206cf337e88] rnbd_clt_put_dev at ffffffffc0d266a7 [rnbd_client]

The problem is both code path try to close same session, which lead to
panic.

To fix it, just skip the sess if the refcount already drop to 0.

Fixes: f7a7a5c ("block/rnbd: client: main functionality")
Signed-off-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@cloud.ionos.com>
Reviewed-by: Gioh Kim <gi-oh.kim@cloud.ionos.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
kakra pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 5, 2021
commit 729e3a6 upstream.

The _DSM #5 method in the ACPI host bridge object tells us whether the OS
must preserve the resource assignments done by firmware. If this is the
case, we should not permit drivers to resize BARs on the fly. Make
pci_resize_resource() take this into account.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210109095353.13417-1-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org	# v5.4+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
kakra pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 5, 2021
[ Upstream commit 7df2871 ]

ath10k_debug_fw_stats_request just be called with conf_mutex held,
otherwise the following warning is seen when lock debugging is enabled:

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 793 at drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/debug.c:357 ath10k_debug_fw_stats_request+0x12c/0x133 [ath10k_core]
Modules linked in: snd_hda_codec_hdmi designware_i2s snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg snd_hda_codec i2c_piix4 snd_hwdep snd_hda_core acpi_als kfifo_buf industrialio snd_soc_max98357a snd_soc_adau7002 snd_soc_acp_da7219mx98357_mach snd_soc_da7219 acp_audio_dma ccm xt_MASQUERADE fuse ath10k_pci ath10k_core lzo_rle ath lzo_compress mac80211 zram cfg80211 r8152 mii joydev
CPU: 0 PID: 793 Comm: wpa_supplicant Tainted: G        W         5.10.9 #5
Hardware name: HP Grunt/Grunt, BIOS Google_Grunt.11031.104.0 09/05/2019
RIP: 0010:ath10k_debug_fw_stats_request+0x12c/0x133 [ath10k_core]
Code: 1e bb a1 ff ff ff 4c 89 ef 48 c7 c6 d3 31 2e c0 89 da 31 c0 e8 bd f8 ff ff 89 d8 eb 02 31 c0 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 <0f> 0b e9 04 ff ff ff 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 56 53 48 89 fb
RSP: 0018:ffffb2478099f7d0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9e432700cce0 RCX: 11c85cfd6b8e3b00
RDX: ffff9e432700cce0 RSI: ffff9e43127c5668 RDI: ffff9e4318deddf0
RBP: ffffb2478099f7f8 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 00000003fd7068cc
R10: ffffffffc01b2749 R11: ffffffffc029efaf R12: ffff9e432700c000
R13: ffff9e43127c33e0 R14: ffffb2478099f918 R15: ffff9e43127c33e0
FS:  00007f7ea48e2740(0000) GS:ffff9e432aa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000059aa799ddf38 CR3: 0000000118de2000 CR4: 00000000001506f0
Call Trace:
 ath10k_sta_statistics+0x4d/0x270 [ath10k_core]
 sta_set_sinfo+0x1be/0xaec [mac80211]
 ieee80211_get_station+0x58/0x76 [mac80211]
 rdev_get_station+0xf1/0x11e [cfg80211]
 nl80211_get_station+0x7f/0x146 [cfg80211]
 genl_rcv_msg+0x32e/0x35e
 ? nl80211_stop_ap+0x19/0x19 [cfg80211]
 ? nl80211_get_station+0x146/0x146 [cfg80211]
 ? genl_rcv+0x19/0x36
 ? genl_rcv+0x36/0x36
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x89/0xfb
 genl_rcv+0x28/0x36
 netlink_unicast+0x169/0x23b
 netlink_sendmsg+0x38a/0x402
 sock_sendmsg+0x72/0x76
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x153/0x1cc
 ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x5d/0x85
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x7c/0xb5
 ? lock_acquire+0x181/0x23d
 ? syscall_trace_enter+0x15e/0x160
 ? find_held_lock+0x3d/0xb2
 ? syscall_trace_enter+0x15e/0x160
 ? sched_clock_cpu+0x15/0xc6
 __sys_sendmsg+0x62/0x9a
 do_syscall_64+0x43/0x55
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Fixes: 4913e67 ("ath10k: enable rx duration report default for wmi tlv")
Signed-off-by: Anand K Mistry <amistry@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210202144033.1.I9e556f9fb1110d58c31d04a8a1293995fb8bb678@changeid
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
kakra pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 5, 2021
[ Upstream commit e6daa8f ]

  BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in _mlx4_ib_post_send+0x1bd2/0x2770 [mlx4_ib]
  Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880d5a7f980 by task kworker/0:1H/565

  CPU: 0 PID: 565 Comm: kworker/0:1H Tainted: G           O      5.4.84-storage #5.4.84-1+feature+linux+5.4.y+dbg+20201216.1319+b6b887b~deb10
  Hardware name: Supermicro H8QG6/H8QG6, BIOS 3.00       09/04/2012
  Workqueue: ib-comp-wq ib_cq_poll_work [ib_core]
  Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0x96/0xe0
   print_address_description.constprop.4+0x1f/0x300
   ? irq_work_claim+0x2e/0x50
   __kasan_report.cold.8+0x78/0x92
   ? _mlx4_ib_post_send+0x1bd2/0x2770 [mlx4_ib]
   kasan_report+0x10/0x20
   _mlx4_ib_post_send+0x1bd2/0x2770 [mlx4_ib]
   ? check_chain_key+0x1d7/0x2e0
   ? _mlx4_ib_post_recv+0x630/0x630 [mlx4_ib]
   ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x1a8/0x290
   ? stack_depot_save+0x218/0x56e
   ? do_profile_hits.isra.6.cold.13+0x1d/0x1d
   ? check_chain_key+0x1d7/0x2e0
   ? save_stack+0x4d/0x80
   ? save_stack+0x19/0x80
   ? __kasan_slab_free+0x125/0x170
   ? kfree+0xe7/0x3b0
   rdma_write_sg+0x5b0/0x950 [rtrs_server]

The problem is when we send imm_wr, the type should be ib_rdma_wr, so hw
driver like mlx4 can do rdma_wr(wr), so fix it by use the ib_rdma_wr as
type for imm_wr.

Fixes: 9cb8374 ("RDMA/rtrs: server: main functionality")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210212134525.103456-2-jinpu.wang@cloud.ionos.com
Signed-off-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@cloud.ionos.com>
Reviewed-by: Gioh Kim <gi-oh.kim@cloud.ionos.com>
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
kakra pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 5, 2021
[ Upstream commit c5c97ca ]

The ubsan reported the following error.  It was because sample's raw
data missed u32 padding at the end.  So it broke the alignment of the
array after it.

The raw data contains an u32 size prefix so the data size should have
an u32 padding after 8-byte aligned data.

27: Sample parsing  :util/synthetic-events.c:1539:4:
  runtime error: store to misaligned address 0x62100006b9bc for type
  '__u64' (aka 'unsigned long long'), which requires 8 byte alignment
0x62100006b9bc: note: pointer points here
  00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff  ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff  ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff  ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
              ^
    #0 0x561532a9fc96 in perf_event__synthesize_sample util/synthetic-events.c:1539:13
    #1 0x5615327f4a4f in do_test tests/sample-parsing.c:284:8
    #2 0x5615327f3f50 in test__sample_parsing tests/sample-parsing.c:381:9
    #3 0x56153279d3a1 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:424:9
    #4 0x56153279c836 in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:454:9
    #5 0x56153279b7eb in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:675:4
    #6 0x56153279abf0 in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:821:9
    #7 0x56153264e796 in run_builtin perf.c:312:11
    #8 0x56153264cf03 in handle_internal_command perf.c:364:8
    #9 0x56153264e47d in run_argv perf.c:408:2
    #10 0x56153264c9a9 in main perf.c:538:3
    #11 0x7f137ab6fbbc in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x38bbc)
    #12 0x561532596828 in _start ...

SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: misaligned-pointer-use
 util/synthetic-events.c:1539:4 in

Fixes: 045f8cd ("perf tests: Add a sample parsing test")
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210214091638.519643-1-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
kakra pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 5, 2021
commit a56f441 upstream.

In sdhci_esdhc_imx_remove() the SDHCI_INT_STATUS in read. Under some
circumstances, this may be done while the device is runtime suspended,
triggering the below splat.

Fix the problem by adding a pm_runtime_get_sync(), before reading the
register, which will turn on clocks etc making the device accessible again.

[ 1811.323148] mmc1: card aaaa removed
[ 1811.347483] Internal error: synchronous external abort: 96000210 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 1811.354988] Modules linked in: sdhci_esdhc_imx(-) sdhci_pltfm sdhci cqhci mmc_block mmc_core [last unloaded: mmc_core]
[ 1811.365726] CPU: 0 PID: 3464 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 5.10.1-sd-99871-g53835a2e8186 #5
[ 1811.373559] Hardware name: Freescale i.MX8DXL EVK (DT)
[ 1811.378705] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
[ 1811.384723] pc : sdhci_esdhc_imx_remove+0x28/0x15c [sdhci_esdhc_imx]
[ 1811.391090] lr : platform_drv_remove+0x2c/0x50
[ 1811.395536] sp : ffff800012c7bcb0
[ 1811.398855] x29: ffff800012c7bcb0 x28: ffff00002c72b900
[ 1811.404181] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000
[ 1811.409497] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000
[ 1811.414814] x23: ffff0000042b3890 x22: ffff800009127120
[ 1811.420131] x21: ffff00002c4c9580 x20: ffff0000042d0810
[ 1811.425456] x19: ffff0000042d0800 x18: 0000000000000020
[ 1811.430773] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1811.436089] x15: 0000000000000004 x14: ffff000004019c10
[ 1811.441406] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000020
[ 1811.446723] x11: 0101010101010101 x10: 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f
[ 1811.452040] x9 : fefefeff6364626d x8 : 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f
[ 1811.457356] x7 : 78725e6473607372 x6 : 0000000080808080
[ 1811.462673] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 1811.467990] x3 : ffff800011ac1cb0 x2 : 0000000000000000
[ 1811.473307] x1 : ffff8000091214d4 x0 : ffff8000133a0030
[ 1811.478624] Call trace:
[ 1811.481081]  sdhci_esdhc_imx_remove+0x28/0x15c [sdhci_esdhc_imx]
[ 1811.487098]  platform_drv_remove+0x2c/0x50
[ 1811.491198]  __device_release_driver+0x188/0x230
[ 1811.495818]  driver_detach+0xc0/0x14c
[ 1811.499487]  bus_remove_driver+0x5c/0xb0
[ 1811.503413]  driver_unregister+0x30/0x60
[ 1811.507341]  platform_driver_unregister+0x14/0x20
[ 1811.512048]  sdhci_esdhc_imx_driver_exit+0x1c/0x3a8 [sdhci_esdhc_imx]
[ 1811.518495]  __arm64_sys_delete_module+0x19c/0x230
[ 1811.523291]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x78/0x1a0
[ 1811.528086]  do_el0_svc+0x24/0x90
[ 1811.531405]  el0_svc+0x14/0x20
[ 1811.534461]  el0_sync_handler+0x1a4/0x1b0
[ 1811.538474]  el0_sync+0x174/0x180
[ 1811.541801] Code: a9025bf5 f9403e95 f9400ea0 9100c000 (b9400000)
[ 1811.547902] ---[ end trace 3fb1a3bd48ff7be5 ]---

Signed-off-by: Frank Li <Frank.Li@nxp.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.0+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210210181933.29263-1-Frank.Li@nxp.com
[Ulf: Clarified the commit message a bit]
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
kakra pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 5, 2021
commit ee576c4 upstream.

The icmp{,v6}_send functions make all sorts of use of skb->cb, casting
it with IPCB or IP6CB, assuming the skb to have come directly from the
inet layer. But when the packet comes from the ndo layer, especially
when forwarded, there's no telling what might be in skb->cb at that
point. As a result, the icmp sending code risks reading bogus memory
contents, which can result in nasty stack overflows such as this one
reported by a user:

    panic+0x108/0x2ea
    __stack_chk_fail+0x14/0x20
    __icmp_send+0x5bd/0x5c0
    icmp_ndo_send+0x148/0x160

In icmp_send, skb->cb is cast with IPCB and an ip_options struct is read
from it. The optlen parameter there is of particular note, as it can
induce writes beyond bounds. There are quite a few ways that can happen
in __ip_options_echo. For example:

    // sptr/skb are attacker-controlled skb bytes
    sptr = skb_network_header(skb);
    // dptr/dopt points to stack memory allocated by __icmp_send
    dptr = dopt->__data;
    // sopt is the corrupt skb->cb in question
    if (sopt->rr) {
        optlen  = sptr[sopt->rr+1]; // corrupt skb->cb + skb->data
        soffset = sptr[sopt->rr+2]; // corrupt skb->cb + skb->data
	// this now writes potentially attacker-controlled data, over
	// flowing the stack:
        memcpy(dptr, sptr+sopt->rr, optlen);
    }

In the icmpv6_send case, the story is similar, but not as dire, as only
IP6CB(skb)->iif and IP6CB(skb)->dsthao are used. The dsthao case is
worse than the iif case, but it is passed to ipv6_find_tlv, which does
a bit of bounds checking on the value.

This is easy to simulate by doing a `memset(skb->cb, 0x41,
sizeof(skb->cb));` before calling icmp{,v6}_ndo_send, and it's only by
good fortune and the rarity of icmp sending from that context that we've
avoided reports like this until now. For example, in KASAN:

    BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo+0xa0e/0x12b0
    Write of size 38 at addr ffff888006f1f80e by task ping/89
    CPU: 2 PID: 89 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.10.0-rc7-debug+ #5
    Call Trace:
     dump_stack+0x9a/0xcc
     print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1a/0x160
     __kasan_report.cold+0x20/0x38
     kasan_report+0x32/0x40
     check_memory_region+0x145/0x1a0
     memcpy+0x39/0x60
     __ip_options_echo+0xa0e/0x12b0
     __icmp_send+0x744/0x1700

Actually, out of the 4 drivers that do this, only gtp zeroed the cb for
the v4 case, while the rest did not. So this commit actually removes the
gtp-specific zeroing, while putting the code where it belongs in the
shared infrastructure of icmp{,v6}_ndo_send.

This commit fixes the issue by passing an empty IPCB or IP6CB along to
the functions that actually do the work. For the icmp_send, this was
already trivial, thanks to __icmp_send providing the plumbing function.
For icmpv6_send, this required a tiny bit of refactoring to make it
behave like the v4 case, after which it was straight forward.

Fixes: a2b78e9 ("sunvnet: generate ICMP PTMUD messages for smaller port MTUs")
Reported-by: SinYu <liuxyon@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAF=yD-LOF116aHub6RMe8vB8ZpnrrnoTdqhobEx+bvoA8AsP0w@mail.gmail.com/T/
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210223131858.72082-1-Jason@zx2c4.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
kakra pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 22, 2021
[ Upstream commit 6980d13 ]

Geethika reported a trace when doing a dlpar CPU add.

------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 152 PID: 1134 at kernel/sched/topology.c:2057
CPU: 152 PID: 1134 Comm: kworker/152:1 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc5-master #5
Workqueue: events cpuset_hotplug_workfn
NIP:  c0000000001cfc14 LR: c0000000001cfc10 CTR: c0000000007e3420
REGS: c0000034a08eb260 TRAP: 0700   Not tainted  (5.12.0-rc5-master+)
MSR:  8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 28828422  XER: 00000020
CFAR: c0000000001fd888 IRQMASK: 0 #012GPR00: c0000000001cfc10
c0000034a08eb500 c000000001f35400 0000000000000027 #012GPR04:
c0000035abaa8010 c0000035abb30a00 0000000000000027 c0000035abaa8018
#012GPR08: 0000000000000023 c0000035abaaef48 00000035aa540000
c0000035a49dffe8 #012GPR12: 0000000028828424 c0000035bf1a1c80
0000000000000497 0000000000000004 #012GPR16: c00000000347a258
0000000000000140 c00000000203d468 c000000001a1a490 #012GPR20:
c000000001f9c160 c0000034adf70920 c0000034aec9fd20 0000000100087bd3
#012GPR24: 0000000100087bd3 c0000035b3de09f8 0000000000000030
c0000035b3de09f8 #012GPR28: 0000000000000028 c00000000347a280
c0000034aefe0b00 c0000000010a2a68
NIP [c0000000001cfc14] build_sched_domains+0x6a4/0x1500
LR [c0000000001cfc10] build_sched_domains+0x6a0/0x1500
Call Trace:
[c0000034a08eb500] [c0000000001cfc10] build_sched_domains+0x6a0/0x1500 (unreliable)
[c0000034a08eb640] [c0000000001d1e6c] partition_sched_domains_locked+0x3ec/0x530
[c0000034a08eb6e0] [c0000000002936d4] rebuild_sched_domains_locked+0x524/0xbf0
[c0000034a08eb7e0] [c000000000296bb0] rebuild_sched_domains+0x40/0x70
[c0000034a08eb810] [c000000000296e74] cpuset_hotplug_workfn+0x294/0xe20
[c0000034a08ebc30] [c000000000178dd0] process_one_work+0x300/0x670
[c0000034a08ebd10] [c0000000001791b8] worker_thread+0x78/0x520
[c0000034a08ebda0] [c000000000185090] kthread+0x1a0/0x1b0
[c0000034a08ebe10] [c00000000000ccec] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x70
Instruction dump:
7d2903a6 4e800421 e8410018 7f67db78 7fe6fb78 7f45d378 7f84e378 7c681b78
3c62ff1a 3863c6f8 4802dc35 60000000 <0fe00000> 3920fff4 f9210070 e86100a0
---[ end trace 532d9066d3d4d7ec ]---

Some of the per-CPU masks use cpu_cpu_mask as a filter to limit the search
for related CPUs. On a dlpar add of a CPU, update cpu_cpu_mask before
updating the per-CPU masks. This will ensure the cpu_cpu_mask is updated
correctly before its used in setting the masks. Setting the numa_node will
ensure that when cpu_cpu_mask() gets called, the correct node number is
used. This code movement helped fix the above call trace.

Reported-by: Geetika Moolchandani <Geetika.Moolchandani1@ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210401154200.150077-1-srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
kakra pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 22, 2021
commit 1d5e464 upstream.

Commit 4af22de ("arc: fix memory initialization for systems
with two memory banks") fixed highmem, but for the PAE case it causes
bug messages:

| BUG: Bad page state in process swapper  pfn:80000
| page:(ptrval) refcount:0 mapcount:1 mapping:00000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x80000 flags: 0x0()
| raw: 00000000 00000100 00000122 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
| raw: 00000000
| page dumped because: nonzero mapcount
| Modules linked in:
| CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.12.0-rc5-00003-g1e43c377a79f #1

This is because the fix expects highmem to be always less than
lowmem and uses min_low_pfn as an upper zone border for highmem.

max_high_pfn should be ok for both highmem and highmem+PAE cases.

Fixes: 4af22de ("arc: fix memory initialization for systems with two memory banks")
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Isaev <isaev@synopsys.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org  #5.8 onwards
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
kakra pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 3, 2021
…xtent

[ Upstream commit 6416954 ]

When cloning an inline extent there are a few cases, such as when we have
an implicit hole at file offset 0, where we start a transaction while
holding a read lock on a leaf. Starting the transaction results in a call
to sb_start_intwrite(), which results in doing a read lock on a percpu
semaphore. Lockdep doesn't like this and complains about it:

  [46.580704] ======================================================
  [46.580752] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
  [46.580799] 5.13.0-rc1 #28 Not tainted
  [46.580832] ------------------------------------------------------
  [46.580877] cloner/3835 is trying to acquire lock:
  [46.580918] c00000001301d638 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: clone_copy_inline_extent+0xe4/0x5a0
  [46.581167]
  [46.581167] but task is already holding lock:
  [46.581217] c000000007fa2550 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x70/0x1d0
  [46.581293]
  [46.581293] which lock already depends on the new lock.
  [46.581293]
  [46.581351]
  [46.581351] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
  [46.581410]
  [46.581410] -> #1 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}:
  [46.581464]        down_read_nested+0x68/0x200
  [46.581536]        __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x70/0x1d0
  [46.581577]        btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x88/0x200
  [46.581623]        btrfs_search_slot+0x298/0xb70
  [46.581665]        btrfs_set_inode_index+0xfc/0x260
  [46.581708]        btrfs_new_inode+0x26c/0x950
  [46.581749]        btrfs_create+0xf4/0x2b0
  [46.581782]        lookup_open.isra.57+0x55c/0x6a0
  [46.581855]        path_openat+0x418/0xd20
  [46.581888]        do_filp_open+0x9c/0x130
  [46.581920]        do_sys_openat2+0x2ec/0x430
  [46.581961]        do_sys_open+0x90/0xc0
  [46.581993]        system_call_exception+0x3d4/0x410
  [46.582037]        system_call_common+0xec/0x278
  [46.582078]
  [46.582078] -> #0 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}:
  [46.582135]        __lock_acquire+0x1e90/0x2c50
  [46.582176]        lock_acquire+0x2b4/0x5b0
  [46.582263]        start_transaction+0x3cc/0x950
  [46.582308]        clone_copy_inline_extent+0xe4/0x5a0
  [46.582353]        btrfs_clone+0x5fc/0x880
  [46.582388]        btrfs_clone_files+0xd8/0x1c0
  [46.582434]        btrfs_remap_file_range+0x3d8/0x590
  [46.582481]        do_clone_file_range+0x10c/0x270
  [46.582558]        vfs_clone_file_range+0x1b0/0x310
  [46.582605]        ioctl_file_clone+0x90/0x130
  [46.582651]        do_vfs_ioctl+0x874/0x1ac0
  [46.582697]        sys_ioctl+0x6c/0x120
  [46.582733]        system_call_exception+0x3d4/0x410
  [46.582777]        system_call_common+0xec/0x278
  [46.582822]
  [46.582822] other info that might help us debug this:
  [46.582822]
  [46.582888]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
  [46.582888]
  [46.582942]        CPU0                    CPU1
  [46.582984]        ----                    ----
  [46.583028]   lock(btrfs-tree-00);
  [46.583062]                                lock(sb_internal#2);
  [46.583119]                                lock(btrfs-tree-00);
  [46.583174]   lock(sb_internal#2);
  [46.583212]
  [46.583212]  *** DEADLOCK ***
  [46.583212]
  [46.583266] 6 locks held by cloner/3835:
  [46.583299]  #0: c00000001301d448 (sb_writers#12){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ioctl_file_clone+0x90/0x130
  [46.583382]  #1: c00000000f6d3768 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#15){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_two_nondirectories+0x58/0xc0
  [46.583477]  #2: c00000000f6d72a8 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#15/4){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_two_nondirectories+0x9c/0xc0
  [46.583574]  #3: c00000000f6d7138 (&ei->i_mmap_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_remap_file_range+0xd0/0x590
  [46.583657]  #4: c00000000f6d35f8 (&ei->i_mmap_lock/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_remap_file_range+0xe0/0x590
  [46.583743]  #5: c000000007fa2550 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x70/0x1d0
  [46.583828]
  [46.583828] stack backtrace:
  [46.583872] CPU: 1 PID: 3835 Comm: cloner Not tainted 5.13.0-rc1 #28
  [46.583931] Call Trace:
  [46.583955] [c0000000167c7200] [c000000000c1ee78] dump_stack+0xec/0x144 (unreliable)
  [46.584052] [c0000000167c7240] [c000000000274058] print_circular_bug.isra.32+0x3a8/0x400
  [46.584123] [c0000000167c72e0] [c0000000002741f4] check_noncircular+0x144/0x190
  [46.584191] [c0000000167c73b0] [c000000000278fc0] __lock_acquire+0x1e90/0x2c50
  [46.584259] [c0000000167c74f0] [c00000000027aa94] lock_acquire+0x2b4/0x5b0
  [46.584317] [c0000000167c75e0] [c000000000a0d6cc] start_transaction+0x3cc/0x950
  [46.584388] [c0000000167c7690] [c000000000af47a4] clone_copy_inline_extent+0xe4/0x5a0
  [46.584457] [c0000000167c77c0] [c000000000af525c] btrfs_clone+0x5fc/0x880
  [46.584514] [c0000000167c7990] [c000000000af5698] btrfs_clone_files+0xd8/0x1c0
  [46.584583] [c0000000167c7a00] [c000000000af5b58] btrfs_remap_file_range+0x3d8/0x590
  [46.584652] [c0000000167c7ae0] [c0000000005d81dc] do_clone_file_range+0x10c/0x270
  [46.584722] [c0000000167c7b40] [c0000000005d84f0] vfs_clone_file_range+0x1b0/0x310
  [46.584793] [c0000000167c7bb0] [c00000000058bf80] ioctl_file_clone+0x90/0x130
  [46.584861] [c0000000167c7c10] [c00000000058c894] do_vfs_ioctl+0x874/0x1ac0
  [46.584922] [c0000000167c7d10] [c00000000058db4c] sys_ioctl+0x6c/0x120
  [46.584978] [c0000000167c7d60] [c0000000000364a4] system_call_exception+0x3d4/0x410
  [46.585046] [c0000000167c7e10] [c00000000000d45c] system_call_common+0xec/0x278
  [46.585114] --- interrupt: c00 at 0x7ffff7e22990
  [46.585160] NIP:  00007ffff7e22990 LR: 00000001000010ec CTR: 0000000000000000
  [46.585224] REGS: c0000000167c7e80 TRAP: 0c00   Not tainted  (5.13.0-rc1)
  [46.585280] MSR:  800000000280f033 <SF,VEC,VSX,EE,PR,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 28000244  XER: 00000000
  [46.585374] IRQMASK: 0
  [46.585374] GPR00: 0000000000000036 00007fffffffdec0 00007ffff7f17100 0000000000000004
  [46.585374] GPR04: 000000008020940d 00007fffffffdf40 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  [46.585374] GPR08: 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  [46.585374] GPR12: 0000000000000000 00007ffff7ffa940 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  [46.585374] GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  [46.585374] GPR20: 0000000000000000 000000009123683e 00007fffffffdf40 0000000000000000
  [46.585374] GPR24: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000004
  [46.585374] GPR28: 0000000100030260 0000000100030280 0000000000000003 000000000000005f
  [46.585919] NIP [00007ffff7e22990] 0x7ffff7e22990
  [46.585964] LR [00000001000010ec] 0x1000010ec
  [46.586010] --- interrupt: c00

This should be a false positive, as both locks are acquired in read mode.
Nevertheless, we don't need to hold a leaf locked when we start the
transaction, so just release the leaf (path) before starting it.

Reported-by: Ritesh Harjani <riteshh@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/20210513214404.xks77p566fglzgum@riteshh-domain/
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
kakra pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 24, 2021
…ble pull

commit 8b3bdd9 upstream.

On remote cable pull, a zfcp_port keeps its status and only gets
ZFCP_STATUS_PORT_LINK_TEST added. Only after an ADISC timeout, we would
actually start port recovery and remove ZFCP_STATUS_COMMON_UNBLOCKED which
zfcp_sysfs_port_fc_security_show() detected and reported as "unknown"
instead of the old and possibly stale zfcp_port->connection_info.

Add check for ZFCP_STATUS_PORT_LINK_TEST for timely "unknown" report.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210702160922.2667874-1-maier@linux.ibm.com
Fixes: a17c784 ("scsi: zfcp: report FC Endpoint Security in sysfs")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #5.7+
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Block <bblock@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Maier <maier@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
kakra pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 31, 2022
[ Upstream commit af68656 ]

While handling PCI errors (AER flow) driver tries to
disable NAPI [napi_disable()] after NAPI is deleted
[__netif_napi_del()] which causes unexpected system
hang/crash.

System message log shows the following:
=======================================
[ 3222.537510] EEH: Detected PCI bus error on PHB#384-PE#800000 [ 3222.537511] EEH: This PCI device has failed 2 times in the last hour and will be permanently disabled after 5 failures.
[ 3222.537512] EEH: Notify device drivers to shutdown [ 3222.537513] EEH: Beginning: 'error_detected(IO frozen)'
[ 3222.537514] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): Invoking
bnx2x->error_detected(IO frozen)
[ 3222.537516] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_error_detected:14236(eth14)]IO error detected [ 3222.537650] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): bnx2x driver reports:
'need reset'
[ 3222.537651] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.1): Invoking
bnx2x->error_detected(IO frozen)
[ 3222.537651] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_error_detected:14236(eth13)]IO error detected [ 3222.537729] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.1): bnx2x driver reports:
'need reset'
[ 3222.537729] EEH: Finished:'error_detected(IO frozen)' with aggregate recovery state:'need reset'
[ 3222.537890] EEH: Collect temporary log [ 3222.583481] EEH: of node=0384:80:00.0 [ 3222.583519] EEH: PCI device/vendor: 168e14e4 [ 3222.583557] EEH: PCI cmd/status register: 00100140 [ 3222.583557] EEH: PCI-E capabilities and status follow:
[ 3222.583744] EEH: PCI-E 00: 00020010 012c8da2 00095d5e 00455c82 [ 3222.583892] EEH: PCI-E 10: 10820000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.583893] EEH: PCI-E 20: 00000000 [ 3222.583893] EEH: PCI-E AER capability register set follows:
[ 3222.584079] EEH: PCI-E AER 00: 13c10001 00000000 00000000 00062030 [ 3222.584230] EEH: PCI-E AER 10: 00002000 000031c0 000001e0 00000000 [ 3222.584378] EEH: PCI-E AER 20: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584416] EEH: PCI-E AER 30: 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584416] EEH: of node=0384:80:00.1 [ 3222.584454] EEH: PCI device/vendor: 168e14e4 [ 3222.584491] EEH: PCI cmd/status register: 00100140 [ 3222.584492] EEH: PCI-E capabilities and status follow:
[ 3222.584677] EEH: PCI-E 00: 00020010 012c8da2 00095d5e 00455c82 [ 3222.584825] EEH: PCI-E 10: 10820000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584826] EEH: PCI-E 20: 00000000 [ 3222.584826] EEH: PCI-E AER capability register set follows:
[ 3222.585011] EEH: PCI-E AER 00: 13c10001 00000000 00000000 00062030 [ 3222.585160] EEH: PCI-E AER 10: 00002000 000031c0 000001e0 00000000 [ 3222.585309] EEH: PCI-E AER 20: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.585347] EEH: PCI-E AER 30: 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.586872] RTAS: event: 5, Type: Platform Error (224), Severity: 2 [ 3222.586873] EEH: Reset without hotplug activity [ 3224.762767] EEH: Beginning: 'slot_reset'
[ 3224.762770] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): Invoking
bnx2x->slot_reset()
[ 3224.762771] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14271(eth14)]IO slot reset initializing...
[ 3224.762887] bnx2x 0384:80:00.0: enabling device (0140 -> 0142) [ 3224.768157] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14287(eth14)]IO slot reset
--> driver unload

Uninterruptible tasks
=====================
crash> ps | grep UN
     213      2  11  c000000004c89e00  UN   0.0       0      0  [eehd]
     215      2   0  c000000004c80000  UN   0.0       0      0
[kworker/0:2]
    2196      1  28  c000000004504f00  UN   0.1   15936  11136  wickedd
    4287      1   9  c00000020d076800  UN   0.0    4032   3008  agetty
    4289      1  20  c00000020d056680  UN   0.0    7232   3840  agetty
   32423      2  26  c00000020038c580  UN   0.0       0      0
[kworker/26:3]
   32871   4241  27  c0000002609ddd00  UN   0.1   18624  11648  sshd
   32920  10130  16  c00000027284a100  UN   0.1   48512  12608  sendmail
   33092  32987   0  c000000205218b00  UN   0.1   48512  12608  sendmail
   33154   4567  16  c000000260e51780  UN   0.1   48832  12864  pickup
   33209   4241  36  c000000270cb6500  UN   0.1   18624  11712  sshd
   33473  33283   0  c000000205211480  UN   0.1   48512  12672  sendmail
   33531   4241  37  c00000023c902780  UN   0.1   18624  11648  sshd

EEH handler hung while bnx2x sleeping and holding RTNL lock
===========================================================
crash> bt 213
PID: 213    TASK: c000000004c89e00  CPU: 11  COMMAND: "eehd"
  #0 [c000000004d477e0] __schedule at c000000000c70808
  #1 [c000000004d478b0] schedule at c000000000c70ee0
  #2 [c000000004d478e0] schedule_timeout at c000000000c76dec
  #3 [c000000004d479c0] msleep at c0000000002120cc
  #4 [c000000004d479f0] napi_disable at c000000000a06448
                                        ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
  #5 [c000000004d47a30] bnx2x_netif_stop at c0080000018dba94 [bnx2x]
  #6 [c000000004d47a60] bnx2x_io_slot_reset at c0080000018a551c [bnx2x]
  #7 [c000000004d47b20] eeh_report_reset at c00000000004c9bc
  #8 [c000000004d47b90] eeh_pe_report at c00000000004d1a8
  #9 [c000000004d47c40] eeh_handle_normal_event at c00000000004da64

And the sleeping source code
============================
crash> dis -ls c000000000a06448
FILE: ../net/core/dev.c
LINE: 6702

   6697  {
   6698          might_sleep();
   6699          set_bit(NAPI_STATE_DISABLE, &n->state);
   6700
   6701          while (test_and_set_bit(NAPI_STATE_SCHED, &n->state))
* 6702                  msleep(1);
   6703          while (test_and_set_bit(NAPI_STATE_NPSVC, &n->state))
   6704                  msleep(1);
   6705
   6706          hrtimer_cancel(&n->timer);
   6707
   6708          clear_bit(NAPI_STATE_DISABLE, &n->state);
   6709  }

EEH calls into bnx2x twice based on the system log above, first through
bnx2x_io_error_detected() and then bnx2x_io_slot_reset(), and executes
the following call chains:

bnx2x_io_error_detected()
  +-> bnx2x_eeh_nic_unload()
       +-> bnx2x_del_all_napi()
            +-> __netif_napi_del()

bnx2x_io_slot_reset()
  +-> bnx2x_netif_stop()
       +-> bnx2x_napi_disable()
            +->napi_disable()

Fix this by correcting the sequence of NAPI APIs usage,
that is delete the NAPI after disabling it.

Fixes: 7fa6f34 ("bnx2x: AER revised")
Reported-by: David Christensen <drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: David Christensen <drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Manish Chopra <manishc@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Ariel Elior <aelior@marvell.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220426153913.6966-1-manishc@marvell.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
kakra pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 31, 2022
[ Upstream commit 4503cc7 ]

Do not allow to write timestamps on RX rings if PF is being configured.
When PF is being configured RX rings can be freed or rebuilt. If at the
same time timestamps are updated, the kernel will crash by dereferencing
null RX ring pointer.

PID: 1449   TASK: ff187d28ed658040  CPU: 34  COMMAND: "ice-ptp-0000:51"
 #0 [ff1966a94a713bb0] machine_kexec at ffffffff9d05a0be
 #1 [ff1966a94a713c08] __crash_kexec at ffffffff9d192e9d
 #2 [ff1966a94a713cd0] crash_kexec at ffffffff9d1941bd
 #3 [ff1966a94a713ce8] oops_end at ffffffff9d01bd54
 #4 [ff1966a94a713d08] no_context at ffffffff9d06bda4
 #5 [ff1966a94a713d60] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff9d06c10c
 #6 [ff1966a94a713da8] do_page_fault at ffffffff9d06cae4
 #7 [ff1966a94a713de0] page_fault at ffffffff9da0107e
    [exception RIP: ice_ptp_update_cached_phctime+91]
    RIP: ffffffffc076db8b  RSP: ff1966a94a713e98  RFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: 16e3db9c6b7ccae4  RBX: ff187d269dd3c180  RCX: ff187d269cd4d018
    RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: 0000000000000000  RDI: 0000000000000000
    RBP: ff187d269cfcc644   R8: ff187d339b9641b0   R9: 0000000000000000
    R10: 0000000000000002  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: ff187d269cfcc648
    R13: ffffffff9f128784  R14: ffffffff9d101b70  R15: ff187d269cfcc640
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #8 [ff1966a94a713ea0] ice_ptp_periodic_work at ffffffffc076dbef [ice]
 #9 [ff1966a94a713ee0] kthread_worker_fn at ffffffff9d101c1b
 #10 [ff1966a94a713f10] kthread at ffffffff9d101b4d
 #11 [ff1966a94a713f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff9da0023f

Fixes: 77a7811 ("ice: enable receive hardware timestamping")
Signed-off-by: Arkadiusz Kubalewski <arkadiusz.kubalewski@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Dave Cain <dcain@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Gurucharan <gurucharanx.g@intel.com> (A Contingent worker at Intel)
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
kakra pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 1, 2022
…tion

commit 07fd5b6 upstream.

Each cset (css_set) is pinned by its tasks. When we're moving tasks around
across csets for a migration, we need to hold the source and destination
csets to ensure that they don't go away while we're moving tasks about. This
is done by linking cset->mg_preload_node on either the
mgctx->preloaded_src_csets or mgctx->preloaded_dst_csets list. Using the
same cset->mg_preload_node for both the src and dst lists was deemed okay as
a cset can't be both the source and destination at the same time.

Unfortunately, this overloading becomes problematic when multiple tasks are
involved in a migration and some of them are identity noop migrations while
others are actually moving across cgroups. For example, this can happen with
the following sequence on cgroup1:

 #1> mkdir -p /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/b
 #2> echo $$ > /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/cgroup.procs
 #3> RUN_A_COMMAND_WHICH_CREATES_MULTIPLE_THREADS &
 #4> PID=$!
 #5> echo $PID > /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/b/tasks
 #6> echo $PID > /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/cgroup.procs

the process including the group leader back into a. In this final migration,
non-leader threads would be doing identity migration while the group leader
is doing an actual one.

After #3, let's say the whole process was in cset A, and that after #4, the
leader moves to cset B. Then, during #6, the following happens:

 1. cgroup_migrate_add_src() is called on B for the leader.

 2. cgroup_migrate_add_src() is called on A for the other threads.

 3. cgroup_migrate_prepare_dst() is called. It scans the src list.

 4. It notices that B wants to migrate to A, so it tries to A to the dst
    list but realizes that its ->mg_preload_node is already busy.

 5. and then it notices A wants to migrate to A as it's an identity
    migration, it culls it by list_del_init()'ing its ->mg_preload_node and
    putting references accordingly.

 6. The rest of migration takes place with B on the src list but nothing on
    the dst list.

This means that A isn't held while migration is in progress. If all tasks
leave A before the migration finishes and the incoming task pins it, the
cset will be destroyed leading to use-after-free.

This is caused by overloading cset->mg_preload_node for both src and dst
preload lists. We wanted to exclude the cset from the src list but ended up
inadvertently excluding it from the dst list too.

This patch fixes the issue by separating out cset->mg_preload_node into
->mg_src_preload_node and ->mg_dst_preload_node, so that the src and dst
preloadings don't interfere with each other.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Mukesh Ojha <quic_mojha@quicinc.com>
Reported-by: shisiyuan <shisiyuan19870131@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1654187688-27411-1-git-send-email-shisiyuan@xiaomi.com
Link: https://www.spinics.net/lists/cgroups/msg33313.html
Fixes: f817de9 ("cgroup: prepare migration path for unified hierarchy")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.16+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
kakra pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 1, 2022
[ Upstream commit 51fb127 ]

Fixes an issue caught by KASAN about use-after-free in mt76_txq_schedule
by protecting mtxq->wcid with rcu_lock between mt76_txq_schedule and
sta_info_[alloc, free].

[18853.876689] ==================================================================
[18853.876751] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mt76_txq_schedule+0x204/0xaf8 [mt76]
[18853.876773] Read of size 8 at addr ffffffaf989a2138 by task mt76-tx phy0/883
[18853.876786]
[18853.876810] CPU: 5 PID: 883 Comm: mt76-tx phy0 Not tainted 5.10.100-fix-510-56778d365941-kasan #5 0b01fbbcf41a530f52043508fec2e31a4215

[18853.876840] Call trace:
[18853.876861]  dump_backtrace+0x0/0x3ec
[18853.876878]  show_stack+0x20/0x2c
[18853.876899]  dump_stack+0x11c/0x1ac
[18853.876918]  print_address_description+0x74/0x514
[18853.876934]  kasan_report+0x134/0x174
[18853.876948]  __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x44/0x50
[18853.876976]  mt76_txq_schedule+0x204/0xaf8 [mt76 074e03e4640e97fe7405ee1fab547b81c4fa45d2]
[18853.877002]  mt76_txq_schedule_all+0x2c/0x48 [mt76 074e03e4640e97fe7405ee1fab547b81c4fa45d2]
[18853.877030]  mt7921_tx_worker+0xa0/0x1cc [mt7921_common f0875ebac9d7b4754e1010549e7db50fbd90a047]
[18853.877054]  __mt76_worker_fn+0x190/0x22c [mt76 074e03e4640e97fe7405ee1fab547b81c4fa45d2]
[18853.877071]  kthread+0x2f8/0x3b8
[18853.877087]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x30
[18853.877098]
[18853.877112] Allocated by task 941:
[18853.877131]  kasan_save_stack+0x38/0x68
[18853.877147]  __kasan_kmalloc+0xd4/0xfc
[18853.877163]  kasan_kmalloc+0x10/0x1c
[18853.877177]  __kmalloc+0x264/0x3c4
[18853.877294]  sta_info_alloc+0x460/0xf88 [mac80211]
[18853.877410]  ieee80211_prep_connection+0x204/0x1ee0 [mac80211]
[18853.877523]  ieee80211_mgd_auth+0x6c4/0xa4c [mac80211]
[18853.877635]  ieee80211_auth+0x20/0x2c [mac80211]
[18853.877733]  rdev_auth+0x7c/0x438 [cfg80211]
[18853.877826]  cfg80211_mlme_auth+0x26c/0x390 [cfg80211]
[18853.877919]  nl80211_authenticate+0x6d4/0x904 [cfg80211]
[18853.877938]  genl_rcv_msg+0x748/0x93c
[18853.877954]  netlink_rcv_skb+0x160/0x2a8
[18853.877969]  genl_rcv+0x3c/0x54
[18853.877985]  netlink_unicast_kernel+0x104/0x1ec
[18853.877999]  netlink_unicast+0x178/0x268
[18853.878015]  netlink_sendmsg+0x3cc/0x5f0
[18853.878030]  sock_sendmsg+0xb4/0xd8
[18853.878043]  ____sys_sendmsg+0x2f8/0x53c
[18853.878058]  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe8/0x150
[18853.878071]  __sys_sendmsg+0xc4/0x1f4
[18853.878087]  __arm64_compat_sys_sendmsg+0x88/0x9c
[18853.878101]  el0_svc_common+0x1b4/0x390
[18853.878115]  do_el0_svc_compat+0x8c/0xdc
[18853.878131]  el0_svc_compat+0x10/0x1c
[18853.878146]  el0_sync_compat_handler+0xa8/0xcc
[18853.878161]  el0_sync_compat+0x188/0x1c0
[18853.878171]
[18853.878183] Freed by task 10927:
[18853.878200]  kasan_save_stack+0x38/0x68
[18853.878215]  kasan_set_track+0x28/0x3c
[18853.878228]  kasan_set_free_info+0x24/0x48
[18853.878244]  __kasan_slab_free+0x11c/0x154
[18853.878259]  kasan_slab_free+0x14/0x24
[18853.878273]  slab_free_freelist_hook+0xac/0x1b0
[18853.878287]  kfree+0x104/0x390
[18853.878402]  sta_info_free+0x198/0x210 [mac80211]
[18853.878515]  __sta_info_destroy_part2+0x230/0x2d4 [mac80211]
[18853.878628]  __sta_info_flush+0x300/0x37c [mac80211]
[18853.878740]  ieee80211_set_disassoc+0x2cc/0xa7c [mac80211]
[18853.878851]  ieee80211_mgd_deauth+0x4a4/0x10a0 [mac80211]
[18853.878962]  ieee80211_deauth+0x20/0x2c [mac80211]
[18853.879057]  rdev_deauth+0x7c/0x438 [cfg80211]
[18853.879150]  cfg80211_mlme_deauth+0x274/0x414 [cfg80211]
[18853.879243]  cfg80211_mlme_down+0xe4/0x118 [cfg80211]
[18853.879335]  cfg80211_disconnect+0x218/0x2d8 [cfg80211]
[18853.879427]  __cfg80211_leave+0x17c/0x240 [cfg80211]
[18853.879519]  cfg80211_leave+0x3c/0x58 [cfg80211]
[18853.879611]  wiphy_suspend+0xdc/0x200 [cfg80211]
[18853.879628]  dpm_run_callback+0x58/0x408
[18853.879642]  __device_suspend+0x4cc/0x864
[18853.879658]  async_suspend+0x34/0xf4
[18853.879673]  async_run_entry_fn+0xe0/0x37c
[18853.879689]  process_one_work+0x508/0xb98
[18853.879702]  worker_thread+0x7f4/0xcd4
[18853.879717]  kthread+0x2f8/0x3b8
[18853.879731]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x30
[18853.879741]
[18853.879757] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffffffaf989a2000
[18853.879757]  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8k of size 8192
[18853.879774] The buggy address is located 312 bytes inside of
[18853.879774]  8192-byte region [ffffffaf989a2000, ffffffaf989a4000)
[18853.879787] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[18853.879807] page:000000004bda2a59 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1d89a0
[18853.879823] head:000000004bda2a59 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
[18853.879839] flags: 0x8000000000010200(slab|head)
[18853.879857] raw: 8000000000010200 ffffffffbc89e208 ffffffffb7fb5208 ffffffaec000cc80
[18853.879873] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000010001 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[18853.879885] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[18853.879896]
[18853.879907] Memory state around the buggy address:
[18853.879922]  ffffffaf989a2000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[18853.879935]  ffffffaf989a2080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[18853.879948] >ffffffaf989a2100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[18853.879961]                                         ^
[18853.879973]  ffffffaf989a2180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[18853.879986]  ffffffaf989a2200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[18853.879998] ==================================================================

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Sean Wang <sean.wang@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
kakra pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 9, 2024
[ Upstream commit 86a41ea ]

When l2tp tunnels use a socket provided by userspace, we can hit
lockdep splats like the below when data is transmitted through another
(unrelated) userspace socket which then gets routed over l2tp.

This issue was previously discussed here:
https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/87sfialu2n.fsf@cloudflare.com/

The solution is to have lockdep treat socket locks of l2tp tunnel
sockets separately than those of standard INET sockets. To do so, use
a different lockdep subclass where lock nesting is possible.

  ============================================
  WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
  6.10.0+ #34 Not tainted
  --------------------------------------------
  iperf3/771 is trying to acquire lock:
  ffff8881027601d8 (slock-AF_INET/1){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: l2tp_xmit_skb+0x243/0x9d0

  but task is already holding lock:
  ffff888102650d98 (slock-AF_INET/1){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: tcp_v4_rcv+0x1848/0x1e10

  other info that might help us debug this:
   Possible unsafe locking scenario:

         CPU0
         ----
    lock(slock-AF_INET/1);
    lock(slock-AF_INET/1);

   *** DEADLOCK ***

   May be due to missing lock nesting notation

  10 locks held by iperf3/771:
   #0: ffff888102650258 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: tcp_sendmsg+0x1a/0x40
   #1: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __ip_queue_xmit+0x4b/0xbc0
   #2: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x17a/0x1130
   #3: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: process_backlog+0x28b/0x9f0
   #4: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_local_deliver_finish+0xf9/0x260
   #5: ffff888102650d98 (slock-AF_INET/1){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: tcp_v4_rcv+0x1848/0x1e10
   #6: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __ip_queue_xmit+0x4b/0xbc0
   #7: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x17a/0x1130
   #8: ffffffff822ac1e0 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0xcc/0x1450
   #9: ffff888101f33258 (dev->qdisc_tx_busylock ?: &qdisc_tx_busylock#2){+...}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x513/0x1450

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 771 Comm: iperf3 Not tainted 6.10.0+ #34
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
  Call Trace:
   <IRQ>
   dump_stack_lvl+0x69/0xa0
   dump_stack+0xc/0x20
   __lock_acquire+0x135d/0x2600
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2a0
   ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x243/0x9d0
   ? __skb_checksum+0xa3/0x540
   _raw_spin_lock_nested+0x35/0x50
   ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x243/0x9d0
   l2tp_xmit_skb+0x243/0x9d0
   l2tp_eth_dev_xmit+0x3c/0xc0
   dev_hard_start_xmit+0x11e/0x420
   sch_direct_xmit+0xc3/0x640
   __dev_queue_xmit+0x61c/0x1450
   ? ip_finish_output2+0xf4c/0x1130
   ip_finish_output2+0x6b6/0x1130
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? __ip_finish_output+0x217/0x380
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   __ip_finish_output+0x217/0x380
   ip_output+0x99/0x120
   __ip_queue_xmit+0xae4/0xbc0
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? tcp_options_write.constprop.0+0xcb/0x3e0
   ip_queue_xmit+0x34/0x40
   __tcp_transmit_skb+0x1625/0x1890
   __tcp_send_ack+0x1b8/0x340
   tcp_send_ack+0x23/0x30
   __tcp_ack_snd_check+0xa8/0x530
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   tcp_rcv_established+0x412/0xd70
   tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x299/0x420
   tcp_v4_rcv+0x1991/0x1e10
   ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x50/0x220
   ip_local_deliver_finish+0x158/0x260
   ip_local_deliver+0xc8/0xe0
   ip_rcv+0xe5/0x1d0
   ? __pfx_ip_rcv+0x10/0x10
   __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xce/0xe0
   ? process_backlog+0x28b/0x9f0
   __netif_receive_skb+0x34/0xd0
   ? process_backlog+0x28b/0x9f0
   process_backlog+0x2cb/0x9f0
   __napi_poll.constprop.0+0x61/0x280
   net_rx_action+0x332/0x670
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   handle_softirqs+0xda/0x480
   ? __dev_queue_xmit+0xa2c/0x1450
   do_softirq+0xa1/0xd0
   </IRQ>
   <TASK>
   __local_bh_enable_ip+0xc8/0xe0
   ? __dev_queue_xmit+0xa2c/0x1450
   __dev_queue_xmit+0xa48/0x1450
   ? ip_finish_output2+0xf4c/0x1130
   ip_finish_output2+0x6b6/0x1130
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? __ip_finish_output+0x217/0x380
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   __ip_finish_output+0x217/0x380
   ip_output+0x99/0x120
   __ip_queue_xmit+0xae4/0xbc0
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? tcp_options_write.constprop.0+0xcb/0x3e0
   ip_queue_xmit+0x34/0x40
   __tcp_transmit_skb+0x1625/0x1890
   tcp_write_xmit+0x766/0x2fb0
   ? __entry_text_end+0x102ba9/0x102bad
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? __might_fault+0x74/0xc0
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   __tcp_push_pending_frames+0x56/0x190
   tcp_push+0x117/0x310
   tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x14c1/0x1740
   tcp_sendmsg+0x28/0x40
   inet_sendmsg+0x5d/0x90
   sock_write_iter+0x242/0x2b0
   vfs_write+0x68d/0x800
   ? __pfx_sock_write_iter+0x10/0x10
   ksys_write+0xc8/0xf0
   __x64_sys_write+0x3d/0x50
   x64_sys_call+0xfaf/0x1f50
   do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  RIP: 0033:0x7f4d143af992
  Code: c3 8b 07 85 c0 75 24 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 89 5c 24 08 0f 05 <c3> e9 01 cc ff ff 41 54 b8 02 00 00 0
  RSP: 002b:00007ffd65032058 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007f4d143af992
  RDX: 0000000000000025 RSI: 00007f4d143f3bcc RDI: 0000000000000005
  RBP: 00007f4d143f2b28 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f4d143f3bcc
  R13: 0000000000000005 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffd650323f0
   </TASK>

Fixes: 0b2c597 ("l2tp: close all race conditions in l2tp_tunnel_register()")
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+6acef9e0a4d1f46c83d4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=6acef9e0a4d1f46c83d4
CC: gnault@redhat.com
CC: cong.wang@bytedance.com
Signed-off-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Parkin <tparkin@katalix.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240806160626.1248317-1-jchapman@katalix.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment
Labels
None yet
Projects
None yet
Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.