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Update Makefile #2

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chewitt commented Jan 29, 2023

Closing as related to #1 which cannot be accepted. I would also expect to receive a single PR with all changes; not one PR for each file changed. See https://wiki.libreelec.tv/development/git-tutorial for some general advice on git workflow. Hint: do not use the GitHub GUI to edit files.

@chewitt chewitt closed this Jan 29, 2023
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 10, 2023
[ Upstream commit 3c46372 ]

This lockdep splat says it better than I could:

================================
WARNING: inconsistent lock state
6.2.0-rc2-07010-ga9b9500ffaac-dirty torvalds#967 Not tainted
--------------------------------
inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage.
kworker/1:3/179 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes:
ffff3ec4036ce098 (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.?.}-{3:3}, at: netif_freeze_queues+0x5c/0xc0
{IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at:
  _raw_spin_lock+0x5c/0xc0
  sch_direct_xmit+0x148/0x37c
  __dev_queue_xmit+0x528/0x111c
  ip6_finish_output2+0x5ec/0xb7c
  ip6_finish_output+0x240/0x3f0
  ip6_output+0x78/0x360
  ndisc_send_skb+0x33c/0x85c
  ndisc_send_rs+0x54/0x12c
  addrconf_rs_timer+0x154/0x260
  call_timer_fn+0xb8/0x3a0
  __run_timers.part.0+0x214/0x26c
  run_timer_softirq+0x3c/0x74
  __do_softirq+0x14c/0x5d8
  ____do_softirq+0x10/0x20
  call_on_irq_stack+0x2c/0x5c
  do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x30
  __irq_exit_rcu+0x168/0x1a0
  irq_exit_rcu+0x10/0x40
  el1_interrupt+0x38/0x64
irq event stamp: 7825
hardirqs last  enabled at (7825): [<ffffdf1f7200cae4>] exit_to_kernel_mode+0x34/0x130
hardirqs last disabled at (7823): [<ffffdf1f708105f0>] __do_softirq+0x550/0x5d8
softirqs last  enabled at (7824): [<ffffdf1f7081050c>] __do_softirq+0x46c/0x5d8
softirqs last disabled at (7811): [<ffffdf1f708166e0>] ____do_softirq+0x10/0x20

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(_xmit_ETHER#2);
  <Interrupt>
    lock(_xmit_ETHER#2);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

3 locks held by kworker/1:3/179:
 #0: ffff3ec400004748 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1f4/0x6c0
 #1: ffff80000a0bbdc8 ((work_completion)(&priv->tx_onestep_tstamp)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1f4/0x6c0
 #2: ffff3ec4036cd438 (&dev->tx_global_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: netif_tx_lock+0x1c/0x34

Workqueue: events enetc_tx_onestep_tstamp
Call trace:
 print_usage_bug.part.0+0x208/0x22c
 mark_lock+0x7f0/0x8b0
 __lock_acquire+0x7c4/0x1ce0
 lock_acquire.part.0+0xe0/0x220
 lock_acquire+0x68/0x84
 _raw_spin_lock+0x5c/0xc0
 netif_freeze_queues+0x5c/0xc0
 netif_tx_lock+0x24/0x34
 enetc_tx_onestep_tstamp+0x20/0x100
 process_one_work+0x28c/0x6c0
 worker_thread+0x74/0x450
 kthread+0x118/0x11c

but I'll say it anyway: the enetc_tx_onestep_tstamp() work item runs in
process context, therefore with softirqs enabled (i.o.w., it can be
interrupted by a softirq). If we hold the netif_tx_lock() when there is
an interrupt, and the NET_TX softirq then gets scheduled, this will take
the netif_tx_lock() a second time and deadlock the kernel.

To solve this, use netif_tx_lock_bh(), which blocks softirqs from
running.

Fixes: 7294380 ("enetc: support PTP Sync packet one-step timestamping")
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Duyck <alexanderduyck@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230112105440.1786799-1-vladimir.oltean@nxp.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 10, 2023
[ Upstream commit 241f519 ]

This attempts to avoid circular locking dependency between sock_lock
and hdev_lock:

WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.0.0-rc7-03728-g18dd8ab0a783 #3 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
kworker/u3:2/53 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888000254130 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO){+.+.}-{0:0}, at:
iso_conn_del+0xbd/0x1d0
but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff9f39a080 (hci_cb_list_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at:
hci_le_cis_estabilished_evt+0x1b5/0x500
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #2 (hci_cb_list_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       __mutex_lock+0x10e/0xfe0
       hci_le_remote_feat_complete_evt+0x17f/0x320
       hci_event_packet+0x39c/0x7d0
       hci_rx_work+0x2bf/0x950
       process_one_work+0x569/0x980
       worker_thread+0x2a3/0x6f0
       kthread+0x153/0x180
       ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
-> #1 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       __mutex_lock+0x10e/0xfe0
       iso_connect_cis+0x6f/0x5a0
       iso_sock_connect+0x1af/0x710
       __sys_connect+0x17e/0x1b0
       __x64_sys_connect+0x37/0x50
       do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x62/0xcc
-> #0 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO){+.+.}-{0:0}:
       __lock_acquire+0x1b51/0x33d0
       lock_acquire+0x16f/0x3b0
       lock_sock_nested+0x32/0x80
       iso_conn_del+0xbd/0x1d0
       iso_connect_cfm+0x226/0x680
       hci_le_cis_estabilished_evt+0x1ed/0x500
       hci_event_packet+0x39c/0x7d0
       hci_rx_work+0x2bf/0x950
       process_one_work+0x569/0x980
       worker_thread+0x2a3/0x6f0
       kthread+0x153/0x180
       ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
  sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO --> &hdev->lock --> hci_cb_list_lock
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:
       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(hci_cb_list_lock);
                               lock(&hdev->lock);
                               lock(hci_cb_list_lock);
  lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO);
 *** DEADLOCK ***
4 locks held by kworker/u3:2/53:
 #0: ffff8880021d9130 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at:
 process_one_work+0x4ad/0x980
 #1: ffff888002387de0 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0},
 at: process_one_work+0x4ad/0x980
 #2: ffff888001ac0070 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at:
 hci_le_cis_estabilished_evt+0xc3/0x500
 #3: ffffffff9f39a080 (hci_cb_list_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at:
 hci_le_cis_estabilished_evt+0x1b5/0x500

Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Stable-dep-of: 6a5ad25 ("Bluetooth: ISO: Fix possible circular locking dependency")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 10, 2023
[ Upstream commit e9d50f7 ]

This fixes the following trace caused by attempting to lock
cmd_sync_work_lock while holding the rcu_read_lock:

kworker/u3:2/212 is trying to lock:
ffff888002600910 (&hdev->cmd_sync_work_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at:
hci_cmd_sync_queue+0xad/0x140
other info that might help us debug this:
context-{4:4}
4 locks held by kworker/u3:2/212:
 #0: ffff8880028c6530 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at:
 process_one_work+0x4dc/0x9a0
 #1: ffff888001aafde0 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0},
 at: process_one_work+0x4dc/0x9a0
 #2: ffff888002600070 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at:
 hci_cc_le_set_cig_params+0x64/0x4f0
 #3: ffffffffa5994b00 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at:
 hci_cc_le_set_cig_params+0x2f9/0x4f0

Fixes: 26afbd8 ("Bluetooth: Add initial implementation of CIS connections")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 10, 2023
[ Upstream commit 5aa5610 ]

The cited commit changed class of tc_ht internal mutex in order to avoid
false lock dependency with fs_core node and flow_table hash table
structures. However, hash table implementation internally also includes a
workqueue task with its own lockdep map which causes similar bogus lockdep
splat[0]. Fix it by also adding dedicated class for hash table workqueue
work structure of tc_ht.

[0]:

[ 1139.672465] ======================================================
[ 1139.673552] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[ 1139.674635] 6.1.0_for_upstream_debug_2022_12_12_17_02 #1 Not tainted
[ 1139.675734] ------------------------------------------------------
[ 1139.676801] modprobe/5998 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 1139.677726] ffff88811e7b93b8 (&node->lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: down_write_ref_node+0x7c/0xe0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.679662]
               but task is already holding lock:
[ 1139.680703] ffff88813c1f96a0 (&tc_ht_lock_key){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rhashtable_free_and_destroy+0x38/0x6f0
[ 1139.682223]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.

[ 1139.683640]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[ 1139.684887]
               -> #2 (&tc_ht_lock_key){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[ 1139.685975]        __mutex_lock+0x12c/0x14b0
[ 1139.686659]        rht_deferred_worker+0x35/0x1540
[ 1139.687405]        process_one_work+0x7c2/0x1310
[ 1139.688134]        worker_thread+0x59d/0xec0
[ 1139.688820]        kthread+0x28f/0x330
[ 1139.689444]        ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[ 1139.690106]
               -> #1 ((work_completion)(&ht->run_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
[ 1139.691250]        __flush_work+0xe8/0x900
[ 1139.691915]        __cancel_work_timer+0x2ca/0x3f0
[ 1139.692655]        rhashtable_free_and_destroy+0x22/0x6f0
[ 1139.693472]        del_sw_flow_table+0x22/0xb0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.694592]        tree_put_node+0x24c/0x450 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.695686]        tree_remove_node+0x6e/0x100 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.696803]        mlx5_destroy_flow_table+0x187/0x690 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.698017]        mlx5e_tc_nic_cleanup+0x2f8/0x400 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.699217]        mlx5e_cleanup_nic_rx+0x2b/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.700397]        mlx5e_detach_netdev+0x19d/0x2b0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.701571]        mlx5e_suspend+0xdb/0x140 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.702665]        mlx5e_remove+0x89/0x190 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.703756]        auxiliary_bus_remove+0x52/0x70
[ 1139.704492]        device_release_driver_internal+0x3c1/0x600
[ 1139.705360]        bus_remove_device+0x2a5/0x560
[ 1139.706080]        device_del+0x492/0xb80
[ 1139.706724]        mlx5_rescan_drivers_locked+0x194/0x6a0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.707961]        mlx5_unregister_device+0x7a/0xa0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.709138]        mlx5_uninit_one+0x5f/0x160 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.710252]        remove_one+0xd1/0x160 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.711297]        pci_device_remove+0x96/0x1c0
[ 1139.722721]        device_release_driver_internal+0x3c1/0x600
[ 1139.723590]        unbind_store+0x1b1/0x200
[ 1139.724259]        kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x348/0x520
[ 1139.725019]        vfs_write+0x7b2/0xbf0
[ 1139.725658]        ksys_write+0xf3/0x1d0
[ 1139.726292]        do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
[ 1139.726942]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
[ 1139.727769]
               -> #0 (&node->lock){++++}-{3:3}:
[ 1139.728698]        __lock_acquire+0x2cf5/0x62f0
[ 1139.729415]        lock_acquire+0x1c1/0x540
[ 1139.730076]        down_write+0x8e/0x1f0
[ 1139.730709]        down_write_ref_node+0x7c/0xe0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.731841]        mlx5_del_flow_rules+0x6f/0x610 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.732982]        __mlx5_eswitch_del_rule+0xdd/0x560 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.734207]        mlx5_eswitch_del_offloaded_rule+0x14/0x20 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.735491]        mlx5e_tc_rule_unoffload+0x104/0x2b0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.736716]        mlx5e_tc_unoffload_fdb_rules+0x10c/0x1f0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.738007]        mlx5e_tc_del_fdb_flow+0xc3c/0xfa0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.739213]        mlx5e_tc_del_flow+0x146/0xa20 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.740377]        _mlx5e_tc_del_flow+0x38/0x60 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.741534]        rhashtable_free_and_destroy+0x3be/0x6f0
[ 1139.742351]        mlx5e_tc_ht_cleanup+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.743512]        mlx5e_cleanup_rep_tx+0x4a/0xe0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.744683]        mlx5e_detach_netdev+0x1ca/0x2b0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.745860]        mlx5e_netdev_change_profile+0xd9/0x1c0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.747098]        mlx5e_netdev_attach_nic_profile+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.748372]        mlx5e_vport_rep_unload+0x16a/0x1b0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.749590]        __esw_offloads_unload_rep+0xb1/0xd0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.750813]        mlx5_eswitch_unregister_vport_reps+0x409/0x5f0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.752147]        mlx5e_rep_remove+0x62/0x80 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.753293]        auxiliary_bus_remove+0x52/0x70
[ 1139.754028]        device_release_driver_internal+0x3c1/0x600
[ 1139.754885]        driver_detach+0xc1/0x180
[ 1139.755553]        bus_remove_driver+0xef/0x2e0
[ 1139.756260]        auxiliary_driver_unregister+0x16/0x50
[ 1139.757059]        mlx5e_rep_cleanup+0x19/0x30 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.758207]        mlx5e_cleanup+0x12/0x30 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.759295]        mlx5_cleanup+0xc/0x49 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.760384]        __x64_sys_delete_module+0x2b5/0x450
[ 1139.761166]        do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
[ 1139.761827]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
[ 1139.762663]
               other info that might help us debug this:

[ 1139.763925] Chain exists of:
                 &node->lock --> (work_completion)(&ht->run_work) --> &tc_ht_lock_key

[ 1139.765743]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[ 1139.766688]        CPU0                    CPU1
[ 1139.767399]        ----                    ----
[ 1139.768111]   lock(&tc_ht_lock_key);
[ 1139.768704]                                lock((work_completion)(&ht->run_work));
[ 1139.769869]                                lock(&tc_ht_lock_key);
[ 1139.770770]   lock(&node->lock);
[ 1139.771326]
                *** DEADLOCK ***

[ 1139.772345] 2 locks held by modprobe/5998:
[ 1139.772994]  #0: ffff88813c1ff0e8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x8d/0x600
[ 1139.774399]  #1: ffff88813c1f96a0 (&tc_ht_lock_key){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rhashtable_free_and_destroy+0x38/0x6f0
[ 1139.775822]
               stack backtrace:
[ 1139.776579] CPU: 3 PID: 5998 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.1.0_for_upstream_debug_2022_12_12_17_02 #1
[ 1139.777935] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 1139.779529] Call Trace:
[ 1139.779992]  <TASK>
[ 1139.780409]  dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d
[ 1139.781015]  check_noncircular+0x278/0x300
[ 1139.781687]  ? print_circular_bug+0x460/0x460
[ 1139.782381]  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70
[ 1139.783121]  ? lock_release+0x487/0x7c0
[ 1139.783759]  ? orc_find.part.0+0x1f1/0x330
[ 1139.784423]  ? mark_lock.part.0+0xef/0x2fc0
[ 1139.785091]  __lock_acquire+0x2cf5/0x62f0
[ 1139.785754]  ? register_lock_class+0x18e0/0x18e0
[ 1139.786483]  lock_acquire+0x1c1/0x540
[ 1139.787093]  ? down_write_ref_node+0x7c/0xe0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.788195]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x3f0/0x3f0
[ 1139.788978]  ? register_lock_class+0x18e0/0x18e0
[ 1139.789715]  down_write+0x8e/0x1f0
[ 1139.790292]  ? down_write_ref_node+0x7c/0xe0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.791380]  ? down_write_killable+0x220/0x220
[ 1139.792080]  ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x110
[ 1139.792713]  down_write_ref_node+0x7c/0xe0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.793795]  mlx5_del_flow_rules+0x6f/0x610 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.794879]  __mlx5_eswitch_del_rule+0xdd/0x560 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.796032]  ? __esw_offloads_unload_rep+0xd0/0xd0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.797227]  ? xa_load+0x11a/0x200
[ 1139.797800]  ? __xa_clear_mark+0xf0/0xf0
[ 1139.798438]  mlx5_eswitch_del_offloaded_rule+0x14/0x20 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.799660]  mlx5e_tc_rule_unoffload+0x104/0x2b0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.800821]  mlx5e_tc_unoffload_fdb_rules+0x10c/0x1f0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.802049]  ? mlx5_eswitch_get_uplink_priv+0x25/0x80 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.803260]  mlx5e_tc_del_fdb_flow+0xc3c/0xfa0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.804398]  ? __cancel_work_timer+0x1c2/0x3f0
[ 1139.805099]  ? mlx5e_tc_unoffload_from_slow_path+0x460/0x460 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.806387]  mlx5e_tc_del_flow+0x146/0xa20 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.807481]  _mlx5e_tc_del_flow+0x38/0x60 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.808564]  rhashtable_free_and_destroy+0x3be/0x6f0
[ 1139.809336]  ? mlx5e_tc_del_flow+0xa20/0xa20 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.809336]  ? mlx5e_tc_del_flow+0xa20/0xa20 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.810455]  mlx5e_tc_ht_cleanup+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.811552]  mlx5e_cleanup_rep_tx+0x4a/0xe0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.812655]  mlx5e_detach_netdev+0x1ca/0x2b0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.813768]  mlx5e_netdev_change_profile+0xd9/0x1c0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.814952]  mlx5e_netdev_attach_nic_profile+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.816166]  mlx5e_vport_rep_unload+0x16a/0x1b0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.817336]  __esw_offloads_unload_rep+0xb1/0xd0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.818507]  mlx5_eswitch_unregister_vport_reps+0x409/0x5f0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.819788]  ? mlx5_eswitch_uplink_get_proto_dev+0x30/0x30 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.821051]  ? kernfs_find_ns+0x137/0x310
[ 1139.821705]  mlx5e_rep_remove+0x62/0x80 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.822778]  auxiliary_bus_remove+0x52/0x70
[ 1139.823449]  device_release_driver_internal+0x3c1/0x600
[ 1139.824240]  driver_detach+0xc1/0x180
[ 1139.824842]  bus_remove_driver+0xef/0x2e0
[ 1139.825504]  auxiliary_driver_unregister+0x16/0x50
[ 1139.826245]  mlx5e_rep_cleanup+0x19/0x30 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.827322]  mlx5e_cleanup+0x12/0x30 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.828345]  mlx5_cleanup+0xc/0x49 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.829382]  __x64_sys_delete_module+0x2b5/0x450
[ 1139.830119]  ? module_flags+0x300/0x300
[ 1139.830750]  ? task_work_func_match+0x50/0x50
[ 1139.831440]  ? task_work_cancel+0x20/0x20
[ 1139.832088]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3f0
[ 1139.832873]  ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x1d/0x50
[ 1139.833661]  ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x2d/0x100
[ 1139.834328]  do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
[ 1139.834922]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
[ 1139.835700] RIP: 0033:0x7f153e71288b
[ 1139.836302] Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 9d 75 0e 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 b0 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 6d 75 0e 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 1139.838866] RSP: 002b:00007ffe0a3ed938 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0
[ 1139.840020] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000564c2cbf8220 RCX: 00007f153e71288b
[ 1139.841043] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 0000564c2cbf8288
[ 1139.842072] RBP: 0000564c2cbf8220 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 1139.843094] R10: 00007f153e7a3ac0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000564c2cbf8288
[ 1139.844118] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000564c2cbf7ae8 R15: 00007ffe0a3efcb8

Fixes: 9ba3333 ("net/mlx5e: Avoid false lock depenency warning on tc_ht")
Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Eli Cohen <elic@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Roi Dayan <roid@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 9, 2023
…kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD

KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.2, take #2

- Pass the correct address to mte_clear_page_tags() on initialising
  a tagged page

- Plug a race against a GICv4.1 doorbell interrupt while saving
  the vgic-v3 pending state.
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 9, 2023
Jakub Sitnicki says:

====================

This patch set addresses the syzbot report in [1].

Patch #1 has been suggested by Eric [2]. I extended it to cover the rest of
sock_map proto callbacks. Otherwise we would still overflow the stack.

Patch #2 contains the actual fix and bug analysis.
Patches #3 & #4 add coverage to selftests to trigger the bug.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/00000000000073b14905ef2e7401@google.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CANn89iK2UN1FmdUcH12fv_xiZkv2G+Nskvmq7fG6aA_6VKRf6g@mail.gmail.com/
---
v1 -> v2:
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230113-sockmap-fix-v1-0-d3cad092ee10@cloudflare.com
[v1 didn't hit bpf@ ML by mistake]

 * pull in Eric's patch to protect against recursion loop bugs (Eric)
 * add a macro helper to check if pointer is inside a memory range (Eric)
====================

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 9, 2023
…eues().

Christoph Paasch reported that commit b5fc292 ("inet6: Remove
inet6_destroy_sock() in sk->sk_prot->destroy().") started triggering
WARN_ON_ONCE(sk->sk_forward_alloc) in sk_stream_kill_queues().  [0 - 2]
Also, we can reproduce it by a program in [3].

In the commit, we delay freeing ipv6_pinfo.pktoptions from sk->destroy()
to sk->sk_destruct(), so sk->sk_forward_alloc is no longer zero in
inet_csk_destroy_sock().

The same check has been in inet_sock_destruct() from at least v2.6,
we can just remove the WARN_ON_ONCE().  However, among the users of
sk_stream_kill_queues(), only CAIF is not calling inet_sock_destruct().
Thus, we add the same WARN_ON_ONCE() to caif_sock_destructor().

[0]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/39725AB4-88F1-41B3-B07F-949C5CAEFF4F@icloud.com/
[1]: multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next#341
[2]:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3232 at net/core/stream.c:212 sk_stream_kill_queues+0x2f9/0x3e0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 3232 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc5ab24eb4698afbe147b424149c529e2a43ec24eb5 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:sk_stream_kill_queues+0x2f9/0x3e0
Code: 03 0f b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e ec 00 00 00 8b ab 08 01 00 00 e9 60 ff ff ff e8 d0 5f b6 fe 0f 0b eb 97 e8 c7 5f b6 fe <0f> 0b eb a0 e8 be 5f b6 fe 0f 0b e9 6a fe ff ff e8 02 07 e3 fe e9
RSP: 0018:ffff88810570fc68 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff888101f38f40 RSI: ffffffff8285e529 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 0000000000000ce0 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000ce0 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8881009e9488
R13: ffffffff84af2cc0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8881009e9458
FS:  00007f7fdfbd5800(0000) GS:ffff88811b600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b32923000 CR3: 00000001062fc006 CR4: 0000000000170ef0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 inet_csk_destroy_sock+0x1a1/0x320
 __tcp_close+0xab6/0xe90
 tcp_close+0x30/0xc0
 inet_release+0xe9/0x1f0
 inet6_release+0x4c/0x70
 __sock_release+0xd2/0x280
 sock_close+0x15/0x20
 __fput+0x252/0xa20
 task_work_run+0x169/0x250
 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x113/0x120
 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x40
 do_syscall_64+0x48/0x90
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
RIP: 0033:0x7f7fdf7ae28d
Code: c1 20 00 00 75 10 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 ee fb ff ff 48 89 04 24 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 8b 3c 24 48 89 c2 e8 37 fc ff ff 48 89 d0 48 83 c4 08 48 3d 01
RSP: 002b:00000000007dfbb0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00007f7fdf7ae28d
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffffffffff RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000007f338e0f R09: 0000000000000e0f
R10: 000000007f338e13 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00007f7fdefff000
R13: 00007f7fdefffcd8 R14: 00007f7fdefffce0 R15: 00007f7fdefffcd8
 </TASK>

[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230208004245.83497-1-kuniyu@amazon.com/

Fixes: b5fc292 ("inet6: Remove inet6_destroy_sock() in sk->sk_prot->destroy().")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Paasch <christophpaasch@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 14, 2023
…eues().

commit 62ec33b upstream.

Christoph Paasch reported that commit b5fc292 ("inet6: Remove
inet6_destroy_sock() in sk->sk_prot->destroy().") started triggering
WARN_ON_ONCE(sk->sk_forward_alloc) in sk_stream_kill_queues().  [0 - 2]
Also, we can reproduce it by a program in [3].

In the commit, we delay freeing ipv6_pinfo.pktoptions from sk->destroy()
to sk->sk_destruct(), so sk->sk_forward_alloc is no longer zero in
inet_csk_destroy_sock().

The same check has been in inet_sock_destruct() from at least v2.6,
we can just remove the WARN_ON_ONCE().  However, among the users of
sk_stream_kill_queues(), only CAIF is not calling inet_sock_destruct().
Thus, we add the same WARN_ON_ONCE() to caif_sock_destructor().

[0]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/39725AB4-88F1-41B3-B07F-949C5CAEFF4F@icloud.com/
[1]: multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next#341
[2]:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3232 at net/core/stream.c:212 sk_stream_kill_queues+0x2f9/0x3e0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 3232 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc5ab24eb4698afbe147b424149c529e2a43ec24eb5 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:sk_stream_kill_queues+0x2f9/0x3e0
Code: 03 0f b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e ec 00 00 00 8b ab 08 01 00 00 e9 60 ff ff ff e8 d0 5f b6 fe 0f 0b eb 97 e8 c7 5f b6 fe <0f> 0b eb a0 e8 be 5f b6 fe 0f 0b e9 6a fe ff ff e8 02 07 e3 fe e9
RSP: 0018:ffff88810570fc68 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff888101f38f40 RSI: ffffffff8285e529 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 0000000000000ce0 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000ce0 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8881009e9488
R13: ffffffff84af2cc0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8881009e9458
FS:  00007f7fdfbd5800(0000) GS:ffff88811b600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b32923000 CR3: 00000001062fc006 CR4: 0000000000170ef0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 inet_csk_destroy_sock+0x1a1/0x320
 __tcp_close+0xab6/0xe90
 tcp_close+0x30/0xc0
 inet_release+0xe9/0x1f0
 inet6_release+0x4c/0x70
 __sock_release+0xd2/0x280
 sock_close+0x15/0x20
 __fput+0x252/0xa20
 task_work_run+0x169/0x250
 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x113/0x120
 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x40
 do_syscall_64+0x48/0x90
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
RIP: 0033:0x7f7fdf7ae28d
Code: c1 20 00 00 75 10 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 ee fb ff ff 48 89 04 24 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 8b 3c 24 48 89 c2 e8 37 fc ff ff 48 89 d0 48 83 c4 08 48 3d 01
RSP: 002b:00000000007dfbb0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00007f7fdf7ae28d
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffffffffff RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000007f338e0f R09: 0000000000000e0f
R10: 000000007f338e13 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00007f7fdefff000
R13: 00007f7fdefffcd8 R14: 00007f7fdefffce0 R15: 00007f7fdefffcd8
 </TASK>

[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230208004245.83497-1-kuniyu@amazon.com/

Fixes: b5fc292 ("inet6: Remove inet6_destroy_sock() in sk->sk_prot->destroy().")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Paasch <christophpaasch@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 14, 2023
[ Upstream commit e40b801 ]

There is a certain chance to trigger the following panic:

PID: 5900   TASK: ffff88c1c8af4100  CPU: 1   COMMAND: "kworker/1:48"
 #0 [ffff9456c1cc79a0] machine_kexec at ffffffff870665b7
 #1 [ffff9456c1cc79f0] __crash_kexec at ffffffff871b4c7a
 #2 [ffff9456c1cc7ab0] crash_kexec at ffffffff871b5b60
 #3 [ffff9456c1cc7ac0] oops_end at ffffffff87026ce7
 #4 [ffff9456c1cc7ae0] page_fault_oops at ffffffff87075715
 #5 [ffff9456c1cc7b58] exc_page_fault at ffffffff87ad0654
 #6 [ffff9456c1cc7b80] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff87c00b62
    [exception RIP: ib_alloc_mr+19]
    RIP: ffffffffc0c9cce3  RSP: ffff9456c1cc7c38  RFLAGS: 00010202
    RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: 0000000000000002  RCX: 0000000000000004
    RDX: 0000000000000010  RSI: 0000000000000000  RDI: 0000000000000000
    RBP: ffff88c1ea281d00   R8: 000000020a34ffff   R9: ffff88c1350bbb20
    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000001  R12: 0000000000000000
    R13: 0000000000000010  R14: ffff88c1ab040a50  R15: ffff88c1ea281d00
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #7 [ffff9456c1cc7c60] smc_ib_get_memory_region at ffffffffc0aff6df [smc]
 #8 [ffff9456c1cc7c88] smcr_buf_map_link at ffffffffc0b0278c [smc]
 #9 [ffff9456c1cc7ce0] __smc_buf_create at ffffffffc0b03586 [smc]

The reason here is that when the server tries to create a second link,
smc_llc_srv_add_link() has no protection and may add a new link to
link group. This breaks the security environment protected by
llc_conf_mutex.

Fixes: 2d2209f ("net/smc: first part of add link processing as SMC server")
Signed-off-by: D. Wythe <alibuda@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Larysa Zaremba <larysa.zaremba@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Wenjia Zhang <wenjia@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 14, 2023
[ Upstream commit 3a70e0d ]

When doing timestamping in lan966x and having PROVE_LOCKING
enabled the following warning is shown.

========================================================
WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected
6.2.0-rc7-01749-gc54e1f7f7e36 #2786 Tainted: G                 N
--------------------------------------------------------
swapper/0/0 just changed the state of lock:
c2609f5 (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sch_direct_xmit+0x16c/0x2e8
but this lock took another, SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock in the past:
 (&lan966x->ptp_ts_id_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}

and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them.

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&lan966x->ptp_ts_id_lock);
                               local_irq_disable();
                               lock(_xmit_ETHER#2);
                               lock(&lan966x->ptp_ts_id_lock);
  <Interrupt>
    lock(_xmit_ETHER#2);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

5 locks held by swapper/0/0:
 #0: c1001e18 ((&ndev->rs_timer)){+.-.}-{0:0}, at: call_timer_fn+0x0/0x33c
 #1: c105e7c4 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ndisc_send_skb+0x134/0x81c
 #2: c105e7d8 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: ip6_finish_output2+0x17c/0xc64
 #3: c105e7d8 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x4c/0x1224
 #4: c3056174 (dev->qdisc_tx_busylock ?: &qdisc_tx_busylock){+...}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x354/0x1224

the shortest dependencies between 2nd lock and 1st lock:
 -> (&lan966x->ptp_ts_id_lock){+.+.}-{2:2} {
    HARDIRQ-ON-W at:
                      lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248
                      _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48
                      lan966x_ptp_irq_handler+0x164/0x2a8
                      irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x78
                      irq_thread+0x130/0x278
                      kthread+0xec/0x110
                      ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28
    SOFTIRQ-ON-W at:
                      lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248
                      _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48
                      lan966x_ptp_irq_handler+0x164/0x2a8
                      irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x78
                      irq_thread+0x130/0x278
                      kthread+0xec/0x110
                      ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28
    INITIAL USE at:
                     lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248
                     _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4c/0x68
                     lan966x_ptp_txtstamp_request+0x128/0x1cc
                     lan966x_port_xmit+0x224/0x43c
                     dev_hard_start_xmit+0xa8/0x2f0
                     sch_direct_xmit+0x108/0x2e8
                     __dev_queue_xmit+0x41c/0x1224
                     packet_sendmsg+0xdb4/0x134c
                     __sys_sendto+0xd0/0x154
                     sys_send+0x18/0x20
                     ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c
  }
  ... key      at: [<c174ba0c>] __key.2+0x0/0x8
  ... acquired at:
   _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4c/0x68
   lan966x_ptp_txtstamp_request+0x128/0x1cc
   lan966x_port_xmit+0x224/0x43c
   dev_hard_start_xmit+0xa8/0x2f0
   sch_direct_xmit+0x108/0x2e8
   __dev_queue_xmit+0x41c/0x1224
   packet_sendmsg+0xdb4/0x134c
   __sys_sendto+0xd0/0x154
   sys_send+0x18/0x20
   ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c

-> (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-.}-{2:2} {
   HARDIRQ-ON-W at:
                    lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248
                    _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48
                    netif_freeze_queues+0x38/0x68
                    dev_deactivate_many+0xac/0x388
                    dev_deactivate+0x38/0x6c
                    linkwatch_do_dev+0x70/0x8c
                    __linkwatch_run_queue+0xd4/0x1e8
                    linkwatch_event+0x24/0x34
                    process_one_work+0x284/0x744
                    worker_thread+0x28/0x4bc
                    kthread+0xec/0x110
                    ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28
   IN-SOFTIRQ-W at:
                    lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248
                    _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48
                    sch_direct_xmit+0x16c/0x2e8
                    __dev_queue_xmit+0x41c/0x1224
                    ip6_finish_output2+0x5f4/0xc64
                    ndisc_send_skb+0x4cc/0x81c
                    addrconf_rs_timer+0xb0/0x2f8
                    call_timer_fn+0xb4/0x33c
                    expire_timers+0xb4/0x10c
                    run_timer_softirq+0xf8/0x2a8
                    __do_softirq+0xd4/0x5fc
                    __irq_exit_rcu+0x138/0x17c
                    irq_exit+0x8/0x28
                    __irq_svc+0x90/0xbc
                    arch_cpu_idle+0x30/0x3c
                    default_idle_call+0x44/0xac
                    do_idle+0xc8/0x138
                    cpu_startup_entry+0x18/0x1c
                    rest_init+0xcc/0x168
                    arch_post_acpi_subsys_init+0x0/0x8
   INITIAL USE at:
                   lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248
                   _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48
                   netif_freeze_queues+0x38/0x68
                   dev_deactivate_many+0xac/0x388
                   dev_deactivate+0x38/0x6c
                   linkwatch_do_dev+0x70/0x8c
                   __linkwatch_run_queue+0xd4/0x1e8
                   linkwatch_event+0x24/0x34
                   process_one_work+0x284/0x744
                   worker_thread+0x28/0x4bc
                   kthread+0xec/0x110
                   ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28
 }
 ... key      at: [<c175974c>] netdev_xmit_lock_key+0x8/0x1c8
 ... acquired at:
   __lock_acquire+0x978/0x2978
   lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248
   _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48
   sch_direct_xmit+0x16c/0x2e8
   __dev_queue_xmit+0x41c/0x1224
   ip6_finish_output2+0x5f4/0xc64
   ndisc_send_skb+0x4cc/0x81c
   addrconf_rs_timer+0xb0/0x2f8
   call_timer_fn+0xb4/0x33c
   expire_timers+0xb4/0x10c
   run_timer_softirq+0xf8/0x2a8
   __do_softirq+0xd4/0x5fc
   __irq_exit_rcu+0x138/0x17c
   irq_exit+0x8/0x28
   __irq_svc+0x90/0xbc
   arch_cpu_idle+0x30/0x3c
   default_idle_call+0x44/0xac
   do_idle+0xc8/0x138
   cpu_startup_entry+0x18/0x1c
   rest_init+0xcc/0x168
   arch_post_acpi_subsys_init+0x0/0x8

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G                 N 6.2.0-rc7-01749-gc54e1f7f7e36 #2786
Hardware name: Generic DT based system
 unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x10/0x14
 show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x58/0x70
 dump_stack_lvl from mark_lock.part.0+0x59c/0x93c
 mark_lock.part.0 from __lock_acquire+0x978/0x2978
 __lock_acquire from lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248
 lock_acquire.part.0 from _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48
 _raw_spin_lock from sch_direct_xmit+0x16c/0x2e8
 sch_direct_xmit from __dev_queue_xmit+0x41c/0x1224
 __dev_queue_xmit from ip6_finish_output2+0x5f4/0xc64
 ip6_finish_output2 from ndisc_send_skb+0x4cc/0x81c
 ndisc_send_skb from addrconf_rs_timer+0xb0/0x2f8
 addrconf_rs_timer from call_timer_fn+0xb4/0x33c
 call_timer_fn from expire_timers+0xb4/0x10c
 expire_timers from run_timer_softirq+0xf8/0x2a8
 run_timer_softirq from __do_softirq+0xd4/0x5fc
 __do_softirq from __irq_exit_rcu+0x138/0x17c
 __irq_exit_rcu from irq_exit+0x8/0x28
 irq_exit from __irq_svc+0x90/0xbc
Exception stack(0xc1001f20 to 0xc1001f68)
1f20: ffffffff ffffffff 00000001 c011f840 c100e000 c100e000 c1009314 c1009370
1f40: c10f0c1a c0d5e564 c0f5da8c 00000000 00000000 c1001f70 c010f0bc c010f0c0
1f60: 600f0013 ffffffff
 __irq_svc from arch_cpu_idle+0x30/0x3c
 arch_cpu_idle from default_idle_call+0x44/0xac
 default_idle_call from do_idle+0xc8/0x138
 do_idle from cpu_startup_entry+0x18/0x1c
 cpu_startup_entry from rest_init+0xcc/0x168
 rest_init from arch_post_acpi_subsys_init+0x0/0x8

Fix this by using spin_lock_irqsave/spin_lock_irqrestore also
inside lan966x_ptp_irq_handler.

Fixes: e85a96e ("net: lan966x: Add support for ptp interrupts")
Signed-off-by: Horatiu Vultur <horatiu.vultur@microchip.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230217210917.2649365-1-horatiu.vultur@microchip.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 14, 2023
[ Upstream commit 91621be ]

When --overwrite and --max-size options of perf record are used
together, a segmentation fault occurs. The following is an example:

  # perf record -e sched:sched* --overwrite --max-size 1K -a -- sleep 1
  [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ]
  perf: Segmentation fault
  Obtained 12 stack frames.
  ./perf/perf(+0x197673) [0x55f99710b673]
  /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(+0x3ef0f) [0x7fa45f3cff0f]
  ./perf/perf(+0x8eb40) [0x55f997002b40]
  ./perf/perf(+0x1f6882) [0x55f99716a882]
  ./perf/perf(+0x794c2) [0x55f996fed4c2]
  ./perf/perf(+0x7b7c7) [0x55f996fef7c7]
  ./perf/perf(+0x9074b) [0x55f99700474b]
  ./perf/perf(+0x12e23c) [0x55f9970a223c]
  ./perf/perf(+0x12e54a) [0x55f9970a254a]
  ./perf/perf(+0x7db60) [0x55f996ff1b60]
  /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xe6) [0x7fa45f3b2c86]
  ./perf/perf(+0x7dfe9) [0x55f996ff1fe9]
  Segmentation fault (core dumped)

backtrace of the core file is as follows:

  (gdb) bt
  #0  record__bytes_written (rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:234
  #1  record__output_max_size_exceeded (rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:242
  #2  record__write (map=0x0, size=12816, bf=0x55f9978da2e0, rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:263
  #3  process_synthesized_event (tool=tool@entry=0x55f99755a200 <record>, event=event@entry=0x55f9978da2e0, sample=sample@entry=0x0, machine=machine@entry=0x55f997893658) at builtin-record.c:618
  #4  0x000055f99716a883 in __perf_event__synthesize_id_index (tool=tool@entry=0x55f99755a200 <record>, process=process@entry=0x55f997002aa0 <process_synthesized_event>, evlist=0x55f9978928b0, machine=machine@entry=0x55f997893658,
      from=from@entry=0) at util/synthetic-events.c:1895
  #5  0x000055f99716a91f in perf_event__synthesize_id_index (tool=tool@entry=0x55f99755a200 <record>, process=process@entry=0x55f997002aa0 <process_synthesized_event>, evlist=<optimized out>, machine=machine@entry=0x55f997893658)
      at util/synthetic-events.c:1905
  #6  0x000055f996fed4c3 in record__synthesize (tail=tail@entry=true, rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:1997
  #7  0x000055f996fef7c8 in __cmd_record (argc=argc@entry=2, argv=argv@entry=0x7ffc67551260, rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:2802
  #8  0x000055f99700474c in cmd_record (argc=<optimized out>, argv=0x7ffc67551260) at builtin-record.c:4258
  #9  0x000055f9970a223d in run_builtin (p=0x55f997564d88 <commands+264>, argc=10, argv=0x7ffc67551260) at perf.c:330
  #10 0x000055f9970a254b in handle_internal_command (argc=10, argv=0x7ffc67551260) at perf.c:384
  #11 0x000055f996ff1b61 in run_argv (argcp=<synthetic pointer>, argv=<synthetic pointer>) at perf.c:428
  #12 main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=0x7ffc67551260) at perf.c:562

The reason is that record__bytes_written accesses the freed memory rec->thread_data,
The process is as follows:
  __cmd_record
    -> record__free_thread_data
      -> zfree(&rec->thread_data)         // free rec->thread_data
    -> record__synthesize
      -> perf_event__synthesize_id_index
        -> process_synthesized_event
          -> record__write
            -> record__bytes_written      // access rec->thread_data

We add a member variable "thread_bytes_written" in the struct "record"
to save the data size written by the threads.

Fixes: 6d57581 ("perf record: Add support for limit perf output file size")
Signed-off-by: Yang Jihong <yangjihong1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiwei Sun <jiwei.sun@windriver.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAM9d7ci_TRrqBQVQNW8=GwakUr7SsZpYxaaty-S4bxF8zJWyqw@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 14, 2023
…dler

commit 42e19e6 upstream.

Recent test_kprobe_missed kprobes kunit test uncovers the following error
(reported when CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP is enabled):

BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:580
in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 662, name: kunit_try_catch
preempt_count: 0, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
no locks held by kunit_try_catch/662.
irq event stamp: 280
hardirqs last  enabled at (279): [<00000003e60a3d42>] __do_pgm_check+0x17a/0x1c0
hardirqs last disabled at (280): [<00000003e3bd774a>] kprobe_exceptions_notify+0x27a/0x318
softirqs last  enabled at (0): [<00000003e3c5c890>] copy_process+0x14a8/0x4c80
softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
CPU: 46 PID: 662 Comm: kunit_try_catch Tainted: G                 N 6.2.0-173644-g44c18d77f0c0 #2
Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 704 (LPAR)
Call Trace:
 [<00000003e60a3a00>] dump_stack_lvl+0x120/0x198
 [<00000003e3d02e82>] __might_resched+0x60a/0x668
 [<00000003e60b9908>] __mutex_lock+0xc0/0x14e0
 [<00000003e60bad5a>] mutex_lock_nested+0x32/0x40
 [<00000003e3f7b460>] unregister_kprobe+0x30/0xd8
 [<00000003e51b2602>] test_kprobe_missed+0xf2/0x268
 [<00000003e51b5406>] kunit_try_run_case+0x10e/0x290
 [<00000003e51b7dfa>] kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x62/0xb8
 [<00000003e3ce30f8>] kthread+0x2d0/0x398
 [<00000003e3b96afa>] __ret_from_fork+0x8a/0xe8
 [<00000003e60ccada>] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x40

The reason for this error report is that kprobes handling code failed
to restore irqs.

The problem is that when kprobe is triggered from another kprobe
post_handler current sequence of enable_singlestep / disable_singlestep
is the following:
enable_singlestep  <- original kprobe (saves kprobe_saved_imask)
enable_singlestep  <- kprobe triggered from post_handler (clobbers kprobe_saved_imask)
disable_singlestep <- kprobe triggered from post_handler (restores kprobe_saved_imask)
disable_singlestep <- original kprobe (restores wrong clobbered kprobe_saved_imask)

There is just one kprobe_ctlblk per cpu and both calls saves and
loads irq mask to kprobe_saved_imask. To fix the problem simply move
resume_execution (which calls disable_singlestep) before calling
post_handler. This also fixes the problem that post_handler is called
with pt_regs which were not yet adjusted after single-stepping.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 4ba069b ("[S390] add kprobes support.")
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 14, 2023
commit 60eed1e upstream.

code path:

ocfs2_ioctl_move_extents
 ocfs2_move_extents
  ocfs2_defrag_extent
   __ocfs2_move_extent
    + ocfs2_journal_access_di
    + ocfs2_split_extent  //sub-paths call jbd2_journal_restart
    + ocfs2_journal_dirty //crash by jbs2 ASSERT

crash stacks:

PID: 11297  TASK: ffff974a676dcd00  CPU: 67  COMMAND: "defragfs.ocfs2"
 #0 [ffffb25d8dad3900] machine_kexec at ffffffff8386fe01
 #1 [ffffb25d8dad3958] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8395959d
 #2 [ffffb25d8dad3a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff8395a45d
 #3 [ffffb25d8dad3a38] oops_end at ffffffff83836d3f
 #4 [ffffb25d8dad3a58] do_trap at ffffffff83833205
 #5 [ffffb25d8dad3aa0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff83833aa6
 #6 [ffffb25d8dad3ac0] invalid_op at ffffffff84200d18
    [exception RIP: jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata+0x2ba]
    RIP: ffffffffc09ca54a  RSP: ffffb25d8dad3b70  RFLAGS: 00010207
    RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: ffff9706eedc5248  RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 0000000000000001  RSI: ffff97337029ea28  RDI: ffff9706eedc5250
    RBP: ffff9703c3520200   R8: 000000000f46b0b2   R9: 0000000000000000
    R10: 0000000000000001  R11: 00000001000000fe  R12: ffff97337029ea28
    R13: 0000000000000000  R14: ffff9703de59bf60  R15: ffff9706eedc5250
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #7 [ffffb25d8dad3ba8] ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc137fb95 [ocfs2]
 #8 [ffffb25d8dad3be8] __ocfs2_move_extent at ffffffffc139a950 [ocfs2]
 #9 [ffffb25d8dad3c80] ocfs2_defrag_extent at ffffffffc139b2d2 [ocfs2]

Analysis

This bug has the same root cause of 'commit 7f27ec9 ("ocfs2: call
ocfs2_journal_access_di() before ocfs2_journal_dirty() in
ocfs2_write_end_nolock()")'.  For this bug, jbd2_journal_restart() is
called by ocfs2_split_extent() during defragmenting.

How to fix

For ocfs2_split_extent() can handle journal operations totally by itself.
Caller doesn't need to call journal access/dirty pair, and caller only
needs to call journal start/stop pair.  The fix method is to remove
journal access/dirty from __ocfs2_move_extent().

The discussion for this patch:
https://oss.oracle.com/pipermail/ocfs2-devel/2023-February/000647.html

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230217003717.32469-1-heming.zhao@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 14, 2023
[ Upstream commit e9e4229 ]

The TC architecture allows filters and actions to be created independently.
In filters the user can reference action objects using:
tc action add action pedit ... index 1
tc filter add ... action pedit index 1

In the current code for act_pedit this is broken as it checks netlink
attributes for create/update before actually checking if we are binding to an
existing action.

tdc results:
1..69
ok 1 319a - Add pedit action that mangles IP TTL
ok 2 7e67 - Replace pedit action with invalid goto chain
ok 3 377e - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32
ok 4 a0ca - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 (INVALID)
ok 5 dd8a - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16 u16
ok 6 53db - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16 (INVALID)
ok 7 5c7e - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u8 add value
ok 8 2893 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u8 quad
ok 9 3a07 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u8-u16-u8
ok 10 ab0f - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16-u8-u8
ok 11 9d12 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 set u16 clear u8 invert
ok 12 ebfa - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset overflow u32 (INVALID)
ok 13 f512 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16 at offmask shift set
ok 14 c2cb - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 retain value
ok 15 1762 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u8 clear value
ok 16 bcee - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u8 retain value
ok 17 e89f - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16 retain value
ok 18 c282 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 clear value
ok 19 c422 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16 invert value
ok 20 d3d3 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 invert value
ok 21 57e5 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u8 preserve value
ok 22 99e0 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16 preserve value
ok 23 1892 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 preserve value
ok 24 4b60 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP negative offset u16/u32 set value
ok 25 a5a7 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth set src
ok 26 86d4 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth set src & dst
ok 27 f8a9 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth set dst
ok 28 c715 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth set src (INVALID)
ok 29 8131 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth set dst (INVALID)
ok 30 ba22 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth type set/clear sequence
ok 31 dec4 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth set type (INVALID)
ok 32 ab06 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth add type
ok 33 918d - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth invert src
ok 34 a8d4 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth invert dst
ok 35 ee13 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth invert type
ok 36 7588 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set src
ok 37 0fa7 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set dst
ok 38 5810 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set src & dst
ok 39 1092 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set ihl & dsfield
ok 40 02d8 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set ttl & protocol
ok 41 3e2d - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set ttl (INVALID)
ok 42 31ae - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip ttl clear/set
ok 43 486f - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set duplicate fields
ok 44 e790 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set ce, df, mf, firstfrag, nofrag fields
ok 45 cc8a - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set tos
ok 46 7a17 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set precedence
ok 47 c3b6 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip add tos
ok 48 43d3 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip add precedence
ok 49 438e - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip clear tos
ok 50 6b1b - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip clear precedence
ok 51 824a - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip invert tos
ok 52 106f - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip invert precedence
ok 53 6829 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP beyond ip set dport & sport
ok 54 afd8 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP beyond ip set icmp_type & icmp_code
ok 55 3143 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP beyond ip set dport (INVALID)
ok 56 815c - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 set src
ok 57 4dae - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 set dst
ok 58 fc1f - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 set src & dst
ok 59 6d34 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 dst retain value (INVALID)
ok 60 94bb - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 traffic_class
ok 61 6f5e - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 flow_lbl
ok 62 6795 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 set payload_len, nexthdr, hoplimit
ok 63 1442 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP tcp set dport & sport
ok 64 b7ac - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP tcp sport set (INVALID)
ok 65 cfcc - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP tcp flags set
ok 66 3bc4 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP tcp set dport, sport & flags fields
ok 67 f1c8 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP udp set dport & sport
ok 68 d784 - Add pedit action with mixed RAW/LAYERED_OP #1
ok 69 70ca - Add pedit action with mixed RAW/LAYERED_OP #2

Fixes: 71d0ed7 ("net/act_pedit: Support using offset relative to the conventional network headers")
Fixes: f67169f ("net/sched: act_pedit: fix WARN() in the traffic path")
Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 14, 2023
[ Upstream commit 3dca1f8 ]

Don't hold sdw_dev_lock while calling the peripheral driver
probe() and remove() callbacks.

Holding sdw_dev_lock around the probe() and remove() calls causes
a theoretical mutex inversion which lockdep will assert on.

During probe() the sdw_dev_lock mutex is taken first and then
ASoC/ALSA locks are taken by the probe() implementation.

During normal operation ASoC can take its locks and then trigger
a runtime resume of the component. The SoundWire resume will then
take sdw_dev_lock. This is the reverse order compared to probe().

It's not necessary to hold sdw_dev_lock when calling the probe()
and remove(), it is only used to prevent the bus core calling the
driver callbacks if there isn't a driver or the driver is removing.

All calls to the driver callbacks are guarded by the 'probed' flag.
So if sdw_dev_lock is held while setting and clearing the 'probed'
flag this is sufficient to guarantee the safety of callback
functions.

Removing the mutex from around the call to probe() means that it
is now possible for a bus event (PING response) to be handled in
parallel with the probe(). But sdw_bus_probe() already has
handling for this by calling the device update_status() after
the probe() has completed.

Example lockdep assert:
[   46.098514] ======================================================
[   46.104736] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[   46.110961] 6.1.0-rc4-jamerson #1 Tainted: G            E
[   46.116842] ------------------------------------------------------
[   46.123063] mpg123/1130 is trying to acquire lock:
[   46.127883] ffff8b445031fb80 (&slave->sdw_dev_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70
[   46.137225]
               but task is already holding lock:
[   46.143074] ffffffffc1455310 (&card->pcm_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dpcm_fe_dai_open+0x49/0x830
[   46.151536]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.[   46.159732]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[   46.167231]
               -> #4 (&card->pcm_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[   46.173428]        __mutex_lock+0x94/0x920
[   46.177542]        snd_soc_dpcm_runtime_update+0x2e/0x100
[   46.182958]        snd_soc_dapm_put_enum_double+0x1c2/0x200
[   46.188548]        snd_ctl_elem_write+0x10c/0x1d0
[   46.193268]        snd_ctl_ioctl+0x126/0x850
[   46.197556]        __x64_sys_ioctl+0x87/0xc0
[   46.201845]        do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[   46.205959]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[   46.211553]
               -> #3 (&card->controls_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}:
[   46.218188]        down_write+0x2b/0xd0
[   46.222038]        snd_ctl_add_replace+0x39/0xb0
[   46.226672]        snd_soc_add_controls+0x53/0x80
[   46.231393]        soc_probe_component+0x1e4/0x2a0
[   46.236202]        snd_soc_bind_card+0x51a/0xc80
[   46.240836]        devm_snd_soc_register_card+0x43/0x90
[   46.246079]        mc_probe+0x982/0xfe0 [snd_soc_sof_sdw]
[   46.251500]        platform_probe+0x3c/0xa0
[   46.255700]        really_probe+0xde/0x390
[   46.259814]        __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x180
[   46.264710]        driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x90
[   46.269347]        __driver_attach+0x9f/0x1f0
[   46.273721]        bus_for_each_dev+0x78/0xc0
[   46.278098]        bus_add_driver+0x1ac/0x200
[   46.282473]        driver_register+0x8f/0xf0
[   46.286759]        do_one_initcall+0x58/0x310
[   46.291136]        do_init_module+0x4c/0x1f0
[   46.295422]        __do_sys_finit_module+0xb4/0x130
[   46.300321]        do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[   46.304434]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[   46.310027]
               -> #2 (&card->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[   46.315883]        __mutex_lock+0x94/0x920
[   46.320000]        snd_soc_bind_card+0x3e/0xc80
[   46.324551]        devm_snd_soc_register_card+0x43/0x90
[   46.329798]        mc_probe+0x982/0xfe0 [snd_soc_sof_sdw]
[   46.335219]        platform_probe+0x3c/0xa0
[   46.339420]        really_probe+0xde/0x390
[   46.343532]        __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x180
[   46.348430]        driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x90
[   46.353065]        __driver_attach+0x9f/0x1f0
[   46.357437]        bus_for_each_dev+0x78/0xc0
[   46.361812]        bus_add_driver+0x1ac/0x200
[   46.366716]        driver_register+0x8f/0xf0
[   46.371528]        do_one_initcall+0x58/0x310
[   46.376424]        do_init_module+0x4c/0x1f0
[   46.381239]        __do_sys_finit_module+0xb4/0x130
[   46.386665]        do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[   46.391299]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[   46.397416]
               -> #1 (client_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[   46.404307]        __mutex_lock+0x94/0x920
[   46.408941]        snd_soc_add_component+0x24/0x2c0
[   46.414345]        devm_snd_soc_register_component+0x54/0xa0
[   46.420522]        cs35l56_common_probe+0x280/0x370 [snd_soc_cs35l56]
[   46.427487]        cs35l56_sdw_probe+0xf4/0x170 [snd_soc_cs35l56_sdw]
[   46.434442]        sdw_drv_probe+0x80/0x1a0
[   46.439136]        really_probe+0xde/0x390
[   46.443738]        __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x180
[   46.449120]        driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x90
[   46.454247]        __driver_attach+0x9f/0x1f0
[   46.459106]        bus_for_each_dev+0x78/0xc0
[   46.463971]        bus_add_driver+0x1ac/0x200
[   46.468825]        driver_register+0x8f/0xf0
[   46.473592]        do_one_initcall+0x58/0x310
[   46.478441]        do_init_module+0x4c/0x1f0
[   46.483202]        __do_sys_finit_module+0xb4/0x130
[   46.488572]        do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[   46.493158]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[   46.499229]
               -> #0 (&slave->sdw_dev_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[   46.506737]        __lock_acquire+0x1121/0x1df0
[   46.511765]        lock_acquire+0xd5/0x300
[   46.516360]        __mutex_lock+0x94/0x920
[   46.520949]        sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70
[   46.526409]        sdw_clear_slave_status+0xd8/0xe0
[   46.531783]        intel_resume_runtime+0x139/0x2a0
[   46.537155]        __rpm_callback+0x41/0x120
[   46.541919]        rpm_callback+0x5d/0x70
[   46.546422]        rpm_resume+0x531/0x7e0
[   46.550920]        __pm_runtime_resume+0x4a/0x80
[   46.556024]        snd_soc_pcm_component_pm_runtime_get+0x2f/0xc0
[   46.562611]        __soc_pcm_open+0x62/0x520
[   46.567375]        dpcm_be_dai_startup+0x116/0x210
[   46.572661]        dpcm_fe_dai_open+0xf7/0x830
[   46.577597]        snd_pcm_open_substream+0x54a/0x8b0
[   46.583145]        snd_pcm_open.part.0+0xdc/0x200
[   46.588341]        snd_pcm_playback_open+0x51/0x80
[   46.593625]        chrdev_open+0xc0/0x250
[   46.598129]        do_dentry_open+0x15f/0x430
[   46.602981]        path_openat+0x75e/0xa80
[   46.607575]        do_filp_open+0xb2/0x160
[   46.612162]        do_sys_openat2+0x9a/0x160
[   46.616922]        __x64_sys_openat+0x53/0xa0
[   46.621767]        do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[   46.626352]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[   46.632414]
               other info that might help us debug this:[   46.641862] Chain exists of:
                 &slave->sdw_dev_lock --> &card->controls_rwsem --> &card->pcm_mutex[   46.655145]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:[   46.662048]        CPU0                    CPU1
[   46.667080]        ----                    ----
[   46.672108]   lock(&card->pcm_mutex);
[   46.676267]                                lock(&card->controls_rwsem);
[   46.683382]                                lock(&card->pcm_mutex);
[   46.690063]   lock(&slave->sdw_dev_lock);
[   46.694574]
                *** DEADLOCK ***[   46.701942] 2 locks held by mpg123/1130:
[   46.706356]  #0: ffff8b4457b22b90 (&pcm->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: snd_pcm_open.part.0+0xc9/0x200
[   46.715999]  #1: ffffffffc1455310 (&card->pcm_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dpcm_fe_dai_open+0x49/0x830
[   46.725390]
               stack backtrace:
[   46.730752] CPU: 0 PID: 1130 Comm: mpg123 Tainted: G            E      6.1.0-rc4-jamerson #1
[   46.739703] Hardware name: AAEON UP-WHL01/UP-WHL01, BIOS UPW1AM19 11/10/2020
[   46.747270] Call Trace:
[   46.750239]  <TASK>
[   46.752857]  dump_stack_lvl+0x56/0x73
[   46.757045]  check_noncircular+0x102/0x120
[   46.761664]  __lock_acquire+0x1121/0x1df0
[   46.766197]  lock_acquire+0xd5/0x300
[   46.770292]  ? sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70
[   46.775432]  ? lock_is_held_type+0xe2/0x140
[   46.780143]  __mutex_lock+0x94/0x920
[   46.784241]  ? sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70
[   46.789387]  ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
[   46.793750]  ? sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70
[   46.798894]  ? lock_release+0x147/0x2f0
[   46.803262]  ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x47/0x250
[   46.808315]  ? sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70
[   46.813456]  sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70
[   46.818422]  sdw_clear_slave_status+0xd8/0xe0
[   46.823302]  ? pm_generic_runtime_suspend+0x30/0x30
[   46.828706]  intel_resume_runtime+0x139/0x2a0
[   46.833583]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x50
[   46.838462]  ? pm_generic_runtime_suspend+0x30/0x30
[   46.843866]  __rpm_callback+0x41/0x120
[   46.848142]  ? pm_generic_runtime_suspend+0x30/0x30
[   46.853550]  rpm_callback+0x5d/0x70
[   46.857568]  rpm_resume+0x531/0x7e0
[   46.861578]  ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x62/0x70
[   46.866634]  __pm_runtime_resume+0x4a/0x80
[   46.871258]  snd_soc_pcm_component_pm_runtime_get+0x2f/0xc0
[   46.877358]  __soc_pcm_open+0x62/0x520
[   46.881634]  ? dpcm_add_paths.isra.0+0x35d/0x4c0
[   46.886784]  dpcm_be_dai_startup+0x116/0x210
[   46.891592]  dpcm_fe_dai_open+0xf7/0x830
[   46.896046]  ? debug_mutex_init+0x33/0x50
[   46.900591]  snd_pcm_open_substream+0x54a/0x8b0
[   46.905658]  snd_pcm_open.part.0+0xdc/0x200
[   46.910376]  ? wake_up_q+0x90/0x90
[   46.914312]  snd_pcm_playback_open+0x51/0x80
[   46.919118]  chrdev_open+0xc0/0x250
[   46.923147]  ? cdev_device_add+0x90/0x90
[   46.927608]  do_dentry_open+0x15f/0x430
[   46.931976]  path_openat+0x75e/0xa80
[   46.936086]  do_filp_open+0xb2/0x160
[   46.940194]  ? lock_release+0x147/0x2f0
[   46.944563]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x50
[   46.949101]  do_sys_openat2+0x9a/0x160
[   46.953377]  __x64_sys_openat+0x53/0xa0
[   46.957733]  do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[   46.961829]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[   46.967402] RIP: 0033:0x7fa6397ccd3b
[   46.971506] Code: 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 4b 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 67 44 89 e2 48 89 ee bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 91 00 00 00 48 8b 4c 24 28 64 48 33 0c 25
[   46.991413] RSP: 002b:00007fff838e8990 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101
[   46.999580] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000080802 RCX: 00007fa6397ccd3b
[   47.007311] RDX: 0000000000080802 RSI: 00007fff838e8b50 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c
[   47.015047] RBP: 00007fff838e8b50 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000011
[   47.022787] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000080802
[   47.030539] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007fff838e8b50
[   47.038289]  </TASK>

Signed-off-by: Richard Fitzgerald <rf@opensource.cirrus.com>
Reviewed-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230123172520.339367-1-rf@opensource.cirrus.com
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 14, 2023
commit 0e68b55 upstream.

Running a rt-kernel base on 6.2.0-rc3-rt1 on an Ampere Altra outputs
the following:
  BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:46
  in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 9, name: kworker/u320:0
  preempt_count: 2, expected: 0
  RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
  3 locks held by kworker/u320:0/9:
  #0: ffff3fff8c27d128 ((wq_completion)efi_rts_wq){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work (./include/linux/atomic/atomic-long.h:41)
  #1: ffff80000861bdd0 ((work_completion)(&efi_rts_work.work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work (./include/linux/atomic/atomic-long.h:41)
  #2: ffffdf7e1ed3e460 (efi_rt_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: efi_call_rts (drivers/firmware/efi/runtime-wrappers.c:101)
  Preemption disabled at:
  efi_virtmap_load (./arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu_context.h:248)
  CPU: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/u320:0 Tainted: G        W          6.2.0-rc3-rt1
  Hardware name: WIWYNN Mt.Jade Server System B81.03001.0005/Mt.Jade Motherboard, BIOS 1.08.20220218 (SCP: 1.08.20220218) 2022/02/18
  Workqueue: efi_rts_wq efi_call_rts
  Call trace:
  dump_backtrace (arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:158)
  show_stack (arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:165)
  dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:107 (discriminator 4))
  dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:114)
  __might_resched (kernel/sched/core.c:10134)
  rt_spin_lock (kernel/locking/rtmutex.c:1769 (discriminator 4))
  efi_call_rts (drivers/firmware/efi/runtime-wrappers.c:101)
  [...]

This seems to come from commit ff7a167 ("arm64: efi: Execute
runtime services from a dedicated stack") which adds a spinlock. This
spinlock is taken through:
efi_call_rts()
\-efi_call_virt()
  \-efi_call_virt_pointer()
    \-arch_efi_call_virt_setup()

Make 'efi_rt_lock' a raw_spinlock to avoid being preempted.

[ardb: The EFI runtime services are called with a different set of
       translation tables, and are permitted to use the SIMD registers.
       The context switch code preserves/restores neither, and so EFI
       calls must be made with preemption disabled, rather than only
       disabling migration.]

Fixes: ff7a167 ("arm64: efi: Execute runtime services from a dedicated stack")
Signed-off-by: Pierre Gondois <pierre.gondois@arm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.1+
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 15, 2023
[ Upstream commit e40b801 ]

There is a certain chance to trigger the following panic:

PID: 5900   TASK: ffff88c1c8af4100  CPU: 1   COMMAND: "kworker/1:48"
 #0 [ffff9456c1cc79a0] machine_kexec at ffffffff870665b7
 #1 [ffff9456c1cc79f0] __crash_kexec at ffffffff871b4c7a
 #2 [ffff9456c1cc7ab0] crash_kexec at ffffffff871b5b60
 #3 [ffff9456c1cc7ac0] oops_end at ffffffff87026ce7
 #4 [ffff9456c1cc7ae0] page_fault_oops at ffffffff87075715
 #5 [ffff9456c1cc7b58] exc_page_fault at ffffffff87ad0654
 #6 [ffff9456c1cc7b80] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff87c00b62
    [exception RIP: ib_alloc_mr+19]
    RIP: ffffffffc0c9cce3  RSP: ffff9456c1cc7c38  RFLAGS: 00010202
    RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: 0000000000000002  RCX: 0000000000000004
    RDX: 0000000000000010  RSI: 0000000000000000  RDI: 0000000000000000
    RBP: ffff88c1ea281d00   R8: 000000020a34ffff   R9: ffff88c1350bbb20
    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000001  R12: 0000000000000000
    R13: 0000000000000010  R14: ffff88c1ab040a50  R15: ffff88c1ea281d00
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #7 [ffff9456c1cc7c60] smc_ib_get_memory_region at ffffffffc0aff6df [smc]
 #8 [ffff9456c1cc7c88] smcr_buf_map_link at ffffffffc0b0278c [smc]
 #9 [ffff9456c1cc7ce0] __smc_buf_create at ffffffffc0b03586 [smc]

The reason here is that when the server tries to create a second link,
smc_llc_srv_add_link() has no protection and may add a new link to
link group. This breaks the security environment protected by
llc_conf_mutex.

Fixes: 2d2209f ("net/smc: first part of add link processing as SMC server")
Signed-off-by: D. Wythe <alibuda@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Larysa Zaremba <larysa.zaremba@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Wenjia Zhang <wenjia@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 15, 2023
[ Upstream commit 3a70e0d ]

When doing timestamping in lan966x and having PROVE_LOCKING
enabled the following warning is shown.

========================================================
WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected
6.2.0-rc7-01749-gc54e1f7f7e36 #2786 Tainted: G                 N
--------------------------------------------------------
swapper/0/0 just changed the state of lock:
c2609f5 (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sch_direct_xmit+0x16c/0x2e8
but this lock took another, SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock in the past:
 (&lan966x->ptp_ts_id_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}

and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them.

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&lan966x->ptp_ts_id_lock);
                               local_irq_disable();
                               lock(_xmit_ETHER#2);
                               lock(&lan966x->ptp_ts_id_lock);
  <Interrupt>
    lock(_xmit_ETHER#2);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

5 locks held by swapper/0/0:
 #0: c1001e18 ((&ndev->rs_timer)){+.-.}-{0:0}, at: call_timer_fn+0x0/0x33c
 #1: c105e7c4 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ndisc_send_skb+0x134/0x81c
 #2: c105e7d8 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: ip6_finish_output2+0x17c/0xc64
 #3: c105e7d8 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x4c/0x1224
 #4: c3056174 (dev->qdisc_tx_busylock ?: &qdisc_tx_busylock){+...}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x354/0x1224

the shortest dependencies between 2nd lock and 1st lock:
 -> (&lan966x->ptp_ts_id_lock){+.+.}-{2:2} {
    HARDIRQ-ON-W at:
                      lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248
                      _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48
                      lan966x_ptp_irq_handler+0x164/0x2a8
                      irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x78
                      irq_thread+0x130/0x278
                      kthread+0xec/0x110
                      ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28
    SOFTIRQ-ON-W at:
                      lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248
                      _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48
                      lan966x_ptp_irq_handler+0x164/0x2a8
                      irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x78
                      irq_thread+0x130/0x278
                      kthread+0xec/0x110
                      ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28
    INITIAL USE at:
                     lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248
                     _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4c/0x68
                     lan966x_ptp_txtstamp_request+0x128/0x1cc
                     lan966x_port_xmit+0x224/0x43c
                     dev_hard_start_xmit+0xa8/0x2f0
                     sch_direct_xmit+0x108/0x2e8
                     __dev_queue_xmit+0x41c/0x1224
                     packet_sendmsg+0xdb4/0x134c
                     __sys_sendto+0xd0/0x154
                     sys_send+0x18/0x20
                     ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c
  }
  ... key      at: [<c174ba0c>] __key.2+0x0/0x8
  ... acquired at:
   _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4c/0x68
   lan966x_ptp_txtstamp_request+0x128/0x1cc
   lan966x_port_xmit+0x224/0x43c
   dev_hard_start_xmit+0xa8/0x2f0
   sch_direct_xmit+0x108/0x2e8
   __dev_queue_xmit+0x41c/0x1224
   packet_sendmsg+0xdb4/0x134c
   __sys_sendto+0xd0/0x154
   sys_send+0x18/0x20
   ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c

-> (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-.}-{2:2} {
   HARDIRQ-ON-W at:
                    lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248
                    _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48
                    netif_freeze_queues+0x38/0x68
                    dev_deactivate_many+0xac/0x388
                    dev_deactivate+0x38/0x6c
                    linkwatch_do_dev+0x70/0x8c
                    __linkwatch_run_queue+0xd4/0x1e8
                    linkwatch_event+0x24/0x34
                    process_one_work+0x284/0x744
                    worker_thread+0x28/0x4bc
                    kthread+0xec/0x110
                    ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28
   IN-SOFTIRQ-W at:
                    lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248
                    _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48
                    sch_direct_xmit+0x16c/0x2e8
                    __dev_queue_xmit+0x41c/0x1224
                    ip6_finish_output2+0x5f4/0xc64
                    ndisc_send_skb+0x4cc/0x81c
                    addrconf_rs_timer+0xb0/0x2f8
                    call_timer_fn+0xb4/0x33c
                    expire_timers+0xb4/0x10c
                    run_timer_softirq+0xf8/0x2a8
                    __do_softirq+0xd4/0x5fc
                    __irq_exit_rcu+0x138/0x17c
                    irq_exit+0x8/0x28
                    __irq_svc+0x90/0xbc
                    arch_cpu_idle+0x30/0x3c
                    default_idle_call+0x44/0xac
                    do_idle+0xc8/0x138
                    cpu_startup_entry+0x18/0x1c
                    rest_init+0xcc/0x168
                    arch_post_acpi_subsys_init+0x0/0x8
   INITIAL USE at:
                   lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248
                   _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48
                   netif_freeze_queues+0x38/0x68
                   dev_deactivate_many+0xac/0x388
                   dev_deactivate+0x38/0x6c
                   linkwatch_do_dev+0x70/0x8c
                   __linkwatch_run_queue+0xd4/0x1e8
                   linkwatch_event+0x24/0x34
                   process_one_work+0x284/0x744
                   worker_thread+0x28/0x4bc
                   kthread+0xec/0x110
                   ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28
 }
 ... key      at: [<c175974c>] netdev_xmit_lock_key+0x8/0x1c8
 ... acquired at:
   __lock_acquire+0x978/0x2978
   lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248
   _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48
   sch_direct_xmit+0x16c/0x2e8
   __dev_queue_xmit+0x41c/0x1224
   ip6_finish_output2+0x5f4/0xc64
   ndisc_send_skb+0x4cc/0x81c
   addrconf_rs_timer+0xb0/0x2f8
   call_timer_fn+0xb4/0x33c
   expire_timers+0xb4/0x10c
   run_timer_softirq+0xf8/0x2a8
   __do_softirq+0xd4/0x5fc
   __irq_exit_rcu+0x138/0x17c
   irq_exit+0x8/0x28
   __irq_svc+0x90/0xbc
   arch_cpu_idle+0x30/0x3c
   default_idle_call+0x44/0xac
   do_idle+0xc8/0x138
   cpu_startup_entry+0x18/0x1c
   rest_init+0xcc/0x168
   arch_post_acpi_subsys_init+0x0/0x8

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G                 N 6.2.0-rc7-01749-gc54e1f7f7e36 #2786
Hardware name: Generic DT based system
 unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x10/0x14
 show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x58/0x70
 dump_stack_lvl from mark_lock.part.0+0x59c/0x93c
 mark_lock.part.0 from __lock_acquire+0x978/0x2978
 __lock_acquire from lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248
 lock_acquire.part.0 from _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48
 _raw_spin_lock from sch_direct_xmit+0x16c/0x2e8
 sch_direct_xmit from __dev_queue_xmit+0x41c/0x1224
 __dev_queue_xmit from ip6_finish_output2+0x5f4/0xc64
 ip6_finish_output2 from ndisc_send_skb+0x4cc/0x81c
 ndisc_send_skb from addrconf_rs_timer+0xb0/0x2f8
 addrconf_rs_timer from call_timer_fn+0xb4/0x33c
 call_timer_fn from expire_timers+0xb4/0x10c
 expire_timers from run_timer_softirq+0xf8/0x2a8
 run_timer_softirq from __do_softirq+0xd4/0x5fc
 __do_softirq from __irq_exit_rcu+0x138/0x17c
 __irq_exit_rcu from irq_exit+0x8/0x28
 irq_exit from __irq_svc+0x90/0xbc
Exception stack(0xc1001f20 to 0xc1001f68)
1f20: ffffffff ffffffff 00000001 c011f840 c100e000 c100e000 c1009314 c1009370
1f40: c10f0c1a c0d5e564 c0f5da8c 00000000 00000000 c1001f70 c010f0bc c010f0c0
1f60: 600f0013 ffffffff
 __irq_svc from arch_cpu_idle+0x30/0x3c
 arch_cpu_idle from default_idle_call+0x44/0xac
 default_idle_call from do_idle+0xc8/0x138
 do_idle from cpu_startup_entry+0x18/0x1c
 cpu_startup_entry from rest_init+0xcc/0x168
 rest_init from arch_post_acpi_subsys_init+0x0/0x8

Fix this by using spin_lock_irqsave/spin_lock_irqrestore also
inside lan966x_ptp_irq_handler.

Fixes: e85a96e ("net: lan966x: Add support for ptp interrupts")
Signed-off-by: Horatiu Vultur <horatiu.vultur@microchip.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230217210917.2649365-1-horatiu.vultur@microchip.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 15, 2023
[ Upstream commit 91621be ]

When --overwrite and --max-size options of perf record are used
together, a segmentation fault occurs. The following is an example:

  # perf record -e sched:sched* --overwrite --max-size 1K -a -- sleep 1
  [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ]
  perf: Segmentation fault
  Obtained 12 stack frames.
  ./perf/perf(+0x197673) [0x55f99710b673]
  /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(+0x3ef0f) [0x7fa45f3cff0f]
  ./perf/perf(+0x8eb40) [0x55f997002b40]
  ./perf/perf(+0x1f6882) [0x55f99716a882]
  ./perf/perf(+0x794c2) [0x55f996fed4c2]
  ./perf/perf(+0x7b7c7) [0x55f996fef7c7]
  ./perf/perf(+0x9074b) [0x55f99700474b]
  ./perf/perf(+0x12e23c) [0x55f9970a223c]
  ./perf/perf(+0x12e54a) [0x55f9970a254a]
  ./perf/perf(+0x7db60) [0x55f996ff1b60]
  /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xe6) [0x7fa45f3b2c86]
  ./perf/perf(+0x7dfe9) [0x55f996ff1fe9]
  Segmentation fault (core dumped)

backtrace of the core file is as follows:

  (gdb) bt
  #0  record__bytes_written (rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:234
  #1  record__output_max_size_exceeded (rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:242
  #2  record__write (map=0x0, size=12816, bf=0x55f9978da2e0, rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:263
  #3  process_synthesized_event (tool=tool@entry=0x55f99755a200 <record>, event=event@entry=0x55f9978da2e0, sample=sample@entry=0x0, machine=machine@entry=0x55f997893658) at builtin-record.c:618
  #4  0x000055f99716a883 in __perf_event__synthesize_id_index (tool=tool@entry=0x55f99755a200 <record>, process=process@entry=0x55f997002aa0 <process_synthesized_event>, evlist=0x55f9978928b0, machine=machine@entry=0x55f997893658,
      from=from@entry=0) at util/synthetic-events.c:1895
  #5  0x000055f99716a91f in perf_event__synthesize_id_index (tool=tool@entry=0x55f99755a200 <record>, process=process@entry=0x55f997002aa0 <process_synthesized_event>, evlist=<optimized out>, machine=machine@entry=0x55f997893658)
      at util/synthetic-events.c:1905
  #6  0x000055f996fed4c3 in record__synthesize (tail=tail@entry=true, rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:1997
  #7  0x000055f996fef7c8 in __cmd_record (argc=argc@entry=2, argv=argv@entry=0x7ffc67551260, rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:2802
  #8  0x000055f99700474c in cmd_record (argc=<optimized out>, argv=0x7ffc67551260) at builtin-record.c:4258
  #9  0x000055f9970a223d in run_builtin (p=0x55f997564d88 <commands+264>, argc=10, argv=0x7ffc67551260) at perf.c:330
  #10 0x000055f9970a254b in handle_internal_command (argc=10, argv=0x7ffc67551260) at perf.c:384
  #11 0x000055f996ff1b61 in run_argv (argcp=<synthetic pointer>, argv=<synthetic pointer>) at perf.c:428
  #12 main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=0x7ffc67551260) at perf.c:562

The reason is that record__bytes_written accesses the freed memory rec->thread_data,
The process is as follows:
  __cmd_record
    -> record__free_thread_data
      -> zfree(&rec->thread_data)         // free rec->thread_data
    -> record__synthesize
      -> perf_event__synthesize_id_index
        -> process_synthesized_event
          -> record__write
            -> record__bytes_written      // access rec->thread_data

We add a member variable "thread_bytes_written" in the struct "record"
to save the data size written by the threads.

Fixes: 6d57581 ("perf record: Add support for limit perf output file size")
Signed-off-by: Yang Jihong <yangjihong1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiwei Sun <jiwei.sun@windriver.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAM9d7ci_TRrqBQVQNW8=GwakUr7SsZpYxaaty-S4bxF8zJWyqw@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 15, 2023
…dler

commit 42e19e6 upstream.

Recent test_kprobe_missed kprobes kunit test uncovers the following error
(reported when CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP is enabled):

BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:580
in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 662, name: kunit_try_catch
preempt_count: 0, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
no locks held by kunit_try_catch/662.
irq event stamp: 280
hardirqs last  enabled at (279): [<00000003e60a3d42>] __do_pgm_check+0x17a/0x1c0
hardirqs last disabled at (280): [<00000003e3bd774a>] kprobe_exceptions_notify+0x27a/0x318
softirqs last  enabled at (0): [<00000003e3c5c890>] copy_process+0x14a8/0x4c80
softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
CPU: 46 PID: 662 Comm: kunit_try_catch Tainted: G                 N 6.2.0-173644-g44c18d77f0c0 #2
Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 704 (LPAR)
Call Trace:
 [<00000003e60a3a00>] dump_stack_lvl+0x120/0x198
 [<00000003e3d02e82>] __might_resched+0x60a/0x668
 [<00000003e60b9908>] __mutex_lock+0xc0/0x14e0
 [<00000003e60bad5a>] mutex_lock_nested+0x32/0x40
 [<00000003e3f7b460>] unregister_kprobe+0x30/0xd8
 [<00000003e51b2602>] test_kprobe_missed+0xf2/0x268
 [<00000003e51b5406>] kunit_try_run_case+0x10e/0x290
 [<00000003e51b7dfa>] kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x62/0xb8
 [<00000003e3ce30f8>] kthread+0x2d0/0x398
 [<00000003e3b96afa>] __ret_from_fork+0x8a/0xe8
 [<00000003e60ccada>] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x40

The reason for this error report is that kprobes handling code failed
to restore irqs.

The problem is that when kprobe is triggered from another kprobe
post_handler current sequence of enable_singlestep / disable_singlestep
is the following:
enable_singlestep  <- original kprobe (saves kprobe_saved_imask)
enable_singlestep  <- kprobe triggered from post_handler (clobbers kprobe_saved_imask)
disable_singlestep <- kprobe triggered from post_handler (restores kprobe_saved_imask)
disable_singlestep <- original kprobe (restores wrong clobbered kprobe_saved_imask)

There is just one kprobe_ctlblk per cpu and both calls saves and
loads irq mask to kprobe_saved_imask. To fix the problem simply move
resume_execution (which calls disable_singlestep) before calling
post_handler. This also fixes the problem that post_handler is called
with pt_regs which were not yet adjusted after single-stepping.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 4ba069b ("[S390] add kprobes support.")
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 15, 2023
commit 60eed1e upstream.

code path:

ocfs2_ioctl_move_extents
 ocfs2_move_extents
  ocfs2_defrag_extent
   __ocfs2_move_extent
    + ocfs2_journal_access_di
    + ocfs2_split_extent  //sub-paths call jbd2_journal_restart
    + ocfs2_journal_dirty //crash by jbs2 ASSERT

crash stacks:

PID: 11297  TASK: ffff974a676dcd00  CPU: 67  COMMAND: "defragfs.ocfs2"
 #0 [ffffb25d8dad3900] machine_kexec at ffffffff8386fe01
 #1 [ffffb25d8dad3958] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8395959d
 #2 [ffffb25d8dad3a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff8395a45d
 #3 [ffffb25d8dad3a38] oops_end at ffffffff83836d3f
 #4 [ffffb25d8dad3a58] do_trap at ffffffff83833205
 #5 [ffffb25d8dad3aa0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff83833aa6
 #6 [ffffb25d8dad3ac0] invalid_op at ffffffff84200d18
    [exception RIP: jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata+0x2ba]
    RIP: ffffffffc09ca54a  RSP: ffffb25d8dad3b70  RFLAGS: 00010207
    RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: ffff9706eedc5248  RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 0000000000000001  RSI: ffff97337029ea28  RDI: ffff9706eedc5250
    RBP: ffff9703c3520200   R8: 000000000f46b0b2   R9: 0000000000000000
    R10: 0000000000000001  R11: 00000001000000fe  R12: ffff97337029ea28
    R13: 0000000000000000  R14: ffff9703de59bf60  R15: ffff9706eedc5250
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #7 [ffffb25d8dad3ba8] ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc137fb95 [ocfs2]
 #8 [ffffb25d8dad3be8] __ocfs2_move_extent at ffffffffc139a950 [ocfs2]
 #9 [ffffb25d8dad3c80] ocfs2_defrag_extent at ffffffffc139b2d2 [ocfs2]

Analysis

This bug has the same root cause of 'commit 7f27ec9 ("ocfs2: call
ocfs2_journal_access_di() before ocfs2_journal_dirty() in
ocfs2_write_end_nolock()")'.  For this bug, jbd2_journal_restart() is
called by ocfs2_split_extent() during defragmenting.

How to fix

For ocfs2_split_extent() can handle journal operations totally by itself.
Caller doesn't need to call journal access/dirty pair, and caller only
needs to call journal start/stop pair.  The fix method is to remove
journal access/dirty from __ocfs2_move_extent().

The discussion for this patch:
https://oss.oracle.com/pipermail/ocfs2-devel/2023-February/000647.html

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230217003717.32469-1-heming.zhao@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 15, 2023
[ Upstream commit e9e4229 ]

The TC architecture allows filters and actions to be created independently.
In filters the user can reference action objects using:
tc action add action pedit ... index 1
tc filter add ... action pedit index 1

In the current code for act_pedit this is broken as it checks netlink
attributes for create/update before actually checking if we are binding to an
existing action.

tdc results:
1..69
ok 1 319a - Add pedit action that mangles IP TTL
ok 2 7e67 - Replace pedit action with invalid goto chain
ok 3 377e - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32
ok 4 a0ca - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 (INVALID)
ok 5 dd8a - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16 u16
ok 6 53db - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16 (INVALID)
ok 7 5c7e - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u8 add value
ok 8 2893 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u8 quad
ok 9 3a07 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u8-u16-u8
ok 10 ab0f - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16-u8-u8
ok 11 9d12 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 set u16 clear u8 invert
ok 12 ebfa - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset overflow u32 (INVALID)
ok 13 f512 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16 at offmask shift set
ok 14 c2cb - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 retain value
ok 15 1762 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u8 clear value
ok 16 bcee - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u8 retain value
ok 17 e89f - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16 retain value
ok 18 c282 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 clear value
ok 19 c422 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16 invert value
ok 20 d3d3 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 invert value
ok 21 57e5 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u8 preserve value
ok 22 99e0 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16 preserve value
ok 23 1892 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 preserve value
ok 24 4b60 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP negative offset u16/u32 set value
ok 25 a5a7 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth set src
ok 26 86d4 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth set src & dst
ok 27 f8a9 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth set dst
ok 28 c715 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth set src (INVALID)
ok 29 8131 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth set dst (INVALID)
ok 30 ba22 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth type set/clear sequence
ok 31 dec4 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth set type (INVALID)
ok 32 ab06 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth add type
ok 33 918d - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth invert src
ok 34 a8d4 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth invert dst
ok 35 ee13 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth invert type
ok 36 7588 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set src
ok 37 0fa7 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set dst
ok 38 5810 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set src & dst
ok 39 1092 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set ihl & dsfield
ok 40 02d8 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set ttl & protocol
ok 41 3e2d - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set ttl (INVALID)
ok 42 31ae - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip ttl clear/set
ok 43 486f - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set duplicate fields
ok 44 e790 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set ce, df, mf, firstfrag, nofrag fields
ok 45 cc8a - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set tos
ok 46 7a17 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set precedence
ok 47 c3b6 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip add tos
ok 48 43d3 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip add precedence
ok 49 438e - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip clear tos
ok 50 6b1b - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip clear precedence
ok 51 824a - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip invert tos
ok 52 106f - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip invert precedence
ok 53 6829 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP beyond ip set dport & sport
ok 54 afd8 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP beyond ip set icmp_type & icmp_code
ok 55 3143 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP beyond ip set dport (INVALID)
ok 56 815c - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 set src
ok 57 4dae - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 set dst
ok 58 fc1f - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 set src & dst
ok 59 6d34 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 dst retain value (INVALID)
ok 60 94bb - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 traffic_class
ok 61 6f5e - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 flow_lbl
ok 62 6795 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 set payload_len, nexthdr, hoplimit
ok 63 1442 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP tcp set dport & sport
ok 64 b7ac - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP tcp sport set (INVALID)
ok 65 cfcc - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP tcp flags set
ok 66 3bc4 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP tcp set dport, sport & flags fields
ok 67 f1c8 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP udp set dport & sport
ok 68 d784 - Add pedit action with mixed RAW/LAYERED_OP #1
ok 69 70ca - Add pedit action with mixed RAW/LAYERED_OP #2

Fixes: 71d0ed7 ("net/act_pedit: Support using offset relative to the conventional network headers")
Fixes: f67169f ("net/sched: act_pedit: fix WARN() in the traffic path")
Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 15, 2023
[ Upstream commit 3dca1f8 ]

Don't hold sdw_dev_lock while calling the peripheral driver
probe() and remove() callbacks.

Holding sdw_dev_lock around the probe() and remove() calls causes
a theoretical mutex inversion which lockdep will assert on.

During probe() the sdw_dev_lock mutex is taken first and then
ASoC/ALSA locks are taken by the probe() implementation.

During normal operation ASoC can take its locks and then trigger
a runtime resume of the component. The SoundWire resume will then
take sdw_dev_lock. This is the reverse order compared to probe().

It's not necessary to hold sdw_dev_lock when calling the probe()
and remove(), it is only used to prevent the bus core calling the
driver callbacks if there isn't a driver or the driver is removing.

All calls to the driver callbacks are guarded by the 'probed' flag.
So if sdw_dev_lock is held while setting and clearing the 'probed'
flag this is sufficient to guarantee the safety of callback
functions.

Removing the mutex from around the call to probe() means that it
is now possible for a bus event (PING response) to be handled in
parallel with the probe(). But sdw_bus_probe() already has
handling for this by calling the device update_status() after
the probe() has completed.

Example lockdep assert:
[   46.098514] ======================================================
[   46.104736] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[   46.110961] 6.1.0-rc4-jamerson #1 Tainted: G            E
[   46.116842] ------------------------------------------------------
[   46.123063] mpg123/1130 is trying to acquire lock:
[   46.127883] ffff8b445031fb80 (&slave->sdw_dev_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70
[   46.137225]
               but task is already holding lock:
[   46.143074] ffffffffc1455310 (&card->pcm_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dpcm_fe_dai_open+0x49/0x830
[   46.151536]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.[   46.159732]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[   46.167231]
               -> #4 (&card->pcm_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[   46.173428]        __mutex_lock+0x94/0x920
[   46.177542]        snd_soc_dpcm_runtime_update+0x2e/0x100
[   46.182958]        snd_soc_dapm_put_enum_double+0x1c2/0x200
[   46.188548]        snd_ctl_elem_write+0x10c/0x1d0
[   46.193268]        snd_ctl_ioctl+0x126/0x850
[   46.197556]        __x64_sys_ioctl+0x87/0xc0
[   46.201845]        do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[   46.205959]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[   46.211553]
               -> #3 (&card->controls_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}:
[   46.218188]        down_write+0x2b/0xd0
[   46.222038]        snd_ctl_add_replace+0x39/0xb0
[   46.226672]        snd_soc_add_controls+0x53/0x80
[   46.231393]        soc_probe_component+0x1e4/0x2a0
[   46.236202]        snd_soc_bind_card+0x51a/0xc80
[   46.240836]        devm_snd_soc_register_card+0x43/0x90
[   46.246079]        mc_probe+0x982/0xfe0 [snd_soc_sof_sdw]
[   46.251500]        platform_probe+0x3c/0xa0
[   46.255700]        really_probe+0xde/0x390
[   46.259814]        __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x180
[   46.264710]        driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x90
[   46.269347]        __driver_attach+0x9f/0x1f0
[   46.273721]        bus_for_each_dev+0x78/0xc0
[   46.278098]        bus_add_driver+0x1ac/0x200
[   46.282473]        driver_register+0x8f/0xf0
[   46.286759]        do_one_initcall+0x58/0x310
[   46.291136]        do_init_module+0x4c/0x1f0
[   46.295422]        __do_sys_finit_module+0xb4/0x130
[   46.300321]        do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[   46.304434]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[   46.310027]
               -> #2 (&card->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[   46.315883]        __mutex_lock+0x94/0x920
[   46.320000]        snd_soc_bind_card+0x3e/0xc80
[   46.324551]        devm_snd_soc_register_card+0x43/0x90
[   46.329798]        mc_probe+0x982/0xfe0 [snd_soc_sof_sdw]
[   46.335219]        platform_probe+0x3c/0xa0
[   46.339420]        really_probe+0xde/0x390
[   46.343532]        __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x180
[   46.348430]        driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x90
[   46.353065]        __driver_attach+0x9f/0x1f0
[   46.357437]        bus_for_each_dev+0x78/0xc0
[   46.361812]        bus_add_driver+0x1ac/0x200
[   46.366716]        driver_register+0x8f/0xf0
[   46.371528]        do_one_initcall+0x58/0x310
[   46.376424]        do_init_module+0x4c/0x1f0
[   46.381239]        __do_sys_finit_module+0xb4/0x130
[   46.386665]        do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[   46.391299]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[   46.397416]
               -> #1 (client_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[   46.404307]        __mutex_lock+0x94/0x920
[   46.408941]        snd_soc_add_component+0x24/0x2c0
[   46.414345]        devm_snd_soc_register_component+0x54/0xa0
[   46.420522]        cs35l56_common_probe+0x280/0x370 [snd_soc_cs35l56]
[   46.427487]        cs35l56_sdw_probe+0xf4/0x170 [snd_soc_cs35l56_sdw]
[   46.434442]        sdw_drv_probe+0x80/0x1a0
[   46.439136]        really_probe+0xde/0x390
[   46.443738]        __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x180
[   46.449120]        driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x90
[   46.454247]        __driver_attach+0x9f/0x1f0
[   46.459106]        bus_for_each_dev+0x78/0xc0
[   46.463971]        bus_add_driver+0x1ac/0x200
[   46.468825]        driver_register+0x8f/0xf0
[   46.473592]        do_one_initcall+0x58/0x310
[   46.478441]        do_init_module+0x4c/0x1f0
[   46.483202]        __do_sys_finit_module+0xb4/0x130
[   46.488572]        do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[   46.493158]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[   46.499229]
               -> #0 (&slave->sdw_dev_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[   46.506737]        __lock_acquire+0x1121/0x1df0
[   46.511765]        lock_acquire+0xd5/0x300
[   46.516360]        __mutex_lock+0x94/0x920
[   46.520949]        sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70
[   46.526409]        sdw_clear_slave_status+0xd8/0xe0
[   46.531783]        intel_resume_runtime+0x139/0x2a0
[   46.537155]        __rpm_callback+0x41/0x120
[   46.541919]        rpm_callback+0x5d/0x70
[   46.546422]        rpm_resume+0x531/0x7e0
[   46.550920]        __pm_runtime_resume+0x4a/0x80
[   46.556024]        snd_soc_pcm_component_pm_runtime_get+0x2f/0xc0
[   46.562611]        __soc_pcm_open+0x62/0x520
[   46.567375]        dpcm_be_dai_startup+0x116/0x210
[   46.572661]        dpcm_fe_dai_open+0xf7/0x830
[   46.577597]        snd_pcm_open_substream+0x54a/0x8b0
[   46.583145]        snd_pcm_open.part.0+0xdc/0x200
[   46.588341]        snd_pcm_playback_open+0x51/0x80
[   46.593625]        chrdev_open+0xc0/0x250
[   46.598129]        do_dentry_open+0x15f/0x430
[   46.602981]        path_openat+0x75e/0xa80
[   46.607575]        do_filp_open+0xb2/0x160
[   46.612162]        do_sys_openat2+0x9a/0x160
[   46.616922]        __x64_sys_openat+0x53/0xa0
[   46.621767]        do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[   46.626352]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[   46.632414]
               other info that might help us debug this:[   46.641862] Chain exists of:
                 &slave->sdw_dev_lock --> &card->controls_rwsem --> &card->pcm_mutex[   46.655145]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:[   46.662048]        CPU0                    CPU1
[   46.667080]        ----                    ----
[   46.672108]   lock(&card->pcm_mutex);
[   46.676267]                                lock(&card->controls_rwsem);
[   46.683382]                                lock(&card->pcm_mutex);
[   46.690063]   lock(&slave->sdw_dev_lock);
[   46.694574]
                *** DEADLOCK ***[   46.701942] 2 locks held by mpg123/1130:
[   46.706356]  #0: ffff8b4457b22b90 (&pcm->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: snd_pcm_open.part.0+0xc9/0x200
[   46.715999]  #1: ffffffffc1455310 (&card->pcm_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dpcm_fe_dai_open+0x49/0x830
[   46.725390]
               stack backtrace:
[   46.730752] CPU: 0 PID: 1130 Comm: mpg123 Tainted: G            E      6.1.0-rc4-jamerson #1
[   46.739703] Hardware name: AAEON UP-WHL01/UP-WHL01, BIOS UPW1AM19 11/10/2020
[   46.747270] Call Trace:
[   46.750239]  <TASK>
[   46.752857]  dump_stack_lvl+0x56/0x73
[   46.757045]  check_noncircular+0x102/0x120
[   46.761664]  __lock_acquire+0x1121/0x1df0
[   46.766197]  lock_acquire+0xd5/0x300
[   46.770292]  ? sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70
[   46.775432]  ? lock_is_held_type+0xe2/0x140
[   46.780143]  __mutex_lock+0x94/0x920
[   46.784241]  ? sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70
[   46.789387]  ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
[   46.793750]  ? sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70
[   46.798894]  ? lock_release+0x147/0x2f0
[   46.803262]  ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x47/0x250
[   46.808315]  ? sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70
[   46.813456]  sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70
[   46.818422]  sdw_clear_slave_status+0xd8/0xe0
[   46.823302]  ? pm_generic_runtime_suspend+0x30/0x30
[   46.828706]  intel_resume_runtime+0x139/0x2a0
[   46.833583]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x50
[   46.838462]  ? pm_generic_runtime_suspend+0x30/0x30
[   46.843866]  __rpm_callback+0x41/0x120
[   46.848142]  ? pm_generic_runtime_suspend+0x30/0x30
[   46.853550]  rpm_callback+0x5d/0x70
[   46.857568]  rpm_resume+0x531/0x7e0
[   46.861578]  ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x62/0x70
[   46.866634]  __pm_runtime_resume+0x4a/0x80
[   46.871258]  snd_soc_pcm_component_pm_runtime_get+0x2f/0xc0
[   46.877358]  __soc_pcm_open+0x62/0x520
[   46.881634]  ? dpcm_add_paths.isra.0+0x35d/0x4c0
[   46.886784]  dpcm_be_dai_startup+0x116/0x210
[   46.891592]  dpcm_fe_dai_open+0xf7/0x830
[   46.896046]  ? debug_mutex_init+0x33/0x50
[   46.900591]  snd_pcm_open_substream+0x54a/0x8b0
[   46.905658]  snd_pcm_open.part.0+0xdc/0x200
[   46.910376]  ? wake_up_q+0x90/0x90
[   46.914312]  snd_pcm_playback_open+0x51/0x80
[   46.919118]  chrdev_open+0xc0/0x250
[   46.923147]  ? cdev_device_add+0x90/0x90
[   46.927608]  do_dentry_open+0x15f/0x430
[   46.931976]  path_openat+0x75e/0xa80
[   46.936086]  do_filp_open+0xb2/0x160
[   46.940194]  ? lock_release+0x147/0x2f0
[   46.944563]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x50
[   46.949101]  do_sys_openat2+0x9a/0x160
[   46.953377]  __x64_sys_openat+0x53/0xa0
[   46.957733]  do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[   46.961829]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[   46.967402] RIP: 0033:0x7fa6397ccd3b
[   46.971506] Code: 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 4b 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 67 44 89 e2 48 89 ee bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 91 00 00 00 48 8b 4c 24 28 64 48 33 0c 25
[   46.991413] RSP: 002b:00007fff838e8990 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101
[   46.999580] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000080802 RCX: 00007fa6397ccd3b
[   47.007311] RDX: 0000000000080802 RSI: 00007fff838e8b50 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c
[   47.015047] RBP: 00007fff838e8b50 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000011
[   47.022787] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000080802
[   47.030539] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007fff838e8b50
[   47.038289]  </TASK>

Signed-off-by: Richard Fitzgerald <rf@opensource.cirrus.com>
Reviewed-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230123172520.339367-1-rf@opensource.cirrus.com
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 15, 2023
commit 0e68b55 upstream.

Running a rt-kernel base on 6.2.0-rc3-rt1 on an Ampere Altra outputs
the following:
  BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:46
  in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 9, name: kworker/u320:0
  preempt_count: 2, expected: 0
  RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
  3 locks held by kworker/u320:0/9:
  #0: ffff3fff8c27d128 ((wq_completion)efi_rts_wq){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work (./include/linux/atomic/atomic-long.h:41)
  #1: ffff80000861bdd0 ((work_completion)(&efi_rts_work.work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work (./include/linux/atomic/atomic-long.h:41)
  #2: ffffdf7e1ed3e460 (efi_rt_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: efi_call_rts (drivers/firmware/efi/runtime-wrappers.c:101)
  Preemption disabled at:
  efi_virtmap_load (./arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu_context.h:248)
  CPU: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/u320:0 Tainted: G        W          6.2.0-rc3-rt1
  Hardware name: WIWYNN Mt.Jade Server System B81.03001.0005/Mt.Jade Motherboard, BIOS 1.08.20220218 (SCP: 1.08.20220218) 2022/02/18
  Workqueue: efi_rts_wq efi_call_rts
  Call trace:
  dump_backtrace (arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:158)
  show_stack (arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:165)
  dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:107 (discriminator 4))
  dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:114)
  __might_resched (kernel/sched/core.c:10134)
  rt_spin_lock (kernel/locking/rtmutex.c:1769 (discriminator 4))
  efi_call_rts (drivers/firmware/efi/runtime-wrappers.c:101)
  [...]

This seems to come from commit ff7a167 ("arm64: efi: Execute
runtime services from a dedicated stack") which adds a spinlock. This
spinlock is taken through:
efi_call_rts()
\-efi_call_virt()
  \-efi_call_virt_pointer()
    \-arch_efi_call_virt_setup()

Make 'efi_rt_lock' a raw_spinlock to avoid being preempted.

[ardb: The EFI runtime services are called with a different set of
       translation tables, and are permitted to use the SIMD registers.
       The context switch code preserves/restores neither, and so EFI
       calls must be made with preemption disabled, rather than only
       disabling migration.]

Fixes: ff7a167 ("arm64: efi: Execute runtime services from a dedicated stack")
Signed-off-by: Pierre Gondois <pierre.gondois@arm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.1+
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 21, 2023
[ Upstream commit 6c20822 ]

&xdp_buff and &xdp_frame are bound in a way that

xdp_buff->data_hard_start == xdp_frame

It's always the case and e.g. xdp_convert_buff_to_frame() relies on
this.
IOW, the following:

	for (u32 i = 0; i < 0xdead; i++) {
		xdpf = xdp_convert_buff_to_frame(&xdp);
		xdp_convert_frame_to_buff(xdpf, &xdp);
	}

shouldn't ever modify @xdpf's contents or the pointer itself.
However, "live packet" code wrongly treats &xdp_frame as part of its
context placed *before* the data_hard_start. With such flow,
data_hard_start is sizeof(*xdpf) off to the right and no longer points
to the XDP frame.

Instead of replacing `sizeof(ctx)` with `offsetof(ctx, xdpf)` in several
places and praying that there are no more miscalcs left somewhere in the
code, unionize ::frm with ::data in a flex array, so that both starts
pointing to the actual data_hard_start and the XDP frame actually starts
being a part of it, i.e. a part of the headroom, not the context.
A nice side effect is that the maximum frame size for this mode gets
increased by 40 bytes, as xdp_buff::frame_sz includes everything from
data_hard_start (-> includes xdpf already) to the end of XDP/skb shared
info.
Also update %MAX_PKT_SIZE accordingly in the selftests code. Leave it
hardcoded for 64 bit && 4k pages, it can be made more flexible later on.

Minor: align `&head->data` with how `head->frm` is assigned for
consistency.
Minor #2: rename 'frm' to 'frame' in &xdp_page_head while at it for
clarity.

(was found while testing XDP traffic generator on ice, which calls
 xdp_convert_frame_to_buff() for each XDP frame)

Fixes: b530e9e ("bpf: Add "live packet" mode for XDP in BPF_PROG_RUN")
Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Lobakin <aleksander.lobakin@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230215185440.4126672-1-aleksander.lobakin@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 1, 2023
[ Upstream commit 13085e1 ]

The following LOCKDEP was detected:
		Workqueue: events smc_lgr_free_work [smc]
		WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
		6.1.0-20221027.rc2.git8.56bc5b569087.300.fc36.s390x+debug #1 Not tainted
		------------------------------------------------------
		kworker/3:0/176251 is trying to acquire lock:
		00000000f1467148 ((wq_completion)smc_tx_wq-00000000#2){+.+.}-{0:0},
			at: __flush_workqueue+0x7a/0x4f0
		but task is already holding lock:
		0000037fffe97dc8 ((work_completion)(&(&lgr->free_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0},
			at: process_one_work+0x232/0x730
		which lock already depends on the new lock.
		the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
		-> #4 ((work_completion)(&(&lgr->free_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
		       __lock_acquire+0x58e/0xbd8
		       lock_acquire.part.0+0xe2/0x248
		       lock_acquire+0xac/0x1c8
		       __flush_work+0x76/0xf0
		       __cancel_work_timer+0x170/0x220
		       __smc_lgr_terminate.part.0+0x34/0x1c0 [smc]
		       smc_connect_rdma+0x15e/0x418 [smc]
		       __smc_connect+0x234/0x480 [smc]
		       smc_connect+0x1d6/0x230 [smc]
		       __sys_connect+0x90/0xc0
		       __do_sys_socketcall+0x186/0x370
		       __do_syscall+0x1da/0x208
		       system_call+0x82/0xb0
		-> #3 (smc_client_lgr_pending){+.+.}-{3:3}:
		       __lock_acquire+0x58e/0xbd8
		       lock_acquire.part.0+0xe2/0x248
		       lock_acquire+0xac/0x1c8
		       __mutex_lock+0x96/0x8e8
		       mutex_lock_nested+0x32/0x40
		       smc_connect_rdma+0xa4/0x418 [smc]
		       __smc_connect+0x234/0x480 [smc]
		       smc_connect+0x1d6/0x230 [smc]
		       __sys_connect+0x90/0xc0
		       __do_sys_socketcall+0x186/0x370
		       __do_syscall+0x1da/0x208
		       system_call+0x82/0xb0
		-> #2 (sk_lock-AF_SMC){+.+.}-{0:0}:
		       __lock_acquire+0x58e/0xbd8
		       lock_acquire.part.0+0xe2/0x248
		       lock_acquire+0xac/0x1c8
		       lock_sock_nested+0x46/0xa8
		       smc_tx_work+0x34/0x50 [smc]
		       process_one_work+0x30c/0x730
		       worker_thread+0x62/0x420
		       kthread+0x138/0x150
		       __ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x58
		       ret_from_fork+0xa/0x40
		-> #1 ((work_completion)(&(&smc->conn.tx_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
		       __lock_acquire+0x58e/0xbd8
		       lock_acquire.part.0+0xe2/0x248
		       lock_acquire+0xac/0x1c8
		       process_one_work+0x2bc/0x730
		       worker_thread+0x62/0x420
		       kthread+0x138/0x150
		       __ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x58
		       ret_from_fork+0xa/0x40
		-> #0 ((wq_completion)smc_tx_wq-00000000#2){+.+.}-{0:0}:
		       check_prev_add+0xd8/0xe88
		       validate_chain+0x70c/0xb20
		       __lock_acquire+0x58e/0xbd8
		       lock_acquire.part.0+0xe2/0x248
		       lock_acquire+0xac/0x1c8
		       __flush_workqueue+0xaa/0x4f0
		       drain_workqueue+0xaa/0x158
		       destroy_workqueue+0x44/0x2d8
		       smc_lgr_free+0x9e/0xf8 [smc]
		       process_one_work+0x30c/0x730
		       worker_thread+0x62/0x420
		       kthread+0x138/0x150
		       __ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x58
		       ret_from_fork+0xa/0x40
		other info that might help us debug this:
		Chain exists of:
		  (wq_completion)smc_tx_wq-00000000#2
	  	  --> smc_client_lgr_pending
		  --> (work_completion)(&(&lgr->free_work)->work)
		 Possible unsafe locking scenario:
		       CPU0                    CPU1
		       ----                    ----
		  lock((work_completion)(&(&lgr->free_work)->work));
		                   lock(smc_client_lgr_pending);
		                   lock((work_completion)
					(&(&lgr->free_work)->work));
		  lock((wq_completion)smc_tx_wq-00000000#2);
		 *** DEADLOCK ***
		2 locks held by kworker/3:0/176251:
		 #0: 0000000080183548
			((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0},
				at: process_one_work+0x232/0x730
		 #1: 0000037fffe97dc8
			((work_completion)
			 (&(&lgr->free_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0},
				at: process_one_work+0x232/0x730
		stack backtrace:
		CPU: 3 PID: 176251 Comm: kworker/3:0 Not tainted
		Hardware name: IBM 8561 T01 701 (z/VM 7.2.0)
		Call Trace:
		 [<000000002983c3e4>] dump_stack_lvl+0xac/0x100
		 [<0000000028b477ae>] check_noncircular+0x13e/0x160
		 [<0000000028b48808>] check_prev_add+0xd8/0xe88
		 [<0000000028b49cc4>] validate_chain+0x70c/0xb20
		 [<0000000028b4bd26>] __lock_acquire+0x58e/0xbd8
		 [<0000000028b4cf6a>] lock_acquire.part.0+0xe2/0x248
		 [<0000000028b4d17c>] lock_acquire+0xac/0x1c8
		 [<0000000028addaaa>] __flush_workqueue+0xaa/0x4f0
		 [<0000000028addf9a>] drain_workqueue+0xaa/0x158
		 [<0000000028ae303c>] destroy_workqueue+0x44/0x2d8
		 [<000003ff8029af26>] smc_lgr_free+0x9e/0xf8 [smc]
		 [<0000000028adf3d4>] process_one_work+0x30c/0x730
		 [<0000000028adf85a>] worker_thread+0x62/0x420
		 [<0000000028aeac50>] kthread+0x138/0x150
		 [<0000000028a63914>] __ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x58
		 [<00000000298503da>] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x40
		INFO: lockdep is turned off.
===================================================================

This deadlock occurs because cancel_delayed_work_sync() waits for
the work(&lgr->free_work) to finish, while the &lgr->free_work
waits for the work(lgr->tx_wq), which needs the sk_lock-AF_SMC, that
is already used under the mutex_lock.

The solution is to use cancel_delayed_work() instead, which kills
off a pending work.

Fixes: a52bcc9 ("net/smc: improve termination processing")
Signed-off-by: Wenjia Zhang <wenjia@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Karcher <jaka@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Karsten Graul <kgraul@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lu <tonylu@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 1, 2023
…omic context

commit 38ed310 upstream.

The following issue was discovered using lockdep:
[    6.691371] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at include/linux/sched/mm.h:209
[    6.694602] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 128, non_block: 0, pid: 1, name: swapper/0
[    6.702431] 2 locks held by swapper/0/1:
[    6.706300]  #0: ffffff8800f6f188 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __device_driver_lock+0x4c/0x90
[    6.714900]  #1: ffffffc009a2abb8 (enable_lock){....}-{2:2}, at: clk_enable_lock+0x4c/0x140
[    6.723156] irq event stamp: 304030
[    6.726596] hardirqs last  enabled at (304029): [<ffffffc008d17ee0>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0xc0/0xd0
[    6.736142] hardirqs last disabled at (304030): [<ffffffc00876bc5c>] clk_enable_lock+0xfc/0x140
[    6.744742] softirqs last  enabled at (303958): [<ffffffc0080904f0>] _stext+0x4f0/0x894
[    6.752655] softirqs last disabled at (303951): [<ffffffc0080e53b8>] irq_exit+0x238/0x280
[    6.760744] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G     U            5.15.36 #2
[    6.768048] Hardware name: xlnx,zynqmp (DT)
[    6.772179] Call trace:
[    6.774584]  dump_backtrace+0x0/0x300
[    6.778197]  show_stack+0x18/0x30
[    6.781465]  dump_stack_lvl+0xb8/0xec
[    6.785077]  dump_stack+0x1c/0x38
[    6.788345]  ___might_sleep+0x1a8/0x2a0
[    6.792129]  __might_sleep+0x6c/0xd0
[    6.795655]  kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x270/0x3d0
[    6.800127]  do_feature_check_call+0x100/0x220
[    6.804513]  zynqmp_pm_invoke_fn+0x8c/0xb0
[    6.808555]  zynqmp_pm_clock_getstate+0x90/0xe0
[    6.813027]  zynqmp_pll_is_enabled+0x8c/0x120
[    6.817327]  zynqmp_pll_enable+0x38/0xc0
[    6.821197]  clk_core_enable+0x144/0x400
[    6.825067]  clk_core_enable+0xd4/0x400
[    6.828851]  clk_core_enable+0xd4/0x400
[    6.832635]  clk_core_enable+0xd4/0x400
[    6.836419]  clk_core_enable+0xd4/0x400
[    6.840203]  clk_core_enable+0xd4/0x400
[    6.843987]  clk_core_enable+0xd4/0x400
[    6.847771]  clk_core_enable+0xd4/0x400
[    6.851555]  clk_core_enable_lock+0x24/0x50
[    6.855683]  clk_enable+0x24/0x40
[    6.858952]  fclk_probe+0x84/0xf0
[    6.862220]  platform_probe+0x8c/0x110
[    6.865918]  really_probe+0x110/0x5f0
[    6.869530]  __driver_probe_device+0xcc/0x210
[    6.873830]  driver_probe_device+0x64/0x140
[    6.877958]  __driver_attach+0x114/0x1f0
[    6.881828]  bus_for_each_dev+0xe8/0x160
[    6.885698]  driver_attach+0x34/0x50
[    6.889224]  bus_add_driver+0x228/0x300
[    6.893008]  driver_register+0xc0/0x1e0
[    6.896792]  __platform_driver_register+0x44/0x60
[    6.901436]  fclk_driver_init+0x1c/0x28
[    6.905220]  do_one_initcall+0x104/0x590
[    6.909091]  kernel_init_freeable+0x254/0x2bc
[    6.913390]  kernel_init+0x24/0x130
[    6.916831]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

Fix it by passing the GFP_ATOMIC gfp flag for the corresponding
memory allocation.

Fixes: acfdd18 ("firmware: xilinx: Use hash-table for api feature check")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Amit Sunil Dhamne <amit.sunil.dhamne@xilinx.com>
Cc: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230308222602.123866-1-roman.gushchin@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 10, 2025
commit 3599bae upstream.

The 32-bit Debian kernel 6.12 fails to boot and crashes like this:

 init (pid 65): Protection id trap (code 7)
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 65 Comm: init Not tainted 6.12.9 #2
 Hardware name: 9000/778/B160L

      YZrvWESTHLNXBCVMcbcbcbcbOGFRQPDI
 PSW: 00000000000001000000000000001111 Not tainted
 r00-03  0004000f 110d39d0 109a6558 12974400
 r04-07  12a810e0 12a810e0 00000000 12a81144
 r08-11  12a81174 00000007 00000000 00000002
 r12-15  f8c55c08 0000006c 00000001 f8c55c08
 r16-19  00000002 f8c58620 002da3a8 0000004e
 r20-23  00001a46 0000000f 10754f84 00000000
 r24-27  00000000 00000003 12ae6980 1127b9d0
 r28-31  00000000 00000000 12974440 109a6558
 sr00-03  00000000 00000000 00000000 00000010
 sr04-07  00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000

 IASQ: 00000000 00000000 IAOQ: 110d39d0 110d39d4
  IIR: baadf00d    ISR: 00000000  IOR: 110d39d0
  CPU:        0   CR30: 128740c0 CR31: 00000000
  ORIG_R28: 000003f3
  IAOQ[0]: 0x110d39d0
  IAOQ[1]: 0x110d39d4
  RP(r2): security_sk_free+0x70/0x1a4
 Backtrace:
  [<10d8c844>] __sk_destruct+0x2bc/0x378
  [<10d8e33c>] sk_destruct+0x68/0x8c
  [<10d8e3dc>] __sk_free+0x7c/0x148
  [<10d8e560>] sk_free+0xb8/0xf0
  [<10f6420c>] unix_release_sock+0x3ac/0x50c
  [<10f643b8>] unix_release+0x4c/0x7c
  [<10d832f8>] __sock_release+0x5c/0xf8
  [<10d833b4>] sock_close+0x20/0x44
  [<107ba52c>] __fput+0xf8/0x468
  [<107baa08>] __fput_sync+0xb4/0xd4
  [<107b471c>] sys_close+0x44/0x94
  [<10405334>] syscall_exit+0x0/0x10

Bisecting points to this commit which triggers the issue:
	commit  417c564
	Author: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
	Date:   Fri Aug 16 17:43:07 2024 +0200
	        lsm: replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls

After more analysis it seems that we don't fully implement the static calls
and jump tables yet. Additionally the functions which mark kernel memory
read-only or read-write-executable needs to be further enhanced to be able to
fully support static calls.

Enabling CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA=y was one possibility to trigger the issue,
although YAMA isn't the reason for the fault.

As a temporary solution disable JUMP_LABEL functionality to
avoid the crashes.

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.12+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 10, 2025
[ Upstream commit e4b6b66 ]

When using touchscreen and framebuffer, Nokia 770 crashes easily with:

    BUG: scheduling while atomic: irq/144-ads7846/82/0x00010000
    Modules linked in: usb_f_ecm g_ether usb_f_rndis u_ether libcomposite configfs omap_udc ohci_omap ohci_hcd
    CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 82 Comm: irq/144-ads7846 Not tainted 6.12.7-770 #2
    Hardware name: Nokia 770
    Call trace:
     unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x10/0x14
     show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x54/0x5c
     dump_stack_lvl from __schedule_bug+0x50/0x70
     __schedule_bug from __schedule+0x4d4/0x5bc
     __schedule from schedule+0x34/0xa0
     schedule from schedule_preempt_disabled+0xc/0x10
     schedule_preempt_disabled from __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x218/0x3b4
     __mutex_lock.constprop.0 from clk_prepare_lock+0x38/0xe4
     clk_prepare_lock from clk_set_rate+0x18/0x154
     clk_set_rate from sossi_read_data+0x4c/0x168
     sossi_read_data from hwa742_read_reg+0x5c/0x8c
     hwa742_read_reg from send_frame_handler+0xfc/0x300
     send_frame_handler from process_pending_requests+0x74/0xd0
     process_pending_requests from lcd_dma_irq_handler+0x50/0x74
     lcd_dma_irq_handler from __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x44/0x130
     __handle_irq_event_percpu from handle_irq_event+0x28/0x68
     handle_irq_event from handle_level_irq+0x9c/0x170
     handle_level_irq from generic_handle_domain_irq+0x2c/0x3c
     generic_handle_domain_irq from omap1_handle_irq+0x40/0x8c
     omap1_handle_irq from generic_handle_arch_irq+0x28/0x3c
     generic_handle_arch_irq from call_with_stack+0x1c/0x24
     call_with_stack from __irq_svc+0x94/0xa8
    Exception stack(0xc5255da0 to 0xc5255de8)
    5da0: 00000001 c22fc620 00000000 00000000 c08384a8 c106fc00 00000000 c240c248
    5dc0: c113a600 c3f6ec30 00000001 00000000 c22fc620 c5255df0 c22fc620 c0279a94
    5de0: 60000013 ffffffff
     __irq_svc from clk_prepare_lock+0x4c/0xe4
     clk_prepare_lock from clk_get_rate+0x10/0x74
     clk_get_rate from uwire_setup_transfer+0x40/0x180
     uwire_setup_transfer from spi_bitbang_transfer_one+0x2c/0x9c
     spi_bitbang_transfer_one from spi_transfer_one_message+0x2d0/0x664
     spi_transfer_one_message from __spi_pump_transfer_message+0x29c/0x498
     __spi_pump_transfer_message from __spi_sync+0x1f8/0x2e8
     __spi_sync from spi_sync+0x24/0x40
     spi_sync from ads7846_halfd_read_state+0x5c/0x1c0
     ads7846_halfd_read_state from ads7846_irq+0x58/0x348
     ads7846_irq from irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x78
     irq_thread_fn from irq_thread+0x120/0x228
     irq_thread from kthread+0xc8/0xe8
     kthread from ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28

As a quick fix, switch to a threaded IRQ which provides a stable system.

Signed-off-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi>
Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 10, 2025
[ Upstream commit 6d00234 ]

Function xen_pin_page calls xen_pte_lock, which in turn grab page
table lock (ptlock). When locking, xen_pte_lock expect mm->page_table_lock
to be held before grabbing ptlock, but this does not happen when pinning
is caused by xen_mm_pin_all.

This commit addresses lockdep warning below, which shows up when
suspending a Xen VM.

[ 3680.658422] Freezing user space processes
[ 3680.660156] Freezing user space processes completed (elapsed 0.001 seconds)
[ 3680.660182] OOM killer disabled.
[ 3680.660192] Freezing remaining freezable tasks
[ 3680.661485] Freezing remaining freezable tasks completed (elapsed 0.001 seconds)
[ 3680.685254]
[ 3680.685265] ==================================
[ 3680.685269] WARNING: Nested lock was not taken
[ 3680.685274] 6.12.0+ #16 Tainted: G        W
[ 3680.685279] ----------------------------------
[ 3680.685283] migration/0/19 is trying to lock:
[ 3680.685288] ffff88800bac33c0 (ptlock_ptr(ptdesc)#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: xen_pin_page+0x175/0x1d0
[ 3680.685303]
[ 3680.685303] but this task is not holding:
[ 3680.685308] init_mm.page_table_lock
[ 3680.685311]
[ 3680.685311] stack backtrace:
[ 3680.685316] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 19 Comm: migration/0 Tainted: G        W          6.12.0+ #16
[ 3680.685324] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[ 3680.685328] Stopper: multi_cpu_stop+0x0/0x120 <- __stop_cpus.constprop.0+0x8c/0xd0
[ 3680.685339] Call Trace:
[ 3680.685344]  <TASK>
[ 3680.685347]  dump_stack_lvl+0x77/0xb0
[ 3680.685356]  __lock_acquire+0x917/0x2310
[ 3680.685364]  lock_acquire+0xce/0x2c0
[ 3680.685369]  ? xen_pin_page+0x175/0x1d0
[ 3680.685373]  _raw_spin_lock_nest_lock+0x2f/0x70
[ 3680.685381]  ? xen_pin_page+0x175/0x1d0
[ 3680.685386]  xen_pin_page+0x175/0x1d0
[ 3680.685390]  ? __pfx_xen_pin_page+0x10/0x10
[ 3680.685394]  __xen_pgd_walk+0x233/0x2c0
[ 3680.685401]  ? stop_one_cpu+0x91/0x100
[ 3680.685405]  __xen_pgd_pin+0x5d/0x250
[ 3680.685410]  xen_mm_pin_all+0x70/0xa0
[ 3680.685415]  xen_pv_pre_suspend+0xf/0x280
[ 3680.685420]  xen_suspend+0x57/0x1a0
[ 3680.685428]  multi_cpu_stop+0x6b/0x120
[ 3680.685432]  ? update_cpumasks_hier+0x7c/0xa60
[ 3680.685439]  ? __pfx_multi_cpu_stop+0x10/0x10
[ 3680.685443]  cpu_stopper_thread+0x8c/0x140
[ 3680.685448]  ? smpboot_thread_fn+0x20/0x1f0
[ 3680.685454]  ? __pfx_smpboot_thread_fn+0x10/0x10
[ 3680.685458]  smpboot_thread_fn+0xed/0x1f0
[ 3680.685462]  kthread+0xde/0x110
[ 3680.685467]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 3680.685471]  ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50
[ 3680.685478]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 3680.685482]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 3680.685489]  </TASK>
[ 3680.685491]
[ 3680.685491] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 3680.685497] 1 lock held by migration/0/19:
[ 3680.685500]  #0: ffffffff8284df38 (pgd_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: xen_mm_pin_all+0x14/0xa0
[ 3680.685512]
[ 3680.685512] stack backtrace:
[ 3680.685518] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 19 Comm: migration/0 Tainted: G        W          6.12.0+ #16
[ 3680.685528] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[ 3680.685531] Stopper: multi_cpu_stop+0x0/0x120 <- __stop_cpus.constprop.0+0x8c/0xd0
[ 3680.685538] Call Trace:
[ 3680.685541]  <TASK>
[ 3680.685544]  dump_stack_lvl+0x77/0xb0
[ 3680.685549]  __lock_acquire+0x93c/0x2310
[ 3680.685554]  lock_acquire+0xce/0x2c0
[ 3680.685558]  ? xen_pin_page+0x175/0x1d0
[ 3680.685562]  _raw_spin_lock_nest_lock+0x2f/0x70
[ 3680.685568]  ? xen_pin_page+0x175/0x1d0
[ 3680.685572]  xen_pin_page+0x175/0x1d0
[ 3680.685578]  ? __pfx_xen_pin_page+0x10/0x10
[ 3680.685582]  __xen_pgd_walk+0x233/0x2c0
[ 3680.685588]  ? stop_one_cpu+0x91/0x100
[ 3680.685592]  __xen_pgd_pin+0x5d/0x250
[ 3680.685596]  xen_mm_pin_all+0x70/0xa0
[ 3680.685600]  xen_pv_pre_suspend+0xf/0x280
[ 3680.685607]  xen_suspend+0x57/0x1a0
[ 3680.685611]  multi_cpu_stop+0x6b/0x120
[ 3680.685615]  ? update_cpumasks_hier+0x7c/0xa60
[ 3680.685620]  ? __pfx_multi_cpu_stop+0x10/0x10
[ 3680.685625]  cpu_stopper_thread+0x8c/0x140
[ 3680.685629]  ? smpboot_thread_fn+0x20/0x1f0
[ 3680.685634]  ? __pfx_smpboot_thread_fn+0x10/0x10
[ 3680.685638]  smpboot_thread_fn+0xed/0x1f0
[ 3680.685642]  kthread+0xde/0x110
[ 3680.685645]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 3680.685649]  ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50
[ 3680.685654]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 3680.685657]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 3680.685662]  </TASK>
[ 3680.685267] xen:grant_table: Grant tables using version 1 layout
[ 3680.685921] OOM killer enabled.
[ 3680.685934] Restarting tasks ... done.

Signed-off-by: Maksym Planeta <maksym@exostellar.io>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Message-ID: <20241204103516.3309112-1-maksym@exostellar.io>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 10, 2025
…ea as VM_ALLOC

[ Upstream commit d262a19 ]

Erhard reported the following KASAN hit while booting his PowerMac G4
with a KASAN-enabled kernel 6.13-rc6:

  BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in copy_to_kernel_nofault+0xd8/0x1c8
  Write of size 8 at addr f1000000 by task chronyd/1293

  CPU: 0 UID: 123 PID: 1293 Comm: chronyd Tainted: G        W          6.13.0-rc6-PMacG4 #2
  Tainted: [W]=WARN
  Hardware name: PowerMac3,6 7455 0x80010303 PowerMac
  Call Trace:
  [c2437590] [c1631a84] dump_stack_lvl+0x70/0x8c (unreliable)
  [c24375b0] [c0504998] print_report+0xdc/0x504
  [c2437610] [c050475c] kasan_report+0xf8/0x108
  [c2437690] [c0505a3c] kasan_check_range+0x24/0x18c
  [c24376a0] [c03fb5e4] copy_to_kernel_nofault+0xd8/0x1c8
  [c24376c0] [c004c014] patch_instructions+0x15c/0x16c
  [c2437710] [c00731a8] bpf_arch_text_copy+0x60/0x7c
  [c2437730] [c0281168] bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize+0x50/0xac
  [c2437750] [c0073cf4] bpf_int_jit_compile+0xb30/0xdec
  [c2437880] [c0280394] bpf_prog_select_runtime+0x15c/0x478
  [c24378d0] [c1263428] bpf_prepare_filter+0xbf8/0xc14
  [c2437990] [c12677ec] bpf_prog_create_from_user+0x258/0x2b4
  [c24379d0] [c027111c] do_seccomp+0x3dc/0x1890
  [c2437ac0] [c001d8e0] system_call_exception+0x2dc/0x420
  [c2437f30] [c00281ac] ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x2c
  --- interrupt: c00 at 0x5a1274
  NIP:  005a1274 LR: 006a3b3c CTR: 005296c8
  REGS: c2437f40 TRAP: 0c00   Tainted: G        W           (6.13.0-rc6-PMacG4)
  MSR:  0200f932 <VEC,EE,PR,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI>  CR: 24004422  XER: 00000000

  GPR00: 00000166 af8f3fa0 a7ee3540 00000001 00000000 013b6500 005a5858 0200f932
  GPR08: 00000000 00001fe9 013d5fc8 005296c8 2822244c 00b2fcd8 00000000 af8f4b57
  GPR16: 00000000 00000001 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000001 00000000 00000002
  GPR24: 00afdbb0 00000000 00000000 00000000 006e0004 013ce060 006e7c1c 00000001
  NIP [005a1274] 0x5a1274
  LR [006a3b3c] 0x6a3b3c
  --- interrupt: c00

  The buggy address belongs to the virtual mapping at
   [f1000000, f1002000) created by:
   text_area_cpu_up+0x20/0x190

  The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
  page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:00000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x76e30
  flags: 0x80000000(zone=2)
  raw: 80000000 00000000 00000122 00000000 00000000 00000000 ffffffff 00000001
  raw: 00000000
  page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

  Memory state around the buggy address:
   f0ffff00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
   f0ffff80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  >f1000000: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
             ^
   f1000080: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
   f1000100: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
  ==================================================================

f8 corresponds to KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID which means the area is not
initialised hence not supposed to be used yet.

Powerpc text patching infrastructure allocates a virtual memory area
using get_vm_area() and flags it as VM_ALLOC. But that flag is meant
to be used for vmalloc() and vmalloc() allocated memory is not
supposed to be used before a call to __vmalloc_node_range() which is
never called for that area.

That went undetected until commit e4137f0 ("mm, kasan, kmsan:
instrument copy_from/to_kernel_nofault")

The area allocated by text_area_cpu_up() is not vmalloc memory, it is
mapped directly on demand when needed by map_kernel_page(). There is
no VM flag corresponding to such usage, so just pass no flag. That way
the area will be unpoisonned and usable immediately.

Reported-by: Erhard Furtner <erhard_f@mailbox.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250112135832.57c92322@yea/
Fixes: 37bc3e5 ("powerpc/lib/code-patching: Use alternate map for patch_instruction()")
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/06621423da339b374f48c0886e3a5db18e896be8.1739342693.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 17, 2025
…cal section

A circular lock dependency splat has been seen involving down_trylock():

  ======================================================
  WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
  6.12.0-41.el10.s390x+debug
  ------------------------------------------------------
  dd/32479 is trying to acquire lock:
  0015a20accd0d4f8 ((console_sem).lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: down_trylock+0x26/0x90

  but task is already holding lock:
  000000017e461698 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: rmqueue_bulk+0xac/0x8f0

  the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
  -> #4 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}:
  -> #3 (hrtimer_bases.lock){-.-.}-{2:2}:
  -> #2 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}:
  -> #1 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}:
  -> #0 ((console_sem).lock){-.-.}-{2:2}:

The console_sem -> pi_lock dependency is due to calling try_to_wake_up()
while holding the console_sem raw_spinlock. This dependency can be broken
by using wake_q to do the wakeup instead of calling try_to_wake_up()
under the console_sem lock. This will also make the semaphore's
raw_spinlock become a terminal lock without taking any further locks
underneath it.

The hrtimer_bases.lock is a raw_spinlock while zone->lock is a
spinlock. The hrtimer_bases.lock -> zone->lock dependency happens via
the debug_objects_fill_pool() helper function in the debugobjects code.

  -> #4 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}:
         __lock_acquire+0xe86/0x1cc0
         lock_acquire.part.0+0x258/0x630
         lock_acquire+0xb8/0xe0
         _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xb4/0x120
         rmqueue_bulk+0xac/0x8f0
         __rmqueue_pcplist+0x580/0x830
         rmqueue_pcplist+0xfc/0x470
         rmqueue.isra.0+0xdec/0x11b0
         get_page_from_freelist+0x2ee/0xeb0
         __alloc_pages_noprof+0x2c2/0x520
         alloc_pages_mpol_noprof+0x1fc/0x4d0
         alloc_pages_noprof+0x8c/0xe0
         allocate_slab+0x320/0x460
         ___slab_alloc+0xa58/0x12b0
         __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x42/0x60
         kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x304/0x350
         fill_pool+0xf6/0x450
         debug_object_activate+0xfe/0x360
         enqueue_hrtimer+0x34/0x190
         __run_hrtimer+0x3c8/0x4c0
         __hrtimer_run_queues+0x1b2/0x260
         hrtimer_interrupt+0x316/0x760
         do_IRQ+0x9a/0xe0
         do_irq_async+0xf6/0x160

Normally a raw_spinlock to spinlock dependency is not legitimate
and will be warned if CONFIG_PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING is enabled,
but debug_objects_fill_pool() is an exception as it explicitly
allows this dependency for non-PREEMPT_RT kernel without causing
PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING lockdep splat. As a result, this dependency is
legitimate and not a bug.

Anyway, semaphore is the only locking primitive left that is still
using try_to_wake_up() to do wakeup inside critical section, all the
other locking primitives had been migrated to use wake_q to do wakeup
outside of the critical section. It is also possible that there are
other circular locking dependencies involving printk/console_sem or
other existing/new semaphores lurking somewhere which may show up in
the future. Let just do the migration now to wake_q to avoid headache
like this.

Reported-by: yzbot+ed801a886dfdbfe7136d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250307232717.1759087-3-boqun.feng@gmail.com
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 17, 2025
A blocking notification chain uses a read-write semaphore to protect the
integrity of the chain. The semaphore is acquired for writing when
adding / removing notifiers to / from the chain and acquired for reading
when traversing the chain and informing notifiers about an event.

In case of the blocking switchdev notification chain, recursive
notifications are possible which leads to the semaphore being acquired
twice for reading and to lockdep warnings being generated [1].

Specifically, this can happen when the bridge driver processes a
SWITCHDEV_BRPORT_UNOFFLOADED event which causes it to emit notifications
about deferred events when calling switchdev_deferred_process().

Fix this by converting the notification chain to a raw notification
chain in a similar fashion to the netdev notification chain. Protect
the chain using the RTNL mutex by acquiring it when modifying the chain.
Events are always informed under the RTNL mutex, but add an assertion in
call_switchdev_blocking_notifiers() to make sure this is not violated in
the future.

Maintain the "blocking" prefix as events are always emitted from process
context and listeners are allowed to block.

[1]:
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.14.0-rc4-custom-g079270089484 #1 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
ip/52731 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff850918d8 ((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0xa0

but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff850918d8 ((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0xa0

other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem);
lock((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem);

*** DEADLOCK ***
May be due to missing lock nesting notation
3 locks held by ip/52731:
 #0: ffffffff84f795b0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_newlink+0x727/0x1dc0
 #1: ffffffff8731f628 (&net->rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_newlink+0x790/0x1dc0
 #2: ffffffff850918d8 ((switchdev_blocking_notif_chain).rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0xa0

stack backtrace:
...
? __pfx_down_read+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_mark_lock+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_switchdev_port_attr_set_deferred+0x10/0x10
blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0xa0
switchdev_port_attr_notify.constprop.0+0xb3/0x1b0
? __pfx_switchdev_port_attr_notify.constprop.0+0x10/0x10
? mark_held_locks+0x94/0xe0
? switchdev_deferred_process+0x11a/0x340
switchdev_port_attr_set_deferred+0x27/0xd0
switchdev_deferred_process+0x164/0x340
br_switchdev_port_unoffload+0xc8/0x100 [bridge]
br_switchdev_blocking_event+0x29f/0x580 [bridge]
notifier_call_chain+0xa2/0x440
blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x6e/0xa0
switchdev_bridge_port_unoffload+0xde/0x1a0
...

Fixes: f7a70d6 ("net: bridge: switchdev: Ensure deferred event delivery on unoffload")
Signed-off-by: Amit Cohen <amcohen@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Oltean <olteanv@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Vladimir Oltean <olteanv@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250305121509.631207-1-amcohen@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 17, 2025
When on a MANA VM hibernation is triggered, as part of hibernate_snapshot(),
mana_gd_suspend() and mana_gd_resume() are called. If during this
mana_gd_resume(), a failure occurs with HWC creation, mana_port_debugfs
pointer does not get reinitialized and ends up pointing to older,
cleaned-up dentry.
Further in the hibernation path, as part of power_down(), mana_gd_shutdown()
is triggered. This call, unaware of the failures in resume, tries to cleanup
the already cleaned up  mana_port_debugfs value and hits the following bug:

[  191.359296] mana 7870:00:00.0: Shutdown was called
[  191.359918] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000098
[  191.360584] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[  191.361125] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
[  191.361727] PGD 1080ea067 P4D 0
[  191.362172] Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[  191.362606] CPU: 11 UID: 0 PID: 1674 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.14.0-rc5+ #2
[  191.363292] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS Hyper-V UEFI Release v4.1 11/21/2024
[  191.364124] RIP: 0010:down_write+0x19/0x50
[  191.364537] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 53 48 89 fb e8 de cd ff ff 31 c0 ba 01 00 00 00 <f0> 48 0f b1 13 75 16 65 48 8b 05 88 24 4c 6a 48 89 43 08 48 8b 5d
[  191.365867] RSP: 0000:ff45fbe0c1c037b8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[  191.366350] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000098 RCX: ffffff8100000000
[  191.366951] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000064 RDI: 0000000000000098
[  191.367600] RBP: ff45fbe0c1c037c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
[  191.368225] R10: ff45fbe0d2b01000 R11: 0000000000000008 R12: 0000000000000000
[  191.368874] R13: 000000000000000b R14: ff43dc27509d67c0 R15: 0000000000000020
[  191.369549] FS:  00007dbc5001e740(0000) GS:ff43dc663f380000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  191.370213] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  191.370830] CR2: 0000000000000098 CR3: 0000000168e8e002 CR4: 0000000000b73ef0
[  191.371557] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  191.372192] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[  191.372906] Call Trace:
[  191.373262]  <TASK>
[  191.373621]  ? show_regs+0x64/0x70
[  191.374040]  ? __die+0x24/0x70
[  191.374468]  ? page_fault_oops+0x290/0x5b0
[  191.374875]  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x448/0x800
[  191.375357]  ? exc_page_fault+0x7a/0x160
[  191.375971]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30
[  191.376416]  ? down_write+0x19/0x50
[  191.376832]  ? down_write+0x12/0x50
[  191.377232]  simple_recursive_removal+0x4a/0x2a0
[  191.377679]  ? __pfx_remove_one+0x10/0x10
[  191.378088]  debugfs_remove+0x44/0x70
[  191.378530]  mana_detach+0x17c/0x4f0
[  191.378950]  ? __flush_work+0x1e2/0x3b0
[  191.379362]  ? __cond_resched+0x1a/0x50
[  191.379787]  mana_remove+0xf2/0x1a0
[  191.380193]  mana_gd_shutdown+0x3b/0x70
[  191.380642]  pci_device_shutdown+0x3a/0x80
[  191.381063]  device_shutdown+0x13e/0x230
[  191.381480]  kernel_power_off+0x35/0x80
[  191.381890]  hibernate+0x3c6/0x470
[  191.382312]  state_store+0xcb/0xd0
[  191.382734]  kobj_attr_store+0x12/0x30
[  191.383211]  sysfs_kf_write+0x3e/0x50
[  191.383640]  kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x140/0x1d0
[  191.384106]  vfs_write+0x271/0x440
[  191.384521]  ksys_write+0x72/0xf0
[  191.384924]  __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x20
[  191.385313]  x64_sys_call+0x2b0/0x20b0
[  191.385736]  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x150
[  191.386146]  ? __mod_memcg_lruvec_state+0xe7/0x240
[  191.386676]  ? __lruvec_stat_mod_folio+0x79/0xb0
[  191.387124]  ? __pfx_lru_add+0x10/0x10
[  191.387515]  ? queued_spin_unlock+0x9/0x10
[  191.387937]  ? do_anonymous_page+0x33c/0xa00
[  191.388374]  ? __handle_mm_fault+0xcf3/0x1210
[  191.388805]  ? __count_memcg_events+0xbe/0x180
[  191.389235]  ? handle_mm_fault+0xae/0x300
[  191.389588]  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x559/0x800
[  191.390027]  ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x43/0x230
[  191.390525]  ? irqentry_exit+0x1d/0x30
[  191.390879]  ? exc_page_fault+0x86/0x160
[  191.391235]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[  191.391745] RIP: 0033:0x7dbc4ff1c574
[  191.392111] Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d d5 ea 0e 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 48 89
[  191.393412] RSP: 002b:00007ffd95a23ab8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[  191.393990] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 00007dbc4ff1c574
[  191.394594] RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: 00005a6eeadb0ce0 RDI: 0000000000000001
[  191.395215] RBP: 00007ffd95a23ae0 R08: 00007dbc50003b20 R09: 0000000000000000
[  191.395805] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000005
[  191.396404] R13: 00005a6eeadb0ce0 R14: 00007dbc500045c0 R15: 00007dbc50001ee0
[  191.396987]  </TASK>

To fix this, we explicitly set such mana debugfs variables to NULL after
debugfs_remove() is called.

Fixes: 6607c17 ("net: mana: Enable debugfs files for MANA device")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Shradha Gupta <shradhagupta@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Kubiak <michal.kubiak@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/1741688260-28922-1-git-send-email-shradhagupta@linux.microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 12, 2025
[ Upstream commit 2d117e6 ]

During a module removal, kvm_exit invokes arch specific disable
call which disables AIA. However, we invoke aia_exit before kvm_exit
resulting in the following warning. KVM kernel module can't be inserted
afterwards due to inconsistent state of IRQ.

[25469.031389] percpu IRQ 31 still enabled on CPU0!
[25469.031732] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 943 at kernel/irq/manage.c:2476 __free_percpu_irq+0xa2/0x150
[25469.031804] Modules linked in: kvm(-)
[25469.031848] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 943 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 6.14.0-rc5-06947-g91c763118f47-dirty #2
[25469.031905] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
[25469.031928] epc : __free_percpu_irq+0xa2/0x150
[25469.031976]  ra : __free_percpu_irq+0xa2/0x150
[25469.032197] epc : ffffffff8007db1e ra : ffffffff8007db1e sp : ff2000000088bd50
[25469.032241]  gp : ffffffff8131cef8 tp : ff60000080b96400 t0 : ff2000000088baf8
[25469.032285]  t1 : fffffffffffffffc t2 : 5249207570637265 s0 : ff2000000088bd90
[25469.032329]  s1 : ff60000098b21080 a0 : 037d527a15eb4f00 a1 : 037d527a15eb4f00
[25469.032372]  a2 : 0000000000000023 a3 : 0000000000000001 a4 : ffffffff8122dbf8
[25469.032410]  a5 : 0000000000000fff a6 : 0000000000000000 a7 : ffffffff8122dc10
[25469.032448]  s2 : ff60000080c22eb0 s3 : 0000000200000022 s4 : 000000000000001f
[25469.032488]  s5 : ff60000080c22e00 s6 : ffffffff80c351c0 s7 : 0000000000000000
[25469.032582]  s8 : 0000000000000003 s9 : 000055556b7fb490 s10: 00007ffff0e12fa0
[25469.032621]  s11: 00007ffff0e13e9a t3 : ffffffff81354ac7 t4 : ffffffff81354ac7
[25469.032664]  t5 : ffffffff81354ac8 t6 : ffffffff81354ac7
[25469.032698] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: ffffffff8007db1e cause: 0000000000000003
[25469.032738] [<ffffffff8007db1e>] __free_percpu_irq+0xa2/0x150
[25469.032797] [<ffffffff8007dbfc>] free_percpu_irq+0x30/0x5e
[25469.032856] [<ffffffff013a57dc>] kvm_riscv_aia_exit+0x40/0x42 [kvm]
[25469.033947] [<ffffffff013b4e82>] cleanup_module+0x10/0x32 [kvm]
[25469.035300] [<ffffffff8009b150>] __riscv_sys_delete_module+0x18e/0x1fc
[25469.035374] [<ffffffff8000c1ca>] syscall_handler+0x3a/0x46
[25469.035456] [<ffffffff809ec9a4>] do_trap_ecall_u+0x72/0x134
[25469.035536] [<ffffffff809f5e18>] handle_exception+0x148/0x156

Invoke aia_exit and other arch specific cleanup functions after kvm_exit
so that disable gets a chance to be called first before exit.

Fixes: 54e4332 ("RISC-V: KVM: Initial skeletal support for AIA")
Fixes: eded675 ("riscv: KVM: add basic support for host vs guest profiling")
Signed-off-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250317-kvm_exit_fix-v1-1-aa5240c5dbd2@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 12, 2025
…void Priority Inversion in SRIOV

[ Upstream commit dc0297f ]

RLCG Register Access is a way for virtual functions to safely access GPU
registers in a virtualized environment., including TLB flushes and
register reads. When multiple threads or VFs try to access the same
registers simultaneously, it can lead to race conditions. By using the
RLCG interface, the driver can serialize access to the registers. This
means that only one thread can access the registers at a time,
preventing conflicts and ensuring that operations are performed
correctly. Additionally, when a low-priority task holds a mutex that a
high-priority task needs, ie., If a thread holding a spinlock tries to
acquire a mutex, it can lead to priority inversion. register access in
amdgpu_virt_rlcg_reg_rw especially in a fast code path is critical.

The call stack shows that the function amdgpu_virt_rlcg_reg_rw is being
called, which attempts to acquire the mutex. This function is invoked
from amdgpu_sriov_wreg, which in turn is called from
gmc_v11_0_flush_gpu_tlb.

The [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] indicates that a thread is trying to
acquire a mutex while it is in a context that does not allow it to sleep
(like holding a spinlock).

Fixes the below:

[  253.013423] =============================
[  253.013434] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ]
[  253.013446] 6.12.0-amdstaging-drm-next-lol-050225 #14 Tainted: G     U     OE
[  253.013464] -----------------------------
[  253.013475] kworker/0:1/10 is trying to lock:
[  253.013487] ffff9f30542e3cf8 (&adev->virt.rlcg_reg_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_virt_rlcg_reg_rw+0xf6/0x330 [amdgpu]
[  253.013815] other info that might help us debug this:
[  253.013827] context-{4:4}
[  253.013835] 3 locks held by kworker/0:1/10:
[  253.013847]  #0: ffff9f3040050f58 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x3f5/0x680
[  253.013877]  #1: ffffb789c008be40 ((work_completion)(&wfc.work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1d6/0x680
[  253.013905]  #2: ffff9f3054281838 (&adev->gmc.invalidate_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: gmc_v11_0_flush_gpu_tlb+0x198/0x4f0 [amdgpu]
[  253.014154] stack backtrace:
[  253.014164] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 10 Comm: kworker/0:1 Tainted: G     U     OE      6.12.0-amdstaging-drm-next-lol-050225 #14
[  253.014189] Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
[  253.014203] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS Hyper-V UEFI Release v4.1 11/18/2024
[  253.014224] Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn
[  253.014241] Call Trace:
[  253.014250]  <TASK>
[  253.014260]  dump_stack_lvl+0x9b/0xf0
[  253.014275]  dump_stack+0x10/0x20
[  253.014287]  __lock_acquire+0xa47/0x2810
[  253.014303]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  253.014321]  lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300
[  253.014333]  ? amdgpu_virt_rlcg_reg_rw+0xf6/0x330 [amdgpu]
[  253.014562]  ? __lock_acquire+0xa6b/0x2810
[  253.014578]  __mutex_lock+0x85/0xe20
[  253.014591]  ? amdgpu_virt_rlcg_reg_rw+0xf6/0x330 [amdgpu]
[  253.014782]  ? sched_clock_noinstr+0x9/0x10
[  253.014795]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  253.014808]  ? local_clock_noinstr+0xe/0xc0
[  253.014822]  ? amdgpu_virt_rlcg_reg_rw+0xf6/0x330 [amdgpu]
[  253.015012]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  253.015029]  mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[  253.015044]  ? mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[  253.015057]  amdgpu_virt_rlcg_reg_rw+0xf6/0x330 [amdgpu]
[  253.015249]  amdgpu_sriov_wreg+0xc5/0xd0 [amdgpu]
[  253.015435]  gmc_v11_0_flush_gpu_tlb+0x44b/0x4f0 [amdgpu]
[  253.015667]  gfx_v11_0_hw_init+0x499/0x29c0 [amdgpu]
[  253.015901]  ? __pfx_smu_v13_0_update_pcie_parameters+0x10/0x10 [amdgpu]
[  253.016159]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  253.016173]  ? smu_hw_init+0x18d/0x300 [amdgpu]
[  253.016403]  amdgpu_device_init+0x29ad/0x36a0 [amdgpu]
[  253.016614]  amdgpu_driver_load_kms+0x1a/0xc0 [amdgpu]
[  253.017057]  amdgpu_pci_probe+0x1c2/0x660 [amdgpu]
[  253.017493]  local_pci_probe+0x4b/0xb0
[  253.017746]  work_for_cpu_fn+0x1a/0x30
[  253.017995]  process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[  253.018248]  worker_thread+0x190/0x330
[  253.018500]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[  253.018746]  kthread+0xe7/0x120
[  253.018988]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  253.019231]  ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[  253.019468]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  253.019701]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  253.019939]  </TASK>

v2: s/spin_trylock/spin_lock_irqsave to be safe (Christian).

Fixes: e864180 ("drm/amdgpu: Add lock around VF RLCG interface")
Cc: lin cao <lin.cao@amd.com>
Cc: Jingwen Chen <Jingwen.Chen2@amd.com>
Cc: Victor Skvortsov <victor.skvortsov@amd.com>
Cc: Zhigang Luo <zhigang.luo@amd.com>
Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam <srinivasan.shanmugam@amd.com>
Suggested-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 12, 2025
…ate_pagetables'

[ Upstream commit fddc450 ]

This commit addresses a circular locking dependency in the
svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables function. The function previously
held a lock while determining whether to perform an unmap or eviction
operation, which could lead to deadlocks.

Fixes the below:

[  223.418794] ======================================================
[  223.418820] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[  223.418845] 6.12.0-amdstaging-drm-next-lol-050225 #14 Tainted: G     U     OE
[  223.418869] ------------------------------------------------------
[  223.418889] kfdtest/3939 is trying to acquire lock:
[  223.418906] ffff8957552eae38 (&dqm->lock_hidden){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu]
[  223.419302]
               but task is already holding lock:
[  223.419303] ffff8957556b83b0 (&prange->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables+0x9d/0x850 [amdgpu]
[  223.419447] Console: switching to colour dummy device 80x25
[  223.419477] [IGT] amd_basic: executing
[  223.419599]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.

[  223.419611]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[  223.419621]
               -> #2 (&prange->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[  223.419636]        __mutex_lock+0x85/0xe20
[  223.419647]        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[  223.419656]        svm_range_validate_and_map+0x2f1/0x15b0 [amdgpu]
[  223.419954]        svm_range_set_attr+0xe8c/0x1710 [amdgpu]
[  223.420236]        svm_ioctl+0x46/0x50 [amdgpu]
[  223.420503]        kfd_ioctl_svm+0x50/0x90 [amdgpu]
[  223.420763]        kfd_ioctl+0x409/0x6d0 [amdgpu]
[  223.421024]        __x64_sys_ioctl+0x95/0xd0
[  223.421036]        x64_sys_call+0x1205/0x20d0
[  223.421047]        do_syscall_64+0x87/0x140
[  223.421056]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[  223.421068]
               -> #1 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[  223.421084]        __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.0+0xab/0x1560
[  223.421095]        ww_mutex_lock+0x2b/0x90
[  223.421103]        amdgpu_amdkfd_alloc_gtt_mem+0xcc/0x2b0 [amdgpu]
[  223.421361]        add_queue_mes+0x3bc/0x440 [amdgpu]
[  223.421623]        unhalt_cpsch+0x1ae/0x240 [amdgpu]
[  223.421888]        kgd2kfd_start_sched+0x5e/0xd0 [amdgpu]
[  223.422148]        amdgpu_amdkfd_start_sched+0x3d/0x50 [amdgpu]
[  223.422414]        amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler+0x132/0x270 [amdgpu]
[  223.422662]        process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[  223.422673]        worker_thread+0x190/0x330
[  223.422682]        kthread+0xe7/0x120
[  223.422690]        ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[  223.422699]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  223.422708]
               -> #0 (&dqm->lock_hidden){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[  223.422723]        __lock_acquire+0x16f4/0x2810
[  223.422734]        lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300
[  223.422742]        __mutex_lock+0x85/0xe20
[  223.422751]        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[  223.422760]        evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu]
[  223.423025]        kfd_process_evict_queues+0x8a/0x1d0 [amdgpu]
[  223.423285]        kgd2kfd_quiesce_mm+0x43/0x90 [amdgpu]
[  223.423540]        svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables+0x4a7/0x850 [amdgpu]
[  223.423807]        __mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start+0x1f5/0x250
[  223.423819]        copy_page_range+0x1e94/0x1ea0
[  223.423829]        copy_process+0x172f/0x2ad0
[  223.423839]        kernel_clone+0x9c/0x3f0
[  223.423847]        __do_sys_clone+0x66/0x90
[  223.423856]        __x64_sys_clone+0x25/0x30
[  223.423864]        x64_sys_call+0x1d7c/0x20d0
[  223.423872]        do_syscall_64+0x87/0x140
[  223.423880]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[  223.423891]
               other info that might help us debug this:

[  223.423903] Chain exists of:
                 &dqm->lock_hidden --> reservation_ww_class_mutex --> &prange->lock

[  223.423926]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[  223.423935]        CPU0                    CPU1
[  223.423942]        ----                    ----
[  223.423949]   lock(&prange->lock);
[  223.423958]                                lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex);
[  223.423970]                                lock(&prange->lock);
[  223.423981]   lock(&dqm->lock_hidden);
[  223.423990]
                *** DEADLOCK ***

[  223.423999] 5 locks held by kfdtest/3939:
[  223.424006]  #0: ffffffffb82b4fc0 (dup_mmap_sem){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: copy_process+0x1387/0x2ad0
[  223.424026]  #1: ffff89575eda81b0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_process+0x13a8/0x2ad0
[  223.424046]  #2: ffff89575edaf3b0 (&mm->mmap_lock/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: copy_process+0x13e4/0x2ad0
[  223.424066]  #3: ffffffffb82e76e0 (mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: copy_page_range+0x1cea/0x1ea0
[  223.424088]  #4: ffff8957556b83b0 (&prange->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables+0x9d/0x850 [amdgpu]
[  223.424365]
               stack backtrace:
[  223.424374] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3939 Comm: kfdtest Tainted: G     U     OE      6.12.0-amdstaging-drm-next-lol-050225 #14
[  223.424392] Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
[  223.424401] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. X570 AORUS PRO WIFI/X570 AORUS PRO WIFI, BIOS F36a 02/16/2022
[  223.424416] Call Trace:
[  223.424423]  <TASK>
[  223.424430]  dump_stack_lvl+0x9b/0xf0
[  223.424441]  dump_stack+0x10/0x20
[  223.424449]  print_circular_bug+0x275/0x350
[  223.424460]  check_noncircular+0x157/0x170
[  223.424469]  ? __bfs+0xfd/0x2c0
[  223.424481]  __lock_acquire+0x16f4/0x2810
[  223.424490]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.424505]  lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300
[  223.424514]  ? evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu]
[  223.424783]  __mutex_lock+0x85/0xe20
[  223.424792]  ? evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu]
[  223.425058]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.425067]  ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90
[  223.425076]  ? evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu]
[  223.425339]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.425350]  mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[  223.425358]  ? mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[  223.425367]  evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu]
[  223.425631]  kfd_process_evict_queues+0x8a/0x1d0 [amdgpu]
[  223.425893]  kgd2kfd_quiesce_mm+0x43/0x90 [amdgpu]
[  223.426156]  svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables+0x4a7/0x850 [amdgpu]
[  223.426423]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426436]  __mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start+0x1f5/0x250
[  223.426450]  copy_page_range+0x1e94/0x1ea0
[  223.426461]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426474]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426484]  ? lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300
[  223.426494]  ? copy_process+0x1718/0x2ad0
[  223.426502]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426510]  ? sched_clock_noinstr+0x9/0x10
[  223.426519]  ? local_clock_noinstr+0xe/0xc0
[  223.426528]  ? copy_process+0x1718/0x2ad0
[  223.426537]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426550]  copy_process+0x172f/0x2ad0
[  223.426569]  kernel_clone+0x9c/0x3f0
[  223.426577]  ? __schedule+0x4c9/0x1b00
[  223.426586]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426594]  ? sched_clock_noinstr+0x9/0x10
[  223.426602]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426610]  ? local_clock_noinstr+0xe/0xc0
[  223.426619]  ? schedule+0x107/0x1a0
[  223.426629]  __do_sys_clone+0x66/0x90
[  223.426643]  __x64_sys_clone+0x25/0x30
[  223.426652]  x64_sys_call+0x1d7c/0x20d0
[  223.426661]  do_syscall_64+0x87/0x140
[  223.426671]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426679]  ? common_nsleep+0x44/0x50
[  223.426690]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426698]  ? trace_hardirqs_off+0x52/0xd0
[  223.426709]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426717]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xcc/0x200
[  223.426727]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426736]  ? do_syscall_64+0x93/0x140
[  223.426748]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426756]  ? up_write+0x1c/0x1e0
[  223.426765]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426775]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426783]  ? trace_hardirqs_off+0x52/0xd0
[  223.426792]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426800]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xcc/0x200
[  223.426810]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426818]  ? do_syscall_64+0x93/0x140
[  223.426826]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xcc/0x200
[  223.426836]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426844]  ? do_syscall_64+0x93/0x140
[  223.426853]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426861]  ? irqentry_exit+0x6b/0x90
[  223.426869]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  223.426877]  ? exc_page_fault+0xa7/0x2c0
[  223.426888]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[  223.426898] RIP: 0033:0x7f46758eab57
[  223.426906] Code: ba 04 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 48 8b 04 25 10 00 00 00 45 31 c0 31 d2 31 f6 bf 11 00 20 01 4c 8d 90 d0 02 00 00 b8 38 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 41 41 89 c0 85 c0 75 2c 64 48 8b 04 25 10 00
[  223.426930] RSP: 002b:00007fff5c3e5188 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000038
[  223.426943] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f4675f8c040 RCX: 00007f46758eab57
[  223.426954] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000001200011
[  223.426965] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[  223.426975] R10: 00007f4675e81a50 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
[  223.426986] R13: 00007fff5c3e5470 R14: 00007fff5c3e53e0 R15: 00007fff5c3e5410
[  223.427004]  </TASK>

v2: To resolve this issue, the allocation of the process context buffer
(`proc_ctx_bo`) has been moved from the `add_queue_mes` function to the
`pqm_create_queue` function. This change ensures that the buffer is
allocated only when the first queue for a process is created and only if
the Micro Engine Scheduler (MES) is enabled. (Felix)

v3: Fix typo s/Memory Execution Scheduler (MES)/Micro Engine Scheduler
in commit message. (Lijo)

Fixes: 438b39a ("drm/amdkfd: pause autosuspend when creating pdd")
Cc: Jesse Zhang <jesse.zhang@amd.com>
Cc: Yunxiang Li <Yunxiang.Li@amd.com>
Cc: Philip Yang <Philip.Yang@amd.com>
Cc: Alex Sierra <alex.sierra@amd.com>
Cc: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com>
Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam <srinivasan.shanmugam@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Felix Kuehling <felix.kuehling@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 12, 2025
[ Upstream commit 888751e ]

perf test 11 hwmon fails on s390 with this error

 # ./perf test -Fv 11
 --- start ---
 ---- end ----
 11.1: Basic parsing test             : Ok
 --- start ---
 Testing 'temp_test_hwmon_event1'
 Using CPUID IBM,3931,704,A01,3.7,002f
 temp_test_hwmon_event1 -> hwmon_a_test_hwmon_pmu/temp_test_hwmon_event1/
 FAILED tests/hwmon_pmu.c:189 Unexpected config for
    'temp_test_hwmon_event1', 292470092988416 != 655361
 ---- end ----
 11.2: Parsing without PMU name       : FAILED!
 --- start ---
 Testing 'hwmon_a_test_hwmon_pmu/temp_test_hwmon_event1/'
 FAILED tests/hwmon_pmu.c:189 Unexpected config for
    'hwmon_a_test_hwmon_pmu/temp_test_hwmon_event1/',
    292470092988416 != 655361
 ---- end ----
 11.3: Parsing with PMU name          : FAILED!
 #

The root cause is in member test_event::config which is initialized
to 0xA0001 or 655361. During event parsing a long list event parsing
functions are called and end up with this gdb call stack:

 #0  hwmon_pmu__config_term (hwm=0x168dfd0, attr=0x3ffffff5ee8,
	term=0x168db60, err=0x3ffffff81c8) at util/hwmon_pmu.c:623
 #1  hwmon_pmu__config_terms (pmu=0x168dfd0, attr=0x3ffffff5ee8,
	terms=0x3ffffff5ea8, err=0x3ffffff81c8) at util/hwmon_pmu.c:662
 #2  0x00000000012f870c in perf_pmu__config_terms (pmu=0x168dfd0,
	attr=0x3ffffff5ee8, terms=0x3ffffff5ea8, zero=false,
	apply_hardcoded=false, err=0x3ffffff81c8) at util/pmu.c:1519
 #3  0x00000000012f88a4 in perf_pmu__config (pmu=0x168dfd0, attr=0x3ffffff5ee8,
	head_terms=0x3ffffff5ea8, apply_hardcoded=false, err=0x3ffffff81c8)
	at util/pmu.c:1545
 #4  0x00000000012680c4 in parse_events_add_pmu (parse_state=0x3ffffff7fb8,
	list=0x168dc00, pmu=0x168dfd0, const_parsed_terms=0x3ffffff6090,
	auto_merge_stats=true, alternate_hw_config=10)
	at util/parse-events.c:1508
 #5  0x00000000012684c6 in parse_events_multi_pmu_add (parse_state=0x3ffffff7fb8,
	event_name=0x168ec10 "temp_test_hwmon_event1", hw_config=10,
	const_parsed_terms=0x0, listp=0x3ffffff6230, loc_=0x3ffffff70e0)
	at util/parse-events.c:1592
 #6  0x00000000012f0e4e in parse_events_parse (_parse_state=0x3ffffff7fb8,
	scanner=0x16878c0) at util/parse-events.y:293
 #7  0x00000000012695a0 in parse_events__scanner (str=0x3ffffff81d8
	"temp_test_hwmon_event1", input=0x0, parse_state=0x3ffffff7fb8)
	at util/parse-events.c:1867
 #8  0x000000000126a1e8 in __parse_events (evlist=0x168b580,
	str=0x3ffffff81d8 "temp_test_hwmon_event1", pmu_filter=0x0,
	err=0x3ffffff81c8, fake_pmu=false, warn_if_reordered=true,
	fake_tp=false) at util/parse-events.c:2136
 #9  0x00000000011e36aa in parse_events (evlist=0x168b580,
	str=0x3ffffff81d8 "temp_test_hwmon_event1", err=0x3ffffff81c8)
	at /root/linux/tools/perf/util/parse-events.h:41
 #10 0x00000000011e3e64 in do_test (i=0, with_pmu=false, with_alias=false)
	at tests/hwmon_pmu.c:164
 #11 0x00000000011e422c in test__hwmon_pmu (with_pmu=false)
	at tests/hwmon_pmu.c:219
 #12 0x00000000011e431c in test__hwmon_pmu_without_pmu (test=0x1610368
	<suite.hwmon_pmu>, subtest=1) at tests/hwmon_pmu.c:23

where the attr::config is set to value 292470092988416 or 0x10a0000000000
in line 625 of file ./util/hwmon_pmu.c:

   attr->config = key.type_and_num;

However member key::type_and_num is defined as union and bit field:

   union hwmon_pmu_event_key {
        long type_and_num;
        struct {
                int num :16;
                enum hwmon_type type :8;
        };
   };

s390 is big endian and Intel is little endian architecture.
The events for the hwmon dummy pmu have num = 1 or num = 2 and
type is set to HWMON_TYPE_TEMP (which is 10).
On s390 this assignes member key::type_and_num the value of
0x10a0000000000 (which is 292470092988416) as shown in above
trace output.

Fix this and export the structure/union hwmon_pmu_event_key
so the test shares the same implementation as the event parsing
functions for union and bit fields. This should avoid
endianess issues on all platforms.

Output after:
 # ./perf test -F 11
 11.1: Basic parsing test         : Ok
 11.2: Parsing without PMU name   : Ok
 11.3: Parsing with PMU name      : Ok
 #

Fixes: 531ee0f ("perf test: Add hwmon "PMU" test")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Richter <tmricht@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250131112400.568975-1-tmricht@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 12, 2025
[ Upstream commit 053f3ff ]

v2:
- Created a single error handling unlock and exit in veth_pool_store
- Greatly expanded commit message with previous explanatory-only text

Summary: Use rtnl_mutex to synchronize veth_pool_store with itself,
ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open, preventing multiple calls in a row to
napi_disable.

Background: Two (or more) threads could call veth_pool_store through
writing to /sys/devices/vio/30000002/pool*/*. You can do this easily
with a little shell script. This causes a hang.

I configured LOCKDEP, compiled ibmveth.c with DEBUG, and built a new
kernel. I ran this test again and saw:

    Setting pool0/active to 0
    Setting pool1/active to 1
    [   73.911067][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting
    Setting pool1/active to 1
    Setting pool1/active to 0
    [   73.911367][ T4366] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting
    [   73.916056][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close complete
    [   73.916064][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: open starting
    [  110.808564][  T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification.
    [  230.808495][  T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification.
    [  243.683786][  T123] INFO: task stress.sh:4365 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
    [  243.683827][  T123]       Not tainted 6.14.0-01103-g2df0c02dab82-dirty #8
    [  243.683833][  T123] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
    [  243.683838][  T123] task:stress.sh       state:D stack:28096 pid:4365  tgid:4365  ppid:4364   task_flags:0x400040 flags:0x00042000
    [  243.683852][  T123] Call Trace:
    [  243.683857][  T123] [c00000000c38f690] [0000000000000001] 0x1 (unreliable)
    [  243.683868][  T123] [c00000000c38f840] [c00000000001f908] __switch_to+0x318/0x4e0
    [  243.683878][  T123] [c00000000c38f8a0] [c000000001549a70] __schedule+0x500/0x12a0
    [  243.683888][  T123] [c00000000c38f9a0] [c00000000154a878] schedule+0x68/0x210
    [  243.683896][  T123] [c00000000c38f9d0] [c00000000154ac80] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x30/0x50
    [  243.683904][  T123] [c00000000c38fa00] [c00000000154dbb0] __mutex_lock+0x730/0x10f0
    [  243.683913][  T123] [c00000000c38fb10] [c000000001154d40] napi_enable+0x30/0x60
    [  243.683921][  T123] [c00000000c38fb40] [c000000000f4ae94] ibmveth_open+0x68/0x5dc
    [  243.683928][  T123] [c00000000c38fbe0] [c000000000f4aa20] veth_pool_store+0x220/0x270
    [  243.683936][  T123] [c00000000c38fc70] [c000000000826278] sysfs_kf_write+0x68/0xb0
    [  243.683944][  T123] [c00000000c38fcb0] [c0000000008240b8] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x198/0x2d0
    [  243.683951][  T123] [c00000000c38fd00] [c00000000071b9ac] vfs_write+0x34c/0x650
    [  243.683958][  T123] [c00000000c38fdc0] [c00000000071bea8] ksys_write+0x88/0x150
    [  243.683966][  T123] [c00000000c38fe10] [c0000000000317f4] system_call_exception+0x124/0x340
    [  243.683973][  T123] [c00000000c38fe50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
    ...
    [  243.684087][  T123] Showing all locks held in the system:
    [  243.684095][  T123] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/123:
    [  243.684099][  T123]  #0: c00000000278e370 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x50/0x248
    [  243.684114][  T123] 4 locks held by stress.sh/4365:
    [  243.684119][  T123]  #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150
    [  243.684132][  T123]  #1: c000000041aea888 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0
    [  243.684143][  T123]  #2: c0000000366fb9a8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0
    [  243.684155][  T123]  #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_enable+0x30/0x60
    [  243.684166][  T123] 5 locks held by stress.sh/4366:
    [  243.684170][  T123]  #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150
    [  243.684183][  T123]  #1: c00000000aee2288 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0
    [  243.684194][  T123]  #2: c0000000366f4ba8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0
    [  243.684205][  T123]  #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_disable+0x30/0x60
    [  243.684216][  T123]  #4: c0000003ff9bbf18 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __schedule+0x138/0x12a0

From the ibmveth debug, two threads are calling veth_pool_store, which
calls ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open. Here's the sequence:

  T4365             T4366
  ----------------- ----------------- ---------
  veth_pool_store   veth_pool_store
                    ibmveth_close
  ibmveth_close
  napi_disable
                    napi_disable
  ibmveth_open
  napi_enable                         <- HANG

ibmveth_close calls napi_disable at the top and ibmveth_open calls
napi_enable at the top.

https://docs.kernel.org/networking/napi.html]] says

  The control APIs are not idempotent. Control API calls are safe
  against concurrent use of datapath APIs but an incorrect sequence of
  control API calls may result in crashes, deadlocks, or race
  conditions. For example, calling napi_disable() multiple times in a
  row will deadlock.

In the normal open and close paths, rtnl_mutex is acquired to prevent
other callers. This is missing from veth_pool_store. Use rtnl_mutex in
veth_pool_store fixes these hangs.

Signed-off-by: Dave Marquardt <davemarq@linux.ibm.com>
Fixes: 860f242 ("[PATCH] ibmveth change buffer pools dynamically")
Reviewed-by: Nick Child <nnac123@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250402154403.386744-1-davemarq@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 12, 2025
commit c11bcbc upstream.

Currently, zswap_cpu_comp_dead() calls crypto_free_acomp() while holding
the per-CPU acomp_ctx mutex.  crypto_free_acomp() then holds scomp_lock
(through crypto_exit_scomp_ops_async()).

On the other hand, crypto_alloc_acomp_node() holds the scomp_lock (through
crypto_scomp_init_tfm()), and then allocates memory.  If the allocation
results in reclaim, we may attempt to hold the per-CPU acomp_ctx mutex.

The above dependencies can cause an ABBA deadlock.  For example in the
following scenario:

(1) Task A running on CPU #1:
    crypto_alloc_acomp_node()
      Holds scomp_lock
      Enters reclaim
      Reads per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1)

(2) Task A is descheduled

(3) CPU #1 goes offline
    zswap_cpu_comp_dead(CPU #1)
      Holds per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1))
      Calls crypto_free_acomp()
      Waits for scomp_lock

(4) Task A running on CPU #2:
      Waits for per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1) // Read on CPU #1
      DEADLOCK

Since there is no requirement to call crypto_free_acomp() with the per-CPU
acomp_ctx mutex held in zswap_cpu_comp_dead(), move it after the mutex is
unlocked.  Also move the acomp_request_free() and kfree() calls for
consistency and to avoid any potential sublte locking dependencies in the
future.

With this, only setting acomp_ctx fields to NULL occurs with the mutex
held.  This is similar to how zswap_cpu_comp_prepare() only initializes
acomp_ctx fields with the mutex held, after performing all allocations
before holding the mutex.

Opportunistically, move the NULL check on acomp_ctx so that it takes place
before the mutex dereference.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250226185625.2672936-1-yosry.ahmed@linux.dev
Fixes: 12dcb0e ("mm: zswap: properly synchronize freeing resources during CPU hotunplug")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Co-developed-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed@linux.dev>
Reported-by: syzbot+1a517ccfcbc6a7ab0f82@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/67bcea51.050a0220.bbfd1.0096.GAE@google.com/
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Reviewed-by: Chengming Zhou <chengming.zhou@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Nhat Pham <nphamcs@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Nhat Pham <nphamcs@gmail.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Chris Murphy <lists@colorremedies.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 22, 2025
[ Upstream commit 52323ed ]

syzbot reported a deadlock in lock_system_sleep() (see below).

The write operation to "/sys/module/hibernate/parameters/compressor"
conflicts with the registration of ieee80211 device, resulting in a deadlock
when attempting to acquire system_transition_mutex under param_lock.

To avoid this deadlock, change hibernate_compressor_param_set() to use
mutex_trylock() for attempting to acquire system_transition_mutex and
return -EBUSY when it fails.

Task flags need not be saved or adjusted before calling
mutex_trylock(&system_transition_mutex) because the caller is not going
to end up waiting for this mutex and if it runs concurrently with system
suspend in progress, it will be frozen properly when it returns to user
space.

syzbot report:

syz-executor895/5833 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff8e0828c8 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: lock_system_sleep+0x87/0xa0 kernel/power/main.c:56

but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff8e07dc68 (param_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kernel_param_lock kernel/params.c:607 [inline]
ffffffff8e07dc68 (param_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: param_attr_store+0xe6/0x300 kernel/params.c:586

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #3 (param_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
       __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline]
       __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730
       ieee80211_rate_control_ops_get net/mac80211/rate.c:220 [inline]
       rate_control_alloc net/mac80211/rate.c:266 [inline]
       ieee80211_init_rate_ctrl_alg+0x18d/0x6b0 net/mac80211/rate.c:1015
       ieee80211_register_hw+0x20cd/0x4060 net/mac80211/main.c:1531
       mac80211_hwsim_new_radio+0x304e/0x54e0 drivers/net/wireless/virtual/mac80211_hwsim.c:5558
       init_mac80211_hwsim+0x432/0x8c0 drivers/net/wireless/virtual/mac80211_hwsim.c:6910
       do_one_initcall+0x128/0x700 init/main.c:1257
       do_initcall_level init/main.c:1319 [inline]
       do_initcalls init/main.c:1335 [inline]
       do_basic_setup init/main.c:1354 [inline]
       kernel_init_freeable+0x5c7/0x900 init/main.c:1568
       kernel_init+0x1c/0x2b0 init/main.c:1457
       ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148
       ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244

-> #2 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
       __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline]
       __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730
       wg_pm_notification drivers/net/wireguard/device.c:80 [inline]
       wg_pm_notification+0x49/0x180 drivers/net/wireguard/device.c:64
       notifier_call_chain+0xb7/0x410 kernel/notifier.c:85
       notifier_call_chain_robust kernel/notifier.c:120 [inline]
       blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust kernel/notifier.c:345 [inline]
       blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust+0xc9/0x170 kernel/notifier.c:333
       pm_notifier_call_chain_robust+0x27/0x60 kernel/power/main.c:102
       snapshot_open+0x189/0x2b0 kernel/power/user.c:77
       misc_open+0x35a/0x420 drivers/char/misc.c:179
       chrdev_open+0x237/0x6a0 fs/char_dev.c:414
       do_dentry_open+0x735/0x1c40 fs/open.c:956
       vfs_open+0x82/0x3f0 fs/open.c:1086
       do_open fs/namei.c:3830 [inline]
       path_openat+0x1e88/0x2d80 fs/namei.c:3989
       do_filp_open+0x20c/0x470 fs/namei.c:4016
       do_sys_openat2+0x17a/0x1e0 fs/open.c:1428
       do_sys_open fs/open.c:1443 [inline]
       __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1459 [inline]
       __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1454 [inline]
       __x64_sys_openat+0x175/0x210 fs/open.c:1454
       do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
       do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

-> #1 ((pm_chain_head).rwsem){++++}-{4:4}:
       down_read+0x9a/0x330 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1524
       blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust kernel/notifier.c:344 [inline]
       blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust+0xa9/0x170 kernel/notifier.c:333
       pm_notifier_call_chain_robust+0x27/0x60 kernel/power/main.c:102
       snapshot_open+0x189/0x2b0 kernel/power/user.c:77
       misc_open+0x35a/0x420 drivers/char/misc.c:179
       chrdev_open+0x237/0x6a0 fs/char_dev.c:414
       do_dentry_open+0x735/0x1c40 fs/open.c:956
       vfs_open+0x82/0x3f0 fs/open.c:1086
       do_open fs/namei.c:3830 [inline]
       path_openat+0x1e88/0x2d80 fs/namei.c:3989
       do_filp_open+0x20c/0x470 fs/namei.c:4016
       do_sys_openat2+0x17a/0x1e0 fs/open.c:1428
       do_sys_open fs/open.c:1443 [inline]
       __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1459 [inline]
       __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1454 [inline]
       __x64_sys_openat+0x175/0x210 fs/open.c:1454
       do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
       do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

-> #0 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
       check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3163 [inline]
       check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3282 [inline]
       validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3906 [inline]
       __lock_acquire+0x249e/0x3c40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5228
       lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x380 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851
       __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline]
       __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730
       lock_system_sleep+0x87/0xa0 kernel/power/main.c:56
       hibernate_compressor_param_set+0x1c/0x210 kernel/power/hibernate.c:1452
       param_attr_store+0x18f/0x300 kernel/params.c:588
       module_attr_store+0x55/0x80 kernel/params.c:924
       sysfs_kf_write+0x117/0x170 fs/sysfs/file.c:139
       kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x33d/0x500 fs/kernfs/file.c:334
       new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:586 [inline]
       vfs_write+0x5ae/0x1150 fs/read_write.c:679
       ksys_write+0x12b/0x250 fs/read_write.c:731
       do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
       do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

other info that might help us debug this:

Chain exists of:
  system_transition_mutex --> rtnl_mutex --> param_lock

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(param_lock);
                               lock(rtnl_mutex);
                               lock(param_lock);
  lock(system_transition_mutex);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

Reported-by: syzbot+ace60642828c074eb913@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ace60642828c074eb913
Signed-off-by: Lizhi Xu <lizhi.xu@windriver.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250224013139.3994500-1-lizhi.xu@windriver.com
[ rjw: New subject matching the code changes, changelog edits ]
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 22, 2025
[ Upstream commit b61e69b ]

syzbot report a deadlock in diFree. [1]

When calling "ioctl$LOOP_SET_STATUS64", the offset value passed in is 4,
which does not match the mounted loop device, causing the mapping of the
mounted loop device to be invalidated.

When creating the directory and creating the inode of iag in diReadSpecial(),
read the page of fixed disk inode (AIT) in raw mode in read_metapage(), the
metapage data it returns is corrupted, which causes the nlink value of 0 to be
assigned to the iag inode when executing copy_from_dinode(), which ultimately
causes a deadlock when entering diFree().

To avoid this, first check the nlink value of dinode before setting iag inode.

[1]
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.12.0-rc7-syzkaller-00212-g4a5df3796467 #0 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
syz-executor301/5309 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888044548920 (&(imap->im_aglock[index])){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diFree+0x37c/0x2fb0 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:889

but task is already holding lock:
ffff888044548920 (&(imap->im_aglock[index])){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAlloc+0x1b6/0x1630

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&(imap->im_aglock[index]));
  lock(&(imap->im_aglock[index]));

 *** DEADLOCK ***

 May be due to missing lock nesting notation

5 locks held by syz-executor301/5309:
 #0: ffff8880422a4420 (sb_writers#9){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write+0x3f/0x90 fs/namespace.c:515
 #1: ffff88804755b390 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#6/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: inode_lock_nested include/linux/fs.h:850 [inline]
 #1: ffff88804755b390 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#6/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: filename_create+0x260/0x540 fs/namei.c:4026
 #2: ffff888044548920 (&(imap->im_aglock[index])){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAlloc+0x1b6/0x1630
 #3: ffff888044548890 (&imap->im_freelock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diNewIAG fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:2460 [inline]
 #3: ffff888044548890 (&imap->im_freelock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAllocExt fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1905 [inline]
 #3: ffff888044548890 (&imap->im_freelock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAllocAG+0x4b7/0x1e50 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1669
 #4: ffff88804755a618 (&jfs_ip->rdwrlock/1){++++}-{3:3}, at: diNewIAG fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:2477 [inline]
 #4: ffff88804755a618 (&jfs_ip->rdwrlock/1){++++}-{3:3}, at: diAllocExt fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1905 [inline]
 #4: ffff88804755a618 (&jfs_ip->rdwrlock/1){++++}-{3:3}, at: diAllocAG+0x869/0x1e50 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1669

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5309 Comm: syz-executor301 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7-syzkaller-00212-g4a5df3796467 #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 print_deadlock_bug+0x483/0x620 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3037
 check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3089 [inline]
 validate_chain+0x15e2/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3891
 __lock_acquire+0x1384/0x2050 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5202
 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:608 [inline]
 __mutex_lock+0x136/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752
 diFree+0x37c/0x2fb0 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:889
 jfs_evict_inode+0x32d/0x440 fs/jfs/inode.c:156
 evict+0x4e8/0x9b0 fs/inode.c:725
 diFreeSpecial fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:552 [inline]
 duplicateIXtree+0x3c6/0x550 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:3022
 diNewIAG fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:2597 [inline]
 diAllocExt fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1905 [inline]
 diAllocAG+0x17dc/0x1e50 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1669
 diAlloc+0x1d2/0x1630 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1590
 ialloc+0x8f/0x900 fs/jfs/jfs_inode.c:56
 jfs_mkdir+0x1c5/0xba0 fs/jfs/namei.c:225
 vfs_mkdir+0x2f9/0x4f0 fs/namei.c:4257
 do_mkdirat+0x264/0x3a0 fs/namei.c:4280
 __do_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:4295 [inline]
 __se_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:4293 [inline]
 __x64_sys_mkdirat+0x87/0xa0 fs/namei.c:4293
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Reported-by: syzbot+355da3b3a74881008e8f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=355da3b3a74881008e8f
Signed-off-by: Edward Adam Davis <eadavis@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 22, 2025
[ Upstream commit 27b9180 ]

With the device instance lock, there is now a possibility of a deadlock:

[    1.211455] ============================================
[    1.211571] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[    1.211687] 6.14.0-rc5-01215-g032756b4ca7a-dirty #5 Not tainted
[    1.211823] --------------------------------------------
[    1.211936] ip/184 is trying to acquire lock:
[    1.212032] ffff8881024a4c30 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: dev_set_allmulti+0x4e/0xb0
[    1.212207]
[    1.212207] but task is already holding lock:
[    1.212332] ffff8881024a4c30 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: dev_open+0x50/0xb0
[    1.212487]
[    1.212487] other info that might help us debug this:
[    1.212626]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[    1.212626]
[    1.212751]        CPU0
[    1.212815]        ----
[    1.212871]   lock(&dev->lock);
[    1.212944]   lock(&dev->lock);
[    1.213016]
[    1.213016]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[    1.213016]
[    1.213143]  May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[    1.213143]
[    1.213294] 3 locks held by ip/184:
[    1.213371]  #0: ffffffff838b53e0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_nets_lock+0x1b/0xa0
[    1.213543]  #1: ffffffff84e5fc70 (&net->rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rtnl_nets_lock+0x37/0xa0
[    1.213727]  #2: ffff8881024a4c30 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: dev_open+0x50/0xb0
[    1.213895]
[    1.213895] stack backtrace:
[    1.213991] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 184 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.14.0-rc5-01215-g032756b4ca7a-dirty #5
[    1.213993] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014
[    1.213994] Call Trace:
[    1.213995]  <TASK>
[    1.213996]  dump_stack_lvl+0x8e/0xd0
[    1.214000]  print_deadlock_bug+0x28b/0x2a0
[    1.214020]  lock_acquire+0xea/0x2a0
[    1.214027]  __mutex_lock+0xbf/0xd40
[    1.214038]  dev_set_allmulti+0x4e/0xb0 # real_dev->flags & IFF_ALLMULTI
[    1.214040]  vlan_dev_open+0xa5/0x170 # ndo_open on vlandev
[    1.214042]  __dev_open+0x145/0x270
[    1.214046]  __dev_change_flags+0xb0/0x1e0
[    1.214051]  netif_change_flags+0x22/0x60 # IFF_UP vlandev
[    1.214053]  dev_change_flags+0x61/0xb0 # for each device in group from dev->vlan_info
[    1.214055]  vlan_device_event+0x766/0x7c0 # on netdevsim0
[    1.214058]  notifier_call_chain+0x78/0x120
[    1.214062]  netif_open+0x6d/0x90
[    1.214064]  dev_open+0x5b/0xb0 # locks netdevsim0
[    1.214066]  bond_enslave+0x64c/0x1230
[    1.214075]  do_set_master+0x175/0x1e0 # on netdevsim0
[    1.214077]  do_setlink+0x516/0x13b0
[    1.214094]  rtnl_newlink+0xaba/0xb80
[    1.214132]  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x440/0x490
[    1.214144]  netlink_rcv_skb+0xeb/0x120
[    1.214150]  netlink_unicast+0x1f9/0x320
[    1.214153]  netlink_sendmsg+0x346/0x3f0
[    1.214157]  __sock_sendmsg+0x86/0xb0
[    1.214160]  ____sys_sendmsg+0x1c8/0x220
[    1.214164]  ___sys_sendmsg+0x28f/0x2d0
[    1.214179]  __x64_sys_sendmsg+0xef/0x140
[    1.214184]  do_syscall_64+0xec/0x1d0
[    1.214190]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[    1.214191] RIP: 0033:0x7f2d1b4a7e56

Device setup:

     netdevsim0 (down)
     ^        ^
  bond        netdevsim1.100@netdevsim1 allmulticast=on (down)

When we enslave the lower device (netdevsim0) which has a vlan, we
propagate vlan's allmuti/promisc flags during ndo_open. This causes
(re)locking on of the real_dev.

Propagate allmulti/promisc on flags change, not on the open. There
is a slight semantics change that vlans that are down now propagate
the flags, but this seems unlikely to result in the real issues.

Reproducer:

  echo 0 1 > /sys/bus/netdevsim/new_device

  dev_path=$(ls -d /sys/bus/netdevsim/devices/netdevsim0/net/*)
  dev=$(echo $dev_path | rev | cut -d/ -f1 | rev)

  ip link set dev $dev name netdevsim0
  ip link set dev netdevsim0 up

  ip link add link netdevsim0 name netdevsim0.100 type vlan id 100
  ip link set dev netdevsim0.100 allmulticast on down
  ip link add name bond1 type bond mode 802.3ad
  ip link set dev netdevsim0 down
  ip link set dev netdevsim0 master bond1
  ip link set dev bond1 up
  ip link show

Reported-by: syzbot+b0c03d76056ef6cd12a6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/Z9CfXjLMKn6VLG5d@mini-arch/T/#m15ba130f53227c883e79fb969687d69d670337a0
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@fomichev.me>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250313100657.2287455-1-sdf@fomichev.me
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 22, 2025
commit 93ae6e6 upstream.

We have recently seen report of lockdep circular lock dependency warnings
on platforms like Skylake and Kabylake:

 ======================================================
 WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
 6.14.0-rc6-CI_DRM_16276-gca2c04fe76e8+ #1 Not tainted
 ------------------------------------------------------
 swapper/0/1 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffffffff8360ee48 (iommu_probe_device_lock){+.+.}-{3:3},
   at: iommu_probe_device+0x1d/0x70

 but task is already holding lock:
 ffff888102c7efa8 (&device->physical_node_lock){+.+.}-{3:3},
   at: intel_iommu_init+0xe75/0x11f0

 which lock already depends on the new lock.

 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

 -> #6 (&device->physical_node_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
        __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40
        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
        intel_iommu_init+0xe75/0x11f0
        pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70
        do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0
        kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0
        kernel_init+0x1b/0x200
        ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70
        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

 -> #5 (dmar_global_lock){++++}-{3:3}:
        down_read+0x43/0x1d0
        enable_drhd_fault_handling+0x21/0x110
        cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x4c6/0x870
        cpuhp_issue_call+0xbf/0x1f0
        __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x111/0x320
        __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220
        irq_remap_enable_fault_handling+0x3f/0xa0
        apic_intr_mode_init+0x5c/0x110
        x86_late_time_init+0x24/0x40
        start_kernel+0x895/0xbd0
        x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30
        x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110
        common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141

 -> #4 (cpuhp_state_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
        __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40
        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
        __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x67/0x320
        __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220
        page_alloc_init_cpuhp+0x2d/0x60
        mm_core_init+0x18/0x2c0
        start_kernel+0x576/0xbd0
        x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30
        x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110
        common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141

 -> #3 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}:
        __cpuhp_state_add_instance+0x4f/0x220
        iova_domain_init_rcaches+0x214/0x280
        iommu_setup_dma_ops+0x1a4/0x710
        iommu_device_register+0x17d/0x260
        intel_iommu_init+0xda4/0x11f0
        pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70
        do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0
        kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0
        kernel_init+0x1b/0x200
        ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70
        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

 -> #2 (&domain->iova_cookie->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
        __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40
        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
        iommu_setup_dma_ops+0x16b/0x710
        iommu_device_register+0x17d/0x260
        intel_iommu_init+0xda4/0x11f0
        pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70
        do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0
        kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0
        kernel_init+0x1b/0x200
        ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70
        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

 -> #1 (&group->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
        __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40
        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
        __iommu_probe_device+0x24c/0x4e0
        probe_iommu_group+0x2b/0x50
        bus_for_each_dev+0x7d/0xe0
        iommu_device_register+0xe1/0x260
        intel_iommu_init+0xda4/0x11f0
        pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70
        do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0
        kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0
        kernel_init+0x1b/0x200
        ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70
        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

 -> #0 (iommu_probe_device_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
        __lock_acquire+0x1637/0x2810
        lock_acquire+0xc9/0x300
        __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40
        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
        iommu_probe_device+0x1d/0x70
        intel_iommu_init+0xe90/0x11f0
        pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70
        do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0
        kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0
        kernel_init+0x1b/0x200
        ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70
        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

 other info that might help us debug this:

 Chain exists of:
   iommu_probe_device_lock --> dmar_global_lock -->
     &device->physical_node_lock

  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

        CPU0                    CPU1
        ----                    ----
   lock(&device->physical_node_lock);
                                lock(dmar_global_lock);
                                lock(&device->physical_node_lock);
   lock(iommu_probe_device_lock);

  *** DEADLOCK ***

This driver uses a global lock to protect the list of enumerated DMA
remapping units. It is necessary due to the driver's support for dynamic
addition and removal of remapping units at runtime.

Two distinct code paths require iteration over this remapping unit list:

- Device registration and probing: the driver iterates the list to
  register each remapping unit with the upper layer IOMMU framework
  and subsequently probe the devices managed by that unit.
- Global configuration: Upper layer components may also iterate the list
  to apply configuration changes.

The lock acquisition order between these two code paths was reversed. This
caused lockdep warnings, indicating a risk of deadlock. Fix this warning
by releasing the global lock before invoking upper layer interfaces for
device registration.

Fixes: b150654 ("iommu/vt-d: Fix suspicious RCU usage")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-iommu/SJ1PR11MB612953431F94F18C954C4A9CB9D32@SJ1PR11MB6129.namprd11.prod.outlook.com/
Tested-by: Chaitanya Kumar Borah <chaitanya.kumar.borah@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250317035714.1041549-1-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 26, 2025
[ Upstream commit a104042 ]

The ieee80211 skb control block key (set when skb was queued) could have
been removed before ieee80211_tx_dequeue() call. ieee80211_tx_dequeue()
already called ieee80211_tx_h_select_key() to get the current key, but
the latter do not update the key in skb control block in case it is
NULL. Because some drivers actually use this key in their TX callbacks
(e.g. ath1{1,2}k_mac_op_tx()) this could lead to the use after free
below:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ath11k_mac_op_tx+0x590/0x61c
  Read of size 4 at addr ffffff803083c248 by task kworker/u16:4/1440

  CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 1440 Comm: kworker/u16:4 Not tainted 6.13.0-ge128f627f404 #2
  Hardware name: HW (DT)
  Workqueue: bat_events batadv_send_outstanding_bcast_packet
  Call trace:
   show_stack+0x14/0x1c (C)
   dump_stack_lvl+0x58/0x74
   print_report+0x164/0x4c0
   kasan_report+0xac/0xe8
   __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x1c/0x24
   ath11k_mac_op_tx+0x590/0x61c
   ieee80211_handle_wake_tx_queue+0x12c/0x1c8
   ieee80211_queue_skb+0xdcc/0x1b4c
   ieee80211_tx+0x1ec/0x2bc
   ieee80211_xmit+0x224/0x324
   __ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x85c/0xcf8
   ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0xc0/0xec4
   dev_hard_start_xmit+0xf4/0x28c
   __dev_queue_xmit+0x6ac/0x318c
   batadv_send_skb_packet+0x38c/0x4b0
   batadv_send_outstanding_bcast_packet+0x110/0x328
   process_one_work+0x578/0xc10
   worker_thread+0x4bc/0xc7c
   kthread+0x2f8/0x380
   ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

  Allocated by task 1906:
   kasan_save_stack+0x28/0x4c
   kasan_save_track+0x1c/0x40
   kasan_save_alloc_info+0x3c/0x4c
   __kasan_kmalloc+0xac/0xb0
   __kmalloc_noprof+0x1b4/0x380
   ieee80211_key_alloc+0x3c/0xb64
   ieee80211_add_key+0x1b4/0x71c
   nl80211_new_key+0x2b4/0x5d8
   genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x198/0x240
  <...>

  Freed by task 1494:
   kasan_save_stack+0x28/0x4c
   kasan_save_track+0x1c/0x40
   kasan_save_free_info+0x48/0x94
   __kasan_slab_free+0x48/0x60
   kfree+0xc8/0x31c
   kfree_sensitive+0x70/0x80
   ieee80211_key_free_common+0x10c/0x174
   ieee80211_free_keys+0x188/0x46c
   ieee80211_stop_mesh+0x70/0x2cc
   ieee80211_leave_mesh+0x1c/0x60
   cfg80211_leave_mesh+0xe0/0x280
   cfg80211_leave+0x1e0/0x244
  <...>

Reset SKB control block key before calling ieee80211_tx_h_select_key()
to avoid that.

Fixes: bb42f2d ("mac80211: Move reorder-sensitive TX handlers to after TXQ dequeue")
Signed-off-by: Remi Pommarel <repk@triplefau.lt>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/06aa507b853ca385ceded81c18b0a6dd0f081bc8.1742833382.git.repk@triplefau.lt
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 26, 2025
[ Upstream commit 752e221 ]

SMC consists of two sockets: smc_sock and kernel TCP socket.

Currently, there are two ways of creating the sockets, and syzbot reported
a lockdep splat [0] for the newer way introduced by commit d25a92c
("net/smc: Introduce IPPROTO_SMC").

  socket(AF_SMC             , SOCK_STREAM, SMCPROTO_SMC or SMCPROTO_SMC6)
  socket(AF_INET or AF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_SMC)

When a socket is allocated, sock_lock_init() sets a lockdep lock class to
sk->sk_lock.slock based on its protocol family.  In the IPPROTO_SMC case,
AF_INET or AF_INET6 lock class is assigned to smc_sock.

The repro sets IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST for IPv6 UDP and SMC socket and exercises
smc_switch_to_fallback() for IPPROTO_SMC.

  1. smc_switch_to_fallback() is called under lock_sock() and holds
     smc->clcsock_release_lock.

      sk_lock-AF_INET6 -> &smc->clcsock_release_lock
      (sk_lock-AF_SMC)

  2. Setting IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST to SMC holds smc->clcsock_release_lock
     and calls setsockopt() for the kernel TCP socket, which holds RTNL
     and the kernel socket's lock_sock().

      &smc->clcsock_release_lock -> rtnl_mutex (-> k-sk_lock-AF_INET6)

  3. Setting IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST to UDP holds RTNL and lock_sock().

      rtnl_mutex -> sk_lock-AF_INET6

Then, lockdep detects a false-positive circular locking,

  .-> sk_lock-AF_INET6 -> &smc->clcsock_release_lock -> rtnl_mutex -.
  `-----------------------------------------------------------------'

but IPPROTO_SMC should have the same locking rule as AF_SMC.

      sk_lock-AF_SMC   -> &smc->clcsock_release_lock -> rtnl_mutex -> k-sk_lock-AF_INET6

Let's set the same lock class for smc_sock.

Given AF_SMC uses the same lock class for SMCPROTO_SMC and SMCPROTO_SMC6,
we do not need to separate the class for AF_INET and AF_INET6.

[0]:
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.14.0-rc3-syzkaller-00267-gff202c5028a1 #0 Not tainted

syz.4.1528/11571 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff8fef8de8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ipv6_sock_ac_close+0xd9/0x110 net/ipv6/anycast.c:220

but task is already holding lock:
ffff888027f596a8 (&smc->clcsock_release_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: smc_clcsock_release+0x75/0xe0 net/smc/smc_close.c:30

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

 -> #2 (&smc->clcsock_release_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
       __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline]
       __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730
       smc_switch_to_fallback+0x2d/0xa00 net/smc/af_smc.c:903
       smc_sendmsg+0x13d/0x520 net/smc/af_smc.c:2781
       sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:718 [inline]
       __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:733 [inline]
       ____sys_sendmsg+0xaaf/0xc90 net/socket.c:2573
       ___sys_sendmsg+0x135/0x1e0 net/socket.c:2627
       __sys_sendmsg+0x16e/0x220 net/socket.c:2659
       do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
       do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

 -> #1 (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}-{0:0}:
       lock_sock_nested+0x3a/0xf0 net/core/sock.c:3645
       lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1624 [inline]
       sockopt_lock_sock net/core/sock.c:1133 [inline]
       sockopt_lock_sock+0x54/0x70 net/core/sock.c:1124
       do_ipv6_setsockopt+0x2160/0x4520 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:567
       ipv6_setsockopt+0xcb/0x170 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:993
       udpv6_setsockopt+0x7d/0xd0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1850
       do_sock_setsockopt+0x222/0x480 net/socket.c:2303
       __sys_setsockopt+0x1a0/0x230 net/socket.c:2328
       __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2334 [inline]
       __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2331 [inline]
       __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xbd/0x160 net/socket.c:2331
       do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
       do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

 -> #0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
       check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3163 [inline]
       check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3282 [inline]
       validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3906 [inline]
       __lock_acquire+0x249e/0x3c40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5228
       lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x380 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851
       __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline]
       __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730
       ipv6_sock_ac_close+0xd9/0x110 net/ipv6/anycast.c:220
       inet6_release+0x47/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:485
       __sock_release net/socket.c:647 [inline]
       sock_release+0x8e/0x1d0 net/socket.c:675
       smc_clcsock_release+0xb7/0xe0 net/smc/smc_close.c:34
       __smc_release+0x5c2/0x880 net/smc/af_smc.c:301
       smc_release+0x1fc/0x5f0 net/smc/af_smc.c:344
       __sock_release+0xb0/0x270 net/socket.c:647
       sock_close+0x1c/0x30 net/socket.c:1398
       __fput+0x3ff/0xb70 fs/file_table.c:464
       task_work_run+0x14e/0x250 kernel/task_work.c:227
       resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline]
       exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:114 [inline]
       exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:329 [inline]
       __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline]
       syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27b/0x2a0 kernel/entry/common.c:218
       do_syscall_64+0xda/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:89
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

other info that might help us debug this:

Chain exists of:
  rtnl_mutex --> sk_lock-AF_INET6 --> &smc->clcsock_release_lock

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&smc->clcsock_release_lock);
                               lock(sk_lock-AF_INET6);
                               lock(&smc->clcsock_release_lock);
  lock(rtnl_mutex);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

2 locks held by syz.4.1528/11571:
 #0: ffff888077e88208 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#10){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:877 [inline]
 #0: ffff888077e88208 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#10){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __sock_release+0x86/0x270 net/socket.c:646
 #1: ffff888027f596a8 (&smc->clcsock_release_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: smc_clcsock_release+0x75/0xe0 net/smc/smc_close.c:30

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 11571 Comm: syz.4.1528 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc3-syzkaller-00267-gff202c5028a1 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 print_circular_bug+0x490/0x760 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2076
 check_noncircular+0x31a/0x400 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2208
 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3163 [inline]
 check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3282 [inline]
 validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3906 [inline]
 __lock_acquire+0x249e/0x3c40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5228
 lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x380 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851
 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline]
 __mutex_lock+0x19b/0xb10 kernel/locking/mutex.c:730
 ipv6_sock_ac_close+0xd9/0x110 net/ipv6/anycast.c:220
 inet6_release+0x47/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:485
 __sock_release net/socket.c:647 [inline]
 sock_release+0x8e/0x1d0 net/socket.c:675
 smc_clcsock_release+0xb7/0xe0 net/smc/smc_close.c:34
 __smc_release+0x5c2/0x880 net/smc/af_smc.c:301
 smc_release+0x1fc/0x5f0 net/smc/af_smc.c:344
 __sock_release+0xb0/0x270 net/socket.c:647
 sock_close+0x1c/0x30 net/socket.c:1398
 __fput+0x3ff/0xb70 fs/file_table.c:464
 task_work_run+0x14e/0x250 kernel/task_work.c:227
 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:114 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:329 [inline]
 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline]
 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27b/0x2a0 kernel/entry/common.c:218
 do_syscall_64+0xda/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:89
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f8b4b38d169
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffe4efd22d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001b4
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000000b14a3 RCX: 00007f8b4b38d169
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000001e RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f8b4b5a7ba0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 000000114efd25cf
R10: 00007f8b4b200000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f8b4b5a5fac
R13: 00007f8b4b5a5fa0 R14: ffffffffffffffff R15: 00007ffe4efd23f0
 </TASK>

Fixes: d25a92c ("net/smc: Introduce IPPROTO_SMC")
Reported-by: syzbot+be6f4b383534d88989f7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=be6f4b383534d88989f7
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Wenjia Zhang <wenjia@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250407170332.26959-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 26, 2025
commit d54d610 upstream.

Communicating with the hypervisor using the shared GHCB page requires
clearing the C bit in the mapping of that page. When executing in the
context of the EFI boot services, the page tables are owned by the
firmware, and this manipulation is not possible.

So switch to a different API for accepting memory in SEV-SNP guests, one
which is actually supported at the point during boot where the EFI stub
may need to accept memory, but the SEV-SNP init code has not executed
yet.

For simplicity, also switch the memory acceptance carried out by the
decompressor when not booting via EFI - this only involves the
allocation for the decompressed kernel, and is generally only called
after kexec, as normal boot will jump straight into the kernel from the
EFI stub.

Fixes: 6c32117 ("x86/sev: Add SNP-specific unaccepted memory support")
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com>
Cc: Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250404082921.2767593-8-ardb+git@google.com # discussion thread #1
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250410132850.3708703-2-ardb+git@google.com # discussion thread #2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250417202120.1002102-2-ardb+git@google.com # final submission
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 26, 2025
commit afcdf51 upstream.

Commit 7da55c2 ("drm/amd/display: Remove incorrect FP context
start") removes the FP context protection of dml2_create(), and it said
"All the DC_FP_START/END should be used before call anything from DML2".

However, dml2_init()/dml21_init() are not protected from their callers,
causing such errors:

 do_fpu invoked from kernel context![#1]:
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 239 Comm: kworker/0:5 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc6+ #2
 Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn
 pc ffff80000319de80 ra ffff80000319de5c tp 900000010575c000 sp 900000010575f840
 a0 0000000000000000 a1 900000012f210130 a2 900000012f000000 a3 ffff80000357e268
 a4 ffff80000357e260 a5 900000012ea52cf0 a6 0000000400000004 a7 0000012c00001388
 t0 00001900000015e0 t1 ffff80000379d000 t2 0000000010624dd3 t3 0000006400000014
 t4 00000000000003e8 t5 0000005000000018 t6 0000000000000020 t7 0000000f00000064
 t8 000000000000002f u0 5f5e9200f8901912 s9 900000012d380010 s0 900000012ea51fd8
 s1 900000012f000000 s2 9000000109296000 s3 0000000000000001 s4 0000000000001fd8
 s5 0000000000000001 s6 ffff800003415000 s7 900000012d390000 s8 ffff800003211f80
    ra: ffff80000319de5c dml21_apply_soc_bb_overrides+0x3c/0x960 [amdgpu]
   ERA: ffff80000319de80 dml21_apply_soc_bb_overrides+0x60/0x960 [amdgpu]
  CRMD: 000000b0 (PLV0 -IE -DA +PG DACF=CC DACM=CC -WE)
  PRMD: 00000004 (PPLV0 +PIE -PWE)
  EUEN: 00000000 (-FPE -SXE -ASXE -BTE)
  ECFG: 00071c1d (LIE=0,2-4,10-12 VS=7)
 ESTAT: 000f0000 [FPD] (IS= ECode=15 EsubCode=0)
  PRID: 0014d010 (Loongson-64bit, Loongson-3C6000/S)
 Process kworker/0:5 (pid: 239, threadinfo=00000000927eadc6, task=000000008fd31682)
 Stack : 00040dc000003164 0000000000000001 900000012f210130 900000012eabeeb8
         900000012f000000 ffff80000319fe48 900000012f210000 900000012f210130
         900000012f000000 900000012eabeeb8 0000000000000001 ffff8000031a0064
         900000010575f9f0 900000012f210130 900000012eac0000 900000012ea80000
         900000012f000000 ffff8000031cefc4 900000010575f9f0 ffff8000035859c0
         ffff800003414000 900000010575fa78 900000012f000000 ffff8000031b4c50
         0000000000000000 9000000101c9d700 9000000109c40000 5f5e9200f8901912
         900000012d3c4bd0 900000012d3c5000 ffff8000034aed18 900000012d380010
         900000012d3c4bd0 ffff800003414000 900000012d380000 ffff800002ea49dc
         0000000000000001 900000012d3c6000 00000000ffffe423 0000000000010000
         ...
 Call Trace:
 [<ffff80000319de80>] dml21_apply_soc_bb_overrides+0x60/0x960 [amdgpu]
 [<ffff80000319fe44>] dml21_init+0xa4/0x280 [amdgpu]
 [<ffff8000031a0060>] dml21_create+0x40/0x80 [amdgpu]
 [<ffff8000031cefc0>] dc_state_create+0x100/0x160 [amdgpu]
 [<ffff8000031b4c4c>] dc_create+0x44c/0x640 [amdgpu]
 [<ffff800002ea49d8>] amdgpu_dm_init+0x3f8/0x2060 [amdgpu]
 [<ffff800002ea6658>] dm_hw_init+0x18/0x60 [amdgpu]
 [<ffff800002b16738>] amdgpu_device_init+0x1938/0x27e0 [amdgpu]
 [<ffff800002b18e80>] amdgpu_driver_load_kms+0x20/0xa0 [amdgpu]
 [<ffff800002b0c8f0>] amdgpu_pci_probe+0x1b0/0x580 [amdgpu]
 [<900000000448eae4>] local_pci_probe+0x44/0xc0
 [<9000000003b02b18>] work_for_cpu_fn+0x18/0x40
 [<9000000003b05da0>] process_one_work+0x160/0x300
 [<9000000003b06718>] worker_thread+0x318/0x440
 [<9000000003b11b8c>] kthread+0x12c/0x220
 [<9000000003ac1484>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x8/0xa4

Unfortunately, protecting dml2_init()/dml21_init() out of DML2 causes
"sleeping function called from invalid context", so protect them with
DC_FP_START() and DC_FP_END() inside.

Fixes: 7da55c2 ("drm/amd/display: Remove incorrect FP context start")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Reviewed-by: Aurabindo Pillai <aurabindo.pillai@amd.com>
Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 10, 2025
commit ab680dc upstream.

Fix deadlock in job submission and abort handling.
When a thread aborts currently executing jobs due to a fault,
it first locks the global lock protecting submitted_jobs (#1).

After the last job is destroyed, it proceeds to release the related context
and locks file_priv (#2). Meanwhile, in the job submission thread,
the file_priv lock (#2) is taken first, and then the submitted_jobs
lock (#1) is obtained when a job is added to the submitted jobs list.

       CPU0                            CPU1
       ----                    	       ----
  (for example due to a fault)         (jobs submissions keep coming)

  lock(&vdev->submitted_jobs_lock) #1
  ivpu_jobs_abort_all()
  job_destroy()
                                      lock(&file_priv->lock)           #2
                                      lock(&vdev->submitted_jobs_lock) #1
  file_priv_release()
  lock(&vdev->context_list_lock)
  lock(&file_priv->lock)           #2

This order of locking causes a deadlock. To resolve this issue,
change the order of locking in ivpu_job_submit().

Signed-off-by: Karol Wachowski <karol.wachowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Maciej Falkowski <maciej.falkowski@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jacek Lawrynowicz <jacek.lawrynowicz@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jacek Lawrynowicz <jacek.lawrynowicz@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20250107173238.381120-12-maciej.falkowski@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Jacek Lawrynowicz <jacek.lawrynowicz@linux.intel.com>
[ This backport required small adjustments to ivpu_job_submit(),
  which lacks support for explicit command queue creation added in 6.15.  ]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 10, 2025
[ Upstream commit 866bafa ]

There is a potential deadlock if we do report zones in an IO context, detailed
in below lockdep report. When one process do a report zones and another process
freezes the block device, the report zones side cannot allocate a tag because
the freeze is already started. This can thus result in new block group creation
to hang forever, blocking the write path.

Thankfully, a new block group should be created on empty zones. So, reporting
the zones is not necessary and we can set the write pointer = 0 and load the
zone capacity from the block layer using bdev_zone_capacity() helper.

 ======================================================
 WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
 6.14.0-rc1 torvalds#252 Not tainted
 ------------------------------------------------------
 modprobe/1110 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffff888100ac83e0 ((work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x38f/0xb60

 but task is already holding lock:
 ffff8881205b6f20 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#16){++++}-{0:0}, at: sd_remove+0x85/0x130

 which lock already depends on the new lock.

 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

 -> #3 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#16){++++}-{0:0}:
        blk_queue_enter+0x3d9/0x500
        blk_mq_alloc_request+0x47d/0x8e0
        scsi_execute_cmd+0x14f/0xb80
        sd_zbc_do_report_zones+0x1c1/0x470
        sd_zbc_report_zones+0x362/0xd60
        blkdev_report_zones+0x1b1/0x2e0
        btrfs_get_dev_zones+0x215/0x7e0 [btrfs]
        btrfs_load_block_group_zone_info+0x6d2/0x2c10 [btrfs]
        btrfs_make_block_group+0x36b/0x870 [btrfs]
        btrfs_create_chunk+0x147d/0x2320 [btrfs]
        btrfs_chunk_alloc+0x2ce/0xcf0 [btrfs]
        start_transaction+0xce6/0x1620 [btrfs]
        btrfs_uuid_scan_kthread+0x4ee/0x5b0 [btrfs]
        kthread+0x39d/0x750
        ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70
        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

 -> #2 (&fs_info->dev_replace.rwsem){++++}-{4:4}:
        down_read+0x9b/0x470
        btrfs_map_block+0x2ce/0x2ce0 [btrfs]
        btrfs_submit_chunk+0x2d4/0x16c0 [btrfs]
        btrfs_submit_bbio+0x16/0x30 [btrfs]
        btree_write_cache_pages+0xb5a/0xf90 [btrfs]
        do_writepages+0x17f/0x7b0
        __writeback_single_inode+0x114/0xb00
        writeback_sb_inodes+0x52b/0xe00
        wb_writeback+0x1a7/0x800
        wb_workfn+0x12a/0xbd0
        process_one_work+0x85a/0x1460
        worker_thread+0x5e2/0xfc0
        kthread+0x39d/0x750
        ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70
        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

 -> #1 (&fs_info->zoned_meta_io_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
        __mutex_lock+0x1aa/0x1360
        btree_write_cache_pages+0x252/0xf90 [btrfs]
        do_writepages+0x17f/0x7b0
        __writeback_single_inode+0x114/0xb00
        writeback_sb_inodes+0x52b/0xe00
        wb_writeback+0x1a7/0x800
        wb_workfn+0x12a/0xbd0
        process_one_work+0x85a/0x1460
        worker_thread+0x5e2/0xfc0
        kthread+0x39d/0x750
        ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70
        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
        __lock_acquire+0x2f52/0x5ea0
        lock_acquire+0x1b1/0x540
        __flush_work+0x3ac/0xb60
        wb_shutdown+0x15b/0x1f0
        bdi_unregister+0x172/0x5b0
        del_gendisk+0x841/0xa20
        sd_remove+0x85/0x130
        device_release_driver_internal+0x368/0x520
        bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0
        device_del+0x3bd/0x9c0
        __scsi_remove_device+0x272/0x340
        scsi_forget_host+0xf7/0x170
        scsi_remove_host+0xd2/0x2a0
        sdebug_driver_remove+0x52/0x2f0 [scsi_debug]
        device_release_driver_internal+0x368/0x520
        bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0
        device_del+0x3bd/0x9c0
        device_unregister+0x13/0xa0
        sdebug_do_remove_host+0x1fb/0x290 [scsi_debug]
        scsi_debug_exit+0x17/0x70 [scsi_debug]
        __do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x321/0x520
        do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

 other info that might help us debug this:

 Chain exists of:
   (work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work) --> &fs_info->dev_replace.rwsem --> &q->q_usage_counter(queue)#16

  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

        CPU0                    CPU1
        ----                    ----
   lock(&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#16);
                                lock(&fs_info->dev_replace.rwsem);
                                lock(&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#16);
   lock((work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work));

  *** DEADLOCK ***

 5 locks held by modprobe/1110:
  #0: ffff88811f7bc108 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x8f/0x520
  #1: ffff8881022ee0e0 (&shost->scan_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: scsi_remove_host+0x20/0x2a0
  #2: ffff88811b4c4378 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x8f/0x520
  #3: ffff8881205b6f20 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#16){++++}-{0:0}, at: sd_remove+0x85/0x130
  #4: ffffffffa3284360 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: __flush_work+0xda/0xb60

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1110 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.14.0-rc1 torvalds#252
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x6a/0x90
  print_circular_bug.cold+0x1e0/0x274
  check_noncircular+0x306/0x3f0
  ? __pfx_check_noncircular+0x10/0x10
  ? mark_lock+0xf5/0x1650
  ? __pfx_check_irq_usage+0x10/0x10
  ? lockdep_lock+0xca/0x1c0
  ? __pfx_lockdep_lock+0x10/0x10
  __lock_acquire+0x2f52/0x5ea0
  ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx_mark_lock+0x10/0x10
  lock_acquire+0x1b1/0x540
  ? __flush_work+0x38f/0xb60
  ? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10
  ? mark_held_locks+0x94/0xe0
  ? __flush_work+0x38f/0xb60
  __flush_work+0x3ac/0xb60
  ? __flush_work+0x38f/0xb60
  ? __pfx_mark_lock+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx___flush_work+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx___might_resched+0x10/0x10
  ? mark_held_locks+0x94/0xe0
  wb_shutdown+0x15b/0x1f0
  bdi_unregister+0x172/0x5b0
  ? __pfx_bdi_unregister+0x10/0x10
  ? up_write+0x1ba/0x510
  del_gendisk+0x841/0xa20
  ? __pfx_del_gendisk+0x10/0x10
  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x35/0x60
  ? __pm_runtime_resume+0x79/0x110
  sd_remove+0x85/0x130
  device_release_driver_internal+0x368/0x520
  ? kobject_put+0x5d/0x4a0
  bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0
  device_del+0x3bd/0x9c0
  ? __pfx_device_del+0x10/0x10
  __scsi_remove_device+0x272/0x340
  scsi_forget_host+0xf7/0x170
  scsi_remove_host+0xd2/0x2a0
  sdebug_driver_remove+0x52/0x2f0 [scsi_debug]
  ? kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0xc0/0xf0
  device_release_driver_internal+0x368/0x520
  ? kobject_put+0x5d/0x4a0
  bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0
  device_del+0x3bd/0x9c0
  ? __pfx_device_del+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx___mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x10/0x10
  device_unregister+0x13/0xa0
  sdebug_do_remove_host+0x1fb/0x290 [scsi_debug]
  scsi_debug_exit+0x17/0x70 [scsi_debug]
  __do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x321/0x520
  ? __pfx___do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx_slab_free_after_rcu_debug+0x10/0x10
  ? kasan_save_stack+0x2c/0x50
  ? kasan_record_aux_stack+0xa3/0xb0
  ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0xc4/0xfb0
  ? kmem_cache_free+0x3a0/0x590
  ? __x64_sys_close+0x78/0xd0
  do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180
  ? lock_is_held_type+0xd5/0x130
  ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x3c0/0xfb0
  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100
  ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x3c0/0xfb0
  ? __pfx___call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x10/0x10
  ? kmem_cache_free+0x3a0/0x590
  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x16d/0x400
  ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100
  ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
  ? __pfx___x64_sys_openat+0x10/0x10
  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x16d/0x400
  ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100
  ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
 RIP: 0033:0x7f436712b68b
 RSP: 002b:00007ffe9f1a8658 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005559b367fd80 RCX: 00007f436712b68b
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 00005559b367fde8
 RBP: 00007ffe9f1a8680 R08: 1999999999999999 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: 00007f43671a5fe0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007ffe9f1a86b0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
  </TASK>

Reported-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 6.13+
Tested-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota <naohiro.aota@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 10, 2025
[ Upstream commit 48c1d1b ]

[BUG]
There is a bug report that a syzbot reproducer can lead to the following
busy inode at unmount time:

  BTRFS info (device loop1): last unmount of filesystem 1680000e-3c1e-4c46-84b6-56bd3909af50
  VFS: Busy inodes after unmount of loop1 (btrfs)
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at fs/super.c:650!
  Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
  CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 48168 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.15.0-rc2-00471-g119009db2674 #2 PREEMPT(full)
  Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:generic_shutdown_super+0x2e9/0x390 fs/super.c:650
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   kill_anon_super+0x3a/0x60 fs/super.c:1237
   btrfs_kill_super+0x3b/0x50 fs/btrfs/super.c:2099
   deactivate_locked_super+0xbe/0x1a0 fs/super.c:473
   deactivate_super fs/super.c:506 [inline]
   deactivate_super+0xe2/0x100 fs/super.c:502
   cleanup_mnt+0x21f/0x440 fs/namespace.c:1435
   task_work_run+0x14d/0x240 kernel/task_work.c:227
   resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline]
   exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:114 [inline]
   exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:329 [inline]
   __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline]
   syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x269/0x290 kernel/entry/common.c:218
   do_syscall_64+0xd4/0x250 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
   </TASK>

[CAUSE]
When btrfs_alloc_path() failed, btrfs_iget() directly returned without
releasing the inode already allocated by btrfs_iget_locked().

This results the above busy inode and trigger the kernel BUG.

[FIX]
Fix it by calling iget_failed() if btrfs_alloc_path() failed.

If we hit error inside btrfs_read_locked_inode(), it will properly call
iget_failed(), so nothing to worry about.

Although the iget_failed() cleanup inside btrfs_read_locked_inode() is a
break of the normal error handling scheme, let's fix the obvious bug
and backport first, then rework the error handling later.

Reported-by: Penglei Jiang <superman.xpt@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/20250421102425.44431-1-superman.xpt@gmail.com/
Fixes: 7c855e1 ("btrfs: remove conditional path allocation in btrfs_read_locked_inode()")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.13+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Penglei Jiang <superman.xpt@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 18, 2025
…/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD

KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.16, take #2

- Rework of system register accessors for system registers that are
  directly writen to memory, so that sanitisation of the in-memory
  value happens at the correct time (after the read, or before the
  write). For convenience, RMW-style accessors are also provided.

- Multiple fixes for the so-called "arch-timer-edge-cases' selftest,
  which was always broken.
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 24, 2025
As-per the SBI specification, an SBI remote fence operation applies
to the entire address space if either:
1) start_addr and size are both 0
2) size is equal to 2^XLEN-1

>From the above, only #1 is checked by SBI SFENCE calls so fix the
size parameter check in SBI SFENCE calls to cover #2 as well.

Fixes: 13acfec ("RISC-V: KVM: Add remote HFENCE functions based on VCPU requests")
Reviewed-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <apatel@ventanamicro.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250605061458.196003-2-apatel@ventanamicro.com
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 24, 2025
This patch fixes an issue seen in a large-scale deployment under heavy
incoming pkts where the aRFS flow wrongly matches a flow and reprograms the
NIC with wrong settings. That mis-steering causes RX-path latency spikes
and noisy neighbor effects when many connections collide on the same
hash (some of our production servers have 20-30K connections).

set_rps_cpu() calls ndo_rx_flow_steer() with flow_id that is calculated by
hashing the skb sized by the per rx-queue table size. This results in
multiple connections (even across different rx-queues) getting the same
hash value. The driver steer function modifies the wrong flow to use this
rx-queue, e.g.: Flow#1 is first added:
    Flow#1:  <ip1, port1, ip2, port2>, Hash 'h', q#10

Later when a new flow needs to be added:
	    Flow#2:  <ip3, port3, ip4, port4>, Hash 'h', q#20

The driver finds the hash 'h' from Flow#1 and updates it to use q#20. This
results in both flows getting un-optimized - packets for Flow#1 goes to
q#20, and then reprogrammed back to q#10 later and so on; and Flow #2
programming is never done as Flow#1 is matched first for all misses. Many
flows may wrongly share the same hash and reprogram rules of the original
flow each with their own q#.

Tested on two 144-core servers with 16K netperf sessions for 180s. Netperf
clients are pinned to cores 0-71 sequentially (so that wrong packets on q#s
72-143 can be measured). IRQs are set 1:1 for queues -> CPUs, enable XPS,
enable aRFS (global value is 144 * rps_flow_cnt).

Test notes about results from ice_rx_flow_steer():
---------------------------------------------------
1. "Skip:" counter increments here:
    if (fltr_info->q_index == rxq_idx ||
	arfs_entry->fltr_state != ICE_ARFS_ACTIVE)
	    goto out;
2. "Add:" counter increments here:
    ret = arfs_entry->fltr_info.fltr_id;
    INIT_HLIST_NODE(&arfs_entry->list_entry);
3. "Update:" counter increments here:
    /* update the queue to forward to on an already existing flow */

Runtime comparison: original code vs with the patch for different
rps_flow_cnt values.

+-------------------------------+--------------+--------------+
| rps_flow_cnt                  |      512     |    2048      |
+-------------------------------+--------------+--------------+
| Ratio of Pkts on Good:Bad q's | 214 vs 822K  | 1.1M vs 980K |
| Avoid wrong aRFS programming  | 0 vs 310K    | 0 vs 30K     |
| CPU User                      | 216 vs 183   | 216 vs 206   |
| CPU System                    | 1441 vs 1171 | 1447 vs 1320 |
| CPU Softirq                   | 1245 vs 920  | 1238 vs 961  |
| CPU Total                     | 29 vs 22.7   | 29 vs 24.9   |
| aRFS Update                   | 533K vs 59   | 521K vs 32   |
| aRFS Skip                     | 82M vs 77M   | 7.2M vs 4.5M |
+-------------------------------+--------------+--------------+

A separate TCP_STREAM and TCP_RR with 1,4,8,16,64,128,256,512 connections
showed no performance degradation.

Some points on the patch/aRFS behavior:
1. Enabling full tuple matching ensures flows are always correctly matched,
   even with smaller hash sizes.
2. 5-6% drop in CPU utilization as the packets arrive at the correct CPUs
   and fewer calls to driver for programming on misses.
3. Larger hash tables reduces mis-steering due to more unique flow hashes,
   but still has clashes. However, with larger per-device rps_flow_cnt, old
   flows take more time to expire and new aRFS flows cannot be added if h/w
   limits are reached (rps_may_expire_flow() succeeds when 10*rps_flow_cnt
   pkts have been processed by this cpu that are not part of the flow).

Fixes: 28bf267 ("ice: Implement aRFS")
Signed-off-by: Krishna Kumar <krikku@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Rinitha S <sx.rinitha@intel.com> (A Contingent worker at Intel)
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 24, 2025
syzkaller reported a null-ptr-deref in sock_omalloc() while allocating
a CALIPSO option.  [0]

The NULL is of struct sock, which was fetched by sk_to_full_sk() in
calipso_req_setattr().

Since commit a1a5344 ("tcp: avoid two atomic ops for syncookies"),
reqsk->rsk_listener could be NULL when SYN Cookie is returned to its
client, as hinted by the leading SYN Cookie log.

Here are 3 options to fix the bug:

  1) Return 0 in calipso_req_setattr()
  2) Return an error in calipso_req_setattr()
  3) Alaways set rsk_listener

1) is no go as it bypasses LSM, but 2) effectively disables SYN Cookie
for CALIPSO.  3) is also no go as there have been many efforts to reduce
atomic ops and make TCP robust against DDoS.  See also commit 3b24d85
("tcp/dccp: do not touch listener sk_refcnt under synflood").

As of the blamed commit, SYN Cookie already did not need refcounting,
and no one has stumbled on the bug for 9 years, so no CALIPSO user will
care about SYN Cookie.

Let's return an error in calipso_req_setattr() and calipso_req_delattr()
in the SYN Cookie case.

This can be reproduced by [1] on Fedora and now connect() of nc times out.

[0]:
TCP: request_sock_TCPv6: Possible SYN flooding on port [::]:20002. Sending cookies.
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000006: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000030-0x0000000000000037]
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 12262 Comm: syz.1.2611 Not tainted 6.14.0 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:read_pnet include/net/net_namespace.h:406 [inline]
RIP: 0010:sock_net include/net/sock.h:655 [inline]
RIP: 0010:sock_kmalloc+0x35/0x170 net/core/sock.c:2806
Code: 89 d5 41 54 55 89 f5 53 48 89 fb e8 25 e3 c6 fd e8 f0 91 e3 00 48 8d 7b 30 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 26 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b
RSP: 0018:ffff88811af89038 EFLAGS: 00010216
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff888105266400
RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: ffff88800c890000 RDI: 0000000000000030
RBP: 0000000000000050 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88810526640e
R10: ffffed1020a4cc81 R11: ffff88810526640f R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000820 R14: ffff888105266400 R15: 0000000000000050
FS:  00007f0653a07640(0000) GS:ffff88811af80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f863ba096f4 CR3: 00000000163c0005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
PKRU: 80000000
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 ipv6_renew_options+0x279/0x950 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1288
 calipso_req_setattr+0x181/0x340 net/ipv6/calipso.c:1204
 calipso_req_setattr+0x56/0x80 net/netlabel/netlabel_calipso.c:597
 netlbl_req_setattr+0x18a/0x440 net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c:1249
 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request+0x1fb/0x320 security/selinux/netlabel.c:342
 selinux_inet_conn_request+0x1eb/0x2c0 security/selinux/hooks.c:5551
 security_inet_conn_request+0x50/0xa0 security/security.c:4945
 tcp_v6_route_req+0x22c/0x550 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:825
 tcp_conn_request+0xec8/0x2b70 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:7275
 tcp_v6_conn_request+0x1e3/0x440 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1328
 tcp_rcv_state_process+0xafa/0x52b0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6781
 tcp_v6_do_rcv+0x8a6/0x1a40 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1667
 tcp_v6_rcv+0x505e/0x5b50 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1904
 ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x17c/0x1da0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:436
 ip6_input_finish+0x103/0x180 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:480
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:308 [inline]
 ip6_input+0x13c/0x6b0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:491
 dst_input include/net/dst.h:469 [inline]
 ip6_rcv_finish net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79 [inline]
 ip6_rcv_finish+0xb6/0x490 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:69
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:308 [inline]
 ipv6_rcv+0xf9/0x490 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:309
 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x12e/0x1f0 net/core/dev.c:5896
 __netif_receive_skb+0x1d/0x170 net/core/dev.c:6009
 process_backlog+0x41e/0x13b0 net/core/dev.c:6357
 __napi_poll+0xbd/0x710 net/core/dev.c:7191
 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:7260 [inline]
 net_rx_action+0x9de/0xde0 net/core/dev.c:7382
 handle_softirqs+0x19a/0x770 kernel/softirq.c:561
 do_softirq.part.0+0x36/0x70 kernel/softirq.c:462
 </IRQ>
 <TASK>
 do_softirq arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:26 [inline]
 __local_bh_enable_ip+0xf1/0x110 kernel/softirq.c:389
 local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 [inline]
 rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:919 [inline]
 __dev_queue_xmit+0xc2a/0x3c40 net/core/dev.c:4679
 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3313 [inline]
 neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:523 [inline]
 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:537 [inline]
 ip6_finish_output2+0xd69/0x1f80 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:141
 __ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:215 [inline]
 ip6_finish_output+0x5dc/0xd60 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:226
 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline]
 ip6_output+0x24b/0x8d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:247
 dst_output include/net/dst.h:459 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:308 [inline]
 ip6_xmit+0xbbc/0x20d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:366
 inet6_csk_xmit+0x39a/0x720 net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c:135
 __tcp_transmit_skb+0x1a7b/0x3b40 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1471
 tcp_transmit_skb net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1489 [inline]
 tcp_send_syn_data net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:4059 [inline]
 tcp_connect+0x1c0c/0x4510 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:4148
 tcp_v6_connect+0x156c/0x2080 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:333
 __inet_stream_connect+0x3a7/0xed0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:677
 tcp_sendmsg_fastopen+0x3e2/0x710 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1039
 tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x1e82/0x3570 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1091
 tcp_sendmsg+0x2f/0x50 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1358
 inet6_sendmsg+0xb9/0x150 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:659
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:718 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg+0xf4/0x2a0 net/socket.c:733
 __sys_sendto+0x29a/0x390 net/socket.c:2187
 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2194 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2190 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2190
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xc3/0x1d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f06553c47ed
Code: 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f0653a06fc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f0655605fa0 RCX: 00007f06553c47ed
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000000000000000b
RBP: 00007f065545db38 R08: 0000200000000140 R09: 000000000000001c
R10: f7384d4ea84b01bd R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007f0655605fac R14: 00007f0655606038 R15: 00007f06539e7000
 </TASK>
Modules linked in:

[1]:
dnf install -y selinux-policy-targeted policycoreutils netlabel_tools procps-ng nmap-ncat
mount -t selinuxfs none /sys/fs/selinux
load_policy
netlabelctl calipso add pass doi:1
netlabelctl map del default
netlabelctl map add default address:::1 protocol:calipso,1
sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies=2
nc -l ::1 80 &
nc ::1 80

Fixes: e1adea9 ("calipso: Allow request sockets to be relabelled by the lsm.")
Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Reported-by: John Cheung <john.cs.hey@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAP=Rh=MvfhrGADy+-WJiftV2_WzMH4VEhEFmeT28qY+4yxNu4w@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250617224125.17299-1-kuni1840@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 30, 2025
The WARN_ON_ONCE is introduced on truncate_folio_batch_exceptionals() to
capture whether the filesystem has removed all DAX entries or not.

And the fix has been applied on the filesystem xfs and ext4 by the commit
0e2f80a ("fs/dax: ensure all pages are idle prior to filesystem
unmount").

Apply the missed fix on filesystem fuse to fix the runtime warning:

[    2.011450] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[    2.011873] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 145 at mm/truncate.c:89 truncate_folio_batch_exceptionals+0x272/0x2b0
[    2.012468] Modules linked in:
[    2.012718] CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 145 Comm: weston Not tainted 6.16.0-rc2-WSL2-STABLE #2 PREEMPT(undef)
[    2.013292] RIP: 0010:truncate_folio_batch_exceptionals+0x272/0x2b0
[    2.013704] Code: 48 63 d0 41 29 c5 48 8d 1c d5 00 00 00 00 4e 8d 6c 2a 01 49 c1 e5 03 eb 09 48 83 c3 08 49 39 dd 74 83 41 f6 44 1c 08 01 74 ef <0f> 0b 49 8b 34 1e 48 89 ef e8 10 a2 17 00 eb df 48 8b 7d 00 e8 35
[    2.014845] RSP: 0018:ffffa47ec33f3b10 EFLAGS: 00010202
[    2.015279] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[    2.015884] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffa47ec33f3ca0 RDI: ffff98aa44f3fa80
[    2.016377] RBP: ffff98aa44f3fbf0 R08: ffffa47ec33f3ba8 R09: 0000000000000000
[    2.016942] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffa47ec33f3ca0
[    2.017437] R13: 0000000000000008 R14: ffffa47ec33f3ba8 R15: 0000000000000000
[    2.017972] FS:  000079ce006afa40(0000) GS:ffff98aade441000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[    2.018510] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[    2.018987] CR2: 000079ce03e74000 CR3: 000000010784f006 CR4: 0000000000372eb0
[    2.019518] Call Trace:
[    2.019729]  <TASK>
[    2.019901]  truncate_inode_pages_range+0xd8/0x400
[    2.020280]  ? timerqueue_add+0x66/0xb0
[    2.020574]  ? get_nohz_timer_target+0x2a/0x140
[    2.020904]  ? timerqueue_add+0x66/0xb0
[    2.021231]  ? timerqueue_del+0x2e/0x50
[    2.021646]  ? __remove_hrtimer+0x39/0x90
[    2.022017]  ? srso_alias_untrain_ret+0x1/0x10
[    2.022497]  ? psi_group_change+0x136/0x350
[    2.023046]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0xe/0x30
[    2.023514]  ? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x8d/0x280
[    2.024068]  ? __schedule+0x532/0xbd0
[    2.024551]  fuse_evict_inode+0x29/0x190
[    2.025131]  evict+0x100/0x270
[    2.025641]  ? _atomic_dec_and_lock+0x39/0x50
[    2.026316]  ? __pfx_generic_delete_inode+0x10/0x10
[    2.026843]  __dentry_kill+0x71/0x180
[    2.027335]  dput+0xeb/0x1b0
[    2.027725]  __fput+0x136/0x2b0
[    2.028054]  __x64_sys_close+0x3d/0x80
[    2.028469]  do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x1b0
[    2.028832]  ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80
[    2.029182]  ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80
[    2.029533]  ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80
[    2.029902]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[    2.030423] RIP: 0033:0x79ce03d0d067
[    2.030820] Code: b8 ff ff ff ff e9 3e ff ff ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 41 c3 48 83 ec 18 89 7c 24 0c e8 c3 a7 f8 ff
[    2.032354] RSP: 002b:00007ffef0498948 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003
[    2.032939] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffef0498960 RCX: 000079ce03d0d067
[    2.033612] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000001000 RDI: 000000000000000d
[    2.034289] RBP: 00007ffef0498a30 R08: 000000000000000d R09: 0000000000000000
[    2.034944] R10: 00007ffef0498978 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
[    2.035610] R13: 00007ffef0498960 R14: 000079ce03e09ce0 R15: 0000000000000003
[    2.036301]  </TASK>
[    2.036532] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250621171507.3770-1-haiyuewa@163.com
Fixes: bde708f ("fs/dax: always remove DAX page-cache entries when breaking layouts")
Signed-off-by: Haiyue Wang <haiyuewa@163.com>
Cc: Alistair Popple <apopple@nvidia.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 30, 2025
Fix cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect() to take the correct lock order
and prevent the following deadlock from happening

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.16.0-rc3-build2+ #1301 Tainted: G S      W
------------------------------------------------------
cifsd/6055 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88810ad56038 (&tcp_ses->srv_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0x134/0x200

but task is already holding lock:
ffff888119c64330 (&ret_buf->chan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0xcf/0x200

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #2 (&ret_buf->chan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       validate_chain+0x1cf/0x270
       __lock_acquire+0x60e/0x780
       lock_acquire.part.0+0xb4/0x1f0
       _raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40
       cifs_setup_session+0x81/0x4b0
       cifs_get_smb_ses+0x771/0x900
       cifs_mount_get_session+0x7e/0x170
       cifs_mount+0x92/0x2d0
       cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x161/0x460
       smb3_get_tree+0x55/0x90
       vfs_get_tree+0x46/0x180
       do_new_mount+0x1b0/0x2e0
       path_mount+0x6ee/0x740
       do_mount+0x98/0xe0
       __do_sys_mount+0x148/0x180
       do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

-> #1 (&ret_buf->ses_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       validate_chain+0x1cf/0x270
       __lock_acquire+0x60e/0x780
       lock_acquire.part.0+0xb4/0x1f0
       _raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40
       cifs_match_super+0x101/0x320
       sget+0xab/0x270
       cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x1e0/0x460
       smb3_get_tree+0x55/0x90
       vfs_get_tree+0x46/0x180
       do_new_mount+0x1b0/0x2e0
       path_mount+0x6ee/0x740
       do_mount+0x98/0xe0
       __do_sys_mount+0x148/0x180
       do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

-> #0 (&tcp_ses->srv_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       check_noncircular+0x95/0xc0
       check_prev_add+0x115/0x2f0
       validate_chain+0x1cf/0x270
       __lock_acquire+0x60e/0x780
       lock_acquire.part.0+0xb4/0x1f0
       _raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40
       cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0x134/0x200
       __cifs_reconnect+0x8f/0x500
       cifs_handle_standard+0x112/0x280
       cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x64d/0xbc0
       kthread+0x2f7/0x310
       ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x230
       ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

other info that might help us debug this:

Chain exists of:
  &tcp_ses->srv_lock --> &ret_buf->ses_lock --> &ret_buf->chan_lock

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&ret_buf->chan_lock);
                               lock(&ret_buf->ses_lock);
                               lock(&ret_buf->chan_lock);
  lock(&tcp_ses->srv_lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

3 locks held by cifsd/6055:
 #0: ffffffff857de398 (&cifs_tcp_ses_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0x7b/0x200
 #1: ffff888119c64060 (&ret_buf->ses_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0x9c/0x200
 #2: ffff888119c64330 (&ret_buf->chan_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect+0xcf/0x200

Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Fixes: d7d7a66 ("cifs: avoid use of global locks for high contention data")
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
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