[Security Rules] Update security rules package to v8.4.1 (#4740)

Author: terrancedejesus

packages/security_detection_engine/changelog.yml

@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@
 # NOTE: please use pre-release versions (e.g. -dev.0) until a package is ready for production
 - changes:
     - description: Release security rules update
-      link: https://github.com/elastic/integrations/pull/4377
+      link: https://github.com/elastic/integrations/pull/4740
       type: enhancement
-  version: 8.3.2
+  version: 8.4.1
 - changes:
     - description: Release security rules update
       link: https://github.com/elastic/integrations/pull/4063
@@ -89,10 +89,12 @@
     - description: Fix package for 7.13.0 from detection-rules
       link: https://github.com/elastic/integrations/pull/1127
       type: bugfix
+  version: 0.13.0
+- changes:
     - description: Publish package for 7.13.0 from detection-rules
       link: https://github.com/elastic/integrations/pull/1126
       type: enhancement
-  version: 0.13.0
+  version: 0.13.0-dev.0
 - changes:
     - description: Fix security rules naming
       link: https://github.com/elastic/integrations/pull/987

packages/security_detection_engine/kibana/security_rule/000047bb-b27a-47ec-8b62-ef1a5d2c9e19.json

@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@
         "references": [
             "https://help.okta.com/en/prod/Content/Topics/Security/Security_Policies.htm",
             "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/",
-            "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/"
+            "https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/",
+            "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/testing-okta-visibility-and-detection-dorothy"
         ],
         "related_integrations": [
             {
@@ -78,7 +79,7 @@
         ],
         "timestamp_override": "event.ingested",
         "type": "query",
-        "version": 101
+        "version": 102
     },
     "id": "000047bb-b27a-47ec-8b62-ef1a5d2c9e19",
     "type": "security-rule"

packages/security_detection_engine/kibana/security_rule/00140285-b827-4aee-aa09-8113f58a08f3.json

@@ -8,7 +8,8 @@
         "index": [
             "winlogbeat-*",
             "logs-endpoint.events.*",
-            "logs-windows.*"
+            "logs-windows.*",
+            "endgame-*"
         ],
         "language": "eql",
         "license": "Elastic License v2",
@@ -60,7 +61,8 @@
             "Windows",
             "Threat Detection",
             "Credential Access",
-            "has_guide"
+            "Investigation Guide",
+            "Elastic Endgame"
         ],
         "threat": [
             {
@@ -93,7 +95,7 @@
         ],
         "timestamp_override": "event.ingested",
         "type": "eql",
-        "version": 101
+        "version": 102
     },
     "id": "00140285-b827-4aee-aa09-8113f58a08f3",
     "type": "security-rule"

packages/security_detection_engine/kibana/security_rule/0022d47d-39c7-4f69-a232-4fe9dc7a3acd.json

@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@
             "Windows",
             "Threat Detection",
             "Persistence",
-            "has_guide"
+            "Investigation Guide"
         ],
         "threat": [
             {
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@
         ],
         "timestamp_override": "event.ingested",
         "type": "eql",
-        "version": 101
+        "version": 102
     },
     "id": "0022d47d-39c7-4f69-a232-4fe9dc7a3acd",
     "type": "security-rule"

packages/security_detection_engine/kibana/security_rule/02a23ee7-c8f8-4701-b99d-e9038ce313cb.json

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+{
+    "attributes": {
+        "author": [
+            "Elastic"
+        ],
+        "description": "Identifies the creation of a process running as SYSTEM and impersonating a Windows core binary privileges. Adversaries may create a new process with a different token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls.",
+        "from": "now-9m",
+        "index": [
+            "logs-endpoint.events.*"
+        ],
+        "language": "eql",
+        "license": "Elastic License v2",
+        "name": "Process Created with an Elevated Token",
+        "query": "/* This rule is only compatible with Elastic Endpoint 8.4+ */\n\nprocess where event.action == \"start\" and\n\n /* CreateProcessWithToken and effective parent is a privileged MS native binary used as a target for token theft */\n user.id : \"S-1-5-18\"  and\n\n /* Token Theft target process usually running as service are located in one of the following paths */\n process.Ext.effective_parent.executable :\n                (\"?:\\\\Windows\\\\*.exe\",\n                 \"?:\\\\Program Files\\\\*.exe\",\n                 \"?:\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\*.exe\",\n                 \"?:\\\\ProgramData\\\\*\") and\n\n not (process.Ext.effective_parent.executable : \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\Utilman.exe\" and\n      process.parent.executable : \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\Utilman.exe\" and process.parent.args : \"/debug\") and\n\n not process.executable : (\"?:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\WerFault.exe\",\n                           \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\WerFault.exe\",\n                           \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\WerFaultSecure.exe\",\n                           \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\SysWOW64\\\\WerFaultSecure.exe\",\n                           \"?:\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\WerMgr.exe\",\n                           \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\SoftwareDistribution\\\\Download\\\\Install\\\\securityhealthsetup.exe\")  and\n\n not process.parent.executable : (\"?:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\AtBroker.exe\", \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\system32\\\\svchost.exe\", \"?:\\\\Program Files (x86)\\\\*.exe\", \"?:\\\\Program Files\\\\*.exe\", \"?:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\msiexec.exe\",\n \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\DriverStore\\\\*\") and\n\n\n not (process.code_signature.trusted == true and\n      process.code_signature.subject_name in (\"philandro Software GmbH\", \"Freedom Scientific Inc.\", \"TeamViewer Germany GmbH\", \"Projector.is, Inc.\", \"TeamViewer GmbH\", \"Cisco WebEx LLC\", \"Dell Inc\"))\n",
+        "references": [
+            "https://lengjibo.github.io/token/",
+            "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winbase/nf-winbase-createprocesswithtokenw"
+        ],
+        "required_fields": [
+            {
+                "ecs": true,
+                "name": "event.action",
+                "type": "keyword"
+            },
+            {
+                "ecs": false,
+                "name": "process.Ext.effective_parent.executable",
+                "type": "unknown"
+            },
+            {
+                "ecs": true,
+                "name": "process.code_signature.subject_name",
+                "type": "keyword"
+            },
+            {
+                "ecs": true,
+                "name": "process.code_signature.trusted",
+                "type": "boolean"
+            },
+            {
+                "ecs": true,
+                "name": "process.executable",
+                "type": "keyword"
+            },
+            {
+                "ecs": true,
+                "name": "process.parent.args",
+                "type": "keyword"
+            },
+            {
+                "ecs": true,
+                "name": "process.parent.executable",
+                "type": "keyword"
+            },
+            {
+                "ecs": true,
+                "name": "user.id",
+                "type": "keyword"
+            }
+        ],
+        "risk_score": 73,
+        "rule_id": "02a23ee7-c8f8-4701-b99d-e9038ce313cb",
+        "severity": "high",
+        "tags": [
+            "Elastic",
+            "Host",
+            "Windows",
+            "Threat Detection",
+            "Privilege Escalation"
+        ],
+        "threat": [
+            {
+                "framework": "MITRE ATT\u0026CK",
+                "tactic": {
+                    "id": "TA0004",
+                    "name": "Privilege Escalation",
+                    "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
+                },
+                "technique": [
+                    {
+                        "id": "T1134",
+                        "name": "Access Token Manipulation",
+                        "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/",
+                        "subtechnique": [
+                            {
+                                "id": "T1134.002",
+                                "name": "Create Process with Token",
+                                "reference": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002/"
+                            }
+                        ]
+                    }
+                ]
+            }
+        ],
+        "timestamp_override": "event.ingested",
+        "type": "eql",
+        "version": 1
+    },
+    "id": "02a23ee7-c8f8-4701-b99d-e9038ce313cb",
+    "type": "security-rule"
+}

packages/security_detection_engine/kibana/security_rule/02a4576a-7480-4284-9327-548a806b5e48.json

@@ -48,7 +48,8 @@
             "Host",
             "Windows",
             "Threat Detection",
-            "Credential Access"
+            "Credential Access",
+            "Sysmon Only"
         ],
         "threat": [
             {
@@ -76,7 +77,7 @@
         ],
         "timestamp_override": "event.ingested",
         "type": "eql",
-        "version": 100
+        "version": 101
     },
     "id": "02a4576a-7480-4284-9327-548a806b5e48",
     "type": "security-rule"

packages/security_detection_engine/kibana/security_rule/035889c4-2686-4583-a7df-67f89c292f2c.json

@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@
         "name": "High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations",
         "note": "## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating High Number of Process and/or Service Terminations\n\nAttackers can stop services and kill processes for a variety of purposes. For example, they can stop services associated\nwith business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted,\nor stop security and backup solutions, etc.\n\nThis rule identifies a high number (10) of service and/or process terminations (stop, delete, or suspend) from the same\nhost within a short time period.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for\nprevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Check if any files on the host machine have been encrypted.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further destructive behavior, which is commonly associated with this activity.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are\nidentified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business\nsystems, and web services.\n- Reimage the host operating system or restore it to the operational state.\n- If any other destructive action was identified on the host, it is recommended to prioritize the investigation and look\nfor ransomware preparation and execution activities.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and\nmalware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the\nmean time to respond (MTTR).\n",
         "query": "event.category:process and event.type:start and process.name:(net.exe or sc.exe or taskkill.exe) and\n process.args:(stop or pause or delete or \"/PID\" or \"/IM\" or \"/T\" or \"/F\" or \"/t\" or \"/f\" or \"/im\" or \"/pid\")\n",
+        "references": [
+            "https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/luna-ransomware-attack-pattern"
+        ],
         "required_fields": [
             {
                 "ecs": true,
@@ -46,7 +49,7 @@
             "Windows",
             "Threat Detection",
             "Impact",
-            "has_guide"
+            "Investigation Guide"
         ],
         "threat": [
             {
@@ -72,7 +75,7 @@
             "value": 10
         },
         "type": "threshold",
-        "version": 101
+        "version": 102
     },
     "id": "035889c4-2686-4583-a7df-67f89c292f2c",
     "type": "security-rule"

packages/security_detection_engine/kibana/security_rule/053a0387-f3b5-4ba5-8245-8002cca2bd08.json

@@ -12,7 +12,8 @@
         "index": [
             "winlogbeat-*",
             "logs-endpoint.events.*",
-            "logs-windows.*"
+            "logs-windows.*",
+            "endgame-*"
         ],
         "language": "eql",
         "license": "Elastic License v2",
@@ -53,7 +54,8 @@
             "Host",
             "Windows",
             "Threat Detection",
-            "Defense Evasion"
+            "Defense Evasion",
+            "Elastic Endgame"
         ],
         "threat": [
             {
@@ -81,7 +83,7 @@
         ],
         "timestamp_override": "event.ingested",
         "type": "eql",
-        "version": 100
+        "version": 101
     },
     "id": "053a0387-f3b5-4ba5-8245-8002cca2bd08",
     "type": "security-rule"

packages/security_detection_engine/kibana/security_rule/0564fb9d-90b9-4234-a411-82a546dc1343.json

@@ -8,7 +8,8 @@
         "index": [
             "winlogbeat-*",
             "logs-endpoint.events.*",
-            "logs-windows.*"
+            "logs-windows.*",
+            "endgame-*"
         ],
         "language": "eql",
         "license": "Elastic License v2",
@@ -50,7 +51,8 @@
             "Host",
             "Windows",
             "Threat Detection",
-            "Credential Access"
+            "Credential Access",
+            "Elastic Endgame"
         ],
         "threat": [
             {
@@ -71,7 +73,7 @@
         ],
         "timestamp_override": "event.ingested",
         "type": "eql",
-        "version": 101
+        "version": 102
     },
     "id": "0564fb9d-90b9-4234-a411-82a546dc1343",
     "type": "security-rule"

packages/security_detection_engine/kibana/security_rule/05b358de-aa6d-4f6c-89e6-78f74018b43b.json

@@ -8,7 +8,8 @@
         "index": [
             "winlogbeat-*",
             "logs-endpoint.events.*",
-            "logs-windows.*"
+            "logs-windows.*",
+            "endgame-*"
         ],
         "language": "eql",
         "license": "Elastic License v2",
@@ -50,7 +51,8 @@
             "Windows",
             "Threat Detection",
             "Execution",
-            "has_guide"
+            "Investigation Guide",
+            "Elastic Endgame"
         ],
         "threat": [
             {
@@ -71,7 +73,7 @@
         ],
         "timestamp_override": "event.ingested",
         "type": "eql",
-        "version": 101
+        "version": 102
     },
     "id": "05b358de-aa6d-4f6c-89e6-78f74018b43b",
     "type": "security-rule"