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cmd/geth: implement vulnerability check (#21859)
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* cmd/geth: implement vulnerability check

* cmd/geth: use minisign to verify vulnerability feed

* cmd/geth: add the test too

* cmd/geth: more minisig/signify testing

* cmd/geth: support multiple pubfiles for signing

* cmd/geth: add @holiman minisig pubkey

* cmd/geth: polishes on vulnerability check

* cmd/geth: fix ineffassign linter nit

* cmd/geth: add CVE to version check struct

* cmd/geth/testdata: add missing testfile

* cmd/geth: add more keys to versionchecker

* cmd/geth: support file:// URLs in version check

* cmd/geth: improve key ID printing when signature check fails

Co-authored-by: Felix Lange <fjl@twurst.com>
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holiman and fjl authored Dec 4, 2020
1 parent 7770e41 commit 15339cf
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1 change: 1 addition & 0 deletions cmd/geth/main.go
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -242,6 +242,7 @@ func init() {
makecacheCommand,
makedagCommand,
versionCommand,
versionCheckCommand,
licenseCommand,
// See config.go
dumpConfigCommand,
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27 changes: 27 additions & 0 deletions cmd/geth/misccmd.go
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -31,6 +31,18 @@ import (
)

var (
VersionCheckUrlFlag = cli.StringFlag{
Name: "check.url",
Usage: "URL to use when checking vulnerabilities",
Value: "https://geth.ethereum.org/docs/vulnerabilities/vulnerabilities.json",
}
VersionCheckVersionFlag = cli.StringFlag{
Name: "check.version",
Usage: "Version to check",
Value: fmt.Sprintf("Geth/v%v/%v-%v/%v",
params.VersionWithCommit(gitCommit, gitDate),
runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH, runtime.Version()),
}
makecacheCommand = cli.Command{
Action: utils.MigrateFlags(makecache),
Name: "makecache",
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -65,6 +77,21 @@ Regular users do not need to execute it.
Category: "MISCELLANEOUS COMMANDS",
Description: `
The output of this command is supposed to be machine-readable.
`,
}
versionCheckCommand = cli.Command{
Action: utils.MigrateFlags(versionCheck),
Flags: []cli.Flag{
VersionCheckUrlFlag,
VersionCheckVersionFlag,
},
Name: "version-check",
Usage: "Checks (online) whether the current version suffers from any known security vulnerabilities",
ArgsUsage: "<versionstring (optional)>",
Category: "MISCELLANEOUS COMMANDS",
Description: `
The version-check command fetches vulnerability-information from https://geth.ethereum.org/docs/vulnerabilities/vulnerabilities.json,
and displays information about any security vulnerabilities that affect the currently executing version.
`,
}
licenseCommand = cli.Command{
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61 changes: 61 additions & 0 deletions cmd/geth/testdata/vcheck/data.json
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@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
[
{
"name": "CorruptedDAG",
"uid": "GETH-2020-01",
"summary": "Mining nodes will generate erroneous PoW on epochs > `385`.",
"description": "A mining flaw could cause miners to erroneously calculate PoW, due to an index overflow, if DAG size is exceeding the maximum 32 bit unsigned value.\n\nThis occurred on the ETC chain on 2020-11-06. This is likely to trigger for ETH mainnet around block `11550000`/epoch `385`, slated to occur early January 2021.\n\nThis issue is relevant only for miners, non-mining nodes are unaffected, since non-mining nodes use a smaller verification cache instead of a full DAG.",
"links": [
"https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/pull/21793",
"https://blog.ethereum.org/2020/11/12/geth_security_release/",
"https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/commit/567d41d9363706b4b13ce0903804e8acf214af49"
],
"introduced": "v1.6.0",
"fixed": "v1.9.24",
"published": "2020-11-12",
"severity": "Medium",
"check": "Geth\\/v1\\.(6|7|8)\\..*|Geth\\/v1\\.9\\.2(1|2|3)-.*"
},
{
"name": "GoCrash",
"uid": "GETH-2020-02",
"summary": "A denial-of-service issue can be used to crash Geth nodes during block processing, due to an underlying bug in Go (CVE-2020-28362) versions < `1.15.5`, or `<1.14.12`",
"description": "The DoS issue can be used to crash all Geth nodes during block processing, the effects of which would be that a major part of the Ethereum network went offline.\n\nOutside of Go-Ethereum, the issue is most likely relevant for all forks of Geth (such as TurboGeth or ETC’s core-geth) which is built with versions of Go which contains the vulnerability.",
"links": [
"https://blog.ethereum.org/2020/11/12/geth_security_release/",
"https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/NpBGTTmKzpM",
"https://github.com/golang/go/issues/42552"
],
"fixed": "v1.9.24",
"published": "2020-11-12",
"severity": "Critical",
"check": "Geth.*\\/go1\\.(11(.*)|12(.*)|13(.*)|14|14\\.(\\d|10|11|)|15|15\\.[0-4])$"
},
{
"name": "ShallowCopy",
"uid": "GETH-2020-03",
"summary": "A consensus flaw in Geth, related to `datacopy` precompile",
"description": "Geth erroneously performed a 'shallow' copy when the precompiled `datacopy` (at `0x00...04`) was invoked. An attacker could deploy a contract that uses the shallow copy to corrupt the contents of the `RETURNDATA`, thus causing a consensus failure.",
"links": [
"https://blog.ethereum.org/2020/11/12/geth_security_release/"
],
"introduced": "v1.9.7",
"fixed": "v1.9.17",
"published": "2020-11-12",
"severity": "Critical",
"check": "Geth\\/v1\\.9\\.(7|8|9|10|11|12|13|14|15|16).*$"
},
{
"name": "GethCrash",
"uid": "GETH-2020-04",
"summary": "A denial-of-service issue can be used to crash Geth nodes during block processing",
"description": "Full details to be disclosed at a later date",
"links": [
"https://blog.ethereum.org/2020/11/12/geth_security_release/"
],
"introduced": "v1.9.16",
"fixed": "v1.9.18",
"published": "2020-11-12",
"severity": "Critical",
"check": "Geth\\/v1\\.9.(16|17).*$"
}
]
62 changes: 62 additions & 0 deletions cmd/geth/testdata/vcheck/data2.json
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
[
{
"name": "CorruptedDAG",
"uid": "GETH-2020-01",
"summary": "Mining nodes will generate erroneous PoW on epochs > `385`.",
"description": "A mining flaw could cause miners to erroneously calculate PoW, due to an index overflow, if DAG size is exceeding the maximum 32 bit unsigned value.\n\nThis occurred on the ETC chain on 2020-11-06. This is likely to trigger for ETH mainnet around block `11550000`/epoch `385`, slated to occur early January 2021.\n\nThis issue is relevant only for miners, non-mining nodes are unaffected, since non-mining nodes use a smaller verification cache instead of a full DAG.",
"links": [
"https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/pull/21793",
"https://blog.ethereum.org/2020/11/12/geth_security_release/",
"https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/commit/567d41d9363706b4b13ce0903804e8acf214af49"
],
"introduced": "v1.6.0",
"fixed": "v1.9.24",
"published": "2020-11-12",
"severity": "Medium",
"check": "Geth\\/v1\\.(6|7|8)\\..*|Geth\\/v1\\.9\\.2(1|2|3)-.*",
"CVE": "correct"
},
{
"name": "GoCrash",
"uid": "GETH-2020-02",
"summary": "A denial-of-service issue can be used to crash Geth nodes during block processing, due to an underlying bug in Go (CVE-2020-28362) versions < `1.15.5`, or `<1.14.12`",
"description": "The DoS issue can be used to crash all Geth nodes during block processing, the effects of which would be that a major part of the Ethereum network went offline.\n\nOutside of Go-Ethereum, the issue is most likely relevant for all forks of Geth (such as TurboGeth or ETC’s core-geth) which is built with versions of Go which contains the vulnerability.",
"links": [
"https://blog.ethereum.org/2020/11/12/geth_security_release/",
"https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/NpBGTTmKzpM",
"https://github.com/golang/go/issues/42552"
],
"fixed": "v1.9.24",
"published": "2020-11-12",
"severity": "Critical",
"check": "Geth.*\\/go1\\.(11(.*)|12(.*)|13(.*)|14|14\\.(\\d|10|11|)|15|15\\.[0-4])$"
},
{
"name": "ShallowCopy",
"uid": "GETH-2020-03",
"summary": "A consensus flaw in Geth, related to `datacopy` precompile",
"description": "Geth erroneously performed a 'shallow' copy when the precompiled `datacopy` (at `0x00...04`) was invoked. An attacker could deploy a contract that uses the shallow copy to corrupt the contents of the `RETURNDATA`, thus causing a consensus failure.",
"links": [
"https://blog.ethereum.org/2020/11/12/geth_security_release/"
],
"introduced": "v1.9.7",
"fixed": "v1.9.17",
"published": "2020-11-12",
"severity": "Critical",
"check": "Geth\\/v1\\.9\\.(7|8|9|10|11|12|13|14|15|16).*$"
},
{
"name": "GethCrash",
"uid": "GETH-2020-04",
"summary": "A denial-of-service issue can be used to crash Geth nodes during block processing",
"description": "Full details to be disclosed at a later date",
"links": [
"https://blog.ethereum.org/2020/11/12/geth_security_release/"
],
"introduced": "v1.9.16",
"fixed": "v1.9.18",
"published": "2020-11-12",
"severity": "Critical",
"check": "Geth\\/v1\\.9.(16|17).*$"
}
]
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untrusted comment: signature from minisign secret key
RWQkliYstQBOKFQFQTjmCd6TPw07VZyWFSB3v4+1BM1kv8eHLE5FDy2OkPEqtdaL53xftlrHoJQie0uCcovdlSV8kpyxiLrxEQ0=
trusted comment: timestamp:1605618622 file:vulnerabilities.json
osAPs4QPdDkmiWQxqeMIzYv/b+ZGxJ+19Sbrk1Cpq4t2gHBT+lqFtwL3OCzKWWyjGRTmHfsVGBYpzEdPRQ0/BQ==
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
untrusted comment: Here's a comment
RWQkliYstQBOKFQFQTjmCd6TPw07VZyWFSB3v4+1BM1kv8eHLE5FDy2OkPEqtdaL53xftlrHoJQie0uCcovdlSV8kpyxiLrxEQ0=
trusted comment: Here's a trusted comment
3CnkIuz9MEDa7uNyGZAbKZhuirwfiqm7E1uQHrd2SiO4Y8+Akw9vs052AyKw0s5nhbYHCZE2IMQdHNjKwxEGAQ==
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
untrusted comment: One more (untrusted) comment
RWQkliYstQBOKFQFQTjmCd6TPw07VZyWFSB3v4+1BM1kv8eHLE5FDy2OkPEqtdaL53xftlrHoJQie0uCcovdlSV8kpyxiLrxEQ0=
trusted comment: Here's a trusted comment
3CnkIuz9MEDa7uNyGZAbKZhuirwfiqm7E1uQHrd2SiO4Y8+Akw9vs052AyKw0s5nhbYHCZE2IMQdHNjKwxEGAQ==
2 changes: 2 additions & 0 deletions cmd/geth/testdata/vcheck/minisign.pub
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@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
untrusted comment: minisign public key 284E00B52C269624
RWQkliYstQBOKOdtClfgC3IypIPX6TAmoEi7beZ4gyR3wsaezvqOMWsp
2 changes: 2 additions & 0 deletions cmd/geth/testdata/vcheck/minisign.sec
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@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
untrusted comment: minisign encrypted secret key
RWRTY0Iyz8kmPMKrqk6DCtlO9a33akKiaOQG1aLolqDxs52qvPoAAAACAAAAAAAAAEAAAAAArEiggdvyn6+WzTprirLtgiYQoU+ihz/HyGgjhuF+Pz2ddMduyCO+xjCHeq+vgVVW039fbsI8hW6LRGJZLBKV5/jdxCXAVVQE7qTQ6xpEdO0z8Z731/pV1hlspQXG2PNd16NMtwd9dWw=
2 changes: 2 additions & 0 deletions cmd/geth/testdata/vcheck/signify-sigs/data.json.sig
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
untrusted comment: verify with ./signifykey.pub
RWSKLNhZb0KdAbhRUhW2LQZXdnwttu2SYhM9EuC4mMgOJB85h7/YIPupf8/ldTs4N8e9Y/fhgdY40q5LQpt5IFC62fq0v8U1/w8=
2 changes: 2 additions & 0 deletions cmd/geth/testdata/vcheck/signifykey.pub
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
untrusted comment: signify public key
RWSKLNhZb0KdATtRT7mZC/bybI3t3+Hv/O2i3ye04Dq9fnT9slpZ1a2/
2 changes: 2 additions & 0 deletions cmd/geth/testdata/vcheck/signifykey.sec
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
untrusted comment: signify secret key
RWRCSwAAACpLQDLawSQCtI7eAVIvaiHzjTsTyJsfV5aKLNhZb0KdAWeICXJGa93/bHAcsY6jUh9I8RdEcDWEoGxmaXZC+IdVBPxDpkix9fBRGEUdKWHi3dOfqME0YRzErWI5AVg3cRw=
4 changes: 4 additions & 0 deletions cmd/geth/testdata/vcheck/sigs/vulnerabilities.json.minisig.1
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@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
untrusted comment: signature from minisign secret key
RWQkliYstQBOKFQFQTjmCd6TPw07VZyWFSB3v4+1BM1kv8eHLE5FDy2OkPEqtdaL53xftlrHoJQie0uCcovdlSV8kpyxiLrxEQ0=
trusted comment: timestamp:1605618622 file:vulnerabilities.json
osAPs4QPdDkmiWQxqeMIzYv/b+ZGxJ+19Sbrk1Cpq4t2gHBT+lqFtwL3OCzKWWyjGRTmHfsVGBYpzEdPRQ0/BQ==
4 changes: 4 additions & 0 deletions cmd/geth/testdata/vcheck/sigs/vulnerabilities.json.minisig.2
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@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
untrusted comment: Here's a comment
RWQkliYstQBOKFQFQTjmCd6TPw07VZyWFSB3v4+1BM1kv8eHLE5FDy2OkPEqtdaL53xftlrHoJQie0uCcovdlSV8kpyxiLrxEQ0=
trusted comment: Here's a trusted comment
3CnkIuz9MEDa7uNyGZAbKZhuirwfiqm7E1uQHrd2SiO4Y8+Akw9vs052AyKw0s5nhbYHCZE2IMQdHNjKwxEGAQ==
4 changes: 4 additions & 0 deletions cmd/geth/testdata/vcheck/sigs/vulnerabilities.json.minisig.3
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@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
untrusted comment: One more (untrusted) comment
RWQkliYstQBOKFQFQTjmCd6TPw07VZyWFSB3v4+1BM1kv8eHLE5FDy2OkPEqtdaL53xftlrHoJQie0uCcovdlSV8kpyxiLrxEQ0=
trusted comment: Here's a trusted comment
3CnkIuz9MEDa7uNyGZAbKZhuirwfiqm7E1uQHrd2SiO4Y8+Akw9vs052AyKw0s5nhbYHCZE2IMQdHNjKwxEGAQ==
169 changes: 169 additions & 0 deletions cmd/geth/version_check.go
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@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
// Copyright 2020 The go-ethereum Authors
// This file is part of go-ethereum.
//
// go-ethereum is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
// it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
// (at your option) any later version.
//
// go-ethereum is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
// GNU General Public License for more details.
//
// You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
// along with go-ethereum. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.

package main

import (
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io/ioutil"
"net/http"
"regexp"
"strings"

"github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/log"
"github.com/jedisct1/go-minisign"
"gopkg.in/urfave/cli.v1"
)

var gethPubKeys []string = []string{
//@holiman, minisign public key FB1D084D39BAEC24
"RWQk7Lo5TQgd+wxBNZM+Zoy+7UhhMHaWKzqoes9tvSbFLJYZhNTbrIjx",
//minisign public key 138B1CA303E51687
"RWSHFuUDoxyLEzjszuWZI1xStS66QTyXFFZG18uDfO26CuCsbckX1e9J",
//minisign public key FD9813B2D2098484
"RWSEhAnSshOY/b+GmaiDkObbCWefsAoavjoLcPjBo1xn71yuOH5I+Lts",
}

type vulnJson struct {
Name string
Uid string
Summary string
Description string
Links []string
Introduced string
Fixed string
Published string
Severity string
Check string
CVE string
}

func versionCheck(ctx *cli.Context) error {
url := ctx.String(VersionCheckUrlFlag.Name)
version := ctx.String(VersionCheckVersionFlag.Name)
log.Info("Checking vulnerabilities", "version", version, "url", url)
return checkCurrent(url, version)
}

func checkCurrent(url, current string) error {
var (
data []byte
sig []byte
err error
)
if data, err = fetch(url); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("could not retrieve data: %w", err)
}
if sig, err = fetch(fmt.Sprintf("%v.minisig", url)); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("could not retrieve signature: %w", err)
}
if err = verifySignature(gethPubKeys, data, sig); err != nil {
return err
}
var vulns []vulnJson
if err = json.Unmarshal(data, &vulns); err != nil {
return err
}
allOk := true
for _, vuln := range vulns {
r, err := regexp.Compile(vuln.Check)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if r.MatchString(current) {
allOk = false
fmt.Printf("## Vulnerable to %v (%v)\n\n", vuln.Uid, vuln.Name)
fmt.Printf("Severity: %v\n", vuln.Severity)
fmt.Printf("Summary : %v\n", vuln.Summary)
fmt.Printf("Fixed in: %v\n", vuln.Fixed)
if len(vuln.CVE) > 0 {
fmt.Printf("CVE: %v\n", vuln.CVE)
}
if len(vuln.Links) > 0 {
fmt.Printf("References:\n")
for _, ref := range vuln.Links {
fmt.Printf("\t- %v\n", ref)
}
}
fmt.Println()
}
}
if allOk {
fmt.Println("No vulnerabilities found")
}
return nil
}

// fetch makes an HTTP request to the given url and returns the response body
func fetch(url string) ([]byte, error) {
if filep := strings.TrimPrefix(url, "file://"); filep != url {
return ioutil.ReadFile(filep)
}
res, err := http.Get(url)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer res.Body.Close()
body, err := ioutil.ReadAll(res.Body)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return body, nil
}

// verifySignature checks that the sigData is a valid signature of the given
// data, for pubkey GethPubkey
func verifySignature(pubkeys []string, data, sigdata []byte) error {
sig, err := minisign.DecodeSignature(string(sigdata))
if err != nil {
return err
}
// find the used key
var key *minisign.PublicKey
for _, pubkey := range pubkeys {
pub, err := minisign.NewPublicKey(pubkey)
if err != nil {
// our pubkeys should be parseable
return err
}
if pub.KeyId != sig.KeyId {
continue
}
key = &pub
break
}
if key == nil {
log.Info("Signing key not trusted", "keyid", keyID(sig.KeyId), "error", err)
return errors.New("signature could not be verified")
}
if ok, err := key.Verify(data, sig); !ok || err != nil {
log.Info("Verification failed error", "keyid", keyID(key.KeyId), "error", err)
return errors.New("signature could not be verified")
}
return nil
}

// keyID turns a binary minisign key ID into a hex string.
// Note: key IDs are printed in reverse byte order.
func keyID(id [8]byte) string {
var rev [8]byte
for i := range id {
rev[len(rev)-1-i] = id[i]
}
return fmt.Sprintf("%X", rev)
}
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