From b75d9ecbbc624fcc75f92696ddbd9dcf296465f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Leonardo Grasso Date: Fri, 1 Sep 2023 18:47:11 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] update(rules): keep deprecated rules only in falco-deprecated_rules.yaml Signed-off-by: Leonardo Grasso --- rules/falco-deprecated_rules.yaml | 3624 +---------------------------- 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 3578 deletions(-) diff --git a/rules/falco-deprecated_rules.yaml b/rules/falco-deprecated_rules.yaml index a675f5f63..f37a15a5a 100644 --- a/rules/falco-deprecated_rules.yaml +++ b/rules/falco-deprecated_rules.yaml @@ -26,30 +26,6 @@ # However the Falco rules file does not use them by default. - required_engine_version: 17 -# Currently disabled as read/write are ignored syscalls. The nearly -# similar open_write/open_read check for files being opened for -# reading/writing. -# - macro: write -# condition: (syscall.type=write and fd.type in (file, directory)) -# - macro: read -# condition: (syscall.type=read and evt.dir=> and fd.type in (file, directory)) - -- macro: open_write - condition: (evt.type in (open,openat,openat2) and evt.is_open_write=true and fd.typechar='f' and fd.num>=0) - -- macro: open_read - condition: (evt.type in (open,openat,openat2) and evt.is_open_read=true and fd.typechar='f' and fd.num>=0) - -- macro: open_directory - condition: (evt.type in (open,openat,openat2) and evt.is_open_read=true and fd.typechar='d' and fd.num>=0) - -# Failed file open attempts, useful to detect threat actors making mistakes -# https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man3/errno.3.html -# evt.res=ENOENT - No such file or directory -# evt.res=EACCESS - Permission denied -- macro: open_file_failed - condition: (evt.type in (open,openat,openat2) and fd.typechar='f' and fd.num=-1 and evt.res startswith E) - # This macro `never_true` is used as placeholder for tuning negative logical sub-expressions, for example # - macro: allowed_ssh_hosts # condition: (never_true) @@ -58,307 +34,9 @@ # When tuning the rule you can override the macro with something useful, e.g. # - macro: allowed_ssh_hosts # condition: (evt.hostname contains xyz) - - macro: never_true condition: (evt.num=0) -# This macro `always_true` is the flip side of the macro `never_true` and currently is commented out as -# it is not used. You can use it as placeholder for a positive logical sub-expression tuning template -# macro, e.g. `and custom_procs`, where -# - macro: custom_procs -# condition: (always_true) -# later you can customize, override the macros to something like -# - macro: custom_procs -# condition: (proc.name in (custom1, custom2, custom3)) - -# - macro: always_true -# condition: (evt.num>=0) - -# In some cases, such as dropped system call events, information about -# the process name may be missing. For some rules that really depend -# on the identity of the process performing an action such as opening -# a file, etc., we require that the process name be known. -- macro: proc_name_exists - condition: (proc.name!="") - -- macro: rename - condition: (evt.type in (rename, renameat, renameat2)) - -- macro: mkdir - condition: (evt.type in (mkdir, mkdirat)) - -- macro: remove - condition: (evt.type in (rmdir, unlink, unlinkat)) - -- macro: modify - condition: (rename or remove) - -# %evt.arg.flags available for evt.dir=>, but only for umount2 -# %evt.arg.name is path and available for evt.dir=< -# - macro: umount -# condition: (evt.type in (umount, umount2)) - -- macro: spawned_process - condition: (evt.type in (execve, execveat) and evt.dir=<) - -- macro: create_symlink - condition: (evt.type in (symlink, symlinkat) and evt.dir=<) - -- macro: create_hardlink - condition: (evt.type in (link, linkat) and evt.dir=<) - -- macro: chmod - condition: (evt.type in (chmod, fchmod, fchmodat) and evt.dir=<) - -- macro: kernel_module_load - condition: (evt.type in (init_module, finit_module) and evt.dir=<) - -- macro: dup - condition: (evt.type in (dup, dup2, dup3)) - -# File categories -- macro: bin_dir - condition: (fd.directory in (/bin, /sbin, /usr/bin, /usr/sbin)) - -- macro: bin_dir_mkdir - condition: > - (evt.arg.path startswith /bin/ or - evt.arg.path startswith /sbin/ or - evt.arg.path startswith /usr/bin/ or - evt.arg.path startswith /usr/sbin/) - -- macro: bin_dir_rename - condition: > - (evt.arg.path startswith /bin/ or - evt.arg.path startswith /sbin/ or - evt.arg.path startswith /usr/bin/ or - evt.arg.path startswith /usr/sbin/ or - evt.arg.name startswith /bin/ or - evt.arg.name startswith /sbin/ or - evt.arg.name startswith /usr/bin/ or - evt.arg.name startswith /usr/sbin/ or - evt.arg.oldpath startswith /bin/ or - evt.arg.oldpath startswith /sbin/ or - evt.arg.oldpath startswith /usr/bin/ or - evt.arg.oldpath startswith /usr/sbin/ or - evt.arg.newpath startswith /bin/ or - evt.arg.newpath startswith /sbin/ or - evt.arg.newpath startswith /usr/bin/ or - evt.arg.newpath startswith /usr/sbin/) - -- macro: etc_dir - condition: (fd.name startswith /etc/) - -# This detects writes immediately below / or any write anywhere below /root -- macro: root_dir - condition: (fd.directory=/ or fd.name startswith /root/) - -- list: shell_binaries - items: [ash, bash, csh, ksh, sh, tcsh, zsh, dash] - -- list: ssh_binaries - items: [ - sshd, sftp-server, ssh-agent, - ssh, scp, sftp, - ssh-keygen, ssh-keysign, ssh-keyscan, ssh-add - ] - -- list: shell_mgmt_binaries - items: [add-shell, remove-shell] - -- macro: shell_procs - condition: (proc.name in (shell_binaries)) - -- list: coreutils_binaries - items: [ - truncate, sha1sum, numfmt, fmt, fold, uniq, cut, who, - groups, csplit, sort, expand, printf, printenv, unlink, tee, chcon, stat, - basename, split, nice, "yes", whoami, sha224sum, hostid, users, stdbuf, - base64, unexpand, cksum, od, paste, nproc, pathchk, sha256sum, wc, test, - comm, arch, du, factor, sha512sum, md5sum, tr, runcon, env, dirname, - tsort, join, shuf, install, logname, pinky, nohup, expr, pr, tty, timeout, - tail, "[", seq, sha384sum, nl, head, id, mkfifo, sum, dircolors, ptx, shred, - tac, link, chroot, vdir, chown, touch, ls, dd, uname, "true", pwd, date, - chgrp, chmod, mktemp, cat, mknod, sync, ln, "false", rm, mv, cp, echo, - readlink, sleep, stty, mkdir, df, dir, rmdir, touch - ] - -# dpkg -L login | grep bin | xargs ls -ld | grep -v '^d' | awk '{print $9}' | xargs -L 1 basename | tr "\\n" "," -- list: login_binaries - items: [ - login, systemd, '"(systemd)"', systemd-logind, su, - nologin, faillog, lastlog, newgrp, sg - ] - -# dpkg -L passwd | grep bin | xargs ls -ld | grep -v '^d' | awk '{print $9}' | xargs -L 1 basename | tr "\\n" "," -- list: passwd_binaries - items: [ - shadowconfig, grpck, pwunconv, grpconv, pwck, - groupmod, vipw, pwconv, useradd, newusers, cppw, chpasswd, usermod, - groupadd, groupdel, grpunconv, chgpasswd, userdel, chage, chsh, - gpasswd, chfn, expiry, passwd, vigr, cpgr, adduser, addgroup, deluser, delgroup - ] - -# repoquery -l shadow-utils | grep bin | xargs ls -ld | grep -v '^d' | -# awk '{print $9}' | xargs -L 1 basename | tr "\\n" "," -- list: shadowutils_binaries - items: [ - chage, gpasswd, lastlog, newgrp, sg, adduser, deluser, chpasswd, - groupadd, groupdel, addgroup, delgroup, groupmems, groupmod, grpck, grpconv, grpunconv, - newusers, pwck, pwconv, pwunconv, useradd, userdel, usermod, vigr, vipw, unix_chkpwd - ] - -- list: sysdigcloud_binaries - items: [setup-backend, dragent, sdchecks] - -- list: k8s_binaries - items: [hyperkube, skydns, kube2sky, exechealthz, weave-net, loopback, bridge, openshift-sdn, openshift] - -- list: lxd_binaries - items: [lxd, lxcfs] - -- list: http_server_binaries - items: [nginx, httpd, httpd-foregroun, lighttpd, apache, apache2] - -- list: db_server_binaries - items: [mysqld, postgres, sqlplus] - -- list: postgres_mgmt_binaries - items: [pg_dumpall, pg_ctl, pg_lsclusters, pg_ctlcluster] - -- list: nosql_server_binaries - items: [couchdb, memcached, redis-server, rabbitmq-server, mongod] - -- list: gitlab_binaries - items: [gitlab-shell, gitlab-mon, gitlab-runner-b, git] - -- list: interpreted_binaries - items: [lua, node, perl, perl5, perl6, php, python, python2, python3, ruby, tcl] - -- macro: interpreted_procs - condition: > - (proc.name in (interpreted_binaries)) - -- macro: server_procs - condition: (proc.name in (http_server_binaries, db_server_binaries, docker_binaries, sshd)) - -# The explicit quotes are needed to avoid the - characters being -# interpreted by the filter expression. -- list: rpm_binaries - items: [dnf, dnf-automatic, rpm, rpmkey, yum, '"75-system-updat"', rhsmcertd-worke, rhsmcertd, subscription-ma, - repoquery, rpmkeys, rpmq, yum-cron, yum-config-mana, yum-debug-dump, - abrt-action-sav, rpmdb_stat, microdnf, rhn_check, yumdb] - -- list: openscap_rpm_binaries - items: [probe_rpminfo, probe_rpmverify, probe_rpmverifyfile, probe_rpmverifypackage] - -- macro: rpm_procs - condition: (proc.name in (rpm_binaries, openscap_rpm_binaries) or proc.name in (salt-call, salt-minion)) - -- list: deb_binaries - items: [dpkg, dpkg-preconfigu, dpkg-reconfigur, dpkg-divert, apt, apt-get, aptitude, - frontend, preinst, add-apt-reposit, apt-auto-remova, apt-key, - apt-listchanges, unattended-upgr, apt-add-reposit, apt-cache, apt.systemd.dai - ] -- list: python_package_managers - items: [pip, pip3, conda] - -# The truncated dpkg-preconfigu is intentional, process names are -# truncated at the falcosecurity-libs level. -- list: package_mgmt_binaries - items: [rpm_binaries, deb_binaries, update-alternat, gem, npm, python_package_managers, sane-utils.post, alternatives, chef-client, apk, snapd] - -- macro: package_mgmt_procs - condition: (proc.name in (package_mgmt_binaries)) - -- macro: package_mgmt_ancestor_procs - condition: (proc.pname in (package_mgmt_binaries) or - proc.aname[2] in (package_mgmt_binaries) or - proc.aname[3] in (package_mgmt_binaries) or - proc.aname[4] in (package_mgmt_binaries)) - -- macro: coreos_write_ssh_dir - condition: (proc.name=update-ssh-keys and fd.name startswith /home/core/.ssh) - -- macro: run_by_package_mgmt_binaries - condition: (proc.aname in (package_mgmt_binaries, needrestart)) - -- list: ssl_mgmt_binaries - items: [ca-certificates] - -- list: dhcp_binaries - items: [dhclient, dhclient-script, 11-dhclient] - -# A canonical set of processes that run other programs with different -# privileges or as a different user. -- list: userexec_binaries - items: [sudo, su, suexec, critical-stack, dzdo] - -- list: known_setuid_binaries - items: [ - sshd, dbus-daemon-lau, ping, ping6, critical-stack-, pmmcli, - filemng, PassengerAgent, bwrap, osdetect, nginxmng, sw-engine-fpm, - start-stop-daem - ] - -- list: user_mgmt_binaries - items: [login_binaries, passwd_binaries, shadowutils_binaries] - -- list: dev_creation_binaries - items: [blkid, rename_device, update_engine, sgdisk] - -- list: hids_binaries - items: [aide, aide.wrapper, update-aide.con, logcheck, syslog-summary, osqueryd, ossec-syscheckd] - -- list: vpn_binaries - items: [openvpn] - -- list: nomachine_binaries - items: [nxexec, nxnode.bin, nxserver.bin, nxclient.bin] - -- macro: system_procs - condition: (proc.name in (coreutils_binaries, user_mgmt_binaries)) - -- list: mail_binaries - items: [ - sendmail, sendmail-msp, postfix, procmail, exim4, - pickup, showq, mailq, dovecot, imap-login, imap, - mailmng-core, pop3-login, dovecot-lda, pop3 - ] - -- list: mail_config_binaries - items: [ - update_conf, parse_mc, makemap_hash, newaliases, update_mk, update_tlsm4, - update_db, update_mc, ssmtp.postinst, mailq, postalias, postfix.config., - postfix.config, postfix-script, postconf - ] - -- list: sensitive_file_names - items: [/etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers, /etc/pam.conf, /etc/security/pwquality.conf] - -- list: sensitive_directory_names - items: [/, /etc, /etc/, /root, /root/] - -- macro: sensitive_files - condition: > - ((fd.name startswith /etc and fd.name in (sensitive_file_names)) or - fd.directory in (/etc/sudoers.d, /etc/pam.d)) - -# Indicates that the process is new. Currently detected using time -# since process was started, using a threshold of 5 seconds. -- macro: proc_is_new - condition: (proc.duration <= 5000000000) - -# Network -- macro: inbound - condition: > - (((evt.type in (accept,accept4,listen) and evt.dir=<) or - (evt.type in (recvfrom,recvmsg) and evt.dir=< and - fd.l4proto != tcp and fd.connected=false and fd.name_changed=true)) and - (fd.typechar = 4 or fd.typechar = 6) and - (fd.ip != "0.0.0.0" and fd.net != "127.0.0.0/8") and - (evt.rawres >= 0 or evt.res = EINPROGRESS)) - # RFC1918 addresses were assigned for private network usage - list: rfc_1918_addresses items: ['"10.0.0.0/8"', '"172.16.0.0/12"', '"192.168.0.0/16"'] @@ -445,117 +123,7 @@ output: Disallowed outbound connection destination (connection=%fd.name lport=%fd.lport rport=%fd.rport fd_type=%fd.type fd_proto=fd.l4proto evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) priority: NOTICE tags: [maturity_deprecated, host, container, network, mitre_command_and_control, TA0011] - -- list: allowed_inbound_source_ipaddrs - items: ['"127.0.0.1"'] - -- list: allowed_inbound_source_networks - items: ['"127.0.0.1/8"', '"10.0.0.0/8"'] - -- list: allowed_inbound_source_domains - items: [google.com] - -- rule: Unexpected inbound connection source - desc: > - Detect any inbound connection from a source outside of an allowed set of ips, networks, or domain names. - This rule absolutely requires profiling your environment beforehand. Network-based rules are extremely crucial - in any security program, as they can often provide the only definitive evidence. However, effectively operationalizing - them can be challenging due to the potential for noise. - condition: > - inbound - and not ((fd.cip in (allowed_inbound_source_ipaddrs)) or - (fd.cnet in (allowed_inbound_source_networks)) or - (fd.cip.name in (allowed_inbound_source_domains))) - enabled: false - output: Disallowed inbound connection source (connection=%fd.name lport=%fd.lport rport=%fd.rport fd_type=%fd.type fd_proto=fd.l4proto evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: NOTICE - tags: [maturity_sandbox, host, container, network, mitre_command_and_control, TA0011] - -- list: bash_config_filenames - items: [.bashrc, .bash_profile, .bash_history, .bash_login, .bash_logout, .inputrc, .profile] - -- list: bash_config_files - items: [/etc/profile, /etc/bashrc] - -# Covers both csh and tcsh -- list: csh_config_filenames - items: [.cshrc, .login, .logout, .history, .tcshrc, .cshdirs] - -- list: csh_config_files - items: [/etc/csh.cshrc, /etc/csh.login] - -- list: zsh_config_filenames - items: [.zshenv, .zprofile, .zshrc, .zlogin, .zlogout] - -- list: shell_config_filenames - items: [bash_config_filenames, csh_config_filenames, zsh_config_filenames] - -- list: shell_config_files - items: [bash_config_files, csh_config_files] - -- list: shell_config_directories - items: [/etc/zsh] - -- macro: user_known_shell_config_modifiers - condition: (never_true) - -- rule: Modify Shell Configuration File - desc: > - Detect attempts to modify shell configuration files, primarily aimed at establishing persistence by automatically inserting - commands into scripts executed by shells. The upstream rule excludes shell processes because they often create unnecessary noise. - However, this might lead to missed detections. To customize the rule for your situation, you can fine-tune it using enhanced profiling. - For example, you might want to only consider interactive shell processes (where proc.tty != 0). - condition: > - open_write - and (fd.filename in (shell_config_filenames) or - fd.name in (shell_config_files) or - fd.directory in (shell_config_directories)) - and not proc.name in (shell_binaries) - and not exe_running_docker_save - and not user_known_shell_config_modifiers - output: A shell configuration file has been modified (file=%fd.name pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: - WARNING - tags: [maturity_incubating, host, container, filesystem, mitre_persistence, T1546.004] - -# This rule is not enabled by default, as there are many legitimate -# readers of shell config files. -- rule: Read Shell Configuration File - desc: > - This rule detects attempts made by non-shell programs to read shell configuration files. It offers additional generic auditing. - It serves as a baseline detection alert for unusual shell configuration file accesses. The rule "Modify Shell Configuration File" - might be more relevant and adequate for your specific cases. - condition: > - open_read - and (fd.filename in (shell_config_filenames) or - fd.name in (shell_config_files) or - fd.directory in (shell_config_directories)) - and not proc.name in (shell_binaries) - enabled: false - output: A shell configuration file was read by a non-shell program (file=%fd.name evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: - WARNING - tags: [maturity_sandbox, host, container, filesystem, mitre_discovery, T1546.004] - -- macro: user_known_cron_jobs - condition: (never_true) - -- rule: Schedule Cron Jobs - desc: > - Detect scheduled cron jobs; this is a highly generic detection and certainly needs adjustments and profiling in your environment before - operationalization. Simultaneously, exploiting the functionality of cron jobs is among one of the oldest TTPs used by adversaries. - condition: > - ((open_write and fd.name startswith /etc/cron) or - (spawned_process and proc.name = "crontab")) - and not user_known_cron_jobs - enabled: false - output: Cron jobs were scheduled to run (file=%fd.name evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: - NOTICE - tags: [maturity_incubating, host, container, filesystem, mitre_execution, T1053.003] - # Use this to test whether the event occurred within a container. - # When displaying container information in the output field, use # %container.info, without any leading term (file=%fd.name # %container.info user=%user.name user_loginuid=%user.loginuid, and not file=%fd.name @@ -565,2808 +133,58 @@ - macro: container condition: (container.id != host) -- macro: container_started - condition: > - ((evt.type = container or - (spawned_process and proc.vpid=1)) and - container.image.repository != incomplete) - -- macro: interactive - condition: > - ((proc.aname=sshd and proc.name != sshd) or - proc.name=systemd-logind or proc.name=login) - -- list: cron_binaries - items: [anacron, cron, crond, crontab] - -# https://github.com/liske/needrestart -- list: needrestart_binaries - items: [needrestart, 10-dpkg, 20-rpm, 30-pacman] - -# Possible scripts run by sshkit -- list: sshkit_script_binaries - items: [10_etc_sudoers., 10_passwd_group] - -- list: plesk_binaries - items: [sw-engine, sw-engine-fpm, sw-engine-kv, filemng, f2bmng] - -# System users that should never log into a system. Consider adding your own -# service users (e.g. 'apache' or 'mysqld') here. -- macro: system_users - condition: (user.name in (bin, daemon, games, lp, mail, nobody, sshd, sync, uucp, www-data)) - -- macro: httpd_writing_ssl_conf - condition: > - (proc.pname=run-httpd and - (proc.cmdline startswith "sed -ri" or proc.cmdline startswith "sed -i") and - (fd.name startswith /etc/httpd/conf.d/ or fd.name startswith /etc/httpd/conf)) - -- macro: userhelper_writing_etc_security - condition: (proc.name=userhelper and fd.name startswith /etc/security) - -- macro: ansible_running_python - condition: (proc.name in (python, pypy, python3) and proc.cmdline contains ansible) - -- macro: python_running_chef - condition: (proc.name=python and (proc.cmdline contains yum-dump.py or proc.cmdline="python /usr/bin/chef-monitor.py")) - -- macro: python_running_denyhosts - condition: > - (proc.name=python and - (proc.cmdline contains /usr/sbin/denyhosts or - proc.cmdline contains /usr/local/bin/denyhosts.py)) - -# Qualys seems to run a variety of shell subprocesses, at various -# levels. This checks at a few levels without the cost of a full -# proc.aname, which traverses the full parent hierarchy. -- macro: run_by_qualys - condition: > - (proc.pname=qualys-cloud-ag or - proc.aname[2]=qualys-cloud-ag or - proc.aname[3]=qualys-cloud-ag or - proc.aname[4]=qualys-cloud-ag) - -- macro: run_by_sumologic_securefiles - condition: > - ((proc.cmdline="usermod -a -G sumologic_collector" or - proc.cmdline="groupadd sumologic_collector") and - (proc.pname=secureFiles.sh and proc.aexe[2] endswith java)) - -- macro: run_by_yum - condition: ((proc.pname=sh and proc.aname[2]=yum) or - (proc.aname[2]=sh and proc.aname[3]=yum)) - -- macro: run_by_ms_oms - condition: > - (proc.aname[3] startswith omsagent- or - proc.aname[3] startswith scx-) - -- macro: run_by_google_accounts_daemon - condition: > - (proc.aname[1] startswith google_accounts or - proc.aname[2] startswith google_accounts or - proc.aname[3] startswith google_accounts) - -# Chef is similar. -- macro: run_by_chef - condition: (proc.aname[2]=chef_command_wr or proc.aname[3]=chef_command_wr or - proc.aname[2]=chef-client or proc.aname[3]=chef-client or - proc.name=chef-client) - -- macro: run_by_adclient - condition: (proc.aname[2]=adclient or proc.aname[3]=adclient or proc.aname[4]=adclient) - -- macro: run_by_centrify - condition: (proc.aname[2]=centrify or proc.aname[3]=centrify or proc.aname[4]=centrify) - -# Also handles running semi-indirectly via scl -- macro: run_by_foreman - condition: > - (user.name=foreman and - ((proc.pname in (rake, ruby, scl) and proc.aname[5] in (tfm-rake,tfm-ruby)) or - (proc.pname=scl and proc.aname[2] in (tfm-rake,tfm-ruby)))) - -- macro: java_running_sdjagent - condition: (proc.exe endswith java and proc.cmdline contains sdjagent.jar) - -- macro: kubelet_running_loopback - condition: (proc.pname=kubelet and proc.name=loopback) - -- macro: python_mesos_marathon_scripting - condition: (proc.pcmdline startswith "python3 /marathon-lb/marathon_lb.py") - -- macro: splunk_running_forwarder - condition: (proc.pname=splunkd and proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c /opt/splunkforwarder") - -- macro: parent_supervise_running_multilog - condition: (proc.name=multilog and proc.pname=supervise) - -- macro: supervise_writing_status - condition: (proc.name in (supervise,svc) and fd.name startswith "/etc/sb/") - -- macro: pki_realm_writing_realms - condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "bash /usr/local/lib/pki/pki-realm" and fd.name startswith /etc/pki/realms) - -- macro: htpasswd_writing_passwd - condition: (proc.name=htpasswd and fd.name=/etc/nginx/.htpasswd) - -- macro: lvprogs_writing_conf - condition: > - (proc.name in (dmeventd,lvcreate,pvscan,lvs) and - (fd.name startswith /etc/lvm/archive or - fd.name startswith /etc/lvm/backup or - fd.name startswith /etc/lvm/cache)) - -- macro: ovsdb_writing_openvswitch - condition: (proc.name=ovsdb-server and fd.directory=/etc/openvswitch) - -- macro: perl_running_plesk - condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "perl /opt/psa/admin/bin/plesk_agent_manager" or - proc.pcmdline startswith "perl /opt/psa/admin/bin/plesk_agent_manager") - -- macro: perl_running_updmap - condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "perl /usr/bin/updmap") - -- macro: perl_running_centrifydc - condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "perl /usr/share/centrifydc") - -- macro: runuser_reading_pam - condition: (proc.name=runuser and fd.directory=/etc/pam.d) - -# CIS Linux Benchmark program -- macro: linux_bench_reading_etc_shadow - condition: ((proc.aname[2]=linux-bench and - proc.name in (awk,cut,grep)) and - (fd.name=/etc/shadow or - fd.directory=/etc/pam.d)) - -- macro: parent_ucf_writing_conf - condition: (proc.pname=ucf and proc.aname[2]=frontend) - -- macro: consul_template_writing_conf - condition: > - ((proc.name=consul-template and fd.name startswith /etc/haproxy) or - (proc.name=reload.sh and proc.aname[2]=consul-template and fd.name startswith /etc/ssl)) - -- macro: countly_writing_nginx_conf - condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "nodejs /opt/countly/bin" and fd.name startswith /etc/nginx) - -- list: ms_oms_binaries - items: [omi.postinst, omsconfig.posti, scx.postinst, omsadmin.sh, omiagent] - -- macro: ms_oms_writing_conf - condition: > - ((proc.name in (omiagent,omsagent,in_heartbeat_r*,omsadmin.sh,PerformInventor,dsc_host) - or proc.pname in (ms_oms_binaries) - or proc.aname[2] in (ms_oms_binaries)) - and (fd.name startswith /etc/opt/omi or fd.name startswith /etc/opt/microsoft/omsagent)) - -- macro: ms_scx_writing_conf - condition: (proc.name in (GetLinuxOS.sh) and fd.name startswith /etc/opt/microsoft/scx) - -- macro: azure_scripts_writing_conf - condition: (proc.pname startswith "bash /var/lib/waagent/" and fd.name startswith /etc/azure) - -- macro: azure_networkwatcher_writing_conf - condition: (proc.name in (NetworkWatcherA) and fd.name=/etc/init.d/AzureNetworkWatcherAgent) - -- macro: couchdb_writing_conf - condition: (proc.name=beam.smp and proc.cmdline contains couchdb and fd.name startswith /etc/couchdb) - -- macro: update_texmf_writing_conf - condition: (proc.name=update-texmf and fd.name startswith /etc/texmf) - -- macro: slapadd_writing_conf - condition: (proc.name=slapadd and fd.name startswith /etc/ldap) - -- macro: openldap_writing_conf - condition: (proc.pname=run-openldap.sh and fd.name startswith /etc/openldap) - -- macro: ucpagent_writing_conf - condition: (proc.name=apiserver and container.image.repository=docker/ucp-agent and fd.name=/etc/authorization_config.cfg) - -- macro: iscsi_writing_conf - condition: (proc.name=iscsiadm and fd.name startswith /etc/iscsi) - -- macro: istio_writing_conf - condition: (proc.name=pilot-agent and fd.name startswith /etc/istio) - -- macro: symantec_writing_conf - condition: > - ((proc.name=symcfgd and fd.name startswith /etc/symantec) or - (proc.name=navdefutil and fd.name=/etc/symc-defutils.conf)) - -- macro: liveupdate_writing_conf - condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "java LiveUpdate" and fd.name in (/etc/liveupdate.conf, /etc/Product.Catalog.JavaLiveUpdate)) - -- macro: rancher_agent - condition: (proc.name=agent and container.image.repository contains "rancher/agent") - -- macro: rancher_network_manager - condition: (proc.name=rancher-bridge and container.image.repository contains "rancher/network-manager") - -- macro: sosreport_writing_files - condition: > - (proc.name=urlgrabber-ext- and proc.aname[3]=sosreport and - (fd.name startswith /etc/pkt/nssdb or fd.name startswith /etc/pki/nssdb)) - -- macro: pkgmgmt_progs_writing_pki - condition: > - (proc.name=urlgrabber-ext- and proc.pname in (yum, yum-cron, repoquery) and - (fd.name startswith /etc/pkt/nssdb or fd.name startswith /etc/pki/nssdb)) - -- macro: update_ca_trust_writing_pki - condition: (proc.pname=update-ca-trust and proc.name=trust and fd.name startswith /etc/pki) - -- macro: brandbot_writing_os_release - condition: (proc.name=brandbot and fd.name=/etc/os-release) - -- macro: selinux_writing_conf - condition: (proc.name in (semodule,genhomedircon,sefcontext_comp) and fd.name startswith /etc/selinux) - -- list: veritas_binaries - items: [vxconfigd, sfcache, vxclustadm, vxdctl, vxprint, vxdmpadm, vxdisk, vxdg, vxassist, vxtune] - -- macro: veritas_driver_script - condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "perl /opt/VRTSsfmh/bin/mh_driver.pl") - -- macro: veritas_progs - condition: (proc.name in (veritas_binaries) or veritas_driver_script) +- list: allowed_image + items: [] # add image to monitor, i.e.: bitnami/nginx -- macro: veritas_writing_config - condition: (veritas_progs and (fd.name startswith /etc/vx or fd.name startswith /etc/opt/VRTS or fd.name startswith /etc/vom)) +- list: authorized_server_binary + items: [] # add binary to allow, i.e.: nginx + +- list: authorized_server_port + items: [] # add port to allow, i.e.: 80 -- macro: nginx_writing_conf - condition: (proc.name in (nginx,nginx-ingress-c,nginx-ingress) and (fd.name startswith /etc/nginx or fd.name startswith /etc/ingress-controller)) +# # How to test: +# kubectl run --image=nginx nginx-app --port=80 --env="DOMAIN=cluster" +# kubectl expose deployment nginx-app --port=80 --name=nginx-http --type=LoadBalancer +# # On minikube: +# minikube service nginx-http +# # On general K8s: +# kubectl get services +# kubectl cluster-info +# # Visit the Nginx service and port, should not fire. +# # Change rule to different port, then different process name, and test again that it fires. -- macro: nginx_writing_certs +- rule: Outbound or Inbound Traffic not to Authorized Server Process and Port + desc: > + Detect traffic to an unauthorized server process and port within pre-defined containers. + This rule absolutely requires profiling your environment beforehand and also necessitates adjusting the list of containers + to which this rule will be applied. The current expression logic will never evaluate to true unless the list is populated. + Network-based rules are extremely crucial in any security program, as they can often provide the only definitive evidence. + However, effectively operationalizing them can be challenging due to the potential for noise. Notably, this rule is challenging + to operationalize. condition: > - (((proc.name=openssl and proc.pname=nginx-launch.sh) or proc.name=nginx-launch.sh) and fd.name startswith /etc/nginx/certs) - -- macro: chef_client_writing_conf - condition: (proc.pcmdline startswith "chef-client /opt/gitlab" and fd.name startswith /etc/gitlab) - -- macro: centrify_writing_krb - condition: (proc.name in (adjoin,addns) and fd.name startswith /etc/krb5) - -- macro: sssd_writing_krb - condition: (proc.name=adcli and proc.aname[2]=sssd and fd.name startswith /etc/krb5) + inbound_outbound + and container + and container.image.repository in (allowed_image) + and not proc.name in (authorized_server_binary) + and not fd.sport in (authorized_server_port) + enabled: false + output: Network connection outside authorized port and binary (connection=%fd.name lport=%fd.lport rport=%fd.rport fd_type=%fd.type fd_proto=fd.l4proto evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) + priority: WARNING + tags: [maturity_deprecated, container, network, mitre_discovery, TA0011, NIST_800-53_CM-7] -- macro: cockpit_writing_conf - condition: > - ((proc.pname=cockpit-kube-la or proc.aname[2]=cockpit-kube-la) - and fd.name startswith /etc/cockpit) +- list: c2_server_ip_list + items: [] -- macro: ipsec_writing_conf - condition: (proc.name=start-ipsec.sh and fd.directory=/etc/ipsec) +- list: c2_server_fqdn_list + items: [] -- macro: exe_running_docker_save - condition: > - (proc.name = "exe" - and (proc.cmdline contains "/var/lib/docker" - or proc.cmdline contains "/var/run/docker") - and proc.pname in (dockerd, docker, dockerd-current, docker-current)) - -# Ideally we'd have a length check here as well but -# filterchecks don't have operators like len() -- macro: sed_temporary_file - condition: (proc.name=sed and fd.name startswith "/etc/sed") - -- macro: python_running_get_pip - condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "python get-pip.py") - -- macro: python_running_ms_oms - condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "python /var/lib/waagent/") - -- macro: gugent_writing_guestagent_log - condition: (proc.name=gugent and fd.name=GuestAgent.log) - -- macro: dse_writing_tmp - condition: (proc.name=dse-entrypoint and fd.name=/root/tmp__) - -- macro: zap_writing_state - condition: (proc.exe endswith java and proc.cmdline contains "jar /zap" and fd.name startswith /root/.ZAP) - -- macro: airflow_writing_state - condition: (proc.name=airflow and fd.name startswith /root/airflow) - -- macro: rpm_writing_root_rpmdb - condition: (proc.name=rpm and fd.directory=/root/.rpmdb) - -- macro: maven_writing_groovy - condition: (proc.exe endswith java and proc.cmdline contains "classpath /usr/local/apache-maven" and fd.name startswith /root/.groovy) - -- macro: chef_writing_conf - condition: (proc.name=chef-client and fd.name startswith /root/.chef) - -- macro: kubectl_writing_state - condition: (proc.name in (kubectl,oc) and fd.name startswith /root/.kube) - -- macro: java_running_cassandra - condition: (proc.exe endswith java and proc.cmdline contains "cassandra.jar") - -- macro: cassandra_writing_state - condition: (java_running_cassandra and fd.directory=/root/.cassandra) - -# Istio -- macro: galley_writing_state - condition: (proc.name=galley and fd.name in (known_istio_files)) - -- list: known_istio_files - items: [/healthready, /healthliveness] - -- macro: calico_writing_state - condition: (proc.name=kube-controller and fd.name startswith /status.json and k8s.pod.name startswith calico) - -- macro: calico_writing_envvars - condition: (proc.name=start_runit and fd.name startswith "/etc/envvars" and container.image.repository endswith "calico/node") - -- list: repository_files - items: [sources.list] - -- list: repository_directories - items: [/etc/apt/sources.list.d, /etc/yum.repos.d, /etc/apt] - -- macro: access_repositories - condition: (fd.directory in (repository_directories) or - (fd.name pmatch (repository_directories) and - fd.filename in (repository_files))) - -- macro: modify_repositories - condition: (evt.arg.newpath pmatch (repository_directories)) - -- macro: user_known_update_package_registry - condition: (never_true) - -- rule: Update Package Repository - desc: > - This rule generically detects updates to package repositories and can be seen as an auditing measure. - Recommend evaluating its relevance for your specific environment. - condition: > - ((open_write and access_repositories) or (modify and modify_repositories)) - and not package_mgmt_procs - and not package_mgmt_ancestor_procs - and not exe_running_docker_save - and not user_known_update_package_registry - output: Repository files get updated (newpath=%evt.arg.newpath file=%fd.name pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: - NOTICE - tags: [maturity_sandbox, host, container, filesystem, mitre_execution, T1072] - -# Users should overwrite this macro to specify conditions under which a -# write under the binary dir is ignored. For example, it may be okay to -# install a binary in the context of a ci/cd build. -- macro: user_known_write_below_binary_dir_activities - condition: (never_true) - -- rule: Write below binary dir - desc: > - Trying to write to any file below specific binary directories can serve as an auditing rule to track general system changes. - Such rules can be noisy and challenging to interpret, particularly if your system frequently undergoes updates. However, careful - profiling of your environment can transform this rule into an effective rule for detecting unusual behavior associated with system - changes, including compliance-related cases. - condition: > - open_write and evt.dir=< - and bin_dir - and not package_mgmt_procs - and not exe_running_docker_save - and not python_running_get_pip - and not python_running_ms_oms - and not user_known_write_below_binary_dir_activities - output: File below a known binary directory opened for writing (file=%fd.name pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline gparent=%proc.aname[2] evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: ERROR - tags: [maturity_sandbox, host, container, filesystem, mitre_persistence, T1543] - -# If you'd like to generally monitor a wider set of directories on top -# of the ones covered by the rule Write below binary dir, you can use -# the following rule and lists. -- list: monitored_directories - items: [/boot, /lib, /lib64, /usr/lib, /usr/local/lib, /usr/local/sbin, /usr/local/bin, /root/.ssh] - -- macro: user_ssh_directory - condition: (fd.name contains '/.ssh/' and fd.name glob '/home/*/.ssh/*') - -- macro: directory_traversal - condition: (fd.nameraw contains '../' and fd.nameraw glob '*../*../*') - -# google_accounts_(daemon) -- macro: google_accounts_daemon_writing_ssh - condition: (proc.name=google_accounts and user_ssh_directory) - -- macro: cloud_init_writing_ssh - condition: (proc.name=cloud-init and user_ssh_directory) - -- macro: mkinitramfs_writing_boot - condition: (proc.pname in (mkinitramfs, update-initramf) and fd.directory=/boot) - -- macro: monitored_dir - condition: > - (fd.directory in (monitored_directories) - or user_ssh_directory) - and not mkinitramfs_writing_boot - -# Add conditions to this macro (probably in a separate file, -# overwriting this macro) to allow for specific combinations of -# programs writing below monitored directories. -# -# Its default value is an expression that always is false, which -# becomes true when the "not ..." in the rule is applied. -- macro: user_known_write_monitored_dir_conditions - condition: (never_true) - -- rule: Write below monitored dir - desc: > - Trying to write to any file below a set of monitored directories can serve as an auditing rule to track general system changes. - Such rules can be noisy and challenging to interpret, particularly if your system frequently undergoes updates. However, careful - profiling of your environment can transform this rule into an effective rule for detecting unusual behavior associated with system - changes, including compliance-related cases. - condition: > - open_write and evt.dir=< - and monitored_dir - and not package_mgmt_procs - and not coreos_write_ssh_dir - and not exe_running_docker_save - and not python_running_get_pip - and not python_running_ms_oms - and not google_accounts_daemon_writing_ssh - and not cloud_init_writing_ssh - and not user_known_write_monitored_dir_conditions - output: File below a monitored directory opened for writing (file=%fd.name pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline gparent=%proc.aname[2] evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: ERROR - tags: [maturity_sandbox, host, container, filesystem, mitre_persistence, T1543] - -# ****************************************************************************** -# * "Directory traversal monitored file read" requires FALCO_ENGINE_VERSION 13 * -# ****************************************************************************** - -- rule: Directory traversal monitored file read - desc: > - Web applications can be vulnerable to directory traversal attacks that allow accessing files outside of the web app's root directory - (e.g. Arbitrary File Read bugs). System directories like /etc are typically accessed via absolute paths. Access patterns outside of this - (here path traversal) can be regarded as suspicious. This rule includes failed file open attempts. - condition: > - (open_read or open_file_failed) - and (etc_dir or user_ssh_directory or - fd.name startswith /root/.ssh or - fd.name contains "id_rsa") - and directory_traversal - and not proc.pname in (shell_binaries) - enabled: true - output: Read monitored file via directory traversal (file=%fd.name fileraw=%fd.nameraw gparent=%proc.aname[2] ggparent=%proc.aname[3] gggparent=%proc.aname[4] evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: WARNING - tags: [maturity_stable, host, container, filesystem, mitre_credential_access, T1555] - -# The rule below is disabled by default as many system management tools -# like ansible, etc can read these files/paths. Enable it using this macro. -- macro: user_known_read_ssh_information_activities - condition: (never_true) - -- rule: Read ssh information - desc: > - This rule identifies attempts to read files within ssh directories using programs that are not related to ssh. It's a simple and - versatile detection method that works well alongside more specific rules focused on sensitive file access. You have a couple of - options for using this rule effectively: you can adjust the specialized rules to cover all the important scenarios and ensure - precedence in rule smatching for those, or you can analyze the combined view of ssh-related file access across various rules on - your downstream computing platform. Just like with other rules, you can narrow down monitoring to specific processes, or you can - limit it to interactive access only. - condition: > - (open_read or open_directory) - and (user_ssh_directory or fd.name startswith /root/.ssh) - and not user_known_read_ssh_information_activities - and not proc.name in (ssh_binaries) - enabled: false - output: ssh-related file/directory read by non-ssh program (file=%fd.name pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: ERROR - tags: [maturity_incubating, host, container, filesystem, mitre_collection, T1005] - -- list: safe_etc_dirs - items: [/etc/cassandra, /etc/ssl/certs/java, /etc/logstash, /etc/nginx/conf.d, /etc/container_environment, /etc/hrmconfig, /etc/fluent/configs.d. /etc/alertmanager] - -- macro: fluentd_writing_conf_files - condition: (proc.name=start-fluentd and fd.name in (/etc/fluent/fluent.conf, /etc/td-agent/td-agent.conf)) - -- macro: qualys_writing_conf_files - condition: (proc.name=qualys-cloud-ag and fd.name=/etc/qualys/cloud-agent/qagent-log.conf) - -- macro: git_writing_nssdb - condition: (proc.name=git-remote-http and fd.directory=/etc/pki/nssdb) - -- macro: plesk_writing_keys - condition: (proc.name in (plesk_binaries) and fd.name startswith /etc/sw/keys) - -- macro: plesk_install_writing_apache_conf - condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "bash -hB /usr/lib/plesk-9.0/services/webserver.apache configure" - and fd.name="/etc/apache2/apache2.conf.tmp") - -- macro: plesk_running_mktemp - condition: (proc.name=mktemp and proc.aname[3] in (plesk_binaries)) - -- macro: networkmanager_writing_resolv_conf - condition: (proc.aname[2]=nm-dispatcher and fd.name=/etc/resolv.conf) - -- macro: add_shell_writing_shells_tmp - condition: (proc.name=add-shell and fd.name=/etc/shells.tmp) - -- macro: duply_writing_exclude_files - condition: (proc.name=touch and proc.pcmdline startswith "bash /usr/bin/duply" and fd.name startswith "/etc/duply") - -- macro: xmlcatalog_writing_files - condition: (proc.name=update-xmlcatal and fd.directory=/etc/xml) - -- macro: datadog_writing_conf - condition: ((proc.cmdline startswith "python /opt/datadog-agent" or - proc.cmdline startswith "entrypoint.sh /entrypoint.sh datadog start" or - proc.cmdline startswith "agent.py /opt/datadog-agent") - and fd.name startswith "/etc/dd-agent") - -- macro: rancher_writing_conf - condition: ((proc.name in (healthcheck, lb-controller, rancher-dns)) and - (container.image.repository contains "rancher/healthcheck" or - container.image.repository contains "rancher/lb-service-haproxy" or - container.image.repository contains "rancher/dns") and - (fd.name startswith "/etc/haproxy" or fd.name startswith "/etc/rancher-dns")) - -- macro: rancher_writing_root - condition: (proc.name=rancher-metadat and - (container.image.repository contains "rancher/metadata" or container.image.repository contains "rancher/lb-service-haproxy") and - fd.name startswith "/answers.json") - -- macro: checkpoint_writing_state - condition: (proc.name=checkpoint and - container.image.repository contains "coreos/pod-checkpointer" and - fd.name startswith "/etc/kubernetes") - -- macro: jboss_in_container_writing_passwd - condition: > - ((proc.cmdline="run-java.sh /opt/jboss/container/java/run/run-java.sh" - or proc.cmdline="run-java.sh /opt/run-java/run-java.sh") - and container - and fd.name=/etc/passwd) - -- macro: curl_writing_pki_db - condition: (proc.name=curl and fd.directory=/etc/pki/nssdb) - -- macro: haproxy_writing_conf - condition: ((proc.name in (update-haproxy-,haproxy_reload.) or proc.pname in (update-haproxy-,haproxy_reload,haproxy_reload.)) - and (fd.name=/etc/openvpn/client.map or fd.name startswith /etc/haproxy)) - -- macro: java_writing_conf - condition: (proc.exe endswith java and fd.name=/etc/.java/.systemPrefs/.system.lock) - -- macro: rabbitmq_writing_conf - condition: (proc.name=rabbitmq-server and fd.directory=/etc/rabbitmq) - -- macro: rook_writing_conf - condition: (proc.name=toolbox.sh and container.image.repository=rook/toolbox - and fd.directory=/etc/ceph) - -- macro: httpd_writing_conf_logs - condition: (proc.name=httpd and fd.name startswith /etc/httpd/) - -- macro: mysql_writing_conf - condition: > - ((proc.name in (start-mysql.sh, run-mysqld) or proc.pname=start-mysql.sh) and - (fd.name startswith /etc/mysql or fd.directory=/etc/my.cnf.d)) - -- macro: redis_writing_conf - condition: > - (proc.name in (run-redis, redis-launcher.) and (fd.name=/etc/redis.conf or fd.name startswith /etc/redis)) - -- macro: openvpn_writing_conf - condition: (proc.name in (openvpn,openvpn-entrypo) and fd.name startswith /etc/openvpn) - -- macro: php_handlers_writing_conf - condition: (proc.name=php_handlers_co and fd.name=/etc/psa/php_versions.json) - -- macro: sed_writing_temp_file - condition: > - ((proc.aname[3]=cron_start.sh and fd.name startswith /etc/security/sed) or - (proc.name=sed and (fd.name startswith /etc/apt/sources.list.d/sed or - fd.name startswith /etc/apt/sed or - fd.name startswith /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/sed))) - -- macro: cron_start_writing_pam_env - condition: (proc.cmdline="bash /usr/sbin/start-cron" and fd.name=/etc/security/pam_env.conf) - -# In some cases dpkg-reconfigur runs commands that modify /etc. Not -# putting the full set of package management programs yet. -- macro: dpkg_scripting - condition: (proc.aname[2] in (dpkg-reconfigur, dpkg-preconfigu)) - -- macro: ufw_writing_conf - condition: (proc.name=ufw and fd.directory=/etc/ufw) - -- macro: calico_writing_conf - condition: > - (((proc.name = calico-node) or - (container.image.repository=gcr.io/projectcalico-org/node and proc.name in (start_runit, cp)) or - (container.image.repository=gcr.io/projectcalico-org/cni and proc.name=sed)) - and fd.name startswith /etc/calico) - -- macro: prometheus_conf_writing_conf - condition: (proc.name=prometheus-conf and fd.name startswith /etc/prometheus/config_out) - -- macro: openshift_writing_conf - condition: (proc.name=oc and fd.name startswith /etc/origin/node) - -- macro: keepalived_writing_conf - condition: (proc.name in (keepalived, kube-keepalived) and fd.name=/etc/keepalived/keepalived.conf) - -- macro: etcd_manager_updating_dns - condition: (container and proc.name=etcd-manager and fd.name=/etc/hosts) - -- macro: automount_using_mtab - condition: (proc.pname = automount and fd.name startswith /etc/mtab) - -- macro: mcafee_writing_cma_d - condition: (proc.name=macompatsvc and fd.directory=/etc/cma.d) - -- macro: avinetworks_supervisor_writing_ssh - condition: > - (proc.cmdline="se_supervisor.p /opt/avi/scripts/se_supervisor.py -d" and - (fd.name startswith /etc/ssh/known_host_ or - fd.name startswith /etc/ssh/ssh_monitor_config_ or - fd.name startswith /etc/ssh/ssh_config_)) - -- macro: multipath_writing_conf - condition: (proc.name = multipath and fd.name startswith /etc/multipath/) - -# Add conditions to this macro (probably in a separate file, -# overwriting this macro) to allow for specific combinations of -# programs writing below specific directories below -# /etc. fluentd_writing_conf_files is a good example to follow, as it -# specifies both the program doing the writing as well as the specific -# files it is allowed to modify. -# -# In this file, it just takes one of the programs in the base macro -# and repeats it. - -- macro: user_known_write_etc_conditions - condition: (proc.name=confd) - -# This is a placeholder for user to extend the whitelist for write below etc rule -- macro: user_known_write_below_etc_activities - condition: (never_true) - -- macro: calico_node - condition: (container.image.repository endswith calico/node and proc.name=calico-node) - -- macro: write_etc_common - condition: > - (open_write - and etc_dir and evt.dir=< - and proc_name_exists - and not proc.name in (passwd_binaries, shadowutils_binaries, sysdigcloud_binaries, - package_mgmt_binaries, ssl_mgmt_binaries, dhcp_binaries, - dev_creation_binaries, shell_mgmt_binaries, - mail_config_binaries, - sshkit_script_binaries, - ldconfig.real, ldconfig, confd, gpg, insserv, - apparmor_parser, update-mime, tzdata.config, tzdata.postinst, - systemd, systemd-machine, systemd-sysuser, - debconf-show, rollerd, bind9.postinst, sv, - gen_resolvconf., update-ca-certi, certbot, runsv, - qualys-cloud-ag, locales.postins, nomachine_binaries, - adclient, certutil, crlutil, pam-auth-update, parallels_insta, - openshift-launc, update-rc.d, puppet, falcoctl) - and not (container and proc.cmdline in ("cp /run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt /etc/pki/ca-trust/source/anchors/openshift-ca.crt")) - and not proc.pname in (sysdigcloud_binaries, mail_config_binaries, hddtemp.postins, sshkit_script_binaries, locales.postins, deb_binaries, dhcp_binaries) - and not fd.name pmatch (safe_etc_dirs) - and not fd.name in (/etc/container_environment.sh, /etc/container_environment.json, /etc/motd, /etc/motd.svc) - and not sed_temporary_file - and not exe_running_docker_save - and not ansible_running_python - and not python_running_denyhosts - and not fluentd_writing_conf_files - and not user_known_write_etc_conditions - and not run_by_centrify - and not run_by_adclient - and not qualys_writing_conf_files - and not git_writing_nssdb - and not plesk_writing_keys - and not plesk_install_writing_apache_conf - and not plesk_running_mktemp - and not networkmanager_writing_resolv_conf - and not run_by_chef - and not add_shell_writing_shells_tmp - and not duply_writing_exclude_files - and not xmlcatalog_writing_files - and not parent_supervise_running_multilog - and not supervise_writing_status - and not pki_realm_writing_realms - and not htpasswd_writing_passwd - and not lvprogs_writing_conf - and not ovsdb_writing_openvswitch - and not datadog_writing_conf - and not curl_writing_pki_db - and not haproxy_writing_conf - and not java_writing_conf - and not dpkg_scripting - and not parent_ucf_writing_conf - and not rabbitmq_writing_conf - and not rook_writing_conf - and not php_handlers_writing_conf - and not sed_writing_temp_file - and not cron_start_writing_pam_env - and not httpd_writing_conf_logs - and not mysql_writing_conf - and not openvpn_writing_conf - and not consul_template_writing_conf - and not countly_writing_nginx_conf - and not ms_oms_writing_conf - and not ms_scx_writing_conf - and not azure_scripts_writing_conf - and not azure_networkwatcher_writing_conf - and not couchdb_writing_conf - and not update_texmf_writing_conf - and not slapadd_writing_conf - and not symantec_writing_conf - and not liveupdate_writing_conf - and not sosreport_writing_files - and not selinux_writing_conf - and not veritas_writing_config - and not nginx_writing_conf - and not nginx_writing_certs - and not chef_client_writing_conf - and not centrify_writing_krb - and not sssd_writing_krb - and not cockpit_writing_conf - and not ipsec_writing_conf - and not httpd_writing_ssl_conf - and not userhelper_writing_etc_security - and not pkgmgmt_progs_writing_pki - and not update_ca_trust_writing_pki - and not brandbot_writing_os_release - and not redis_writing_conf - and not openldap_writing_conf - and not ucpagent_writing_conf - and not iscsi_writing_conf - and not istio_writing_conf - and not ufw_writing_conf - and not calico_writing_conf - and not calico_writing_envvars - and not prometheus_conf_writing_conf - and not openshift_writing_conf - and not keepalived_writing_conf - and not rancher_writing_conf - and not checkpoint_writing_state - and not jboss_in_container_writing_passwd - and not etcd_manager_updating_dns - and not user_known_write_below_etc_activities - and not automount_using_mtab - and not mcafee_writing_cma_d - and not avinetworks_supervisor_writing_ssh - and not multipath_writing_conf - and not calico_node) - -- rule: Write below etc - desc: > - Trying to write to any file below /etc can serve as an auditing rule to track general system changes. - Such rules can be noisy and challenging to interpret, particularly if your system frequently undergoes updates. However, careful - profiling of your environment can transform this rule into an effective rule for detecting unusual behavior associated with system - changes, including compliance-related cases. - condition: write_etc_common - output: File below /etc opened for writing (file=%fd.name pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline gparent=%proc.aname[2] ggparent=%proc.aname[3] gggparent=%proc.aname[4] evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: ERROR - tags: [maturity_sandbox, host, container, filesystem, mitre_persistence, T1098] - -- list: known_root_files - items: [/root/.monit.state, /root/.auth_tokens, /root/.bash_history, /root/.ash_history, /root/.aws/credentials, - /root/.viminfo.tmp, /root/.lesshst, /root/.bzr.log, /root/.gitconfig.lock, /root/.babel.json, /root/.localstack, - /root/.node_repl_history, /root/.mongorc.js, /root/.dbshell, /root/.augeas/history, /root/.rnd, /root/.wget-hsts, /health, /exec.fifo] - -- list: known_root_directories - items: [/root/.oracle_jre_usage, /root/.ssh, /root/.subversion, /root/.nami] - -- macro: known_root_conditions - condition: (fd.name startswith /root/orcexec. - or fd.name startswith /root/.m2 - or fd.name startswith /root/.npm - or fd.name startswith /root/.pki - or fd.name startswith /root/.ivy2 - or fd.name startswith /root/.config/Cypress - or fd.name startswith /root/.config/pulse - or fd.name startswith /root/.config/configstore - or fd.name startswith /root/jenkins/workspace - or fd.name startswith /root/.jenkins - or fd.name startswith /root/.cache - or fd.name startswith /root/.sbt - or fd.name startswith /root/.java - or fd.name startswith /root/.glide - or fd.name startswith /root/.sonar - or fd.name startswith /root/.v8flag - or fd.name startswith /root/infaagent - or fd.name startswith /root/.local/lib/python - or fd.name startswith /root/.pm2 - or fd.name startswith /root/.gnupg - or fd.name startswith /root/.pgpass - or fd.name startswith /root/.theano - or fd.name startswith /root/.gradle - or fd.name startswith /root/.android - or fd.name startswith /root/.ansible - or fd.name startswith /root/.crashlytics - or fd.name startswith /root/.dbus - or fd.name startswith /root/.composer - or fd.name startswith /root/.gconf - or fd.name startswith /root/.nv - or fd.name startswith /root/.local/share/jupyter - or fd.name startswith /root/oradiag_root - or fd.name startswith /root/workspace - or fd.name startswith /root/jvm - or fd.name startswith /root/.node-gyp) - -# Add conditions to this macro (probably in a separate file, -# overwriting this macro) to allow for specific combinations of -# programs writing below specific directories below -# / or /root. -# -# In this file, it just takes one of the condition in the base macro -# and repeats it. -- macro: user_known_write_root_conditions - condition: (fd.name=/root/.bash_history) - -# This is a placeholder for user to extend the whitelist for write below root rule -- macro: user_known_write_below_root_activities - condition: (never_true) - -- macro: runc_writing_exec_fifo - condition: (proc.cmdline="runc:[1:CHILD] init" and fd.name=/exec.fifo) - -- macro: runc_writing_var_lib_docker - condition: (proc.cmdline="runc:[1:CHILD] init" and evt.arg.filename startswith /var/lib/docker) - -- macro: mysqlsh_writing_state - condition: (proc.name=mysqlsh and fd.directory=/root/.mysqlsh) - -- rule: Write below root - desc: > - Trying to write to any file directly below / or /root can serve as an auditing rule to track general system changes. - Such rules can be noisy and challenging to interpret, particularly if your system frequently undergoes updates. However, careful - profiling of your environment can transform this rule into an effective rule for detecting unusual behavior associated with system - changes, including compliance-related cases. Lastly, this rule stands out as potentially the noisiest one among rules related - to "write below. - condition: > - open_write and evt.dir=< - and root_dir - and proc_name_exists - and not fd.name in (known_root_files) - and not fd.directory pmatch (known_root_directories) - and not exe_running_docker_save - and not gugent_writing_guestagent_log - and not dse_writing_tmp - and not zap_writing_state - and not airflow_writing_state - and not rpm_writing_root_rpmdb - and not maven_writing_groovy - and not chef_writing_conf - and not kubectl_writing_state - and not cassandra_writing_state - and not galley_writing_state - and not calico_writing_state - and not rancher_writing_root - and not runc_writing_exec_fifo - and not mysqlsh_writing_state - and not known_root_conditions - and not user_known_write_root_conditions - and not user_known_write_below_root_activities - output: File below / or /root opened for writing (file=%fd.name evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: ERROR - tags: [maturity_sandbox, host, container, filesystem, mitre_persistence, TA0003] - -- macro: cmp_cp_by_passwd - condition: (proc.name in (cmp, cp) and proc.pname in (passwd, run-parts)) - -- macro: user_known_read_sensitive_files_activities - condition: (never_true) - -- rule: Read sensitive file trusted after startup - desc: > - An attempt to read any sensitive file (e.g. files containing user/password/authentication - information) by a trusted program after startup. Trusted programs might read these files - at startup to load initial state, but not afterwards. Can be customized as needed. - In modern containerized cloud infrastructures, accessing traditional Linux sensitive files - might be less relevant, yet it remains valuable for baseline detections. While we provide additional - rules for SSH or cloud vendor-specific credentials, you can significantly enhance your security - program by crafting custom rules for critical application credentials unique to your environment. - condition: > - open_read - and sensitive_files - and server_procs - and not proc_is_new - and proc.name!="sshd" - and not user_known_read_sensitive_files_activities - output: Sensitive file opened for reading by trusted program after startup (file=%fd.name pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline gparent=%proc.aname[2] ggparent=%proc.aname[3] gggparent=%proc.aname[4] evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: WARNING - tags: [maturity_stable, host, container, filesystem, mitre_credential_access, T1555] - -- list: read_sensitive_file_binaries - items: [ - iptables, ps, lsb_release, check-new-relea, dumpe2fs, accounts-daemon, sshd, - vsftpd, systemd, mysql_install_d, psql, screen, debconf-show, sa-update, - pam-auth-update, pam-config, /usr/sbin/spamd, polkit-agent-he, lsattr, file, sosreport, - scxcimservera, adclient, rtvscand, cockpit-session, userhelper, ossec-syscheckd - ] - -# Add conditions to this macro (probably in a separate file, -# overwriting this macro) to allow for specific combinations of -# programs accessing sensitive files. -# fluentd_writing_conf_files is a good example to follow, as it -# specifies both the program doing the writing as well as the specific -# files it is allowed to modify. -# -# In this file, it just takes one of the macros in the base rule -# and repeats it. -- macro: user_read_sensitive_file_conditions - condition: cmp_cp_by_passwd - -- list: read_sensitive_file_images - items: [] - -- macro: user_read_sensitive_file_containers - condition: (container and container.image.repository in (read_sensitive_file_images)) - -# This macro detects man-db postinst, see https://salsa.debian.org/debian/man-db/-/blob/master/debian/postinst -# The rule "Read sensitive file untrusted" use this macro to avoid FPs. -- macro: mandb_postinst - condition: > - (proc.name=perl and proc.args startswith "-e" and - proc.args contains "@pwd = getpwnam(" and - proc.args contains "exec " and - proc.args contains "/usr/bin/mandb") - -- rule: Read sensitive file untrusted - desc: > - An attempt to read any sensitive file (e.g. files containing user/password/authentication - information). Exceptions are made for known trusted programs. Can be customized as needed. - In modern containerized cloud infrastructures, accessing traditional Linux sensitive files - might be less relevant, yet it remains valuable for baseline detections. While we provide additional - rules for SSH or cloud vendor-specific credentials, you can significantly enhance your security - program by crafting custom rules for critical application credentials unique to your environment. - condition: > - open_read - and sensitive_files - and proc_name_exists - and not proc.name in (user_mgmt_binaries, userexec_binaries, package_mgmt_binaries, - cron_binaries, read_sensitive_file_binaries, shell_binaries, hids_binaries, - vpn_binaries, mail_config_binaries, nomachine_binaries, sshkit_script_binaries, - in.proftpd, mandb, salt-call, salt-minion, postgres_mgmt_binaries, - google_oslogin_ - ) - and not cmp_cp_by_passwd - and not ansible_running_python - and not run_by_qualys - and not run_by_chef - and not run_by_google_accounts_daemon - and not user_read_sensitive_file_conditions - and not mandb_postinst - and not perl_running_plesk - and not perl_running_updmap - and not veritas_driver_script - and not perl_running_centrifydc - and not runuser_reading_pam - and not linux_bench_reading_etc_shadow - and not user_known_read_sensitive_files_activities - and not user_read_sensitive_file_containers - output: Sensitive file opened for reading by non-trusted program (file=%fd.name gparent=%proc.aname[2] ggparent=%proc.aname[3] gggparent=%proc.aname[4] evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: WARNING - tags: [maturity_stable, host, container, filesystem, mitre_credential_access, T1555] - -- macro: amazon_linux_running_python_yum - condition: > - (proc.name = python and - proc.pcmdline = "python -m amazon_linux_extras system_motd" and - proc.cmdline startswith "python -c import yum;") - -- macro: user_known_write_rpm_database_activities - condition: (never_true) - -# Only let rpm-related programs write to the rpm database -- rule: Write below rpm database - desc: > - Trying to write to the rpm database by any non-rpm related program can serve as an auditing rule to track general system changes. - Such rules can be noisy and challenging to interpret, particularly if your system frequently undergoes updates. However, careful - profiling of your environment can transform this rule into an effective rule for detecting unusual behavior associated with system - changes, including compliance-related cases. - condition: > - open_write - and fd.name startswith /var/lib/rpm - and not rpm_procs - and not ansible_running_python - and not python_running_chef - and not exe_running_docker_save - and not amazon_linux_running_python_yum - and not user_known_write_rpm_database_activities - output: rpm database opened for writing by a non-rpm program (file=%fd.name pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: ERROR - tags: [maturity_sandbox, host, container, filesystem, software_mgmt, mitre_persistence, T1072] - -- macro: postgres_running_wal_e - condition: (proc.pname=postgres and (proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c envdir /etc/wal-e.d/env /usr/local/bin/wal-e" or proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c envdir \"/run/etc/wal-e.d/env\" wal-g wal-push")) - -- macro: redis_running_prepost_scripts - condition: (proc.aname[2]=redis-server and (proc.cmdline contains "redis-server.post-up.d" or proc.cmdline contains "redis-server.pre-up.d")) - -- macro: rabbitmq_running_scripts - condition: > - (proc.pname=beam.smp and - (proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c exec ps" or - proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c exec inet_gethost" or - proc.cmdline= "sh -s unix:cmd" or - proc.cmdline= "sh -c exec /bin/sh -s unix:cmd 2>&1")) - -- macro: rabbitmqctl_running_scripts - condition: (proc.aname[2]=rabbitmqctl and proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c ") - -- macro: run_by_appdynamics - condition: (proc.pexe endswith java and proc.pcmdline contains " -jar -Dappdynamics") - -- macro: user_known_db_spawned_processes - condition: (never_true) - -- rule: DB program spawned process - desc: > - A program related to the database server creates an unexpected child process (other than itself). - This is not supposed to happen and often follows SQL injection attacks. This behavioral detection could - indicate potential unauthorized data extraction or tampering with the database. - condition: > - spawned_process - and proc.pname in (db_server_binaries) - and not proc.name in (db_server_binaries) - and not postgres_running_wal_e - and not user_known_db_spawned_processes - output: Database-related program spawned process other than itself (evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: NOTICE - tags: [maturity_incubating, host, container, process, database, mitre_execution, T1190] - -- macro: user_known_modify_bin_dir_activities - condition: (never_true) - -- rule: Modify binary dirs - desc: > - Trying to modify any file below a set of binary directories can serve as an auditing rule to track general system changes. - Such rules can be noisy and challenging to interpret, particularly if your system frequently undergoes updates. However, careful - profiling of your environment can transform this rule into an effective rule for detecting unusual behavior associated with system - changes, including compliance-related cases. - condition: > - modify - and bin_dir_rename - and not package_mgmt_procs - and not exe_running_docker_save - and not user_known_modify_bin_dir_activities - output: File below known binary directory renamed/removed (file=%fd.name pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline evt_args=%evt.args evt_type=%evt.type evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: ERROR - tags: [maturity_sandbox, host, container, filesystem, mitre_defense_evasion, T1222.002] - -- macro: user_known_mkdir_bin_dir_activities - condition: (never_true) - -- rule: Mkdir binary dirs - desc: > - Trying to create a directory below a set of binary directories can serve as an auditing rule to track general system changes. - Such rules can be noisy and challenging to interpret, particularly if your system frequently undergoes updates. However, careful - profiling of your environment can transform this rule into an effective rule for detecting unusual behavior associated with system - changes, including compliance-related cases. - condition: > - mkdir - and bin_dir_mkdir - and not package_mgmt_procs - and not user_known_mkdir_bin_dir_activities - and not exe_running_docker_save - output: Directory below known binary directory created (directory=%evt.arg.path evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: ERROR - tags: [maturity_sandbox, host, container, filesystem, mitre_persistence, T1222.002] - -# This list allows for easy additions to the set of commands allowed -# to change thread namespace without having to copy and override the -# entire change thread namespace rule. -- list: user_known_change_thread_namespace_binaries - items: [crio, multus] - -- macro: user_known_change_thread_namespace_activities - condition: (never_true) - -- list: network_plugin_binaries - items: [aws-cni, azure-vnet] - -- macro: weaveworks_scope - condition: (container.image.repository endswith weaveworks/scope and proc.name=scope) - -- rule: Change thread namespace - desc: > - An attempt to alter the namespace of a process (often performed while creating a container) through the setns syscall. - Conversely, the same syscall setns is triggered when an unauthorized attempt is made to break out from the container - to the host, for example, when using commands like `nsenter --target 1` and similar ones. Recommending to profile your - environment and refine this rule for effective operationalization. - condition: > - evt.type=setns and evt.dir=< - and proc_name_exists - and not (container.id=host and proc.name in (docker_binaries, k8s_binaries, lxd_binaries, nsenter)) - and not proc.name in (sysdigcloud_binaries, sysdig, calico, oci-umount, cilium-cni, network_plugin_binaries) - and not proc.name in (user_known_change_thread_namespace_binaries) - and not proc.name startswith "runc" - and not proc.cmdline startswith "containerd" - and not proc.pname in (sysdigcloud_binaries, hyperkube, kubelet, protokube, dockerd, tini, aws) - and not java_running_sdjagent - and not kubelet_running_loopback - and not rancher_agent - and not rancher_network_manager - and not calico_node - and not weaveworks_scope - and not user_known_change_thread_namespace_activities - enabled: false - output: Namespace change (setns) by unexpected program (evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: NOTICE - tags: [maturity_incubating, host, container, process, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1611] - -# The binaries in this list and their descendents are *not* allowed -# spawn shells. This includes the binaries spawning shells directly as -# well as indirectly. For example, apache -> php/perl for -# mod_{php,perl} -> some shell is also not allowed, because the shell -# has apache as an ancestor. - -- list: protected_shell_spawning_binaries - items: [ - http_server_binaries, db_server_binaries, nosql_server_binaries, mail_binaries, - fluentd, flanneld, splunkd, consul, smbd, runsv, PM2 - ] - -- macro: parent_java_running_zookeeper - condition: (proc.pexe endswith java and proc.pcmdline contains org.apache.zookeeper.server) - -- macro: parent_java_running_kafka - condition: (proc.pexe endswith java and proc.pcmdline contains kafka.Kafka) - -- macro: parent_java_running_elasticsearch - condition: (proc.pexe endswith java and proc.pcmdline contains org.elasticsearch.bootstrap.Elasticsearch) - -- macro: parent_java_running_activemq - condition: (proc.pexe endswith java and proc.pcmdline contains activemq.jar) - -- macro: parent_java_running_cassandra - condition: (proc.pexe endswith java and (proc.pcmdline contains "-Dcassandra.config.loader" or proc.pcmdline contains org.apache.cassandra.service.CassandraDaemon)) - -- macro: parent_java_running_jboss_wildfly - condition: (proc.pexe endswith java and proc.pcmdline contains org.jboss) - -- macro: parent_java_running_glassfish - condition: (proc.pexe endswith java and proc.pcmdline contains com.sun.enterprise.glassfish) - -- macro: parent_java_running_hadoop - condition: (proc.pexe endswith java and proc.pcmdline contains org.apache.hadoop) - -- macro: parent_java_running_datastax - condition: (proc.pexe endswith java and proc.pcmdline contains com.datastax) - -- macro: nginx_starting_nginx - condition: (proc.pname=nginx and proc.cmdline contains "/usr/sbin/nginx -c /etc/nginx/nginx.conf") - -- macro: nginx_running_aws_s3_cp - condition: (proc.pname=nginx and proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c /usr/local/bin/aws s3 cp") - -- macro: consul_running_net_scripts - condition: (proc.pname=consul and (proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c curl" or proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c nc")) - -- macro: consul_running_alert_checks - condition: (proc.pname=consul and proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c /bin/consul-alerts") - -- macro: serf_script - condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c serf") - -- macro: check_process_status - condition: (proc.cmdline startswith "sh -c kill -0 ") - -# In some cases, you may want to consider node processes run directly -# in containers as protected shell spawners. Examples include using -# pm2-docker or pm2 start some-app.js --no-daemon-mode as the direct -# entrypoint of the container, and when the node app is a long-lived -# server using something like express. -# -# However, there are other uses of node related to build pipelines for -# which node is not really a server but instead a general scripting -# tool. In these cases, shells are very likely and in these cases you -# don't want to consider node processes protected shell spawners. -# -# We have to choose one of these cases, so we consider node processes -# as unprotected by default. If you want to consider any node process -# run in a container as a protected shell spawner, override the below -# macro to remove the "never_true" clause, which allows it to take effect. -- macro: possibly_node_in_container - condition: (never_true and (proc.pname=node and proc.aname[3]=docker-containe)) - -# Similarly, you may want to consider any shell spawned by apache -# tomcat as suspect. The famous apache struts attack (CVE-2017-5638) -# could be exploited to do things like spawn shells. -# -# However, many applications *do* use tomcat to run arbitrary shells, -# as a part of build pipelines, etc. -# -# Like for node, we make this case opt-in. -- macro: possibly_parent_java_running_tomcat - condition: (never_true and proc.pexe endswith java and proc.pcmdline contains org.apache.catalina.startup.Bootstrap) - -- macro: protected_shell_spawner - condition: > - (proc.aname in (protected_shell_spawning_binaries) - or parent_java_running_zookeeper - or parent_java_running_kafka - or parent_java_running_elasticsearch - or parent_java_running_activemq - or parent_java_running_cassandra - or parent_java_running_jboss_wildfly - or parent_java_running_glassfish - or parent_java_running_hadoop - or parent_java_running_datastax - or possibly_parent_java_running_tomcat - or possibly_node_in_container) - -- list: mesos_shell_binaries - items: [mesos-docker-ex, mesos-slave, mesos-health-ch] - -# Note that runsv is both in protected_shell_spawner and the -# exclusions by pname. This means that runsv can itself spawn shells -# (the ./run and ./finish scripts), but the processes runsv can not -# spawn shells. -- rule: Run shell untrusted - desc: > - An attempt to spawn a shell below a non-shell application. The non-shell applications that are monitored are - defined in the protected_shell_spawner macro, with protected_shell_spawning_binaries being the list you can - easily customize. For Java parent processes, please note that Java often has a custom process name. Therefore, - rely more on proc.exe to define Java applications. This rule can be noisier, as you can see in the exhaustive - existing tuning. However, given it is very behavior-driven and broad, it is universally relevant to catch - general Remote Code Execution (RCE). Allocate time to tune this rule for your use cases and reduce noise. - Tuning suggestions include looking at the duration of the parent process (proc.ppid.duration) to define your - long-running app processes. Checking for newer fields such as proc.vpgid.name and proc.vpgid.exe instead of the - direct parent process being a non-shell application could make the rule more robust. - condition: > - spawned_process - and shell_procs - and proc.pname exists - and protected_shell_spawner - and not proc.pname in (shell_binaries, gitlab_binaries, cron_binaries, user_known_shell_spawn_binaries, - needrestart_binaries, - mesos_shell_binaries, - erl_child_setup, exechealthz, - PM2, PassengerWatchd, c_rehash, svlogd, logrotate, hhvm, serf, - lb-controller, nvidia-installe, runsv, statsite, erlexec, calico-node, - "puma reactor") - and not proc.cmdline in (known_shell_spawn_cmdlines) - and not proc.aname in (unicorn_launche) - and not consul_running_net_scripts - and not consul_running_alert_checks - and not nginx_starting_nginx - and not nginx_running_aws_s3_cp - and not run_by_package_mgmt_binaries - and not serf_script - and not check_process_status - and not run_by_foreman - and not python_mesos_marathon_scripting - and not splunk_running_forwarder - and not postgres_running_wal_e - and not redis_running_prepost_scripts - and not rabbitmq_running_scripts - and not rabbitmqctl_running_scripts - and not run_by_appdynamics - and not user_shell_container_exclusions - output: Shell spawned by untrusted binary (parent_exe=%proc.pexe parent_exepath=%proc.pexepath pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline gparent=%proc.aname[2] ggparent=%proc.aname[3] aname[4]=%proc.aname[4] aname[5]=%proc.aname[5] aname[6]=%proc.aname[6] aname[7]=%proc.aname[7] evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: NOTICE - tags: [maturity_stable, host, container, process, shell, mitre_execution, T1059.004] - -- macro: allowed_openshift_registry_root - condition: > - (container.image.repository startswith openshift3/ or - container.image.repository startswith registry.redhat.io/openshift3/ or - container.image.repository startswith registry.access.redhat.com/openshift3/) - -# Source: https://docs.openshift.com/enterprise/3.2/install_config/install/disconnected_install.html -- macro: openshift_image - condition: > - (allowed_openshift_registry_root and - (container.image.repository endswith /logging-deployment or - container.image.repository endswith /logging-elasticsearch or - container.image.repository endswith /logging-kibana or - container.image.repository endswith /logging-fluentd or - container.image.repository endswith /logging-auth-proxy or - container.image.repository endswith /metrics-deployer or - container.image.repository endswith /metrics-hawkular-metrics or - container.image.repository endswith /metrics-cassandra or - container.image.repository endswith /metrics-heapster or - container.image.repository endswith /ose-haproxy-router or - container.image.repository endswith /ose-deployer or - container.image.repository endswith /ose-sti-builder or - container.image.repository endswith /ose-docker-builder or - container.image.repository endswith /ose-pod or - container.image.repository endswith /ose-node or - container.image.repository endswith /ose-docker-registry or - container.image.repository endswith /prometheus-node-exporter or - container.image.repository endswith /image-inspector)) - -- list: redhat_io_images_privileged - items: [registry.redhat.io/openshift-logging/fluentd-rhel8, registry.redhat.io/openshift4/ose-csi-node-driver-registrar, registry.redhat.io/openshift4/ose-kubernetes-nmstate-handler-rhel8, registry.redhat.io/openshift4/ose-local-storage-diskmaker] - -- macro: redhat_image - condition: > - (container.image.repository in (redhat_io_images_privileged)) - -# https://docs.aws.amazon.com/eks/latest/userguide/add-ons-images.html -# official AWS EKS registry list. AWS has different ECR repo per region -- macro: allowed_aws_ecr_registry_root_for_eks - condition: > - (container.image.repository startswith "602401143452.dkr.ecr" or - container.image.repository startswith "877085696533.dkr.ecr" or - container.image.repository startswith "800184023465.dkr.ecr" or - container.image.repository startswith "918309763551.dkr.ecr" or - container.image.repository startswith "961992271922.dkr.ecr" or - container.image.repository startswith "590381155156.dkr.ecr" or - container.image.repository startswith "558608220178.dkr.ecr" or - container.image.repository startswith "151742754352.dkr.ecr" or - container.image.repository startswith "013241004608.dkr.ecr") - - -- macro: aws_eks_core_images - condition: > - (allowed_aws_ecr_registry_root_for_eks and - (container.image.repository endswith ".amazonaws.com/amazon-k8s-cni" or - container.image.repository endswith ".amazonaws.com/eks/kube-proxy")) - - -- macro: aws_eks_image_sensitive_mount - condition: > - (allowed_aws_ecr_registry_root_for_eks and container.image.repository endswith ".amazonaws.com/amazon-k8s-cni") - -# These images are allowed both to run with --privileged and to mount -# sensitive paths from the host filesystem. -# -# NOTE: This list is only provided for backwards compatibility with -# older local falco rules files that may have been appending to -# trusted_images. To make customizations, it's better to add images to -# either privileged_images or falco_sensitive_mount_images. -- list: trusted_images - items: [] - -# Add conditions to this macro (probably in a separate file, -# overwriting this macro) to specify additional containers that are -# trusted and therefore allowed to run privileged *and* with sensitive -# mounts. -# -# Like trusted_images, this is deprecated in favor of -# user_privileged_containers and user_sensitive_mount_containers and -# is only provided for backwards compatibility. -# -# In this file, it just takes one of the images in trusted_containers -# and repeats it. -- macro: user_trusted_containers - condition: (never_true) - -- list: sematext_images - items: [docker.io/sematext/sematext-agent-docker, docker.io/sematext/agent, docker.io/sematext/logagent, - registry.access.redhat.com/sematext/sematext-agent-docker, - registry.access.redhat.com/sematext/agent, - registry.access.redhat.com/sematext/logagent] - -# Falco containers -- list: falco_containers - items: - - falcosecurity/falco - - docker.io/falcosecurity/falco - - public.ecr.aws/falcosecurity/falco - -# Falco no driver containers -- list: falco_no_driver_containers - items: - - falcosecurity/falco-no-driver - - docker.io/falcosecurity/falco-no-driver - - public.ecr.aws/falcosecurity/falco-no-driver - -# These container images are allowed to run with --privileged and full set of capabilities -# TODO: Remove k8s.gcr.io reference after 01/Dec/2023 -- list: falco_privileged_images - items: [ - falco_containers, - docker.io/calico/node, - calico/node, - docker.io/cloudnativelabs/kube-router, - docker.io/docker/ucp-agent, - docker.io/mesosphere/mesos-slave, - docker.io/rook/toolbox, - docker.io/sysdig/sysdig, - gcr.io/google_containers/kube-proxy, - gcr.io/google-containers/startup-script, - gcr.io/projectcalico-org/node, - gke.gcr.io/kube-proxy, - gke.gcr.io/gke-metadata-server, - gke.gcr.io/netd-amd64, - gke.gcr.io/watcher-daemonset, - gcr.io/google-containers/prometheus-to-sd, - k8s.gcr.io/ip-masq-agent-amd64, - k8s.gcr.io/kube-proxy, - k8s.gcr.io/prometheus-to-sd, - registry.k8s.io/ip-masq-agent-amd64, - registry.k8s.io/kube-proxy, - registry.k8s.io/prometheus-to-sd, - quay.io/calico/node, - sysdig/sysdig, - sematext_images, - k8s.gcr.io/dns/k8s-dns-node-cache, - registry.k8s.io/dns/k8s-dns-node-cache, - mcr.microsoft.com/oss/kubernetes/kube-proxy - ] - -- macro: falco_privileged_containers - condition: (openshift_image or - user_trusted_containers or - aws_eks_core_images or - container.image.repository in (trusted_images) or - container.image.repository in (falco_privileged_images) or - container.image.repository startswith istio/proxy_ or - container.image.repository startswith quay.io/sysdig/) - -# Add conditions to this macro (probably in a separate file, -# overwriting this macro) to specify additional containers that are -# allowed to run privileged -# -# In this file, it just takes one of the images in falco_privileged_images -# and repeats it. -- macro: user_privileged_containers - condition: (never_true) - -# These container images are allowed to mount sensitive paths from the -# host filesystem. -- list: falco_sensitive_mount_images - items: [ - falco_containers, - docker.io/sysdig/sysdig, sysdig/sysdig, - gcr.io/google_containers/hyperkube, - gcr.io/google_containers/kube-proxy, docker.io/calico/node, - docker.io/rook/toolbox, docker.io/cloudnativelabs/kube-router, docker.io/consul, - docker.io/datadog/docker-dd-agent, docker.io/datadog/agent, docker.io/docker/ucp-agent, docker.io/gliderlabs/logspout, - docker.io/netdata/netdata, docker.io/google/cadvisor, docker.io/prom/node-exporter, - amazon/amazon-ecs-agent, prom/node-exporter, amazon/cloudwatch-agent - ] - -- macro: falco_sensitive_mount_containers - condition: (user_trusted_containers or - aws_eks_image_sensitive_mount or - container.image.repository in (trusted_images) or - container.image.repository in (falco_sensitive_mount_images) or - container.image.repository startswith quay.io/sysdig/ or - container.image.repository=k8scloudprovider/cinder-csi-plugin) - -# Add conditions to this macro (probably in a separate file, -# overwriting this macro) to specify additional containers that are -# allowed to perform sensitive mounts. -# -# In this file, it just takes one of the images in falco_sensitive_mount_images -# and repeats it. -- macro: user_sensitive_mount_containers - condition: (never_true) - -- rule: Launch Privileged Container - desc: > - Detect the initial process initiation within a privileged container, with exemptions for known and trusted images. - This rule primarily serves as an excellent auditing mechanism since highly privileged containers, when compromised, - can result in significant harm. For instance, if another rule triggers within such a privileged container, it could be - seen as more suspicious, prompting a closer inspection. - condition: > - container_started - and container - and container.privileged=true - and not falco_privileged_containers - and not user_privileged_containers - and not redhat_image - output: Privileged container started (evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: INFO - tags: [maturity_incubating, container, cis, mitre_execution, T1610, PCI_DSS_10.2.5] - -# These capabilities were used in the past to escape from containers -- macro: excessively_capable_container - condition: > - (thread.cap_permitted contains CAP_SYS_ADMIN - or thread.cap_permitted contains CAP_SYS_MODULE - or thread.cap_permitted contains CAP_SYS_RAWIO - or thread.cap_permitted contains CAP_SYS_PTRACE - or thread.cap_permitted contains CAP_SYS_BOOT - or thread.cap_permitted contains CAP_SYSLOG - or thread.cap_permitted contains CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH - or thread.cap_permitted contains CAP_NET_ADMIN - or thread.cap_permitted contains CAP_BPF) - -- rule: Launch Excessively Capable Container - desc: > - Identify containers that start with a powerful set of capabilities, with exceptions for recognized trusted images. - Similar to the "Launch Privileged Container" rule, this functions as a robust auditing rule. Compromised highly privileged - containers can lead to substantial harm. For instance, if another rule is triggered within such a container, it might - raise suspicion, prompting closer scrutiny. - condition: > - container_started - and container - and excessively_capable_container - and not falco_privileged_containers - and not user_privileged_containers - output: Excessively capable container started (cap_permitted=%thread.cap_permitted evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: INFO - tags: [maturity_incubating, container, cis, mitre_execution, T1610] - - -# For now, only considering a full mount of /etc as -# sensitive. Ideally, this would also consider all subdirectories -# below /etc as well, but the globbing mechanism -# doesn't allow exclusions of a full pattern, only single characters. -- macro: sensitive_mount - condition: (container.mount.dest[/proc*] != "N/A" or - container.mount.dest[/var/run/docker.sock] != "N/A" or - container.mount.dest[/var/run/crio/crio.sock] != "N/A" or - container.mount.dest[/run/containerd/containerd.sock] != "N/A" or - container.mount.dest[/var/lib/kubelet] != "N/A" or - container.mount.dest[/var/lib/kubelet/pki] != "N/A" or - container.mount.dest[/] != "N/A" or - container.mount.dest[/home/admin] != "N/A" or - container.mount.dest[/etc] != "N/A" or - container.mount.dest[/etc/kubernetes] != "N/A" or - container.mount.dest[/etc/kubernetes/manifests] != "N/A" or - container.mount.dest[/root*] != "N/A") - -# The steps libcontainer performs to set up the root program for a container are: -# - clone + exec self to a program runc:[0:PARENT] -# - clone a program runc:[1:CHILD] which sets up all the namespaces -# - clone a second program runc:[2:INIT] + exec to the root program. -# The parent of runc:[2:INIT] is runc:0:PARENT] -# As soon as 1:CHILD is created, 0:PARENT exits, so there's a race -# where at the time 2:INIT execs the root program, 0:PARENT might have -# already exited, or might still be around. So we handle both. -# We also let runc:[1:CHILD] count as the parent process, which can occur -# when we lose events and lose track of state. - -- macro: container_entrypoint - condition: (not proc.pname exists or proc.pname in (runc:[0:PARENT], runc:[1:CHILD], runc, docker-runc, exe, docker-runc-cur, containerd-shim, systemd, crio)) - -- rule: Launch Sensitive Mount Container - desc: > - Detect the initial process launched within a container that has a mount from a sensitive host directory (e.g. /proc). - Exceptions are made for known trusted images. This rule holds value for generic auditing; however, its noisiness - varies based on your environment. - condition: > - container_started - and container - and sensitive_mount - and not falco_sensitive_mount_containers - and not user_sensitive_mount_containers - output: Container with sensitive mount started (mounts=%container.mounts evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: INFO - tags: [maturity_sandbox, container, cis, mitre_execution, T1610] - -# In a local/user rules file, you could override this macro to -# explicitly enumerate the container images that you want to run in -# your environment. In this main falco rules file, there isn't any way -# to know all the containers that can run, so any container is -# allowed, by using a filter that is guaranteed to evaluate to true. -# In the overridden macro, the condition would look something like -# (container.image.repository = vendor/container-1 or -# container.image.repository = vendor/container-2 or ...) -- macro: allowed_containers - condition: (container.id exists) - -- rule: Launch Disallowed Container - desc: > - Detect the initial process launched within a container that is not in a list of allowed containers. - This rule holds value for generic auditing; however, this rule requires a good understanding of your - setup and consistent effort to keep the list of allowed containers current. In some situations, - this can be challenging to manage. - condition: > - container_started - and container - and not allowed_containers - output: Container started and not in allowed list (evt_type=%evt.type user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: WARNING - tags: [maturity_sandbox, container, mitre_lateral_movement, T1610] - -- macro: user_known_system_user_login - condition: (never_true) - -# Anything run interactively by root -# - condition: evt.type != switch and user.name = root and proc.name != sshd and interactive -# output: "Interactive root (%user.name %proc.name %evt.dir %evt.type %evt.args %fd.name)" -# priority: WARNING - -- rule: System user interactive - desc: > - System (e.g. non-login) users spawning new processes. Can add custom service users (e.g. apache or mysqld). - 'Interactive' is defined as new processes as descendants of an ssh session or login process. Consider further tuning - by only looking at processes in a terminal / tty (proc.tty != 0). A newer field proc.is_vpgid_leader could be of help - to distinguish if the process was "directly" executed, for instance, in a tty, or executed as a descendant process in the - same process group, which, for example, is the case when subprocesses are spawned from a script. Consider this rule - as a great template rule to monitor interactive accesses to your systems more broadly. However, such a custom rule would be - unique to your environment. The rule "Terminal shell in container" that fires when using "kubectl exec" is more Kubernetes - relevant, whereas this one could be more interesting for the underlying host. - condition: > - spawned_process - and system_users - and interactive - and not user_known_system_user_login - output: System user ran an interactive command (evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: INFO - tags: [maturity_stable, host, container, users, mitre_execution, T1059, NIST_800-53_AC-2] - -# In some cases, a shell is expected to be run in a container. For example, configuration -# management software may do this, which is expected. -- macro: user_expected_terminal_shell_in_container_conditions - condition: (never_true) - -- rule: Terminal shell in container - desc: > - A shell was used as the entrypoint/exec point into a container with an attached terminal. Parent process may have - legitimately already exited and be null (read container_entrypoint macro). Common when using "kubectl exec" in Kubernetes. - Correlate with k8saudit exec logs if possible to find user or serviceaccount token used (fuzzy correlation by namespace and pod name). - Rather than considering it a standalone rule, it may be best used as generic auditing rule while examining other triggered - rules in this container/tty. - condition: > - spawned_process - and container - and shell_procs - and proc.tty != 0 - and container_entrypoint - and not user_expected_terminal_shell_in_container_conditions - output: A shell was spawned in a container with an attached terminal (evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: NOTICE - tags: [maturity_stable, container, shell, mitre_execution, T1059] - -# For some container types (mesos), there isn't a container image to -# work with, and the container name is autogenerated, so there isn't -# any stable aspect of the software to work with. In this case, we -# fall back to allowing certain command lines. - -- list: known_shell_spawn_cmdlines - items: [ - '"sh -c uname -p 2> /dev/null"', - '"sh -c uname -s 2>&1"', - '"sh -c uname -r 2>&1"', - '"sh -c uname -v 2>&1"', - '"sh -c uname -a 2>&1"', - '"sh -c ruby -v 2>&1"', - '"sh -c getconf CLK_TCK"', - '"sh -c getconf PAGESIZE"', - '"sh -c LC_ALL=C LANG=C /sbin/ldconfig -p 2>/dev/null"', - '"sh -c LANG=C /sbin/ldconfig -p 2>/dev/null"', - '"sh -c /sbin/ldconfig -p 2>/dev/null"', - '"sh -c stty -a 2>/dev/null"', - '"sh -c stty -a < /dev/tty"', - '"sh -c stty -g < /dev/tty"', - '"sh -c node index.js"', - '"sh -c node index"', - '"sh -c node ./src/start.js"', - '"sh -c node app.js"', - '"sh -c node -e \"require(''nan'')\""', - '"sh -c node -e \"require(''nan'')\")"', - '"sh -c node $NODE_DEBUG_OPTION index.js "', - '"sh -c crontab -l 2"', - '"sh -c lsb_release -a"', - '"sh -c lsb_release -is 2>/dev/null"', - '"sh -c whoami"', - '"sh -c node_modules/.bin/bower-installer"', - '"sh -c /bin/hostname -f 2> /dev/null"', - '"sh -c locale -a"', - '"sh -c -t -i"', - '"sh -c openssl version"', - '"bash -c id -Gn kafadmin"', - '"sh -c /bin/sh -c ''date +%%s''"', - '"sh -c /usr/share/lighttpd/create-mime.conf.pl"' - ] - -# This list allows for easy additions to the set of commands allowed -# to run shells in containers without having to without having to copy -# and override the entire run shell in container macro. Once -# https://github.com/falcosecurity/falco/issues/255 is fixed this will be a -# bit easier, as someone could append of any of the existing lists. -- list: user_known_shell_spawn_binaries - items: [] - -# This macro allows for easy additions to the set of commands allowed -# to run shells in containers without having to override the entire -# rule. Its default value is an expression that always is false, which -# becomes true when the "not ..." in the rule is applied. -- macro: user_shell_container_exclusions - condition: (never_true) - -- macro: login_doing_dns_lookup - condition: (proc.name=login and fd.l4proto=udp and fd.sport=53) - -# sockfamily ip is to exclude certain processes (like 'groups') that communicate on unix-domain sockets -# systemd can listen on ports to launch things like sshd on demand -- rule: System procs network activity - desc: > - Detect any unexpected network activity performed by system binaries that typically shouldn't perform network activity, including - coreutils binaries (like sleep, mkdir, who, date, and others) or user management binaries (such as login, systemd, usermod, deluser, - adduser, chpasswd, and others). This serves as a valuable baseline detection for network-related activities. - condition: > - inbound_outbound - and fd.sockfamily = ip - and (system_procs or proc.name in (shell_binaries)) - and not proc.name in (known_system_procs_network_activity_binaries) - and not login_doing_dns_lookup - and not user_expected_system_procs_network_activity_conditions - output: Known system binary sent/received network traffic (connection=%fd.name lport=%fd.lport rport=%fd.rport fd_type=%fd.type fd_proto=fd.l4proto evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: NOTICE - tags: [maturity_incubating, host, network, process, mitre_execution, T1059] - -# This list allows easily whitelisting system proc names that are -# expected to communicate on the network. -- list: known_system_procs_network_activity_binaries - items: [systemd, hostid, id] - -# This macro allows specifying conditions under which a system binary -# is allowed to communicate on the network. For instance, only specific -# proc.cmdline values could be allowed to be more granular in what is -# allowed. -- macro: user_expected_system_procs_network_activity_conditions - condition: (never_true) - -# When filled in, this should look something like: -# (proc.env contains "HTTP_PROXY=http://my.http.proxy.com ") -# The trailing space is intentional so avoid matching on prefixes of -# the actual proxy. -- macro: allowed_ssh_proxy_env - condition: (never_true) - -- list: http_proxy_binaries - items: [curl, wget] - -- macro: http_proxy_procs - condition: (proc.name in (http_proxy_binaries)) - -- rule: Program run with disallowed http proxy env - desc: > - Detect curl or wget usage with HTTP_PROXY environment variable. Attackers can manipulate the HTTP_PROXY variable's - value to redirect application's internal HTTP requests. This could expose sensitive information like authentication - keys and private data. - condition: > - spawned_process - and http_proxy_procs - and proc.env icontains HTTP_PROXY - and not allowed_ssh_proxy_env - enabled: false - output: Curl or wget run with disallowed HTTP_PROXY environment variable (env=%proc.env evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: NOTICE - tags: [maturity_incubating, host, container, users, mitre_execution, T1204] - -# In some environments, any attempt by a interpreted program (perl, -# python, ruby, etc) to listen for incoming connections or perform -# outgoing connections might be suspicious. These rules are not -# enabled by default. - -- rule: Interpreted procs inbound network activity - desc: > - Any inbound network activity performed by any interpreted program (perl, python, ruby, etc.). While it offers broad coverage and behavioral - insights, operationalizing it effectively requires significant time and might result in a moderate level of noise. Suggesting customizing - this rule to be more specific. For example, you could set it up to alert only for important namespaces after studying their usual behavior. - condition: > - inbound - and interpreted_procs - enabled: false - output: Interpreted program received/listened for network traffic (connection=%fd.name lport=%fd.lport rport=%fd.rport fd_type=%fd.type fd_proto=fd.l4proto evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: NOTICE - tags: [maturity_sandbox, host, container, network, mitre_exfiltration, TA0011] - -- rule: Interpreted procs outbound network activity - desc: > - Any outbound network activity performed by any interpreted program (perl, python, ruby, etc.). While it offers broad coverage and behavioral - insights, operationalizing it effectively requires significant time and might result in a moderate level of noise. Suggesting customizing - this rule to be more specific. For example, you could set it up to alert only for important namespaces after studying their usual behavior. - condition: > - outbound - and interpreted_procs - enabled: false - output: Interpreted program performed outgoing network connection (connection=%fd.name lport=%fd.lport rport=%fd.rport fd_type=%fd.type fd_proto=fd.l4proto evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: NOTICE - tags: [maturity_sandbox, host, container, network, mitre_exfiltration, TA0011] - -- list: openvpn_udp_ports - items: [1194, 1197, 1198, 8080, 9201] - -- list: l2tp_udp_ports - items: [500, 1701, 4500, 10000] - -- list: statsd_ports - items: [8125] - -- list: ntp_ports - items: [123] - -# Some applications will connect a udp socket to an address only to -# test connectivity. Assuming the udp connect works, they will follow -# up with a tcp connect that actually sends/receives data. -# -# With that in mind, we listed a few commonly seen ports here to avoid -# some false positives. In addition, we make the main rule opt-in, so -# it's disabled by default. - -- list: test_connect_ports - items: [0, 9, 80, 3306] - -- list: expected_udp_ports - items: [53, openvpn_udp_ports, l2tp_udp_ports, statsd_ports, ntp_ports, test_connect_ports] - -- macro: expected_udp_traffic - condition: fd.port in (expected_udp_ports) - -- rule: Unexpected UDP Traffic - desc: > - Detecting UDP traffic on ports other than 53 (DNS) or other commonly used ports. Misusing UDP is a known TTP among attackers. - Monitoring unusual network activity is highly valuable but often generates significant noise, as is the case with this detection. - condition: > - inbound_outbound - and fd.l4proto=udp - and not expected_udp_traffic - enabled: false - output: Unexpected UDP Traffic Seen (connection=%fd.name lport=%fd.lport rport=%fd.rport fd_type=%fd.type fd_proto=fd.l4proto evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: NOTICE - tags: [maturity_incubating, host, container, network, mitre_exfiltration, TA0011] - -# With the current restriction on system calls handled by falco -# (e.g. excluding read/write/sendto/recvfrom/etc, this rule won't -# trigger). -# - rule: Ssh error in syslog -# desc: any ssh errors (failed logins, disconnects, ...) sent to syslog -# condition: syslog and ssh_error_message and evt.dir = < -# output: "sshd sent error message to syslog (error=%evt.buffer)" -# priority: WARNING - -- macro: somebody_becoming_themselves - condition: ((user.name=nobody and evt.arg.uid=nobody) or - (user.name=www-data and evt.arg.uid=www-data) or - (user.name=_apt and evt.arg.uid=_apt) or - (user.name=postfix and evt.arg.uid=postfix) or - (user.name=pki-agent and evt.arg.uid=pki-agent) or - (user.name=pki-acme and evt.arg.uid=pki-acme) or - (user.name=nfsnobody and evt.arg.uid=nfsnobody) or - (user.name=postgres and evt.arg.uid=postgres)) - -- macro: nrpe_becoming_nagios - condition: (proc.name=nrpe and evt.arg.uid=nagios) - -# In containers, the user name might be for a uid that exists in the -# container but not on the host. (See -# https://github.com/draios/sysdig/issues/954). So in that case, allow -# a setuid. -- macro: known_user_in_container - condition: (container and user.name != "N/A") - -# Add conditions to this macro (probably in a separate file, -# overwriting this macro) to allow for specific combinations of -# programs changing users by calling setuid. -# -# In this file, it just takes one of the condition in the base macro -# and repeats it. -- macro: user_known_non_sudo_setuid_conditions - condition: (user.name=root) - -# sshd, mail programs attempt to setuid to root even when running as non-root. Excluding here to avoid meaningless FPs -- rule: Non sudo setuid - desc: > - Detect attempts to change users through the use of setuid, with exceptions for sudo/su. - The users "root" and "nobody" using setuid on themselves are also excluded, as setuid calls in these cases - typically involve reducing privileges. By setting the setuid bit, an attacker could execute code in a - different user's context, potentially with higher privileges. One drawback is the potential for noise, - as many applications legitimately use this approach. - condition: > - evt.type=setuid and evt.dir=> - and (known_user_in_container or not container) - and not (user.name=root or user.uid=0) - and not somebody_becoming_themselves - and not proc.name in (known_setuid_binaries, userexec_binaries, mail_binaries, docker_binaries, - nomachine_binaries) - and not proc.name startswith "runc:" - and not java_running_sdjagent - and not nrpe_becoming_nagios - and not user_known_non_sudo_setuid_conditions - output: Unexpected setuid call by non-sudo, non-root program (arg_uid=%evt.arg.uid evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: NOTICE - tags: [maturity_incubating, host, container, users, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1548.001] - -- macro: user_known_user_management_activities - condition: (never_true) - -- macro: chage_list - condition: (proc.name=chage and (proc.cmdline contains "-l" or proc.cmdline contains "--list")) - -- rule: User mgmt binaries - desc: > - Detect activity by any programs that can manage users, passwords, or permissions (such as login, systemd, usermod, deluser, adduser, - chpasswd, and others). sudo and su are excluded. Activity in containers is also excluded -- some containers create custom users on - top of a base linux distribution at startup. Some innocuous command lines that don't actually change anything are excluded. You might - want to consider applying this rule to container actions as well. - condition: > - spawned_process - and not container - and proc.name in (user_mgmt_binaries) - and not proc.name in (su, sudo, lastlog, nologin, unix_chkpwd) - and not proc.pname in (cron_binaries, systemd, systemd.postins, udev.postinst, run-parts) - and not proc.cmdline startswith "passwd -S" - and not proc.cmdline startswith "useradd -D" - and not proc.cmdline startswith "systemd --version" - and not run_by_qualys - and not run_by_sumologic_securefiles - and not run_by_yum - and not run_by_ms_oms - and not run_by_google_accounts_daemon - and not chage_list - and not user_known_user_management_activities - output: User management binary command run outside of container (gparent=%proc.aname[2] ggparent=%proc.aname[3] gggparent=%proc.aname[4] evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: NOTICE - tags: [maturity_incubating, host, users, software_mgmt, mitre_persistence, T1098] - -- list: allowed_dev_files - items: [ - /dev/null, /dev/stdin, /dev/stdout, /dev/stderr, - /dev/random, /dev/urandom, /dev/console, /dev/kmsg - ] - -- macro: user_known_create_files_below_dev_activities - condition: (never_true) - -# (we may need to add additional checks against false positives, see: -# https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/rkhunter/+bug/86153) -- rule: Create files below dev - desc: > - Detect the creation of files under /dev except for authorized device management programs. This can reveal rootkits hiding - files in /dev. Additionally, consider the "Execution from /dev/shm" rule. The upstream rule already covers some tuning - scenarios that you can further expand upon. - condition: > - (evt.type = creat or (evt.type in (open,openat,openat2))) - and evt.arg.flags contains O_CREAT - and fd.directory = /dev - and not proc.name in (dev_creation_binaries) - and not fd.name in (allowed_dev_files) - and not fd.name startswith /dev/tty - and not user_known_create_files_below_dev_activities - output: File created below /dev by untrusted program (file=%fd.name evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: ERROR - tags: [maturity_incubating, host, filesystem, mitre_persistence, T1543] - - -# In a local/user rules file, you could override this macro to -# explicitly enumerate the container images that you want to allow -# access to EC2 metadata. In this main falco rules file, there isn't -# any way to know all the containers that should have access, so any -# container is allowed, by repeating the "container" macro. In the -# overridden macro, the condition would look something like -# (container.image.repository = vendor/container-1 or -# container.image.repository = vendor/container-2 or ...) -- macro: ec2_metadata_containers - condition: (never_true) - -# On EC2 instances, 169.254.169.254 is a special IP used to fetch -# metadata about the instance. It may be desirable to prevent access -# to this IP from containers. -- rule: Contact EC2 Instance Metadata Service From Container - desc: > - Detects attempts to communicate with the EC2 Instance Metadata Service from a container. This detection is narrowly focused - and might not apply to your environment. In addition, it could generate noise and require fine-tuning. - condition: > - outbound - and container - and fd.sip="169.254.169.254" - and not ec2_metadata_containers - output: Outbound connection to EC2 instance metadata service (connection=%fd.name lport=%fd.lport rport=%fd.rport fd_type=%fd.type fd_proto=fd.l4proto evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: NOTICE - enabled: false - tags: [maturity_incubating, network, aws, container, mitre_credential_access, T1552.005] - - -# This rule is not enabled by default, since this rule is for cloud environment(GCP, AWS and Azure) only. -# You can filter the container that you want to allow access to metadata by overwriting user_known_metadata_access macro. - -- macro: user_known_metadata_access - condition: (k8s.ns.name = "kube-system") - -# On GCP, AWS and Azure, 169.254.169.254 is a special IP used to fetch -# metadata about the instance. The metadata could be used to get credentials by attackers. -- rule: Contact cloud metadata service from container - desc: > - Detects attempts to communicate with the Cloud Instance Metadata Service from a container. This detection is narrowly focused - and might not apply to your environment. In addition, it could generate noise and require fine-tuning. - condition: > - outbound - and container - and fd.sip="169.254.169.254" - and not user_known_metadata_access - enabled: true - output: Outbound connection to cloud instance metadata service (connection=%fd.name lport=%fd.lport rport=%fd.rport fd_type=%fd.type fd_proto=fd.l4proto evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: NOTICE - tags: [maturity_incubating, network, container, mitre_discovery, T1565] - -# Containers from IBM Cloud -- list: ibm_cloud_containers - items: - - icr.io/ext/sysdig/agent - - registry.ng.bluemix.net/armada-master/metrics-server-amd64 - - registry.ng.bluemix.net/armada-master/olm - -# In a local/user rules file, list the namespace or container images that are -# allowed to contact the K8s API Server from within a container. This -# might cover cases where the K8s infrastructure itself is running -# within a container. -# TODO: Remove k8s.gcr.io reference after 01/Dec/2023 -- macro: k8s_containers - condition: > - (container.image.repository in (gcr.io/google_containers/hyperkube-amd64, - gcr.io/google_containers/kube2sky, - docker.io/sysdig/sysdig, sysdig/sysdig, - fluent/fluentd-kubernetes-daemonset, prom/prometheus, - falco_containers, - falco_no_driver_containers, - ibm_cloud_containers, - velero/velero, - quay.io/jetstack/cert-manager-cainjector, weaveworks/kured, - quay.io/prometheus-operator/prometheus-operator, k8s.gcr.io/ingress-nginx/kube-webhook-certgen, - registry.k8s.io/ingress-nginx/kube-webhook-certgen, quay.io/spotahome/redis-operator, - registry.opensource.zalan.do/acid/postgres-operator, registry.opensource.zalan.do/acid/postgres-operator-ui, - rabbitmqoperator/cluster-operator, quay.io/kubecost1/kubecost-cost-model, - docker.io/bitnami/prometheus, docker.io/bitnami/kube-state-metrics, mcr.microsoft.com/oss/azure/aad-pod-identity/nmi) - or (k8s.ns.name = "kube-system")) - -- macro: k8s_api_server - condition: (fd.sip.name="kubernetes.default.svc.cluster.local") - -- macro: user_known_contact_k8s_api_server_activities - condition: (never_true) - -- rule: Contact K8S API Server From Container - desc: > - Detect attempts to communicate with the K8S API Server from a container by non-profiled users. Kubernetes APIs play a - pivotal role in configuring the cluster management lifecycle. Detecting potential unauthorized access to the API server - is of utmost importance. Audit your complete infrastructure and pinpoint any potential machines from which the API server - might be accessible based on your network layout. If Falco can't operate on all these machines, consider analyzing the - Kubernetes audit logs (typically drained from control nodes, and Falco offers a k8saudit plugin) as an additional data - source for detections within the control plane. - condition: > - evt.type=connect and evt.dir=< - and (fd.typechar=4 or fd.typechar=6) - and container - and k8s_api_server - and not k8s_containers - and not user_known_contact_k8s_api_server_activities - output: Unexpected connection to K8s API Server from container (connection=%fd.name lport=%fd.lport rport=%fd.rport fd_type=%fd.type fd_proto=fd.l4proto evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: NOTICE - tags: [maturity_stable, container, network, k8s, mitre_discovery, T1565] - -# In a local/user rules file, list the container images that are -# allowed to contact NodePort services from within a container. This -# might cover cases where the K8s infrastructure itself is running -# within a container. -# -# By default, all containers are allowed to contact NodePort services. -- macro: nodeport_containers - condition: (never_true) - -- rule: Unexpected K8s NodePort Connection - desc: > - Detect attempts to utilize K8s NodePorts from a container. K8s NodePorts are accessible on the eth0 interface of - each node, and they facilitate external traffic into a Kubernetes cluster. Attackers could misuse them for - unauthorized access. The rule uses default port ranges, but check for custom ranges and make necessary adjustments. - Also, consider tuning this rule as needed. - condition: > - inbound_outbound - and container - and fd.sport >= 30000 - and fd.sport <= 32767 - and not nodeport_containers - enabled: false - output: Unexpected K8s NodePort Connection (connection=%fd.name lport=%fd.lport rport=%fd.rport fd_type=%fd.type fd_proto=fd.l4proto evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: NOTICE - tags: [maturity_sandbox, network, k8s, container, mitre_persistence, T1205.001, NIST_800-53_AC-6] - -- list: network_tool_binaries - items: [nc, ncat, netcat, nmap, dig, tcpdump, tshark, ngrep, telnet, mitmproxy, socat, zmap] - -- macro: network_tool_procs - condition: (proc.name in (network_tool_binaries)) - -# In a local/user rules file, create a condition that matches legitimate uses -# of a package management process inside a container. -# -# For example: -# - macro: user_known_package_manager_in_container -# condition: proc.cmdline="dpkg -l" -- macro: user_known_package_manager_in_container - condition: (never_true) - -# Container is supposed to be immutable. Package management should be done in building the image. -# TODO: Remove k8s.gcr.io reference after 01/Dec/2023 -- macro: pkg_mgmt_in_kube_proxy - condition: > - (proc.cmdline startswith "update-alternat" - and (container.image.repository = "registry.k8s.io/kube-proxy" - or container.image.repository = "k8s.gcr.io/kube-proxy")) - -- rule: Launch Package Management Process in Container - desc: > - Detect package management processes executed within containers. An excellent auditing rule to monitor general drifts - in containers. Particularly useful for newer rules like "Drop and execute new binary in container" during incident - response investigations. This helps identify common anti-patterns of ad-hoc debugging. Simultaneously, to maintain - optimal hygiene, it's recommended to prevent container drifts and instead opt for redeploying new containers. - condition: > - spawned_process - and container - and user.name != "_apt" - and package_mgmt_procs - and not package_mgmt_ancestor_procs - and not user_known_package_manager_in_container - and not pkg_mgmt_in_kube_proxy - output: Package management process launched in container (evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: ERROR - tags: [maturity_incubating, container, process, software_mgmt, mitre_persistence, T1505] - -- rule: Netcat Remote Code Execution in Container - desc: > - Netcat Program runs inside container that allows remote code execution and may be utilized - as a part of a variety of reverse shell payload https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/. - These programs are of higher relevance as they are commonly installed on UNIX-like operating systems. - Can fire in combination with the "Redirect STDOUT/STDIN to Network Connection in Container" - rule as it utilizes a different evt.type. - condition: > - spawned_process - and container - and ((proc.name = "nc" and (proc.cmdline contains " -e" or - proc.cmdline contains " -c")) or - (proc.name = "ncat" and (proc.args contains "--sh-exec" or - proc.args contains "--exec" or proc.args contains "-e " or - proc.args contains "-c " or proc.args contains "--lua-exec")) - ) - output: Netcat runs inside container that allows remote code execution (evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: WARNING - tags: [maturity_stable, container, network, process, mitre_execution, T1059] - -- macro: user_known_network_tool_activities - condition: (never_true) - -- rule: Launch Suspicious Network Tool in Container - desc: > - Detect network tools (like netcat, nmap, tcpdump, socat, and more) launched within containers without any additional filters. - This serves as a valuable general detection, but it's recommended to invest engineering effort to fine-tune it and prevent a - high volume of legitimate logs. This rule complements the more specific "Netcat Remote Code Execution in Container" rule. - condition: > - spawned_process - and container - and network_tool_procs - and not user_known_network_tool_activities - output: Network tool launched in container (evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: NOTICE - tags: [maturity_incubating, container, network, process, mitre_execution, T1059] - -- rule: Launch Suspicious Network Tool on Host - desc: > - Detect network tools (like netcat, nmap, tcpdump, socat, and more) launched within containers without any additional filters. - This serves as a valuable general detection, but it's recommended to invest engineering effort to fine-tune it and prevent a - high volume of legitimate logs. The host equivalent of "Launch Suspicious Network Tool in Container.". - condition: > - spawned_process - and not container - and network_tool_procs - and not user_known_network_tool_activities - enabled: false - output: Network tool launched on host (evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags) - priority: NOTICE - tags: [maturity_incubating, host, network, process, mitre_execution, T1059] - -- list: grep_binaries - items: [grep, egrep, fgrep] - -- macro: grep_commands - condition: (proc.name in (grep_binaries)) - -# a less restrictive search for things that might be passwords/ssh/user etc. -- macro: grep_more - condition: (never_true) - -- macro: private_key_or_password - condition: > - (proc.args icontains "BEGIN PRIVATE" or - proc.args icontains "BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE" or - proc.args icontains "BEGIN RSA PRIVATE" or - proc.args icontains "BEGIN DSA PRIVATE" or - proc.args icontains "BEGIN EC PRIVATE" or - (grep_more and - (proc.args icontains " pass " or - proc.args icontains " ssh " or - proc.args icontains " user ")) - ) - -- rule: Search Private Keys or Passwords - desc: > - Detect attempts to search for private keys or passwords using the grep or find command. This is often seen with - unsophisticated attackers, as there are many ways to access files using bash built-ins that could go unnoticed. - Regardless, this serves as a solid baseline detection that can be tailored to cover these gaps while maintaining - an acceptable noise level. - condition: > - spawned_process - and ((grep_commands and private_key_or_password) or - (proc.name = "find" and (proc.args contains "id_rsa" or - proc.args contains "id_dsa" or - proc.args contains "id_ed25519" or - proc.args contains "id_ecdsa" - ) - )) - output: Grep private keys or passwords activities found (evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: - WARNING - tags: [maturity_stable, host, container, process, filesystem, mitre_credential_access, T1552.001] - -- list: log_directories - items: [/var/log, /dev/log] - -- list: log_files - items: [syslog, auth.log, secure, kern.log, cron, user.log, dpkg.log, last.log, yum.log, access_log, mysql.log, mysqld.log] - -- macro: access_log_files - condition: (fd.directory in (log_directories) or fd.filename in (log_files)) - -# a placeholder for whitelist log files that could be cleared. Recommend the macro as (fd.name startswith "/var/log/app1*") -- macro: allowed_clear_log_files - condition: (never_true) - -- macro: trusted_logging_images - condition: (container.image.repository endswith "splunk/fluentd-hec" or - container.image.repository endswith "fluent/fluentd-kubernetes-daemonset" or - container.image.repository endswith "openshift3/ose-logging-fluentd" or - container.image.repository endswith "containernetworking/azure-npm") - -- rule: Clear Log Activities - desc: > - Detect clearing of critical access log files, typically done to erase evidence that could be attributed to an adversary's - actions. To effectively customize and operationalize this detection, check for potentially missing log file destinations - relevant to your environment, and adjust the profiled containers you wish not to be alerted on. - condition: > - open_write - and access_log_files - and evt.arg.flags contains "O_TRUNC" - and not trusted_logging_images - and not allowed_clear_log_files - output: Log files were tampered (file=%fd.name evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: - WARNING - tags: [maturity_stable, host, container, filesystem, mitre_defense_evasion, T1070, NIST_800-53_AU-10] - -- list: data_remove_commands - items: [shred, mkfs, mke2fs] - -- macro: clear_data_procs - condition: (proc.name in (data_remove_commands)) - -- macro: user_known_remove_data_activities - condition: (never_true) - -- rule: Remove Bulk Data from Disk - desc: > - Detect a process running to clear bulk data from disk with the intention to destroy data, possibly interrupting availability - to systems. Profile your environment and use user_known_remove_data_activities to tune this rule. - condition: > - spawned_process - and clear_data_procs - and not user_known_remove_data_activities - output: Bulk data has been removed from disk (file=%fd.name evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: - WARNING - tags: [maturity_stable, host, container, process, filesystem, mitre_impact, T1485] - -# here `ash_history` will match both `bash_history` and `ash_history` -- macro: modify_shell_history - condition: > - (modify and ( - evt.arg.name endswith "ash_history" or - evt.arg.name endswith "zsh_history" or - evt.arg.name contains "fish_read_history" or - evt.arg.name endswith "fish_history" or - evt.arg.oldpath endswith "ash_history" or - evt.arg.oldpath endswith "zsh_history" or - evt.arg.oldpath contains "fish_read_history" or - evt.arg.oldpath endswith "fish_history" or - evt.arg.path endswith "ash_history" or - evt.arg.path endswith "zsh_history" or - evt.arg.path contains "fish_read_history" or - evt.arg.path endswith "fish_history")) - -# here `ash_history` will match both `bash_history` and `ash_history` -- macro: truncate_shell_history - condition: > - (open_write and ( - fd.name endswith "ash_history" or - fd.name endswith "zsh_history" or - fd.name contains "fish_read_history" or - fd.name endswith "fish_history") and evt.arg.flags contains "O_TRUNC") - -- macro: var_lib_docker_filepath - condition: (evt.arg.name startswith /var/lib/docker or fd.name startswith /var/lib/docker) - -- rule: Delete or rename shell history - desc: > - Detect shell history deletion, frequently used by unsophisticated adversaries to eliminate evidence. - Note that it can also trigger when exiting a Terminal shell, such as with `kubectl exec`, which - may introduce some noise. - condition: > - (modify_shell_history or truncate_shell_history) - and not var_lib_docker_filepath - and not proc.name in (docker_binaries) - output: Shell history deleted or renamed (file=%fd.name name=%evt.arg.name path=%evt.arg.path oldpath=%evt.arg.oldpath evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: - WARNING - tags: [maturity_incubating, host, container, process, filesystem, mitre_defense_evasion, T1070] - -- list: user_known_chmod_applications - items: [hyperkube, kubelet, k3s-agent] - -# This macro should be overridden in user rules as needed. This is useful if a given application -# should not be ignored altogether with the user_known_chmod_applications list, but only in -# specific conditions. -- macro: user_known_set_setuid_or_setgid_bit_conditions - condition: (never_true) - -- rule: Set Setuid or Setgid bit - desc: > - This rule is focused on detecting the use of setuid or setgid bits set via chmod. These bits, when set for an application, - result in the application running with the privileges of the owning user or group. By enabling the setuid or setgid bits, - an attacker could run code in a different user's context, possibly with elevated privileges. However, there's a trade-off - with noise, given that numerous applications legitimately run chmod. This rule is related to the "Non sudo setuid" rule. - condition: > - chmod - and (evt.arg.mode contains "S_ISUID" or evt.arg.mode contains "S_ISGID") - and not proc.name in (user_known_chmod_applications) - and not exe_running_docker_save - and not user_known_set_setuid_or_setgid_bit_conditions - enabled: false - output: Setuid or setgid bit is set via chmod (fd=%evt.arg.fd filename=%evt.arg.filename mode=%evt.arg.mode evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: - NOTICE - tags: [maturity_incubating, host, container, process, users, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1548.001] - -- list: exclude_hidden_directories - items: [/root/.cassandra] - -# The rule is disabled by default. -- macro: user_known_create_hidden_file_activities - condition: (never_true) - -- rule: Create Hidden Files or Directories - desc: > - Detecting hidden files or directories creation can serve as an auditing rule to track general system changes. - Such rules can be noisy and challenging to interpret, particularly if your system frequently undergoes updates. However, careful - profiling of your environment can transform this rule into an effective rule for detecting unusual behavior associated with system - changes, including compliance-related cases. - condition: > - ((modify and evt.arg.newpath contains "/.") or - (mkdir and evt.arg.path contains "/.") or - (open_write and evt.arg.flags contains "O_CREAT" and fd.name contains "/." and not fd.name pmatch (exclude_hidden_directories))) - and not user_known_create_hidden_file_activities - and not exe_running_docker_save - enabled: false - output: Hidden file or directory created (file=%fd.name newpath=%evt.arg.newpath evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: - NOTICE - tags: [maturity_sandbox, host, container, filesystem, mitre_defense_evasion, T1564.001] - -- list: remote_file_copy_binaries - items: [rsync, scp, sftp, dcp] - -- macro: remote_file_copy_procs - condition: (proc.name in (remote_file_copy_binaries)) - -# Users should overwrite this macro to specify conditions under which a -# Custom condition for use of remote file copy tool in container -- macro: user_known_remote_file_copy_activities - condition: (never_true) - -- rule: Launch Remote File Copy Tools in Container - desc: > - Detect remote file copy tools (like rsync, scp, sftp, dcp) launched within a container, potentially indicating data - exfiltration. Suggest refining this rule to accommodate legitimate use cases. - condition: > - spawned_process - and container - and remote_file_copy_procs - and not user_known_remote_file_copy_activities - output: Remote file copy tool launched in container (evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: NOTICE - tags: [maturity_incubating, container, network, process, mitre_exfiltration, T1020] - -- rule: Create Symlink Over Sensitive Files - desc: > - Detect symlinks created over a curated list of sensitive files or subdirectories under /etc/ or - root directories. Can be customized as needed. Refer to further and equivalent guidance within the - rule "Read sensitive file untrusted". - condition: > - create_symlink - and (evt.arg.target in (sensitive_file_names) or evt.arg.target in (sensitive_directory_names)) - output: Symlinks created over sensitive files (target=%evt.arg.target linkpath=%evt.arg.linkpath evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: WARNING - tags: [maturity_stable, host, container, filesystem, mitre_credential_access, T1555] - -- rule: Create Hardlink Over Sensitive Files - desc: > - Detect hardlink created over a curated list of sensitive files or subdirectories under /etc/ or - root directories. Can be customized as needed. Refer to further and equivalent guidance within the - rule "Read sensitive file untrusted". - condition: > - create_hardlink - and (evt.arg.oldpath in (sensitive_file_names)) - output: Hardlinks created over sensitive files (target=%evt.arg.target linkpath=%evt.arg.linkpath evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: WARNING - tags: [maturity_stable, host, container, filesystem, mitre_credential_access, T1555] - -- list: miner_ports - items: [ - 25, 3333, 3334, 3335, 3336, 3357, 4444, - 5555, 5556, 5588, 5730, 6099, 6666, 7777, - 7778, 8000, 8001, 8008, 8080, 8118, 8333, - 8888, 8899, 9332, 9999, 14433, 14444, - 45560, 45700 - ] - -- list: miner_domains - items: [ - "asia1.ethpool.org","ca.minexmr.com", - "cn.stratum.slushpool.com","de.minexmr.com", - "eth-ar.dwarfpool.com","eth-asia.dwarfpool.com", - "eth-asia1.nanopool.org","eth-au.dwarfpool.com", - "eth-au1.nanopool.org","eth-br.dwarfpool.com", - "eth-cn.dwarfpool.com","eth-cn2.dwarfpool.com", - "eth-eu.dwarfpool.com","eth-eu1.nanopool.org", - "eth-eu2.nanopool.org","eth-hk.dwarfpool.com", - "eth-jp1.nanopool.org","eth-ru.dwarfpool.com", - "eth-ru2.dwarfpool.com","eth-sg.dwarfpool.com", - "eth-us-east1.nanopool.org","eth-us-west1.nanopool.org", - "eth-us.dwarfpool.com","eth-us2.dwarfpool.com", - "eu.stratum.slushpool.com","eu1.ethermine.org", - "eu1.ethpool.org","fr.minexmr.com", - "mine.moneropool.com","mine.xmrpool.net", - "pool.minexmr.com","pool.monero.hashvault.pro", - "pool.supportxmr.com","sg.minexmr.com", - "sg.stratum.slushpool.com","stratum-eth.antpool.com", - "stratum-ltc.antpool.com","stratum-zec.antpool.com", - "stratum.antpool.com","us-east.stratum.slushpool.com", - "us1.ethermine.org","us1.ethpool.org", - "us2.ethermine.org","us2.ethpool.org", - "xmr-asia1.nanopool.org","xmr-au1.nanopool.org", - "xmr-eu1.nanopool.org","xmr-eu2.nanopool.org", - "xmr-jp1.nanopool.org","xmr-us-east1.nanopool.org", - "xmr-us-west1.nanopool.org","xmr.crypto-pool.fr", - "xmr.pool.minergate.com", "rx.unmineable.com", - "ss.antpool.com","dash.antpool.com", - "eth.antpool.com","zec.antpool.com", - "xmc.antpool.com","btm.antpool.com", - "stratum-dash.antpool.com","stratum-xmc.antpool.com", - "stratum-btm.antpool.com" - ] - -- list: https_miner_domains - items: [ - "ca.minexmr.com", - "cn.stratum.slushpool.com", - "de.minexmr.com", - "fr.minexmr.com", - "mine.moneropool.com", - "mine.xmrpool.net", - "pool.minexmr.com", - "sg.minexmr.com", - "stratum-eth.antpool.com", - "stratum-ltc.antpool.com", - "stratum-zec.antpool.com", - "stratum.antpool.com", - "xmr.crypto-pool.fr", - "ss.antpool.com", - "stratum-dash.antpool.com", - "stratum-xmc.antpool.com", - "stratum-btm.antpool.com", - "btm.antpool.com" - ] - -- list: http_miner_domains - items: [ - "ca.minexmr.com", - "de.minexmr.com", - "fr.minexmr.com", - "mine.moneropool.com", - "mine.xmrpool.net", - "pool.minexmr.com", - "sg.minexmr.com", - "xmr.crypto-pool.fr" - ] - -# Add rule based on crypto mining IOCs -- macro: minerpool_https - condition: (fd.sport="443" and fd.sip.name in (https_miner_domains)) - -- macro: minerpool_http - condition: (fd.sport="80" and fd.sip.name in (http_miner_domains)) - -- macro: minerpool_other - condition: (fd.sport in (miner_ports) and fd.sip.name in (miner_domains)) - -- macro: net_miner_pool - condition: (evt.type in (sendto, sendmsg, connect) and evt.dir=< and (fd.net != "127.0.0.0/8" and not fd.snet in (rfc_1918_addresses)) and ((minerpool_http) or (minerpool_https) or (minerpool_other))) - -- macro: trusted_images_query_miner_domain_dns - condition: (container.image.repository in (falco_containers)) - -# The rule is disabled by default. -# Note: falco will send DNS request to resolve miner pool domain which may trigger alerts in your environment. -- rule: Detect outbound connections to common miner pool ports - desc: > - Miners usually connect to miner pools using standard ports, and this rule flags such activity. Important: Falco currently sends DNS - requests to resolve miner pool domains, which could trigger other alerts. Prior to enabling this rule, it's advised to ensure whether - this is acceptable for your environment. This rule is specifically disabled for that reason. - condition: > - net_miner_pool - and not trusted_images_query_miner_domain_dns - enabled: false - output: Outbound connection to IP/Port flagged by https://cryptoioc.ch (ip=%fd.rip connection=%fd.name lport=%fd.lport rport=%fd.rport fd_type=%fd.type fd_proto=fd.l4proto evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: CRITICAL - tags: [maturity_sandbox, host, container, network, mitre_impact, T1496] - -- rule: Detect crypto miners using the Stratum protocol - desc: > - Miners commonly specify the mining pool to connect to using a URI that starts with "stratum+tcp". However, this rule is highly specific to - this technique, and matching command-line arguments can generally be bypassed quite easily. - condition: > - spawned_process - and (proc.cmdline contains "stratum+tcp" or - proc.cmdline contains "stratum2+tcp" or - proc.cmdline contains "stratum+ssl" or - proc.cmdline contains "stratum2+ssl") - output: Possible miner running (evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: CRITICAL - tags: [maturity_sandbox, host, container, process, mitre_impact, T1496] - -- list: k8s_client_binaries - items: [docker, kubectl, crictl] - -# TODO: Remove k8s.gcr.io reference after 01/Dec/2023 -- list: user_known_k8s_ns_kube_system_images - items: [ - k8s.gcr.io/fluentd-gcp-scaler, - k8s.gcr.io/node-problem-detector/node-problem-detector, - registry.k8s.io/fluentd-gcp-scaler, - registry.k8s.io/node-problem-detector/node-problem-detector - ] - -- list: user_known_k8s_images - items: [ - mcr.microsoft.com/aks/hcp/hcp-tunnel-front - ] - -# Whitelist for known docker client binaries run inside container -# - k8s.gcr.io/fluentd-gcp-scaler / registry.k8s.io/fluentd-gcp-scaler in GCP/GKE -# TODO: Remove k8s.gcr.io reference after 01/Dec/2023 -- macro: user_known_k8s_client_container - condition: > - (k8s.ns.name="kube-system" and container.image.repository in (user_known_k8s_ns_kube_system_images)) or container.image.repository in (user_known_k8s_images) - -- macro: user_known_k8s_client_container_parens - condition: (user_known_k8s_client_container) - -- rule: The docker client is executed in a container - desc: > - Detect the execution of a Kubernetes client tool (like docker, kubectl, crictl) within a container, which is typically not expected behavior. - Although this rule targets container workloads, monitoring the use of tools like crictl on the host over interactive access could also be - valuable for broader auditing objectives. The rule name is outdated and somewhat misleading when considering the expanded use cases now involved. - condition: > - spawned_process - and container - and not user_known_k8s_client_container_parens - and proc.name in (k8s_client_binaries) - output: Docker or kubernetes client executed in container (evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: WARNING - tags: [maturity_sandbox, container, mitre_execution, T1610] - -- list: user_known_packet_socket_binaries - items: [] - -- rule: Packet socket created in container - desc: > - Detect new packet socket at the device driver (OSI Layer 2) level in a container. Packet socket could be used for ARP Spoofing - and privilege escalation (CVE-2020-14386) by an attacker. Noise can be reduced by using the user_known_packet_socket_binaries - template list. - condition: > - evt.type=socket - and container - and evt.arg[0] contains AF_PACKET - and not proc.name in (user_known_packet_socket_binaries) - output: Packet socket was created in a container (socket_info=%evt.args connection=%fd.name lport=%fd.lport rport=%fd.rport fd_type=%fd.type fd_proto=fd.l4proto evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: NOTICE - tags: [maturity_stable, container, network, mitre_credential_access, T1557.002] - -# Namespaces where the rule is enforce -- list: namespace_scope_network_only_subnet - items: [] - -- macro: network_local_subnet - condition: > - (fd.rnet in (rfc_1918_addresses) or - fd.ip = "0.0.0.0" or - fd.net = "127.0.0.0/8") - -# # The rule is disabled by default. -# # How to test: -# # Add 'default' to namespace_scope_network_only_subnet -# # Run: -# kubectl run --generator=run-pod/v1 -n default -i --tty busybox --image=busybox --rm -- wget google.com -O /var/google.html -# # Check logs running - -- rule: Network Connection outside Local Subnet - desc: > - Detect network traffic (inbound or outbound) from a container to a destination outside the local subnet. - To operationalize this rule, profile your environment and update the template macro namespace_scope_network_only_subnet. - Customizing network-related rules usually demands substantial engineering effort to ensure their functionality. - condition: > - inbound_outbound - and container - and k8s.ns.name in (namespace_scope_network_only_subnet) - and not network_local_subnet - enabled: false - output: Network connection outside local subnet (fd_rip_name=%fd.rip.name fd_lip_name=%fd.lip.name fd_cip_name=%fd.cip.name fd_sip_name=%fd.sip.name connection=%fd.name lport=%fd.lport rport=%fd.rport fd_type=%fd.type fd_proto=fd.l4proto evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: WARNING - tags: [maturity_incubating, container, network, mitre_discovery, T1046, PCI_DSS_6.4.2] - -- list: allowed_image - items: [] # add image to monitor, i.e.: bitnami/nginx - -- list: authorized_server_binary - items: [] # add binary to allow, i.e.: nginx - -- list: authorized_server_port - items: [] # add port to allow, i.e.: 80 - -# # How to test: -# kubectl run --image=nginx nginx-app --port=80 --env="DOMAIN=cluster" -# kubectl expose deployment nginx-app --port=80 --name=nginx-http --type=LoadBalancer -# # On minikube: -# minikube service nginx-http -# # On general K8s: -# kubectl get services -# kubectl cluster-info -# # Visit the Nginx service and port, should not fire. -# # Change rule to different port, then different process name, and test again that it fires. - -- rule: Outbound or Inbound Traffic not to Authorized Server Process and Port - desc: > - Detect traffic to an unauthorized server process and port within pre-defined containers. - This rule absolutely requires profiling your environment beforehand and also necessitates adjusting the list of containers - to which this rule will be applied. The current expression logic will never evaluate to true unless the list is populated. - Network-based rules are extremely crucial in any security program, as they can often provide the only definitive evidence. - However, effectively operationalizing them can be challenging due to the potential for noise. Notably, this rule is challenging - to operationalize. - condition: > - inbound_outbound - and container - and container.image.repository in (allowed_image) - and not proc.name in (authorized_server_binary) - and not fd.sport in (authorized_server_port) - enabled: false - output: Network connection outside authorized port and binary (connection=%fd.name lport=%fd.lport rport=%fd.rport fd_type=%fd.type fd_proto=fd.l4proto evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: WARNING - tags: [maturity_deprecated, container, network, mitre_discovery, TA0011, NIST_800-53_CM-7] - -- macro: user_known_stand_streams_redirect_activities - condition: (never_true) - -# As of engine version 20 this rule can be improved by using the fd.types[] -# field so it only triggers once when all three of std{out,err,in} are -# redirected. -# -# - list: ip_sockets -# items: ["ipv4", "ipv6"] -# -# - rule: Redirect STDOUT/STDIN to Network Connection in Container once -# condition: dup and container and evt.rawres in (0, 1, 2) and fd.type in (ip_sockets) and fd.types[0] in (ip_sockets) and fd.types[1] in (ip_sockets) and fd.types[2] in (ip_sockets) and not user_known_stand_streams_redirect_activities -# -# The following rule has not been changed by default as existing users could be -# relying on the rule triggering when any of std{out,err,in} are redirected. - -- rule: Redirect STDOUT/STDIN to Network Connection in Container - desc: > - Detect redirection of stdout/stdin to a network connection within a container, achieved by utilizing a - variant of the dup syscall (potential reverse shell or remote code execution - https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/). This detection is behavior-based and may generate - noise in the system, and can be adjusted using the user_known_stand_streams_redirect_activities template - macro. Tuning can be performed similarly to existing detections based on process lineage or container images, - and/or it can be limited to interactive tty (tty != 0). - condition: > - dup - and container - and evt.rawres in (0, 1, 2) - and fd.type in ("ipv4", "ipv6") - and not user_known_stand_streams_redirect_activities - output: Redirect stdout/stdin to network connection (gparent=%proc.aname[2] ggparent=%proc.aname[3] gggparent=%proc.aname[4] fd.sip=%fd.sip connection=%fd.name lport=%fd.lport rport=%fd.rport fd_type=%fd.type fd_proto=fd.l4proto evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: NOTICE - tags: [maturity_stable, container, network, process, mitre_execution, T1059] - -# The two Container Drift rules below will fire when a new executable is created in a container. -# There are two ways to create executables - file is created with execution permissions or permissions change of existing file. -# We will use a new filter, is_open_exec, to find all files creations with execution permission, and will trace all chmods in a container. -# The use case we are targeting here is an attempt to execute code that was not shipped as part of a container (drift) - -# an activity that might be malicious or non-compliant. -# Two things to pay attention to: -# 1) In most cases, 'docker cp' will not be identified, but the assumption is that if an attacker gained access to the container runtime daemon, they are already privileged -# 2) Drift rules will be noisy in environments in which containers are built (e.g. docker build) -# These two rules are not enabled by default. - -- macro: user_known_container_drift_activities - condition: (never_true) - -- rule: Container Drift Detected (chmod) - desc: > - Detect new executables created within a container as a result of chmod. While this detection can generate significant noise, chmod - usage is frequently linked to dropping and executing malicious implants. The newer rule "Drop and execute new binary in container" - provides more precise detection of this TTP using unambiguous kernel signals. It is recommended to use the new rule. However, this - rule might be more relevant for auditing if applicable in your environment, such as when chmod is used on files within the /tmp folder. - condition: > - chmod - and container - and evt.rawres>=0 - and ((evt.arg.mode contains "S_IXUSR") or - (evt.arg.mode contains "S_IXGRP") or - (evt.arg.mode contains "S_IXOTH")) - and not runc_writing_exec_fifo - and not runc_writing_var_lib_docker - and not user_known_container_drift_activities - enabled: false - output: Drift detected (chmod), new executable created in a container (filename=%evt.arg.filename name=%evt.arg.name mode=%evt.arg.mode evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: ERROR - tags: [maturity_sandbox, container, process, filesystem, mitre_execution, T1059] - -# **************************************************************************** -# * "Container Drift Detected (open+create)" requires FALCO_ENGINE_VERSION 6 * -# **************************************************************************** -- rule: Container Drift Detected (open+create) - desc: > - Detect new executables created within a container as a result of open+create. The newer rule "Drop and execute new binary in container" - provides more precise detection of this TTP using unambiguous kernel signals. It is recommended to use the new rule. - condition: > - evt.type in (open,openat,openat2,creat) - and evt.rawres>=0 - and evt.is_open_exec=true - and container - and not runc_writing_exec_fifo - and not runc_writing_var_lib_docker - and not user_known_container_drift_activities - enabled: false - output: Drift detected (open+create), new executable created in a container (filename=%evt.arg.filename name=%evt.arg.name mode=%evt.arg.mode evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: ERROR - tags: [maturity_sandbox, container, process, filesystem, mitre_execution, T1059] - -- list: c2_server_ip_list - items: [] - -- list: c2_server_fqdn_list - items: [] - -# For example, you can fetch a list of IP addresses and FQDN on this website: -# https://feodotracker.abuse.ch/downloads/ipblocklist_recommended.json. -# Use Falco HELM chart to update (append) the c2 server lists with your values. -# See an example below. -# -# ```yaml -# # values.yaml Falco HELM chart file -# [...] -# customRules: -# c2-servers-list.yaml: |- -# - list: c2_server_ip_list -# append: true -# items: -# - "'51.178.161.32'" -# - "'46.101.90.205'" -# -# - list: c2_server_fqdn_list -# append: true -# items: -# - "srv-web.ffconsulting.com" -# - "57.ip-142-44-247.net" -# ``` - -- rule: Outbound Connection to C2 Servers - desc: > - Detect outbound connections to command and control servers using a list of IP addresses and fully qualified domain names (FQDNs). - This rule absolutely requires profiling your environment beforehand and also necessitates adjusting the template lists. The current - expression logic will never evaluate to true unless the lists are populated. Network-based rules are extremely crucial in any - security program, as they can often provide the only definitive evidence. However, effectively operationalizing them can be challenging - due to the potential for noise. Notably, this rule is challenging to operationalize. +- rule: Outbound Connection to C2 Servers + desc: > + Detect outbound connections to command and control servers using a list of IP addresses and fully qualified domain names (FQDNs). + This rule absolutely requires profiling your environment beforehand and also necessitates adjusting the template lists. The current + expression logic will never evaluate to true unless the lists are populated. Network-based rules are extremely crucial in any + security program, as they can often provide the only definitive evidence. However, effectively operationalizing them can be challenging + due to the potential for noise. Notably, this rule is challenging to operationalize. condition: > outbound and ((fd.sip in (c2_server_ip_list)) or @@ -3374,354 +192,4 @@ output: Outbound connection to C2 server (c2_domain=%fd.sip.name c2_addr=%fd.sip connection=%fd.name lport=%fd.lport rport=%fd.rport fd_type=%fd.type fd_proto=fd.l4proto evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) priority: WARNING enabled: false - tags: [maturity_deprecated, host, container, network, mitre_command_and_control, TA0011] - -- list: allowed_container_images_loading_kernel_module - items: [] - -- rule: Linux Kernel Module Injection Detected - desc: > - Inject Linux Kernel Modules from containers using insmod or modprobe with init_module and finit_module - syscalls, given the precondition of sys_module effective capabilities. Profile the environment and consider - allowed_container_images_loading_kernel_module to reduce noise and account for legitimate cases. - condition: > - kernel_module_load - and container - and thread.cap_effective icontains sys_module - and not container.image.repository in (allowed_container_images_loading_kernel_module) - output: Linux Kernel Module injection from container (parent_exepath=%proc.pexepath gparent=%proc.aname[2] gexepath=%proc.aexepath[2] module=%proc.args res=%evt.res evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: WARNING - tags: [maturity_stable, host, container, process, mitre_persistence, TA0003] - -- list: run_as_root_image_list - items: [] - -- macro: user_known_run_as_root_container - condition: (container.image.repository in (run_as_root_image_list)) - -# The rule is disabled by default and should be enabled when non-root container policy has been applied. -# Note the rule will not work as expected when usernamespace is applied, e.g. userns-remap is enabled. -- rule: Container Run as Root User - desc: > - Container detected running as the root user. This should be taken into account especially when policies disallow containers from running with - root user privileges. Note that a root user in containers doesn't inherently possess extensive power, as modern container environments define - privileges through Linux capabilities. To learn more, check out the rule "Launch Privileged Container". - condition: > - spawned_process - and container - and proc.vpid=1 - and user.uid=0 - and not user_known_run_as_root_container - enabled: false - output: Container launched with root user privilege (evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: INFO - tags: [maturity_sandbox, container, process, users, mitre_execution, T1610] - -# This rule helps detect CVE-2021-3156: -# A privilege escalation to root through heap-based buffer overflow -- rule: Sudo Potential Privilege Escalation - desc: > - Affecting sudo (<= 1.9.5p2), there's a privilege escalation vulnerability. By executing sudo using the sudoedit -s or sudoedit -i command with a - command-line argument that ends with a single backslash character, an unprivileged user can potentially escalate privileges to root. This rule is - highly specific and might be bypassed due to potential issues with string matching on command line arguments. - condition: > - spawned_process - and user.uid != 0 - and (proc.name=sudoedit or proc.name = sudo) - and (proc.args contains -s or proc.args contains -i or proc.args contains --login) - and (proc.args contains "\ " or proc.args endswith \) - output: Detect Sudo Privilege Escalation Exploit (CVE-2021-3156) (evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: CRITICAL - tags: [maturity_sandbox, host, container, filesystem, users, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1548.003] - -- rule: Debugfs Launched in Privileged Container - desc: > - Detect file system debugger debugfs launched inside a privileged container which might lead to container escape. - This rule has a more narrow scope. - condition: > - spawned_process - and container - and container.privileged=true - and proc.name=debugfs - output: Debugfs launched started in a privileged container (evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: WARNING - tags: [maturity_stable, container, cis, process, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1611] - -- macro: mount_info - condition: (proc.args="" or proc.args intersects ("-V", "-l", "-h")) - -- macro: known_gke_mount_in_privileged_containers - condition: - (k8s.ns.name = kube-system - and container.image.repository = gke.gcr.io/gcp-compute-persistent-disk-csi-driver) - -- macro: known_aks_mount_in_privileged_containers - condition: - ((k8s.ns.name = kube-system and container.image.repository in (mcr.microsoft.com/oss/kubernetes-csi/azuredisk-csi,mcr.microsoft.com/oss/kubernetes-csi/azurefile-csi)) - or (k8s.ns.name = system and container.image.repository = mcr.microsoft.com/oss/kubernetes-csi/secrets-store/driver)) - -- macro: user_known_mount_in_privileged_containers - condition: (never_true) - -- rule: Mount Launched in Privileged Container - desc: > - Detect filesystem mounts (using the mount binary) within a privileged container. Due to the elevated privileges, - this action could be one of the TTPs used in an attempt to escape from a container to the host. This type of action - is often preceded by reconnaissance activities, for which you can also create custom rules. - condition: > - spawned_process - and container - and container.privileged=true - and proc.name=mount - and not mount_info - and not known_gke_mount_in_privileged_containers - and not known_aks_mount_in_privileged_containers - and not user_known_mount_in_privileged_containers - output: Mount was executed inside a privileged container (evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: WARNING - tags: [maturity_incubating, container, cis, filesystem, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1611] - -- list: user_known_userfaultfd_processes - items: [] - -- rule: Unprivileged Delegation of Page Faults Handling to a Userspace Process - desc: > - Detect a successful unprivileged userfaultfd syscall, which could serve as an attack primitive for exploiting other vulnerabilities. - To fine-tune this rule, consider using the template list "user_known_userfaultfd_processes". - condition: > - evt.type = userfaultfd - and user.uid != 0 - and (evt.rawres >= 0 or evt.res != -1) - and not proc.name in (user_known_userfaultfd_processes) - output: An userfaultfd syscall was successfully executed by an unprivileged user (evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: CRITICAL - tags: [maturity_sandbox, host, container, process, mitre_defense_evasion, TA0005] - -- list: ingress_remote_file_copy_binaries - items: [wget] - -- macro: ingress_remote_file_copy_procs - condition: (proc.name in (ingress_remote_file_copy_binaries)) - -# Users should overwrite this macro to specify conditions under which a -# Custom condition for use of ingress remote file copy tool in container -- macro: user_known_ingress_remote_file_copy_activities - condition: (never_true) - -- macro: curl_download - condition: (proc.name = curl and - (proc.cmdline contains " -o " or - proc.cmdline contains " --output " or - proc.cmdline contains " -O " or - proc.cmdline contains " --remote-name ")) - -- rule: Launch Ingress Remote File Copy Tools in Container - desc: > - Detect ingress remote file copy tools (such as curl or wget) launched inside containers. This rule can be - considered a valuable auditing tool, but it has the potential to generate notable noise and requires careful - profiling before full operationalization. - condition: > - spawned_process - and container - and (ingress_remote_file_copy_procs or curl_download) - and not user_known_ingress_remote_file_copy_activities - output: Ingress remote file copy tool launched in container (evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: NOTICE - tags: [maturity_incubating, container, network, process, mitre_command_and_control, TA0011] - -# This rule helps detect CVE-2021-4034: -# A privilege escalation to root through memory corruption -- rule: Polkit Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability (CVE-2021-4034) - desc: > - This rule detects attempts to exploit a privilege escalation vulnerability in Polkit's pkexec. Through the execution of specially - crafted code, a local user can exploit this weakness to attain root privileges on a compromised system. This rule is highly - specific in its scope. - condition: - spawned_process - and user.uid != 0 - and proc.name=pkexec - and proc.args = '' - output: Detect Polkit pkexec Local Privilege Escalation Exploit (CVE-2021-4034) (args=%proc.args evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: CRITICAL - tags: [maturity_sandbox, host, container, process, users, mitre_privilege_escalation, TA0004] - -- rule: Detect release_agent File Container Escapes - desc: > - Detect an attempt to exploit a container escape using release_agent file. - By running a container with certains capabilities, a privileged user can modify - release_agent file and escape from the container. - condition: > - open_write - and container - and fd.name endswith release_agent - and (user.uid=0 or thread.cap_effective contains CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) - and thread.cap_effective contains CAP_SYS_ADMIN - output: Detect an attempt to exploit a container escape using release_agent file (file=%fd.name cap_effective=%thread.cap_effective evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: CRITICAL - tags: [maturity_stable, container, process, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1611] - -# Rule for detecting potential Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228) exploitation -# Note: Not compatible with Java 17+, which uses read() syscalls -- macro: java_network_read - condition: (evt.type=recvfrom and fd.type in (ipv4, ipv6) and proc.exe endswith java) - -- rule: Java Process Class File Download - desc: > - Detecting a Java process downloading a class file which could indicate a successful exploit of the log4shell Log4j vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228). - This rule is highly specific in its scope. - condition: > - java_network_read - and evt.buffer bcontains cafebabe - output: Java process class file download (server_ip=%fd.sip server_port=%fd.sport connection=%fd.name lport=%fd.lport rport=%fd.rport fd_type=%fd.type fd_proto=fd.l4proto evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: CRITICAL - enabled: false - tags: [maturity_sandbox, host, container, process, mitre_initial_access, T1190] - -- list: docker_binaries - items: [docker, dockerd, containerd-shim, "runc:[1:CHILD]", pause, exe, docker-compose, docker-entrypoi, docker-runc-cur, docker-current, dockerd-current] - -- macro: docker_procs - condition: proc.name in (docker_binaries) - -- rule: Modify Container Entrypoint - desc: > - This rule detect an attempt to write on container entrypoint symlink (/proc/self/exe). Possible CVE-2019-5736 Container Breakout exploitation attempt. - This rule has a more narrow scope. - condition: > - open_write - and container - and (fd.name=/proc/self/exe or fd.name startswith /proc/self/fd/) - and not docker_procs - and not proc.cmdline = "runc:[1:CHILD] init" - enabled: false - output: Detect Potential Container Breakout Exploit (CVE-2019-5736) (file=%fd.name evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: WARNING - tags: [maturity_sandbox, container, filesystem, mitre_initial_access, T1611] - -- list: known_binaries_to_read_environment_variables_from_proc_files - items: [scsi_id, argoexec] - -- rule: Read environment variable from /proc files - desc: > - An attempt to read process environment variables from /proc files. The consequences are akin to accessing traditional - sensitive files, as sensitive data, including secrets, might be stored in environment variables. Understanding your - environment, such as identifying critical namespaces, and incorporating extra filtering statements to alert exclusively - for those, can enhance the rule's effectiveness. - condition: > - open_read - and container - and (fd.name glob /proc/*/environ) - and not proc.name in (known_binaries_to_read_environment_variables_from_proc_files) - output: Environment variables were retrieved from /proc files (file=%fd.name gparent=%proc.aname[2] ggparent=%proc.aname[3] gggparent=%proc.aname[4] evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: WARNING - tags: [maturity_incubating, container, filesystem, process, mitre_discovery, T1083] - -- list: known_ptrace_binaries - items: [] - -- macro: known_ptrace_procs - condition: (proc.name in (known_ptrace_binaries)) - -- macro: ptrace_attach_or_injection - condition: > - (evt.type=ptrace and evt.dir=> and - (evt.arg.request contains PTRACE_POKETEXT or - evt.arg.request contains PTRACE_POKEDATA or - evt.arg.request contains PTRACE_ATTACH or - evt.arg.request contains PTRACE_SEIZE or - evt.arg.request contains PTRACE_SETREGS)) - -- rule: PTRACE attached to process - desc: > - Detect an attempt to inject potentially malicious code into a process using PTRACE in order to evade - process-based defenses or elevate privileges. Common anti-patterns are debuggers. Additionally, profiling - your environment via the known_ptrace_procs template macro can reduce noise. - A successful ptrace syscall generates multiple logs at once. - condition: > - ptrace_attach_or_injection - and proc_name_exists - and not known_ptrace_procs - output: Detected ptrace PTRACE_ATTACH attempt (proc_pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: WARNING - tags: [maturity_stable, host, container, process, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1055.008] - -- rule: PTRACE anti-debug attempt - desc: > - Detect usage of the PTRACE system call with the PTRACE_TRACEME argument, indicating a program actively attempting - to avoid debuggers attaching to the process. This behavior is typically indicative of malware activity. - Read more about PTRACE in the "PTRACE attached to process" rule. - condition: > - evt.type=ptrace and evt.dir=> - and evt.arg.request contains PTRACE_TRACEME - and proc_name_exists - output: Detected potential PTRACE_TRACEME anti-debug attempt (proc_pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: NOTICE - tags: [maturity_stable, host, container, process, mitre_defense_evasion, T1622] - -- macro: private_aws_credentials - condition: > - (proc.args icontains "aws_access_key_id" or - proc.args icontains "aws_secret_access_key" or - proc.args icontains "aws_session_token" or - proc.args icontains "accesskeyid" or - proc.args icontains "secretaccesskey") - -- rule: Find AWS Credentials - desc: > - Detect attempts to search for private keys or passwords using the grep or find command, particularly targeting standard - AWS credential locations. This is often seen with unsophisticated attackers, as there are many ways to access files - using bash built-ins that could go unnoticed. Regardless, this serves as a solid baseline detection that can be tailored - to cover these gaps while maintaining an acceptable noise level. This rule complements the rule "Search Private Keys or Passwords". - condition: > - spawned_process - and ((grep_commands and private_aws_credentials) or - (proc.name = "find" and proc.args endswith ".aws/credentials")) - output: Detected AWS credentials search activity (proc_pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline proc_cwd=%proc.cwd group_gid=%group.gid group_name=%group.name user_loginname=%user.loginname evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: WARNING - tags: [maturity_stable, host, container, process, aws, mitre_credential_access, T1552] - -- rule: Execution from /dev/shm - desc: > - This rule detects file execution in the /dev/shm directory, a tactic often used by threat actors to store their readable, writable, and - occasionally executable files. /dev/shm acts as a link to the host or other containers, creating vulnerabilities for their compromise - as well. Notably, /dev/shm remains unchanged even after a container restart. Consider this rule alongside the newer - "Drop and execute new binary in container" rule. - condition: > - spawned_process - and (proc.exe startswith "/dev/shm/" or - (proc.cwd startswith "/dev/shm/" and proc.exe startswith "./" ) or - (shell_procs and proc.args startswith "-c /dev/shm") or - (shell_procs and proc.args startswith "-i /dev/shm") or - (shell_procs and proc.args startswith "/dev/shm") or - (proc.cwd startswith "/dev/shm/" and proc.args startswith "./" )) - and not container.image.repository in (falco_privileged_images, trusted_images) - output: File execution detected from /dev/shm (evt_res=%evt.res file=%fd.name proc_cwd=%proc.cwd proc_pcmdline=%proc.pcmdline user_loginname=%user.loginname group_gid=%group.gid group_name=%group.name evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: WARNING - tags: [maturity_stable, host, container, mitre_execution, T1059.004] - -# List of allowed container images that are known to execute binaries not part of their base image. -- list: known_drop_and_execute_containers - items: [] - -- rule: Drop and execute new binary in container - desc: > - Detect if an executable not belonging to the base image of a container is being executed. - The drop and execute pattern can be observed very often after an attacker gained an initial foothold. - is_exe_upper_layer filter field only applies for container runtimes that use overlayfs as union mount filesystem. - Adopters can utilize the provided template list known_drop_and_execute_containers containing allowed container - images known to execute binaries not included in their base image. Alternatively, you could exclude non-production - namespaces in Kubernetes settings by adjusting the rule further. This helps reduce noise by applying application - and environment-specific knowledge to this rule. Common anti-patterns include administrators or SREs performing - ad-hoc debugging. - condition: > - spawned_process - and container - and proc.is_exe_upper_layer=true - and not container.image.repository in (known_drop_and_execute_containers) - output: Executing binary not part of base image (proc_exe=%proc.exe proc_sname=%proc.sname gparent=%proc.aname[2] proc_exe_ino_ctime=%proc.exe_ino.ctime proc_exe_ino_mtime=%proc.exe_ino.mtime proc_exe_ino_ctime_duration_proc_start=%proc.exe_ino.ctime_duration_proc_start proc_cwd=%proc.cwd container_start_ts=%container.start_ts evt_type=%evt.type user=%user.name user_uid=%user.uid user_loginuid=%user.loginuid process=%proc.name proc_exepath=%proc.exepath parent=%proc.pname command=%proc.cmdline terminal=%proc.tty exe_flags=%evt.arg.flags %container.info) - priority: CRITICAL - tags: [maturity_stable, container, process, mitre_persistence, TA0003, PCI_DSS_11.5.1] - -# Application rules have moved to application_rules.yaml. Please look -# there if you want to enable them by adding to -# falco_rules.local.yaml. + tags: [maturity_deprecated, host, container, network, mitre_command_and_control, TA0011] \ No newline at end of file