Jz 5.14 #1

citral23 · 2021-09-13T16:44:42Z

No description provided.

…_hv_generic driver The following crash happens when a never-used device is unbound from uio_hv_generic driver: kernel BUG at mm/slub.c:321! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 4001 Comm: bash Kdump: loaded Tainted: G X --------- --- 5.14.0-0.rc2.23.el9.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS 090008 12/07/2018 RIP: 0010:__slab_free+0x1d5/0x3d0 ... Call Trace: ? pick_next_task_fair+0x18e/0x3b0 ? __cond_resched+0x16/0x40 ? vunmap_pmd_range.isra.0+0x154/0x1c0 ? __vunmap+0x22d/0x290 ? hv_ringbuffer_cleanup+0x36/0x40 [hv_vmbus] kfree+0x331/0x380 ? hv_uio_remove+0x43/0x60 [uio_hv_generic] hv_ringbuffer_cleanup+0x36/0x40 [hv_vmbus] vmbus_free_ring+0x21/0x60 [hv_vmbus] hv_uio_remove+0x4f/0x60 [uio_hv_generic] vmbus_remove+0x23/0x30 [hv_vmbus] __device_release_driver+0x17a/0x230 device_driver_detach+0x3c/0xa0 unbind_store+0x113/0x130 ... The problem appears to be that we free 'ring_info->pkt_buffer' twice: first, when the device is unbound from in-kernel driver (netvsc in this case) and second from hv_uio_remove(). Normally, ring buffer is supposed to be re-initialized from hv_uio_open() but this happens when UIO device is being opened and this is not guaranteed to happen. Generally, it is OK to call hv_ringbuffer_cleanup() twice for the same channel (which is being handed over between in-kernel drivers and UIO) even if we didn't call hv_ringbuffer_init() in between. We, however, need to avoid kfree() call for an already freed pointer. Fixes: adae1e9 ("Drivers: hv: vmbus: Copy packets sent by Hyper-V out of the ring buffer") Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Andrea Parri <parri.andrea@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210831143916.144983-1-vkuznets@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>

The kernel test robot reports: [ 843.509974][ T345] ============================= [ 843.524220][ T345] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [ 843.538791][ T345] 5.14.0-rc2-00606-g889b7da23abf #1 Not tainted [ 843.553617][ T345] ----------------------------- [ 843.567412][ T345] net/mctp/route.c:310 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! - we're missing the rcu read lock acquire around the destruction path. This change adds the acquire/release - the path is already atomic, and we're using the _rcu list iterators. Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Kerr <jk@codeconstruct.com.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

…ntries Jiri Olsa reported a fault when running: # cat /proc/kallsyms | grep ksys_read ffffffff8136d580 T ksys_read # objdump -d --start-address=0xffffffff8136d580 --stop-address=0xffffffff8136d590 /proc/kcore /proc/kcore: file format elf64-x86-64 Segmentation fault general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xf887ffcbff000: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 12 PID: 1079 Comm: objdump Not tainted 5.14.0-rc5qemu+ torvalds#508 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.14.0-4.fc34 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:kern_addr_valid Call Trace: read_kcore ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held ? trace_hardirqs_on ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held ? lock_acquire ? lock_acquire ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held ? lock_acquire ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held ? lock_release ? _raw_spin_unlock ? __handle_mm_fault ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held ? lock_acquire ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held ? lock_release proc_reg_read ? vfs_read vfs_read ksys_read do_syscall_64 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe The fault happens because kern_addr_valid() dereferences existent but not present PMD in the high kernel mappings. Such PMDs are created when free_kernel_image_pages() frees regions larger than 2Mb. In this case, a part of the freed memory is mapped with PMDs and the set_memory_np_noalias() -> ... -> __change_page_attr() sequence will mark the PMD as not present rather than wipe it completely. Have kern_addr_valid() check whether higher level page table entries are present before trying to dereference them to fix this issue and to avoid similar issues in the future. Stable backporting note: ------------------------ Note that the stable marking is for all active stable branches because there could be cases where pagetable entries exist but are not valid - see 9a14aef ("x86: cpa, fix lookup_address"), for example. So make sure to be on the safe side here and use pXY_present() accessors rather than pXY_none() which could #GP when accessing pages in the direct map. Also see: c40a56a ("x86/mm/init: Remove freed kernel image areas from alias mapping") for more info. Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Tested-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.4+ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210819132717.19358-1-rppt@kernel.org

We queue an irq work for deferred processing of mce event in realmode mce handler, where translation is disabled. Queuing of the work may result in accessing memory outside RMO region, such access needs the translation to be enabled for an LPAR running with hash mmu else the kernel crashes. After enabling translation in mce_handle_error() we used to leave it enabled to avoid crashing here, but now with the commit 74c3354 ("powerpc/pseries/mce: restore msr before returning from handler") we are restoring the MSR to disable translation. Hence to fix this enable the translation before queuing the work. Without this change following trace is seen on injecting SLB multihit in an LPAR running with hash mmu. Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries CPU: 5 PID: 1883 Comm: insmod Tainted: G OE 5.14.0-mce+ torvalds#137 NIP: c000000000735d60 LR: c000000000318640 CTR: 0000000000000000 REGS: c00000001ebff9a0 TRAP: 0300 Tainted: G OE (5.14.0-mce+) MSR: 8000000000001003 <SF,ME,RI,LE> CR: 28008228 XER: 00000001 CFAR: c00000000031863c DAR: c00000027fa8fe08 DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK: 0 ... NIP llist_add_batch+0x0/0x40 LR __irq_work_queue_local+0x70/0xc0 Call Trace: 0xc00000001ebffc0c (unreliable) irq_work_queue+0x40/0x70 machine_check_queue_event+0xbc/0xd0 machine_check_early_common+0x16c/0x1f4 Fixes: 74c3354 ("powerpc/pseries/mce: restore msr before returning from handler") Signed-off-by: Ganesh Goudar <ganeshgr@linux.ibm.com> [mpe: Fix comment formatting, trim oops in change log for readability] Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210909064330.312432-1-ganeshgr@linux.ibm.com

As previously noted in commit 66e4f4a ("rtc: cmos: Use spin_lock_irqsave() in cmos_interrupt()"): <4>[ 254.192378] WARNING: inconsistent lock state <4>[ 254.192384] 5.12.0-rc1-CI-CI_DRM_9834+ #1 Not tainted <4>[ 254.192396] -------------------------------- <4>[ 254.192400] inconsistent {IN-HARDIRQ-W} -> {HARDIRQ-ON-W} usage. <4>[ 254.192409] rtcwake/5309 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes: <4>[ 254.192429] ffffffff8263c5f8 (rtc_lock){?...}-{2:2}, at: cmos_interrupt+0x18/0x100 <4>[ 254.192481] {IN-HARDIRQ-W} state was registered at: <4>[ 254.192488] lock_acquire+0xd1/0x3d0 <4>[ 254.192504] _raw_spin_lock+0x2a/0x40 <4>[ 254.192519] cmos_interrupt+0x18/0x100 <4>[ 254.192536] rtc_handler+0x1f/0xc0 <4>[ 254.192553] acpi_ev_fixed_event_detect+0x109/0x13c <4>[ 254.192574] acpi_ev_sci_xrupt_handler+0xb/0x28 <4>[ 254.192596] acpi_irq+0x13/0x30 <4>[ 254.192620] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x43/0x2c0 <4>[ 254.192641] handle_irq_event_percpu+0x2b/0x70 <4>[ 254.192661] handle_irq_event+0x2f/0x50 <4>[ 254.192680] handle_fasteoi_irq+0x9e/0x150 <4>[ 254.192693] __common_interrupt+0x76/0x140 <4>[ 254.192715] common_interrupt+0x96/0xc0 <4>[ 254.192732] asm_common_interrupt+0x1e/0x40 <4>[ 254.192750] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x38/0x60 <4>[ 254.192767] resume_irqs+0xba/0xf0 <4>[ 254.192786] dpm_resume_noirq+0x245/0x3d0 <4>[ 254.192811] suspend_devices_and_enter+0x230/0xaa0 <4>[ 254.192835] pm_suspend.cold.8+0x301/0x34a <4>[ 254.192859] state_store+0x7b/0xe0 <4>[ 254.192879] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x11d/0x1c0 <4>[ 254.192899] new_sync_write+0x11d/0x1b0 <4>[ 254.192916] vfs_write+0x265/0x390 <4>[ 254.192933] ksys_write+0x5a/0xd0 <4>[ 254.192949] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 <4>[ 254.192965] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae <4>[ 254.192986] irq event stamp: 43775 <4>[ 254.192994] hardirqs last enabled at (43775): [<ffffffff81c00c42>] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20 <4>[ 254.193023] hardirqs last disabled at (43774): [<ffffffff81aa691a>] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa/0xb0 <4>[ 254.193049] softirqs last enabled at (42548): [<ffffffff81e00342>] __do_softirq+0x342/0x48e <4>[ 254.193074] softirqs last disabled at (42543): [<ffffffff810b45fd>] irq_exit_rcu+0xad/0xd0 <4>[ 254.193101] other info that might help us debug this: <4>[ 254.193107] Possible unsafe locking scenario: <4>[ 254.193112] CPU0 <4>[ 254.193117] ---- <4>[ 254.193121] lock(rtc_lock); <4>[ 254.193137] <Interrupt> <4>[ 254.193142] lock(rtc_lock); <4>[ 254.193156] *** DEADLOCK *** <4>[ 254.193161] 6 locks held by rtcwake/5309: <4>[ 254.193174] #0: ffff888104861430 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x5a/0xd0 <4>[ 254.193232] #1: ffff88810f823288 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0xe7/0x1c0 <4>[ 254.193282] OpenDingux#2: ffff888100cef3c0 (kn->active#285 <7>[ 254.192706] i915 0000:00:02.0: [drm:intel_modeset_setup_hw_state [i915]] [CRTC:51:pipe A] hw state readout: disabled <4>[ 254.193307] ){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0xf0/0x1c0 <4>[ 254.193333] OpenDingux#3: ffffffff82649fa8 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: pm_suspend.cold.8+0xce/0x34a <4>[ 254.193387] OpenDingux#4: ffffffff827a2108 (acpi_scan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: acpi_suspend_begin+0x47/0x70 <4>[ 254.193433] OpenDingux#5: ffff8881019ea178 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_resume+0x68/0x1e0 <4>[ 254.193485] stack backtrace: <4>[ 254.193492] CPU: 1 PID: 5309 Comm: rtcwake Not tainted 5.12.0-rc1-CI-CI_DRM_9834+ #1 <4>[ 254.193514] Hardware name: Google Soraka/Soraka, BIOS MrChromebox-4.10 08/25/2019 <4>[ 254.193524] Call Trace: <4>[ 254.193536] dump_stack+0x7f/0xad <4>[ 254.193567] mark_lock.part.47+0x8ca/0xce0 <4>[ 254.193604] __lock_acquire+0x39b/0x2590 <4>[ 254.193626] ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20 <4>[ 254.193660] lock_acquire+0xd1/0x3d0 <4>[ 254.193677] ? cmos_interrupt+0x18/0x100 <4>[ 254.193716] _raw_spin_lock+0x2a/0x40 <4>[ 254.193735] ? cmos_interrupt+0x18/0x100 <4>[ 254.193758] cmos_interrupt+0x18/0x100 <4>[ 254.193785] cmos_resume+0x2ac/0x2d0 <4>[ 254.193813] ? acpi_pm_set_device_wakeup+0x1f/0x110 <4>[ 254.193842] ? pnp_bus_suspend+0x10/0x10 <4>[ 254.193864] pnp_bus_resume+0x5e/0x90 <4>[ 254.193885] dpm_run_callback+0x5f/0x240 <4>[ 254.193914] device_resume+0xb2/0x1e0 <4>[ 254.193942] ? pm_dev_err+0x25/0x25 <4>[ 254.193974] dpm_resume+0xea/0x3f0 <4>[ 254.194005] dpm_resume_end+0x8/0x10 <4>[ 254.194030] suspend_devices_and_enter+0x29b/0xaa0 <4>[ 254.194066] pm_suspend.cold.8+0x301/0x34a <4>[ 254.194094] state_store+0x7b/0xe0 <4>[ 254.194124] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x11d/0x1c0 <4>[ 254.194151] new_sync_write+0x11d/0x1b0 <4>[ 254.194183] vfs_write+0x265/0x390 <4>[ 254.194207] ksys_write+0x5a/0xd0 <4>[ 254.194232] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 <4>[ 254.194251] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae <4>[ 254.194274] RIP: 0033:0x7f07d79691e7 <4>[ 254.194293] Code: 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb bb 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 <4>[ 254.194312] RSP: 002b:00007ffd9cc2c768 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 <4>[ 254.194337] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00007f07d79691e7 <4>[ 254.194352] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 0000556ebfc63590 RDI: 000000000000000b <4>[ 254.194366] RBP: 0000556ebfc63590 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000004 <4>[ 254.194379] R10: 0000556ebf0ec2a6 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000004 which breaks S3-resume on fi-kbl-soraka presumably as that's slow enough to trigger the alarm during the suspend. Fixes: 6950d04 ("rtc: cmos: Replace spin_lock_irqsave with spin_lock in hard IRQ") References: 66e4f4a ("rtc: cmos: Use spin_lock_irqsave() in cmos_interrupt()"): Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> Cc: Xiaofei Tan <tanxiaofei@huawei.com> Cc: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com> Cc: Alessandro Zummo <a.zummo@towertech.it> Cc: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210305122140.28774-1-chris@chris-wilson.co.uk

Commit 0881ace ("mm/mremap: use pmd/pud_poplulate to update page table entries") introduced a regression when running as Xen PV guest. Today pmd_populate() for Xen PV assumes that the PFN inserted is referencing a not yet used page table. In case of move_normal_pmd() this is not true, resulting in WARN splats like: [34321.304270] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [34321.304277] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 23628 at arch/x86/xen/multicalls.c:102 xen_mc_flush+0x176/0x1a0 [34321.304288] Modules linked in: [34321.304291] CPU: 0 PID: 23628 Comm: apt-get Not tainted 5.14.1-20210906-doflr-mac80211debug+ #1 [34321.304294] Hardware name: MSI MS-7640/890FXA-GD70 (MS-7640) , BIOS V1.8B1 09/13/2010 [34321.304296] RIP: e030:xen_mc_flush+0x176/0x1a0 [34321.304300] Code: 89 45 18 48 c1 e9 3f 48 89 ce e9 20 ff ff ff e8 60 03 00 00 66 90 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d c3 48 c7 45 18 ea ff ff ff be 01 00 00 00 <0f> 0b 8b 55 00 48 c7 c7 10 97 aa 82 31 db 49 c7 c5 38 97 aa 82 65 [34321.304303] RSP: e02b:ffffc90000a97c90 EFLAGS: 00010002 [34321.304305] RAX: ffff88807d416398 RBX: ffff88807d416350 RCX: ffff88807d416398 [34321.304306] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: deadbeefdeadf00d [34321.304308] RBP: ffff88807d416300 R08: aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa R09: ffff888006160cc0 [34321.304309] R10: deadbeefdeadf00d R11: ffffea000026a600 R12: 0000000000000000 [34321.304310] R13: ffff888012f6b000 R14: 0000000012f6b000 R15: 0000000000000001 [34321.304320] FS: 00007f5071177800(0000) GS:ffff88807d400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [34321.304322] CS: 10000e030 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [34321.304323] CR2: 00007f506f542000 CR3: 00000000160cc000 CR4: 0000000000000660 [34321.304326] Call Trace: [34321.304331] xen_alloc_pte+0x294/0x320 [34321.304334] move_pgt_entry+0x165/0x4b0 [34321.304339] move_page_tables+0x6fa/0x8d0 [34321.304342] move_vma.isra.44+0x138/0x500 [34321.304345] __x64_sys_mremap+0x296/0x410 [34321.304348] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80 [34321.304352] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [34321.304355] RIP: 0033:0x7f507196301a [34321.304358] Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 76 0e 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 49 89 ca b8 19 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 46 0e 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [34321.304360] RSP: 002b:00007ffda1eecd38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000019 [34321.304362] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000056205f950f30 RCX: 00007f507196301a [34321.304363] RDX: 0000000001a00000 RSI: 0000000001900000 RDI: 00007f506dc56000 [34321.304364] RBP: 0000000001a00000 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000004 [34321.304365] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f506dc56060 [34321.304367] R13: 00007f506dc56000 R14: 00007f506dc56060 R15: 000056205f950f30 [34321.304368] ---[ end trace a19885b78fe8f33e ]--- [34321.304370] 1 of 2 multicall(s) failed: cpu 0 [34321.304371] call 2: op=12297829382473034410 arg=[aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa] result=-22 Fix that by modifying xen_alloc_ptpage() to only pin the page table in case it wasn't pinned already. Fixes: 0881ace ("mm/mremap: use pmd/pud_poplulate to update page table entries") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-by: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it> Tested-by: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210908073640.11299-1-jgross@suse.com Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>

The network interface managed by the mlxbf_gige driver can get into a problem state where traffic does not flow. In this state, the interface will be up and enabled, but will stop processing received packets. This problem state will happen if three specific conditions occur: 1) driver has received more than (N * RxRingSize) packets but less than (N+1 * RxRingSize) packets, where N is an odd number Note: the command "ethtool -g <interface>" will display the current receive ring size, which currently defaults to 128 2) the driver's interface was disabled via "ifconfig oob_net0 down" during the window described in #1. 3) the driver's interface is re-enabled via "ifconfig oob_net0 up" This patch ensures that the driver's "valid_polarity" field is cleared during the open() method so that it always matches the receive polarity used by hardware. Without this fix, the driver needs to be unloaded and reloaded to correct this problem state. Fixes: f92e186 ("Add Mellanox BlueField Gigabit Ethernet driver") Reviewed-by: Asmaa Mnebhi <asmaa@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: David Thompson <davthompson@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

It's later supposed to be either a correct address or NULL. Without the initialization, it may contain an undefined value which results in the following segmentation fault: # perf top --sort comm -g --ignore-callees=do_idle terminates with: #0 0x00007ffff56b7685 in __strlen_avx2 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #1 0x00007ffff55e3802 in strdup () from /lib64/libc.so.6 OpenDingux#2 0x00005555558cb139 in hist_entry__init (callchain_size=<optimized out>, sample_self=true, template=0x7fffde7fb110, he=0x7fffd801c250) at util/hist.c:489 OpenDingux#3 hist_entry__new (template=template@entry=0x7fffde7fb110, sample_self=sample_self@entry=true) at util/hist.c:564 OpenDingux#4 0x00005555558cb4ba in hists__findnew_entry (hists=hists@entry=0x5555561d9e38, entry=entry@entry=0x7fffde7fb110, al=al@entry=0x7fffde7fb420, sample_self=sample_self@entry=true) at util/hist.c:657 OpenDingux#5 0x00005555558cba1b in __hists__add_entry (hists=hists@entry=0x5555561d9e38, al=0x7fffde7fb420, sym_parent=<optimized out>, bi=bi@entry=0x0, mi=mi@entry=0x0, sample=sample@entry=0x7fffde7fb4b0, sample_self=true, ops=0x0, block_info=0x0) at util/hist.c:288 OpenDingux#6 0x00005555558cbb70 in hists__add_entry (sample_self=true, sample=0x7fffde7fb4b0, mi=0x0, bi=0x0, sym_parent=<optimized out>, al=<optimized out>, hists=0x5555561d9e38) at util/hist.c:1056 OpenDingux#7 iter_add_single_cumulative_entry (iter=0x7fffde7fb460, al=<optimized out>) at util/hist.c:1056 OpenDingux#8 0x00005555558cc8a4 in hist_entry_iter__add (iter=iter@entry=0x7fffde7fb460, al=al@entry=0x7fffde7fb420, max_stack_depth=<optimized out>, arg=arg@entry=0x7fffffff7db0) at util/hist.c:1231 OpenDingux#9 0x00005555557cdc9a in perf_event__process_sample (machine=<optimized out>, sample=0x7fffde7fb4b0, evsel=<optimized out>, event=<optimized out>, tool=0x7fffffff7db0) at builtin-top.c:842 OpenDingux#10 deliver_event (qe=<optimized out>, qevent=<optimized out>) at builtin-top.c:1202 OpenDingux#11 0x00005555558a9318 in do_flush (show_progress=false, oe=0x7fffffff80e0) at util/ordered-events.c:244 OpenDingux#12 __ordered_events__flush (oe=oe@entry=0x7fffffff80e0, how=how@entry=OE_FLUSH__TOP, timestamp=timestamp@entry=0) at util/ordered-events.c:323 OpenDingux#13 0x00005555558a9789 in __ordered_events__flush (timestamp=<optimized out>, how=<optimized out>, oe=<optimized out>) at util/ordered-events.c:339 OpenDingux#14 ordered_events__flush (how=OE_FLUSH__TOP, oe=0x7fffffff80e0) at util/ordered-events.c:341 OpenDingux#15 ordered_events__flush (oe=oe@entry=0x7fffffff80e0, how=how@entry=OE_FLUSH__TOP) at util/ordered-events.c:339 MIPS#16 0x00005555557cd631 in process_thread (arg=0x7fffffff7db0) at builtin-top.c:1114 MIPS#17 0x00007ffff7bb817a in start_thread () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0 MIPS#18 0x00007ffff5656dc3 in clone () from /lib64/libc.so.6 If you look at the frame OpenDingux#2, the code is: 488 if (he->srcline) { 489 he->srcline = strdup(he->srcline); 490 if (he->srcline == NULL) 491 goto err_rawdata; 492 } If he->srcline is not NULL (it is not NULL if it is uninitialized rubbish), it gets strdupped and strdupping a rubbish random string causes the problem. Also, if you look at the commit 1fb7d06, it adds the srcline property into the struct, but not initializing it everywhere needed. Committer notes: Now I see, when using --ignore-callees=do_idle we end up here at line 2189 in add_callchain_ip(): 2181 if (al.sym != NULL) { 2182 if (perf_hpp_list.parent && !*parent && 2183 symbol__match_regex(al.sym, &parent_regex)) 2184 *parent = al.sym; 2185 else if (have_ignore_callees && root_al && 2186 symbol__match_regex(al.sym, &ignore_callees_regex)) { 2187 /* Treat this symbol as the root, 2188 forgetting its callees. */ 2189 *root_al = al; 2190 callchain_cursor_reset(cursor); 2191 } 2192 } And the al that doesn't have the ->srcline field initialized will be copied to the root_al, so then, back to: 1211 int hist_entry_iter__add(struct hist_entry_iter *iter, struct addr_location *al, 1212 int max_stack_depth, void *arg) 1213 { 1214 int err, err2; 1215 struct map *alm = NULL; 1216 1217 if (al) 1218 alm = map__get(al->map); 1219 1220 err = sample__resolve_callchain(iter->sample, &callchain_cursor, &iter->parent, 1221 iter->evsel, al, max_stack_depth); 1222 if (err) { 1223 map__put(alm); 1224 return err; 1225 } 1226 1227 err = iter->ops->prepare_entry(iter, al); 1228 if (err) 1229 goto out; 1230 1231 err = iter->ops->add_single_entry(iter, al); 1232 if (err) 1233 goto out; 1234 That al at line 1221 is what hist_entry_iter__add() (called from sample__resolve_callchain()) saw as 'root_al', and then: iter->ops->add_single_entry(iter, al); will go on with al->srcline with a bogus value, I'll add the above sequence to the cset and apply, thanks! Signed-off-by: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com> CC: Milian Wolff <milian.wolff@kdab.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Fixes: 1fb7d06 ("perf report Use srcline from callchain for hist entries") Link: https //lore.kernel.org/r/20210719145332.29747-1-mpetlan@redhat.com Reported-by: Juri Lelli <jlelli@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

FD uses xyarray__entry that may return NULL if an index is out of bounds. If NULL is returned then a segv happens as FD unconditionally dereferences the pointer. This was happening in a case of with perf iostat as shown below. The fix is to make FD an "int*" rather than an int and handle the NULL case as either invalid input or a closed fd. $ sudo gdb --args perf stat --iostat list ... Breakpoint 1, perf_evsel__alloc_fd (evsel=0x5555560951a0, ncpus=1, nthreads=1) at evsel.c:50 50 { (gdb) bt #0 perf_evsel__alloc_fd (evsel=0x5555560951a0, ncpus=1, nthreads=1) at evsel.c:50 #1 0x000055555585c188 in evsel__open_cpu (evsel=0x5555560951a0, cpus=0x555556093410, threads=0x555556086fb0, start_cpu=0, end_cpu=1) at util/evsel.c:1792 OpenDingux#2 0x000055555585cfb2 in evsel__open (evsel=0x5555560951a0, cpus=0x0, threads=0x555556086fb0) at util/evsel.c:2045 OpenDingux#3 0x000055555585d0db in evsel__open_per_thread (evsel=0x5555560951a0, threads=0x555556086fb0) at util/evsel.c:2065 OpenDingux#4 0x00005555558ece64 in create_perf_stat_counter (evsel=0x5555560951a0, config=0x555555c34700 <stat_config>, target=0x555555c2f1c0 <target>, cpu=0) at util/stat.c:590 OpenDingux#5 0x000055555578e927 in __run_perf_stat (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe4a0, run_idx=0) at builtin-stat.c:833 OpenDingux#6 0x000055555578f3c6 in run_perf_stat (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe4a0, run_idx=0) at builtin-stat.c:1048 OpenDingux#7 0x0000555555792ee5 in cmd_stat (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe4a0) at builtin-stat.c:2534 OpenDingux#8 0x0000555555835ed3 in run_builtin (p=0x555555c3f540 <commands+288>, argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe4a0) at perf.c:313 OpenDingux#9 0x0000555555836154 in handle_internal_command (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe4a0) at perf.c:365 OpenDingux#10 0x000055555583629f in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffe2ec, argv=0x7fffffffe2e0) at perf.c:409 OpenDingux#11 0x0000555555836692 in main (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe4a0) at perf.c:539 ... (gdb) c Continuing. Error: The sys_perf_event_open() syscall returned with 22 (Invalid argument) for event (uncore_iio_0/event=0x83,umask=0x04,ch_mask=0xF,fc_mask=0x07/). /bin/dmesg | grep -i perf may provide additional information. Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x00005555559b03ea in perf_evsel__close_fd_cpu (evsel=0x5555560951a0, cpu=1) at evsel.c:166 166 if (FD(evsel, cpu, thread) >= 0) v3. fixes a bug in perf_evsel__run_ioctl where the sense of a branch was backward. Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210918054440.2350466-1-irogers@google.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

Instead of having one 'hwdesc' variable for the plane #0, one for the plane #1 and one for the palette, use a 'hwdesc[3]' array, where the DMA hardware descriptors are indexed by the plane's number. v2: dma_hwdesc_addr() extended to support palette hwdesc. The palette hwdesc is now hwdesc[3] to simplify things. Add ingenic_drm_configure_hwdesc*() functions to factorize code. Signed-off-by: Paul Cercueil <paul@crapouillou.net>

The resilient nexthop group torture tests in fib_nexthop.sh exposed a possible division by zero while replacing a resilient group [1]. The division by zero occurs when the data path sees a resilient nexthop group with zero buckets. The tests replace a resilient nexthop group in a loop while traffic is forwarded through it. The tests do not specify the number of buckets while performing the replacement, resulting in the kernel allocating a stub resilient table (i.e, 'struct nh_res_table') with zero buckets. This table should never be visible to the data path, but the old nexthop group (i.e., 'oldg') might still be used by the data path when the stub table is assigned to it. Fix this by only assigning the stub table to the old nexthop group after making sure the group is no longer used by the data path. Tested with fib_nexthops.sh: Tests passed: 222 Tests failed: 0 [1] divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 0 PID: 1850 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.14.0-custom-10271-ga86eb53057fe torvalds#1107 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-4.fc34 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:nexthop_select_path+0x2d2/0x1a80 [...] Call Trace: fib_select_multipath+0x79b/0x1530 fib_select_path+0x8fb/0x1c10 ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu+0x1198/0x2da0 ip_route_output_key_hash+0x190/0x340 ip_route_output_flow+0x21/0x120 raw_sendmsg+0x91d/0x2e10 inet_sendmsg+0x9e/0xe0 __sys_sendto+0x23d/0x360 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 283a72a ("nexthop: Add implementation of resilient next-hop groups") Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This patch addresses the following Coverity report about the zno * sdkp->zone_blocks expression: CID 1475514 (#1 of 1): Unintentional integer overflow (OVERFLOW_BEFORE_WIDEN) overflow_before_widen: Potentially overflowing expression zno * sdkp->zone_blocks with type unsigned int (32 bits, unsigned) is evaluated using 32-bit arithmetic, and then used in a context that expects an expression of type sector_t (64 bits, unsigned). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210917212314.2362324-1-bvanassche@acm.org Fixes: 5795eb4 ("scsi: sd_zbc: emulate ZONE_APPEND commands") Cc: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Cc: Damien Le Moal <Damien.LeMoal@wdc.com> Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: Himanshu Madhani <himanshu.madhani@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>

This reverts commit 437b38c. The memory semantics added in commit 437b38c causes SystemMemory Operation region, whose address range is not described in the EFI memory map to be mapped as NormalNC memory on arm64 platforms (through acpi_os_map_memory() in acpi_ex_system_memory_space_handler()). This triggers the following abort on an ARM64 Ampere eMAG machine, because presumably the physical address range area backing the Opregion does not support NormalNC memory attributes driven on the bus. Internal error: synchronous external abort: 96000410 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.14.0+ torvalds#462 Hardware name: MiTAC RAPTOR EV-883832-X3-0001/RAPTOR, BIOS 0.14 02/22/2019 pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [...snip...] Call trace: acpi_ex_system_memory_space_handler+0x26c/0x2c8 acpi_ev_address_space_dispatch+0x228/0x2c4 acpi_ex_access_region+0x114/0x268 acpi_ex_field_datum_io+0x128/0x1b8 acpi_ex_extract_from_field+0x14c/0x2ac acpi_ex_read_data_from_field+0x190/0x1b8 acpi_ex_resolve_node_to_value+0x1ec/0x288 acpi_ex_resolve_to_value+0x250/0x274 acpi_ds_evaluate_name_path+0xac/0x124 acpi_ds_exec_end_op+0x90/0x410 acpi_ps_parse_loop+0x4ac/0x5d8 acpi_ps_parse_aml+0xe0/0x2c8 acpi_ps_execute_method+0x19c/0x1ac acpi_ns_evaluate+0x1f8/0x26c acpi_ns_init_one_device+0x104/0x140 acpi_ns_walk_namespace+0x158/0x1d0 acpi_ns_initialize_devices+0x194/0x218 acpi_initialize_objects+0x48/0x50 acpi_init+0xe0/0x498 If the Opregion address range is not present in the EFI memory map there is no way for us to determine the memory attributes to use to map it - defaulting to NormalNC does not work (and it is not correct on a memory region that may have read side-effects) and therefore commit 437b38c should be reverted, which means reverting back to the original behavior whereby address ranges that are mapped using acpi_os_map_memory() default to the safe devicenGnRnE attributes on ARM64 if the mapped address range is not defined in the EFI memory map. Fixes: 437b38c ("ACPI: Add memory semantics to acpi_os_map_memory()") Signed-off-by: Jia He <justin.he@arm.com> Acked-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com> Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>

There is an use-after-free problem triggered by following process: P1(sda) P2(sdb) echo 0 > /sys/block/sdb/trace/enable blk_trace_remove_queue synchronize_rcu blk_trace_free relay_close rcu_read_lock __blk_add_trace trace_note_tsk (Iterate running_trace_list) relay_close_buf relay_destroy_buf kfree(buf) trace_note(sdb's bt) relay_reserve buf->offset <- nullptr deference (use-after-free) !!! rcu_read_unlock [ 502.714379] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010 [ 502.715260] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 502.715903] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 502.716546] PGD 103984067 P4D 103984067 PUD 17592b067 PMD 0 [ 502.717252] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 502.720308] RIP: 0010:trace_note.isra.0+0x86/0x360 [ 502.732872] Call Trace: [ 502.733193] __blk_add_trace.cold+0x137/0x1a3 [ 502.733734] blk_add_trace_rq+0x7b/0xd0 [ 502.734207] blk_add_trace_rq_issue+0x54/0xa0 [ 502.734755] blk_mq_start_request+0xde/0x1b0 [ 502.735287] scsi_queue_rq+0x528/0x1140 ... [ 502.742704] sg_new_write.isra.0+0x16e/0x3e0 [ 502.747501] sg_ioctl+0x466/0x1100 Reproduce method: ioctl(/dev/sda, BLKTRACESETUP, blk_user_trace_setup[buf_size=127]) ioctl(/dev/sda, BLKTRACESTART) ioctl(/dev/sdb, BLKTRACESETUP, blk_user_trace_setup[buf_size=127]) ioctl(/dev/sdb, BLKTRACESTART) echo 0 > /sys/block/sdb/trace/enable & // Add delay(mdelay/msleep) before kernel enters blk_trace_free() ioctl$SG_IO(/dev/sda, SG_IO, ...) // Enters trace_note_tsk() after blk_trace_free() returned // Use mdelay in rcu region rather than msleep(which may schedule out) Remove blk_trace from running_list before calling blk_trace_free() by sysfs if blk_trace is at Blktrace_running state. Fixes: c71a896 ("blktrace: add ftrace plugin") Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210923134921.109194-1-chengzhihao1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Instead of having one 'hwdesc' variable for the plane #0, one for the plane #1 and one for the palette, use a 'hwdesc[3]' array, where the DMA hardware descriptors are indexed by the plane's number. v2: dma_hwdesc_addr() extended to support palette hwdesc. The palette hwdesc is now hwdesc[3] to simplify things. Add ingenic_drm_configure_hwdesc*() functions to factorize code. Signed-off-by: Paul Cercueil <paul@crapouillou.net>

…nel/git/at91/linux into arm/fixes AT91 fixes #1 for 5.15: - Fixes for newly introduced SAMA7G5 and its Power Management code. Associated core peripherals need to be instantiated in DT for benefiting from best PM support like Backup mode with DDR in Self-Refresh. - Add chip ID for SAMA7G5 for easing the kernel log identification. - Avoid Camera Sensor probe error on sama5d27 som1 ek board. * tag 'at91-fixes-5.15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/at91/linux: ARM: dts: at91: sama5d2_som1_ek: disable ISC node by default ARM: at91: pm: switch backup area to vbat in backup mode ARM: dts: at91: sama7g5: add chipid ARM: dts: at91: sama7g5: add shdwc node ARM: dts: at91: sama7g5: add securam node ARM: dts: at91: sama7g5: add ram controllers ARM: at91: pm: do not panic if ram controllers are not enabled Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210914162314.54347-1-nicolas.ferre@microchip.com Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

The conditional branch instructions on MIPS use 18-bit signed offsets allowing for a branch range of 128 KBytes (backward and forward). However, this limit is not observed by the cBPF JIT compiler, and so the JIT compiler emits out-of-range branches when translating certain cBPF programs. A specific example of such a cBPF program is included in the "BPF_MAXINSNS: exec all MSH" test from lib/test_bpf.c that executes anomalous machine code containing incorrect branch offsets under JIT. Furthermore, this issue can be abused to craft undesirable machine code, where the control flow is hijacked to execute arbitrary Kernel code. The following steps can be used to reproduce the issue: # echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_enable # modprobe test_bpf test_name="BPF_MAXINSNS: exec all MSH" This should produce multiple warnings from build_bimm() similar to: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 209 at arch/mips/mm/uasm-mips.c:210 build_insn+0x558/0x590 Micro-assembler field overflow Modules linked in: test_bpf(+) CPU: 0 PID: 209 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 5.14.3 #1 Stack : 00000000 807bb824 82b33c9c 801843c0 00000000 00000004 00000000 63c9b5ee 82b33af4 8099989 80910000 80900000 82fd6030 00000001 82b33a98 82087180 00000000 00000000 80873b28 00000000 000000fc 82b3394c 00000000 2e34312e 6d6d6f43 809a180f 809a1836 6f6d203a 80900000 00000001 82b33bac 80900000 00027f80 00000000 00000000 807bb824 00000000 804ed790 001cc317 00000001 [...] Call Trace: [<80108f44>] show_stack+0x38/0x118 [<807a7aac>] dump_stack_lvl+0x5c/0x7c [<807a4b3c>] __warn+0xcc/0x140 [<807a4c3c>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x8c/0xb8 [<8011e198>] build_insn+0x558/0x590 [<8011e358>] uasm_i_bne+0x20/0x2c [<80127b48>] build_body+0xa58/0x2a94 [<80129c98>] bpf_jit_compile+0x114/0x1e4 [<80613fc4>] bpf_prepare_filter+0x2ec/0x4e4 [<8061423c>] bpf_prog_create+0x80/0xc4 [<c0a006e4>] test_bpf_init+0x300/0xba8 [test_bpf] [<8010051c>] do_one_initcall+0x50/0x1d4 [<801c5e54>] do_init_module+0x60/0x220 [<801c8b20>] sys_finit_module+0xc4/0xfc [<801144d0>] syscall_common+0x34/0x58 [...] ---[ end trace a287d9742503c645 ]--- Then the anomalous machine code executes: => 0xc0a18000: addiu sp,sp,-16 0xc0a18004: sw s3,0(sp) 0xc0a18008: sw s4,4(sp) 0xc0a1800c: sw s5,8(sp) 0xc0a18010: sw ra,12(sp) 0xc0a18014: move s5,a0 0xc0a18018: move s4,zero 0xc0a1801c: move s3,zero # __BPF_STMT(BPF_LDX | BPF_B | BPF_MSH, 0) 0xc0a18020: lui t6,0x8012 0xc0a18024: ori t4,t6,0x9e14 0xc0a18028: li a1,0 0xc0a1802c: jalr t4 0xc0a18030: move a0,s5 0xc0a18034: bnez v0,0xc0a1ffb8 # incorrect branch offset 0xc0a18038: move v0,zero 0xc0a1803c: andi s4,s3,0xf 0xc0a18040: b 0xc0a18048 0xc0a18044: sll s4,s4,0x2 [...] # __BPF_STMT(BPF_LDX | BPF_B | BPF_MSH, 0) 0xc0a1ffa0: lui t6,0x8012 0xc0a1ffa4: ori t4,t6,0x9e14 0xc0a1ffa8: li a1,0 0xc0a1ffac: jalr t4 0xc0a1ffb0: move a0,s5 0xc0a1ffb4: bnez v0,0xc0a1ffb8 # incorrect branch offset 0xc0a1ffb8: move v0,zero 0xc0a1ffbc: andi s4,s3,0xf 0xc0a1ffc0: b 0xc0a1ffc8 0xc0a1ffc4: sll s4,s4,0x2 # __BPF_STMT(BPF_LDX | BPF_B | BPF_MSH, 0) 0xc0a1ffc8: lui t6,0x8012 0xc0a1ffcc: ori t4,t6,0x9e14 0xc0a1ffd0: li a1,0 0xc0a1ffd4: jalr t4 0xc0a1ffd8: move a0,s5 0xc0a1ffdc: bnez v0,0xc0a3ffb8 # correct branch offset 0xc0a1ffe0: move v0,zero 0xc0a1ffe4: andi s4,s3,0xf 0xc0a1ffe8: b 0xc0a1fff0 0xc0a1ffec: sll s4,s4,0x2 [...] # epilogue 0xc0a3ffb8: lw s3,0(sp) 0xc0a3ffbc: lw s4,4(sp) 0xc0a3ffc0: lw s5,8(sp) 0xc0a3ffc4: lw ra,12(sp) 0xc0a3ffc8: addiu sp,sp,16 0xc0a3ffcc: jr ra 0xc0a3ffd0: nop To mitigate this issue, we assert the branch ranges for each emit call that could generate an out-of-range branch. Fixes: 36366e3 ("MIPS: BPF: Restore MIPS32 cBPF JIT") Fixes: c6610de ("MIPS: net: Add BPF JIT") Signed-off-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Tested-by: Johan Almbladh <johan.almbladh@anyfinetworks.com> Acked-by: Johan Almbladh <johan.almbladh@anyfinetworks.com> Cc: Paul Burton <paulburton@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210915160437.4080-1-piotras@gmail.com

Syzbot was able to trigger the following warning [1] No repro found by syzbot yet but I was able to trigger similar issue by having 2 scripts running in parallel, changing conntrack hash sizes, and: for j in `seq 1 1000` ; do unshare -n /bin/true >/dev/null ; done It would take more than 5 minutes for net_namespace structures to be cleaned up. This is because nf_ct_iterate_cleanup() has to restart everytime a resize happened. By adding a mutex, we can serialize hash resizes and cleanups and also make get_next_corpse() faster by skipping over empty buckets. Even without resizes in the picture, this patch considerably speeds up network namespace dismantles. [1] INFO: task syz-executor.0:8312 can't die for more than 144 seconds. task:syz-executor.0 state:R running task stack:25672 pid: 8312 ppid: 6573 flags:0x00004006 Call Trace: context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:4955 [inline] __schedule+0x940/0x26f0 kernel/sched/core.c:6236 preempt_schedule_common+0x45/0xc0 kernel/sched/core.c:6408 preempt_schedule_thunk+0x16/0x18 arch/x86/entry/thunk_64.S:35 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x109/0x120 kernel/softirq.c:390 local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:32 [inline] get_next_corpse net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:2252 [inline] nf_ct_iterate_cleanup+0x15a/0x450 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:2275 nf_conntrack_cleanup_net_list+0x14c/0x4f0 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:2469 ops_exit_list+0x10d/0x160 net/core/net_namespace.c:171 setup_net+0x639/0xa30 net/core/net_namespace.c:349 copy_net_ns+0x319/0x760 net/core/net_namespace.c:470 create_new_namespaces+0x3f6/0xb20 kernel/nsproxy.c:110 unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xc1/0x1f0 kernel/nsproxy.c:226 ksys_unshare+0x445/0x920 kernel/fork.c:3128 __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3202 [inline] __se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3200 [inline] __x64_sys_unshare+0x2d/0x40 kernel/fork.c:3200 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f63da68e739 RSP: 002b:00007f63d7c05188 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000110 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f63da792f80 RCX: 00007f63da68e739 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000040000000 RBP: 00007f63da6e8cc4 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f63da792f80 R13: 00007fff50b75d3f R14: 00007f63d7c05300 R15: 0000000000022000 Showing all locks held in the system: 1 lock held by khungtaskd/27: #0: ffffffff8b980020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x53/0x260 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6446 2 locks held by kworker/u4:2/153: #0: ffff888010c69138 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: arch_atomic64_set arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:34 [inline] #0: ffff888010c69138 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: arch_atomic_long_set include/linux/atomic/atomic-long.h:41 [inline] #0: ffff888010c69138 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: atomic_long_set include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1198 [inline] #0: ffff888010c69138 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: set_work_data kernel/workqueue.c:634 [inline] #0: ffff888010c69138 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: set_work_pool_and_clear_pending kernel/workqueue.c:661 [inline] #0: ffff888010c69138 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x896/0x1690 kernel/workqueue.c:2268 #1: ffffc9000140fdb0 ((kfence_timer).work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x8ca/0x1690 kernel/workqueue.c:2272 1 lock held by systemd-udevd/2970: 1 lock held by in:imklog/6258: #0: ffff88807f970ff0 (&f->f_pos_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __fdget_pos+0xe9/0x100 fs/file.c:990 3 locks held by kworker/1:6/8158: 1 lock held by syz-executor.0/8312: 2 locks held by kworker/u4:13/9320: 1 lock held by syz-executor.5/10178: 1 lock held by syz-executor.4/10217: Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

The FSM can run in a circle allowing rdma_resolve_ip() to be called twice on the same id_priv. While this cannot happen without going through the work, it violates the invariant that the same address resolution background request cannot be active twice. CPU 1 CPU 2 rdma_resolve_addr(): RDMA_CM_IDLE -> RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY rdma_resolve_ip(addr_handler) #1 process_one_req(): for #1 addr_handler(): RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY -> RDMA_CM_ADDR_BOUND mutex_unlock(&id_priv->handler_mutex); [.. handler still running ..] rdma_resolve_addr(): RDMA_CM_ADDR_BOUND -> RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY rdma_resolve_ip(addr_handler) !! two requests are now on the req_list rdma_destroy_id(): destroy_id_handler_unlock(): _destroy_id(): cma_cancel_operation(): rdma_addr_cancel() // process_one_req() self removes it spin_lock_bh(&lock); cancel_delayed_work(&req->work); if (!list_empty(&req->list)) == true ! rdma_addr_cancel() returns after process_on_req #1 is done kfree(id_priv) process_one_req(): for OpenDingux#2 addr_handler(): mutex_lock(&id_priv->handler_mutex); !! Use after free on id_priv rdma_addr_cancel() expects there to be one req on the list and only cancels the first one. The self-removal behavior of the work only happens after the handler has returned. This yields a situations where the req_list can have two reqs for the same "handle" but rdma_addr_cancel() only cancels the first one. The second req remains active beyond rdma_destroy_id() and will use-after-free id_priv once it inevitably triggers. Fix this by remembering if the id_priv has called rdma_resolve_ip() and always cancel before calling it again. This ensures the req_list never gets more than one item in it and doesn't cost anything in the normal flow that never uses this strange error path. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0-v1-3bc675b8006d+22-syz_cancel_uaf_jgg@nvidia.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: e51060f ("IB: IP address based RDMA connection manager") Reported-by: syzbot+dc3dfba010d7671e05f5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>

…/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into kvm-master KVM/arm64 fixes for 5.15, take #1 - Add missing FORCE target when building the EL2 object - Fix a PMU probe regression on some platforms

hns3_nic_net_open() is not allowed to called repeatly, but there is no checking for this. When doing device reset and setup tc concurrently, there is a small oppotunity to call hns3_nic_net_open repeatedly, and cause kernel bug by calling napi_enable twice. The calltrace information is like below: [ 3078.222780] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 3078.230255] kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c:6991! [ 3078.236224] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 3078.243431] Modules linked in: hns3 hclgevf hclge hnae3 vfio_iommu_type1 vfio_pci vfio_virqfd vfio pv680_mii(O) [ 3078.258880] CPU: 0 PID: 295 Comm: kworker/u8:5 Tainted: G O 5.14.0-rc4+ #1 [ 3078.269102] Hardware name: , BIOS KpxxxFPGA 1P B600 V181 08/12/2021 [ 3078.276801] Workqueue: hclge hclge_service_task [hclge] [ 3078.288774] pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) [ 3078.296168] pc : napi_enable+0x80/0x84 tc qdisc sho[w 3d0e7v8 .e3t0h218 79] lr : hns3_nic_net_open+0x138/0x510 [hns3] [ 3078.314771] sp : ffff8000108abb20 [ 3078.319099] x29: ffff8000108abb20 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffff0820a8490300 [ 3078.329121] x26: 0000000000000001 x25: ffff08209cfc6200 x24: 0000000000000000 [ 3078.339044] x23: ffff0820a8490300 x22: ffff08209cd76000 x21: ffff0820abfe3880 [ 3078.349018] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffff08209cd76900 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 3078.358620] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffc816e1727a50 x15: 0000ffff8f4ff930 [ 3078.368895] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000259e9dbeb6b4 [ 3078.377987] x11: 0096a8f7e764eb40 x10: 634615ad28d3eab5 x9 : ffffc816ad8885b8 [ 3078.387091] x8 : ffff08209cfc6fb8 x7 : ffff0820ac0da058 x6 : ffff0820a8490344 [ 3078.396356] x5 : 0000000000000140 x4 : 0000000000000003 x3 : ffff08209cd76938 [ 3078.405365] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000010 x0 : ffff0820abfe38a0 [ 3078.414657] Call trace: [ 3078.418517] napi_enable+0x80/0x84 [ 3078.424626] hns3_reset_notify_up_enet+0x78/0xd0 [hns3] [ 3078.433469] hns3_reset_notify+0x64/0x80 [hns3] [ 3078.441430] hclge_notify_client+0x68/0xb0 [hclge] [ 3078.450511] hclge_reset_rebuild+0x524/0x884 [hclge] [ 3078.458879] hclge_reset_service_task+0x3c4/0x680 [hclge] [ 3078.467470] hclge_service_task+0xb0/0xb54 [hclge] [ 3078.475675] process_one_work+0x1dc/0x48c [ 3078.481888] worker_thread+0x15c/0x464 [ 3078.487104] kthread+0x160/0x170 [ 3078.492479] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 [ 3078.498785] Code: c8027c81 35ffffa2 d50323bf d65f03c0 (d4210000) [ 3078.506889] ---[ end trace 8ebe0340a1b0fb44 ]--- Once hns3_nic_net_open() is excute success, the flag HNS3_NIC_STATE_DOWN will be cleared. So add checking for this flag, directly return when HNS3_NIC_STATE_DOWN is no set. Fixes: e888402 ("net: hns3: call hns3_nic_net_open() while doing HNAE3_UP_CLIENT") Signed-off-by: Jian Shen <shenjian15@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Guangbin Huang <huangguangbin2@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Syzkaller reported a false positive deadlock involving the nl socket lock and the subflow socket lock: MPTCP: kernel_bind error, err=-98 ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 5.15.0-rc1-syzkaller #0 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- syz-executor998/6520 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8880795718a0 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_close+0x267/0x7b0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2738 but task is already holding lock: ffff8880787c8c60 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1612 [inline] ffff8880787c8c60 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_close+0x23/0x7b0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2720 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(k-sk_lock-AF_INET); lock(k-sk_lock-AF_INET); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 3 locks held by syz-executor998/6520: #0: ffffffff8d176c50 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv+0x15/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:802 #1: ffffffff8d176d08 (genl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: genl_lock net/netlink/genetlink.c:33 [inline] #1: ffffffff8d176d08 (genl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv_msg+0x3e0/0x580 net/netlink/genetlink.c:790 OpenDingux#2: ffff8880787c8c60 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1612 [inline] OpenDingux#2: ffff8880787c8c60 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_close+0x23/0x7b0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2720 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 6520 Comm: syz-executor998 Not tainted 5.15.0-rc1-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_deadlock_bug kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2944 [inline] check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2987 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3776 [inline] __lock_acquire.cold+0x149/0x3ab kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5015 lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5625 [inline] lock_acquire+0x1ab/0x510 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5590 lock_sock_fast+0x36/0x100 net/core/sock.c:3229 mptcp_close+0x267/0x7b0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2738 inet_release+0x12e/0x280 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:431 __sock_release net/socket.c:649 [inline] sock_release+0x87/0x1b0 net/socket.c:677 mptcp_pm_nl_create_listen_socket+0x238/0x2c0 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:900 mptcp_nl_cmd_add_addr+0x359/0x930 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1170 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x228/0x320 net/netlink/genetlink.c:731 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:775 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x328/0x580 net/netlink/genetlink.c:792 netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2504 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:803 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1314 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1340 netlink_sendmsg+0x86d/0xdb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1929 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:704 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:724 sock_no_sendpage+0x101/0x150 net/core/sock.c:2980 kernel_sendpage.part.0+0x1a0/0x340 net/socket.c:3504 kernel_sendpage net/socket.c:3501 [inline] sock_sendpage+0xe5/0x140 net/socket.c:1003 pipe_to_sendpage+0x2ad/0x380 fs/splice.c:364 splice_from_pipe_feed fs/splice.c:418 [inline] __splice_from_pipe+0x43e/0x8a0 fs/splice.c:562 splice_from_pipe fs/splice.c:597 [inline] generic_splice_sendpage+0xd4/0x140 fs/splice.c:746 do_splice_from fs/splice.c:767 [inline] direct_splice_actor+0x110/0x180 fs/splice.c:936 splice_direct_to_actor+0x34b/0x8c0 fs/splice.c:891 do_splice_direct+0x1b3/0x280 fs/splice.c:979 do_sendfile+0xae9/0x1240 fs/read_write.c:1249 __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1314 [inline] __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1300 [inline] __x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1cc/0x210 fs/read_write.c:1300 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f215cb69969 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 14 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffc96bb3868 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000028 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f215cbad072 RCX: 00007f215cb69969 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00007ffc96bb3a08 R09: 00007ffc96bb3a08 R10: 0000000100000002 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffc96bb387c R13: 431bde82d7b634db R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 the problem originates from uncorrect lock annotation in the mptcp code and is only visible since commit 2dcb96b ("net: core: Correct the sock::sk_lock.owned lockdep annotations"), but is present since the port-based endpoint support initial implementation. This patch addresses the issue introducing a nested variant of lock_sock_fast() and using it in the relevant code path. Fixes: 1729cf1 ("mptcp: create the listening socket for new port") Fixes: 2dcb96b ("net: core: Correct the sock::sk_lock.owned lockdep annotations") Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+1dd53f7a89b299d59eaf@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

In prealloc_elems_and_freelist(), the multiplication to calculate the size passed to bpf_map_area_alloc() could lead to an integer overflow. As a result, out-of-bounds write could occur in pcpu_freelist_populate() as reported by KASAN: [...] [ 16.968613] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in pcpu_freelist_populate+0xd9/0x100 [ 16.969408] Write of size 8 at addr ffff888104fc6ea0 by task crash/78 [ 16.970038] [ 16.970195] CPU: 0 PID: 78 Comm: crash Not tainted 5.15.0-rc2+ #1 [ 16.970878] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 [ 16.972026] Call Trace: [ 16.972306] dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44 [ 16.972687] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x21/0x140 [ 16.973297] ? pcpu_freelist_populate+0xd9/0x100 [ 16.973777] ? pcpu_freelist_populate+0xd9/0x100 [ 16.974257] kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b [ 16.974681] ? pcpu_freelist_populate+0xd9/0x100 [ 16.975190] pcpu_freelist_populate+0xd9/0x100 [ 16.975669] stack_map_alloc+0x209/0x2a0 [ 16.976106] __sys_bpf+0xd83/0x2ce0 [...] The possibility of this overflow was originally discussed in [0], but was overlooked. Fix the integer overflow by changing elem_size to u64 from u32. [0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/728b238e-a481-eb50-98e9-b0f430ab01e7@gmail.com/ Fixes: 557c0c6 ("bpf: convert stackmap to pre-allocation") Signed-off-by: Tatsuhiko Yasumatsu <th.yasumatsu@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210930135545.173698-1-th.yasumatsu@gmail.com

Now EXT4_FC_TAG_ADD_RANGE uses ext4_extent to track the newly-added blocks, but the limit on the max value of ee_len field is ignored, and it can lead to BUG_ON as shown below when running command "fallocate -l 128M file" on a fast_commit-enabled fs: kernel BUG at fs/ext4/ext4_extents.h:199! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 3 PID: 624 Comm: fallocate Not tainted 5.14.0-rc6+ #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) RIP: 0010:ext4_fc_write_inode_data+0x1f3/0x200 Call Trace: ? ext4_fc_write_inode+0xf2/0x150 ext4_fc_commit+0x93b/0xa00 ? ext4_fallocate+0x1ad/0x10d0 ext4_sync_file+0x157/0x340 ? ext4_sync_file+0x157/0x340 vfs_fsync_range+0x49/0x80 do_fsync+0x3d/0x70 __x64_sys_fsync+0x14/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Simply fixing it by limiting the number of blocks in one EXT4_FC_TAG_ADD_RANGE TLV. Fixes: aa75f4d ("ext4: main fast-commit commit path") Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210820044505.474318-1-houtao1@huawei.com

The error path in ext4_fill_super forget to flush s_error_work before journal destroy, and it may trigger the follow bug since flush_stashed_error_work can run concurrently with journal destroy without any protection for sbi->s_journal. [32031.740193] EXT4-fs (loop66): get root inode failed [32031.740484] EXT4-fs (loop66): mount failed [32031.759805] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [32031.759807] kernel BUG at fs/jbd2/transaction.c:373! [32031.760075] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [32031.760336] CPU: 5 PID: 1029268 Comm: kworker/5:1 Kdump: loaded 4.18.0 [32031.765112] Call Trace: [32031.765375] ? __switch_to_asm+0x35/0x70 [32031.765635] ? __switch_to_asm+0x41/0x70 [32031.765893] ? __switch_to_asm+0x35/0x70 [32031.766148] ? __switch_to_asm+0x41/0x70 [32031.766405] ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x40 [32031.766665] jbd2__journal_start+0xf1/0x1f0 [jbd2] [32031.766934] jbd2_journal_start+0x19/0x20 [jbd2] [32031.767218] flush_stashed_error_work+0x30/0x90 [ext4] [32031.767487] process_one_work+0x195/0x390 [32031.767747] worker_thread+0x30/0x390 [32031.768007] ? process_one_work+0x390/0x390 [32031.768265] kthread+0x10d/0x130 [32031.768521] ? kthread_flush_work_fn+0x10/0x10 [32031.768778] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 static int start_this_handle(...) BUG_ON(journal->j_flags & JBD2_UNMOUNT); <---- Trigger this Besides, after we enable fast commit, ext4_fc_replay can add work to s_error_work but return success, so the latter journal destroy in ext4_load_journal can trigger this problem too. Fix this problem with two steps: 1. Call ext4_commit_super directly in ext4_handle_error for the case that called from ext4_fc_replay 2. Since it's hard to pair the init and flush for s_error_work, we'd better add a extras flush_work before journal destroy in ext4_fill_super Besides, this patch will call ext4_commit_super in ext4_handle_error for any nojournal case too. But it seems safe since the reason we call schedule_work was that we should save error info to sb through journal if available. Conversely, for the nojournal case, it seems useless delay commit superblock to s_error_work. Fixes: c92dc85 ("ext4: defer saving error info from atomic context") Fixes: 2d01ddc ("ext4: save error info to sb through journal if available") Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: yangerkun <yangerkun@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210924093917.1953239-1-yangerkun@huawei.com

syzbot reported another NULL deref in fifo_set_limit() [1] I could repro the issue with : unshare -n tc qd add dev lo root handle 1:0 tbf limit 200000 burst 70000 rate 100Mbit tc qd replace dev lo parent 1:0 pfifo_fast tc qd change dev lo root handle 1:0 tbf limit 300000 burst 70000 rate 100Mbit pfifo_fast does not have a change() operation. Make fifo_set_limit() more robust about this. [1] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 PGD 1cf99067 P4D 1cf99067 PUD 7ca49067 PMD 0 Oops: 0010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 1 PID: 14443 Comm: syz-executor959 Not tainted 5.15.0-rc3-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:0x0 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffffffffffd6. RSP: 0018:ffffc9000e2f7310 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffff8d6ecc00 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff888024c27910 RDI: ffff888071e34000 RBP: ffff888071e34000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffffff8fcfb947 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888024c27910 R13: ffff888071e34018 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88801ef74800 FS: 00007f321d897700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 00000000722c3000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: fifo_set_limit net/sched/sch_fifo.c:242 [inline] fifo_set_limit+0x198/0x210 net/sched/sch_fifo.c:227 tbf_change+0x6ec/0x16d0 net/sched/sch_tbf.c:418 qdisc_change net/sched/sch_api.c:1332 [inline] tc_modify_qdisc+0xd9a/0x1a60 net/sched/sch_api.c:1634 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x413/0xb80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5572 netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2504 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1314 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1340 netlink_sendmsg+0x86d/0xdb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1929 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:704 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:724 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2409 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2463 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2492 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Fixes: fb0305c ("net-sched: consolidate default fifo qdisc setup") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210930212239.3430364-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

On SiFive Unmatched, I recently fell onto the following BUG when booting: [ 0.000000] ftrace: allocating 36610 entries in 144 pages [ 0.000000] Oops - illegal instruction [#1] [ 0.000000] Modules linked in: [ 0.000000] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.13.1+ OpenDingux#5 [ 0.000000] Hardware name: SiFive HiFive Unmatched A00 (DT) [ 0.000000] epc : riscv_cpuid_to_hartid_mask+0x6/0xae [ 0.000000] ra : __sbi_rfence_v02+0xc8/0x10a [ 0.000000] epc : ffffffff80007240 ra : ffffffff80009964 sp : ffffffff81803e10 [ 0.000000] gp : ffffffff81a1ea70 tp : ffffffff8180f500 t0 : ffffffe07fe30000 [ 0.000000] t1 : 0000000000000004 t2 : 0000000000000000 s0 : ffffffff81803e60 [ 0.000000] s1 : 0000000000000000 a0 : ffffffff81a22238 a1 : ffffffff81803e10 [ 0.000000] a2 : 0000000000000000 a3 : 0000000000000000 a4 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.000000] a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : ffffffff8000989c a7 : 0000000052464e43 [ 0.000000] s2 : ffffffff81a220c8 s3 : 0000000000000000 s4 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.000000] s5 : 0000000000000000 s6 : 0000000200000100 s7 : 0000000000000001 [ 0.000000] s8 : ffffffe07fe04040 s9 : ffffffff81a22c80 s10: 0000000000001000 [ 0.000000] s11: 0000000000000004 t3 : 0000000000000001 t4 : 0000000000000008 [ 0.000000] t5 : ffffffcf04000808 t6 : ffffffe3ffddf188 [ 0.000000] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 0000000000000002 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80007240>] riscv_cpuid_to_hartid_mask+0x6/0xae [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80009474>] sbi_remote_fence_i+0x1e/0x26 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8000b8f4>] flush_icache_all+0x12/0x1a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8000666c>] patch_text_nosync+0x26/0x32 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8000884e>] ftrace_init_nop+0x52/0x8c [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff800f051e>] ftrace_process_locs.isra.0+0x29c/0x360 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80a0e3c6>] ftrace_init+0x80/0x130 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80a00f8c>] start_kernel+0x5c4/0x8f6 [ 0.000000] ---[ end trace f67eb9af4d8d492b ]--- [ 0.000000] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill the idle task! [ 0.000000] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill the idle task! ]--- While ftrace is looping over a list of addresses to patch, it always failed when patching the same function: riscv_cpuid_to_hartid_mask. Looking at the backtrace, the illegal instruction is encountered in this same function. However, patch_text_nosync, after patching the instructions, calls flush_icache_range. But looking at what happens in this function: flush_icache_range -> flush_icache_all -> sbi_remote_fence_i -> __sbi_rfence_v02 -> riscv_cpuid_to_hartid_mask The icache and dcache of the current cpu are never synchronized between the patching of riscv_cpuid_to_hartid_mask and calling this same function. So fix this by flushing the current cpu's icache before asking for the other cpus to do the same. Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr> Fixes: fab957c ("RISC-V: Atomic and Locking Code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>

…rylock() While reboot the system by sysrq, the following bug will be occur. BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/semaphore.c:90 in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 128, non_block: 0, pid: 10052, name: rc.shutdown CPU: 3 PID: 10052 Comm: rc.shutdown Tainted: G W O 5.10.0 #1 Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1c8 show_stack+0x18/0x28 dump_stack+0xd0/0x110 ___might_sleep+0x14c/0x160 __might_sleep+0x74/0x88 down_interruptible+0x40/0x118 virt_efi_reset_system+0x3c/0xd0 efi_reboot+0xd4/0x11c machine_restart+0x60/0x9c emergency_restart+0x1c/0x2c sysrq_handle_reboot+0x1c/0x2c __handle_sysrq+0xd0/0x194 write_sysrq_trigger+0xbc/0xe4 proc_reg_write+0xd4/0xf0 vfs_write+0xa8/0x148 ksys_write+0x6c/0xd8 __arm64_sys_write+0x18/0x28 el0_svc_common.constprop.3+0xe4/0x16c do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x2c el0_svc+0x20/0x30 el0_sync_handler+0x80/0x17c el0_sync+0x158/0x180 The reason for this problem is that irq has been disabled in machine_restart() and then it calls down_interruptible() in virt_efi_reset_system(), which would occur sleep in irq context, it is dangerous! Commit 99409b9("locking/semaphore: Add might_sleep() to down_*() family") add might_sleep() in down_interruptible(), so the bug info is here. down_trylock() can solve this problem, cause there is no might_sleep. -------- Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>

One missing check in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() allowed syzbot to crash kernels again [1] Do not allow gso_size to be set to GSO_BY_FRAGS (0xffff), because this magic value is used by the kernel. [1] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000e: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000070-0x0000000000000077] CPU: 0 PID: 5039 Comm: syz-executor401 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc5-next-20230809-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/26/2023 RIP: 0010:skb_segment+0x1a52/0x3ef0 net/core/skbuff.c:4500 Code: 00 00 00 e9 ab eb ff ff e8 6b 96 5d f9 48 8b 84 24 00 01 00 00 48 8d 78 70 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e ea 21 00 00 48 8b 84 24 00 01 RSP: 0018:ffffc90003d3f1c8 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 000000000001fffe RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: ffffffff882a3115 RDI: 0000000000000070 RBP: ffffc90003d3f378 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 000000000000ffff R10: 000000000000ffff R11: 5ee4a93e456187d6 R12: 000000000001ffc6 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 0000000000000008 R15: 000000000000ffff FS: 00005555563f2380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020020000 CR3: 000000001626d000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> udp6_ufo_fragment+0x9d2/0xd50 net/ipv6/udp_offload.c:109 ipv6_gso_segment+0x5c4/0x17b0 net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c:120 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x292/0x610 net/core/gso.c:53 __skb_gso_segment+0x339/0x710 net/core/gso.c:124 skb_gso_segment include/net/gso.h:83 [inline] validate_xmit_skb+0x3a5/0xf10 net/core/dev.c:3625 __dev_queue_xmit+0x8f0/0x3d60 net/core/dev.c:4329 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3082 [inline] packet_xmit+0x257/0x380 net/packet/af_packet.c:276 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3087 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x24c7/0x5570 net/packet/af_packet.c:3119 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:727 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd9/0x180 net/socket.c:750 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6ac/0x940 net/socket.c:2496 ___sys_sendmsg+0x135/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2550 __sys_sendmsg+0x117/0x1e0 net/socket.c:2579 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7ff27cdb34d9 Fixes: 3953c46 ("sk_buff: allow segmenting based on frag sizes") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Xuan Zhuo <xuanzhuo@linux.alibaba.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230816142158.1779798-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

During stress test with attaching and detaching VF from KVM and simultaneously changing VFs spoofcheck and trust there was a NULL pointer dereference in ice_reset_vf that VF's VSI is null. More than one instance of ice_reset_vf() can be running at a given time. When we rebuild the VSI in ice_reset_vf, another reset can be triaged from ice_service_task. In this case we can access the currently uninitialized VSI and cause panic. The window for this racing condition has been around for a long time but it's much worse after commit 227bf45 ("ice: move VSI delete outside deconfig") because the reset runs faster. ice_reset_vf() using vf->cfg_lock and when we move this lock before accessing to the VF VSI, we can fix BUG for all cases. Panic occurs sometimes in ice_vsi_is_rx_queue_active() and sometimes in ice_vsi_stop_all_rx_rings() With our reproducer, we can hit BUG: ~8h before commit 227bf45 ("ice: move VSI delete outside deconfig"). ~20m after commit 227bf45 ("ice: move VSI delete outside deconfig"). After this fix we are not able to reproduce it after ~48h There was commit cf90b74 ("ice: Fix call trace with null VSI during VF reset") which also tried to fix this issue, but it was only partially resolved and the bug still exists. [ 6420.658415] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 6420.665382] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 6420.670521] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 6420.675659] PGD 0 [ 6420.677679] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 6420.682038] CPU: 53 PID: 326472 Comm: kworker/53:0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.14.0-317.el9.x86_64 #1 [ 6420.691250] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R750/04V528, BIOS 1.6.5 04/15/2022 [ 6420.698729] Workqueue: ice ice_service_task [ice] [ 6420.703462] RIP: 0010:ice_vsi_is_rx_queue_active+0x2d/0x60 [ice] [ 6420.705860] ice 0000:ca:00.0: VF 0 is now untrusted [ 6420.709494] Code: 00 00 66 83 bf 76 04 00 00 00 48 8b 77 10 74 3e 31 c0 eb 0f 0f b7 97 76 04 00 00 48 83 c0 01 39 c2 7e 2b 48 8b 97 68 04 00 00 <0f> b7 0c 42 48 8b 96 20 13 00 00 48 8d 94 8a 00 00 12 00 8b 12 83 [ 6420.714426] ice 0000:ca:00.0 ens7f0: Setting MAC 22:22:22:22:22:00 on VF 0. VF driver will be reinitialized [ 6420.733120] RSP: 0018:ff778d2ff383fdd8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 6420.733123] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ff2acf1916294000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 6420.733125] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ff2acf1f2c6401a0 RDI: ff2acf1a27301828 [ 6420.762346] RBP: ff2acf1a27301828 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000001000 [ 6420.769476] R10: ff2acf1916286000 R11: 00000000019eba3f R12: ff2acf19066460d0 [ 6420.776611] R13: ff2acf1f2c6401a0 R14: ff2acf1f2c6401a0 R15: 00000000ffffffff [ 6420.783742] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff2acf28ffa80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 6420.791829] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 6420.797575] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000016ad410003 CR4: 0000000000773ee0 [ 6420.804708] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 6420.811034] vfio-pci 0000:ca:01.0: enabling device (0000 -> 0002) [ 6420.811840] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 6420.811841] PKRU: 55555554 [ 6420.811842] Call Trace: [ 6420.811843] <TASK> [ 6420.811844] ice_reset_vf+0x9a/0x450 [ice] [ 6420.811876] ice_process_vflr_event+0x8f/0xc0 [ice] [ 6420.841343] ice_service_task+0x23b/0x600 [ice] [ 6420.845884] ? __schedule+0x212/0x550 [ 6420.849550] process_one_work+0x1e2/0x3b0 [ 6420.853563] ? rescuer_thread+0x390/0x390 [ 6420.857577] worker_thread+0x50/0x3a0 [ 6420.861242] ? rescuer_thread+0x390/0x390 [ 6420.865253] kthread+0xdd/0x100 [ 6420.868400] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 [ 6420.873194] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 6420.876774] </TASK> [ 6420.878967] Modules linked in: vfio_pci vfio_pci_core vfio_iommu_type1 vfio iavf vhost_net vhost vhost_iotlb tap tun xt_CHECKSUM xt_MASQUERADE xt_conntrack ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 nft_compat nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 nft_counter nf_tables bridge stp llc sctp ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel nfp tls nfnetlink bluetooth mlx4_en mlx4_core rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace fscache netfs rfkill sunrpc intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common i10nm_edac nfit libnvdimm ipmi_ssif x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp irdma kvm_intel i40e kvm iTCO_wdt dcdbas ib_uverbs irqbypass iTCO_vendor_support mgag200 mei_me ib_core dell_smbios isst_if_mmio isst_if_mbox_pci rapl i2c_algo_bit drm_shmem_helper intel_cstate drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect isst_if_common sysimgblt intel_uncore fb_sys_fops dell_wmi_descriptor wmi_bmof intel_vsec mei i2c_i801 acpi_ipmi ipmi_si i2c_smbus ipmi_devintf intel_pch_thermal acpi_power_meter pcspk r Fixes: efe4186 ("ice: Fix memory corruption in VF driver") Fixes: f23df52 ("ice: Fix spurious interrupt during removal of trusted VF") Signed-off-by: Petr Oros <poros@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com> Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <rafal.romanowski@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>

… via GUP-fast In contrast to most other GUP code, GUP-fast common page table walking code like gup_pte_range() also handles hugetlb pages. But in contrast to other hugetlb page table walking code, it does not look at the hugetlb PTE abstraction whereby we have only a single logical hugetlb PTE per hugetlb page, even when using multiple cont-PTEs underneath -- which is for example what huge_ptep_get() abstracts. So when we have a hugetlb page that is mapped via cont-PTEs, GUP-fast might stumble over a PTE that does not map the head page of a hugetlb page -- not the first "head" PTE of such a cont mapping. Logically, the whole hugetlb page is mapped (entire_mapcount == 1), but we might end up calling gup_must_unshare() with a tail page of a hugetlb page. We only maintain a single PageAnonExclusive flag per hugetlb page (as hugetlb pages cannot get partially COW-shared), stored for the head page. That flag is clear for all tail pages. So when gup_must_unshare() ends up calling PageAnonExclusive() with a tail page of a hugetlb page: 1) With CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_PGFLAGS Stumbles over the: VM_BUG_ON_PGFLAGS(PageHuge(page) && !PageHead(page), page); For example, when executing the COW selftests with 64k hugetlb pages on arm64: [ 61.082187] page:00000000829819ff refcount:3 mapcount:1 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x11ee11 [ 61.082842] head:0000000080f79bf7 order:4 entire_mapcount:1 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:2 [ 61.083384] anon flags: 0x17ffff80003000e(referenced|uptodate|dirty|head|mappedtodisk|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0xfffff) [ 61.084101] page_type: 0xffffffff() [ 61.084332] raw: 017ffff800000000 fffffc00037b8401 0000000000000402 0000000200000000 [ 61.084840] raw: 0000000000000010 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 61.085359] head: 017ffff80003000e ffffd9e95b09b788 ffffd9e95b09b788 ffff0007ff63cf71 [ 61.085885] head: 0000000000000000 0000000000000002 00000003ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 61.086415] page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PageHuge(page) && !PageHead(page)) [ 61.086914] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 61.087220] kernel BUG at include/linux/page-flags.h:990! [ 61.087591] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP [ 61.087999] Modules linked in: ... [ 61.089404] CPU: 0 PID: 4612 Comm: cow Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.5.0-rc4+ OpenDingux#3 [ 61.089917] Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 [ 61.090409] pstate: 604000c5 (nZCv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 61.090897] pc : gup_must_unshare.part.0+0x64/0x98 [ 61.091242] lr : gup_must_unshare.part.0+0x64/0x98 [ 61.091592] sp : ffff8000825eb940 [ 61.091826] x29: ffff8000825eb940 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: fffffc00037b8440 [ 61.092329] x26: 0400000000000001 x25: 0000000000080101 x24: 0000000000080000 [ 61.092835] x23: 0000000000080100 x22: ffff0000cffb9588 x21: ffff0000c8ec6b58 [ 61.093341] x20: 0000ffffad6b1000 x19: fffffc00037b8440 x18: ffffffffffffffff [ 61.093850] x17: 2864616548656761 x16: 5021202626202965 x15: 6761702865677548 [ 61.094358] x14: 6567615028454741 x13: 2929656761702864 x12: 6165486567615021 [ 61.094858] x11: 00000000ffff7fff x10: 00000000ffff7fff x9 : ffffd9e958b7a1c0 [ 61.095359] x8 : 00000000000bffe8 x7 : c0000000ffff7fff x6 : 00000000002bffa8 [ 61.095873] x5 : ffff0008bb19e708 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 61.096380] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff0000cf6636c0 x0 : 0000000000000046 [ 61.096894] Call trace: [ 61.097080] gup_must_unshare.part.0+0x64/0x98 [ 61.097392] gup_pte_range+0x3a8/0x3f0 [ 61.097662] gup_pgd_range+0x1ec/0x280 [ 61.097942] lockless_pages_from_mm+0x64/0x1a0 [ 61.098258] internal_get_user_pages_fast+0xe4/0x1d0 [ 61.098612] pin_user_pages_fast+0x58/0x78 [ 61.098917] pin_longterm_test_start+0xf4/0x2b8 [ 61.099243] gup_test_ioctl+0x170/0x3b0 [ 61.099528] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xa8/0xf0 [ 61.099822] invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x7c/0xd0 [ 61.100160] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xe8/0x100 [ 61.100500] do_el0_svc+0x38/0xa0 [ 61.100736] el0_svc+0x3c/0x198 [ 61.100971] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x134/0x150 [ 61.101280] el0t_64_sync+0x17c/0x180 [ 61.101543] Code: aa1303e0 f00074c1 912b0021 97fffeb2 (d4210000) 2) Without CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_PGFLAGS Always detects "not exclusive" for passed tail pages and refuses to PIN the tail pages R/O, as gup_must_unshare() == true. GUP-fast will fallback to ordinary GUP. As ordinary GUP properly considers the logical hugetlb PTE abstraction in hugetlb_follow_page_mask(), pinning the page will succeed when looking at the PageAnonExclusive on the head page only. So the only real effect of this is that with cont-PTE hugetlb pages, we'll always fallback from GUP-fast to ordinary GUP when not working on the head page, which ends up checking the head page and do the right thing. Consequently, the cow selftests pass with cont-PTE hugetlb pages as well without CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_PGFLAGS. Note that this only applies to anon hugetlb pages that are mapped using cont-PTEs: for example 64k hugetlb pages on a 4k arm64 kernel. ... and only when R/O-pinning (FOLL_PIN) such pages that are mapped into the page table R/O using GUP-fast. On production kernels (and even most debug kernels, that don't set CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_PGFLAGS) this patch should theoretically not be required to be backported. But of course, it does not hurt. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230805101256.87306-1-david@redhat.com Fixes: a7f2266 ("mm/gup: trigger FAULT_FLAG_UNSHARE when R/O-pinning a possibly shared anonymous page") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reported-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com> Tested-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

If ptp_clock_register() fails or CONFIG_PTP isn't enabled, avoid starting PTP related workqueues. In this way we can fix this: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc9000440b6f8 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 100000067 P4D 100000067 PUD 1001e0067 PMD 107dc5067 PTE 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [...] Workqueue: events igb_ptp_overflow_check RIP: 0010:igb_rd32+0x1f/0x60 [...] Call Trace: igb_ptp_read_82580+0x20/0x50 timecounter_read+0x15/0x60 igb_ptp_overflow_check+0x1a/0x50 process_one_work+0x1cb/0x3c0 worker_thread+0x53/0x3f0 ? rescuer_thread+0x370/0x370 kthread+0x142/0x160 ? kthread_associate_blkcg+0xc0/0xc0 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Fixes: 1f6e817 ("igb: Prevent dropped Tx timestamps via work items and interrupts.") Fixes: d339b13 ("igb: add PTP Hardware Clock code") Signed-off-by: Alessio Igor Bogani <alessio.bogani@elettra.eu> Tested-by: Arpana Arland <arpanax.arland@intel.com> (A Contingent worker at Intel) Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230821171927.2203644-1-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

For multiple commands the driver was not correctly validating the shader stages resulting in possible kernel oopses. The validation code was only. if ever, checking the upper bound on the shader stages but never a lower bound (valid shader stages start at 1 not 0). Fixes kernel oopses ending up in vmw_binding_add, e.g.: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 1 PID: 2443 Comm: testcase Not tainted 6.3.0-rc4-vmwgfx #1 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020 RIP: 0010:vmw_binding_add+0x4c/0x140 [vmwgfx] Code: 7e 30 49 83 ff 0e 0f 87 ea 00 00 00 4b 8d 04 7f 89 d2 89 cb 48 c1 e0 03 4c 8b b0 40 3d 93 c0 48 8b 80 48 3d 93 c0 49 0f af de <48> 03 1c d0 4c 01 e3 49 8> RSP: 0018:ffffb8014416b968 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: ffffffffc0933ec0 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 00000000ffffffff RSI: ffffb8014416b9c0 RDI: ffffb8014316f000 RBP: ffffb8014416b998 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 746f6c735f726564 R10: ffffffffaaf2bda0 R11: 732e676e69646e69 R12: ffffb8014316f000 R13: ffffb8014416b9c0 R14: 0000000000000040 R15: 0000000000000006 FS: 00007fba8c0af740(0000) GS:ffff8a1277c80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000007c0933eb8 CR3: 0000000118244001 CR4: 00000000003706e0 Call Trace: <TASK> vmw_view_bindings_add+0xf5/0x1b0 [vmwgfx] ? ___drm_dbg+0x8a/0xb0 [drm] vmw_cmd_dx_set_shader_res+0x8f/0xc0 [vmwgfx] vmw_execbuf_process+0x590/0x1360 [vmwgfx] vmw_execbuf_ioctl+0x173/0x370 [vmwgfx] ? __drm_dev_dbg+0xb4/0xe0 [drm] ? __pfx_vmw_execbuf_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [vmwgfx] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xbc/0x160 [drm] drm_ioctl+0x2d2/0x580 [drm] ? __pfx_vmw_execbuf_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [vmwgfx] ? do_fault+0x1a6/0x420 vmw_generic_ioctl+0xbd/0x180 [vmwgfx] vmw_unlocked_ioctl+0x19/0x20 [vmwgfx] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x96/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x90 ? handle_mm_fault+0xe4/0x2f0 ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x1b/0x30 ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x2e/0x50 ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x40/0x180 ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0xd/0x20 ? irqentry_exit+0x3f/0x50 ? exc_page_fault+0x8b/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc Signed-off-by: Zack Rusin <zackr@vmware.com> Cc: security@openanolis.org Reported-by: Ziming Zhang <ezrakiez@gmail.com> Testcase-found-by: Niels De Graef <ndegraef@redhat.com> Fixes: d80efd5 ("drm/vmwgfx: Initial DX support") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.3+ Reviewed-by: Maaz Mombasawala<mombasawalam@vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Martin Krastev <krastevm@vmware.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230616190934.54828-1-zack@kde.org

[ Upstream commit 8d21155 ] adjust_inuse_and_calc_cost() use spin_lock_irq() and IRQ will be enabled when unlock. DEADLOCK might happen if we have held other locks and disabled IRQ before invoking it. Fix it by using spin_lock_irqsave() instead, which can keep IRQ state consistent with before when unlock. ================================ WARNING: inconsistent lock state 5.10.0-02758-g8e5f91fd772f MIPS#26 Not tainted -------------------------------- inconsistent {IN-HARDIRQ-W} -> {HARDIRQ-ON-W} usage. kworker/2:3/388 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] takes: ffff888118c00c28 (&bfqd->lock){?.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_irq ffff888118c00c28 (&bfqd->lock){?.-.}-{2:2}, at: bfq_bio_merge+0x141/0x390 {IN-HARDIRQ-W} state was registered at: __lock_acquire+0x3d7/0x1070 lock_acquire+0x197/0x4a0 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3b/0x60 bfq_idle_slice_timer_body bfq_idle_slice_timer+0x53/0x1d0 __run_hrtimer+0x477/0xa70 __hrtimer_run_queues+0x1c6/0x2d0 hrtimer_interrupt+0x302/0x9e0 local_apic_timer_interrupt __sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xfd/0x420 run_sysvec_on_irqstack_cond sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x46/0xa0 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20 irq event stamp: 837522 hardirqs last enabled at (837521): [<ffffffff84b9419d>] __raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore hardirqs last enabled at (837521): [<ffffffff84b9419d>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3d/0x40 hardirqs last disabled at (837522): [<ffffffff84b93fa3>] __raw_spin_lock_irq hardirqs last disabled at (837522): [<ffffffff84b93fa3>] _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x43/0x50 softirqs last enabled at (835852): [<ffffffff84e00558>] __do_softirq+0x558/0x8ec softirqs last disabled at (835845): [<ffffffff84c010ff>] asm_call_irq_on_stack+0xf/0x20 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&bfqd->lock); <Interrupt> lock(&bfqd->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by kworker/2:3/388: #0: ffff888107af0f38 ((wq_completion)kthrotld){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x742/0x13f0 #1: ffff8881176bfdd8 ((work_completion)(&td->dispatch_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x777/0x13f0 OpenDingux#2: ffff888118c00c28 (&bfqd->lock){?.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_irq OpenDingux#2: ffff888118c00c28 (&bfqd->lock){?.-.}-{2:2}, at: bfq_bio_merge+0x141/0x390 stack backtrace: CPU: 2 PID: 388 Comm: kworker/2:3 Not tainted 5.10.0-02758-g8e5f91fd772f MIPS#26 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: kthrotld blk_throtl_dispatch_work_fn Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x107/0x167 print_usage_bug valid_state mark_lock_irq.cold+0x32/0x3a mark_lock+0x693/0xbc0 mark_held_locks+0x9e/0xe0 __trace_hardirqs_on_caller lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare.part.0+0x151/0x360 trace_hardirqs_on+0x5b/0x180 __raw_spin_unlock_irq _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x40 spin_unlock_irq adjust_inuse_and_calc_cost+0x4fb/0x970 ioc_rqos_merge+0x277/0x740 __rq_qos_merge+0x62/0xb0 rq_qos_merge bio_attempt_back_merge+0x12c/0x4a0 blk_mq_sched_try_merge+0x1b6/0x4d0 bfq_bio_merge+0x24a/0x390 __blk_mq_sched_bio_merge+0xa6/0x460 blk_mq_sched_bio_merge blk_mq_submit_bio+0x2e7/0x1ee0 __submit_bio_noacct_mq+0x175/0x3b0 submit_bio_noacct+0x1fb/0x270 blk_throtl_dispatch_work_fn+0x1ef/0x2b0 process_one_work+0x83e/0x13f0 process_scheduled_works worker_thread+0x7e3/0xd80 kthread+0x353/0x470 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Fixes: b0853ab ("blk-iocost: revamp in-period donation snapbacks") Signed-off-by: Li Nan <linan122@huawei.com> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230527091904.3001833-1-linan666@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 23fc8df ] Running the 'kfree_rcu_test' test case [1] results in a splat [2]. The root cause is the kfree_scale_thread thread(s) continue running after unloading the rcuscale module. This commit fixes that isue by invoking kfree_scale_cleanup() from rcu_scale_cleanup() when removing the rcuscale module. [1] modprobe rcuscale kfree_rcu_test=1 // After some time rmmod rcuscale rmmod torture [2] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffc0601a87 #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page PGD 11de4f067 P4D 11de4f067 PUD 11de51067 PMD 112f4d067 PTE 0 Oops: 0010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 1798 Comm: kfree_scale_thr Not tainted 6.3.0-rc1-rcu+ #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:0xffffffffc0601a87 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffc0601a5d. RSP: 0018:ffffb25bc2e57e18 EFLAGS: 00010297 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffffc061f0b6 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff962fd0de RDI: ffffffff962fd0de RBP: ffffb25bc2e57ea8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000000000a R15: 00000000001c1dbe FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff921fa2200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffffffc0601a5d CR3: 000000011de4c006 CR4: 0000000000370ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ? kvfree_call_rcu+0xf0/0x3a0 ? kthread+0xf3/0x120 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ? ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 </TASK> Modules linked in: rfkill sunrpc ... [last unloaded: torture] CR2: ffffffffc0601a87 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fixes: e6e78b0 ("rcuperf: Add kfree_rcu() performance Tests") Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Reviewed-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Signed-off-by: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit f655bad ] Fix propagate_precision() logic to perform propagation of all necessary registers and stack slots across all active frames *in one batch step*. Doing this for each register/slot in each individual frame is wasteful, but the main problem is that backtracking of instruction in any frame except the deepest one just doesn't work. This is due to backtracking logic relying on jump history, and available jump history always starts (or ends, depending how you view it) in current frame. So, if prog A (frame #0) called subprog B (frame #1) and we need to propagate precision of, say, register R6 (callee-saved) within frame #0, we actually don't even know where jump history that corresponds to prog A even starts. We'd need to skip subprog part of jump history first to be able to do this. Luckily, with struct backtrack_state and __mark_chain_precision() handling bitmasks tracking/propagation across all active frames at the same time (added in previous patch), propagate_precision() can be both fixed and sped up by setting all the necessary bits across all frames and then performing one __mark_chain_precision() pass. This makes it unnecessary to skip subprog parts of jump history. We also improve logging along the way, to clearly specify which registers' and slots' precision markings are propagated within which frame. Each frame will have dedicated line and all registers and stack slots from that frame will be reported in format similar to precision backtrack regs/stack logging. E.g.: frame 1: propagating r1,r2,r3,fp-8,fp-16 frame 0: propagating r3,r9,fp-120 Fixes: 529409e ("bpf: propagate precision across all frames, not just the last one") Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230505043317.3629845-7-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 904e6dd ] Change mark_chain_precision() to track precision in situations like below: r2 = unknown value ... --- state #0 --- ... r1 = r2 // r1 and r2 now share the same ID ... --- state #1 {r1.id = A, r2.id = A} --- ... if (r2 > 10) goto exit; // find_equal_scalars() assigns range to r1 ... --- state OpenDingux#2 {r1.id = A, r2.id = A} --- r3 = r10 r3 += r1 // need to mark both r1 and r2 At the beginning of the processing of each state, ensure that if a register with a scalar ID is marked as precise, all registers sharing this ID are also marked as precise. This property would be used by a follow-up change in regsafe(). Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230613153824.3324830-2-eddyz87@gmail.com Stable-dep-of: 1ffc85d ("bpf: Verify scalar ids mapping in regsafe() using check_ids()") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 99d4850 ] Found by leak sanitizer: ``` ==1632594==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 21 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f2953a7077b in __interceptor_strdup ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439 #1 0x556701d6fbbf in perf_env__read_cpuid util/env.c:369 OpenDingux#2 0x556701d70589 in perf_env__cpuid util/env.c:465 OpenDingux#3 0x55670204bba2 in x86__is_amd_cpu arch/x86/util/env.c:14 OpenDingux#4 0x5567020487a2 in arch__post_evsel_config arch/x86/util/evsel.c:83 OpenDingux#5 0x556701d8f78b in evsel__config util/evsel.c:1366 OpenDingux#6 0x556701ef5872 in evlist__config util/record.c:108 OpenDingux#7 0x556701cd6bcd in test__PERF_RECORD tests/perf-record.c:112 OpenDingux#8 0x556701cacd07 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:236 OpenDingux#9 0x556701cacfac in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:265 OpenDingux#10 0x556701cadddb in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:402 OpenDingux#11 0x556701caf2aa in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:559 OpenDingux#12 0x556701d3b557 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:323 OpenDingux#13 0x556701d3bac8 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:377 OpenDingux#14 0x556701d3be90 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:421 OpenDingux#15 0x556701d3c3f8 in main tools/perf/perf.c:537 MIPS#16 0x7f2952a46189 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 21 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). ``` Fixes: f7b58cb ("perf mem/c2c: Add load store event mappings for AMD") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Acked-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613235416.1650755-1-irogers@google.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit b684c09 ] ppc_save_regs() skips one stack frame while saving the CPU register states. Instead of saving current R1, it pulls the previous stack frame pointer. When vmcores caused by direct panic call (such as `echo c > /proc/sysrq-trigger`), are debugged with gdb, gdb fails to show the backtrace correctly. On further analysis, it was found that it was because of mismatch between r1 and NIP. GDB uses NIP to get current function symbol and uses corresponding debug info of that function to unwind previous frames, but due to the mismatching r1 and NIP, the unwinding does not work, and it fails to unwind to the 2nd frame and hence does not show the backtrace. GDB backtrace with vmcore of kernel without this patch: --------- (gdb) bt #0 0xc0000000002a53e8 in crash_setup_regs (oldregs=<optimized out>, newregs=0xc000000004f8f8d8) at ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/kexec.h:69 #1 __crash_kexec (regs=<optimized out>) at kernel/kexec_core.c:974 OpenDingux#2 0x0000000000000063 in ?? () OpenDingux#3 0xc000000003579320 in ?? () --------- Further analysis revealed that the mismatch occurred because "ppc_save_regs" was saving the previous stack's SP instead of the current r1. This patch fixes this by storing current r1 in the saved pt_regs. GDB backtrace with vmcore of patched kernel: -------- (gdb) bt #0 0xc0000000002a53e8 in crash_setup_regs (oldregs=0x0, newregs=0xc00000000670b8d8) at ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/kexec.h:69 #1 __crash_kexec (regs=regs@entry=0x0) at kernel/kexec_core.c:974 OpenDingux#2 0xc000000000168918 in panic (fmt=fmt@entry=0xc000000001654a60 "sysrq triggered crash\n") at kernel/panic.c:358 OpenDingux#3 0xc000000000b735f8 in sysrq_handle_crash (key=<optimized out>) at drivers/tty/sysrq.c:155 OpenDingux#4 0xc000000000b742cc in __handle_sysrq (key=key@entry=99, check_mask=check_mask@entry=false) at drivers/tty/sysrq.c:602 OpenDingux#5 0xc000000000b7506c in write_sysrq_trigger (file=<optimized out>, buf=<optimized out>, count=2, ppos=<optimized out>) at drivers/tty/sysrq.c:1163 OpenDingux#6 0xc00000000069a7bc in pde_write (ppos=<optimized out>, count=<optimized out>, buf=<optimized out>, file=<optimized out>, pde=0xc00000000362cb40) at fs/proc/inode.c:340 OpenDingux#7 proc_reg_write (file=<optimized out>, buf=<optimized out>, count=<optimized out>, ppos=<optimized out>) at fs/proc/inode.c:352 OpenDingux#8 0xc0000000005b3bbc in vfs_write (file=file@entry=0xc000000006aa6b00, buf=buf@entry=0x61f498b4f60 <error: Cannot access memory at address 0x61f498b4f60>, count=count@entry=2, pos=pos@entry=0xc00000000670bda0) at fs/read_write.c:582 OpenDingux#9 0xc0000000005b4264 in ksys_write (fd=<optimized out>, buf=0x61f498b4f60 <error: Cannot access memory at address 0x61f498b4f60>, count=2) at fs/read_write.c:637 OpenDingux#10 0xc00000000002ea2c in system_call_exception (regs=0xc00000000670be80, r0=<optimized out>) at arch/powerpc/kernel/syscall.c:171 OpenDingux#11 0xc00000000000c270 in system_call_vectored_common () at arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt_64.S:192 -------- Nick adds: So this now saves regs as though it was an interrupt taken in the caller, at the instruction after the call to ppc_save_regs, whereas previously the NIP was there, but R1 came from the caller's caller and that mismatch is what causes gdb's dwarf unwinder to go haywire. Signed-off-by: Aditya Gupta <adityag@linux.ibm.com> Fixes: d16a58f ("powerpc: Improve ppc_save_regs()") Reivewed-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20230615091047.90433-1-adityag@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

…s list commit babebf0 upstream. When deleting the free space tree we are deleting the free space root from the list fs_info->dirty_cowonly_roots without taking the lock that protects it, which is struct btrfs_fs_info::trans_lock. This unsynchronized list manipulation may cause chaos if there's another concurrent manipulation of this list, such as when adding a root to it with ctree.c:add_root_to_dirty_list(). This can result in all sorts of weird failures caused by a race, such as the following crash: [337571.278245] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead000000000108: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [337571.278933] CPU: 1 PID: 115447 Comm: btrfs Tainted: G W 6.4.0-rc6-btrfs-next-134+ #1 [337571.279153] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [337571.279572] RIP: 0010:commit_cowonly_roots+0x11f/0x250 [btrfs] [337571.279928] Code: 85 38 06 00 (...) [337571.280363] RSP: 0018:ffff9f63446efba0 EFLAGS: 00010206 [337571.280582] RAX: ffff942d98ec2638 RBX: ffff9430b82b4c30 RCX: 0000000449e1c000 [337571.280798] RDX: dead000000000100 RSI: ffff9430021e4900 RDI: 0000000000036070 [337571.281015] RBP: ffff942d98ec2000 R08: ffff942d98ec2000 R09: 000000000000015b [337571.281254] R10: 0000000000000009 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff942fe8fbf600 [337571.281476] R13: ffff942dabe23040 R14: ffff942dabe20800 R15: ffff942d92cf3b48 [337571.281723] FS: 00007f478adb7340(0000) GS:ffff94349fa40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [337571.281950] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [337571.282184] CR2: 00007f478ab9a3d5 CR3: 000000001e02c001 CR4: 0000000000370ee0 [337571.282416] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [337571.282647] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [337571.282874] Call Trace: [337571.283101] <TASK> [337571.283327] ? __die_body+0x1b/0x60 [337571.283570] ? die_addr+0x39/0x60 [337571.283796] ? exc_general_protection+0x22e/0x430 [337571.284022] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30 [337571.284251] ? commit_cowonly_roots+0x11f/0x250 [btrfs] [337571.284531] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x42e/0xf90 [btrfs] [337571.284803] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x15/0x30 [337571.285031] ? release_extent_buffer+0x103/0x130 [btrfs] [337571.285305] reset_balance_state+0x152/0x1b0 [btrfs] [337571.285578] btrfs_balance+0xa50/0x11e0 [btrfs] [337571.285864] ? __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x14a/0x410 [337571.286086] btrfs_ioctl+0x249a/0x3320 [btrfs] [337571.286358] ? mod_objcg_state+0xd2/0x360 [337571.286577] ? refill_obj_stock+0xb0/0x160 [337571.286798] ? seq_release+0x25/0x30 [337571.287016] ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x3ba/0x4b0 [337571.287235] ? percpu_counter_add_batch+0x2e/0xa0 [337571.287455] ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0 [337571.287675] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0 [337571.287901] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [337571.288126] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc [337571.288352] RIP: 0033:0x7f478aaffe9b So fix this by locking struct btrfs_fs_info::trans_lock before deleting the free space root from that list. Fixes: a5ed918 ("Btrfs: implement the free space B-tree") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+ Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 303c9c6 ] Changes in VFIO caused a pseudo-device to be created as child of fsl-mc devices causing a crash [1] when trying to bind a fsl-mc device to VFIO. Fix this by checking the device type when enumerating fsl-mc child devices. [1] Modules linked in: Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 6 PID: 1289 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.2.0-rc5-00047-g7c46948a6e9c OpenDingux#2 Hardware name: NXP Layerscape LX2160ARDB (DT) pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : mc_send_command+0x24/0x1f0 lr : dprc_get_obj_region+0xfc/0x1c0 sp : ffff80000a88b900 x29: ffff80000a88b900 x28: ffff48a9429e1400 x27: 00000000000002b2 x26: ffff48a9429e1718 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000 x23: ffffd59331ba3918 x22: ffffd59331ba3000 x21: 0000000000000000 x20: ffff80000a88b9b8 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000001 x17: 7270642f636d2d6c x16: 73662e3030303030 x15: ffffffffffffffff x14: ffffd59330f1d668 x13: ffff48a8727dc389 x12: ffff48a8727dc386 x11: 0000000000000002 x10: 00008ceaf02f35d4 x9 : 0000000000000012 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000006 x6 : ffff80000a88bab0 x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffff80000a88b9e8 x2 : ffff80000a88b9e8 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff48a945142b80 Call trace: mc_send_command+0x24/0x1f0 dprc_get_obj_region+0xfc/0x1c0 fsl_mc_device_add+0x340/0x590 fsl_mc_obj_device_add+0xd0/0xf8 dprc_scan_objects+0x1c4/0x340 dprc_scan_container+0x38/0x60 vfio_fsl_mc_probe+0x9c/0xf8 fsl_mc_driver_probe+0x24/0x70 really_probe+0xbc/0x2a8 __driver_probe_device+0x78/0xe0 device_driver_attach+0x30/0x68 bind_store+0xa8/0x130 drv_attr_store+0x24/0x38 sysfs_kf_write+0x44/0x60 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x128/0x1b8 vfs_write+0x334/0x448 ksys_write+0x68/0xf0 __arm64_sys_write+0x1c/0x28 invoke_syscall+0x44/0x108 el0_svc_common.constprop.1+0x94/0xf8 do_el0_svc+0x38/0xb0 el0_svc+0x20/0x50 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x98/0xc0 el0t_64_sync+0x174/0x178 Code: aa0103f4 a9025bf5 d5384100 b9400801 (79401260) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fixes: 3c28a76 ("vfio: Add struct device to vfio_device") Signed-off-by: Laurentiu Tudor <laurentiu.tudor@nxp.com> Tested-by: Ioana Ciornei <ioana.ciornei@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Ioana Ciornei <ioana.ciornei@nxp.com> Message-ID: <20230613160718.29500-1-laurentiu.tudor@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit f06cf1e ] vduse_vdpa_set_vq_affinity callback can be called with NULL value as cpu_mask when deleting the vduse device. This patch resets virtqueue's IRQ affinity mask value to set all CPUs instead of dereferencing NULL cpu_mask. [ 4760.952149] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 4760.959110] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 4760.964247] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 4760.969385] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 4760.971927] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [ 4760.976112] CPU: 13 PID: 2346 Comm: vdpa Not tainted 6.4.0-rc6+ OpenDingux#4 [ 4760.982291] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R640/0W23H8, BIOS 2.8.1 06/26/2020 [ 4760.989769] RIP: 0010:memcpy_orig+0xc5/0x130 [ 4760.994049] Code: 16 f8 4c 89 07 4c 89 4f 08 4c 89 54 17 f0 4c 89 5c 17 f8 c3 cc cc cc cc 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 83 fa 08 72 1b <4c> 8b 06 4c 8b 4c 16 f8 4c 89 07 4c 89 4c 17 f8 c3 cc cc cc cc 66 [ 4761.012793] RSP: 0018:ffffb1d565abb830 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 4761.018020] RAX: ffff9f4bf6b27898 RBX: ffff9f4be23969c0 RCX: ffff9f4bcadf6400 [ 4761.025152] RDX: 0000000000000008 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9f4bf6b27898 [ 4761.032286] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000008 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 4761.039416] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000600 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 4761.046549] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000080 R15: ffffb1d565abbb10 [ 4761.053680] FS: 00007f64c2ec2740(0000) GS:ffff9f635f980000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 4761.061765] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 4761.067513] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000001875270006 CR4: 00000000007706e0 [ 4761.074645] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 4761.081775] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 4761.088909] PKRU: 55555554 [ 4761.091620] Call Trace: [ 4761.094074] <TASK> [ 4761.096180] ? __die+0x1f/0x70 [ 4761.099238] ? page_fault_oops+0x171/0x4f0 [ 4761.103340] ? exc_page_fault+0x7b/0x180 [ 4761.107265] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 [ 4761.111460] ? memcpy_orig+0xc5/0x130 [ 4761.115126] vduse_vdpa_set_vq_affinity+0x3e/0x50 [vduse] [ 4761.120533] virtnet_clean_affinity.part.0+0x3d/0x90 [virtio_net] [ 4761.126635] remove_vq_common+0x1a4/0x250 [virtio_net] [ 4761.131781] virtnet_remove+0x5d/0x70 [virtio_net] [ 4761.136580] virtio_dev_remove+0x3a/0x90 [ 4761.140509] device_release_driver_internal+0x19b/0x200 [ 4761.145742] bus_remove_device+0xc2/0x130 [ 4761.149755] device_del+0x158/0x3e0 [ 4761.153245] ? kernfs_find_ns+0x35/0xc0 [ 4761.157086] device_unregister+0x13/0x60 [ 4761.161010] unregister_virtio_device+0x11/0x20 [ 4761.165543] device_release_driver_internal+0x19b/0x200 [ 4761.170770] bus_remove_device+0xc2/0x130 [ 4761.174782] device_del+0x158/0x3e0 [ 4761.178276] ? __pfx_vdpa_name_match+0x10/0x10 [vdpa] [ 4761.183336] device_unregister+0x13/0x60 [ 4761.187260] vdpa_nl_cmd_dev_del_set_doit+0x63/0xe0 [vdpa] Fixes: 28f6288 ("vduse: Support set_vq_affinity callback") Cc: xieyongji@bytedance.com Signed-off-by: Maxime Coquelin <maxime.coquelin@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20230622204851.318125-1-maxime.coquelin@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Xie Yongji <xieyongji@bytedance.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 85fadc0 ] The initial memblock metadata is accessed from kernel image mapping. The regions arrays need to "reallocated" from memblock and accessed through linear mapping to cover more memblock regions. So the resizing should not be allowed until linear mapping is ready. Note that there are memblock allocations when building linear mapping. This patch is similar to 24cc61d ("arm64: memblock: don't permit memblock resizing until linear mapping is up"). In following log, many memblock regions are reserved before create_linear_mapping_page_table(). And then it triggered reallocation of memblock.reserved.regions and memcpy the old array in kernel image mapping to the new array in linear mapping which caused a page fault. [ 0.000000] memblock_reserve: [0x00000000bf01f000-0x00000000bf01ffff] early_init_fdt_scan_reserved_mem+0x28c/0x2c6 [ 0.000000] memblock_reserve: [0x00000000bf021000-0x00000000bf021fff] early_init_fdt_scan_reserved_mem+0x28c/0x2c6 [ 0.000000] memblock_reserve: [0x00000000bf023000-0x00000000bf023fff] early_init_fdt_scan_reserved_mem+0x28c/0x2c6 [ 0.000000] memblock_reserve: [0x00000000bf025000-0x00000000bf025fff] early_init_fdt_scan_reserved_mem+0x28c/0x2c6 [ 0.000000] memblock_reserve: [0x00000000bf027000-0x00000000bf027fff] early_init_fdt_scan_reserved_mem+0x28c/0x2c6 [ 0.000000] memblock_reserve: [0x00000000bf029000-0x00000000bf029fff] early_init_fdt_scan_reserved_mem+0x28c/0x2c6 [ 0.000000] memblock_reserve: [0x00000000bf02b000-0x00000000bf02bfff] early_init_fdt_scan_reserved_mem+0x28c/0x2c6 [ 0.000000] memblock_reserve: [0x00000000bf02d000-0x00000000bf02dfff] early_init_fdt_scan_reserved_mem+0x28c/0x2c6 [ 0.000000] memblock_reserve: [0x00000000bf02f000-0x00000000bf02ffff] early_init_fdt_scan_reserved_mem+0x28c/0x2c6 [ 0.000000] memblock_reserve: [0x00000000bf030000-0x00000000bf030fff] early_init_fdt_scan_reserved_mem+0x28c/0x2c6 [ 0.000000] OF: reserved mem: 0x0000000080000000..0x000000008007ffff (512 KiB) map non-reusable mmode_resv0@80000000 [ 0.000000] memblock_reserve: [0x00000000bf000000-0x00000000bf001fed] paging_init+0x19a/0x5ae [ 0.000000] memblock_phys_alloc_range: 4096 bytes align=0x1000 from=0x0000000000000000 max_addr=0x0000000000000000 alloc_pmd_fixmap+0x14/0x1c [ 0.000000] memblock_reserve: [0x000000017ffff000-0x000000017fffffff] memblock_alloc_range_nid+0xb8/0x128 [ 0.000000] memblock: reserved is doubled to 256 at [0x000000017fffd000-0x000000017fffe7ff] [ 0.000000] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ff600000ffffd000 [ 0.000000] Oops [#1] [ 0.000000] Modules linked in: [ 0.000000] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.4.0-rc1-00011-g99a670b2069c MIPS#66 [ 0.000000] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) [ 0.000000] epc : __memcpy+0x60/0xf8 [ 0.000000] ra : memblock_double_array+0x192/0x248 [ 0.000000] epc : ffffffff8081d214 ra : ffffffff80a3dfc0 sp : ffffffff81403bd0 [ 0.000000] gp : ffffffff814fbb38 tp : ffffffff8140dac0 t0 : 0000000001600000 [ 0.000000] t1 : 0000000000000000 t2 : 000000008f001000 s0 : ffffffff81403c60 [ 0.000000] s1 : ffffffff80c0bc98 a0 : ff600000ffffd000 a1 : ffffffff80c0bcd8 [ 0.000000] a2 : 0000000000000c00 a3 : ffffffff80c0c8d8 a4 : 0000000080000000 [ 0.000000] a5 : 0000000000080000 a6 : 0000000000000000 a7 : 0000000080200000 [ 0.000000] s2 : ff600000ffffd000 s3 : 0000000000002000 s4 : 0000000000000c00 [ 0.000000] s5 : ffffffff80c0bc60 s6 : ffffffff80c0bcc8 s7 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.000000] s8 : ffffffff814fd0a8 s9 : 000000017fffe7ff s10: 0000000000000000 [ 0.000000] s11: 0000000000001000 t3 : 0000000000001000 t4 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.000000] t5 : 000000008f003000 t6 : ff600000ffffd000 [ 0.000000] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: ff600000ffffd000 cause: 000000000000000f [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff8081d214>] __memcpy+0x60/0xf8 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80a3e1a2>] memblock_add_range.isra.14+0x12c/0x162 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80a3e36a>] memblock_reserve+0x6e/0x8c [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80a123fc>] memblock_alloc_range_nid+0xb8/0x128 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80a1256a>] memblock_phys_alloc_range+0x5e/0x6a [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80a04732>] alloc_pmd_fixmap+0x14/0x1c [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80a0475a>] alloc_p4d_fixmap+0xc/0x14 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80a04a36>] create_pgd_mapping+0x98/0x17c [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80a04e9e>] create_linear_mapping_range.constprop.10+0xe4/0x112 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80a05bb8>] paging_init+0x3ec/0x5ae [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80a03354>] setup_arch+0xb2/0x576 [ 0.000000] [<ffffffff80a00726>] start_kernel+0x72/0x57e [ 0.000000] Code: b303 0285 b383 0305 be03 0385 be83 0405 bf03 0485 (b023) 00ef [ 0.000000] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 0.000000] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill the idle task! [ 0.000000] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill the idle task! ]--- Fixes: 671f9a3 ("RISC-V: Setup initial page tables in two stages") Signed-off-by: Woody Zhang <woodylab@foxmail.com> Tested-by: Song Shuai <songshuaishuai@tinylab.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/tencent_FBB94CE615C5CCE7701CD39C15CCE0EE9706@qq.com Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 160fe8f upstream. Callers of `btrfs_reduce_alloc_profile` expect it to return exactly one allocation profile flag, and failing to do so may ultimately result in a WARN_ON and remount-ro when allocating new blocks, like the below transaction abort on 6.1. `btrfs_reduce_alloc_profile` has two ways of determining the profile, first it checks if a conversion balance is currently running and uses the profile we're converting to. If no balance is currently running, it returns the max-redundancy profile which at least one block in the selected block group has. This works by simply checking each known allocation profile bit in redundancy order. However, `btrfs_reduce_alloc_profile` has not been updated as new flags have been added - first with the `DUP` profile and later with the RAID1C34 profiles. Because of the way it checks, if we have blocks with different profiles and at least one is known, that profile will be selected. However, if none are known we may return a flag set with multiple allocation profiles set. This is currently only possible when a balance from one of the three unhandled profiles to another of the unhandled profiles is canceled after allocating at least one block using the new profile. In that case, a transaction abort like the below will occur and the filesystem will need to be mounted with -o skip_balance to get it mounted rw again (but the balance cannot be resumed without a similar abort). [770.648] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [770.648] BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -22) [770.648] WARNING: CPU: 43 PID: 1159593 at fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4122 find_free_extent+0x1d94/0x1e00 [btrfs] [770.648] CPU: 43 PID: 1159593 Comm: btrfs Tainted: G W 6.1.0-0.deb11.7-powerpc64le #1 Debian 6.1.20-2~bpo11+1a~test [770.648] Hardware name: T2P9D01 REV 1.00 POWER9 0x4e1202 opal:skiboot-bc106a0 PowerNV [770.648] NIP: c00800000f6784fc LR: c00800000f6784f8 CTR: c000000000d746c0 [770.648] REGS: c000200089afe9a0 TRAP: 0700 Tainted: G W (6.1.0-0.deb11.7-powerpc64le Debian 6.1.20-2~bpo11+1a~test) [770.648] MSR: 9000000002029033 <SF,HV,VEC,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 28848282 XER: 20040000 [770.648] CFAR: c000000000135110 IRQMASK: 0 GPR00: c00800000f6784f8 c000200089afec40 c00800000f7ea800 0000000000000026 GPR04: 00000001004820c2 c000200089afea00 c000200089afe9f8 0000000000000027 GPR08: c000200ffbfe7f98 c000000002127f90 ffffffffffffffd8 0000000026d6a6e8 GPR12: 0000000028848282 c000200fff7f3800 5deadbeef0000122 c00000002269d000 GPR16: c0002008c7797c40 c000200089afef17 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 c000200008bc5a98 0000000000000001 GPR24: 0000000000000000 c0000003c73088d0 c000200089afef17 c000000016d3a800 GPR28: c0000003c7308800 c00000002269d000 ffffffffffffffea 0000000000000001 [770.648] NIP [c00800000f6784fc] find_free_extent+0x1d94/0x1e00 [btrfs] [770.648] LR [c00800000f6784f8] find_free_extent+0x1d90/0x1e00 [btrfs] [770.648] Call Trace: [770.648] [c000200089afec40] [c00800000f6784f8] find_free_extent+0x1d90/0x1e00 [btrfs] (unreliable) [770.648] [c000200089afed30] [c00800000f681398] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x1a0/0x2f0 [btrfs] [770.648] [c000200089afeea0] [c00800000f681bf0] btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x108/0x670 [btrfs] [770.648] [c000200089afeff0] [c00800000f66bd68] __btrfs_cow_block+0x170/0x850 [btrfs] [770.648] [c000200089aff100] [c00800000f66c58c] btrfs_cow_block+0x144/0x288 [btrfs] [770.648] [c000200089aff1b0] [c00800000f67113c] btrfs_search_slot+0x6b4/0xcb0 [btrfs] [770.648] [c000200089aff2a0] [c00800000f679f60] lookup_inline_extent_backref+0x128/0x7c0 [btrfs] [770.648] [c000200089aff3b0] [c00800000f67b338] lookup_extent_backref+0x70/0x190 [btrfs] [770.648] [c000200089aff470] [c00800000f67b54c] __btrfs_free_extent+0xf4/0x1490 [btrfs] [770.648] [c000200089aff5a0] [c00800000f67d770] __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x328/0x1530 [btrfs] [770.648] [c000200089aff740] [c00800000f67ea2c] btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0xb4/0x3e0 [btrfs] [770.648] [c000200089aff800] [c00800000f699aa4] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x8c/0x12b0 [btrfs] [770.648] [c000200089aff8f0] [c00800000f6dc628] reset_balance_state+0x1c0/0x290 [btrfs] [770.648] [c000200089aff9a0] [c00800000f6e2f7c] btrfs_balance+0x1164/0x1500 [btrfs] [770.648] [c000200089affb40] [c00800000f6f8e4c] btrfs_ioctl+0x2b54/0x3100 [btrfs] [770.648] [c000200089affc80] [c00000000053be14] sys_ioctl+0x794/0x1310 [770.648] [c000200089affd70] [c00000000002af98] system_call_exception+0x138/0x250 [770.648] [c000200089affe10] [c00000000000c654] system_call_common+0xf4/0x258 [770.648] --- interrupt: c00 at 0x7fff94126800 [770.648] NIP: 00007fff94126800 LR: 0000000107e0b594 CTR: 0000000000000000 [770.648] REGS: c000200089affe80 TRAP: 0c00 Tainted: G W (6.1.0-0.deb11.7-powerpc64le Debian 6.1.20-2~bpo11+1a~test) [770.648] MSR: 900000000000d033 <SF,HV,EE,PR,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 24002848 XER: 00000000 [770.648] IRQMASK: 0 GPR00: 0000000000000036 00007fffc9439da0 00007fff94217100 0000000000000003 GPR04: 00000000c4009420 00007fffc9439ee8 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR08: 00000000803c7416 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR12: 0000000000000000 00007fff9467d120 0000000107e64c9c 0000000107e64d0a GPR16: 0000000107e64d06 0000000107e64cf1 0000000107e64cc4 0000000107e64c73 GPR20: 0000000107e64c31 0000000107e64bf1 0000000107e64be7 0000000000000000 GPR24: 0000000000000000 00007fffc9439ee0 0000000000000003 0000000000000001 GPR28: 00007fffc943f713 0000000000000000 00007fffc9439ee8 0000000000000000 [770.648] NIP [00007fff94126800] 0x7fff94126800 [770.648] LR [0000000107e0b594] 0x107e0b594 [770.648] --- interrupt: c00 [770.648] Instruction dump: [770.648] 3b00ffe4 e8898828 481175f5 60000000 4bfff4fc 3be00000 4bfff570 3d220000 [770.648] 7fc4f378 e8698830 4811cd95 e8410018 <0fe00000> f9c10060 f9e10068 fa010070 [770.648] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [770.648] BTRFS: error (device dm-2: state A) in find_free_extent_update_loop:4122: errno=-22 unknown [770.648] BTRFS info (device dm-2: state EA): forced readonly [770.648] BTRFS: error (device dm-2: state EA) in __btrfs_free_extent:3070: errno=-22 unknown [770.648] BTRFS error (device dm-2: state EA): failed to run delayed ref for logical 17838685708288 num_bytes 24576 type 184 action 2 ref_mod 1: -22 [770.648] BTRFS: error (device dm-2: state EA) in btrfs_run_delayed_refs:2144: errno=-22 unknown [770.648] BTRFS: error (device dm-2: state EA) in reset_balance_state:3599: errno=-22 unknown Fixes: 47e6f74 ("btrfs: add support for 3-copy replication (raid1c3)") Fixes: 8d6fac0 ("btrfs: add support for 4-copy replication (raid1c4)") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+ Signed-off-by: Matt Corallo <blnxfsl@bluematt.me> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 5cead54 upstream. There is a fairly unlikely race condition in tree mod log rewind that can result in a kernel panic which has the following trace: [530.569] BTRFS critical (device sda3): unable to find logical 0 length 4096 [530.585] BTRFS critical (device sda3): unable to find logical 0 length 4096 [530.602] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000002 [530.618] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [530.629] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [530.641] PGD 0 P4D 0 [530.647] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [530.654] CPU: 30 PID: 398973 Comm: below Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S O K 5.12.0-0_fbk13_clang_7455_gb24de3bdb045 #1 [530.680] Hardware name: Quanta Mono Lake-M.2 SATA 1HY9U9Z001G/Mono Lake-M.2 SATA, BIOS F20_3A15 08/16/2017 [530.703] RIP: 0010:__btrfs_map_block+0xaa/0xd00 [530.755] RSP: 0018:ffffc9002c2f7600 EFLAGS: 00010246 [530.767] RAX: ffffffffffffffea RBX: ffff888292e41000 RCX: f2702d8b8be15100 [530.784] RDX: ffff88885fda6fb8 RSI: ffff88885fd973c8 RDI: ffff88885fd973c8 [530.800] RBP: ffff888292e410d0 R08: ffffffff82fd7fd0 R09: 00000000fffeffff [530.816] R10: ffffffff82e57fd0 R11: ffffffff82e57d70 R12: 0000000000000000 [530.832] R13: 0000000000001000 R14: 0000000000001000 R15: ffffc9002c2f76f0 [530.848] FS: 00007f38d64af000(0000) GS:ffff88885fd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [530.866] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [530.880] CR2: 0000000000000002 CR3: 00000002b6770004 CR4: 00000000003706e0 [530.896] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [530.912] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [530.928] Call Trace: [530.934] ? btrfs_printk+0x13b/0x18c [530.943] ? btrfs_bio_counter_inc_blocked+0x3d/0x130 [530.955] btrfs_map_bio+0x75/0x330 [530.963] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x12a/0x2d0 [530.973] ? btrfs_submit_metadata_bio+0x63/0x100 [530.984] btrfs_submit_metadata_bio+0xa4/0x100 [530.995] submit_extent_page+0x30f/0x360 [531.004] read_extent_buffer_pages+0x49e/0x6d0 [531.015] ? submit_extent_page+0x360/0x360 [531.025] btree_read_extent_buffer_pages+0x5f/0x150 [531.037] read_tree_block+0x37/0x60 [531.046] read_block_for_search+0x18b/0x410 [531.056] btrfs_search_old_slot+0x198/0x2f0 [531.066] resolve_indirect_ref+0xfe/0x6f0 [531.076] ? ulist_alloc+0x31/0x60 [531.084] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x12e/0x2b0 [531.095] find_parent_nodes+0x720/0x1830 [531.105] ? ulist_alloc+0x10/0x60 [531.113] iterate_extent_inodes+0xea/0x370 [531.123] ? btrfs_previous_extent_item+0x8f/0x110 [531.134] ? btrfs_search_path_in_tree+0x240/0x240 [531.146] iterate_inodes_from_logical+0x98/0xd0 [531.157] ? btrfs_search_path_in_tree+0x240/0x240 [531.168] btrfs_ioctl_logical_to_ino+0xd9/0x180 [531.179] btrfs_ioctl+0xe2/0x2eb0 This occurs when logical inode resolution takes a tree mod log sequence number, and then while backref walking hits a rewind on a busy node which has the following sequence of tree mod log operations (numbers filled in from a specific example, but they are somewhat arbitrary) REMOVE_WHILE_FREEING slot 532 REMOVE_WHILE_FREEING slot 531 REMOVE_WHILE_FREEING slot 530 ... REMOVE_WHILE_FREEING slot 0 REMOVE slot 455 REMOVE slot 454 REMOVE slot 453 ... REMOVE slot 0 ADD slot 455 ADD slot 454 ADD slot 453 ... ADD slot 0 MOVE src slot 0 -> dst slot 456 nritems 533 REMOVE slot 455 REMOVE slot 454 REMOVE slot 453 ... REMOVE slot 0 When this sequence gets applied via btrfs_tree_mod_log_rewind, it allocates a fresh rewind eb, and first inserts the correct key info for the 533 elements, then overwrites the first 456 of them, then decrements the count by 456 via the add ops, then rewinds the move by doing a memmove from 456:988->0:532. We have never written anything past 532, so that memmove writes garbage into the 0:532 range. In practice, this results in a lot of fully 0 keys. The rewind then puts valid keys into slots 0:455 with the last removes, but 456:532 are still invalid. When search_old_slot uses this eb, if it uses one of those invalid slots, it can then read the extent buffer and issue a bio for offset 0 which ultimately panics looking up extent mappings. This bad tree mod log sequence gets generated when the node balancing code happens to do a balance_node_right followed by a push_node_left while logging in the tree mod log. Illustrated for ebs L and R (left and right): L R start: [XXX|YYY|...] [ZZZ|...|...] balance_node_right: [XXX|YYY|...] [...|ZZZ|...] move Z to make room for Y [XXX|...|...] [YYY|ZZZ|...] copy Y from L to R push_node_left: [XXX|YYY|...] [...|ZZZ|...] copy Y from R to L [XXX|YYY|...] [ZZZ|...|...] move Z into emptied space (NOT LOGGED!) This is because balance_node_right logs a move, but push_node_left explicitly doesn't. That is because logging the move would remove the overwritten src < dst range in the right eb, which was already logged when we called btrfs_tree_mod_log_eb_copy. The correct sequence would include a move from 456:988 to 0:532 after remove 0:455 and before removing 0:532. Reversing that sequence would entail creating keys for 0:532, then moving those keys out to 456:988, then creating more keys for 0:455. i.e., REMOVE_WHILE_FREEING slot 532 REMOVE_WHILE_FREEING slot 531 REMOVE_WHILE_FREEING slot 530 ... REMOVE_WHILE_FREEING slot 0 MOVE src slot 456 -> dst slot 0 nritems 533 REMOVE slot 455 REMOVE slot 454 REMOVE slot 453 ... REMOVE slot 0 ADD slot 455 ADD slot 454 ADD slot 453 ... ADD slot 0 MOVE src slot 0 -> dst slot 456 nritems 533 REMOVE slot 455 REMOVE slot 454 REMOVE slot 453 ... REMOVE slot 0 Fix this to log the move but avoid the double remove by putting all the logging logic in btrfs_tree_mod_log_eb_copy which has enough information to detect these cases and properly log moves, removes, and adds. Leave btrfs_tree_mod_log_insert_move to handle insert_ptr and delete_ptr's tree mod logging. (Un)fortunately, this is quite difficult to reproduce, and I was only able to reproduce it by adding sleeps in btrfs_search_old_slot that would encourage more log rewinding during ino_to_logical ioctls. I was able to hit the warning in the previous patch in the series without the fix quite quickly, but not after this patch. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.15+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit b31cb5a upstream. When disabling quotas we are deleting the quota root from the list fs_info->dirty_cowonly_roots without taking the lock that protects it, which is struct btrfs_fs_info::trans_lock. This unsynchronized list manipulation may cause chaos if there's another concurrent manipulation of this list, such as when adding a root to it with ctree.c:add_root_to_dirty_list(). This can result in all sorts of weird failures caused by a race, such as the following crash: [337571.278245] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead000000000108: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [337571.278933] CPU: 1 PID: 115447 Comm: btrfs Tainted: G W 6.4.0-rc6-btrfs-next-134+ #1 [337571.279153] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [337571.279572] RIP: 0010:commit_cowonly_roots+0x11f/0x250 [btrfs] [337571.279928] Code: 85 38 06 00 (...) [337571.280363] RSP: 0018:ffff9f63446efba0 EFLAGS: 00010206 [337571.280582] RAX: ffff942d98ec2638 RBX: ffff9430b82b4c30 RCX: 0000000449e1c000 [337571.280798] RDX: dead000000000100 RSI: ffff9430021e4900 RDI: 0000000000036070 [337571.281015] RBP: ffff942d98ec2000 R08: ffff942d98ec2000 R09: 000000000000015b [337571.281254] R10: 0000000000000009 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff942fe8fbf600 [337571.281476] R13: ffff942dabe23040 R14: ffff942dabe20800 R15: ffff942d92cf3b48 [337571.281723] FS: 00007f478adb7340(0000) GS:ffff94349fa40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [337571.281950] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [337571.282184] CR2: 00007f478ab9a3d5 CR3: 000000001e02c001 CR4: 0000000000370ee0 [337571.282416] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [337571.282647] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [337571.282874] Call Trace: [337571.283101] <TASK> [337571.283327] ? __die_body+0x1b/0x60 [337571.283570] ? die_addr+0x39/0x60 [337571.283796] ? exc_general_protection+0x22e/0x430 [337571.284022] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30 [337571.284251] ? commit_cowonly_roots+0x11f/0x250 [btrfs] [337571.284531] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x42e/0xf90 [btrfs] [337571.284803] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x15/0x30 [337571.285031] ? release_extent_buffer+0x103/0x130 [btrfs] [337571.285305] reset_balance_state+0x152/0x1b0 [btrfs] [337571.285578] btrfs_balance+0xa50/0x11e0 [btrfs] [337571.285864] ? __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x14a/0x410 [337571.286086] btrfs_ioctl+0x249a/0x3320 [btrfs] [337571.286358] ? mod_objcg_state+0xd2/0x360 [337571.286577] ? refill_obj_stock+0xb0/0x160 [337571.286798] ? seq_release+0x25/0x30 [337571.287016] ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x3ba/0x4b0 [337571.287235] ? percpu_counter_add_batch+0x2e/0xa0 [337571.287455] ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0 [337571.287675] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0 [337571.287901] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [337571.288126] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc [337571.288352] RIP: 0033:0x7f478aaffe9b So fix this by locking struct btrfs_fs_info::trans_lock before deleting the quota root from that list. Fixes: bed92ea ("Btrfs: qgroup implementation and prototypes") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+ Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 21a235b ] When attempting to run Xen on a QEMU/KVM virtual machine with virtio devices (all x86_64), function xen_dt_get_node() crashes on accessing bus->bridge->parent->of_node because a bridge of the PCI root bus has no parent set: [ 1.694192][ T1] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000288 [ 1.695688][ T1] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 1.696297][ T1] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 1.696297][ T1] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 1.696297][ T1] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 1.696297][ T1] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.3.7-1-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed a577eae57964bb7e83477b5a5645a1781df990f0 [ 1.696297][ T1] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 [ 1.696297][ T1] RIP: e030:xen_virtio_restricted_mem_acc+0xd9/0x1c0 [ 1.696297][ T1] Code: 45 0c 83 e8 c9 a3 ea ff 31 c0 eb d7 48 8b 87 40 ff ff ff 48 89 c2 48 8b 40 10 48 85 c0 75 f4 48 8b 82 10 01 00 00 48 8b 40 40 <48> 83 b8 88 02 00 00 00 0f 84 45 ff ff ff 66 90 31 c0 eb a5 48 89 [ 1.696297][ T1] RSP: e02b:ffffc90040013cc8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 1.696297][ T1] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888006c75000 RCX: 0000000000000029 [ 1.696297][ T1] RDX: ffff888005ed1000 RSI: ffffc900400f100c RDI: ffff888005ee30d0 [ 1.696297][ T1] RBP: ffff888006c75010 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000330000006 [ 1.696297][ T1] R10: ffff888005850028 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffffffff830439a0 [ 1.696297][ T1] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff888005657900 R15: ffff888006e3e1e8 [ 1.696297][ T1] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88804a000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1.696297][ T1] CS: e030 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 1.696297][ T1] CR2: 0000000000000288 CR3: 0000000002e36000 CR4: 0000000000050660 [ 1.696297][ T1] Call Trace: [ 1.696297][ T1] <TASK> [ 1.696297][ T1] virtio_features_ok+0x1b/0xd0 [ 1.696297][ T1] virtio_dev_probe+0x19c/0x270 [ 1.696297][ T1] really_probe+0x19b/0x3e0 [ 1.696297][ T1] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x160 [ 1.696297][ T1] driver_probe_device+0x1f/0x90 [ 1.696297][ T1] __driver_attach+0xd2/0x1c0 [ 1.696297][ T1] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc0 [ 1.696297][ T1] bus_add_driver+0x116/0x220 [ 1.696297][ T1] driver_register+0x59/0x100 [ 1.696297][ T1] virtio_console_init+0x7f/0x110 [ 1.696297][ T1] do_one_initcall+0x47/0x220 [ 1.696297][ T1] kernel_init_freeable+0x328/0x480 [ 1.696297][ T1] kernel_init+0x1a/0x1c0 [ 1.696297][ T1] ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50 [ 1.696297][ T1] </TASK> [ 1.696297][ T1] Modules linked in: [ 1.696297][ T1] CR2: 0000000000000288 [ 1.696297][ T1] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- The PCI root bus is in this case created from ACPI description via acpi_pci_root_add() -> pci_acpi_scan_root() -> acpi_pci_root_create() -> pci_create_root_bus() where the last function is called with parent=NULL. It indicates that no parent is present and then bus->bridge->parent is NULL too. Fix the problem by checking bus->bridge->parent in xen_dt_get_node() for NULL first. Fixes: ef8ae38 ("xen/virtio: Handle PCI devices which Host controller is described in DT") Signed-off-by: Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Oleksandr Tyshchenko <oleksandr_tyshchenko@epam.com> Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230621131214.9398-2-petr.pavlu@suse.com Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 65e6464 ] Currently the check for NOT_READY flag is performed before obtaining the necessary lock. This opens a possibility for race condition when the flow is concurrently removed from unready_flows list by the workqueue task, which causes a double-removal from the list and a crash[0]. Fix the issue by moving the flag check inside the section protected by uplink_priv->unready_flows_lock mutex. [0]: [44376.389654] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead000000000108: 0000 [#1] SMP [44376.391665] CPU: 7 PID: 59123 Comm: tc Not tainted 6.4.0-rc4+ #1 [44376.392984] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [44376.395342] RIP: 0010:mlx5e_tc_del_fdb_flow+0xb3/0x340 [mlx5_core] [44376.396857] Code: 00 48 8b b8 68 ce 02 00 e8 8a 4d 02 00 4c 8d a8 a8 01 00 00 4c 89 ef e8 8b 79 88 e1 48 8b 83 98 06 00 00 48 8b 93 90 06 00 00 <48> 89 42 08 48 89 10 48 b8 00 01 00 00 00 00 ad de 48 89 83 90 06 [44376.399167] RSP: 0018:ffff88812cc97570 EFLAGS: 00010246 [44376.399680] RAX: dead000000000122 RBX: ffff8881088e3800 RCX: ffff8881881bac00 [44376.400337] RDX: dead000000000100 RSI: ffff88812cc97500 RDI: ffff8881242f71b0 [44376.401001] RBP: ffff88811cbb0940 R08: 0000000000000400 R09: 0000000000000001 [44376.401663] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88812c944000 [44376.402342] R13: ffff8881242f71a8 R14: ffff8881222b4000 R15: 0000000000000000 [44376.402999] FS: 00007f0451104800(0000) GS:ffff88852cb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [44376.403787] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [44376.404343] CR2: 0000000000489108 CR3: 0000000123a79003 CR4: 0000000000370ea0 [44376.405004] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [44376.405665] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [44376.406339] Call Trace: [44376.406651] <TASK> [44376.406939] ? die_addr+0x33/0x90 [44376.407311] ? exc_general_protection+0x192/0x390 [44376.407795] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30 [44376.408292] ? mlx5e_tc_del_fdb_flow+0xb3/0x340 [mlx5_core] [44376.408876] __mlx5e_tc_del_fdb_peer_flow+0xbc/0xe0 [mlx5_core] [44376.409482] mlx5e_tc_del_flow+0x42/0x210 [mlx5_core] [44376.410055] mlx5e_flow_put+0x25/0x50 [mlx5_core] [44376.410529] mlx5e_delete_flower+0x24b/0x350 [mlx5_core] [44376.411043] tc_setup_cb_reoffload+0x22/0x80 [44376.411462] fl_reoffload+0x261/0x2f0 [cls_flower] [44376.411907] ? mlx5e_rep_indr_setup_ft_cb+0x160/0x160 [mlx5_core] [44376.412481] ? mlx5e_rep_indr_setup_ft_cb+0x160/0x160 [mlx5_core] [44376.413044] tcf_block_playback_offloads+0x76/0x170 [44376.413497] tcf_block_unbind+0x7b/0xd0 [44376.413881] tcf_block_setup+0x17d/0x1c0 [44376.414269] tcf_block_offload_cmd.isra.0+0xf1/0x130 [44376.414725] tcf_block_offload_unbind+0x43/0x70 [44376.415153] __tcf_block_put+0x82/0x150 [44376.415532] ingress_destroy+0x22/0x30 [sch_ingress] [44376.415986] qdisc_destroy+0x3b/0xd0 [44376.416343] qdisc_graft+0x4d0/0x620 [44376.416706] tc_get_qdisc+0x1c9/0x3b0 [44376.417074] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x29c/0x390 [44376.419978] ? rep_movs_alternative+0x3a/0xa0 [44376.420399] ? rtnl_calcit.isra.0+0x120/0x120 [44376.420813] netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 [44376.421192] netlink_unicast+0x1f6/0x2c0 [44376.421573] netlink_sendmsg+0x232/0x4a0 [44376.421980] sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60 [44376.422328] ____sys_sendmsg+0x1d0/0x1e0 [44376.422709] ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x6d/0xa0 [44376.423127] ___sys_sendmsg+0x80/0xc0 [44376.423495] ? ___sys_recvmsg+0x8b/0xc0 [44376.423869] __sys_sendmsg+0x51/0x90 [44376.424226] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 [44376.424587] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 [44376.425046] RIP: 0033:0x7f045134f887 [44376.425403] Code: 0a 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b9 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10 [44376.426914] RSP: 002b:00007ffd63a82b98 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e [44376.427592] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000006481955f RCX: 00007f045134f887 [44376.428195] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffd63a82c00 RDI: 0000000000000003 [44376.428796] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [44376.429404] R10: 00007f0451208708 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 [44376.430039] R13: 0000000000409980 R14: 000000000047e538 R15: 0000000000485400 [44376.430644] </TASK> [44376.430907] Modules linked in: mlx5_ib mlx5_core act_mirred act_tunnel_key cls_flower vxlan dummy sch_ingress openvswitch nsh rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_umad rdma_cm ib_ipoib iw_cm ib_cm ib_uverbs ib_core xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat br_netfilter rpcsec_g ss_krb5 auth_rpcgss oid_registry overlay zram zsmalloc fuse [last unloaded: mlx5_core] [44376.433936] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [44376.434373] RIP: 0010:mlx5e_tc_del_fdb_flow+0xb3/0x340 [mlx5_core] [44376.434951] Code: 00 48 8b b8 68 ce 02 00 e8 8a 4d 02 00 4c 8d a8 a8 01 00 00 4c 89 ef e8 8b 79 88 e1 48 8b 83 98 06 00 00 48 8b 93 90 06 00 00 <48> 89 42 08 48 89 10 48 b8 00 01 00 00 00 00 ad de 48 89 83 90 06 [44376.436452] RSP: 0018:ffff88812cc97570 EFLAGS: 00010246 [44376.436924] RAX: dead000000000122 RBX: ffff8881088e3800 RCX: ffff8881881bac00 [44376.437530] RDX: dead000000000100 RSI: ffff88812cc97500 RDI: ffff8881242f71b0 [44376.438179] RBP: ffff88811cbb0940 R08: 0000000000000400 R09: 0000000000000001 [44376.438786] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88812c944000 [44376.439393] R13: ffff8881242f71a8 R14: ffff8881222b4000 R15: 0000000000000000 [44376.439998] FS: 00007f0451104800(0000) GS:ffff88852cb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [44376.440714] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [44376.441225] CR2: 0000000000489108 CR3: 0000000123a79003 CR4: 0000000000370ea0 [44376.441843] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [44376.442471] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Fixes: ad86755 ("net/mlx5e: Protect unready flows with dedicated lock") Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Roi Dayan <roid@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit c329b26 ] Ian reported several skb corruptions triggered by rx-gro-list, collecting different oops alike: [ 62.624003] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000c0 [ 62.631083] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 62.636312] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 62.641541] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 62.644174] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 62.648629] CPU: 1 PID: 913 Comm: napi/eno2-79 Not tainted 6.4.0 torvalds#364 [ 62.655162] Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/A2SDi-12C-HLN4F, BIOS 1.7a 10/13/2022 [ 62.663344] RIP: 0010:__udp_gso_segment (./include/linux/skbuff.h:2858 ./include/linux/udp.h:23 net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:228 net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:261 net/ipv4/udp_offload.c:277) [ 62.687193] RSP: 0018:ffffbd3a83b4f868 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 62.692515] RAX: 00000000000000ce RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 62.699743] RDX: ffffa124def8a000 RSI: 0000000000000079 RDI: ffffa125952a14d4 [ 62.706970] RBP: ffffa124def8a000 R08: 0000000000000022 R09: 00002000001558c9 [ 62.714199] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 00000000be554639 R12: 00000000000000e2 [ 62.721426] R13: ffffa125952a1400 R14: ffffa125952a1400 R15: 00002000001558c9 [ 62.728654] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa127efa40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 62.736852] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 62.742702] CR2: 00000000000000c0 CR3: 00000001034b0000 CR4: 00000000003526e0 [ 62.749948] Call Trace: [ 62.752498] <TASK> [ 62.779267] inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1398) [ 62.787605] skb_mac_gso_segment (net/core/gro.c:141) [ 62.791906] __skb_gso_segment (net/core/dev.c:3403 (discriminator 2)) [ 62.800492] validate_xmit_skb (./include/linux/netdevice.h:4862 net/core/dev.c:3659) [ 62.804695] validate_xmit_skb_list (net/core/dev.c:3710) [ 62.809158] sch_direct_xmit (net/sched/sch_generic.c:330) [ 62.813198] __dev_queue_xmit (net/core/dev.c:3805 net/core/dev.c:4210) net/netfilter/core.c:626) [ 62.821093] br_dev_queue_push_xmit (net/bridge/br_forward.c:55) [ 62.825652] maybe_deliver (net/bridge/br_forward.c:193) [ 62.829420] br_flood (net/bridge/br_forward.c:233) [ 62.832758] br_handle_frame_finish (net/bridge/br_input.c:215) [ 62.837403] br_handle_frame (net/bridge/br_input.c:298 net/bridge/br_input.c:416) [ 62.851417] __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0 (net/core/dev.c:5387) [ 62.866114] __netif_receive_skb_list_core (net/core/dev.c:5570) [ 62.871367] netif_receive_skb_list_internal (net/core/dev.c:5638 net/core/dev.c:5727) [ 62.876795] napi_complete_done (./include/linux/list.h:37 ./include/net/gro.h:434 ./include/net/gro.h:429 net/core/dev.c:6067) [ 62.881004] ixgbe_poll (drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c:3191) [ 62.893534] __napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:6498) [ 62.897133] napi_threaded_poll (./include/linux/netpoll.h:89 net/core/dev.c:6640) [ 62.905276] kthread (kernel/kthread.c:379) [ 62.913435] ret_from_fork (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:314) [ 62.917119] </TASK> In the critical scenario, rx-gro-list GRO-ed packets are fed, via a bridge, both to the local input path and to an egress device (tun). The segmentation of such packets unsafely writes to the cloned skbs with shared heads. This change addresses the issue by uncloning as needed the to-be-segmented skbs. Reported-by: Ian Kumlien <ian.kumlien@gmail.com> Tested-by: Ian Kumlien <ian.kumlien@gmail.com> Fixes: 3a1296a ("net: Support GRO/GSO fraglist chaining.") Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 2aaa8a1 ] With some IPv6 Ext Hdr (RPL, SRv6, etc.), we can send a packet that has the link-local address as src and dst IP and will be forwarded to an external IP in the IPv6 Ext Hdr. For example, the script below generates a packet whose src IP is the link-local address and dst is updated to 11::. # for f in $(find /proc/sys/net/ -name *seg6_enabled*); do echo 1 > $f; done # python3 >>> from socket import * >>> from scapy.all import * >>> >>> SRC_ADDR = DST_ADDR = "fe80::5054:ff:fe12:3456" >>> >>> pkt = IPv6(src=SRC_ADDR, dst=DST_ADDR) >>> pkt /= IPv6ExtHdrSegmentRouting(type=4, addresses=["11::", "22::"], segleft=1) >>> >>> sk = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW) >>> sk.sendto(bytes(pkt), (DST_ADDR, 0)) For such a packet, we call ip6_route_input() to look up a route for the next destination in these three functions depending on the header type. * ipv6_rthdr_rcv() * ipv6_rpl_srh_rcv() * ipv6_srh_rcv() If no route is found, ip6_null_entry is set to skb, and the following dst_input(skb) calls ip6_pkt_drop(). Finally, in icmp6_dev(), we dereference skb_rt6_info(skb)->rt6i_idev->dev as the input device is the loopback interface. Then, we have to check if skb_rt6_info(skb)->rt6i_idev is NULL or not to avoid NULL pointer deref for ip6_null_entry. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 157 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.4.0-11996-gb121d614371c MIPS#35 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:icmp6_send (net/ipv6/icmp.c:436 net/ipv6/icmp.c:503) Code: fe ff ff 48 c7 40 30 c0 86 5d 83 e8 c6 44 1c 00 e9 c8 fc ff ff 49 8b 46 58 48 83 e0 fe 0f 84 4a fb ff ff 48 8b 80 d0 00 00 00 <48> 8b 00 44 8b 88 e0 00 00 00 e9 34 fb ff ff 4d 85 ed 0f 85 69 01 RSP: 0018:ffffc90000003c70 EFLAGS: 00000286 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00000000000000e0 RDX: 0000000000000021 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888006d72a18 RBP: ffffc90000003d80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: ffffc90000003d98 R11: 0000000000000040 R12: ffff888006d72a10 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8880057fb800 R15: ffffffff835d86c0 FS: 00007f9dc72ee740(0000) GS:ffff88807dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000057b2000 CR4: 00000000007506f0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <IRQ> ip6_pkt_drop (net/ipv6/route.c:4513) ipv6_rthdr_rcv (net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:640 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:686) ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:437 (discriminator 5)) ip6_input_finish (./include/linux/rcupdate.h:781 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:483) __netif_receive_skb_one_core (net/core/dev.c:5455) process_backlog (./include/linux/rcupdate.h:781 net/core/dev.c:5895) __napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:6460) net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:6529 net/core/dev.c:6660) __do_softirq (./arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:27 ./include/linux/jump_label.h:207 ./include/trace/events/irq.h:142 kernel/softirq.c:554) do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:454 kernel/softirq.c:441) </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip (kernel/softirq.c:381) __dev_queue_xmit (net/core/dev.c:4231) ip6_finish_output2 (./include/net/neighbour.h:544 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:135) rawv6_sendmsg (./include/net/dst.h:458 ./include/linux/netfilter.h:303 net/ipv6/raw.c:656 net/ipv6/raw.c:914) sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:725 net/socket.c:748) __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2134) __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2146 net/socket.c:2142 net/socket.c:2142) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120) RIP: 0033:0x7f9dc751baea Code: d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 89 ca 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 15 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 7e c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 48 83 ec 30 44 89 RSP: 002b:00007ffe98712c38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe98712cf8 RCX: 00007f9dc751baea RDX: 0000000000000060 RSI: 00007f9dc6460b90 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f9dc56e8be0 R08: 00007ffe98712d70 R09: 000000000000001c R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffffffffc4653600 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 00007f9dc6af5d1b </TASK> Modules linked in: CR2: 0000000000000000 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:icmp6_send (net/ipv6/icmp.c:436 net/ipv6/icmp.c:503) Code: fe ff ff 48 c7 40 30 c0 86 5d 83 e8 c6 44 1c 00 e9 c8 fc ff ff 49 8b 46 58 48 83 e0 fe 0f 84 4a fb ff ff 48 8b 80 d0 00 00 00 <48> 8b 00 44 8b 88 e0 00 00 00 e9 34 fb ff ff 4d 85 ed 0f 85 69 01 RSP: 0018:ffffc90000003c70 EFLAGS: 00000286 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00000000000000e0 RDX: 0000000000000021 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888006d72a18 RBP: ffffc90000003d80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: ffffc90000003d98 R11: 0000000000000040 R12: ffff888006d72a10 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8880057fb800 R15: ffffffff835d86c0 FS: 00007f9dc72ee740(0000) GS:ffff88807dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000057b2000 CR4: 00000000007506f0 PKRU: 55555554 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt Kernel Offset: disabled Fixes: 4832c30 ("net: ipv6: put host and anycast routes on device with address") Reported-by: Wang Yufen <wangyufen@huawei.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/c41403a9-c2f6-3b7e-0c96-e1901e605cd0@huawei.com/ Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 458c15d upstream. syzbot reports a bug as below: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000009: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x69/0x2000 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4942 Call Trace: lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5691 __raw_write_lock include/linux/rwlock_api_smp.h:209 [inline] _raw_write_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:300 __drop_extent_tree+0x3ac/0x660 fs/f2fs/extent_cache.c:1100 f2fs_drop_extent_tree+0x17/0x30 fs/f2fs/extent_cache.c:1116 f2fs_insert_range+0x2d5/0x3c0 fs/f2fs/file.c:1664 f2fs_fallocate+0x4e4/0x6d0 fs/f2fs/file.c:1838 vfs_fallocate+0x54b/0x6b0 fs/open.c:324 ksys_fallocate fs/open.c:347 [inline] __do_sys_fallocate fs/open.c:355 [inline] __se_sys_fallocate fs/open.c:353 [inline] __x64_sys_fallocate+0xbd/0x100 fs/open.c:353 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd The root cause is race condition as below: - since it tries to remount rw filesystem, so that do_remount won't call sb_prepare_remount_readonly to block fallocate, there may be race condition in between remount and fallocate. - in f2fs_remount(), default_options() will reset mount option to default one, and then update it based on result of parse_options(), so there is a hole which race condition can happen. Thread A Thread B - f2fs_fill_super - parse_options - clear_opt(READ_EXTENT_CACHE) - f2fs_remount - default_options - set_opt(READ_EXTENT_CACHE) - f2fs_fallocate - f2fs_insert_range - f2fs_drop_extent_tree - __drop_extent_tree - __may_extent_tree - test_opt(READ_EXTENT_CACHE) return true - write_lock(&et->lock) access NULL pointer - parse_options - clear_opt(READ_EXTENT_CACHE) Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-by: syzbot+d015b6c2fbb5c383bf08@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/20230522124203.3838360-1-chao@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 5eda1ad upstream. Thread #1: [122554.641906][ T92] f2fs_getxattr+0xd4/0x5fc -> waiting for f2fs_down_read(&F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_sem); [122554.641927][ T92] __f2fs_get_acl+0x50/0x284 [122554.641948][ T92] f2fs_init_acl+0x84/0x54c [122554.641969][ T92] f2fs_init_inode_metadata+0x460/0x5f0 [122554.641990][ T92] f2fs_add_inline_entry+0x11c/0x350 -> Locked dir->inode_page by f2fs_get_node_page() [122554.642009][ T92] f2fs_do_add_link+0x100/0x1e4 [122554.642025][ T92] f2fs_create+0xf4/0x22c [122554.642047][ T92] vfs_create+0x130/0x1f4 Thread OpenDingux#2: [123996.386358][ T92] __get_node_page+0x8c/0x504 -> waiting for dir->inode_page lock [123996.386383][ T92] read_all_xattrs+0x11c/0x1f4 [123996.386405][ T92] __f2fs_setxattr+0xcc/0x528 [123996.386424][ T92] f2fs_setxattr+0x158/0x1f4 -> f2fs_down_write(&F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_sem); [123996.386443][ T92] __f2fs_set_acl+0x328/0x430 [123996.386618][ T92] f2fs_set_acl+0x38/0x50 [123996.386642][ T92] posix_acl_chmod+0xc8/0x1c8 [123996.386669][ T92] f2fs_setattr+0x5e0/0x6bc [123996.386689][ T92] notify_change+0x4d8/0x580 [123996.386717][ T92] chmod_common+0xd8/0x184 [123996.386748][ T92] do_fchmodat+0x60/0x124 [123996.386766][ T92] __arm64_sys_fchmodat+0x28/0x3c Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Fixes: 27161f1 "f2fs: avoid race in between read xattr & write xattr" Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 8bbe9fe upstream. Lockdep warns that the use of the hpte_lock in native_hpte_remove() is not safe against an IRQ coming in: ================================ WARNING: inconsistent lock state 6.4.0-rc2-g0c54f4d30ecc #1 Not tainted -------------------------------- inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage. qemu-system-ppc/93865 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes: c0000000021f5180 (hpte_lock){+.?.}-{0:0}, at: native_lock_hpte+0x8/0xd0 {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at: lock_acquire+0x134/0x3f0 native_lock_hpte+0x44/0xd0 native_hpte_insert+0xd4/0x2a0 __hash_page_64K+0x218/0x4f0 hash_page_mm+0x464/0x840 do_hash_fault+0x11c/0x260 data_access_common_virt+0x210/0x220 __ip_select_ident+0x140/0x150 ... net_rx_action+0x3bc/0x440 __do_softirq+0x180/0x534 ... sys_sendmmsg+0x34/0x50 system_call_exception+0x128/0x320 system_call_common+0x160/0x2e4 ... Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(hpte_lock); <Interrupt> lock(hpte_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** ... Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x98/0xe0 (unreliable) print_usage_bug.part.0+0x250/0x278 mark_lock+0xc9c/0xd30 __lock_acquire+0x440/0x1ca0 lock_acquire+0x134/0x3f0 native_lock_hpte+0x44/0xd0 native_hpte_remove+0xb0/0x190 kvmppc_mmu_map_page+0x650/0x698 [kvm_pr] kvmppc_handle_pagefault+0x534/0x6e8 [kvm_pr] kvmppc_handle_exit_pr+0x6d8/0xe90 [kvm_pr] after_sprg3_load+0x80/0x90 [kvm_pr] kvmppc_vcpu_run_pr+0x108/0x270 [kvm_pr] kvmppc_vcpu_run+0x34/0x48 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x340/0x470 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x338/0x8b8 [kvm] sys_ioctl+0x7c4/0x13e0 system_call_exception+0x128/0x320 system_call_common+0x160/0x2e4 I suspect kvm_pr is the only caller that doesn't already have IRQs disabled, which is why this hasn't been reported previously. Fix it by disabling IRQs in native_hpte_remove(). Fixes: 35159b5 ("powerpc/64s: make HPTE lock and native_tlbie_lock irq-safe") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.1+ Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20230517123033.18430-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit e4de205 upstream. After commit 45c7e8a ("MIPS: Remove KVM_TE support") we get a NULL pointer dereference when creating a KVM guest: [ 146.243409] Starting KVM with MIPS VZ extensions [ 149.849151] CPU 3 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000000000000300, epc == ffffffffc06356ec, ra == ffffffffc063568c [ 149.849177] Oops[#1]: [ 149.849182] CPU: 3 PID: 2265 Comm: qemu-system-mip Not tainted 6.4.0-rc3+ #1671 [ 149.849188] Hardware name: THTF CX TL630 Series/THTF-LS3A4000-7A1000-ML4A, BIOS KL4.1F.TF.D.166.201225.R 12/25/2020 [ 149.849192] $ 0 : 0000000000000000 000000007400cce0 0000000000400004 ffffffff8119c740 [ 149.849209] $ 4 : 000000007400cce1 000000007400cce1 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 149.849221] $ 8 : 000000240058bb36 ffffffff81421ac0 0000000000000000 0000000000400dc0 [ 149.849233] $12 : 9800000102a07cc8 ffffffff80e40e38 0000000000000001 0000000000400dc0 [ 149.849245] $16 : 0000000000000000 9800000106cd0000 9800000106cd0000 9800000100cce000 [ 149.849257] $20 : ffffffffc0632b28 ffffffffc05b31b0 9800000100ccca00 0000000000400000 [ 149.849269] $24 : 9800000106cd09ce ffffffff802f69d0 [ 149.849281] $28 : 9800000102a04000 9800000102a07cd0 98000001106a8000 ffffffffc063568c [ 149.849293] Hi : 00000335b2111e66 [ 149.849295] Lo : 6668d90061ae0ae9 [ 149.849298] epc : ffffffffc06356ec kvm_vz_vcpu_setup+0xc4/0x328 [kvm] [ 149.849324] ra : ffffffffc063568c kvm_vz_vcpu_setup+0x64/0x328 [kvm] [ 149.849336] Status: 7400cce3 KX SX UX KERNEL EXL IE [ 149.849351] Cause : 1000000c (ExcCode 03) [ 149.849354] BadVA : 0000000000000300 [ 149.849357] PrId : 0014c004 (ICT Loongson-3) [ 149.849360] Modules linked in: kvm nfnetlink_queue nfnetlink_log nfnetlink fuse sha256_generic libsha256 cfg80211 rfkill binfmt_misc vfat fat snd_hda_codec_hdmi input_leds led_class snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_pcm snd_timer snd serio_raw xhci_pci radeon drm_suballoc_helper drm_display_helper xhci_hcd ip_tables x_tables [ 149.849432] Process qemu-system-mip (pid: 2265, threadinfo=00000000ae2982d2, task=0000000038e09ad4, tls=000000ffeba16030) [ 149.849439] Stack : 9800000000000003 9800000100ccca00 9800000100ccc000 ffffffffc062cef4 [ 149.849453] 9800000102a07d18 c89b63a7ab338e00 0000000000000000 ffffffff811a0000 [ 149.849465] 0000000000000000 9800000106cd0000 ffffffff80e59938 98000001106a8920 [ 149.849476] ffffffff80e57f30 ffffffffc062854c ffffffff811a0000 9800000102bf4240 [ 149.849488] ffffffffc05b0000 ffffffff80e3a798 000000ff78000000 000000ff78000010 [ 149.849500] 0000000000000255 98000001021f7de0 98000001023f0078 ffffffff81434000 [ 149.849511] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 9800000102ae0000 980000025e92ae28 [ 149.849523] 0000000000000000 c89b63a7ab338e00 0000000000000001 ffffffff8119dce0 [ 149.849535] 000000ff78000010 ffffffff804f3d3c 9800000102a07eb0 0000000000000255 [ 149.849546] 0000000000000000 ffffffff8049460c 000000ff78000010 0000000000000255 [ 149.849558] ... [ 149.849565] Call Trace: [ 149.849567] [<ffffffffc06356ec>] kvm_vz_vcpu_setup+0xc4/0x328 [kvm] [ 149.849586] [<ffffffffc062cef4>] kvm_arch_vcpu_create+0x184/0x228 [kvm] [ 149.849605] [<ffffffffc062854c>] kvm_vm_ioctl+0x64c/0xf28 [kvm] [ 149.849623] [<ffffffff805209c0>] sys_ioctl+0xc8/0x118 [ 149.849631] [<ffffffff80219eb0>] syscall_common+0x34/0x58 The root cause is the deletion of kvm_mips_commpage_init() leaves vcpu ->arch.cop0 NULL. So fix it by making cop0 from a pointer to an embedded object. Fixes: 45c7e8a ("MIPS: Remove KVM_TE support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com> Suggested-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn> Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit fcced95 upstream. PAGE_ALIGN(x) macro gives the next highest value which is multiple of pagesize. But if x is already page aligned then it simply returns x. So, if x passed is 0 in dax_zero_range() function, that means the length gets passed as 0 to ->iomap_begin(). In ext2 it then calls ext2_get_blocks -> max_blocks as 0 and hits bug_on here in ext2_get_blocks(). BUG_ON(maxblocks == 0); Instead we should be calling dax_truncate_page() here which takes care of it. i.e. it only calls dax_zero_range if the offset is not page/block aligned. This can be easily triggered with following on fsdax mounted pmem device. dd if=/dev/zero of=file count=1 bs=512 truncate -s 0 file [79.525838] EXT2-fs (pmem0): DAX enabled. Warning: EXPERIMENTAL, use at your own risk [79.529376] ext2 filesystem being mounted at /mnt1/test supports timestamps until 2038 (0x7fffffff) [93.793207] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [93.795102] kernel BUG at fs/ext2/inode.c:637! [93.796904] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [93.798659] CPU: 0 PID: 1192 Comm: truncate Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2-xfstests-00056-g131086faa369 torvalds#139 [93.806459] RIP: 0010:ext2_get_blocks.constprop.0+0x524/0x610 <...> [93.835298] Call Trace: [93.836253] <TASK> [93.837103] ? lock_acquire+0xf8/0x110 [93.838479] ? d_lookup+0x69/0xd0 [93.839779] ext2_iomap_begin+0xa7/0x1c0 [93.841154] iomap_iter+0xc7/0x150 [93.842425] dax_zero_range+0x6e/0xa0 [93.843813] ext2_setsize+0x176/0x1b0 [93.845164] ext2_setattr+0x151/0x200 [93.846467] notify_change+0x341/0x4e0 [93.847805] ? lock_acquire+0xf8/0x110 [93.849143] ? do_truncate+0x74/0xe0 [93.850452] ? do_truncate+0x84/0xe0 [93.851739] do_truncate+0x84/0xe0 [93.852974] do_sys_ftruncate+0x2b4/0x2f0 [93.854404] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 [93.855789] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 2aa3048 ("iomap: switch iomap_zero_range to use iomap_iter") Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) <ritesh.list@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Message-Id: <046a58317f29d9603d1068b2bbae47c2332c17ae.1682069716.git.ritesh.list@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 66843b1 upstream. Since commit 096b52f ("perf: RISC-V: throttle perf events") the perf_sample_event_took() function was added to report time spent in overflow interrupts. If the interrupt takes too long, the perf framework will lower the sysctl_perf_event_sample_rate and max_samples_per_tick. When hwc->interrupts is larger than max_samples_per_tick, the hwc->interrupts will be set to MAX_INTERRUPTS, and events will be throttled within the __perf_event_account_interrupt() function. However, the RISC-V PMU driver doesn't call riscv_pmu_stop() to update the PERF_HES_STOPPED flag after perf_event_overflow() in pmu_sbi_ovf_handler() function to avoid throttling. When the perf framework unthrottled the event in the timer interrupt handler, it triggers riscv_pmu_start() function and causes a WARN_ON_ONCE() warning, as shown below: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 240 at drivers/perf/riscv_pmu.c:184 riscv_pmu_start+0x7c/0x8e Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 240 Comm: ls Not tainted 6.4-rc4-g19d0788e9ef2 #1 Hardware name: SiFive (DT) epc : riscv_pmu_start+0x7c/0x8e ra : riscv_pmu_start+0x28/0x8e epc : ffffffff80aef864 ra : ffffffff80aef810 sp : ffff8f80004db6f0 gp : ffffffff81c83750 tp : ffffaf80069f9bc0 t0 : ffff8f80004db6c0 t1 : 0000000000000000 t2 : 000000000000001f s0 : ffff8f80004db720 s1 : ffffaf8008ca1068 a0 : 0000ffffffffffff a1 : 0000000000000000 a2 : 0000000000000001 a3 : 0000000000000870 a4 : 0000000000000000 a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : 0000000000000840 a7 : 0000000000000030 s2 : 0000000000000000 s3 : ffffaf8005165800 s4 : ffffaf800424da00 s5 : ffffffffffffffff s6 : ffffffff81cc7590 s7 : 0000000000000000 s8 : 0000000000000006 s9 : 0000000000000001 s10: ffffaf807efbc340 s11: ffffaf807efbbf00 t3 : ffffaf8006a16028 t4 : 00000000dbfbb796 t5 : 0000000700000000 t6 : ffffaf8005269870 status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 0000000000000003 [<ffffffff80aef864>] riscv_pmu_start+0x7c/0x8e [<ffffffff80185b56>] perf_adjust_freq_unthr_context+0x15e/0x174 [<ffffffff80188642>] perf_event_task_tick+0x88/0x9c [<ffffffff800626a8>] scheduler_tick+0xfe/0x27c [<ffffffff800b5640>] update_process_times+0x9a/0xba [<ffffffff800c5bd4>] tick_sched_handle+0x32/0x66 [<ffffffff800c5e0c>] tick_sched_timer+0x64/0xb0 [<ffffffff800b5e50>] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x156/0x2f4 [<ffffffff800b6bdc>] hrtimer_interrupt+0xe2/0x1fe [<ffffffff80acc9e8>] riscv_timer_interrupt+0x38/0x42 [<ffffffff80090a16>] handle_percpu_devid_irq+0x90/0x1d2 [<ffffffff8008a9f4>] generic_handle_domain_irq+0x28/0x36 After referring other PMU drivers like Arm, Loongarch, Csky, and Mips, they don't call *_pmu_stop() to update with PERF_HES_STOPPED flag after perf_event_overflow() function nor do they add PERF_HES_STOPPED flag checking in *_pmu_start() which don't cause this warning. Thus, it's recommended to remove this unnecessary check in riscv_pmu_start() function to prevent this warning. Signed-off-by: Eric Lin <eric.lin@sifive.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230710154328.19574-1-eric.lin@sifive.com Fixes: 096b52f ("perf: RISC-V: throttle perf events") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 5f81018 upstream. While running bpf selftests it's possible to get following fault: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address \ 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC NOPTI ... Call Trace: <TASK> fprobe_handler+0xc1/0x270 ? __pfx_bpf_testmod_init+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_bpf_testmod_init+0x10/0x10 ? bpf_fentry_test1+0x5/0x10 ? bpf_fentry_test1+0x5/0x10 ? bpf_testmod_init+0x22/0x80 ? do_one_initcall+0x63/0x2e0 ? rcu_is_watching+0xd/0x40 ? kmalloc_trace+0xaf/0xc0 ? do_init_module+0x60/0x250 ? __do_sys_finit_module+0xac/0x120 ? do_syscall_64+0x37/0x90 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc </TASK> In unregister_fprobe function we can't release fp->rethook while it's possible there are some of its users still running on another cpu. Moving rethook_free call after fp->ops is unregistered with unregister_ftrace_function call. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230615115236.3476617-1-jolsa@kernel.org/ Fixes: 5b0ab78 ("fprobe: Add exit_handler support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 20fce50 upstream. System crash when qla2x00_start_sp(sp) returns error code EGAIN and wake_up gets called for uninitialized wait queue sp->nvme_ls_waitq. qla2xxx [0000:37:00.1]-2121:5: Returning existing qpair of ffff8ae2c0513400 for idx=0 qla2xxx [0000:37:00.1]-700e:5: qla2x00_start_sp failed = 11 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL360 Gen10/ProLiant DL360 Gen10, BIOS U32 09/03/2021 Workqueue: nvme-wq nvme_fc_connect_ctrl_work [nvme_fc] RIP: 0010:__wake_up_common+0x4c/0x190 RSP: 0018:ffff95f3e0cb7cd0 EFLAGS: 00010086 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8b08d3b26328 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: ffff8b08d3b26320 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffffffffe8 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff95f3e0cb7a60 R12: ffff95f3e0cb7d20 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8b2fdf6c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000002f1e410002 CR4: 00000000007706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: __wake_up_common_lock+0x7c/0xc0 qla_nvme_ls_req+0x355/0x4c0 [qla2xxx] ? __nvme_fc_send_ls_req+0x260/0x380 [nvme_fc] ? nvme_fc_send_ls_req.constprop.42+0x1a/0x45 [nvme_fc] ? nvme_fc_connect_ctrl_work.cold.63+0x1e3/0xa7d [nvme_fc] Remove unused nvme_ls_waitq wait queue. nvme_ls_waitq logic was removed previously in the commits tagged Fixed: below. Fixes: 219d27d ("scsi: qla2xxx: Fix race conditions in the code for aborting SCSI commands") Fixes: 5621b0d ("scsi: qla2xxx: Simpify unregistration of FC-NVMe local/remote ports") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Manish Rangankar <mrangankar@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: Nilesh Javali <njavali@marvell.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230615074633.12721-1-njavali@marvell.com Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

citral23 merged commit 2d1229e into citral23:jz-5.14 Sep 13, 2021

citral23 force-pushed the jz-5.14 branch from 649805f to 2d1229e Compare September 13, 2021 17:00

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citral23 commented Sep 13, 2021

Jz 5.14 #1

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citral23 commented Sep 13, 2021