add required SECURITY.md file for OSSF Scorecard compliance #4

rdower · 2024-05-03T22:28:25Z

add required SECURITY.md file for OSSF Scorecard compliance

Drop support for virtualizing adaptive PEBS, as KVM's implementation is architecturally broken without an obvious/easy path forward, and because exposing adaptive PEBS can leak host LBRs to the guest, i.e. can leak host kernel addresses to the guest. Bug #1 is that KVM doesn't account for the upper 32 bits of IA32_FIXED_CTR_CTRL when (re)programming fixed counters, e.g fixed_ctrl_field() drops the upper bits, reprogram_fixed_counters() stores local variables as u8s and truncates the upper bits too, etc. Bug #2 is that, because KVM _always_ sets precise_ip to a non-zero value for PEBS events, perf will _always_ generate an adaptive record, even if the guest requested a basic record. Note, KVM will also enable adaptive PEBS in individual *counter*, even if adaptive PEBS isn't exposed to the guest, but this is benign as MSR_PEBS_DATA_CFG is guaranteed to be zero, i.e. the guest will only ever see Basic records. Bug #3 is in perf. intel_pmu_disable_fixed() doesn't clear the upper bits either, i.e. leaves ICL_FIXED_0_ADAPTIVE set, and intel_pmu_enable_fixed() effectively doesn't clear ICL_FIXED_0_ADAPTIVE either. I.e. perf _always_ enables ADAPTIVE counters, regardless of what KVM requests. Bug #4 is that adaptive PEBS *might* effectively bypass event filters set by the host, as "Updated Memory Access Info Group" records information that might be disallowed by userspace via KVM_SET_PMU_EVENT_FILTER. Bug #5 is that KVM doesn't ensure LBR MSRs hold guest values (or at least zeros) when entering a vCPU with adaptive PEBS, which allows the guest to read host LBRs, i.e. host RIPs/addresses, by enabling "LBR Entries" records. Disable adaptive PEBS support as an immediate fix due to the severity of the LBR leak in particular, and because fixing all of the bugs will be non-trivial, e.g. not suitable for backporting to stable kernels. Note! This will break live migration, but trying to make KVM play nice with live migration would be quite complicated, wouldn't be guaranteed to work (i.e. KVM might still kill/confuse the guest), and it's not clear that there are any publicly available VMMs that support adaptive PEBS, let alone live migrate VMs that support adaptive PEBS, e.g. QEMU doesn't support PEBS in any capacity. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240306230153.786365-1-seanjc@google.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZeepGjHCeSfadANM@google.com Fixes: c59a1f1 ("KVM: x86/pmu: Add IA32_PEBS_ENABLE MSR emulation for extended PEBS") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Like Xu <like.xu.linux@gmail.com> Cc: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com> Cc: Zhenyu Wang <zhenyuw@linux.intel.com> Cc: Zhang Xiong <xiong.y.zhang@intel.com> Cc: Lv Zhiyuan <zhiyuan.lv@intel.com> Cc: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@intel.com> Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Acked-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240307005833.827147-1-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>

When I did hard offline test with hugetlb pages, below deadlock occurs: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.8.0-11409-gf6cef5f8c37f #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ bash/46904 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffffabe68910 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: static_key_slow_dec+0x16/0x60 but task is already holding lock: ffffffffabf92ea8 (pcp_batch_high_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: zone_pcp_disable+0x16/0x40 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (pcp_batch_high_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x6c/0x770 page_alloc_cpu_online+0x3c/0x70 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x397/0x5f0 __cpuhp_invoke_callback_range+0x71/0xe0 _cpu_up+0xeb/0x210 cpu_up+0x91/0xe0 cpuhp_bringup_mask+0x49/0xb0 bringup_nonboot_cpus+0xb7/0xe0 smp_init+0x25/0xa0 kernel_init_freeable+0x15f/0x3e0 kernel_init+0x15/0x1b0 ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x1298/0x1cd0 lock_acquire+0xc0/0x2b0 cpus_read_lock+0x2a/0xc0 static_key_slow_dec+0x16/0x60 __hugetlb_vmemmap_restore_folio+0x1b9/0x200 dissolve_free_huge_page+0x211/0x260 __page_handle_poison+0x45/0xc0 memory_failure+0x65e/0xc70 hard_offline_page_store+0x55/0xa0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x12c/0x1d0 vfs_write+0x387/0x550 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0xca/0x1e0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(pcp_batch_high_lock); lock(cpu_hotplug_lock); lock(pcp_batch_high_lock); rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by bash/46904: #0: ffff98f6c3bb23f0 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x64/0xe0 #1: ffff98f6c328e488 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0xf8/0x1d0 #2: ffff98ef83b31890 (kn->active#113){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x100/0x1d0 #3: ffffffffabf9db48 (mf_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: memory_failure+0x44/0xc70 #4: ffffffffabf92ea8 (pcp_batch_high_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: zone_pcp_disable+0x16/0x40 stack backtrace: CPU: 10 PID: 46904 Comm: bash Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.8.0-11409-gf6cef5f8c37f #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0xa0 check_noncircular+0x129/0x140 __lock_acquire+0x1298/0x1cd0 lock_acquire+0xc0/0x2b0 cpus_read_lock+0x2a/0xc0 static_key_slow_dec+0x16/0x60 __hugetlb_vmemmap_restore_folio+0x1b9/0x200 dissolve_free_huge_page+0x211/0x260 __page_handle_poison+0x45/0xc0 memory_failure+0x65e/0xc70 hard_offline_page_store+0x55/0xa0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x12c/0x1d0 vfs_write+0x387/0x550 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0xca/0x1e0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 RIP: 0033:0x7fc862314887 Code: 10 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 RSP: 002b:00007fff19311268 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000c RCX: 00007fc862314887 RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: 000056405645fe10 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 000056405645fe10 R08: 00007fc8623d1460 R09: 000000007fffffff R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000000c R13: 00007fc86241b780 R14: 00007fc862417600 R15: 00007fc862416a00 In short, below scene breaks the lock dependency chain: memory_failure __page_handle_poison zone_pcp_disable -- lock(pcp_batch_high_lock) dissolve_free_huge_page __hugetlb_vmemmap_restore_folio static_key_slow_dec cpus_read_lock -- rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock) Fix this by calling drain_all_pages() instead. This issue won't occur until commit a6b4085 ("mm: hugetlb: replace hugetlb_free_vmemmap_enabled with a static_key"). As it introduced rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock) in dissolve_free_huge_page() code path while lock(pcp_batch_high_lock) is already in the __page_handle_poison(). [linmiaohe@huawei.com: extend comment per Oscar] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: reflow block comment] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240407085456.2798193-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com Fixes: a6b4085 ("mm: hugetlb: replace hugetlb_free_vmemmap_enabled with a static_key") Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Acked-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jane Chu <jane.chu@oracle.com> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

…git/netfilter/nf Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter fixes for net The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for net: Patch #1 syzbot reports that nf_reinject() could be called without rcu_read_lock() when flushing pending packets at nfnetlink queue removal, from Eric Dumazet. Patch #2 flushes ipset list:set when canceling garbage collection to reference to other lists to fix a race, from Jozsef Kadlecsik. Patch #3 restores q-in-q matching with nft_payload by reverting f6ae9f1 ("netfilter: nft_payload: add C-VLAN support"). Patch #4 fixes vlan mangling in skbuff when vlan offload is present in skbuff, without this patch nft_payload corrupts packets in this case. Patch #5 fixes possible nul-deref in tproxy no IP address is found in netdevice, reported by syzbot and patch from Florian Westphal. Patch #6 removes a superfluous restriction which prevents loose fib lookups from input and forward hooks, from Eric Garver. My assessment is that patches #1, #2 and #5 address possible kernel crash, anything else in this batch fixes broken features. netfilter pull request 24-05-29 * tag 'nf-24-05-29' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf: netfilter: nft_fib: allow from forward/input without iif selector netfilter: tproxy: bail out if IP has been disabled on the device netfilter: nft_payload: skbuff vlan metadata mangle support netfilter: nft_payload: restore vlan q-in-q match support netfilter: ipset: Add list flush to cancel_gc netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: acquire rcu_read_lock() in instance_destroy_rcu() ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240528225519.1155786-1-pablo@netfilter.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

With commit c4cb231 ("iommu/amd: Add support for enable/disable IOPF") we are hitting below issue. This happens because in IOPF enablement path it holds spin lock with irq disable and then tries to take mutex lock. dmesg: ----- [ 0.938739] ============================= [ 0.938740] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] [ 0.938742] 6.10.0-rc1+ #1 Not tainted [ 0.938745] ----------------------------- [ 0.938746] swapper/0/1 is trying to lock: [ 0.938748] ffffffff8c9f01d8 (&port_lock_key){....}-{3:3}, at: serial8250_console_write+0x78/0x4a0 [ 0.938767] other info that might help us debug this: [ 0.938768] context-{5:5} [ 0.938769] 7 locks held by swapper/0/1: [ 0.938772] #0: ffff888101a91310 (&group->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: bus_iommu_probe+0x70/0x160 [ 0.938790] #1: ffff888101d1f1b8 (&domain->lock){....}-{3:3}, at: amd_iommu_attach_device+0xa5/0x700 [ 0.938799] #2: ffff888101cc3d18 (&dev_data->lock){....}-{3:3}, at: amd_iommu_attach_device+0xc5/0x700 [ 0.938806] #3: ffff888100052830 (&iommu->lock){....}-{2:2}, at: amd_iommu_iopf_add_device+0x3f/0xa0 [ 0.938813] #4: ffffffff8945a340 (console_lock){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: _printk+0x48/0x50 [ 0.938822] #5: ffffffff8945a390 (console_srcu){....}-{0:0}, at: console_flush_all+0x58/0x4e0 [ 0.938867] #6: ffffffff82459f80 (console_owner){....}-{0:0}, at: console_flush_all+0x1f0/0x4e0 [ 0.938872] stack backtrace: [ 0.938874] CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc1+ #1 [ 0.938877] Hardware name: HP HP EliteBook 745 G3/807E, BIOS N73 Ver. 01.39 04/16/2019 Fix above issue by re-arranging code in attach device path: - move device PASID/IOPF enablement outside lock in AMD IOMMU driver. This is safe as core layer holds group->mutex lock before calling iommu_ops->attach_dev. Reported-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Reported-by: Mikhail Gavrilov <mikhail.v.gavrilov@gmail.com> Reported-by: Chris Bainbridge <chris.bainbridge@gmail.com> Fixes: c4cb231 ("iommu/amd: Add support for enable/disable IOPF") Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Tested-by: Chris Bainbridge <chris.bainbridge@gmail.com> Tested-by: Mikhail Gavrilov <mikhail.v.gavrilov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240530084801.10758-1-vasant.hegde@amd.com Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>

…PLES event" This reverts commit 7d1405c. This causes segfaults in some cases, as reported by Milian: ``` sudo /usr/bin/perf record -z --call-graph dwarf -e cycles -e raw_syscalls:sys_enter ls ... [ perf record: Woken up 3 times to write data ] malloc(): invalid next size (unsorted) Aborted ``` Backtrace with GDB + debuginfod: ``` malloc(): invalid next size (unsorted) Thread 1 "perf" received signal SIGABRT, Aborted. __pthread_kill_implementation (threadid=<optimized out>, signo=signo@entry=6, no_tid=no_tid@entry=0) at pthread_kill.c:44 Downloading source file /usr/src/debug/glibc/glibc/nptl/pthread_kill.c 44 return INTERNAL_SYSCALL_ERROR_P (ret) ? INTERNAL_SYSCALL_ERRNO (ret) : 0; (gdb) bt #0 __pthread_kill_implementation (threadid=<optimized out>, signo=signo@entry=6, no_tid=no_tid@entry=0) at pthread_kill.c:44 #1 0x00007ffff6ea8eb3 in __pthread_kill_internal (threadid=<optimized out>, signo=6) at pthread_kill.c:78 #2 0x00007ffff6e50a30 in __GI_raise (sig=sig@entry=6) at ../sysdeps/posix/ raise.c:26 #3 0x00007ffff6e384c3 in __GI_abort () at abort.c:79 #4 0x00007ffff6e39354 in __libc_message_impl (fmt=fmt@entry=0x7ffff6fc22ea "%s\n") at ../sysdeps/posix/libc_fatal.c:132 #5 0x00007ffff6eb3085 in malloc_printerr (str=str@entry=0x7ffff6fc5850 "malloc(): invalid next size (unsorted)") at malloc.c:5772 #6 0x00007ffff6eb657c in _int_malloc (av=av@entry=0x7ffff6ff6ac0 <main_arena>, bytes=bytes@entry=368) at malloc.c:4081 #7 0x00007ffff6eb877e in __libc_calloc (n=<optimized out>, elem_size=<optimized out>) at malloc.c:3754 #8 0x000055555569bdb6 in perf_session.do_write_header () #9 0x00005555555a373a in __cmd_record.constprop.0 () #10 0x00005555555a6846 in cmd_record () #11 0x000055555564db7f in run_builtin () #12 0x000055555558ed77 in main () ``` Valgrind memcheck: ``` ==45136== Invalid write of size 8 ==45136== at 0x2B38A5: perf_event__synthesize_id_sample (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x157069: __cmd_record.constprop.0 (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x15A845: cmd_record (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x201B7E: run_builtin (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x142D76: main (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== Address 0x6a866a8 is 0 bytes after a block of size 40 alloc'd ==45136== at 0x4849BF3: calloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:1675) ==45136== by 0x3574AB: zalloc (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x1570E0: __cmd_record.constprop.0 (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x15A845: cmd_record (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x201B7E: run_builtin (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x142D76: main (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== ==45136== Syscall param write(buf) points to unaddressable byte(s) ==45136== at 0x575953D: __libc_write (write.c:26) ==45136== by 0x575953D: write (write.c:24) ==45136== by 0x35761F: ion (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x357778: writen (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x1548F7: record__write (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x15708A: __cmd_record.constprop.0 (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x15A845: cmd_record (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x201B7E: run_builtin (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x142D76: main (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== Address 0x6a866a8 is 0 bytes after a block of size 40 alloc'd ==45136== at 0x4849BF3: calloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:1675) ==45136== by 0x3574AB: zalloc (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x1570E0: __cmd_record.constprop.0 (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x15A845: cmd_record (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x201B7E: run_builtin (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x142D76: main (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== ----- Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-perf-users/23879991.0LEYPuXRzz@milian-workstation/ Reported-by: Milian Wolff <milian.wolff@kdab.com> Tested-by: Milian Wolff <milian.wolff@kdab.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: stable@kernel.org # 6.8+ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Zl9ksOlHJHnKM70p@x1 Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

We have been seeing crashes on duplicate keys in btrfs_set_item_key_safe(): BTRFS critical (device vdb): slot 4 key (450 108 8192) new key (450 108 8192) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 3139 Comm: xfs_io Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0 #6 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:btrfs_set_item_key_safe+0x11f/0x290 [btrfs] With the following stack trace: #0 btrfs_set_item_key_safe (fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620:4) #1 btrfs_drop_extents (fs/btrfs/file.c:411:4) #2 log_one_extent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4732:9) #3 btrfs_log_changed_extents (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4955:9) #4 btrfs_log_inode (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6626:9) #5 btrfs_log_inode_parent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7070:8) #6 btrfs_log_dentry_safe (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7171:8) #7 btrfs_sync_file (fs/btrfs/file.c:1933:8) #8 vfs_fsync_range (fs/sync.c:188:9) #9 vfs_fsync (fs/sync.c:202:9) #10 do_fsync (fs/sync.c:212:9) #11 __do_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:225:9) #12 __se_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1) #13 __x64_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1) #14 do_syscall_x64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52:14) #15 do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:83:7) #16 entry_SYSCALL_64+0xaf/0x14c (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) So we're logging a changed extent from fsync, which is splitting an extent in the log tree. But this split part already exists in the tree, triggering the BUG(). This is the state of the log tree at the time of the crash, dumped with drgn (https://github.com/osandov/drgn/blob/main/contrib/btrfs_tree.py) to get more details than btrfs_print_leaf() gives us: >>> print_extent_buffer(prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[0]["eb"]) leaf 33439744 level 0 items 72 generation 9 owner 18446744073709551610 leaf 33439744 flags 0x100000000000000 fs uuid e5bd3946-400c-4223-8923-190ef1f18677 chunk uuid d58cb17e-6d02-494a-829a-18b7d8a399da item 0 key (450 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 16123 itemsize 160 generation 7 transid 9 size 8192 nbytes 8473563889606862198 block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0 sequence 204 flags 0x10(PREALLOC) atime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43) ctime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44) mtime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44) otime 17592186044416.000000000 (559444-03-08 01:40:16) item 1 key (450 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 16110 itemsize 13 index 195 namelen 3 name: 193 item 2 key (450 XATTR_ITEM 1640047104) itemoff 16073 itemsize 37 location key (0 UNKNOWN.0 0) type XATTR transid 7 data_len 1 name_len 6 name: user.a data a item 3 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 16020 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 1 (regular) extent data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 extent data offset 0 nr 4096 ram 12288 extent compression 0 (none) item 4 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 4096) itemoff 15967 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 2 (prealloc) prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 prealloc data offset 4096 nr 8192 item 5 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 8192) itemoff 15914 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 2 (prealloc) prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 prealloc data offset 8192 nr 4096 ... So the real problem happened earlier: notice that items 4 (4k-12k) and 5 (8k-12k) overlap. Both are prealloc extents. Item 4 straddles i_size and item 5 starts at i_size. Here is the state of the filesystem tree at the time of the crash: >>> root = prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[2]["inode"].root >>> ret, nodes, slots = btrfs_search_slot(root, BtrfsKey(450, 0, 0)) >>> print_extent_buffer(nodes[0]) leaf 30425088 level 0 items 184 generation 9 owner 5 leaf 30425088 flags 0x100000000000000 fs uuid e5bd3946-400c-4223-8923-190ef1f18677 chunk uuid d58cb17e-6d02-494a-829a-18b7d8a399da ... item 179 key (450 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 4907 itemsize 160 generation 7 transid 7 size 4096 nbytes 12288 block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0 sequence 6 flags 0x10(PREALLOC) atime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43) ctime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43) mtime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43) otime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43) item 180 key (450 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 4894 itemsize 13 index 195 namelen 3 name: 193 item 181 key (450 XATTR_ITEM 1640047104) itemoff 4857 itemsize 37 location key (0 UNKNOWN.0 0) type XATTR transid 7 data_len 1 name_len 6 name: user.a data a item 182 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 4804 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 1 (regular) extent data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 extent data offset 0 nr 8192 ram 12288 extent compression 0 (none) item 183 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 8192) itemoff 4751 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 2 (prealloc) prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 prealloc data offset 8192 nr 4096 Item 5 in the log tree corresponds to item 183 in the filesystem tree, but nothing matches item 4. Furthermore, item 183 is the last item in the leaf. btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() is responsible for logging prealloc extents beyond i_size. It first truncates any previously logged prealloc extents that start beyond i_size. Then, it walks the filesystem tree and copies the prealloc extent items to the log tree. If it hits the end of a leaf, then it calls btrfs_next_leaf(), which unlocks the tree and does another search. However, while the filesystem tree is unlocked, an ordered extent completion may modify the tree. In particular, it may insert an extent item that overlaps with an extent item that was already copied to the log tree. This may manifest in several ways depending on the exact scenario, including an EEXIST error that is silently translated to a full sync, overlapping items in the log tree, or this crash. This particular crash is triggered by the following sequence of events: - Initially, the file has i_size=4k, a regular extent from 0-4k, and a prealloc extent beyond i_size from 4k-12k. The prealloc extent item is the last item in its B-tree leaf. - The file is fsync'd, which copies its inode item and both extent items to the log tree. - An xattr is set on the file, which sets the BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING flag. - The range 4k-8k in the file is written using direct I/O. i_size is extended to 8k, but the ordered extent is still in flight. - The file is fsync'd. Since BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING is set, this calls copy_inode_items_to_log(), which calls btrfs_log_prealloc_extents(). - btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() finds the 4k-12k prealloc extent in the filesystem tree. Since it starts before i_size, it skips it. Since it is the last item in its B-tree leaf, it calls btrfs_next_leaf(). - btrfs_next_leaf() unlocks the path. - The ordered extent completion runs, which converts the 4k-8k part of the prealloc extent to written and inserts the remaining prealloc part from 8k-12k. - btrfs_next_leaf() does a search and finds the new prealloc extent 8k-12k. - btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() copies the 8k-12k prealloc extent into the log tree. Note that it overlaps with the 4k-12k prealloc extent that was copied to the log tree by the first fsync. - fsync calls btrfs_log_changed_extents(), which tries to log the 4k-8k extent that was written. - This tries to drop the range 4k-8k in the log tree, which requires adjusting the start of the 4k-12k prealloc extent in the log tree to 8k. - btrfs_set_item_key_safe() sees that there is already an extent starting at 8k in the log tree and calls BUG(). Fix this by detecting when we're about to insert an overlapping file extent item in the log tree and truncating the part that would overlap. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

Use a dedicated mutex to guard kvm_usage_count to fix a potential deadlock on x86 due to a chain of locks and SRCU synchronizations. Translating the below lockdep splat, CPU1 #6 will wait on CPU0 #1, CPU0 #8 will wait on CPU2 #3, and CPU2 #7 will wait on CPU1 #4 (if there's a writer, due to the fairness of r/w semaphores). CPU0 CPU1 CPU2 1 lock(&kvm->slots_lock); 2 lock(&vcpu->mutex); 3 lock(&kvm->srcu); 4 lock(cpu_hotplug_lock); 5 lock(kvm_lock); 6 lock(&kvm->slots_lock); 7 lock(cpu_hotplug_lock); 8 sync(&kvm->srcu); Note, there are likely more potential deadlocks in KVM x86, e.g. the same pattern of taking cpu_hotplug_lock outside of kvm_lock likely exists with __kvmclock_cpufreq_notifier(), but actually triggering such deadlocks is beyond rare due to the combination of dependencies and timings involved. E.g. the cpufreq notifier is only used on older CPUs without a constant TSC, mucking with the NX hugepage mitigation while VMs are running is very uncommon, and doing so while also onlining/offlining a CPU (necessary to generate contention on cpu_hotplug_lock) would be even more unusual. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.10.0-smp--c257535a0c9d-pip #330 Tainted: G S O ------------------------------------------------------ tee/35048 is trying to acquire lock: ff6a80eced71e0a8 (&kvm->slots_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: set_nx_huge_pages+0x179/0x1e0 [kvm] but task is already holding lock: ffffffffc07abb08 (kvm_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: set_nx_huge_pages+0x14a/0x1e0 [kvm] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (kvm_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x6a/0xb40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1f/0x30 kvm_dev_ioctl+0x4fb/0xe50 [kvm] __se_sys_ioctl+0x7b/0xd0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x21/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x15d0/0x2e60 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #2 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: cpus_read_lock+0x2e/0xb0 static_key_slow_inc+0x16/0x30 kvm_lapic_set_base+0x6a/0x1c0 [kvm] kvm_set_apic_base+0x8f/0xe0 [kvm] kvm_set_msr_common+0x9ae/0xf80 [kvm] vmx_set_msr+0xa54/0xbe0 [kvm_intel] __kvm_set_msr+0xb6/0x1a0 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0xeca/0x10c0 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x485/0x5b0 [kvm] __se_sys_ioctl+0x7b/0xd0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x21/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x15d0/0x2e60 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #1 (&kvm->srcu){.+.+}-{0:0}: __synchronize_srcu+0x44/0x1a0 synchronize_srcu_expedited+0x21/0x30 kvm_swap_active_memslots+0x110/0x1c0 [kvm] kvm_set_memslot+0x360/0x620 [kvm] __kvm_set_memory_region+0x27b/0x300 [kvm] kvm_vm_ioctl_set_memory_region+0x43/0x60 [kvm] kvm_vm_ioctl+0x295/0x650 [kvm] __se_sys_ioctl+0x7b/0xd0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x21/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x15d0/0x2e60 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #0 (&kvm->slots_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x15ef/0x2e30 lock_acquire+0xe0/0x260 __mutex_lock+0x6a/0xb40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1f/0x30 set_nx_huge_pages+0x179/0x1e0 [kvm] param_attr_store+0x93/0x100 module_attr_store+0x22/0x40 sysfs_kf_write+0x81/0xb0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x133/0x1d0 vfs_write+0x28d/0x380 ksys_write+0x70/0xe0 __x64_sys_write+0x1f/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x281b/0x2e60 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Cc: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com> Fixes: 0bf5049 ("KVM: Drop kvm_count_lock and instead protect kvm_usage_count with kvm_lock") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>

The frame pointer unwinder relies on a standard layout of the stack frame, consisting of (in downward order) Calling frame: PC <---------+ LR | SP | FP | .. locals .. | Callee frame: | PC | LR | SP | FP ----------+ where after storing its previous value on the stack, FP is made to point at the location of PC in the callee stack frame, using the canonical prologue: mov ip, sp stmdb sp!, {fp, ip, lr, pc} sub fp, ip, #4 The ftrace code assumes that this activation record is pushed first, and that any stack space for locals is allocated below this. Strict adherence to this would imply that the caller's value of SP at the time of the function call can always be obtained by adding 4 to FP (which points to PC in the callee frame). However, recent versions of GCC appear to deviate from this rule, and so the only reliable way to obtain the caller's value of SP is to read it from the activation record. Since this involves a read from memory rather than simple arithmetic, we need to use the uaccess API here which protects against inadvertent data aborts resulting from attempts to dereference bogus FP values. The plain uaccess API is ftrace instrumented itself, so to avoid unbounded recursion, use the __get_kernel_nofault() primitive directly. Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/alp44tukzo6mvcwl4ke4ehhmojrqnv6xfcdeuliybxfjfvgd3e@gpjvwj33cc76 Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/d870c149-4363-43de-b0ea-7125dec5608e@broadcom.com/ Reported-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de> Reported-by: Justin Chen <justin.chen@broadcom.com> Tested-by: Thorsten Scherer <t.scherer@eckelmann.de> Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

Shin'ichiro reported that when he's running fstests' test-case btrfs/167 on emulated zoned devices, he's seeing the following NULL pointer dereference in 'btrfs_zone_finish_endio()': Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000011: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000088-0x000000000000008f] CPU: 4 PID: 2332440 Comm: kworker/u80:15 Tainted: G W 6.10.0-rc2-kts+ #4 Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/X11SPi-TF, BIOS 3.3 02/21/2020 Workqueue: btrfs-endio-write btrfs_work_helper [btrfs] RIP: 0010:btrfs_zone_finish_endio.part.0+0x34/0x160 [btrfs] RSP: 0018:ffff88867f107a90 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff893e5534 RDX: 0000000000000011 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000088 RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1081696028 R10: ffff88840b4b0143 R11: ffff88834dfff600 R12: ffff88840b4b0000 R13: 0000000000020000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888530ad5210 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888e3f800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f87223fff38 CR3: 00000007a7c6a002 CR4: 00000000007706f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x27 ? die_addr+0x46/0x70 ? exc_general_protection+0x14f/0x250 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30 ? do_raw_read_unlock+0x44/0x70 ? btrfs_zone_finish_endio.part.0+0x34/0x160 [btrfs] btrfs_finish_one_ordered+0x5d9/0x19a0 [btrfs] ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10 ? do_raw_write_lock+0x90/0x260 ? __pfx_do_raw_write_lock+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_btrfs_finish_one_ordered+0x10/0x10 [btrfs] ? _raw_write_unlock+0x23/0x40 ? btrfs_finish_ordered_zoned+0x5a9/0x850 [btrfs] ? lock_acquire+0x435/0x500 btrfs_work_helper+0x1b1/0xa70 [btrfs] ? __schedule+0x10a8/0x60b0 ? __pfx___might_resched+0x10/0x10 process_one_work+0x862/0x1410 ? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10 ? assign_work+0x16c/0x240 worker_thread+0x5e6/0x1010 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x2c3/0x3a0 ? trace_irq_enable.constprop.0+0xce/0x110 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x70 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Enabling CONFIG_BTRFS_ASSERT revealed the following assertion to trigger: assertion failed: !list_empty(&ordered->list), in fs/btrfs/zoned.c:1815 This indicates, that we're missing the checksums list on the ordered_extent. As btrfs/167 is doing a NOCOW write this is to be expected. Further analysis with drgn confirmed the assumption: >>> inode = prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[11]['ordered'].inode >>> btrfs_inode = drgn.container_of(inode, "struct btrfs_inode", \ "vfs_inode") >>> print(btrfs_inode.flags) (u32)1 As zoned emulation mode simulates conventional zones on regular devices, we cannot use zone-append for writing. But we're only attaching dummy checksums if we're doing a zone-append write. So for NOCOW zoned data writes on conventional zones, also attach a dummy checksum. Reported-by: Shinichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com> Fixes: cbfce4c ("btrfs: optimize the logical to physical mapping for zoned writes") CC: Naohiro Aota <Naohiro.Aota@wdc.com> # 6.6+ Tested-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: Naohiro Aota <naohiro.aota@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

The syzbot fuzzer found that the interrupt-URB completion callback in the cdc-wdm driver was taking too long, and the driver's immediate resubmission of interrupt URBs with -EPROTO status combined with the dummy-hcd emulation to cause a CPU lockup: cdc_wdm 1-1:1.0: nonzero urb status received: -71 cdc_wdm 1-1:1.0: wdm_int_callback - 0 bytes watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [syz-executor782:6625] CPU#0 Utilization every 4s during lockup: #1: 98% system, 0% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle #2: 98% system, 0% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle #3: 98% system, 0% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle #4: 98% system, 0% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle #5: 98% system, 1% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle Modules linked in: irq event stamp: 73096 hardirqs last enabled at (73095): [<ffff80008037bc00>] console_emit_next_record kernel/printk/printk.c:2935 [inline] hardirqs last enabled at (73095): [<ffff80008037bc00>] console_flush_all+0x650/0xb74 kernel/printk/printk.c:2994 hardirqs last disabled at (73096): [<ffff80008af10b00>] __el1_irq arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:533 [inline] hardirqs last disabled at (73096): [<ffff80008af10b00>] el1_interrupt+0x24/0x68 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:551 softirqs last enabled at (73048): [<ffff8000801ea530>] softirq_handle_end kernel/softirq.c:400 [inline] softirqs last enabled at (73048): [<ffff8000801ea530>] handle_softirqs+0xa60/0xc34 kernel/softirq.c:582 softirqs last disabled at (73043): [<ffff800080020de8>] __do_softirq+0x14/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:588 CPU: 0 PID: 6625 Comm: syz-executor782 Tainted: G W 6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-g8867bbd4a056 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024 Testing showed that the problem did not occur if the two error messages -- the first two lines above -- were removed; apparently adding material to the kernel log takes a surprisingly large amount of time. In any case, the best approach for preventing these lockups and to avoid spamming the log with thousands of error messages per second is to ratelimit the two dev_err() calls. Therefore we replace them with dev_err_ratelimited(). Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Suggested-by: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+5f996b83575ef4058638@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/00000000000073d54b061a6a1c65@google.com/ Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+1b2abad17596ad03dcff@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/000000000000f45085061aa9b37e@google.com/ Fixes: 9908a32 ("USB: remove err() macro from usb class drivers") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/40dfa45b-5f21-4eef-a8c1-51a2f320e267@rowland.harvard.edu/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/29855215-52f5-4385-b058-91f42c2bee18@rowland.harvard.edu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Luis has been reporting an assert failure when freeing an inode cluster during inode inactivation for a while. The assert looks like: XFS: Assertion failed: bp->b_flags & XBF_DONE, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans_buf.c, line: 241 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/xfs/xfs_message.c:102! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 4 PID: 73 Comm: kworker/4:1 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc1 #4 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Workqueue: xfs-inodegc/loop5 xfs_inodegc_worker [xfs] RIP: 0010:assfail (fs/xfs/xfs_message.c:102) xfs RSP: 0018:ffff88810188f7f0 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88816e748250 RCX: 1ffffffff844b0e7 RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: ffff88810188f558 RDI: ffffffffc2431fa0 RBP: 1ffff11020311f01 R08: 0000000042431f9f R09: ffffed1020311e9b R10: ffff88810188f4df R11: ffffffffac725d70 R12: ffff88817a3f4000 R13: ffff88812182f000 R14: ffff88810188f998 R15: ffffffffc2423f80 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8881c8400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055fe9d0f109c CR3: 000000014426c002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> xfs_trans_read_buf_map (fs/xfs/xfs_trans_buf.c:241 (discriminator 1)) xfs xfs_imap_to_bp (fs/xfs/xfs_trans.h:210 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_inode_buf.c:138) xfs xfs_inode_item_precommit (fs/xfs/xfs_inode_item.c:145) xfs xfs_trans_run_precommits (fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c:931) xfs __xfs_trans_commit (fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c:966) xfs xfs_inactive_ifree (fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c:1811) xfs xfs_inactive (fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c:2013) xfs xfs_inodegc_worker (fs/xfs/xfs_icache.c:1841 fs/xfs/xfs_icache.c:1886) xfs process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3231) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3306 (discriminator 2) kernel/workqueue.c:3393 (discriminator 2)) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:389) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:257) </TASK> And occurs when the the inode precommit handlers is attempt to look up the inode cluster buffer to attach the inode for writeback. The trail of logic that I can reconstruct is as follows. 1. the inode is clean when inodegc runs, so it is not attached to a cluster buffer when precommit runs. 2. #1 implies the inode cluster buffer may be clean and not pinned by dirty inodes when inodegc runs. 3. #2 implies that the inode cluster buffer can be reclaimed by memory pressure at any time. 4. The assert failure implies that the cluster buffer was attached to the transaction, but not marked done. It had been accessed earlier in the transaction, but not marked done. 5. #4 implies the cluster buffer has been invalidated (i.e. marked stale). 6. #5 implies that the inode cluster buffer was instantiated uninitialised in the transaction in xfs_ifree_cluster(), which only instantiates the buffers to invalidate them and never marks them as done. Given factors 1-3, this issue is highly dependent on timing and environmental factors. Hence the issue can be very difficult to reproduce in some situations, but highly reliable in others. Luis has an environment where it can be reproduced easily by g/531 but, OTOH, I've reproduced it only once in ~2000 cycles of g/531. I think the fix is to have xfs_ifree_cluster() set the XBF_DONE flag on the cluster buffers, even though they may not be initialised. The reasons why I think this is safe are: 1. A buffer cache lookup hit on a XBF_STALE buffer will clear the XBF_DONE flag. Hence all future users of the buffer know they have to re-initialise the contents before use and mark it done themselves. 2. xfs_trans_binval() sets the XFS_BLI_STALE flag, which means the buffer remains locked until the journal commit completes and the buffer is unpinned. Hence once marked XBF_STALE/XFS_BLI_STALE by xfs_ifree_cluster(), the only context that can access the freed buffer is the currently running transaction. 3. #2 implies that future buffer lookups in the currently running transaction will hit the transaction match code and not the buffer cache. Hence XBF_STALE and XFS_BLI_STALE will not be cleared unless the transaction initialises and logs the buffer with valid contents again. At which point, the buffer will be marked marked XBF_DONE again, so having XBF_DONE already set on the stale buffer is a moot point. 4. #2 also implies that any concurrent access to that cluster buffer will block waiting on the buffer lock until the inode cluster has been fully freed and is no longer an active inode cluster buffer. 5. #4 + #1 means that any future user of the disk range of that buffer will always see the range of disk blocks covered by the cluster buffer as not done, and hence must initialise the contents themselves. 6. Setting XBF_DONE in xfs_ifree_cluster() then means the unlinked inode precommit code will see a XBF_DONE buffer from the transaction match as it expects. It can then attach the stale but newly dirtied inode to the stale but newly dirtied cluster buffer without unexpected failures. The stale buffer will then sail through the journal and do the right thing with the attached stale inode during unpin. Hence the fix is just one line of extra code. The explanation of why we have to set XBF_DONE in xfs_ifree_cluster, OTOH, is long and complex.... Fixes: 82842fe ("xfs: fix AGF vs inode cluster buffer deadlock") Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Tested-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org>

…git/netfilter/nf Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter fixes for net The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for net: Patch #1 fixes the suspicious RCU usage warning that resulted from the recent fix for the race between namespace cleanup and gc in ipset left out checking the pernet exit phase when calling rcu_dereference_protected(), from Jozsef Kadlecsik. Patch #2 fixes incorrect input and output netdevice in SRv6 prerouting hooks, from Jianguo Wu. Patch #3 moves nf_hooks_lwtunnel sysctl toggle to the netfilter core. The connection tracking system is loaded on-demand, this ensures availability of this knob regardless. Patch #4-#5 adds selftests for SRv6 netfilter hooks also from Jianguo Wu. netfilter pull request 24-06-19 * tag 'nf-24-06-19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf: selftests: add selftest for the SRv6 End.DX6 behavior with netfilter selftests: add selftest for the SRv6 End.DX4 behavior with netfilter netfilter: move the sysctl nf_hooks_lwtunnel into the netfilter core seg6: fix parameter passing when calling NF_HOOK() in End.DX4 and End.DX6 behaviors netfilter: ipset: Fix suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240619170537.2846-1-pablo@netfilter.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

…play During inode logging (and log replay too), we are holding a transaction handle and we often need to call btrfs_iget(), which will read an inode from its subvolume btree if it's not loaded in memory and that results in allocating an inode with GFP_KERNEL semantics at the btrfs_alloc_inode() callback - and this may recurse into the filesystem in case we are under memory pressure and attempt to commit the current transaction, resulting in a deadlock since the logging (or log replay) task is holding a transaction handle open. Syzbot reported this with the following stack traces: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-00361-g061d1af7b030 #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor.1/9919 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffff8dd3aac0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: might_alloc include/linux/sched/mm.h:334 [inline] ffffffff8dd3aac0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: slab_pre_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3891 [inline] ffffffff8dd3aac0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3981 [inline] ffffffff8dd3aac0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: kmem_cache_alloc_lru_noprof+0x58/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:4020 but task is already holding lock: ffff88804b569358 (&ei->log_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_log_inode+0x39c/0x4660 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6481 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (&ei->log_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:608 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x175/0x9c0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752 btrfs_log_inode+0x39c/0x4660 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6481 btrfs_log_inode_parent+0x8cb/0x2a90 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7079 btrfs_log_dentry_safe+0x59/0x80 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7180 btrfs_sync_file+0x9c1/0xe10 fs/btrfs/file.c:1959 vfs_fsync_range+0x141/0x230 fs/sync.c:188 generic_write_sync include/linux/fs.h:2794 [inline] btrfs_do_write_iter+0x584/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/file.c:1705 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline] vfs_write+0x6b6/0x1140 fs/read_write.c:590 ksys_write+0x12f/0x260 fs/read_write.c:643 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:165 [inline] __do_fast_syscall_32+0x73/0x120 arch/x86/entry/common.c:386 do_fast_syscall_32+0x32/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:411 entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x84/0x8e -> #2 (btrfs_trans_num_extwriters){++++}-{0:0}: join_transaction+0x164/0xf40 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:315 start_transaction+0x427/0x1a70 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:700 btrfs_commit_super+0xa1/0x110 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:4170 close_ctree+0xcb0/0xf90 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:4324 generic_shutdown_super+0x159/0x3d0 fs/super.c:642 kill_anon_super+0x3a/0x60 fs/super.c:1226 btrfs_kill_super+0x3b/0x50 fs/btrfs/super.c:2096 deactivate_locked_super+0xbe/0x1a0 fs/super.c:473 deactivate_super+0xde/0x100 fs/super.c:506 cleanup_mnt+0x222/0x450 fs/namespace.c:1267 task_work_run+0x14e/0x250 kernel/task_work.c:180 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:114 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:328 [inline] __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x278/0x2a0 kernel/entry/common.c:218 __do_fast_syscall_32+0x80/0x120 arch/x86/entry/common.c:389 do_fast_syscall_32+0x32/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:411 entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x84/0x8e -> #1 (btrfs_trans_num_writers){++++}-{0:0}: __lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5468 [inline] lock_release+0x33e/0x6c0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5774 percpu_up_read include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:99 [inline] __sb_end_write include/linux/fs.h:1650 [inline] sb_end_intwrite include/linux/fs.h:1767 [inline] __btrfs_end_transaction+0x5ca/0x920 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:1071 btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_inode+0x228/0x330 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1301 btrfs_evict_inode+0x960/0xe80 fs/btrfs/inode.c:5291 evict+0x2ed/0x6c0 fs/inode.c:667 iput_final fs/inode.c:1741 [inline] iput.part.0+0x5a8/0x7f0 fs/inode.c:1767 iput+0x5c/0x80 fs/inode.c:1757 dentry_unlink_inode+0x295/0x480 fs/dcache.c:400 __dentry_kill+0x1d0/0x600 fs/dcache.c:603 dput.part.0+0x4b1/0x9b0 fs/dcache.c:845 dput+0x1f/0x30 fs/dcache.c:835 ovl_stack_put+0x60/0x90 fs/overlayfs/util.c:132 ovl_destroy_inode+0xc6/0x190 fs/overlayfs/super.c:182 destroy_inode+0xc4/0x1b0 fs/inode.c:311 iput_final fs/inode.c:1741 [inline] iput.part.0+0x5a8/0x7f0 fs/inode.c:1767 iput+0x5c/0x80 fs/inode.c:1757 dentry_unlink_inode+0x295/0x480 fs/dcache.c:400 __dentry_kill+0x1d0/0x600 fs/dcache.c:603 shrink_kill fs/dcache.c:1048 [inline] shrink_dentry_list+0x140/0x5d0 fs/dcache.c:1075 prune_dcache_sb+0xeb/0x150 fs/dcache.c:1156 super_cache_scan+0x32a/0x550 fs/super.c:221 do_shrink_slab+0x44f/0x11c0 mm/shrinker.c:435 shrink_slab_memcg mm/shrinker.c:548 [inline] shrink_slab+0xa87/0x1310 mm/shrinker.c:626 shrink_one+0x493/0x7c0 mm/vmscan.c:4790 shrink_many mm/vmscan.c:4851 [inline] lru_gen_shrink_node+0x89f/0x1750 mm/vmscan.c:4951 shrink_node mm/vmscan.c:5910 [inline] kswapd_shrink_node mm/vmscan.c:6720 [inline] balance_pgdat+0x1105/0x1970 mm/vmscan.c:6911 kswapd+0x5ea/0xbf0 mm/vmscan.c:7180 kthread+0x2c1/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 -> #0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x2478/0x3b30 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 [inline] lock_acquire+0x1b1/0x560 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5719 __fs_reclaim_acquire mm/page_alloc.c:3801 [inline] fs_reclaim_acquire+0x102/0x160 mm/page_alloc.c:3815 might_alloc include/linux/sched/mm.h:334 [inline] slab_pre_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3891 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3981 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_lru_noprof+0x58/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:4020 btrfs_alloc_inode+0x118/0xb20 fs/btrfs/inode.c:8411 alloc_inode+0x5d/0x230 fs/inode.c:261 iget5_locked fs/inode.c:1235 [inline] iget5_locked+0x1c9/0x2c0 fs/inode.c:1228 btrfs_iget_locked fs/btrfs/inode.c:5590 [inline] btrfs_iget_path fs/btrfs/inode.c:5607 [inline] btrfs_iget+0xfb/0x230 fs/btrfs/inode.c:5636 add_conflicting_inode fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:5657 [inline] copy_inode_items_to_log+0x1039/0x1e30 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:5928 btrfs_log_inode+0xa48/0x4660 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6592 log_new_delayed_dentries fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6363 [inline] btrfs_log_inode+0x27dd/0x4660 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6718 btrfs_log_all_parents fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6833 [inline] btrfs_log_inode_parent+0x22ba/0x2a90 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7141 btrfs_log_dentry_safe+0x59/0x80 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7180 btrfs_sync_file+0x9c1/0xe10 fs/btrfs/file.c:1959 vfs_fsync_range+0x141/0x230 fs/sync.c:188 generic_write_sync include/linux/fs.h:2794 [inline] btrfs_do_write_iter+0x584/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/file.c:1705 do_iter_readv_writev+0x504/0x780 fs/read_write.c:741 vfs_writev+0x36f/0xde0 fs/read_write.c:971 do_pwritev+0x1b2/0x260 fs/read_write.c:1072 __do_compat_sys_pwritev2 fs/read_write.c:1218 [inline] __se_compat_sys_pwritev2 fs/read_write.c:1210 [inline] __ia32_compat_sys_pwritev2+0x121/0x1b0 fs/read_write.c:1210 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:165 [inline] __do_fast_syscall_32+0x73/0x120 arch/x86/entry/common.c:386 do_fast_syscall_32+0x32/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:411 entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x84/0x8e other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: fs_reclaim --> btrfs_trans_num_extwriters --> &ei->log_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&ei->log_mutex); lock(btrfs_trans_num_extwriters); lock(&ei->log_mutex); lock(fs_reclaim); *** DEADLOCK *** 7 locks held by syz-executor.1/9919: #0: ffff88802be20420 (sb_writers#23){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: do_pwritev+0x1b2/0x260 fs/read_write.c:1072 #1: ffff888065c0f8f0 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#33){++++}-{3:3}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:791 [inline] #1: ffff888065c0f8f0 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#33){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_inode_lock+0xc8/0x110 fs/btrfs/inode.c:385 #2: ffff888065c0f778 (&ei->i_mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_inode_lock+0xee/0x110 fs/btrfs/inode.c:388 #3: ffff88802be20610 (sb_internal#4){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_sync_file+0x95b/0xe10 fs/btrfs/file.c:1952 #4: ffff8880546323f0 (btrfs_trans_num_writers){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0x430/0xf40 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:290 #5: ffff888054632418 (btrfs_trans_num_extwriters){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0x430/0xf40 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:290 #6: ffff88804b569358 (&ei->log_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_log_inode+0x39c/0x4660 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6481 stack backtrace: CPU: 2 PID: 9919 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-00361-g061d1af7b030 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:114 check_noncircular+0x31a/0x400 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2187 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x2478/0x3b30 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 [inline] lock_acquire+0x1b1/0x560 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5719 __fs_reclaim_acquire mm/page_alloc.c:3801 [inline] fs_reclaim_acquire+0x102/0x160 mm/page_alloc.c:3815 might_alloc include/linux/sched/mm.h:334 [inline] slab_pre_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3891 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3981 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_lru_noprof+0x58/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:4020 btrfs_alloc_inode+0x118/0xb20 fs/btrfs/inode.c:8411 alloc_inode+0x5d/0x230 fs/inode.c:261 iget5_locked fs/inode.c:1235 [inline] iget5_locked+0x1c9/0x2c0 fs/inode.c:1228 btrfs_iget_locked fs/btrfs/inode.c:5590 [inline] btrfs_iget_path fs/btrfs/inode.c:5607 [inline] btrfs_iget+0xfb/0x230 fs/btrfs/inode.c:5636 add_conflicting_inode fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:5657 [inline] copy_inode_items_to_log+0x1039/0x1e30 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:5928 btrfs_log_inode+0xa48/0x4660 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6592 log_new_delayed_dentries fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6363 [inline] btrfs_log_inode+0x27dd/0x4660 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6718 btrfs_log_all_parents fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6833 [inline] btrfs_log_inode_parent+0x22ba/0x2a90 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7141 btrfs_log_dentry_safe+0x59/0x80 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7180 btrfs_sync_file+0x9c1/0xe10 fs/btrfs/file.c:1959 vfs_fsync_range+0x141/0x230 fs/sync.c:188 generic_write_sync include/linux/fs.h:2794 [inline] btrfs_do_write_iter+0x584/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/file.c:1705 do_iter_readv_writev+0x504/0x780 fs/read_write.c:741 vfs_writev+0x36f/0xde0 fs/read_write.c:971 do_pwritev+0x1b2/0x260 fs/read_write.c:1072 __do_compat_sys_pwritev2 fs/read_write.c:1218 [inline] __se_compat_sys_pwritev2 fs/read_write.c:1210 [inline] __ia32_compat_sys_pwritev2+0x121/0x1b0 fs/read_write.c:1210 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:165 [inline] __do_fast_syscall_32+0x73/0x120 arch/x86/entry/common.c:386 do_fast_syscall_32+0x32/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:411 entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x84/0x8e RIP: 0023:0xf7334579 Code: b8 01 10 06 03 (...) RSP: 002b:00000000f5f265ac EFLAGS: 00000292 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000017b RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00000000200002c0 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000292 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Fix this by ensuring we are under a NOFS scope whenever we call btrfs_iget() during inode logging and log replay. Reported-by: syzbot+8576cfa84070dce4d59b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/000000000000274a3a061abbd928@google.com/ Fixes: 712e36c ("btrfs: use GFP_KERNEL in btrfs_alloc_inode") Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

The code in ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() estimates number of necessary transaction credits using ocfs2_calc_extend_credits(). This however does not take into account that the IO could be arbitrarily large and can contain arbitrary number of extents. Extent tree manipulations do often extend the current transaction but not in all of the cases. For example if we have only single block extents in the tree, ocfs2_mark_extent_written() will end up calling ocfs2_replace_extent_rec() all the time and we will never extend the current transaction and eventually exhaust all the transaction credits if the IO contains many single block extents. Once that happens a WARN_ON(jbd2_handle_buffer_credits(handle) <= 0) is triggered in jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata() and subsequently OCFS2 aborts in response to this error. This was actually triggered by one of our customers on a heavily fragmented OCFS2 filesystem. To fix the issue make sure the transaction always has enough credits for one extent insert before each call of ocfs2_mark_extent_written(). Heming Zhao said: ------ PANIC: "Kernel panic - not syncing: OCFS2: (device dm-1): panic forced after error" PID: xxx TASK: xxxx CPU: 5 COMMAND: "SubmitThread-CA" #0 machine_kexec at ffffffff8c069932 #1 __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c1338fa #2 panic at ffffffff8c1d69b9 #3 ocfs2_handle_error at ffffffffc0c86c0c [ocfs2] #4 __ocfs2_abort at ffffffffc0c88387 [ocfs2] #5 ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc0c51e98 [ocfs2] #6 ocfs2_split_extent at ffffffffc0c27ea3 [ocfs2] #7 ocfs2_change_extent_flag at ffffffffc0c28053 [ocfs2] #8 ocfs2_mark_extent_written at ffffffffc0c28347 [ocfs2] #9 ocfs2_dio_end_io_write at ffffffffc0c2bef9 [ocfs2] #10 ocfs2_dio_end_io at ffffffffc0c2c0f5 [ocfs2] #11 dio_complete at ffffffff8c2b9fa7 #12 do_blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff8c2bc09f #13 ocfs2_direct_IO at ffffffffc0c2b653 [ocfs2] #14 generic_file_direct_write at ffffffff8c1dcf14 #15 __generic_file_write_iter at ffffffff8c1dd07b #16 ocfs2_file_write_iter at ffffffffc0c49f1f [ocfs2] #17 aio_write at ffffffff8c2cc72e #18 kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8c248dde #19 do_io_submit at ffffffff8c2ccada #20 do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8c004984 #21 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff8c8000ba Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240617095543.6971-1-jack@suse.cz Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240614145243.8837-1-jack@suse.cz Fixes: c15471f ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io") Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

Bos can be put with multiple unrelated dma-resv locks held. But imported bos attempt to grab the bo dma-resv during dma-buf detach that typically happens during cleanup. That leads to lockde splats similar to the below and a potential ABBA deadlock. Fix this by always taking the delayed workqueue cleanup path for imported bos. Requesting stable fixes from when the Xe driver was introduced, since its usage of drm_exec and wide vm dma_resvs appear to be the first reliable trigger of this. [22982.116427] ============================================ [22982.116428] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected [22982.116429] 6.10.0-rc2+ #10 Tainted: G U W [22982.116430] -------------------------------------------- [22982.116430] glxgears:sh0/5785 is trying to acquire lock: [22982.116431] ffff8c2bafa539a8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dma_buf_detach+0x3b/0xf0 [22982.116438] but task is already holding lock: [22982.116438] ffff8c2d9aba6da8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: drm_exec_lock_obj+0x49/0x2b0 [drm_exec] [22982.116442] other info that might help us debug this: [22982.116442] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [22982.116443] CPU0 [22982.116444] ---- [22982.116444] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [22982.116445] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [22982.116447] *** DEADLOCK *** [22982.116447] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [22982.116448] 5 locks held by glxgears:sh0/5785: [22982.116449] #0: ffff8c2d9aba58c8 (&xef->vm.lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: xe_file_close+0xde/0x1c0 [xe] [22982.116507] #1: ffff8c2e28cc8480 (&vm->lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: xe_vm_close_and_put+0x161/0x9b0 [xe] [22982.116578] #2: ffff8c2e31982970 (&val->lock){.+.+}-{3:3}, at: xe_validation_ctx_init+0x6d/0x70 [xe] [22982.116647] #3: ffffacdc469478a8 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: xe_vma_destroy_unlocked+0x7f/0xe0 [xe] [22982.116716] #4: ffff8c2d9aba6da8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: drm_exec_lock_obj+0x49/0x2b0 [drm_exec] [22982.116719] stack backtrace: [22982.116720] CPU: 8 PID: 5785 Comm: glxgears:sh0 Tainted: G U W 6.10.0-rc2+ #10 [22982.116721] Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME B560M-A AC, BIOS 2001 02/01/2023 [22982.116723] Call Trace: [22982.116724] <TASK> [22982.116725] dump_stack_lvl+0x77/0xb0 [22982.116727] __lock_acquire+0x1232/0x2160 [22982.116730] lock_acquire+0xcb/0x2d0 [22982.116732] ? dma_buf_detach+0x3b/0xf0 [22982.116734] ? __lock_acquire+0x417/0x2160 [22982.116736] __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.0+0xd0/0x13b0 [22982.116738] ? dma_buf_detach+0x3b/0xf0 [22982.116741] ? dma_buf_detach+0x3b/0xf0 [22982.116743] ? ww_mutex_lock+0x2b/0x90 [22982.116745] ww_mutex_lock+0x2b/0x90 [22982.116747] dma_buf_detach+0x3b/0xf0 [22982.116749] drm_prime_gem_destroy+0x2f/0x40 [drm] [22982.116775] xe_ttm_bo_destroy+0x32/0x220 [xe] [22982.116818] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x3a/0x290 [22982.116821] drm_exec_unlock_all+0xa1/0xd0 [drm_exec] [22982.116823] drm_exec_fini+0x12/0xb0 [drm_exec] [22982.116824] xe_validation_ctx_fini+0x15/0x40 [xe] [22982.116892] xe_vma_destroy_unlocked+0xb1/0xe0 [xe] [22982.116959] xe_vm_close_and_put+0x41a/0x9b0 [xe] [22982.117025] ? xa_find+0xe3/0x1e0 [22982.117028] xe_file_close+0x10a/0x1c0 [xe] [22982.117074] drm_file_free+0x22a/0x280 [drm] [22982.117099] drm_release_noglobal+0x22/0x70 [drm] [22982.117119] __fput+0xf1/0x2d0 [22982.117122] task_work_run+0x59/0x90 [22982.117125] do_exit+0x330/0xb40 [22982.117127] do_group_exit+0x36/0xa0 [22982.117129] get_signal+0xbd2/0xbe0 [22982.117131] arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x3e/0x240 [22982.117134] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1e7/0x290 [22982.117137] do_syscall_64+0xa1/0x180 [22982.117139] ? lock_acquire+0xcb/0x2d0 [22982.117140] ? __set_task_comm+0x28/0x1e0 [22982.117141] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 [22982.117144] ? __set_task_comm+0xe1/0x1e0 [22982.117145] ? lock_release+0xca/0x290 [22982.117147] ? __do_sys_prctl+0x245/0xab0 [22982.117149] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xde/0x190 [22982.117150] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xb0/0x290 [22982.117152] ? do_syscall_64+0xa1/0x180 [22982.117154] ? __lock_acquire+0x417/0x2160 [22982.117155] ? reacquire_held_locks+0xd1/0x1f0 [22982.117156] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x30c/0x790 [22982.117158] ? lock_acquire+0xcb/0x2d0 [22982.117160] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 [22982.117162] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x357/0x790 [22982.117163] ? lock_release+0xca/0x290 [22982.117164] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x361/0x790 [22982.117166] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0x4b/0xc0 [22982.117168] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x45/0xa0 [22982.117170] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x45/0xa0 [22982.117172] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x45/0xa0 [22982.117174] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [22982.117176] RIP: 0033:0x7f943d267169 [22982.117192] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f943d26713f. [22982.117193] RSP: 002b:00007f9430bffc80 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000ca [22982.117195] RAX: fffffffffffffe00 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f943d267169 [22982.117196] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000189 RDI: 00005622f89579d0 [22982.117197] RBP: 00007f9430bffcb0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffffffff [22982.117198] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [22982.117199] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00005622f89579d0 [22982.117202] </TASK> Fixes: dd08ebf ("drm/xe: Introduce a new DRM driver for Intel GPUs") Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch> Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: intel-xe@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.8+ Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240628153848.4989-1-thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com

Use a dedicated mutex to guard kvm_usage_count to fix a potential deadlock on x86 due to a chain of locks and SRCU synchronizations. Translating the below lockdep splat, CPU1 #6 will wait on CPU0 #1, CPU0 #8 will wait on CPU2 #3, and CPU2 #7 will wait on CPU1 #4 (if there's a writer, due to the fairness of r/w semaphores). CPU0 CPU1 CPU2 1 lock(&kvm->slots_lock); 2 lock(&vcpu->mutex); 3 lock(&kvm->srcu); 4 lock(cpu_hotplug_lock); 5 lock(kvm_lock); 6 lock(&kvm->slots_lock); 7 lock(cpu_hotplug_lock); 8 sync(&kvm->srcu); Note, there are likely more potential deadlocks in KVM x86, e.g. the same pattern of taking cpu_hotplug_lock outside of kvm_lock likely exists with __kvmclock_cpufreq_notifier(), but actually triggering such deadlocks is beyond rare due to the combination of dependencies and timings involved. E.g. the cpufreq notifier is only used on older CPUs without a constant TSC, mucking with the NX hugepage mitigation while VMs are running is very uncommon, and doing so while also onlining/offlining a CPU (necessary to generate contention on cpu_hotplug_lock) would be even more unusual. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.10.0-smp--c257535a0c9d-pip #330 Tainted: G S O ------------------------------------------------------ tee/35048 is trying to acquire lock: ff6a80eced71e0a8 (&kvm->slots_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: set_nx_huge_pages+0x179/0x1e0 [kvm] but task is already holding lock: ffffffffc07abb08 (kvm_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: set_nx_huge_pages+0x14a/0x1e0 [kvm] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (kvm_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x6a/0xb40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1f/0x30 kvm_dev_ioctl+0x4fb/0xe50 [kvm] __se_sys_ioctl+0x7b/0xd0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x21/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x15d0/0x2e60 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #2 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: cpus_read_lock+0x2e/0xb0 static_key_slow_inc+0x16/0x30 kvm_lapic_set_base+0x6a/0x1c0 [kvm] kvm_set_apic_base+0x8f/0xe0 [kvm] kvm_set_msr_common+0x9ae/0xf80 [kvm] vmx_set_msr+0xa54/0xbe0 [kvm_intel] __kvm_set_msr+0xb6/0x1a0 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0xeca/0x10c0 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x485/0x5b0 [kvm] __se_sys_ioctl+0x7b/0xd0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x21/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x15d0/0x2e60 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #1 (&kvm->srcu){.+.+}-{0:0}: __synchronize_srcu+0x44/0x1a0 synchronize_srcu_expedited+0x21/0x30 kvm_swap_active_memslots+0x110/0x1c0 [kvm] kvm_set_memslot+0x360/0x620 [kvm] __kvm_set_memory_region+0x27b/0x300 [kvm] kvm_vm_ioctl_set_memory_region+0x43/0x60 [kvm] kvm_vm_ioctl+0x295/0x650 [kvm] __se_sys_ioctl+0x7b/0xd0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x21/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x15d0/0x2e60 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #0 (&kvm->slots_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x15ef/0x2e30 lock_acquire+0xe0/0x260 __mutex_lock+0x6a/0xb40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1f/0x30 set_nx_huge_pages+0x179/0x1e0 [kvm] param_attr_store+0x93/0x100 module_attr_store+0x22/0x40 sysfs_kf_write+0x81/0xb0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x133/0x1d0 vfs_write+0x28d/0x380 ksys_write+0x70/0xe0 __x64_sys_write+0x1f/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x281b/0x2e60 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Cc: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com> Fixes: 0bf5049 ("KVM: Drop kvm_count_lock and instead protect kvm_usage_count with kvm_lock") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>

Use a dedicated mutex to guard kvm_usage_count to fix a potential deadlock on x86 due to a chain of locks and SRCU synchronizations. Translating the below lockdep splat, CPU1 #6 will wait on CPU0 #1, CPU0 #8 will wait on CPU2 #3, and CPU2 #7 will wait on CPU1 #4 (if there's a writer, due to the fairness of r/w semaphores). CPU0 CPU1 CPU2 1 lock(&kvm->slots_lock); 2 lock(&vcpu->mutex); 3 lock(&kvm->srcu); 4 lock(cpu_hotplug_lock); 5 lock(kvm_lock); 6 lock(&kvm->slots_lock); 7 lock(cpu_hotplug_lock); 8 sync(&kvm->srcu); Note, there are likely more potential deadlocks in KVM x86, e.g. the same pattern of taking cpu_hotplug_lock outside of kvm_lock likely exists with __kvmclock_cpufreq_notifier(), but actually triggering such deadlocks is beyond rare due to the combination of dependencies and timings involved. E.g. the cpufreq notifier is only used on older CPUs without a constant TSC, mucking with the NX hugepage mitigation while VMs are running is very uncommon, and doing so while also onlining/offlining a CPU (necessary to generate contention on cpu_hotplug_lock) would be even more unusual. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.10.0-smp--c257535a0c9d-pip #330 Tainted: G S O ------------------------------------------------------ tee/35048 is trying to acquire lock: ff6a80eced71e0a8 (&kvm->slots_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: set_nx_huge_pages+0x179/0x1e0 [kvm] but task is already holding lock: ffffffffc07abb08 (kvm_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: set_nx_huge_pages+0x14a/0x1e0 [kvm] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (kvm_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x6a/0xb40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1f/0x30 kvm_dev_ioctl+0x4fb/0xe50 [kvm] __se_sys_ioctl+0x7b/0xd0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x21/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x15d0/0x2e60 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #2 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: cpus_read_lock+0x2e/0xb0 static_key_slow_inc+0x16/0x30 kvm_lapic_set_base+0x6a/0x1c0 [kvm] kvm_set_apic_base+0x8f/0xe0 [kvm] kvm_set_msr_common+0x9ae/0xf80 [kvm] vmx_set_msr+0xa54/0xbe0 [kvm_intel] __kvm_set_msr+0xb6/0x1a0 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0xeca/0x10c0 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x485/0x5b0 [kvm] __se_sys_ioctl+0x7b/0xd0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x21/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x15d0/0x2e60 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #1 (&kvm->srcu){.+.+}-{0:0}: __synchronize_srcu+0x44/0x1a0 synchronize_srcu_expedited+0x21/0x30 kvm_swap_active_memslots+0x110/0x1c0 [kvm] kvm_set_memslot+0x360/0x620 [kvm] __kvm_set_memory_region+0x27b/0x300 [kvm] kvm_vm_ioctl_set_memory_region+0x43/0x60 [kvm] kvm_vm_ioctl+0x295/0x650 [kvm] __se_sys_ioctl+0x7b/0xd0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x21/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x15d0/0x2e60 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #0 (&kvm->slots_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x15ef/0x2e30 lock_acquire+0xe0/0x260 __mutex_lock+0x6a/0xb40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1f/0x30 set_nx_huge_pages+0x179/0x1e0 [kvm] param_attr_store+0x93/0x100 module_attr_store+0x22/0x40 sysfs_kf_write+0x81/0xb0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x133/0x1d0 vfs_write+0x28d/0x380 ksys_write+0x70/0xe0 __x64_sys_write+0x1f/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x281b/0x2e60 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Cc: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com> Fixes: 0bf5049 ("KVM: Drop kvm_count_lock and instead protect kvm_usage_count with kvm_lock") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Message-ID: <20240608000639.3295768-2-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Use a dedicated mutex to guard kvm_usage_count to fix a potential deadlock on x86 due to a chain of locks and SRCU synchronizations. Translating the below lockdep splat, CPU1 #6 will wait on CPU0 #1, CPU0 #8 will wait on CPU2 #3, and CPU2 #7 will wait on CPU1 #4 (if there's a writer, due to the fairness of r/w semaphores). CPU0 CPU1 CPU2 1 lock(&kvm->slots_lock); 2 lock(&vcpu->mutex); 3 lock(&kvm->srcu); 4 lock(cpu_hotplug_lock); 5 lock(kvm_lock); 6 lock(&kvm->slots_lock); 7 lock(cpu_hotplug_lock); 8 sync(&kvm->srcu); Note, there are likely more potential deadlocks in KVM x86, e.g. the same pattern of taking cpu_hotplug_lock outside of kvm_lock likely exists with __kvmclock_cpufreq_notifier(): cpuhp_cpufreq_online() | -> cpufreq_online() | -> cpufreq_gov_performance_limits() | -> __cpufreq_driver_target() | -> __target_index() | -> cpufreq_freq_transition_begin() | -> cpufreq_notify_transition() | -> ... __kvmclock_cpufreq_notifier() But, actually triggering such deadlocks is beyond rare due to the combination of dependencies and timings involved. E.g. the cpufreq notifier is only used on older CPUs without a constant TSC, mucking with the NX hugepage mitigation while VMs are running is very uncommon, and doing so while also onlining/offlining a CPU (necessary to generate contention on cpu_hotplug_lock) would be even more unusual. The most robust solution to the general cpu_hotplug_lock issue is likely to switch vm_list to be an RCU-protected list, e.g. so that x86's cpufreq notifier doesn't to take kvm_lock. For now, settle for fixing the most blatant deadlock, as switching to an RCU-protected list is a much more involved change, but add a comment in locking.rst to call out that care needs to be taken when walking holding kvm_lock and walking vm_list. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.10.0-smp--c257535a0c9d-pip #330 Tainted: G S O ------------------------------------------------------ tee/35048 is trying to acquire lock: ff6a80eced71e0a8 (&kvm->slots_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: set_nx_huge_pages+0x179/0x1e0 [kvm] but task is already holding lock: ffffffffc07abb08 (kvm_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: set_nx_huge_pages+0x14a/0x1e0 [kvm] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (kvm_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x6a/0xb40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1f/0x30 kvm_dev_ioctl+0x4fb/0xe50 [kvm] __se_sys_ioctl+0x7b/0xd0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x21/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x15d0/0x2e60 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #2 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: cpus_read_lock+0x2e/0xb0 static_key_slow_inc+0x16/0x30 kvm_lapic_set_base+0x6a/0x1c0 [kvm] kvm_set_apic_base+0x8f/0xe0 [kvm] kvm_set_msr_common+0x9ae/0xf80 [kvm] vmx_set_msr+0xa54/0xbe0 [kvm_intel] __kvm_set_msr+0xb6/0x1a0 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0xeca/0x10c0 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x485/0x5b0 [kvm] __se_sys_ioctl+0x7b/0xd0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x21/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x15d0/0x2e60 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #1 (&kvm->srcu){.+.+}-{0:0}: __synchronize_srcu+0x44/0x1a0 synchronize_srcu_expedited+0x21/0x30 kvm_swap_active_memslots+0x110/0x1c0 [kvm] kvm_set_memslot+0x360/0x620 [kvm] __kvm_set_memory_region+0x27b/0x300 [kvm] kvm_vm_ioctl_set_memory_region+0x43/0x60 [kvm] kvm_vm_ioctl+0x295/0x650 [kvm] __se_sys_ioctl+0x7b/0xd0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x21/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x15d0/0x2e60 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #0 (&kvm->slots_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x15ef/0x2e30 lock_acquire+0xe0/0x260 __mutex_lock+0x6a/0xb40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1f/0x30 set_nx_huge_pages+0x179/0x1e0 [kvm] param_attr_store+0x93/0x100 module_attr_store+0x22/0x40 sysfs_kf_write+0x81/0xb0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x133/0x1d0 vfs_write+0x28d/0x380 ksys_write+0x70/0xe0 __x64_sys_write+0x1f/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x281b/0x2e60 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Cc: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com> Fixes: 0bf5049 ("KVM: Drop kvm_count_lock and instead protect kvm_usage_count with kvm_lock") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Tested-by: Farrah Chen <farrah.chen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-ID: <20240830043600.127750-2-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Syzkaller reported a lockdep splat: ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.11.0-rc6-syzkaller-00019-g67784a74e258 #0 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- syz-executor364/5113 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8880449f1958 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] ffff8880449f1958 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sk_clone_lock+0x2cd/0xf40 net/core/sock.c:2328 but task is already holding lock: ffff88803fe3cb58 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] ffff88803fe3cb58 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sk_clone_lock+0x2cd/0xf40 net/core/sock.c:2328 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(k-slock-AF_INET); lock(k-slock-AF_INET); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 7 locks held by syz-executor364/5113: #0: ffff8880449f0e18 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1607 [inline] #0: ffff8880449f0e18 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_sendmsg+0x153/0x1b10 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1806 #1: ffff88803fe39ad8 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1607 [inline] #1: ffff88803fe39ad8 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_sendmsg_fastopen+0x11f/0x530 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1727 #2: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:326 [inline] #2: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:838 [inline] #2: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __ip_queue_xmit+0x5f/0x1b80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:470 #3: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:326 [inline] #3: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:838 [inline] #3: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x45f/0x1390 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:228 #4: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: local_lock_acquire include/linux/local_lock_internal.h:29 [inline] #4: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: process_backlog+0x33b/0x15b0 net/core/dev.c:6104 #5: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:326 [inline] #5: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:838 [inline] #5: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_local_deliver_finish+0x230/0x5f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:232 #6: ffff88803fe3cb58 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] #6: ffff88803fe3cb58 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sk_clone_lock+0x2cd/0xf40 net/core/sock.c:2328 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5113 Comm: syz-executor364 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc6-syzkaller-00019-g67784a74e258 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:93 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:119 check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3061 [inline] validate_chain+0x15d3/0x5900 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3855 __lock_acquire+0x137a/0x2040 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5142 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5759 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] sk_clone_lock+0x2cd/0xf40 net/core/sock.c:2328 mptcp_sk_clone_init+0x32/0x13c0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:3279 subflow_syn_recv_sock+0x931/0x1920 net/mptcp/subflow.c:874 tcp_check_req+0xfe4/0x1a20 net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c:853 tcp_v4_rcv+0x1c3e/0x37f0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2267 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x22e/0x440 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x341/0x5f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233 NF_HOOK+0x3a4/0x450 include/linux/netfilter.h:314 NF_HOOK+0x3a4/0x450 include/linux/netfilter.h:314 __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5661 [inline] __netif_receive_skb+0x2bf/0x650 net/core/dev.c:5775 process_backlog+0x662/0x15b0 net/core/dev.c:6108 __napi_poll+0xcb/0x490 net/core/dev.c:6772 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6841 [inline] net_rx_action+0x89b/0x1240 net/core/dev.c:6963 handle_softirqs+0x2c4/0x970 kernel/softirq.c:554 do_softirq+0x11b/0x1e0 kernel/softirq.c:455 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0x1bb/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:382 local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 [inline] rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:908 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1763/0x3e90 net/core/dev.c:4450 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3105 [inline] neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:526 [inline] neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:540 [inline] ip_finish_output2+0xd41/0x1390 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:235 ip_local_out net/ipv4/ip_output.c:129 [inline] __ip_queue_xmit+0x118c/0x1b80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:535 __tcp_transmit_skb+0x2544/0x3b30 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1466 tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6542 [inline] tcp_rcv_state_process+0x2c32/0x4570 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6729 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x77d/0xc70 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1934 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:1111 [inline] __release_sock+0x214/0x350 net/core/sock.c:3004 release_sock+0x61/0x1f0 net/core/sock.c:3558 mptcp_sendmsg_fastopen+0x1ad/0x530 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1733 mptcp_sendmsg+0x1884/0x1b10 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1812 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x1a6/0x270 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2597 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2651 [inline] __sys_sendmmsg+0x3b2/0x740 net/socket.c:2737 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2766 [inline] __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2763 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xa0/0xb0 net/socket.c:2763 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f04fb13a6b9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 01 1a 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffd651f42d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f04fb13a6b9 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000d00 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007ffd651f4310 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000020000080 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000f4240 R13: 00007f04fb187449 R14: 00007ffd651f42f4 R15: 00007ffd651f4300 </TASK> As noted by Cong Wang, the splat is false positive, but the code path leading to the report is an unexpected one: a client is attempting an MPC handshake towards the in-kernel listener created by the in-kernel PM for a port based signal endpoint. Such connection will be never accepted; many of them can make the listener queue full and preventing the creation of MPJ subflow via such listener - its intended role. Explicitly detect this scenario at initial-syn time and drop the incoming MPC request. Fixes: 1729cf1 ("mptcp: create the listening socket for new port") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+f4aacdfef2c6a6529c3e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=f4aacdfef2c6a6529c3e Cc: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <martineau@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241014-net-mptcp-mpc-port-endp-v2-1-7faea8e6b6ae@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Hou Tao says: ==================== The patch set fixes several issues in bits iterator. Patch #1 fixes the kmemleak problem of bits iterator. Patch #2~#3 fix the overflow problem of nr_bits. Patch #4 fixes the potential stack corruption when bits iterator is used on 32-bit host. Patch #5 adds more test cases for bits iterator. Please see the individual patches for more details. And comments are always welcome. --- v4: * patch #1: add ack from Yafang * patch #3: revert code-churn like changes: (1) compute nr_bytes and nr_bits before the check of nr_words. (2) use nr_bits == 64 to check for single u64, preventing build warning on 32-bit hosts. * patch #4: use "BITS_PER_LONG == 32" instead of "!defined(CONFIG_64BIT)" v3: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241025013233.804027-1-houtao@huaweicloud.com/T/#t * split the bits-iterator related patches from "Misc fixes for bpf" patch set * patch #1: use "!nr_bits || bits >= nr_bits" to stop the iteration * patch #2: add a new helper for the overflow problem * patch #3: decrease the limitation from 512 to 511 and check whether nr_bytes is too large for bpf memory allocator explicitly * patch #5: add two more test cases for bit iterator v2: http://lore.kernel.org/bpf/d49fa2f4-f743-c763-7579-c3cab4dd88cb@huaweicloud.com ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241030100516.3633640-1-houtao@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

Petr Machata says: ==================== mlxsw: Fixes In this patchset: - Tx header should be pushed for each packet which is transmitted via Spectrum ASICs. Patch #1 adds a missing call to skb_cow_head() to make sure that there is both enough room to push the Tx header and that the SKB header is not cloned and can be modified. - Commit b5b60bb ("mlxsw: pci: Use page pool for Rx buffers allocation") converted mlxsw to use page pool for Rx buffers allocation. Sync for CPU and for device should be done for Rx pages. In patches #2 and #3, add the missing calls to sync pages for, respectively, CPU and the device. - Patch #4 then fixes a bug to IPv6 GRE forwarding offload. Patch #5 adds a generic forwarding test that fails with mlxsw ports prior to the fix. ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/cover.1729866134.git.petrm@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Intel TDX protects guest VM's from malicious host and certain physical attacks. TDX introduces a new operation mode, Secure Arbitration Mode (SEAM) to isolate and protect guest VM's. A TDX guest VM runs in SEAM and, unlike VMX, direct control and interaction with the guest by the host VMM is not possible. Instead, Intel TDX Module, which also runs in SEAM, provides a SEAMCALL API. The SEAMCALL that provides the ability to enter a guest is TDH.VP.ENTER. The TDX Module processes TDH.VP.ENTER, and enters the guest via VMX VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME instructions. When a guest VM-exit requires host VMM interaction, the TDH.VP.ENTER SEAMCALL returns to the host VMM (KVM). Add tdh_vp_enter() to wrap the SEAMCALL invocation of TDH.VP.ENTER. TDH.VP.ENTER is different from other SEAMCALLS in several ways: - it may take some time to return as the guest executes - it uses more arguments - after it returns some host state may need to be restored TDH.VP.ENTER arguments are passed through General Purpose Registers (GPRs). For the special case of the TD guest invoking TDG.VP.VMCALL, nearly any GPR can be used, as well as XMM0 to XMM15. Notably, RBP is not used, and Linux mandates the TDX Module feature NO_RBP_MOD, which is enforced elsewhere. Additionally, XMM registers are not required for the existing Guest Hypervisor Communication Interface and are handled by existing KVM code should they be modified by the guest. There are 2 input formats and 5 output formats for TDH.VP.ENTER arguments. Input #1 : Initial entry or following a previous async. TD Exit Input #2 : Following a previous TDCALL(TDG.VP.VMCALL) Output #1 : On Error (No TD Entry) Output #2 : Async. Exits with a VMX Architectural Exit Reason Output #3 : Async. Exits with a non-VMX TD Exit Status Output #4 : Async. Exits with Cross-TD Exit Details Output #5 : On TDCALL(TDG.VP.VMCALL) Currently, to keep things simple, the wrapper function does not attempt to support different formats, and just passes all the GPRs that could be used. The GPR values are held by KVM in the area set aside for guest GPRs. KVM code uses the guest GPR area (vcpu->arch.regs[]) to set up for or process results of tdh_vp_enter(). Therefore changing tdh_vp_enter() to use more complex argument formats would also alter the way KVM code interacts with tdh_vp_enter(). Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> --- -Kai: - This is not nice, but for now have no clue on improvement.

Intel TDX protects guest VM's from malicious host and certain physical attacks. TDX introduces a new operation mode, Secure Arbitration Mode (SEAM) to isolate and protect guest VM's. A TDX guest VM runs in SEAM and, unlike VMX, direct control and interaction with the guest by the host VMM is not possible. Instead, Intel TDX Module, which also runs in SEAM, provides a SEAMCALL API. The SEAMCALL that provides the ability to enter a guest is TDH.VP.ENTER. The TDX Module processes TDH.VP.ENTER, and enters the guest via VMX VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME instructions. When a guest VM-exit requires host VMM interaction, the TDH.VP.ENTER SEAMCALL returns to the host VMM (KVM). Add tdh_vp_enter() to wrap the SEAMCALL invocation of TDH.VP.ENTER. TDH.VP.ENTER is different from other SEAMCALLS in several ways: - it may take some time to return as the guest executes - it uses more arguments - after it returns some host state may need to be restored TDH.VP.ENTER arguments are passed through General Purpose Registers (GPRs). For the special case of the TD guest invoking TDG.VP.VMCALL, nearly any GPR can be used, as well as XMM0 to XMM15. Notably, RBP is not used, and Linux mandates the TDX Module feature NO_RBP_MOD, which is enforced elsewhere. Additionally, XMM registers are not required for the existing Guest Hypervisor Communication Interface and are handled by existing KVM code should they be modified by the guest. There are 2 input formats and 5 output formats for TDH.VP.ENTER arguments. Input #1 : Initial entry or following a previous async. TD Exit Input #2 : Following a previous TDCALL(TDG.VP.VMCALL) Output #1 : On Error (No TD Entry) Output #2 : Async. Exits with a VMX Architectural Exit Reason Output #3 : Async. Exits with a non-VMX TD Exit Status Output #4 : Async. Exits with Cross-TD Exit Details Output #5 : On TDCALL(TDG.VP.VMCALL) Currently, to keep things simple, the wrapper function does not attempt to support different formats, and just passes all the GPRs that could be used. The GPR values are held by KVM in the area set aside for guest GPRs. KVM code uses the guest GPR area (vcpu->arch.regs[]) to set up for or process results of tdh_vp_enter(). Therefore changing tdh_vp_enter() to use more complex argument formats would also alter the way KVM code interacts with tdh_vp_enter(). Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>

Intel TDX protects guest VM's from malicious host and certain physical attacks. TDX introduces a new operation mode, Secure Arbitration Mode (SEAM) to isolate and protect guest VM's. A TDX guest VM runs in SEAM and, unlike VMX, direct control and interaction with the guest by the host VMM is not possible. Instead, Intel TDX Module, which also runs in SEAM, provides a SEAMCALL API. The SEAMCALL that provides the ability to enter a guest is TDH.VP.ENTER. The TDX Module processes TDH.VP.ENTER, and enters the guest via VMX VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME instructions. When a guest VM-exit requires host VMM interaction, the TDH.VP.ENTER SEAMCALL returns to the host VMM (KVM). Add tdh_vp_enter() to wrap the SEAMCALL invocation of TDH.VP.ENTER. TDH.VP.ENTER is different from other SEAMCALLS in several ways: - it may take some time to return as the guest executes - it uses more arguments - after it returns some host state may need to be restored TDH.VP.ENTER arguments are passed through General Purpose Registers (GPRs). For the special case of the TD guest invoking TDG.VP.VMCALL, nearly any GPR can be used, as well as XMM0 to XMM15. Notably, RBP is not used, and Linux mandates the TDX Module feature NO_RBP_MOD, which is enforced elsewhere. Additionally, XMM registers are not required for the existing Guest Hypervisor Communication Interface and are handled by existing KVM code should they be modified by the guest. There are 2 input formats and 5 output formats for TDH.VP.ENTER arguments. Input #1 : Initial entry or following a previous async. TD Exit Input #2 : Following a previous TDCALL(TDG.VP.VMCALL) Output #1 : On Error (No TD Entry) Output #2 : Async. Exits with a VMX Architectural Exit Reason Output #3 : Async. Exits with a non-VMX TD Exit Status Output #4 : Async. Exits with Cross-TD Exit Details Output #5 : On TDCALL(TDG.VP.VMCALL) Currently, to keep things simple, the wrapper function does not attempt to support different formats, and just passes all the GPRs that could be used. The GPR values are held by KVM in the area set aside for guest GPRs. KVM code uses the guest GPR area (vcpu->arch.regs[]) to set up for or process results of tdh_vp_enter(). Therefore changing tdh_vp_enter() to use more complex argument formats would also alter the way KVM code interacts with tdh_vp_enter(). Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> --- -Kai: - This is not nice, but for now have no clue on improvement.

Intel TDX protects guest VM's from malicious host and certain physical attacks. TDX introduces a new operation mode, Secure Arbitration Mode (SEAM) to isolate and protect guest VM's. A TDX guest VM runs in SEAM and, unlike VMX, direct control and interaction with the guest by the host VMM is not possible. Instead, Intel TDX Module, which also runs in SEAM, provides a SEAMCALL API. The SEAMCALL that provides the ability to enter a guest is TDH.VP.ENTER. The TDX Module processes TDH.VP.ENTER, and enters the guest via VMX VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME instructions. When a guest VM-exit requires host VMM interaction, the TDH.VP.ENTER SEAMCALL returns to the host VMM (KVM). Add tdh_vp_enter() to wrap the SEAMCALL invocation of TDH.VP.ENTER. TDH.VP.ENTER is different from other SEAMCALLS in several ways: - it may take some time to return as the guest executes - it uses more arguments - after it returns some host state may need to be restored TDH.VP.ENTER arguments are passed through General Purpose Registers (GPRs). For the special case of the TD guest invoking TDG.VP.VMCALL, nearly any GPR can be used, as well as XMM0 to XMM15. Notably, RBP is not used, and Linux mandates the TDX Module feature NO_RBP_MOD, which is enforced elsewhere. Additionally, XMM registers are not required for the existing Guest Hypervisor Communication Interface and are handled by existing KVM code should they be modified by the guest. There are 2 input formats and 5 output formats for TDH.VP.ENTER arguments. Input #1 : Initial entry or following a previous async. TD Exit Input #2 : Following a previous TDCALL(TDG.VP.VMCALL) Output #1 : On Error (No TD Entry) Output #2 : Async. Exits with a VMX Architectural Exit Reason Output #3 : Async. Exits with a non-VMX TD Exit Status Output #4 : Async. Exits with Cross-TD Exit Details Output #5 : On TDCALL(TDG.VP.VMCALL) Currently, to keep things simple, the wrapper function does not attempt to support different formats, and just passes all the GPRs that could be used. The GPR values are held by KVM in the area set aside for guest GPRs. KVM code uses the guest GPR area (vcpu->arch.regs[]) to set up for or process results of tdh_vp_enter(). Therefore changing tdh_vp_enter() to use more complex argument formats would also alter the way KVM code interacts with tdh_vp_enter(). Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Message-ID: <20241121201448.36170-2-adrian.hunter@intel.com> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Intel TDX protects guest VM's from malicious host and certain physical attacks. TDX introduces a new operation mode, Secure Arbitration Mode (SEAM) to isolate and protect guest VM's. A TDX guest VM runs in SEAM and, unlike VMX, direct control and interaction with the guest by the host VMM is not possible. Instead, Intel TDX Module, which also runs in SEAM, provides a SEAMCALL API. The SEAMCALL that provides the ability to enter a guest is TDH.VP.ENTER. The TDX Module processes TDH.VP.ENTER, and enters the guest via VMX VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME instructions. When a guest VM-exit requires host VMM interaction, the TDH.VP.ENTER SEAMCALL returns to the host VMM (KVM). Add tdh_vp_enter() to wrap the SEAMCALL invocation of TDH.VP.ENTER; tdh_vp_enter() needs to be noinstr because VM entry in KVM is noinstr as well, which is for two reasons: * marking the area as CT_STATE_GUEST via guest_state_enter_irqoff() and guest_state_exit_irqoff() * IRET must be avoided between VM-exit and NMI handling, in order to avoid prematurely releasing the NMI inhibit. TDH.VP.ENTER is different from other SEAMCALLs in several ways: it uses more arguments, and after it returns some host state may need to be restored. Therefore tdh_vp_enter() uses __seamcall_saved_ret() instead of __seamcall_ret(); since it is the only caller of __seamcall_saved_ret(), it can be made noinstr also. TDH.VP.ENTER arguments are passed through General Purpose Registers (GPRs). For the special case of the TD guest invoking TDG.VP.VMCALL, nearly any GPR can be used, as well as XMM0 to XMM15. Notably, RBP is not used, and Linux mandates the TDX Module feature NO_RBP_MOD, which is enforced elsewhere. Additionally, XMM registers are not required for the existing Guest Hypervisor Communication Interface and are handled by existing KVM code should they be modified by the guest. There are 2 input formats and 5 output formats for TDH.VP.ENTER arguments. Input #1 : Initial entry or following a previous async. TD Exit Input #2 : Following a previous TDCALL(TDG.VP.VMCALL) Output #1 : On Error (No TD Entry) Output #2 : Async. Exits with a VMX Architectural Exit Reason Output #3 : Async. Exits with a non-VMX TD Exit Status Output #4 : Async. Exits with Cross-TD Exit Details Output #5 : On TDCALL(TDG.VP.VMCALL) Currently, to keep things simple, the wrapper function does not attempt to support different formats, and just passes all the GPRs that could be used. The GPR values are held by KVM in the area set aside for guest GPRs. KVM code uses the guest GPR area (vcpu->arch.regs[]) to set up for or process results of tdh_vp_enter(). Therefore changing tdh_vp_enter() to use more complex argument formats would also alter the way KVM code interacts with tdh_vp_enter(). Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Message-ID: <20241121201448.36170-2-adrian.hunter@intel.com> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

…/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.14, take #4 - Fix a couple of bugs affecting pKVM's PSCI relay implementation when running in the hVHE mode, resulting in the host being entered with the MMU in an unknown state, and EL2 being in the wrong mode.

Intel TDX protects guest VM's from malicious host and certain physical attacks. TDX introduces a new operation mode, Secure Arbitration Mode (SEAM) to isolate and protect guest VM's. A TDX guest VM runs in SEAM and, unlike VMX, direct control and interaction with the guest by the host VMM is not possible. Instead, Intel TDX Module, which also runs in SEAM, provides a SEAMCALL API. The SEAMCALL that provides the ability to enter a guest is TDH.VP.ENTER. The TDX Module processes TDH.VP.ENTER, and enters the guest via VMX VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME instructions. When a guest VM-exit requires host VMM interaction, the TDH.VP.ENTER SEAMCALL returns to the host VMM (KVM). Add tdh_vp_enter() to wrap the SEAMCALL invocation of TDH.VP.ENTER; tdh_vp_enter() needs to be noinstr because VM entry in KVM is noinstr as well, which is for two reasons: * marking the area as CT_STATE_GUEST via guest_state_enter_irqoff() and guest_state_exit_irqoff() * IRET must be avoided between VM-exit and NMI handling, in order to avoid prematurely releasing the NMI inhibit. TDH.VP.ENTER is different from other SEAMCALLs in several ways: it uses more arguments, and after it returns some host state may need to be restored. Therefore tdh_vp_enter() uses __seamcall_saved_ret() instead of __seamcall_ret(); since it is the only caller of __seamcall_saved_ret(), it can be made noinstr also. TDH.VP.ENTER arguments are passed through General Purpose Registers (GPRs). For the special case of the TD guest invoking TDG.VP.VMCALL, nearly any GPR can be used, as well as XMM0 to XMM15. Notably, RBP is not used, and Linux mandates the TDX Module feature NO_RBP_MOD, which is enforced elsewhere. Additionally, XMM registers are not required for the existing Guest Hypervisor Communication Interface and are handled by existing KVM code should they be modified by the guest. There are 2 input formats and 5 output formats for TDH.VP.ENTER arguments. Input #1 : Initial entry or following a previous async. TD Exit Input #2 : Following a previous TDCALL(TDG.VP.VMCALL) Output #1 : On Error (No TD Entry) Output #2 : Async. Exits with a VMX Architectural Exit Reason Output #3 : Async. Exits with a non-VMX TD Exit Status Output #4 : Async. Exits with Cross-TD Exit Details Output #5 : On TDCALL(TDG.VP.VMCALL) Currently, to keep things simple, the wrapper function does not attempt to support different formats, and just passes all the GPRs that could be used. The GPR values are held by KVM in the area set aside for guest GPRs. KVM code uses the guest GPR area (vcpu->arch.regs[]) to set up for or process results of tdh_vp_enter(). Therefore changing tdh_vp_enter() to use more complex argument formats would also alter the way KVM code interacts with tdh_vp_enter(). Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Message-ID: <20241121201448.36170-2-adrian.hunter@intel.com> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Use raw_spinlock in order to fix spurious messages about invalid context when spinlock debugging is enabled. The lock is only used to serialize register access. [ 4.239592] ============================= [ 4.239595] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] [ 4.239599] 6.13.0-rc7-arm64-renesas-05496-gd088502a519f #35 Not tainted [ 4.239603] ----------------------------- [ 4.239606] kworker/u8:5/76 is trying to lock: [ 4.239609] ffff0000091898a0 (&p->lock){....}-{3:3}, at: gpio_rcar_config_interrupt_input_mode+0x34/0x164 [ 4.239641] other info that might help us debug this: [ 4.239643] context-{5:5} [ 4.239646] 5 locks held by kworker/u8:5/76: [ 4.239651] #0: ffff0000080fb148 ((wq_completion)async){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x190/0x62c [ 4.250180] OF: /soc/sound@ec500000/ports/port@0/endpoint: Read of boolean property 'frame-master' with a value. [ 4.254094] #1: ffff80008299bd80 ((work_completion)(&entry->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1b8/0x62c [ 4.254109] #2: ffff00000920c8f8 [ 4.258345] OF: /soc/sound@ec500000/ports/port@1/endpoint: Read of boolean property 'bitclock-master' with a value. [ 4.264803] (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __device_attach_async_helper+0x3c/0xdc [ 4.264820] #3: ffff00000a50ca40 (request_class#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __setup_irq+0xa0/0x690 [ 4.264840] #4: [ 4.268872] OF: /soc/sound@ec500000/ports/port@1/endpoint: Read of boolean property 'frame-master' with a value. [ 4.273275] ffff00000a50c8c8 (lock_class){....}-{2:2}, at: __setup_irq+0xc4/0x690 [ 4.296130] renesas_sdhi_internal_dmac ee100000.mmc: mmc1 base at 0x00000000ee100000, max clock rate 200 MHz [ 4.304082] stack backtrace: [ 4.304086] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 76 Comm: kworker/u8:5 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc7-arm64-renesas-05496-gd088502a519f #35 [ 4.304092] Hardware name: Renesas Salvator-X 2nd version board based on r8a77965 (DT) [ 4.304097] Workqueue: async async_run_entry_fn [ 4.304106] Call trace: [ 4.304110] show_stack+0x14/0x20 (C) [ 4.304122] dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x90 [ 4.304131] dump_stack+0x14/0x1c [ 4.304138] __lock_acquire+0xdfc/0x1584 [ 4.426274] lock_acquire+0x1c4/0x33c [ 4.429942] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80 [ 4.434307] gpio_rcar_config_interrupt_input_mode+0x34/0x164 [ 4.440061] gpio_rcar_irq_set_type+0xd4/0xd8 [ 4.444422] __irq_set_trigger+0x5c/0x178 [ 4.448435] __setup_irq+0x2e4/0x690 [ 4.452012] request_threaded_irq+0xc4/0x190 [ 4.456285] devm_request_threaded_irq+0x7c/0xf4 [ 4.459398] ata1: link resume succeeded after 1 retries [ 4.460902] mmc_gpiod_request_cd_irq+0x68/0xe0 [ 4.470660] mmc_start_host+0x50/0xac [ 4.474327] mmc_add_host+0x80/0xe4 [ 4.477817] tmio_mmc_host_probe+0x2b0/0x440 [ 4.482094] renesas_sdhi_probe+0x488/0x6f4 [ 4.486281] renesas_sdhi_internal_dmac_probe+0x60/0x78 [ 4.491509] platform_probe+0x64/0xd8 [ 4.495178] really_probe+0xb8/0x2a8 [ 4.498756] __driver_probe_device+0x74/0x118 [ 4.503116] driver_probe_device+0x3c/0x154 [ 4.507303] __device_attach_driver+0xd4/0x160 [ 4.511750] bus_for_each_drv+0x84/0xe0 [ 4.515588] __device_attach_async_helper+0xb0/0xdc [ 4.520470] async_run_entry_fn+0x30/0xd8 [ 4.524481] process_one_work+0x210/0x62c [ 4.528494] worker_thread+0x1ac/0x340 [ 4.532245] kthread+0x10c/0x110 [ 4.535476] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Signed-off-by: Niklas Söderlund <niklas.soderlund+renesas@ragnatech.se> Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250121135833.3769310-1-niklas.soderlund+renesas@ragnatech.se Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@linaro.org>

…cal section A circular lock dependency splat has been seen involving down_trylock(): ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.12.0-41.el10.s390x+debug ------------------------------------------------------ dd/32479 is trying to acquire lock: 0015a20accd0d4f8 ((console_sem).lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: down_trylock+0x26/0x90 but task is already holding lock: 000000017e461698 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: rmqueue_bulk+0xac/0x8f0 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #4 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #3 (hrtimer_bases.lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #2 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #1 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #0 ((console_sem).lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: The console_sem -> pi_lock dependency is due to calling try_to_wake_up() while holding the console_sem raw_spinlock. This dependency can be broken by using wake_q to do the wakeup instead of calling try_to_wake_up() under the console_sem lock. This will also make the semaphore's raw_spinlock become a terminal lock without taking any further locks underneath it. The hrtimer_bases.lock is a raw_spinlock while zone->lock is a spinlock. The hrtimer_bases.lock -> zone->lock dependency happens via the debug_objects_fill_pool() helper function in the debugobjects code. -> #4 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: __lock_acquire+0xe86/0x1cc0 lock_acquire.part.0+0x258/0x630 lock_acquire+0xb8/0xe0 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xb4/0x120 rmqueue_bulk+0xac/0x8f0 __rmqueue_pcplist+0x580/0x830 rmqueue_pcplist+0xfc/0x470 rmqueue.isra.0+0xdec/0x11b0 get_page_from_freelist+0x2ee/0xeb0 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x2c2/0x520 alloc_pages_mpol_noprof+0x1fc/0x4d0 alloc_pages_noprof+0x8c/0xe0 allocate_slab+0x320/0x460 ___slab_alloc+0xa58/0x12b0 __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x42/0x60 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x304/0x350 fill_pool+0xf6/0x450 debug_object_activate+0xfe/0x360 enqueue_hrtimer+0x34/0x190 __run_hrtimer+0x3c8/0x4c0 __hrtimer_run_queues+0x1b2/0x260 hrtimer_interrupt+0x316/0x760 do_IRQ+0x9a/0xe0 do_irq_async+0xf6/0x160 Normally a raw_spinlock to spinlock dependency is not legitimate and will be warned if CONFIG_PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING is enabled, but debug_objects_fill_pool() is an exception as it explicitly allows this dependency for non-PREEMPT_RT kernel without causing PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING lockdep splat. As a result, this dependency is legitimate and not a bug. Anyway, semaphore is the only locking primitive left that is still using try_to_wake_up() to do wakeup inside critical section, all the other locking primitives had been migrated to use wake_q to do wakeup outside of the critical section. It is also possible that there are other circular locking dependencies involving printk/console_sem or other existing/new semaphores lurking somewhere which may show up in the future. Let just do the migration now to wake_q to avoid headache like this. Reported-by: yzbot+ed801a886dfdbfe7136d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250307232717.1759087-3-boqun.feng@gmail.com

Commit 7da55c2 ("drm/amd/display: Remove incorrect FP context start") removes the FP context protection of dml2_create(), and it said "All the DC_FP_START/END should be used before call anything from DML2". However, dml2_validate()/dml21_validate() are not protected from their callers, causing such errors: do_fpu invoked from kernel context![#1]: CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 331 Comm: kworker/10:1H Not tainted 6.14.0-rc6+ #4 Workqueue: events_highpri dm_irq_work_func [amdgpu] pc ffff800003191eb0 ra ffff800003191e60 tp 9000000107a94000 sp 9000000107a975b0 a0 9000000140ce4910 a1 0000000000000000 a2 9000000140ce49b0 a3 9000000140ce49a8 a4 9000000140ce49a8 a5 0000000100000000 a6 0000000000000001 a7 9000000107a97660 t0 ffff800003790000 t1 9000000140ce5000 t2 0000000000000001 t3 0000000000000000 t4 0000000000000004 t5 0000000000000000 t6 0000000000000000 t7 0000000000000000 t8 0000000100000000 u0 ffff8000031a3b9c s9 9000000130bc0000 s0 9000000132400000 s1 9000000140ec0000 s2 9000000132400000 s3 9000000140ce0000 s4 90000000057f8b88 s5 9000000140ec0000 s6 9000000140ce4910 s7 0000000000000001 s8 9000000130d45010 ra: ffff800003191e60 dml21_map_dc_state_into_dml_display_cfg+0x40/0x1140 [amdgpu] ERA: ffff800003191eb0 dml21_map_dc_state_into_dml_display_cfg+0x90/0x1140 [amdgpu] CRMD: 000000b0 (PLV0 -IE -DA +PG DACF=CC DACM=CC -WE) PRMD: 00000004 (PPLV0 +PIE -PWE) EUEN: 00000000 (-FPE -SXE -ASXE -BTE) ECFG: 00071c1d (LIE=0,2-4,10-12 VS=7) ESTAT: 000f0000 [FPD] (IS= ECode=15 EsubCode=0) PRID: 0014d010 (Loongson-64bit, Loongson-3C6000/S) Process kworker/10:1H (pid: 331, threadinfo=000000007bf9ddb0, task=00000000cc4ab9f3) Stack : 0000000100000000 0000043800000780 0000000100000001 0000000100000001 0000000000000000 0000078000000000 0000000000000438 0000078000000000 0000000000000438 0000078000000000 0000000000000438 0000000100000000 0000000100000000 0000000100000000 0000000100000000 0000000100000000 0000000000000001 9000000140ec0000 9000000132400000 9000000132400000 ffff800003408000 ffff800003408000 9000000132400000 9000000140ce0000 9000000140ce0000 ffff800003193850 0000000000000001 9000000140ec0000 9000000132400000 9000000140ec0860 9000000140ec0738 0000000000000001 90000001405e8000 9000000130bc0000 9000000140ec02a8 ffff8000031b5db8 0000000000000000 0000043800000780 0000000000000003 ffff8000031b79cc ... Call Trace: [<ffff800003191eb0>] dml21_map_dc_state_into_dml_display_cfg+0x90/0x1140 [amdgpu] [<ffff80000319384c>] dml21_validate+0xcc/0x520 [amdgpu] [<ffff8000031b8948>] dc_validate_global_state+0x2e8/0x460 [amdgpu] [<ffff800002e94034>] create_validate_stream_for_sink+0x3d4/0x420 [amdgpu] [<ffff800002e940e4>] amdgpu_dm_connector_mode_valid+0x64/0x240 [amdgpu] [<900000000441d6b8>] drm_connector_mode_valid+0x38/0x80 [<900000000441d824>] __drm_helper_update_and_validate+0x124/0x3e0 [<900000000441ddc0>] drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes+0x2e0/0x620 [<90000000044050dc>] drm_client_modeset_probe+0x23c/0x1780 [<9000000004420384>] __drm_fb_helper_initial_config_and_unlock+0x44/0x5a0 [<9000000004403acc>] drm_client_dev_hotplug+0xcc/0x140 [<ffff800002e9ab50>] handle_hpd_irq_helper+0x1b0/0x1e0 [amdgpu] [<90000000038f5da0>] process_one_work+0x160/0x300 [<90000000038f6718>] worker_thread+0x318/0x440 [<9000000003901b8c>] kthread+0x12c/0x220 [<90000000038b1484>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x8/0xa4 Unfortunately, protecting dml2_validate()/dml21_validate() out of DML2 causes "sleeping function called from invalid context", so protect them with DC_FP_START() and DC_FP_END() inside. Fixes: 7da55c2 ("drm/amd/display: Remove incorrect FP context start") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn> Tested-by: Dongyan Qian <qiandongyan@loongson.cn> Reviewed-by: Aurabindo Pillai <aurabindo.pillai@amd.com> Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>

If we finds a vq without a name in our input array in virtio_ccw_find_vqs(), we treat it as "non-existing" and set the vq pointer to NULL; we will not call virtio_ccw_setup_vq() to allocate/setup a vq. Consequently, we create only a queue if it actually exists (name != NULL) and assign an incremental queue index to each such existing queue. However, in virtio_ccw_register_adapter_ind()->get_airq_indicator() we will not ignore these "non-existing queues", but instead assign an airq indicator to them. Besides never releasing them in virtio_ccw_drop_indicators() (because there is no virtqueue), the bigger issue seems to be that there will be a disagreement between the device and the Linux guest about the airq indicator to be used for notifying a queue, because the indicator bit for adapter I/O interrupt is derived from the queue index. The virtio spec states under "Setting Up Two-Stage Queue Indicators": ... indicator contains the guest address of an area wherein the indicators for the devices are contained, starting at bit_nr, one bit per virtqueue of the device. And further in "Notification via Adapter I/O Interrupts": For notifying the driver of virtqueue buffers, the device sets the bit in the guest-provided indicator area at the corresponding offset. For example, QEMU uses in virtio_ccw_notify() the queue index (passed as "vector") to select the relevant indicator bit. If a queue does not exist, it does not have a corresponding indicator bit assigned, because it effectively doesn't have a queue index. Using a virtio-balloon-ccw device under QEMU with free-page-hinting disabled ("free-page-hint=off") but free-page-reporting enabled ("free-page-reporting=on") will result in free page reporting not working as expected: in the virtio_balloon driver, we'll be stuck forever in virtballoon_free_page_report()->wait_event(), because the waitqueue will not be woken up as the notification from the device is lost: it would use the wrong indicator bit. Free page reporting stops working and we get splats (when configured to detect hung wqs) like: INFO: task kworker/1:3:463 blocked for more than 61 seconds. Not tainted 6.14.0 #4 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:kworker/1:3 [...] Workqueue: events page_reporting_process Call Trace: [<000002f404e6dfb2>] __schedule+0x402/0x1640 [<000002f404e6f22e>] schedule+0x3e/0xe0 [<000002f3846a88fa>] virtballoon_free_page_report+0xaa/0x110 [virtio_balloon] [<000002f40435c8a4>] page_reporting_process+0x2e4/0x740 [<000002f403fd3ee2>] process_one_work+0x1c2/0x400 [<000002f403fd4b96>] worker_thread+0x296/0x420 [<000002f403fe10b4>] kthread+0x124/0x290 [<000002f403f4e0dc>] __ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [<000002f404e77272>] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x38 There was recently a discussion [1] whether the "holes" should be treated differently again, effectively assigning also non-existing queues a queue index: that should also fix the issue, but requires other workarounds to not break existing setups. Let's fix it without affecting existing setups for now by properly ignoring the non-existing queues, so the indicator bits will match the queue indexes. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1720611677.git.mst@redhat.com/ Fixes: a229989 ("virtio: don't allocate vqs when names[i] = NULL") Reported-by: Chandra Merla <cmerla@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Tested-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250402203621.940090-1-david@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>

There is a potential deadlock if we do report zones in an IO context, detailed in below lockdep report. When one process do a report zones and another process freezes the block device, the report zones side cannot allocate a tag because the freeze is already started. This can thus result in new block group creation to hang forever, blocking the write path. Thankfully, a new block group should be created on empty zones. So, reporting the zones is not necessary and we can set the write pointer = 0 and load the zone capacity from the block layer using bdev_zone_capacity() helper. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.14.0-rc1 #252 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ modprobe/1110 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888100ac83e0 ((work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x38f/0xb60 but task is already holding lock: ffff8881205b6f20 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#16){++++}-{0:0}, at: sd_remove+0x85/0x130 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#16){++++}-{0:0}: blk_queue_enter+0x3d9/0x500 blk_mq_alloc_request+0x47d/0x8e0 scsi_execute_cmd+0x14f/0xb80 sd_zbc_do_report_zones+0x1c1/0x470 sd_zbc_report_zones+0x362/0xd60 blkdev_report_zones+0x1b1/0x2e0 btrfs_get_dev_zones+0x215/0x7e0 [btrfs] btrfs_load_block_group_zone_info+0x6d2/0x2c10 [btrfs] btrfs_make_block_group+0x36b/0x870 [btrfs] btrfs_create_chunk+0x147d/0x2320 [btrfs] btrfs_chunk_alloc+0x2ce/0xcf0 [btrfs] start_transaction+0xce6/0x1620 [btrfs] btrfs_uuid_scan_kthread+0x4ee/0x5b0 [btrfs] kthread+0x39d/0x750 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #2 (&fs_info->dev_replace.rwsem){++++}-{4:4}: down_read+0x9b/0x470 btrfs_map_block+0x2ce/0x2ce0 [btrfs] btrfs_submit_chunk+0x2d4/0x16c0 [btrfs] btrfs_submit_bbio+0x16/0x30 [btrfs] btree_write_cache_pages+0xb5a/0xf90 [btrfs] do_writepages+0x17f/0x7b0 __writeback_single_inode+0x114/0xb00 writeback_sb_inodes+0x52b/0xe00 wb_writeback+0x1a7/0x800 wb_workfn+0x12a/0xbd0 process_one_work+0x85a/0x1460 worker_thread+0x5e2/0xfc0 kthread+0x39d/0x750 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #1 (&fs_info->zoned_meta_io_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0x1aa/0x1360 btree_write_cache_pages+0x252/0xf90 [btrfs] do_writepages+0x17f/0x7b0 __writeback_single_inode+0x114/0xb00 writeback_sb_inodes+0x52b/0xe00 wb_writeback+0x1a7/0x800 wb_workfn+0x12a/0xbd0 process_one_work+0x85a/0x1460 worker_thread+0x5e2/0xfc0 kthread+0x39d/0x750 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x2f52/0x5ea0 lock_acquire+0x1b1/0x540 __flush_work+0x3ac/0xb60 wb_shutdown+0x15b/0x1f0 bdi_unregister+0x172/0x5b0 del_gendisk+0x841/0xa20 sd_remove+0x85/0x130 device_release_driver_internal+0x368/0x520 bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0 device_del+0x3bd/0x9c0 __scsi_remove_device+0x272/0x340 scsi_forget_host+0xf7/0x170 scsi_remove_host+0xd2/0x2a0 sdebug_driver_remove+0x52/0x2f0 [scsi_debug] device_release_driver_internal+0x368/0x520 bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0 device_del+0x3bd/0x9c0 device_unregister+0x13/0xa0 sdebug_do_remove_host+0x1fb/0x290 [scsi_debug] scsi_debug_exit+0x17/0x70 [scsi_debug] __do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x321/0x520 do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work) --> &fs_info->dev_replace.rwsem --> &q->q_usage_counter(queue)#16 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#16); lock(&fs_info->dev_replace.rwsem); lock(&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#16); lock((work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work)); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by modprobe/1110: #0: ffff88811f7bc108 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x8f/0x520 #1: ffff8881022ee0e0 (&shost->scan_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: scsi_remove_host+0x20/0x2a0 #2: ffff88811b4c4378 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x8f/0x520 #3: ffff8881205b6f20 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#16){++++}-{0:0}, at: sd_remove+0x85/0x130 #4: ffffffffa3284360 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: __flush_work+0xda/0xb60 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1110 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.14.0-rc1 #252 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6a/0x90 print_circular_bug.cold+0x1e0/0x274 check_noncircular+0x306/0x3f0 ? __pfx_check_noncircular+0x10/0x10 ? mark_lock+0xf5/0x1650 ? __pfx_check_irq_usage+0x10/0x10 ? lockdep_lock+0xca/0x1c0 ? __pfx_lockdep_lock+0x10/0x10 __lock_acquire+0x2f52/0x5ea0 ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_mark_lock+0x10/0x10 lock_acquire+0x1b1/0x540 ? __flush_work+0x38f/0xb60 ? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10 ? mark_held_locks+0x94/0xe0 ? __flush_work+0x38f/0xb60 __flush_work+0x3ac/0xb60 ? __flush_work+0x38f/0xb60 ? __pfx_mark_lock+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___flush_work+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___might_resched+0x10/0x10 ? mark_held_locks+0x94/0xe0 wb_shutdown+0x15b/0x1f0 bdi_unregister+0x172/0x5b0 ? __pfx_bdi_unregister+0x10/0x10 ? up_write+0x1ba/0x510 del_gendisk+0x841/0xa20 ? __pfx_del_gendisk+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x35/0x60 ? __pm_runtime_resume+0x79/0x110 sd_remove+0x85/0x130 device_release_driver_internal+0x368/0x520 ? kobject_put+0x5d/0x4a0 bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0 device_del+0x3bd/0x9c0 ? __pfx_device_del+0x10/0x10 __scsi_remove_device+0x272/0x340 scsi_forget_host+0xf7/0x170 scsi_remove_host+0xd2/0x2a0 sdebug_driver_remove+0x52/0x2f0 [scsi_debug] ? kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0xc0/0xf0 device_release_driver_internal+0x368/0x520 ? kobject_put+0x5d/0x4a0 bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0 device_del+0x3bd/0x9c0 ? __pfx_device_del+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x10/0x10 device_unregister+0x13/0xa0 sdebug_do_remove_host+0x1fb/0x290 [scsi_debug] scsi_debug_exit+0x17/0x70 [scsi_debug] __do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x321/0x520 ? __pfx___do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_slab_free_after_rcu_debug+0x10/0x10 ? kasan_save_stack+0x2c/0x50 ? kasan_record_aux_stack+0xa3/0xb0 ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0xc4/0xfb0 ? kmem_cache_free+0x3a0/0x590 ? __x64_sys_close+0x78/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180 ? lock_is_held_type+0xd5/0x130 ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x3c0/0xfb0 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100 ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x3c0/0xfb0 ? __pfx___call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x10/0x10 ? kmem_cache_free+0x3a0/0x590 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x16d/0x400 ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100 ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180 ? __pfx___x64_sys_openat+0x10/0x10 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x16d/0x400 ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100 ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f436712b68b RSP: 002b:00007ffe9f1a8658 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005559b367fd80 RCX: 00007f436712b68b RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 00005559b367fde8 RBP: 00007ffe9f1a8680 R08: 1999999999999999 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f43671a5fe0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffe9f1a86b0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> Reported-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com> CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 6.13+ Tested-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota <naohiro.aota@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

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