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chewitt commented Jan 29, 2023

Closing as related to #1 which cannot be accepted. I would also expect to receive a single PR with all changes; not one PR for each file changed. See https://wiki.libreelec.tv/development/git-tutorial for some general advice on git workflow. Hint: do not use the GitHub GUI to edit files.

@chewitt chewitt closed this Jan 29, 2023
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 10, 2023
[ Upstream commit 3c46372 ]

This lockdep splat says it better than I could:

================================
WARNING: inconsistent lock state
6.2.0-rc2-07010-ga9b9500ffaac-dirty torvalds#967 Not tainted
--------------------------------
inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage.
kworker/1:3/179 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes:
ffff3ec4036ce098 (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.?.}-{3:3}, at: netif_freeze_queues+0x5c/0xc0
{IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at:
  _raw_spin_lock+0x5c/0xc0
  sch_direct_xmit+0x148/0x37c
  __dev_queue_xmit+0x528/0x111c
  ip6_finish_output2+0x5ec/0xb7c
  ip6_finish_output+0x240/0x3f0
  ip6_output+0x78/0x360
  ndisc_send_skb+0x33c/0x85c
  ndisc_send_rs+0x54/0x12c
  addrconf_rs_timer+0x154/0x260
  call_timer_fn+0xb8/0x3a0
  __run_timers.part.0+0x214/0x26c
  run_timer_softirq+0x3c/0x74
  __do_softirq+0x14c/0x5d8
  ____do_softirq+0x10/0x20
  call_on_irq_stack+0x2c/0x5c
  do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x30
  __irq_exit_rcu+0x168/0x1a0
  irq_exit_rcu+0x10/0x40
  el1_interrupt+0x38/0x64
irq event stamp: 7825
hardirqs last  enabled at (7825): [<ffffdf1f7200cae4>] exit_to_kernel_mode+0x34/0x130
hardirqs last disabled at (7823): [<ffffdf1f708105f0>] __do_softirq+0x550/0x5d8
softirqs last  enabled at (7824): [<ffffdf1f7081050c>] __do_softirq+0x46c/0x5d8
softirqs last disabled at (7811): [<ffffdf1f708166e0>] ____do_softirq+0x10/0x20

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(_xmit_ETHER#2);
  <Interrupt>
    lock(_xmit_ETHER#2);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

3 locks held by kworker/1:3/179:
 #0: ffff3ec400004748 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1f4/0x6c0
 #1: ffff80000a0bbdc8 ((work_completion)(&priv->tx_onestep_tstamp)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1f4/0x6c0
 #2: ffff3ec4036cd438 (&dev->tx_global_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: netif_tx_lock+0x1c/0x34

Workqueue: events enetc_tx_onestep_tstamp
Call trace:
 print_usage_bug.part.0+0x208/0x22c
 mark_lock+0x7f0/0x8b0
 __lock_acquire+0x7c4/0x1ce0
 lock_acquire.part.0+0xe0/0x220
 lock_acquire+0x68/0x84
 _raw_spin_lock+0x5c/0xc0
 netif_freeze_queues+0x5c/0xc0
 netif_tx_lock+0x24/0x34
 enetc_tx_onestep_tstamp+0x20/0x100
 process_one_work+0x28c/0x6c0
 worker_thread+0x74/0x450
 kthread+0x118/0x11c

but I'll say it anyway: the enetc_tx_onestep_tstamp() work item runs in
process context, therefore with softirqs enabled (i.o.w., it can be
interrupted by a softirq). If we hold the netif_tx_lock() when there is
an interrupt, and the NET_TX softirq then gets scheduled, this will take
the netif_tx_lock() a second time and deadlock the kernel.

To solve this, use netif_tx_lock_bh(), which blocks softirqs from
running.

Fixes: 7294380 ("enetc: support PTP Sync packet one-step timestamping")
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Duyck <alexanderduyck@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230112105440.1786799-1-vladimir.oltean@nxp.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 10, 2023
[ Upstream commit 241f519 ]

This attempts to avoid circular locking dependency between sock_lock
and hdev_lock:

WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.0.0-rc7-03728-g18dd8ab0a783 #3 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
kworker/u3:2/53 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888000254130 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO){+.+.}-{0:0}, at:
iso_conn_del+0xbd/0x1d0
but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff9f39a080 (hci_cb_list_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at:
hci_le_cis_estabilished_evt+0x1b5/0x500
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #2 (hci_cb_list_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       __mutex_lock+0x10e/0xfe0
       hci_le_remote_feat_complete_evt+0x17f/0x320
       hci_event_packet+0x39c/0x7d0
       hci_rx_work+0x2bf/0x950
       process_one_work+0x569/0x980
       worker_thread+0x2a3/0x6f0
       kthread+0x153/0x180
       ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
-> #1 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       __mutex_lock+0x10e/0xfe0
       iso_connect_cis+0x6f/0x5a0
       iso_sock_connect+0x1af/0x710
       __sys_connect+0x17e/0x1b0
       __x64_sys_connect+0x37/0x50
       do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x62/0xcc
-> #0 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO){+.+.}-{0:0}:
       __lock_acquire+0x1b51/0x33d0
       lock_acquire+0x16f/0x3b0
       lock_sock_nested+0x32/0x80
       iso_conn_del+0xbd/0x1d0
       iso_connect_cfm+0x226/0x680
       hci_le_cis_estabilished_evt+0x1ed/0x500
       hci_event_packet+0x39c/0x7d0
       hci_rx_work+0x2bf/0x950
       process_one_work+0x569/0x980
       worker_thread+0x2a3/0x6f0
       kthread+0x153/0x180
       ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
  sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO --> &hdev->lock --> hci_cb_list_lock
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:
       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(hci_cb_list_lock);
                               lock(&hdev->lock);
                               lock(hci_cb_list_lock);
  lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO);
 *** DEADLOCK ***
4 locks held by kworker/u3:2/53:
 #0: ffff8880021d9130 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at:
 process_one_work+0x4ad/0x980
 #1: ffff888002387de0 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0},
 at: process_one_work+0x4ad/0x980
 #2: ffff888001ac0070 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at:
 hci_le_cis_estabilished_evt+0xc3/0x500
 #3: ffffffff9f39a080 (hci_cb_list_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at:
 hci_le_cis_estabilished_evt+0x1b5/0x500

Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Stable-dep-of: 6a5ad25 ("Bluetooth: ISO: Fix possible circular locking dependency")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 10, 2023
[ Upstream commit e9d50f7 ]

This fixes the following trace caused by attempting to lock
cmd_sync_work_lock while holding the rcu_read_lock:

kworker/u3:2/212 is trying to lock:
ffff888002600910 (&hdev->cmd_sync_work_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at:
hci_cmd_sync_queue+0xad/0x140
other info that might help us debug this:
context-{4:4}
4 locks held by kworker/u3:2/212:
 #0: ffff8880028c6530 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at:
 process_one_work+0x4dc/0x9a0
 #1: ffff888001aafde0 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0},
 at: process_one_work+0x4dc/0x9a0
 #2: ffff888002600070 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at:
 hci_cc_le_set_cig_params+0x64/0x4f0
 #3: ffffffffa5994b00 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at:
 hci_cc_le_set_cig_params+0x2f9/0x4f0

Fixes: 26afbd8 ("Bluetooth: Add initial implementation of CIS connections")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 10, 2023
[ Upstream commit 5aa5610 ]

The cited commit changed class of tc_ht internal mutex in order to avoid
false lock dependency with fs_core node and flow_table hash table
structures. However, hash table implementation internally also includes a
workqueue task with its own lockdep map which causes similar bogus lockdep
splat[0]. Fix it by also adding dedicated class for hash table workqueue
work structure of tc_ht.

[0]:

[ 1139.672465] ======================================================
[ 1139.673552] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[ 1139.674635] 6.1.0_for_upstream_debug_2022_12_12_17_02 #1 Not tainted
[ 1139.675734] ------------------------------------------------------
[ 1139.676801] modprobe/5998 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 1139.677726] ffff88811e7b93b8 (&node->lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: down_write_ref_node+0x7c/0xe0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.679662]
               but task is already holding lock:
[ 1139.680703] ffff88813c1f96a0 (&tc_ht_lock_key){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rhashtable_free_and_destroy+0x38/0x6f0
[ 1139.682223]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.

[ 1139.683640]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[ 1139.684887]
               -> #2 (&tc_ht_lock_key){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[ 1139.685975]        __mutex_lock+0x12c/0x14b0
[ 1139.686659]        rht_deferred_worker+0x35/0x1540
[ 1139.687405]        process_one_work+0x7c2/0x1310
[ 1139.688134]        worker_thread+0x59d/0xec0
[ 1139.688820]        kthread+0x28f/0x330
[ 1139.689444]        ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[ 1139.690106]
               -> #1 ((work_completion)(&ht->run_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
[ 1139.691250]        __flush_work+0xe8/0x900
[ 1139.691915]        __cancel_work_timer+0x2ca/0x3f0
[ 1139.692655]        rhashtable_free_and_destroy+0x22/0x6f0
[ 1139.693472]        del_sw_flow_table+0x22/0xb0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.694592]        tree_put_node+0x24c/0x450 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.695686]        tree_remove_node+0x6e/0x100 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.696803]        mlx5_destroy_flow_table+0x187/0x690 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.698017]        mlx5e_tc_nic_cleanup+0x2f8/0x400 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.699217]        mlx5e_cleanup_nic_rx+0x2b/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.700397]        mlx5e_detach_netdev+0x19d/0x2b0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.701571]        mlx5e_suspend+0xdb/0x140 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.702665]        mlx5e_remove+0x89/0x190 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.703756]        auxiliary_bus_remove+0x52/0x70
[ 1139.704492]        device_release_driver_internal+0x3c1/0x600
[ 1139.705360]        bus_remove_device+0x2a5/0x560
[ 1139.706080]        device_del+0x492/0xb80
[ 1139.706724]        mlx5_rescan_drivers_locked+0x194/0x6a0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.707961]        mlx5_unregister_device+0x7a/0xa0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.709138]        mlx5_uninit_one+0x5f/0x160 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.710252]        remove_one+0xd1/0x160 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.711297]        pci_device_remove+0x96/0x1c0
[ 1139.722721]        device_release_driver_internal+0x3c1/0x600
[ 1139.723590]        unbind_store+0x1b1/0x200
[ 1139.724259]        kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x348/0x520
[ 1139.725019]        vfs_write+0x7b2/0xbf0
[ 1139.725658]        ksys_write+0xf3/0x1d0
[ 1139.726292]        do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
[ 1139.726942]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
[ 1139.727769]
               -> #0 (&node->lock){++++}-{3:3}:
[ 1139.728698]        __lock_acquire+0x2cf5/0x62f0
[ 1139.729415]        lock_acquire+0x1c1/0x540
[ 1139.730076]        down_write+0x8e/0x1f0
[ 1139.730709]        down_write_ref_node+0x7c/0xe0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.731841]        mlx5_del_flow_rules+0x6f/0x610 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.732982]        __mlx5_eswitch_del_rule+0xdd/0x560 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.734207]        mlx5_eswitch_del_offloaded_rule+0x14/0x20 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.735491]        mlx5e_tc_rule_unoffload+0x104/0x2b0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.736716]        mlx5e_tc_unoffload_fdb_rules+0x10c/0x1f0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.738007]        mlx5e_tc_del_fdb_flow+0xc3c/0xfa0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.739213]        mlx5e_tc_del_flow+0x146/0xa20 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.740377]        _mlx5e_tc_del_flow+0x38/0x60 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.741534]        rhashtable_free_and_destroy+0x3be/0x6f0
[ 1139.742351]        mlx5e_tc_ht_cleanup+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.743512]        mlx5e_cleanup_rep_tx+0x4a/0xe0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.744683]        mlx5e_detach_netdev+0x1ca/0x2b0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.745860]        mlx5e_netdev_change_profile+0xd9/0x1c0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.747098]        mlx5e_netdev_attach_nic_profile+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.748372]        mlx5e_vport_rep_unload+0x16a/0x1b0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.749590]        __esw_offloads_unload_rep+0xb1/0xd0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.750813]        mlx5_eswitch_unregister_vport_reps+0x409/0x5f0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.752147]        mlx5e_rep_remove+0x62/0x80 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.753293]        auxiliary_bus_remove+0x52/0x70
[ 1139.754028]        device_release_driver_internal+0x3c1/0x600
[ 1139.754885]        driver_detach+0xc1/0x180
[ 1139.755553]        bus_remove_driver+0xef/0x2e0
[ 1139.756260]        auxiliary_driver_unregister+0x16/0x50
[ 1139.757059]        mlx5e_rep_cleanup+0x19/0x30 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.758207]        mlx5e_cleanup+0x12/0x30 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.759295]        mlx5_cleanup+0xc/0x49 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.760384]        __x64_sys_delete_module+0x2b5/0x450
[ 1139.761166]        do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
[ 1139.761827]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
[ 1139.762663]
               other info that might help us debug this:

[ 1139.763925] Chain exists of:
                 &node->lock --> (work_completion)(&ht->run_work) --> &tc_ht_lock_key

[ 1139.765743]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[ 1139.766688]        CPU0                    CPU1
[ 1139.767399]        ----                    ----
[ 1139.768111]   lock(&tc_ht_lock_key);
[ 1139.768704]                                lock((work_completion)(&ht->run_work));
[ 1139.769869]                                lock(&tc_ht_lock_key);
[ 1139.770770]   lock(&node->lock);
[ 1139.771326]
                *** DEADLOCK ***

[ 1139.772345] 2 locks held by modprobe/5998:
[ 1139.772994]  #0: ffff88813c1ff0e8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x8d/0x600
[ 1139.774399]  #1: ffff88813c1f96a0 (&tc_ht_lock_key){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rhashtable_free_and_destroy+0x38/0x6f0
[ 1139.775822]
               stack backtrace:
[ 1139.776579] CPU: 3 PID: 5998 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.1.0_for_upstream_debug_2022_12_12_17_02 #1
[ 1139.777935] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 1139.779529] Call Trace:
[ 1139.779992]  <TASK>
[ 1139.780409]  dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d
[ 1139.781015]  check_noncircular+0x278/0x300
[ 1139.781687]  ? print_circular_bug+0x460/0x460
[ 1139.782381]  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70
[ 1139.783121]  ? lock_release+0x487/0x7c0
[ 1139.783759]  ? orc_find.part.0+0x1f1/0x330
[ 1139.784423]  ? mark_lock.part.0+0xef/0x2fc0
[ 1139.785091]  __lock_acquire+0x2cf5/0x62f0
[ 1139.785754]  ? register_lock_class+0x18e0/0x18e0
[ 1139.786483]  lock_acquire+0x1c1/0x540
[ 1139.787093]  ? down_write_ref_node+0x7c/0xe0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.788195]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x3f0/0x3f0
[ 1139.788978]  ? register_lock_class+0x18e0/0x18e0
[ 1139.789715]  down_write+0x8e/0x1f0
[ 1139.790292]  ? down_write_ref_node+0x7c/0xe0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.791380]  ? down_write_killable+0x220/0x220
[ 1139.792080]  ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x110
[ 1139.792713]  down_write_ref_node+0x7c/0xe0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.793795]  mlx5_del_flow_rules+0x6f/0x610 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.794879]  __mlx5_eswitch_del_rule+0xdd/0x560 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.796032]  ? __esw_offloads_unload_rep+0xd0/0xd0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.797227]  ? xa_load+0x11a/0x200
[ 1139.797800]  ? __xa_clear_mark+0xf0/0xf0
[ 1139.798438]  mlx5_eswitch_del_offloaded_rule+0x14/0x20 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.799660]  mlx5e_tc_rule_unoffload+0x104/0x2b0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.800821]  mlx5e_tc_unoffload_fdb_rules+0x10c/0x1f0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.802049]  ? mlx5_eswitch_get_uplink_priv+0x25/0x80 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.803260]  mlx5e_tc_del_fdb_flow+0xc3c/0xfa0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.804398]  ? __cancel_work_timer+0x1c2/0x3f0
[ 1139.805099]  ? mlx5e_tc_unoffload_from_slow_path+0x460/0x460 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.806387]  mlx5e_tc_del_flow+0x146/0xa20 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.807481]  _mlx5e_tc_del_flow+0x38/0x60 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.808564]  rhashtable_free_and_destroy+0x3be/0x6f0
[ 1139.809336]  ? mlx5e_tc_del_flow+0xa20/0xa20 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.809336]  ? mlx5e_tc_del_flow+0xa20/0xa20 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.810455]  mlx5e_tc_ht_cleanup+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.811552]  mlx5e_cleanup_rep_tx+0x4a/0xe0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.812655]  mlx5e_detach_netdev+0x1ca/0x2b0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.813768]  mlx5e_netdev_change_profile+0xd9/0x1c0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.814952]  mlx5e_netdev_attach_nic_profile+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.816166]  mlx5e_vport_rep_unload+0x16a/0x1b0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.817336]  __esw_offloads_unload_rep+0xb1/0xd0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.818507]  mlx5_eswitch_unregister_vport_reps+0x409/0x5f0 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.819788]  ? mlx5_eswitch_uplink_get_proto_dev+0x30/0x30 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.821051]  ? kernfs_find_ns+0x137/0x310
[ 1139.821705]  mlx5e_rep_remove+0x62/0x80 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.822778]  auxiliary_bus_remove+0x52/0x70
[ 1139.823449]  device_release_driver_internal+0x3c1/0x600
[ 1139.824240]  driver_detach+0xc1/0x180
[ 1139.824842]  bus_remove_driver+0xef/0x2e0
[ 1139.825504]  auxiliary_driver_unregister+0x16/0x50
[ 1139.826245]  mlx5e_rep_cleanup+0x19/0x30 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.827322]  mlx5e_cleanup+0x12/0x30 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.828345]  mlx5_cleanup+0xc/0x49 [mlx5_core]
[ 1139.829382]  __x64_sys_delete_module+0x2b5/0x450
[ 1139.830119]  ? module_flags+0x300/0x300
[ 1139.830750]  ? task_work_func_match+0x50/0x50
[ 1139.831440]  ? task_work_cancel+0x20/0x20
[ 1139.832088]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3f0
[ 1139.832873]  ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x1d/0x50
[ 1139.833661]  ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x2d/0x100
[ 1139.834328]  do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
[ 1139.834922]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
[ 1139.835700] RIP: 0033:0x7f153e71288b
[ 1139.836302] Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 9d 75 0e 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 b0 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 6d 75 0e 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 1139.838866] RSP: 002b:00007ffe0a3ed938 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0
[ 1139.840020] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000564c2cbf8220 RCX: 00007f153e71288b
[ 1139.841043] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 0000564c2cbf8288
[ 1139.842072] RBP: 0000564c2cbf8220 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 1139.843094] R10: 00007f153e7a3ac0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000564c2cbf8288
[ 1139.844118] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000564c2cbf7ae8 R15: 00007ffe0a3efcb8

Fixes: 9ba3333 ("net/mlx5e: Avoid false lock depenency warning on tc_ht")
Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Eli Cohen <elic@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Roi Dayan <roid@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 9, 2023
…kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD

KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.2, take #2

- Pass the correct address to mte_clear_page_tags() on initialising
  a tagged page

- Plug a race against a GICv4.1 doorbell interrupt while saving
  the vgic-v3 pending state.
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 9, 2023
Jakub Sitnicki says:

====================

This patch set addresses the syzbot report in [1].

Patch #1 has been suggested by Eric [2]. I extended it to cover the rest of
sock_map proto callbacks. Otherwise we would still overflow the stack.

Patch #2 contains the actual fix and bug analysis.
Patches #3 & #4 add coverage to selftests to trigger the bug.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/00000000000073b14905ef2e7401@google.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CANn89iK2UN1FmdUcH12fv_xiZkv2G+Nskvmq7fG6aA_6VKRf6g@mail.gmail.com/
---
v1 -> v2:
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230113-sockmap-fix-v1-0-d3cad092ee10@cloudflare.com
[v1 didn't hit bpf@ ML by mistake]

 * pull in Eric's patch to protect against recursion loop bugs (Eric)
 * add a macro helper to check if pointer is inside a memory range (Eric)
====================

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 9, 2023
…eues().

Christoph Paasch reported that commit b5fc292 ("inet6: Remove
inet6_destroy_sock() in sk->sk_prot->destroy().") started triggering
WARN_ON_ONCE(sk->sk_forward_alloc) in sk_stream_kill_queues().  [0 - 2]
Also, we can reproduce it by a program in [3].

In the commit, we delay freeing ipv6_pinfo.pktoptions from sk->destroy()
to sk->sk_destruct(), so sk->sk_forward_alloc is no longer zero in
inet_csk_destroy_sock().

The same check has been in inet_sock_destruct() from at least v2.6,
we can just remove the WARN_ON_ONCE().  However, among the users of
sk_stream_kill_queues(), only CAIF is not calling inet_sock_destruct().
Thus, we add the same WARN_ON_ONCE() to caif_sock_destructor().

[0]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/39725AB4-88F1-41B3-B07F-949C5CAEFF4F@icloud.com/
[1]: multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next#341
[2]:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3232 at net/core/stream.c:212 sk_stream_kill_queues+0x2f9/0x3e0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 3232 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc5ab24eb4698afbe147b424149c529e2a43ec24eb5 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:sk_stream_kill_queues+0x2f9/0x3e0
Code: 03 0f b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e ec 00 00 00 8b ab 08 01 00 00 e9 60 ff ff ff e8 d0 5f b6 fe 0f 0b eb 97 e8 c7 5f b6 fe <0f> 0b eb a0 e8 be 5f b6 fe 0f 0b e9 6a fe ff ff e8 02 07 e3 fe e9
RSP: 0018:ffff88810570fc68 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff888101f38f40 RSI: ffffffff8285e529 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 0000000000000ce0 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000ce0 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8881009e9488
R13: ffffffff84af2cc0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8881009e9458
FS:  00007f7fdfbd5800(0000) GS:ffff88811b600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b32923000 CR3: 00000001062fc006 CR4: 0000000000170ef0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 inet_csk_destroy_sock+0x1a1/0x320
 __tcp_close+0xab6/0xe90
 tcp_close+0x30/0xc0
 inet_release+0xe9/0x1f0
 inet6_release+0x4c/0x70
 __sock_release+0xd2/0x280
 sock_close+0x15/0x20
 __fput+0x252/0xa20
 task_work_run+0x169/0x250
 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x113/0x120
 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x40
 do_syscall_64+0x48/0x90
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
RIP: 0033:0x7f7fdf7ae28d
Code: c1 20 00 00 75 10 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 ee fb ff ff 48 89 04 24 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 8b 3c 24 48 89 c2 e8 37 fc ff ff 48 89 d0 48 83 c4 08 48 3d 01
RSP: 002b:00000000007dfbb0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00007f7fdf7ae28d
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffffffffff RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000007f338e0f R09: 0000000000000e0f
R10: 000000007f338e13 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00007f7fdefff000
R13: 00007f7fdefffcd8 R14: 00007f7fdefffce0 R15: 00007f7fdefffcd8
 </TASK>

[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230208004245.83497-1-kuniyu@amazon.com/

Fixes: b5fc292 ("inet6: Remove inet6_destroy_sock() in sk->sk_prot->destroy().")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Paasch <christophpaasch@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 14, 2023
…eues().

commit 62ec33b upstream.

Christoph Paasch reported that commit b5fc292 ("inet6: Remove
inet6_destroy_sock() in sk->sk_prot->destroy().") started triggering
WARN_ON_ONCE(sk->sk_forward_alloc) in sk_stream_kill_queues().  [0 - 2]
Also, we can reproduce it by a program in [3].

In the commit, we delay freeing ipv6_pinfo.pktoptions from sk->destroy()
to sk->sk_destruct(), so sk->sk_forward_alloc is no longer zero in
inet_csk_destroy_sock().

The same check has been in inet_sock_destruct() from at least v2.6,
we can just remove the WARN_ON_ONCE().  However, among the users of
sk_stream_kill_queues(), only CAIF is not calling inet_sock_destruct().
Thus, we add the same WARN_ON_ONCE() to caif_sock_destructor().

[0]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/39725AB4-88F1-41B3-B07F-949C5CAEFF4F@icloud.com/
[1]: multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next#341
[2]:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3232 at net/core/stream.c:212 sk_stream_kill_queues+0x2f9/0x3e0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 3232 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc5ab24eb4698afbe147b424149c529e2a43ec24eb5 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:sk_stream_kill_queues+0x2f9/0x3e0
Code: 03 0f b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e ec 00 00 00 8b ab 08 01 00 00 e9 60 ff ff ff e8 d0 5f b6 fe 0f 0b eb 97 e8 c7 5f b6 fe <0f> 0b eb a0 e8 be 5f b6 fe 0f 0b e9 6a fe ff ff e8 02 07 e3 fe e9
RSP: 0018:ffff88810570fc68 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff888101f38f40 RSI: ffffffff8285e529 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 0000000000000ce0 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000ce0 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8881009e9488
R13: ffffffff84af2cc0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8881009e9458
FS:  00007f7fdfbd5800(0000) GS:ffff88811b600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b32923000 CR3: 00000001062fc006 CR4: 0000000000170ef0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 inet_csk_destroy_sock+0x1a1/0x320
 __tcp_close+0xab6/0xe90
 tcp_close+0x30/0xc0
 inet_release+0xe9/0x1f0
 inet6_release+0x4c/0x70
 __sock_release+0xd2/0x280
 sock_close+0x15/0x20
 __fput+0x252/0xa20
 task_work_run+0x169/0x250
 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x113/0x120
 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x40
 do_syscall_64+0x48/0x90
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
RIP: 0033:0x7f7fdf7ae28d
Code: c1 20 00 00 75 10 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 ee fb ff ff 48 89 04 24 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 8b 3c 24 48 89 c2 e8 37 fc ff ff 48 89 d0 48 83 c4 08 48 3d 01
RSP: 002b:00000000007dfbb0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00007f7fdf7ae28d
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffffffffff RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000007f338e0f R09: 0000000000000e0f
R10: 000000007f338e13 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00007f7fdefff000
R13: 00007f7fdefffcd8 R14: 00007f7fdefffce0 R15: 00007f7fdefffcd8
 </TASK>

[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230208004245.83497-1-kuniyu@amazon.com/

Fixes: b5fc292 ("inet6: Remove inet6_destroy_sock() in sk->sk_prot->destroy().")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Paasch <christophpaasch@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 14, 2023
[ Upstream commit e40b801 ]

There is a certain chance to trigger the following panic:

PID: 5900   TASK: ffff88c1c8af4100  CPU: 1   COMMAND: "kworker/1:48"
 #0 [ffff9456c1cc79a0] machine_kexec at ffffffff870665b7
 #1 [ffff9456c1cc79f0] __crash_kexec at ffffffff871b4c7a
 #2 [ffff9456c1cc7ab0] crash_kexec at ffffffff871b5b60
 #3 [ffff9456c1cc7ac0] oops_end at ffffffff87026ce7
 #4 [ffff9456c1cc7ae0] page_fault_oops at ffffffff87075715
 #5 [ffff9456c1cc7b58] exc_page_fault at ffffffff87ad0654
 #6 [ffff9456c1cc7b80] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff87c00b62
    [exception RIP: ib_alloc_mr+19]
    RIP: ffffffffc0c9cce3  RSP: ffff9456c1cc7c38  RFLAGS: 00010202
    RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: 0000000000000002  RCX: 0000000000000004
    RDX: 0000000000000010  RSI: 0000000000000000  RDI: 0000000000000000
    RBP: ffff88c1ea281d00   R8: 000000020a34ffff   R9: ffff88c1350bbb20
    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000001  R12: 0000000000000000
    R13: 0000000000000010  R14: ffff88c1ab040a50  R15: ffff88c1ea281d00
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #7 [ffff9456c1cc7c60] smc_ib_get_memory_region at ffffffffc0aff6df [smc]
 #8 [ffff9456c1cc7c88] smcr_buf_map_link at ffffffffc0b0278c [smc]
 #9 [ffff9456c1cc7ce0] __smc_buf_create at ffffffffc0b03586 [smc]

The reason here is that when the server tries to create a second link,
smc_llc_srv_add_link() has no protection and may add a new link to
link group. This breaks the security environment protected by
llc_conf_mutex.

Fixes: 2d2209f ("net/smc: first part of add link processing as SMC server")
Signed-off-by: D. Wythe <alibuda@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Larysa Zaremba <larysa.zaremba@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Wenjia Zhang <wenjia@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 14, 2023
[ Upstream commit 3a70e0d ]

When doing timestamping in lan966x and having PROVE_LOCKING
enabled the following warning is shown.

========================================================
WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected
6.2.0-rc7-01749-gc54e1f7f7e36 #2786 Tainted: G                 N
--------------------------------------------------------
swapper/0/0 just changed the state of lock:
c2609f5 (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sch_direct_xmit+0x16c/0x2e8
but this lock took another, SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock in the past:
 (&lan966x->ptp_ts_id_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}

and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them.

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&lan966x->ptp_ts_id_lock);
                               local_irq_disable();
                               lock(_xmit_ETHER#2);
                               lock(&lan966x->ptp_ts_id_lock);
  <Interrupt>
    lock(_xmit_ETHER#2);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

5 locks held by swapper/0/0:
 #0: c1001e18 ((&ndev->rs_timer)){+.-.}-{0:0}, at: call_timer_fn+0x0/0x33c
 #1: c105e7c4 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ndisc_send_skb+0x134/0x81c
 #2: c105e7d8 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: ip6_finish_output2+0x17c/0xc64
 #3: c105e7d8 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x4c/0x1224
 #4: c3056174 (dev->qdisc_tx_busylock ?: &qdisc_tx_busylock){+...}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x354/0x1224

the shortest dependencies between 2nd lock and 1st lock:
 -> (&lan966x->ptp_ts_id_lock){+.+.}-{2:2} {
    HARDIRQ-ON-W at:
                      lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248
                      _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48
                      lan966x_ptp_irq_handler+0x164/0x2a8
                      irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x78
                      irq_thread+0x130/0x278
                      kthread+0xec/0x110
                      ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28
    SOFTIRQ-ON-W at:
                      lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248
                      _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48
                      lan966x_ptp_irq_handler+0x164/0x2a8
                      irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x78
                      irq_thread+0x130/0x278
                      kthread+0xec/0x110
                      ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28
    INITIAL USE at:
                     lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248
                     _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4c/0x68
                     lan966x_ptp_txtstamp_request+0x128/0x1cc
                     lan966x_port_xmit+0x224/0x43c
                     dev_hard_start_xmit+0xa8/0x2f0
                     sch_direct_xmit+0x108/0x2e8
                     __dev_queue_xmit+0x41c/0x1224
                     packet_sendmsg+0xdb4/0x134c
                     __sys_sendto+0xd0/0x154
                     sys_send+0x18/0x20
                     ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c
  }
  ... key      at: [<c174ba0c>] __key.2+0x0/0x8
  ... acquired at:
   _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4c/0x68
   lan966x_ptp_txtstamp_request+0x128/0x1cc
   lan966x_port_xmit+0x224/0x43c
   dev_hard_start_xmit+0xa8/0x2f0
   sch_direct_xmit+0x108/0x2e8
   __dev_queue_xmit+0x41c/0x1224
   packet_sendmsg+0xdb4/0x134c
   __sys_sendto+0xd0/0x154
   sys_send+0x18/0x20
   ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c

-> (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-.}-{2:2} {
   HARDIRQ-ON-W at:
                    lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248
                    _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48
                    netif_freeze_queues+0x38/0x68
                    dev_deactivate_many+0xac/0x388
                    dev_deactivate+0x38/0x6c
                    linkwatch_do_dev+0x70/0x8c
                    __linkwatch_run_queue+0xd4/0x1e8
                    linkwatch_event+0x24/0x34
                    process_one_work+0x284/0x744
                    worker_thread+0x28/0x4bc
                    kthread+0xec/0x110
                    ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28
   IN-SOFTIRQ-W at:
                    lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248
                    _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48
                    sch_direct_xmit+0x16c/0x2e8
                    __dev_queue_xmit+0x41c/0x1224
                    ip6_finish_output2+0x5f4/0xc64
                    ndisc_send_skb+0x4cc/0x81c
                    addrconf_rs_timer+0xb0/0x2f8
                    call_timer_fn+0xb4/0x33c
                    expire_timers+0xb4/0x10c
                    run_timer_softirq+0xf8/0x2a8
                    __do_softirq+0xd4/0x5fc
                    __irq_exit_rcu+0x138/0x17c
                    irq_exit+0x8/0x28
                    __irq_svc+0x90/0xbc
                    arch_cpu_idle+0x30/0x3c
                    default_idle_call+0x44/0xac
                    do_idle+0xc8/0x138
                    cpu_startup_entry+0x18/0x1c
                    rest_init+0xcc/0x168
                    arch_post_acpi_subsys_init+0x0/0x8
   INITIAL USE at:
                   lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248
                   _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48
                   netif_freeze_queues+0x38/0x68
                   dev_deactivate_many+0xac/0x388
                   dev_deactivate+0x38/0x6c
                   linkwatch_do_dev+0x70/0x8c
                   __linkwatch_run_queue+0xd4/0x1e8
                   linkwatch_event+0x24/0x34
                   process_one_work+0x284/0x744
                   worker_thread+0x28/0x4bc
                   kthread+0xec/0x110
                   ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28
 }
 ... key      at: [<c175974c>] netdev_xmit_lock_key+0x8/0x1c8
 ... acquired at:
   __lock_acquire+0x978/0x2978
   lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248
   _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48
   sch_direct_xmit+0x16c/0x2e8
   __dev_queue_xmit+0x41c/0x1224
   ip6_finish_output2+0x5f4/0xc64
   ndisc_send_skb+0x4cc/0x81c
   addrconf_rs_timer+0xb0/0x2f8
   call_timer_fn+0xb4/0x33c
   expire_timers+0xb4/0x10c
   run_timer_softirq+0xf8/0x2a8
   __do_softirq+0xd4/0x5fc
   __irq_exit_rcu+0x138/0x17c
   irq_exit+0x8/0x28
   __irq_svc+0x90/0xbc
   arch_cpu_idle+0x30/0x3c
   default_idle_call+0x44/0xac
   do_idle+0xc8/0x138
   cpu_startup_entry+0x18/0x1c
   rest_init+0xcc/0x168
   arch_post_acpi_subsys_init+0x0/0x8

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G                 N 6.2.0-rc7-01749-gc54e1f7f7e36 #2786
Hardware name: Generic DT based system
 unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x10/0x14
 show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x58/0x70
 dump_stack_lvl from mark_lock.part.0+0x59c/0x93c
 mark_lock.part.0 from __lock_acquire+0x978/0x2978
 __lock_acquire from lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248
 lock_acquire.part.0 from _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48
 _raw_spin_lock from sch_direct_xmit+0x16c/0x2e8
 sch_direct_xmit from __dev_queue_xmit+0x41c/0x1224
 __dev_queue_xmit from ip6_finish_output2+0x5f4/0xc64
 ip6_finish_output2 from ndisc_send_skb+0x4cc/0x81c
 ndisc_send_skb from addrconf_rs_timer+0xb0/0x2f8
 addrconf_rs_timer from call_timer_fn+0xb4/0x33c
 call_timer_fn from expire_timers+0xb4/0x10c
 expire_timers from run_timer_softirq+0xf8/0x2a8
 run_timer_softirq from __do_softirq+0xd4/0x5fc
 __do_softirq from __irq_exit_rcu+0x138/0x17c
 __irq_exit_rcu from irq_exit+0x8/0x28
 irq_exit from __irq_svc+0x90/0xbc
Exception stack(0xc1001f20 to 0xc1001f68)
1f20: ffffffff ffffffff 00000001 c011f840 c100e000 c100e000 c1009314 c1009370
1f40: c10f0c1a c0d5e564 c0f5da8c 00000000 00000000 c1001f70 c010f0bc c010f0c0
1f60: 600f0013 ffffffff
 __irq_svc from arch_cpu_idle+0x30/0x3c
 arch_cpu_idle from default_idle_call+0x44/0xac
 default_idle_call from do_idle+0xc8/0x138
 do_idle from cpu_startup_entry+0x18/0x1c
 cpu_startup_entry from rest_init+0xcc/0x168
 rest_init from arch_post_acpi_subsys_init+0x0/0x8

Fix this by using spin_lock_irqsave/spin_lock_irqrestore also
inside lan966x_ptp_irq_handler.

Fixes: e85a96e ("net: lan966x: Add support for ptp interrupts")
Signed-off-by: Horatiu Vultur <horatiu.vultur@microchip.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230217210917.2649365-1-horatiu.vultur@microchip.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 14, 2023
[ Upstream commit 91621be ]

When --overwrite and --max-size options of perf record are used
together, a segmentation fault occurs. The following is an example:

  # perf record -e sched:sched* --overwrite --max-size 1K -a -- sleep 1
  [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ]
  perf: Segmentation fault
  Obtained 12 stack frames.
  ./perf/perf(+0x197673) [0x55f99710b673]
  /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(+0x3ef0f) [0x7fa45f3cff0f]
  ./perf/perf(+0x8eb40) [0x55f997002b40]
  ./perf/perf(+0x1f6882) [0x55f99716a882]
  ./perf/perf(+0x794c2) [0x55f996fed4c2]
  ./perf/perf(+0x7b7c7) [0x55f996fef7c7]
  ./perf/perf(+0x9074b) [0x55f99700474b]
  ./perf/perf(+0x12e23c) [0x55f9970a223c]
  ./perf/perf(+0x12e54a) [0x55f9970a254a]
  ./perf/perf(+0x7db60) [0x55f996ff1b60]
  /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xe6) [0x7fa45f3b2c86]
  ./perf/perf(+0x7dfe9) [0x55f996ff1fe9]
  Segmentation fault (core dumped)

backtrace of the core file is as follows:

  (gdb) bt
  #0  record__bytes_written (rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:234
  #1  record__output_max_size_exceeded (rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:242
  #2  record__write (map=0x0, size=12816, bf=0x55f9978da2e0, rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:263
  #3  process_synthesized_event (tool=tool@entry=0x55f99755a200 <record>, event=event@entry=0x55f9978da2e0, sample=sample@entry=0x0, machine=machine@entry=0x55f997893658) at builtin-record.c:618
  #4  0x000055f99716a883 in __perf_event__synthesize_id_index (tool=tool@entry=0x55f99755a200 <record>, process=process@entry=0x55f997002aa0 <process_synthesized_event>, evlist=0x55f9978928b0, machine=machine@entry=0x55f997893658,
      from=from@entry=0) at util/synthetic-events.c:1895
  #5  0x000055f99716a91f in perf_event__synthesize_id_index (tool=tool@entry=0x55f99755a200 <record>, process=process@entry=0x55f997002aa0 <process_synthesized_event>, evlist=<optimized out>, machine=machine@entry=0x55f997893658)
      at util/synthetic-events.c:1905
  #6  0x000055f996fed4c3 in record__synthesize (tail=tail@entry=true, rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:1997
  #7  0x000055f996fef7c8 in __cmd_record (argc=argc@entry=2, argv=argv@entry=0x7ffc67551260, rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:2802
  #8  0x000055f99700474c in cmd_record (argc=<optimized out>, argv=0x7ffc67551260) at builtin-record.c:4258
  #9  0x000055f9970a223d in run_builtin (p=0x55f997564d88 <commands+264>, argc=10, argv=0x7ffc67551260) at perf.c:330
  #10 0x000055f9970a254b in handle_internal_command (argc=10, argv=0x7ffc67551260) at perf.c:384
  #11 0x000055f996ff1b61 in run_argv (argcp=<synthetic pointer>, argv=<synthetic pointer>) at perf.c:428
  #12 main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=0x7ffc67551260) at perf.c:562

The reason is that record__bytes_written accesses the freed memory rec->thread_data,
The process is as follows:
  __cmd_record
    -> record__free_thread_data
      -> zfree(&rec->thread_data)         // free rec->thread_data
    -> record__synthesize
      -> perf_event__synthesize_id_index
        -> process_synthesized_event
          -> record__write
            -> record__bytes_written      // access rec->thread_data

We add a member variable "thread_bytes_written" in the struct "record"
to save the data size written by the threads.

Fixes: 6d57581 ("perf record: Add support for limit perf output file size")
Signed-off-by: Yang Jihong <yangjihong1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiwei Sun <jiwei.sun@windriver.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAM9d7ci_TRrqBQVQNW8=GwakUr7SsZpYxaaty-S4bxF8zJWyqw@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 14, 2023
…dler

commit 42e19e6 upstream.

Recent test_kprobe_missed kprobes kunit test uncovers the following error
(reported when CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP is enabled):

BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:580
in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 662, name: kunit_try_catch
preempt_count: 0, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
no locks held by kunit_try_catch/662.
irq event stamp: 280
hardirqs last  enabled at (279): [<00000003e60a3d42>] __do_pgm_check+0x17a/0x1c0
hardirqs last disabled at (280): [<00000003e3bd774a>] kprobe_exceptions_notify+0x27a/0x318
softirqs last  enabled at (0): [<00000003e3c5c890>] copy_process+0x14a8/0x4c80
softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
CPU: 46 PID: 662 Comm: kunit_try_catch Tainted: G                 N 6.2.0-173644-g44c18d77f0c0 #2
Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 704 (LPAR)
Call Trace:
 [<00000003e60a3a00>] dump_stack_lvl+0x120/0x198
 [<00000003e3d02e82>] __might_resched+0x60a/0x668
 [<00000003e60b9908>] __mutex_lock+0xc0/0x14e0
 [<00000003e60bad5a>] mutex_lock_nested+0x32/0x40
 [<00000003e3f7b460>] unregister_kprobe+0x30/0xd8
 [<00000003e51b2602>] test_kprobe_missed+0xf2/0x268
 [<00000003e51b5406>] kunit_try_run_case+0x10e/0x290
 [<00000003e51b7dfa>] kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x62/0xb8
 [<00000003e3ce30f8>] kthread+0x2d0/0x398
 [<00000003e3b96afa>] __ret_from_fork+0x8a/0xe8
 [<00000003e60ccada>] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x40

The reason for this error report is that kprobes handling code failed
to restore irqs.

The problem is that when kprobe is triggered from another kprobe
post_handler current sequence of enable_singlestep / disable_singlestep
is the following:
enable_singlestep  <- original kprobe (saves kprobe_saved_imask)
enable_singlestep  <- kprobe triggered from post_handler (clobbers kprobe_saved_imask)
disable_singlestep <- kprobe triggered from post_handler (restores kprobe_saved_imask)
disable_singlestep <- original kprobe (restores wrong clobbered kprobe_saved_imask)

There is just one kprobe_ctlblk per cpu and both calls saves and
loads irq mask to kprobe_saved_imask. To fix the problem simply move
resume_execution (which calls disable_singlestep) before calling
post_handler. This also fixes the problem that post_handler is called
with pt_regs which were not yet adjusted after single-stepping.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 4ba069b ("[S390] add kprobes support.")
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 14, 2023
commit 60eed1e upstream.

code path:

ocfs2_ioctl_move_extents
 ocfs2_move_extents
  ocfs2_defrag_extent
   __ocfs2_move_extent
    + ocfs2_journal_access_di
    + ocfs2_split_extent  //sub-paths call jbd2_journal_restart
    + ocfs2_journal_dirty //crash by jbs2 ASSERT

crash stacks:

PID: 11297  TASK: ffff974a676dcd00  CPU: 67  COMMAND: "defragfs.ocfs2"
 #0 [ffffb25d8dad3900] machine_kexec at ffffffff8386fe01
 #1 [ffffb25d8dad3958] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8395959d
 #2 [ffffb25d8dad3a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff8395a45d
 #3 [ffffb25d8dad3a38] oops_end at ffffffff83836d3f
 #4 [ffffb25d8dad3a58] do_trap at ffffffff83833205
 #5 [ffffb25d8dad3aa0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff83833aa6
 #6 [ffffb25d8dad3ac0] invalid_op at ffffffff84200d18
    [exception RIP: jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata+0x2ba]
    RIP: ffffffffc09ca54a  RSP: ffffb25d8dad3b70  RFLAGS: 00010207
    RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: ffff9706eedc5248  RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 0000000000000001  RSI: ffff97337029ea28  RDI: ffff9706eedc5250
    RBP: ffff9703c3520200   R8: 000000000f46b0b2   R9: 0000000000000000
    R10: 0000000000000001  R11: 00000001000000fe  R12: ffff97337029ea28
    R13: 0000000000000000  R14: ffff9703de59bf60  R15: ffff9706eedc5250
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #7 [ffffb25d8dad3ba8] ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc137fb95 [ocfs2]
 #8 [ffffb25d8dad3be8] __ocfs2_move_extent at ffffffffc139a950 [ocfs2]
 #9 [ffffb25d8dad3c80] ocfs2_defrag_extent at ffffffffc139b2d2 [ocfs2]

Analysis

This bug has the same root cause of 'commit 7f27ec9 ("ocfs2: call
ocfs2_journal_access_di() before ocfs2_journal_dirty() in
ocfs2_write_end_nolock()")'.  For this bug, jbd2_journal_restart() is
called by ocfs2_split_extent() during defragmenting.

How to fix

For ocfs2_split_extent() can handle journal operations totally by itself.
Caller doesn't need to call journal access/dirty pair, and caller only
needs to call journal start/stop pair.  The fix method is to remove
journal access/dirty from __ocfs2_move_extent().

The discussion for this patch:
https://oss.oracle.com/pipermail/ocfs2-devel/2023-February/000647.html

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230217003717.32469-1-heming.zhao@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 14, 2023
[ Upstream commit e9e4229 ]

The TC architecture allows filters and actions to be created independently.
In filters the user can reference action objects using:
tc action add action pedit ... index 1
tc filter add ... action pedit index 1

In the current code for act_pedit this is broken as it checks netlink
attributes for create/update before actually checking if we are binding to an
existing action.

tdc results:
1..69
ok 1 319a - Add pedit action that mangles IP TTL
ok 2 7e67 - Replace pedit action with invalid goto chain
ok 3 377e - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32
ok 4 a0ca - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 (INVALID)
ok 5 dd8a - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16 u16
ok 6 53db - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16 (INVALID)
ok 7 5c7e - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u8 add value
ok 8 2893 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u8 quad
ok 9 3a07 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u8-u16-u8
ok 10 ab0f - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16-u8-u8
ok 11 9d12 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 set u16 clear u8 invert
ok 12 ebfa - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset overflow u32 (INVALID)
ok 13 f512 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16 at offmask shift set
ok 14 c2cb - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 retain value
ok 15 1762 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u8 clear value
ok 16 bcee - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u8 retain value
ok 17 e89f - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16 retain value
ok 18 c282 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 clear value
ok 19 c422 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16 invert value
ok 20 d3d3 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 invert value
ok 21 57e5 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u8 preserve value
ok 22 99e0 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16 preserve value
ok 23 1892 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 preserve value
ok 24 4b60 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP negative offset u16/u32 set value
ok 25 a5a7 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth set src
ok 26 86d4 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth set src & dst
ok 27 f8a9 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth set dst
ok 28 c715 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth set src (INVALID)
ok 29 8131 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth set dst (INVALID)
ok 30 ba22 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth type set/clear sequence
ok 31 dec4 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth set type (INVALID)
ok 32 ab06 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth add type
ok 33 918d - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth invert src
ok 34 a8d4 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth invert dst
ok 35 ee13 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth invert type
ok 36 7588 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set src
ok 37 0fa7 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set dst
ok 38 5810 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set src & dst
ok 39 1092 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set ihl & dsfield
ok 40 02d8 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set ttl & protocol
ok 41 3e2d - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set ttl (INVALID)
ok 42 31ae - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip ttl clear/set
ok 43 486f - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set duplicate fields
ok 44 e790 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set ce, df, mf, firstfrag, nofrag fields
ok 45 cc8a - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set tos
ok 46 7a17 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set precedence
ok 47 c3b6 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip add tos
ok 48 43d3 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip add precedence
ok 49 438e - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip clear tos
ok 50 6b1b - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip clear precedence
ok 51 824a - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip invert tos
ok 52 106f - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip invert precedence
ok 53 6829 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP beyond ip set dport & sport
ok 54 afd8 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP beyond ip set icmp_type & icmp_code
ok 55 3143 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP beyond ip set dport (INVALID)
ok 56 815c - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 set src
ok 57 4dae - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 set dst
ok 58 fc1f - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 set src & dst
ok 59 6d34 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 dst retain value (INVALID)
ok 60 94bb - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 traffic_class
ok 61 6f5e - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 flow_lbl
ok 62 6795 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 set payload_len, nexthdr, hoplimit
ok 63 1442 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP tcp set dport & sport
ok 64 b7ac - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP tcp sport set (INVALID)
ok 65 cfcc - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP tcp flags set
ok 66 3bc4 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP tcp set dport, sport & flags fields
ok 67 f1c8 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP udp set dport & sport
ok 68 d784 - Add pedit action with mixed RAW/LAYERED_OP #1
ok 69 70ca - Add pedit action with mixed RAW/LAYERED_OP #2

Fixes: 71d0ed7 ("net/act_pedit: Support using offset relative to the conventional network headers")
Fixes: f67169f ("net/sched: act_pedit: fix WARN() in the traffic path")
Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 14, 2023
[ Upstream commit 3dca1f8 ]

Don't hold sdw_dev_lock while calling the peripheral driver
probe() and remove() callbacks.

Holding sdw_dev_lock around the probe() and remove() calls causes
a theoretical mutex inversion which lockdep will assert on.

During probe() the sdw_dev_lock mutex is taken first and then
ASoC/ALSA locks are taken by the probe() implementation.

During normal operation ASoC can take its locks and then trigger
a runtime resume of the component. The SoundWire resume will then
take sdw_dev_lock. This is the reverse order compared to probe().

It's not necessary to hold sdw_dev_lock when calling the probe()
and remove(), it is only used to prevent the bus core calling the
driver callbacks if there isn't a driver or the driver is removing.

All calls to the driver callbacks are guarded by the 'probed' flag.
So if sdw_dev_lock is held while setting and clearing the 'probed'
flag this is sufficient to guarantee the safety of callback
functions.

Removing the mutex from around the call to probe() means that it
is now possible for a bus event (PING response) to be handled in
parallel with the probe(). But sdw_bus_probe() already has
handling for this by calling the device update_status() after
the probe() has completed.

Example lockdep assert:
[   46.098514] ======================================================
[   46.104736] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[   46.110961] 6.1.0-rc4-jamerson #1 Tainted: G            E
[   46.116842] ------------------------------------------------------
[   46.123063] mpg123/1130 is trying to acquire lock:
[   46.127883] ffff8b445031fb80 (&slave->sdw_dev_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70
[   46.137225]
               but task is already holding lock:
[   46.143074] ffffffffc1455310 (&card->pcm_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dpcm_fe_dai_open+0x49/0x830
[   46.151536]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.[   46.159732]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[   46.167231]
               -> #4 (&card->pcm_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[   46.173428]        __mutex_lock+0x94/0x920
[   46.177542]        snd_soc_dpcm_runtime_update+0x2e/0x100
[   46.182958]        snd_soc_dapm_put_enum_double+0x1c2/0x200
[   46.188548]        snd_ctl_elem_write+0x10c/0x1d0
[   46.193268]        snd_ctl_ioctl+0x126/0x850
[   46.197556]        __x64_sys_ioctl+0x87/0xc0
[   46.201845]        do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[   46.205959]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[   46.211553]
               -> #3 (&card->controls_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}:
[   46.218188]        down_write+0x2b/0xd0
[   46.222038]        snd_ctl_add_replace+0x39/0xb0
[   46.226672]        snd_soc_add_controls+0x53/0x80
[   46.231393]        soc_probe_component+0x1e4/0x2a0
[   46.236202]        snd_soc_bind_card+0x51a/0xc80
[   46.240836]        devm_snd_soc_register_card+0x43/0x90
[   46.246079]        mc_probe+0x982/0xfe0 [snd_soc_sof_sdw]
[   46.251500]        platform_probe+0x3c/0xa0
[   46.255700]        really_probe+0xde/0x390
[   46.259814]        __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x180
[   46.264710]        driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x90
[   46.269347]        __driver_attach+0x9f/0x1f0
[   46.273721]        bus_for_each_dev+0x78/0xc0
[   46.278098]        bus_add_driver+0x1ac/0x200
[   46.282473]        driver_register+0x8f/0xf0
[   46.286759]        do_one_initcall+0x58/0x310
[   46.291136]        do_init_module+0x4c/0x1f0
[   46.295422]        __do_sys_finit_module+0xb4/0x130
[   46.300321]        do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[   46.304434]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[   46.310027]
               -> #2 (&card->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[   46.315883]        __mutex_lock+0x94/0x920
[   46.320000]        snd_soc_bind_card+0x3e/0xc80
[   46.324551]        devm_snd_soc_register_card+0x43/0x90
[   46.329798]        mc_probe+0x982/0xfe0 [snd_soc_sof_sdw]
[   46.335219]        platform_probe+0x3c/0xa0
[   46.339420]        really_probe+0xde/0x390
[   46.343532]        __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x180
[   46.348430]        driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x90
[   46.353065]        __driver_attach+0x9f/0x1f0
[   46.357437]        bus_for_each_dev+0x78/0xc0
[   46.361812]        bus_add_driver+0x1ac/0x200
[   46.366716]        driver_register+0x8f/0xf0
[   46.371528]        do_one_initcall+0x58/0x310
[   46.376424]        do_init_module+0x4c/0x1f0
[   46.381239]        __do_sys_finit_module+0xb4/0x130
[   46.386665]        do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[   46.391299]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[   46.397416]
               -> #1 (client_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[   46.404307]        __mutex_lock+0x94/0x920
[   46.408941]        snd_soc_add_component+0x24/0x2c0
[   46.414345]        devm_snd_soc_register_component+0x54/0xa0
[   46.420522]        cs35l56_common_probe+0x280/0x370 [snd_soc_cs35l56]
[   46.427487]        cs35l56_sdw_probe+0xf4/0x170 [snd_soc_cs35l56_sdw]
[   46.434442]        sdw_drv_probe+0x80/0x1a0
[   46.439136]        really_probe+0xde/0x390
[   46.443738]        __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x180
[   46.449120]        driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x90
[   46.454247]        __driver_attach+0x9f/0x1f0
[   46.459106]        bus_for_each_dev+0x78/0xc0
[   46.463971]        bus_add_driver+0x1ac/0x200
[   46.468825]        driver_register+0x8f/0xf0
[   46.473592]        do_one_initcall+0x58/0x310
[   46.478441]        do_init_module+0x4c/0x1f0
[   46.483202]        __do_sys_finit_module+0xb4/0x130
[   46.488572]        do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[   46.493158]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[   46.499229]
               -> #0 (&slave->sdw_dev_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[   46.506737]        __lock_acquire+0x1121/0x1df0
[   46.511765]        lock_acquire+0xd5/0x300
[   46.516360]        __mutex_lock+0x94/0x920
[   46.520949]        sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70
[   46.526409]        sdw_clear_slave_status+0xd8/0xe0
[   46.531783]        intel_resume_runtime+0x139/0x2a0
[   46.537155]        __rpm_callback+0x41/0x120
[   46.541919]        rpm_callback+0x5d/0x70
[   46.546422]        rpm_resume+0x531/0x7e0
[   46.550920]        __pm_runtime_resume+0x4a/0x80
[   46.556024]        snd_soc_pcm_component_pm_runtime_get+0x2f/0xc0
[   46.562611]        __soc_pcm_open+0x62/0x520
[   46.567375]        dpcm_be_dai_startup+0x116/0x210
[   46.572661]        dpcm_fe_dai_open+0xf7/0x830
[   46.577597]        snd_pcm_open_substream+0x54a/0x8b0
[   46.583145]        snd_pcm_open.part.0+0xdc/0x200
[   46.588341]        snd_pcm_playback_open+0x51/0x80
[   46.593625]        chrdev_open+0xc0/0x250
[   46.598129]        do_dentry_open+0x15f/0x430
[   46.602981]        path_openat+0x75e/0xa80
[   46.607575]        do_filp_open+0xb2/0x160
[   46.612162]        do_sys_openat2+0x9a/0x160
[   46.616922]        __x64_sys_openat+0x53/0xa0
[   46.621767]        do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[   46.626352]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[   46.632414]
               other info that might help us debug this:[   46.641862] Chain exists of:
                 &slave->sdw_dev_lock --> &card->controls_rwsem --> &card->pcm_mutex[   46.655145]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:[   46.662048]        CPU0                    CPU1
[   46.667080]        ----                    ----
[   46.672108]   lock(&card->pcm_mutex);
[   46.676267]                                lock(&card->controls_rwsem);
[   46.683382]                                lock(&card->pcm_mutex);
[   46.690063]   lock(&slave->sdw_dev_lock);
[   46.694574]
                *** DEADLOCK ***[   46.701942] 2 locks held by mpg123/1130:
[   46.706356]  #0: ffff8b4457b22b90 (&pcm->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: snd_pcm_open.part.0+0xc9/0x200
[   46.715999]  #1: ffffffffc1455310 (&card->pcm_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dpcm_fe_dai_open+0x49/0x830
[   46.725390]
               stack backtrace:
[   46.730752] CPU: 0 PID: 1130 Comm: mpg123 Tainted: G            E      6.1.0-rc4-jamerson #1
[   46.739703] Hardware name: AAEON UP-WHL01/UP-WHL01, BIOS UPW1AM19 11/10/2020
[   46.747270] Call Trace:
[   46.750239]  <TASK>
[   46.752857]  dump_stack_lvl+0x56/0x73
[   46.757045]  check_noncircular+0x102/0x120
[   46.761664]  __lock_acquire+0x1121/0x1df0
[   46.766197]  lock_acquire+0xd5/0x300
[   46.770292]  ? sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70
[   46.775432]  ? lock_is_held_type+0xe2/0x140
[   46.780143]  __mutex_lock+0x94/0x920
[   46.784241]  ? sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70
[   46.789387]  ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
[   46.793750]  ? sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70
[   46.798894]  ? lock_release+0x147/0x2f0
[   46.803262]  ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x47/0x250
[   46.808315]  ? sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70
[   46.813456]  sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70
[   46.818422]  sdw_clear_slave_status+0xd8/0xe0
[   46.823302]  ? pm_generic_runtime_suspend+0x30/0x30
[   46.828706]  intel_resume_runtime+0x139/0x2a0
[   46.833583]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x50
[   46.838462]  ? pm_generic_runtime_suspend+0x30/0x30
[   46.843866]  __rpm_callback+0x41/0x120
[   46.848142]  ? pm_generic_runtime_suspend+0x30/0x30
[   46.853550]  rpm_callback+0x5d/0x70
[   46.857568]  rpm_resume+0x531/0x7e0
[   46.861578]  ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x62/0x70
[   46.866634]  __pm_runtime_resume+0x4a/0x80
[   46.871258]  snd_soc_pcm_component_pm_runtime_get+0x2f/0xc0
[   46.877358]  __soc_pcm_open+0x62/0x520
[   46.881634]  ? dpcm_add_paths.isra.0+0x35d/0x4c0
[   46.886784]  dpcm_be_dai_startup+0x116/0x210
[   46.891592]  dpcm_fe_dai_open+0xf7/0x830
[   46.896046]  ? debug_mutex_init+0x33/0x50
[   46.900591]  snd_pcm_open_substream+0x54a/0x8b0
[   46.905658]  snd_pcm_open.part.0+0xdc/0x200
[   46.910376]  ? wake_up_q+0x90/0x90
[   46.914312]  snd_pcm_playback_open+0x51/0x80
[   46.919118]  chrdev_open+0xc0/0x250
[   46.923147]  ? cdev_device_add+0x90/0x90
[   46.927608]  do_dentry_open+0x15f/0x430
[   46.931976]  path_openat+0x75e/0xa80
[   46.936086]  do_filp_open+0xb2/0x160
[   46.940194]  ? lock_release+0x147/0x2f0
[   46.944563]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x50
[   46.949101]  do_sys_openat2+0x9a/0x160
[   46.953377]  __x64_sys_openat+0x53/0xa0
[   46.957733]  do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[   46.961829]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[   46.967402] RIP: 0033:0x7fa6397ccd3b
[   46.971506] Code: 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 4b 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 67 44 89 e2 48 89 ee bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 91 00 00 00 48 8b 4c 24 28 64 48 33 0c 25
[   46.991413] RSP: 002b:00007fff838e8990 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101
[   46.999580] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000080802 RCX: 00007fa6397ccd3b
[   47.007311] RDX: 0000000000080802 RSI: 00007fff838e8b50 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c
[   47.015047] RBP: 00007fff838e8b50 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000011
[   47.022787] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000080802
[   47.030539] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007fff838e8b50
[   47.038289]  </TASK>

Signed-off-by: Richard Fitzgerald <rf@opensource.cirrus.com>
Reviewed-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230123172520.339367-1-rf@opensource.cirrus.com
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 14, 2023
commit 0e68b55 upstream.

Running a rt-kernel base on 6.2.0-rc3-rt1 on an Ampere Altra outputs
the following:
  BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:46
  in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 9, name: kworker/u320:0
  preempt_count: 2, expected: 0
  RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
  3 locks held by kworker/u320:0/9:
  #0: ffff3fff8c27d128 ((wq_completion)efi_rts_wq){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work (./include/linux/atomic/atomic-long.h:41)
  #1: ffff80000861bdd0 ((work_completion)(&efi_rts_work.work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work (./include/linux/atomic/atomic-long.h:41)
  #2: ffffdf7e1ed3e460 (efi_rt_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: efi_call_rts (drivers/firmware/efi/runtime-wrappers.c:101)
  Preemption disabled at:
  efi_virtmap_load (./arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu_context.h:248)
  CPU: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/u320:0 Tainted: G        W          6.2.0-rc3-rt1
  Hardware name: WIWYNN Mt.Jade Server System B81.03001.0005/Mt.Jade Motherboard, BIOS 1.08.20220218 (SCP: 1.08.20220218) 2022/02/18
  Workqueue: efi_rts_wq efi_call_rts
  Call trace:
  dump_backtrace (arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:158)
  show_stack (arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:165)
  dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:107 (discriminator 4))
  dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:114)
  __might_resched (kernel/sched/core.c:10134)
  rt_spin_lock (kernel/locking/rtmutex.c:1769 (discriminator 4))
  efi_call_rts (drivers/firmware/efi/runtime-wrappers.c:101)
  [...]

This seems to come from commit ff7a167 ("arm64: efi: Execute
runtime services from a dedicated stack") which adds a spinlock. This
spinlock is taken through:
efi_call_rts()
\-efi_call_virt()
  \-efi_call_virt_pointer()
    \-arch_efi_call_virt_setup()

Make 'efi_rt_lock' a raw_spinlock to avoid being preempted.

[ardb: The EFI runtime services are called with a different set of
       translation tables, and are permitted to use the SIMD registers.
       The context switch code preserves/restores neither, and so EFI
       calls must be made with preemption disabled, rather than only
       disabling migration.]

Fixes: ff7a167 ("arm64: efi: Execute runtime services from a dedicated stack")
Signed-off-by: Pierre Gondois <pierre.gondois@arm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.1+
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 15, 2023
[ Upstream commit e40b801 ]

There is a certain chance to trigger the following panic:

PID: 5900   TASK: ffff88c1c8af4100  CPU: 1   COMMAND: "kworker/1:48"
 #0 [ffff9456c1cc79a0] machine_kexec at ffffffff870665b7
 #1 [ffff9456c1cc79f0] __crash_kexec at ffffffff871b4c7a
 #2 [ffff9456c1cc7ab0] crash_kexec at ffffffff871b5b60
 #3 [ffff9456c1cc7ac0] oops_end at ffffffff87026ce7
 #4 [ffff9456c1cc7ae0] page_fault_oops at ffffffff87075715
 #5 [ffff9456c1cc7b58] exc_page_fault at ffffffff87ad0654
 #6 [ffff9456c1cc7b80] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff87c00b62
    [exception RIP: ib_alloc_mr+19]
    RIP: ffffffffc0c9cce3  RSP: ffff9456c1cc7c38  RFLAGS: 00010202
    RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: 0000000000000002  RCX: 0000000000000004
    RDX: 0000000000000010  RSI: 0000000000000000  RDI: 0000000000000000
    RBP: ffff88c1ea281d00   R8: 000000020a34ffff   R9: ffff88c1350bbb20
    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000001  R12: 0000000000000000
    R13: 0000000000000010  R14: ffff88c1ab040a50  R15: ffff88c1ea281d00
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #7 [ffff9456c1cc7c60] smc_ib_get_memory_region at ffffffffc0aff6df [smc]
 #8 [ffff9456c1cc7c88] smcr_buf_map_link at ffffffffc0b0278c [smc]
 #9 [ffff9456c1cc7ce0] __smc_buf_create at ffffffffc0b03586 [smc]

The reason here is that when the server tries to create a second link,
smc_llc_srv_add_link() has no protection and may add a new link to
link group. This breaks the security environment protected by
llc_conf_mutex.

Fixes: 2d2209f ("net/smc: first part of add link processing as SMC server")
Signed-off-by: D. Wythe <alibuda@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Larysa Zaremba <larysa.zaremba@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Wenjia Zhang <wenjia@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 15, 2023
[ Upstream commit 3a70e0d ]

When doing timestamping in lan966x and having PROVE_LOCKING
enabled the following warning is shown.

========================================================
WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected
6.2.0-rc7-01749-gc54e1f7f7e36 #2786 Tainted: G                 N
--------------------------------------------------------
swapper/0/0 just changed the state of lock:
c2609f5 (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sch_direct_xmit+0x16c/0x2e8
but this lock took another, SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock in the past:
 (&lan966x->ptp_ts_id_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}

and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them.

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&lan966x->ptp_ts_id_lock);
                               local_irq_disable();
                               lock(_xmit_ETHER#2);
                               lock(&lan966x->ptp_ts_id_lock);
  <Interrupt>
    lock(_xmit_ETHER#2);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

5 locks held by swapper/0/0:
 #0: c1001e18 ((&ndev->rs_timer)){+.-.}-{0:0}, at: call_timer_fn+0x0/0x33c
 #1: c105e7c4 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ndisc_send_skb+0x134/0x81c
 #2: c105e7d8 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: ip6_finish_output2+0x17c/0xc64
 #3: c105e7d8 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x4c/0x1224
 #4: c3056174 (dev->qdisc_tx_busylock ?: &qdisc_tx_busylock){+...}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x354/0x1224

the shortest dependencies between 2nd lock and 1st lock:
 -> (&lan966x->ptp_ts_id_lock){+.+.}-{2:2} {
    HARDIRQ-ON-W at:
                      lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248
                      _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48
                      lan966x_ptp_irq_handler+0x164/0x2a8
                      irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x78
                      irq_thread+0x130/0x278
                      kthread+0xec/0x110
                      ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28
    SOFTIRQ-ON-W at:
                      lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248
                      _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48
                      lan966x_ptp_irq_handler+0x164/0x2a8
                      irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x78
                      irq_thread+0x130/0x278
                      kthread+0xec/0x110
                      ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28
    INITIAL USE at:
                     lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248
                     _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4c/0x68
                     lan966x_ptp_txtstamp_request+0x128/0x1cc
                     lan966x_port_xmit+0x224/0x43c
                     dev_hard_start_xmit+0xa8/0x2f0
                     sch_direct_xmit+0x108/0x2e8
                     __dev_queue_xmit+0x41c/0x1224
                     packet_sendmsg+0xdb4/0x134c
                     __sys_sendto+0xd0/0x154
                     sys_send+0x18/0x20
                     ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c
  }
  ... key      at: [<c174ba0c>] __key.2+0x0/0x8
  ... acquired at:
   _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4c/0x68
   lan966x_ptp_txtstamp_request+0x128/0x1cc
   lan966x_port_xmit+0x224/0x43c
   dev_hard_start_xmit+0xa8/0x2f0
   sch_direct_xmit+0x108/0x2e8
   __dev_queue_xmit+0x41c/0x1224
   packet_sendmsg+0xdb4/0x134c
   __sys_sendto+0xd0/0x154
   sys_send+0x18/0x20
   ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c

-> (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-.}-{2:2} {
   HARDIRQ-ON-W at:
                    lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248
                    _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48
                    netif_freeze_queues+0x38/0x68
                    dev_deactivate_many+0xac/0x388
                    dev_deactivate+0x38/0x6c
                    linkwatch_do_dev+0x70/0x8c
                    __linkwatch_run_queue+0xd4/0x1e8
                    linkwatch_event+0x24/0x34
                    process_one_work+0x284/0x744
                    worker_thread+0x28/0x4bc
                    kthread+0xec/0x110
                    ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28
   IN-SOFTIRQ-W at:
                    lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248
                    _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48
                    sch_direct_xmit+0x16c/0x2e8
                    __dev_queue_xmit+0x41c/0x1224
                    ip6_finish_output2+0x5f4/0xc64
                    ndisc_send_skb+0x4cc/0x81c
                    addrconf_rs_timer+0xb0/0x2f8
                    call_timer_fn+0xb4/0x33c
                    expire_timers+0xb4/0x10c
                    run_timer_softirq+0xf8/0x2a8
                    __do_softirq+0xd4/0x5fc
                    __irq_exit_rcu+0x138/0x17c
                    irq_exit+0x8/0x28
                    __irq_svc+0x90/0xbc
                    arch_cpu_idle+0x30/0x3c
                    default_idle_call+0x44/0xac
                    do_idle+0xc8/0x138
                    cpu_startup_entry+0x18/0x1c
                    rest_init+0xcc/0x168
                    arch_post_acpi_subsys_init+0x0/0x8
   INITIAL USE at:
                   lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248
                   _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48
                   netif_freeze_queues+0x38/0x68
                   dev_deactivate_many+0xac/0x388
                   dev_deactivate+0x38/0x6c
                   linkwatch_do_dev+0x70/0x8c
                   __linkwatch_run_queue+0xd4/0x1e8
                   linkwatch_event+0x24/0x34
                   process_one_work+0x284/0x744
                   worker_thread+0x28/0x4bc
                   kthread+0xec/0x110
                   ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28
 }
 ... key      at: [<c175974c>] netdev_xmit_lock_key+0x8/0x1c8
 ... acquired at:
   __lock_acquire+0x978/0x2978
   lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248
   _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48
   sch_direct_xmit+0x16c/0x2e8
   __dev_queue_xmit+0x41c/0x1224
   ip6_finish_output2+0x5f4/0xc64
   ndisc_send_skb+0x4cc/0x81c
   addrconf_rs_timer+0xb0/0x2f8
   call_timer_fn+0xb4/0x33c
   expire_timers+0xb4/0x10c
   run_timer_softirq+0xf8/0x2a8
   __do_softirq+0xd4/0x5fc
   __irq_exit_rcu+0x138/0x17c
   irq_exit+0x8/0x28
   __irq_svc+0x90/0xbc
   arch_cpu_idle+0x30/0x3c
   default_idle_call+0x44/0xac
   do_idle+0xc8/0x138
   cpu_startup_entry+0x18/0x1c
   rest_init+0xcc/0x168
   arch_post_acpi_subsys_init+0x0/0x8

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G                 N 6.2.0-rc7-01749-gc54e1f7f7e36 #2786
Hardware name: Generic DT based system
 unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x10/0x14
 show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x58/0x70
 dump_stack_lvl from mark_lock.part.0+0x59c/0x93c
 mark_lock.part.0 from __lock_acquire+0x978/0x2978
 __lock_acquire from lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248
 lock_acquire.part.0 from _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48
 _raw_spin_lock from sch_direct_xmit+0x16c/0x2e8
 sch_direct_xmit from __dev_queue_xmit+0x41c/0x1224
 __dev_queue_xmit from ip6_finish_output2+0x5f4/0xc64
 ip6_finish_output2 from ndisc_send_skb+0x4cc/0x81c
 ndisc_send_skb from addrconf_rs_timer+0xb0/0x2f8
 addrconf_rs_timer from call_timer_fn+0xb4/0x33c
 call_timer_fn from expire_timers+0xb4/0x10c
 expire_timers from run_timer_softirq+0xf8/0x2a8
 run_timer_softirq from __do_softirq+0xd4/0x5fc
 __do_softirq from __irq_exit_rcu+0x138/0x17c
 __irq_exit_rcu from irq_exit+0x8/0x28
 irq_exit from __irq_svc+0x90/0xbc
Exception stack(0xc1001f20 to 0xc1001f68)
1f20: ffffffff ffffffff 00000001 c011f840 c100e000 c100e000 c1009314 c1009370
1f40: c10f0c1a c0d5e564 c0f5da8c 00000000 00000000 c1001f70 c010f0bc c010f0c0
1f60: 600f0013 ffffffff
 __irq_svc from arch_cpu_idle+0x30/0x3c
 arch_cpu_idle from default_idle_call+0x44/0xac
 default_idle_call from do_idle+0xc8/0x138
 do_idle from cpu_startup_entry+0x18/0x1c
 cpu_startup_entry from rest_init+0xcc/0x168
 rest_init from arch_post_acpi_subsys_init+0x0/0x8

Fix this by using spin_lock_irqsave/spin_lock_irqrestore also
inside lan966x_ptp_irq_handler.

Fixes: e85a96e ("net: lan966x: Add support for ptp interrupts")
Signed-off-by: Horatiu Vultur <horatiu.vultur@microchip.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230217210917.2649365-1-horatiu.vultur@microchip.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 15, 2023
[ Upstream commit 91621be ]

When --overwrite and --max-size options of perf record are used
together, a segmentation fault occurs. The following is an example:

  # perf record -e sched:sched* --overwrite --max-size 1K -a -- sleep 1
  [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ]
  perf: Segmentation fault
  Obtained 12 stack frames.
  ./perf/perf(+0x197673) [0x55f99710b673]
  /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(+0x3ef0f) [0x7fa45f3cff0f]
  ./perf/perf(+0x8eb40) [0x55f997002b40]
  ./perf/perf(+0x1f6882) [0x55f99716a882]
  ./perf/perf(+0x794c2) [0x55f996fed4c2]
  ./perf/perf(+0x7b7c7) [0x55f996fef7c7]
  ./perf/perf(+0x9074b) [0x55f99700474b]
  ./perf/perf(+0x12e23c) [0x55f9970a223c]
  ./perf/perf(+0x12e54a) [0x55f9970a254a]
  ./perf/perf(+0x7db60) [0x55f996ff1b60]
  /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xe6) [0x7fa45f3b2c86]
  ./perf/perf(+0x7dfe9) [0x55f996ff1fe9]
  Segmentation fault (core dumped)

backtrace of the core file is as follows:

  (gdb) bt
  #0  record__bytes_written (rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:234
  #1  record__output_max_size_exceeded (rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:242
  #2  record__write (map=0x0, size=12816, bf=0x55f9978da2e0, rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:263
  #3  process_synthesized_event (tool=tool@entry=0x55f99755a200 <record>, event=event@entry=0x55f9978da2e0, sample=sample@entry=0x0, machine=machine@entry=0x55f997893658) at builtin-record.c:618
  #4  0x000055f99716a883 in __perf_event__synthesize_id_index (tool=tool@entry=0x55f99755a200 <record>, process=process@entry=0x55f997002aa0 <process_synthesized_event>, evlist=0x55f9978928b0, machine=machine@entry=0x55f997893658,
      from=from@entry=0) at util/synthetic-events.c:1895
  #5  0x000055f99716a91f in perf_event__synthesize_id_index (tool=tool@entry=0x55f99755a200 <record>, process=process@entry=0x55f997002aa0 <process_synthesized_event>, evlist=<optimized out>, machine=machine@entry=0x55f997893658)
      at util/synthetic-events.c:1905
  #6  0x000055f996fed4c3 in record__synthesize (tail=tail@entry=true, rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:1997
  #7  0x000055f996fef7c8 in __cmd_record (argc=argc@entry=2, argv=argv@entry=0x7ffc67551260, rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:2802
  #8  0x000055f99700474c in cmd_record (argc=<optimized out>, argv=0x7ffc67551260) at builtin-record.c:4258
  #9  0x000055f9970a223d in run_builtin (p=0x55f997564d88 <commands+264>, argc=10, argv=0x7ffc67551260) at perf.c:330
  #10 0x000055f9970a254b in handle_internal_command (argc=10, argv=0x7ffc67551260) at perf.c:384
  #11 0x000055f996ff1b61 in run_argv (argcp=<synthetic pointer>, argv=<synthetic pointer>) at perf.c:428
  #12 main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=0x7ffc67551260) at perf.c:562

The reason is that record__bytes_written accesses the freed memory rec->thread_data,
The process is as follows:
  __cmd_record
    -> record__free_thread_data
      -> zfree(&rec->thread_data)         // free rec->thread_data
    -> record__synthesize
      -> perf_event__synthesize_id_index
        -> process_synthesized_event
          -> record__write
            -> record__bytes_written      // access rec->thread_data

We add a member variable "thread_bytes_written" in the struct "record"
to save the data size written by the threads.

Fixes: 6d57581 ("perf record: Add support for limit perf output file size")
Signed-off-by: Yang Jihong <yangjihong1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiwei Sun <jiwei.sun@windriver.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAM9d7ci_TRrqBQVQNW8=GwakUr7SsZpYxaaty-S4bxF8zJWyqw@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 15, 2023
…dler

commit 42e19e6 upstream.

Recent test_kprobe_missed kprobes kunit test uncovers the following error
(reported when CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP is enabled):

BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:580
in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 662, name: kunit_try_catch
preempt_count: 0, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
no locks held by kunit_try_catch/662.
irq event stamp: 280
hardirqs last  enabled at (279): [<00000003e60a3d42>] __do_pgm_check+0x17a/0x1c0
hardirqs last disabled at (280): [<00000003e3bd774a>] kprobe_exceptions_notify+0x27a/0x318
softirqs last  enabled at (0): [<00000003e3c5c890>] copy_process+0x14a8/0x4c80
softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
CPU: 46 PID: 662 Comm: kunit_try_catch Tainted: G                 N 6.2.0-173644-g44c18d77f0c0 #2
Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 704 (LPAR)
Call Trace:
 [<00000003e60a3a00>] dump_stack_lvl+0x120/0x198
 [<00000003e3d02e82>] __might_resched+0x60a/0x668
 [<00000003e60b9908>] __mutex_lock+0xc0/0x14e0
 [<00000003e60bad5a>] mutex_lock_nested+0x32/0x40
 [<00000003e3f7b460>] unregister_kprobe+0x30/0xd8
 [<00000003e51b2602>] test_kprobe_missed+0xf2/0x268
 [<00000003e51b5406>] kunit_try_run_case+0x10e/0x290
 [<00000003e51b7dfa>] kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x62/0xb8
 [<00000003e3ce30f8>] kthread+0x2d0/0x398
 [<00000003e3b96afa>] __ret_from_fork+0x8a/0xe8
 [<00000003e60ccada>] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x40

The reason for this error report is that kprobes handling code failed
to restore irqs.

The problem is that when kprobe is triggered from another kprobe
post_handler current sequence of enable_singlestep / disable_singlestep
is the following:
enable_singlestep  <- original kprobe (saves kprobe_saved_imask)
enable_singlestep  <- kprobe triggered from post_handler (clobbers kprobe_saved_imask)
disable_singlestep <- kprobe triggered from post_handler (restores kprobe_saved_imask)
disable_singlestep <- original kprobe (restores wrong clobbered kprobe_saved_imask)

There is just one kprobe_ctlblk per cpu and both calls saves and
loads irq mask to kprobe_saved_imask. To fix the problem simply move
resume_execution (which calls disable_singlestep) before calling
post_handler. This also fixes the problem that post_handler is called
with pt_regs which were not yet adjusted after single-stepping.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 4ba069b ("[S390] add kprobes support.")
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 15, 2023
commit 60eed1e upstream.

code path:

ocfs2_ioctl_move_extents
 ocfs2_move_extents
  ocfs2_defrag_extent
   __ocfs2_move_extent
    + ocfs2_journal_access_di
    + ocfs2_split_extent  //sub-paths call jbd2_journal_restart
    + ocfs2_journal_dirty //crash by jbs2 ASSERT

crash stacks:

PID: 11297  TASK: ffff974a676dcd00  CPU: 67  COMMAND: "defragfs.ocfs2"
 #0 [ffffb25d8dad3900] machine_kexec at ffffffff8386fe01
 #1 [ffffb25d8dad3958] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8395959d
 #2 [ffffb25d8dad3a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff8395a45d
 #3 [ffffb25d8dad3a38] oops_end at ffffffff83836d3f
 #4 [ffffb25d8dad3a58] do_trap at ffffffff83833205
 #5 [ffffb25d8dad3aa0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff83833aa6
 #6 [ffffb25d8dad3ac0] invalid_op at ffffffff84200d18
    [exception RIP: jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata+0x2ba]
    RIP: ffffffffc09ca54a  RSP: ffffb25d8dad3b70  RFLAGS: 00010207
    RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: ffff9706eedc5248  RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 0000000000000001  RSI: ffff97337029ea28  RDI: ffff9706eedc5250
    RBP: ffff9703c3520200   R8: 000000000f46b0b2   R9: 0000000000000000
    R10: 0000000000000001  R11: 00000001000000fe  R12: ffff97337029ea28
    R13: 0000000000000000  R14: ffff9703de59bf60  R15: ffff9706eedc5250
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #7 [ffffb25d8dad3ba8] ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc137fb95 [ocfs2]
 #8 [ffffb25d8dad3be8] __ocfs2_move_extent at ffffffffc139a950 [ocfs2]
 #9 [ffffb25d8dad3c80] ocfs2_defrag_extent at ffffffffc139b2d2 [ocfs2]

Analysis

This bug has the same root cause of 'commit 7f27ec9 ("ocfs2: call
ocfs2_journal_access_di() before ocfs2_journal_dirty() in
ocfs2_write_end_nolock()")'.  For this bug, jbd2_journal_restart() is
called by ocfs2_split_extent() during defragmenting.

How to fix

For ocfs2_split_extent() can handle journal operations totally by itself.
Caller doesn't need to call journal access/dirty pair, and caller only
needs to call journal start/stop pair.  The fix method is to remove
journal access/dirty from __ocfs2_move_extent().

The discussion for this patch:
https://oss.oracle.com/pipermail/ocfs2-devel/2023-February/000647.html

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230217003717.32469-1-heming.zhao@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 15, 2023
[ Upstream commit e9e4229 ]

The TC architecture allows filters and actions to be created independently.
In filters the user can reference action objects using:
tc action add action pedit ... index 1
tc filter add ... action pedit index 1

In the current code for act_pedit this is broken as it checks netlink
attributes for create/update before actually checking if we are binding to an
existing action.

tdc results:
1..69
ok 1 319a - Add pedit action that mangles IP TTL
ok 2 7e67 - Replace pedit action with invalid goto chain
ok 3 377e - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32
ok 4 a0ca - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 (INVALID)
ok 5 dd8a - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16 u16
ok 6 53db - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16 (INVALID)
ok 7 5c7e - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u8 add value
ok 8 2893 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u8 quad
ok 9 3a07 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u8-u16-u8
ok 10 ab0f - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16-u8-u8
ok 11 9d12 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 set u16 clear u8 invert
ok 12 ebfa - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset overflow u32 (INVALID)
ok 13 f512 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16 at offmask shift set
ok 14 c2cb - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 retain value
ok 15 1762 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u8 clear value
ok 16 bcee - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u8 retain value
ok 17 e89f - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16 retain value
ok 18 c282 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 clear value
ok 19 c422 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16 invert value
ok 20 d3d3 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 invert value
ok 21 57e5 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u8 preserve value
ok 22 99e0 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16 preserve value
ok 23 1892 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 preserve value
ok 24 4b60 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP negative offset u16/u32 set value
ok 25 a5a7 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth set src
ok 26 86d4 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth set src & dst
ok 27 f8a9 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth set dst
ok 28 c715 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth set src (INVALID)
ok 29 8131 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth set dst (INVALID)
ok 30 ba22 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth type set/clear sequence
ok 31 dec4 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth set type (INVALID)
ok 32 ab06 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth add type
ok 33 918d - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth invert src
ok 34 a8d4 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth invert dst
ok 35 ee13 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth invert type
ok 36 7588 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set src
ok 37 0fa7 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set dst
ok 38 5810 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set src & dst
ok 39 1092 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set ihl & dsfield
ok 40 02d8 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set ttl & protocol
ok 41 3e2d - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set ttl (INVALID)
ok 42 31ae - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip ttl clear/set
ok 43 486f - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set duplicate fields
ok 44 e790 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set ce, df, mf, firstfrag, nofrag fields
ok 45 cc8a - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set tos
ok 46 7a17 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set precedence
ok 47 c3b6 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip add tos
ok 48 43d3 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip add precedence
ok 49 438e - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip clear tos
ok 50 6b1b - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip clear precedence
ok 51 824a - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip invert tos
ok 52 106f - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip invert precedence
ok 53 6829 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP beyond ip set dport & sport
ok 54 afd8 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP beyond ip set icmp_type & icmp_code
ok 55 3143 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP beyond ip set dport (INVALID)
ok 56 815c - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 set src
ok 57 4dae - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 set dst
ok 58 fc1f - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 set src & dst
ok 59 6d34 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 dst retain value (INVALID)
ok 60 94bb - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 traffic_class
ok 61 6f5e - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 flow_lbl
ok 62 6795 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 set payload_len, nexthdr, hoplimit
ok 63 1442 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP tcp set dport & sport
ok 64 b7ac - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP tcp sport set (INVALID)
ok 65 cfcc - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP tcp flags set
ok 66 3bc4 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP tcp set dport, sport & flags fields
ok 67 f1c8 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP udp set dport & sport
ok 68 d784 - Add pedit action with mixed RAW/LAYERED_OP #1
ok 69 70ca - Add pedit action with mixed RAW/LAYERED_OP #2

Fixes: 71d0ed7 ("net/act_pedit: Support using offset relative to the conventional network headers")
Fixes: f67169f ("net/sched: act_pedit: fix WARN() in the traffic path")
Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 15, 2023
[ Upstream commit 3dca1f8 ]

Don't hold sdw_dev_lock while calling the peripheral driver
probe() and remove() callbacks.

Holding sdw_dev_lock around the probe() and remove() calls causes
a theoretical mutex inversion which lockdep will assert on.

During probe() the sdw_dev_lock mutex is taken first and then
ASoC/ALSA locks are taken by the probe() implementation.

During normal operation ASoC can take its locks and then trigger
a runtime resume of the component. The SoundWire resume will then
take sdw_dev_lock. This is the reverse order compared to probe().

It's not necessary to hold sdw_dev_lock when calling the probe()
and remove(), it is only used to prevent the bus core calling the
driver callbacks if there isn't a driver or the driver is removing.

All calls to the driver callbacks are guarded by the 'probed' flag.
So if sdw_dev_lock is held while setting and clearing the 'probed'
flag this is sufficient to guarantee the safety of callback
functions.

Removing the mutex from around the call to probe() means that it
is now possible for a bus event (PING response) to be handled in
parallel with the probe(). But sdw_bus_probe() already has
handling for this by calling the device update_status() after
the probe() has completed.

Example lockdep assert:
[   46.098514] ======================================================
[   46.104736] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[   46.110961] 6.1.0-rc4-jamerson #1 Tainted: G            E
[   46.116842] ------------------------------------------------------
[   46.123063] mpg123/1130 is trying to acquire lock:
[   46.127883] ffff8b445031fb80 (&slave->sdw_dev_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70
[   46.137225]
               but task is already holding lock:
[   46.143074] ffffffffc1455310 (&card->pcm_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dpcm_fe_dai_open+0x49/0x830
[   46.151536]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.[   46.159732]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[   46.167231]
               -> #4 (&card->pcm_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[   46.173428]        __mutex_lock+0x94/0x920
[   46.177542]        snd_soc_dpcm_runtime_update+0x2e/0x100
[   46.182958]        snd_soc_dapm_put_enum_double+0x1c2/0x200
[   46.188548]        snd_ctl_elem_write+0x10c/0x1d0
[   46.193268]        snd_ctl_ioctl+0x126/0x850
[   46.197556]        __x64_sys_ioctl+0x87/0xc0
[   46.201845]        do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[   46.205959]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[   46.211553]
               -> #3 (&card->controls_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}:
[   46.218188]        down_write+0x2b/0xd0
[   46.222038]        snd_ctl_add_replace+0x39/0xb0
[   46.226672]        snd_soc_add_controls+0x53/0x80
[   46.231393]        soc_probe_component+0x1e4/0x2a0
[   46.236202]        snd_soc_bind_card+0x51a/0xc80
[   46.240836]        devm_snd_soc_register_card+0x43/0x90
[   46.246079]        mc_probe+0x982/0xfe0 [snd_soc_sof_sdw]
[   46.251500]        platform_probe+0x3c/0xa0
[   46.255700]        really_probe+0xde/0x390
[   46.259814]        __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x180
[   46.264710]        driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x90
[   46.269347]        __driver_attach+0x9f/0x1f0
[   46.273721]        bus_for_each_dev+0x78/0xc0
[   46.278098]        bus_add_driver+0x1ac/0x200
[   46.282473]        driver_register+0x8f/0xf0
[   46.286759]        do_one_initcall+0x58/0x310
[   46.291136]        do_init_module+0x4c/0x1f0
[   46.295422]        __do_sys_finit_module+0xb4/0x130
[   46.300321]        do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[   46.304434]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[   46.310027]
               -> #2 (&card->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[   46.315883]        __mutex_lock+0x94/0x920
[   46.320000]        snd_soc_bind_card+0x3e/0xc80
[   46.324551]        devm_snd_soc_register_card+0x43/0x90
[   46.329798]        mc_probe+0x982/0xfe0 [snd_soc_sof_sdw]
[   46.335219]        platform_probe+0x3c/0xa0
[   46.339420]        really_probe+0xde/0x390
[   46.343532]        __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x180
[   46.348430]        driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x90
[   46.353065]        __driver_attach+0x9f/0x1f0
[   46.357437]        bus_for_each_dev+0x78/0xc0
[   46.361812]        bus_add_driver+0x1ac/0x200
[   46.366716]        driver_register+0x8f/0xf0
[   46.371528]        do_one_initcall+0x58/0x310
[   46.376424]        do_init_module+0x4c/0x1f0
[   46.381239]        __do_sys_finit_module+0xb4/0x130
[   46.386665]        do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[   46.391299]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[   46.397416]
               -> #1 (client_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[   46.404307]        __mutex_lock+0x94/0x920
[   46.408941]        snd_soc_add_component+0x24/0x2c0
[   46.414345]        devm_snd_soc_register_component+0x54/0xa0
[   46.420522]        cs35l56_common_probe+0x280/0x370 [snd_soc_cs35l56]
[   46.427487]        cs35l56_sdw_probe+0xf4/0x170 [snd_soc_cs35l56_sdw]
[   46.434442]        sdw_drv_probe+0x80/0x1a0
[   46.439136]        really_probe+0xde/0x390
[   46.443738]        __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x180
[   46.449120]        driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x90
[   46.454247]        __driver_attach+0x9f/0x1f0
[   46.459106]        bus_for_each_dev+0x78/0xc0
[   46.463971]        bus_add_driver+0x1ac/0x200
[   46.468825]        driver_register+0x8f/0xf0
[   46.473592]        do_one_initcall+0x58/0x310
[   46.478441]        do_init_module+0x4c/0x1f0
[   46.483202]        __do_sys_finit_module+0xb4/0x130
[   46.488572]        do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[   46.493158]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[   46.499229]
               -> #0 (&slave->sdw_dev_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[   46.506737]        __lock_acquire+0x1121/0x1df0
[   46.511765]        lock_acquire+0xd5/0x300
[   46.516360]        __mutex_lock+0x94/0x920
[   46.520949]        sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70
[   46.526409]        sdw_clear_slave_status+0xd8/0xe0
[   46.531783]        intel_resume_runtime+0x139/0x2a0
[   46.537155]        __rpm_callback+0x41/0x120
[   46.541919]        rpm_callback+0x5d/0x70
[   46.546422]        rpm_resume+0x531/0x7e0
[   46.550920]        __pm_runtime_resume+0x4a/0x80
[   46.556024]        snd_soc_pcm_component_pm_runtime_get+0x2f/0xc0
[   46.562611]        __soc_pcm_open+0x62/0x520
[   46.567375]        dpcm_be_dai_startup+0x116/0x210
[   46.572661]        dpcm_fe_dai_open+0xf7/0x830
[   46.577597]        snd_pcm_open_substream+0x54a/0x8b0
[   46.583145]        snd_pcm_open.part.0+0xdc/0x200
[   46.588341]        snd_pcm_playback_open+0x51/0x80
[   46.593625]        chrdev_open+0xc0/0x250
[   46.598129]        do_dentry_open+0x15f/0x430
[   46.602981]        path_openat+0x75e/0xa80
[   46.607575]        do_filp_open+0xb2/0x160
[   46.612162]        do_sys_openat2+0x9a/0x160
[   46.616922]        __x64_sys_openat+0x53/0xa0
[   46.621767]        do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[   46.626352]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[   46.632414]
               other info that might help us debug this:[   46.641862] Chain exists of:
                 &slave->sdw_dev_lock --> &card->controls_rwsem --> &card->pcm_mutex[   46.655145]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:[   46.662048]        CPU0                    CPU1
[   46.667080]        ----                    ----
[   46.672108]   lock(&card->pcm_mutex);
[   46.676267]                                lock(&card->controls_rwsem);
[   46.683382]                                lock(&card->pcm_mutex);
[   46.690063]   lock(&slave->sdw_dev_lock);
[   46.694574]
                *** DEADLOCK ***[   46.701942] 2 locks held by mpg123/1130:
[   46.706356]  #0: ffff8b4457b22b90 (&pcm->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: snd_pcm_open.part.0+0xc9/0x200
[   46.715999]  #1: ffffffffc1455310 (&card->pcm_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dpcm_fe_dai_open+0x49/0x830
[   46.725390]
               stack backtrace:
[   46.730752] CPU: 0 PID: 1130 Comm: mpg123 Tainted: G            E      6.1.0-rc4-jamerson #1
[   46.739703] Hardware name: AAEON UP-WHL01/UP-WHL01, BIOS UPW1AM19 11/10/2020
[   46.747270] Call Trace:
[   46.750239]  <TASK>
[   46.752857]  dump_stack_lvl+0x56/0x73
[   46.757045]  check_noncircular+0x102/0x120
[   46.761664]  __lock_acquire+0x1121/0x1df0
[   46.766197]  lock_acquire+0xd5/0x300
[   46.770292]  ? sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70
[   46.775432]  ? lock_is_held_type+0xe2/0x140
[   46.780143]  __mutex_lock+0x94/0x920
[   46.784241]  ? sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70
[   46.789387]  ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
[   46.793750]  ? sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70
[   46.798894]  ? lock_release+0x147/0x2f0
[   46.803262]  ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x47/0x250
[   46.808315]  ? sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70
[   46.813456]  sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70
[   46.818422]  sdw_clear_slave_status+0xd8/0xe0
[   46.823302]  ? pm_generic_runtime_suspend+0x30/0x30
[   46.828706]  intel_resume_runtime+0x139/0x2a0
[   46.833583]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x50
[   46.838462]  ? pm_generic_runtime_suspend+0x30/0x30
[   46.843866]  __rpm_callback+0x41/0x120
[   46.848142]  ? pm_generic_runtime_suspend+0x30/0x30
[   46.853550]  rpm_callback+0x5d/0x70
[   46.857568]  rpm_resume+0x531/0x7e0
[   46.861578]  ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x62/0x70
[   46.866634]  __pm_runtime_resume+0x4a/0x80
[   46.871258]  snd_soc_pcm_component_pm_runtime_get+0x2f/0xc0
[   46.877358]  __soc_pcm_open+0x62/0x520
[   46.881634]  ? dpcm_add_paths.isra.0+0x35d/0x4c0
[   46.886784]  dpcm_be_dai_startup+0x116/0x210
[   46.891592]  dpcm_fe_dai_open+0xf7/0x830
[   46.896046]  ? debug_mutex_init+0x33/0x50
[   46.900591]  snd_pcm_open_substream+0x54a/0x8b0
[   46.905658]  snd_pcm_open.part.0+0xdc/0x200
[   46.910376]  ? wake_up_q+0x90/0x90
[   46.914312]  snd_pcm_playback_open+0x51/0x80
[   46.919118]  chrdev_open+0xc0/0x250
[   46.923147]  ? cdev_device_add+0x90/0x90
[   46.927608]  do_dentry_open+0x15f/0x430
[   46.931976]  path_openat+0x75e/0xa80
[   46.936086]  do_filp_open+0xb2/0x160
[   46.940194]  ? lock_release+0x147/0x2f0
[   46.944563]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x50
[   46.949101]  do_sys_openat2+0x9a/0x160
[   46.953377]  __x64_sys_openat+0x53/0xa0
[   46.957733]  do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[   46.961829]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[   46.967402] RIP: 0033:0x7fa6397ccd3b
[   46.971506] Code: 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 4b 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 67 44 89 e2 48 89 ee bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 91 00 00 00 48 8b 4c 24 28 64 48 33 0c 25
[   46.991413] RSP: 002b:00007fff838e8990 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101
[   46.999580] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000080802 RCX: 00007fa6397ccd3b
[   47.007311] RDX: 0000000000080802 RSI: 00007fff838e8b50 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c
[   47.015047] RBP: 00007fff838e8b50 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000011
[   47.022787] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000080802
[   47.030539] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007fff838e8b50
[   47.038289]  </TASK>

Signed-off-by: Richard Fitzgerald <rf@opensource.cirrus.com>
Reviewed-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230123172520.339367-1-rf@opensource.cirrus.com
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 15, 2023
commit 0e68b55 upstream.

Running a rt-kernel base on 6.2.0-rc3-rt1 on an Ampere Altra outputs
the following:
  BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:46
  in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 9, name: kworker/u320:0
  preempt_count: 2, expected: 0
  RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
  3 locks held by kworker/u320:0/9:
  #0: ffff3fff8c27d128 ((wq_completion)efi_rts_wq){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work (./include/linux/atomic/atomic-long.h:41)
  #1: ffff80000861bdd0 ((work_completion)(&efi_rts_work.work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work (./include/linux/atomic/atomic-long.h:41)
  #2: ffffdf7e1ed3e460 (efi_rt_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: efi_call_rts (drivers/firmware/efi/runtime-wrappers.c:101)
  Preemption disabled at:
  efi_virtmap_load (./arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu_context.h:248)
  CPU: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/u320:0 Tainted: G        W          6.2.0-rc3-rt1
  Hardware name: WIWYNN Mt.Jade Server System B81.03001.0005/Mt.Jade Motherboard, BIOS 1.08.20220218 (SCP: 1.08.20220218) 2022/02/18
  Workqueue: efi_rts_wq efi_call_rts
  Call trace:
  dump_backtrace (arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:158)
  show_stack (arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:165)
  dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:107 (discriminator 4))
  dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:114)
  __might_resched (kernel/sched/core.c:10134)
  rt_spin_lock (kernel/locking/rtmutex.c:1769 (discriminator 4))
  efi_call_rts (drivers/firmware/efi/runtime-wrappers.c:101)
  [...]

This seems to come from commit ff7a167 ("arm64: efi: Execute
runtime services from a dedicated stack") which adds a spinlock. This
spinlock is taken through:
efi_call_rts()
\-efi_call_virt()
  \-efi_call_virt_pointer()
    \-arch_efi_call_virt_setup()

Make 'efi_rt_lock' a raw_spinlock to avoid being preempted.

[ardb: The EFI runtime services are called with a different set of
       translation tables, and are permitted to use the SIMD registers.
       The context switch code preserves/restores neither, and so EFI
       calls must be made with preemption disabled, rather than only
       disabling migration.]

Fixes: ff7a167 ("arm64: efi: Execute runtime services from a dedicated stack")
Signed-off-by: Pierre Gondois <pierre.gondois@arm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.1+
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 21, 2023
[ Upstream commit 6c20822 ]

&xdp_buff and &xdp_frame are bound in a way that

xdp_buff->data_hard_start == xdp_frame

It's always the case and e.g. xdp_convert_buff_to_frame() relies on
this.
IOW, the following:

	for (u32 i = 0; i < 0xdead; i++) {
		xdpf = xdp_convert_buff_to_frame(&xdp);
		xdp_convert_frame_to_buff(xdpf, &xdp);
	}

shouldn't ever modify @xdpf's contents or the pointer itself.
However, "live packet" code wrongly treats &xdp_frame as part of its
context placed *before* the data_hard_start. With such flow,
data_hard_start is sizeof(*xdpf) off to the right and no longer points
to the XDP frame.

Instead of replacing `sizeof(ctx)` with `offsetof(ctx, xdpf)` in several
places and praying that there are no more miscalcs left somewhere in the
code, unionize ::frm with ::data in a flex array, so that both starts
pointing to the actual data_hard_start and the XDP frame actually starts
being a part of it, i.e. a part of the headroom, not the context.
A nice side effect is that the maximum frame size for this mode gets
increased by 40 bytes, as xdp_buff::frame_sz includes everything from
data_hard_start (-> includes xdpf already) to the end of XDP/skb shared
info.
Also update %MAX_PKT_SIZE accordingly in the selftests code. Leave it
hardcoded for 64 bit && 4k pages, it can be made more flexible later on.

Minor: align `&head->data` with how `head->frm` is assigned for
consistency.
Minor #2: rename 'frm' to 'frame' in &xdp_page_head while at it for
clarity.

(was found while testing XDP traffic generator on ice, which calls
 xdp_convert_frame_to_buff() for each XDP frame)

Fixes: b530e9e ("bpf: Add "live packet" mode for XDP in BPF_PROG_RUN")
Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Lobakin <aleksander.lobakin@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230215185440.4126672-1-aleksander.lobakin@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 1, 2023
[ Upstream commit 13085e1 ]

The following LOCKDEP was detected:
		Workqueue: events smc_lgr_free_work [smc]
		WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
		6.1.0-20221027.rc2.git8.56bc5b569087.300.fc36.s390x+debug #1 Not tainted
		------------------------------------------------------
		kworker/3:0/176251 is trying to acquire lock:
		00000000f1467148 ((wq_completion)smc_tx_wq-00000000#2){+.+.}-{0:0},
			at: __flush_workqueue+0x7a/0x4f0
		but task is already holding lock:
		0000037fffe97dc8 ((work_completion)(&(&lgr->free_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0},
			at: process_one_work+0x232/0x730
		which lock already depends on the new lock.
		the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
		-> #4 ((work_completion)(&(&lgr->free_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
		       __lock_acquire+0x58e/0xbd8
		       lock_acquire.part.0+0xe2/0x248
		       lock_acquire+0xac/0x1c8
		       __flush_work+0x76/0xf0
		       __cancel_work_timer+0x170/0x220
		       __smc_lgr_terminate.part.0+0x34/0x1c0 [smc]
		       smc_connect_rdma+0x15e/0x418 [smc]
		       __smc_connect+0x234/0x480 [smc]
		       smc_connect+0x1d6/0x230 [smc]
		       __sys_connect+0x90/0xc0
		       __do_sys_socketcall+0x186/0x370
		       __do_syscall+0x1da/0x208
		       system_call+0x82/0xb0
		-> #3 (smc_client_lgr_pending){+.+.}-{3:3}:
		       __lock_acquire+0x58e/0xbd8
		       lock_acquire.part.0+0xe2/0x248
		       lock_acquire+0xac/0x1c8
		       __mutex_lock+0x96/0x8e8
		       mutex_lock_nested+0x32/0x40
		       smc_connect_rdma+0xa4/0x418 [smc]
		       __smc_connect+0x234/0x480 [smc]
		       smc_connect+0x1d6/0x230 [smc]
		       __sys_connect+0x90/0xc0
		       __do_sys_socketcall+0x186/0x370
		       __do_syscall+0x1da/0x208
		       system_call+0x82/0xb0
		-> #2 (sk_lock-AF_SMC){+.+.}-{0:0}:
		       __lock_acquire+0x58e/0xbd8
		       lock_acquire.part.0+0xe2/0x248
		       lock_acquire+0xac/0x1c8
		       lock_sock_nested+0x46/0xa8
		       smc_tx_work+0x34/0x50 [smc]
		       process_one_work+0x30c/0x730
		       worker_thread+0x62/0x420
		       kthread+0x138/0x150
		       __ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x58
		       ret_from_fork+0xa/0x40
		-> #1 ((work_completion)(&(&smc->conn.tx_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
		       __lock_acquire+0x58e/0xbd8
		       lock_acquire.part.0+0xe2/0x248
		       lock_acquire+0xac/0x1c8
		       process_one_work+0x2bc/0x730
		       worker_thread+0x62/0x420
		       kthread+0x138/0x150
		       __ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x58
		       ret_from_fork+0xa/0x40
		-> #0 ((wq_completion)smc_tx_wq-00000000#2){+.+.}-{0:0}:
		       check_prev_add+0xd8/0xe88
		       validate_chain+0x70c/0xb20
		       __lock_acquire+0x58e/0xbd8
		       lock_acquire.part.0+0xe2/0x248
		       lock_acquire+0xac/0x1c8
		       __flush_workqueue+0xaa/0x4f0
		       drain_workqueue+0xaa/0x158
		       destroy_workqueue+0x44/0x2d8
		       smc_lgr_free+0x9e/0xf8 [smc]
		       process_one_work+0x30c/0x730
		       worker_thread+0x62/0x420
		       kthread+0x138/0x150
		       __ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x58
		       ret_from_fork+0xa/0x40
		other info that might help us debug this:
		Chain exists of:
		  (wq_completion)smc_tx_wq-00000000#2
	  	  --> smc_client_lgr_pending
		  --> (work_completion)(&(&lgr->free_work)->work)
		 Possible unsafe locking scenario:
		       CPU0                    CPU1
		       ----                    ----
		  lock((work_completion)(&(&lgr->free_work)->work));
		                   lock(smc_client_lgr_pending);
		                   lock((work_completion)
					(&(&lgr->free_work)->work));
		  lock((wq_completion)smc_tx_wq-00000000#2);
		 *** DEADLOCK ***
		2 locks held by kworker/3:0/176251:
		 #0: 0000000080183548
			((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0},
				at: process_one_work+0x232/0x730
		 #1: 0000037fffe97dc8
			((work_completion)
			 (&(&lgr->free_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0},
				at: process_one_work+0x232/0x730
		stack backtrace:
		CPU: 3 PID: 176251 Comm: kworker/3:0 Not tainted
		Hardware name: IBM 8561 T01 701 (z/VM 7.2.0)
		Call Trace:
		 [<000000002983c3e4>] dump_stack_lvl+0xac/0x100
		 [<0000000028b477ae>] check_noncircular+0x13e/0x160
		 [<0000000028b48808>] check_prev_add+0xd8/0xe88
		 [<0000000028b49cc4>] validate_chain+0x70c/0xb20
		 [<0000000028b4bd26>] __lock_acquire+0x58e/0xbd8
		 [<0000000028b4cf6a>] lock_acquire.part.0+0xe2/0x248
		 [<0000000028b4d17c>] lock_acquire+0xac/0x1c8
		 [<0000000028addaaa>] __flush_workqueue+0xaa/0x4f0
		 [<0000000028addf9a>] drain_workqueue+0xaa/0x158
		 [<0000000028ae303c>] destroy_workqueue+0x44/0x2d8
		 [<000003ff8029af26>] smc_lgr_free+0x9e/0xf8 [smc]
		 [<0000000028adf3d4>] process_one_work+0x30c/0x730
		 [<0000000028adf85a>] worker_thread+0x62/0x420
		 [<0000000028aeac50>] kthread+0x138/0x150
		 [<0000000028a63914>] __ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x58
		 [<00000000298503da>] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x40
		INFO: lockdep is turned off.
===================================================================

This deadlock occurs because cancel_delayed_work_sync() waits for
the work(&lgr->free_work) to finish, while the &lgr->free_work
waits for the work(lgr->tx_wq), which needs the sk_lock-AF_SMC, that
is already used under the mutex_lock.

The solution is to use cancel_delayed_work() instead, which kills
off a pending work.

Fixes: a52bcc9 ("net/smc: improve termination processing")
Signed-off-by: Wenjia Zhang <wenjia@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Karcher <jaka@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Karsten Graul <kgraul@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lu <tonylu@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 1, 2023
…omic context

commit 38ed310 upstream.

The following issue was discovered using lockdep:
[    6.691371] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at include/linux/sched/mm.h:209
[    6.694602] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 128, non_block: 0, pid: 1, name: swapper/0
[    6.702431] 2 locks held by swapper/0/1:
[    6.706300]  #0: ffffff8800f6f188 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __device_driver_lock+0x4c/0x90
[    6.714900]  #1: ffffffc009a2abb8 (enable_lock){....}-{2:2}, at: clk_enable_lock+0x4c/0x140
[    6.723156] irq event stamp: 304030
[    6.726596] hardirqs last  enabled at (304029): [<ffffffc008d17ee0>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0xc0/0xd0
[    6.736142] hardirqs last disabled at (304030): [<ffffffc00876bc5c>] clk_enable_lock+0xfc/0x140
[    6.744742] softirqs last  enabled at (303958): [<ffffffc0080904f0>] _stext+0x4f0/0x894
[    6.752655] softirqs last disabled at (303951): [<ffffffc0080e53b8>] irq_exit+0x238/0x280
[    6.760744] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G     U            5.15.36 #2
[    6.768048] Hardware name: xlnx,zynqmp (DT)
[    6.772179] Call trace:
[    6.774584]  dump_backtrace+0x0/0x300
[    6.778197]  show_stack+0x18/0x30
[    6.781465]  dump_stack_lvl+0xb8/0xec
[    6.785077]  dump_stack+0x1c/0x38
[    6.788345]  ___might_sleep+0x1a8/0x2a0
[    6.792129]  __might_sleep+0x6c/0xd0
[    6.795655]  kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x270/0x3d0
[    6.800127]  do_feature_check_call+0x100/0x220
[    6.804513]  zynqmp_pm_invoke_fn+0x8c/0xb0
[    6.808555]  zynqmp_pm_clock_getstate+0x90/0xe0
[    6.813027]  zynqmp_pll_is_enabled+0x8c/0x120
[    6.817327]  zynqmp_pll_enable+0x38/0xc0
[    6.821197]  clk_core_enable+0x144/0x400
[    6.825067]  clk_core_enable+0xd4/0x400
[    6.828851]  clk_core_enable+0xd4/0x400
[    6.832635]  clk_core_enable+0xd4/0x400
[    6.836419]  clk_core_enable+0xd4/0x400
[    6.840203]  clk_core_enable+0xd4/0x400
[    6.843987]  clk_core_enable+0xd4/0x400
[    6.847771]  clk_core_enable+0xd4/0x400
[    6.851555]  clk_core_enable_lock+0x24/0x50
[    6.855683]  clk_enable+0x24/0x40
[    6.858952]  fclk_probe+0x84/0xf0
[    6.862220]  platform_probe+0x8c/0x110
[    6.865918]  really_probe+0x110/0x5f0
[    6.869530]  __driver_probe_device+0xcc/0x210
[    6.873830]  driver_probe_device+0x64/0x140
[    6.877958]  __driver_attach+0x114/0x1f0
[    6.881828]  bus_for_each_dev+0xe8/0x160
[    6.885698]  driver_attach+0x34/0x50
[    6.889224]  bus_add_driver+0x228/0x300
[    6.893008]  driver_register+0xc0/0x1e0
[    6.896792]  __platform_driver_register+0x44/0x60
[    6.901436]  fclk_driver_init+0x1c/0x28
[    6.905220]  do_one_initcall+0x104/0x590
[    6.909091]  kernel_init_freeable+0x254/0x2bc
[    6.913390]  kernel_init+0x24/0x130
[    6.916831]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

Fix it by passing the GFP_ATOMIC gfp flag for the corresponding
memory allocation.

Fixes: acfdd18 ("firmware: xilinx: Use hash-table for api feature check")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Amit Sunil Dhamne <amit.sunil.dhamne@xilinx.com>
Cc: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230308222602.123866-1-roman.gushchin@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 1, 2025
If preparing a write bio fails then blk_zone_wplug_bio_work() calls
bio_endio() with zwplug->lock held. If a device mapper driver is stacked
on top of the zoned block device then this results in nested locking of
zwplug->lock. The resulting lockdep complaint is a false positive
because this is nested locking and not recursive locking. Suppress this
false positive by calling blk_zone_wplug_bio_io_error() without holding
zwplug->lock. This is safe because no code in
blk_zone_wplug_bio_io_error() depends on zwplug->lock being held. This
patch suppresses the following lockdep complaint:

WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
--------------------------------------------
kworker/3:0H/46 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffff882968b830 (&zwplug->lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: blk_zone_write_plug_bio_endio+0x64/0x1f0

but task is already holding lock:
ffffff88315bc230 (&zwplug->lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: blk_zone_wplug_bio_work+0x8c/0x48c

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&zwplug->lock);
  lock(&zwplug->lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

 May be due to missing lock nesting notation

3 locks held by kworker/3:0H/46:
 #0: ffffff8809486758 ((wq_completion)sdd_zwplugs){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1bc/0x65c
 #1: ffffffc085de3d70 ((work_completion)(&zwplug->bio_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1e4/0x65c
 #2: ffffff88315bc230 (&zwplug->lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: blk_zone_wplug_bio_work+0x8c/0x48c

stack backtrace:
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 46 Comm: kworker/3:0H Tainted: G        W  OE      6.12.38-android16-5-maybe-dirty-4k #1 8b362b6f76e3645a58cd27d86982bce10d150025
Tainted: [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: Spacecraft board based on MALIBU (DT)
Workqueue: sdd_zwplugs blk_zone_wplug_bio_work
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace+0xfc/0x17c
 show_stack+0x18/0x28
 dump_stack_lvl+0x40/0xa0
 dump_stack+0x18/0x24
 print_deadlock_bug+0x38c/0x398
 __lock_acquire+0x13e8/0x2e1c
 lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4
 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80
 blk_zone_write_plug_bio_endio+0x64/0x1f0
 bio_endio+0x9c/0x240
 __dm_io_complete+0x214/0x260
 clone_endio+0xe8/0x214
 bio_endio+0x218/0x240
 blk_zone_wplug_bio_work+0x204/0x48c
 process_one_work+0x26c/0x65c
 worker_thread+0x33c/0x498
 kthread+0x110/0x134
 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Fixes: dd291d7 ("block: Introduce zone write plugging")
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250825182720.1697203-1-bvanassche@acm.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 1, 2025
…ux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD

KVM/arm64 changes for 6.17, take #2

 - Correctly handle 'invariant' system registers for protected VMs

 - Improved handling of VNCR data aborts, including external aborts

 - Fixes for handling of FEAT_RAS for NV guests, providing a sane
   fault context during SEA injection and preventing the use of
   RASv1p1 fault injection hardware

 - Ensure that page table destruction when a VM is destroyed gives an
   opportunity to reschedule

 - Large fix to KVM's infrastructure for managing guest context loaded
   on the CPU, addressing issues where the output of AT emulation
   doesn't get reflected to the guest

 - Fix AT S12 emulation to actually perform stage-2 translation when
   necessary

 - Avoid attempting vLPI irqbypass when GICv4 has been explicitly
   disabled for a VM

 - Minor KVM + selftest fixes
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 3, 2025
[ Upstream commit 4611d88 ]

The commit under the Fixes tag added a netdev_assert_locked() in
bnxt_free_ntp_fltrs().  The lock should be held during normal run-time
but the assert will be triggered (see below) during bnxt_remove_one()
which should not need the lock.  The netdev is already unregistered by
then.  Fix it by calling netdev_assert_locked_or_invisible() which will
not assert if the netdev is unregistered.

WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 2241 at ./include/net/netdev_lock.h:17 bnxt_free_ntp_fltrs+0xf8/0x100 [bnxt_en]
Modules linked in: rpcrdma rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm configfs ib_core bnxt_en(-) bridge stp llc x86_pkg_temp_thermal xfs tg3 [last unloaded: bnxt_re]
CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 2241 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G S      W           6.16.0 #2 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [W]=WARN
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.4.3 01/17/2017
RIP: 0010:bnxt_free_ntp_fltrs+0xf8/0x100 [bnxt_en]
Code: 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 cc cc cc cc 48 8b 47 60 be ff ff ff ff 48 8d b8 28 0c 00 00 e8 d0 cf 41 c3 85 c0 0f 85 2e ff ff ff <0f> 0b e9 27 ff ff ff 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
RSP: 0018:ffffa92082387da0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9e5b593d8000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff83dc9a70 RDI: ffffffff83e1a1cf
RBP: ffff9e5b593d8c80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff8373a2b3
R10: 000000008100009f R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: ffffffffc01c4478 R14: dead000000000122 R15: dead000000000100
FS:  00007f3a8a52c740(0000) GS:ffff9e631ad1c000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055bb289419c8 CR3: 000000011274e001 CR4: 00000000003706f0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 bnxt_remove_one+0x57/0x180 [bnxt_en]
 pci_device_remove+0x39/0xc0
 device_release_driver_internal+0xa5/0x130
 driver_detach+0x42/0x90
 bus_remove_driver+0x61/0xc0
 pci_unregister_driver+0x38/0x90
 bnxt_exit+0xc/0x7d0 [bnxt_en]

Fixes: 004b500 ("eth: bnxt: remove most dependencies on RTNL")
Reviewed-by: Pavan Chebbi <pavan.chebbi@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Vadim Fedorenko <vadim.fedorenko@linux.dev>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250816183850.4125033-1-michael.chan@broadcom.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 3, 2025
[ Upstream commit eabcac8 ]

Commit 3c7ac40 ("scsi: ufs: core: Delegate the interrupt service
routine to a threaded IRQ handler") introduced an IRQ lock inversion
issue. Fix this lock inversion by changing the spin_lock_irq() calls into
spin_lock_irqsave() calls in code that can be called either from
interrupt context or from thread context. This patch fixes the following
lockdep complaint:

WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected
6.12.30-android16-5-maybe-dirty-4k #1 Tainted: G        W  OE
--------------------------------------------------------
kworker/u28:0/12 just changed the state of lock:
ffffff881e29dd60 (&hba->clk_gating.lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: ufshcd_release_scsi_cmd+0x60/0x110
but this lock took another, HARDIRQ-unsafe lock in the past:
 (shost->host_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}

and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them.

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(shost->host_lock);
                               local_irq_disable();
                               lock(&hba->clk_gating.lock);
                               lock(shost->host_lock);
  <Interrupt>
    lock(&hba->clk_gating.lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

4 locks held by kworker/u28:0/12:
 #0: ffffff8800ac6158 ((wq_completion)async){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1bc/0x65c
 #1: ffffffc085c93d70 ((work_completion)(&entry->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1e4/0x65c
 #2: ffffff881e29c0e0 (&shost->scan_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __scsi_add_device+0x74/0x120
 #3: ffffff881960ea00 (&hwq->cq_lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: ufshcd_mcq_poll_cqe_lock+0x28/0x104

the shortest dependencies between 2nd lock and 1st lock:
 -> (shost->host_lock){+.+.}-{2:2} {
    HARDIRQ-ON-W at:
                      lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4
                      _raw_spin_lock+0x48/0x64
                      ufshcd_sl_intr+0x4c/0xa08
                      ufshcd_threaded_intr+0x70/0x12c
                      irq_thread_fn+0x48/0xa8
                      irq_thread+0x130/0x1ec
                      kthread+0x110/0x134
                      ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
    SOFTIRQ-ON-W at:
                      lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4
                      _raw_spin_lock+0x48/0x64
                      ufshcd_sl_intr+0x4c/0xa08
                      ufshcd_threaded_intr+0x70/0x12c
                      irq_thread_fn+0x48/0xa8
                      irq_thread+0x130/0x1ec
                      kthread+0x110/0x134
                      ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
    INITIAL USE at:
                     lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4
                     _raw_spin_lock+0x48/0x64
                     ufshcd_sl_intr+0x4c/0xa08
                     ufshcd_threaded_intr+0x70/0x12c
                     irq_thread_fn+0x48/0xa8
                     irq_thread+0x130/0x1ec
                     kthread+0x110/0x134
                     ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
  }
  ... key      at: [<ffffffc085ba1a98>] scsi_host_alloc.__key+0x0/0x10
  ... acquired at:
   _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80
   __ufshcd_release+0x78/0x118
   ufshcd_send_uic_cmd+0xe4/0x118
   ufshcd_dme_set_attr+0x88/0x1c8
   ufs_google_phy_initialization+0x68/0x418 [ufs]
   ufs_google_link_startup_notify+0x78/0x27c [ufs]
   ufshcd_link_startup+0x84/0x720
   ufshcd_init+0xf3c/0x1330
   ufshcd_pltfrm_init+0x728/0x7d8
   ufs_google_probe+0x30/0x84 [ufs]
   platform_probe+0xa0/0xe0
   really_probe+0x114/0x454
   __driver_probe_device+0xa4/0x160
   driver_probe_device+0x44/0x23c
   __driver_attach_async_helper+0x60/0xd4
   async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x17c
   process_one_work+0x26c/0x65c
   worker_thread+0x33c/0x498
   kthread+0x110/0x134
   ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

-> (&hba->clk_gating.lock){-...}-{2:2} {
   IN-HARDIRQ-W at:
                    lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4
                    _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80
                    ufshcd_release_scsi_cmd+0x60/0x110
                    ufshcd_compl_one_cqe+0x2c0/0x3f4
                    ufshcd_mcq_poll_cqe_lock+0xb0/0x104
                    ufs_google_mcq_intr+0x80/0xa0 [ufs]
                    __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x104/0x32c
                    handle_irq_event+0x40/0x9c
                    handle_fasteoi_irq+0x170/0x2e8
                    generic_handle_domain_irq+0x58/0x80
                    gic_handle_irq+0x48/0x104
                    call_on_irq_stack+0x3c/0x50
                    do_interrupt_handler+0x7c/0xd8
                    el1_interrupt+0x34/0x58
                    el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24
                    el1h_64_irq+0x68/0x6c
                    _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x6c
                    debug_object_assert_init+0x16c/0x21c
                    __mod_timer+0x4c/0x48c
                    schedule_timeout+0xd4/0x16c
                    io_schedule_timeout+0x48/0x70
                    do_wait_for_common+0x100/0x194
                    wait_for_completion_io_timeout+0x48/0x6c
                    blk_execute_rq+0x124/0x17c
                    scsi_execute_cmd+0x18c/0x3f8
                    scsi_probe_and_add_lun+0x204/0xd74
                    __scsi_add_device+0xbc/0x120
                    ufshcd_async_scan+0x80/0x3c0
                    async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x17c
                    process_one_work+0x26c/0x65c
                    worker_thread+0x33c/0x498
                    kthread+0x110/0x134
                    ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
   INITIAL USE at:
                   lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4
                   _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80
                   ufshcd_hold+0x34/0x14c
                   ufshcd_send_uic_cmd+0x28/0x118
                   ufshcd_dme_set_attr+0x88/0x1c8
                   ufs_google_phy_initialization+0x68/0x418 [ufs]
                   ufs_google_link_startup_notify+0x78/0x27c [ufs]
                   ufshcd_link_startup+0x84/0x720
                   ufshcd_init+0xf3c/0x1330
                   ufshcd_pltfrm_init+0x728/0x7d8
                   ufs_google_probe+0x30/0x84 [ufs]
                   platform_probe+0xa0/0xe0
                   really_probe+0x114/0x454
                   __driver_probe_device+0xa4/0x160
                   driver_probe_device+0x44/0x23c
                   __driver_attach_async_helper+0x60/0xd4
                   async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x17c
                   process_one_work+0x26c/0x65c
                   worker_thread+0x33c/0x498
                   kthread+0x110/0x134
                   ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
 }
 ... key      at: [<ffffffc085ba6fe8>] ufshcd_init.__key+0x0/0x10
 ... acquired at:
   mark_lock+0x1c4/0x224
   __lock_acquire+0x438/0x2e1c
   lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4
   _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80
   ufshcd_release_scsi_cmd+0x60/0x110
   ufshcd_compl_one_cqe+0x2c0/0x3f4
   ufshcd_mcq_poll_cqe_lock+0xb0/0x104
   ufs_google_mcq_intr+0x80/0xa0 [ufs]
   __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x104/0x32c
   handle_irq_event+0x40/0x9c
   handle_fasteoi_irq+0x170/0x2e8
   generic_handle_domain_irq+0x58/0x80
   gic_handle_irq+0x48/0x104
   call_on_irq_stack+0x3c/0x50
   do_interrupt_handler+0x7c/0xd8
   el1_interrupt+0x34/0x58
   el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24
   el1h_64_irq+0x68/0x6c
   _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x6c
   debug_object_assert_init+0x16c/0x21c
   __mod_timer+0x4c/0x48c
   schedule_timeout+0xd4/0x16c
   io_schedule_timeout+0x48/0x70
   do_wait_for_common+0x100/0x194
   wait_for_completion_io_timeout+0x48/0x6c
   blk_execute_rq+0x124/0x17c
   scsi_execute_cmd+0x18c/0x3f8
   scsi_probe_and_add_lun+0x204/0xd74
   __scsi_add_device+0xbc/0x120
   ufshcd_async_scan+0x80/0x3c0
   async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x17c
   process_one_work+0x26c/0x65c
   worker_thread+0x33c/0x498
   kthread+0x110/0x134
   ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

stack backtrace:
CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 12 Comm: kworker/u28:0 Tainted: G        W  OE      6.12.30-android16-5-maybe-dirty-4k #1 ccd4020fe444bdf629efc3b86df6be920b8df7d0
Tainted: [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: Spacecraft board based on MALIBU (DT)
Workqueue: async async_run_entry_fn
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace+0xfc/0x17c
 show_stack+0x18/0x28
 dump_stack_lvl+0x40/0xa0
 dump_stack+0x18/0x24
 print_irq_inversion_bug+0x2fc/0x304
 mark_lock_irq+0x388/0x4fc
 mark_lock+0x1c4/0x224
 __lock_acquire+0x438/0x2e1c
 lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4
 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80
 ufshcd_release_scsi_cmd+0x60/0x110
 ufshcd_compl_one_cqe+0x2c0/0x3f4
 ufshcd_mcq_poll_cqe_lock+0xb0/0x104
 ufs_google_mcq_intr+0x80/0xa0 [ufs dd6f385554e109da094ab91d5f7be18625a2222a]
 __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x104/0x32c
 handle_irq_event+0x40/0x9c
 handle_fasteoi_irq+0x170/0x2e8
 generic_handle_domain_irq+0x58/0x80
 gic_handle_irq+0x48/0x104
 call_on_irq_stack+0x3c/0x50
 do_interrupt_handler+0x7c/0xd8
 el1_interrupt+0x34/0x58
 el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24
 el1h_64_irq+0x68/0x6c
 _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x6c
 debug_object_assert_init+0x16c/0x21c
 __mod_timer+0x4c/0x48c
 schedule_timeout+0xd4/0x16c
 io_schedule_timeout+0x48/0x70
 do_wait_for_common+0x100/0x194
 wait_for_completion_io_timeout+0x48/0x6c
 blk_execute_rq+0x124/0x17c
 scsi_execute_cmd+0x18c/0x3f8
 scsi_probe_and_add_lun+0x204/0xd74
 __scsi_add_device+0xbc/0x120
 ufshcd_async_scan+0x80/0x3c0
 async_run_entry_fn+0x4c/0x17c
 process_one_work+0x26c/0x65c
 worker_thread+0x33c/0x498
 kthread+0x110/0x134
 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

Cc: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong@linaro.org>
Cc: André Draszik <andre.draszik@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Wang <peter.wang@mediatek.com>
Fixes: 3c7ac40 ("scsi: ufs: core: Delegate the interrupt service routine to a threaded IRQ handler")
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250815155842.472867-2-bvanassche@acm.org
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 9, 2025
[ Upstream commit 9776651 ]

With CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_TIMERS unloading hfcpci module leads
to the following splat:

[  250.215892] ODEBUG: assert_init not available (active state 0) object: ffffffffc01a3dc0 object type: timer_list hint: 0x0
[  250.217520] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 233 at lib/debugobjects.c:612 debug_print_object+0x1b6/0x2c0
[  250.218775] Modules linked in: hfcpci(-) mISDN_core
[  250.219537] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 233 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 6.17.0-rc2-g6f713187ac98 #2 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[  250.220940] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[  250.222377] RIP: 0010:debug_print_object+0x1b6/0x2c0
[  250.223131] Code: fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 75 4f 41 56 48 8b 14 dd a0 4e 01 9f 48 89 ee 48 c7 c7 20 46 01 9f e8 cb 84d
[  250.225805] RSP: 0018:ffff888015ea7c08 EFLAGS: 00010286
[  250.226608] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: ffffffff9be93a95
[  250.227708] RDX: 1ffff1100d945138 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88806ca289c0
[  250.228993] RBP: ffffffff9f014a00 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1002bd4f39
[  250.230043] R10: ffff888015ea79cf R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001
[  250.231185] R13: ffffffff9eea0520 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888015ea7cc8
[  250.232454] FS:  00007f3208f01540(0000) GS:ffff8880caf5a000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  250.233851] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  250.234856] CR2: 00007f32090a7421 CR3: 0000000004d63000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[  250.236117] Call Trace:
[  250.236599]  <TASK>
[  250.236967]  ? trace_irq_enable.constprop.0+0xd4/0x130
[  250.237920]  debug_object_assert_init+0x1f6/0x310
[  250.238762]  ? __pfx_debug_object_assert_init+0x10/0x10
[  250.239658]  ? __lock_acquire+0xdea/0x1c70
[  250.240369]  __try_to_del_timer_sync+0x69/0x140
[  250.241172]  ? __pfx___try_to_del_timer_sync+0x10/0x10
[  250.242058]  ? __timer_delete_sync+0xc6/0x120
[  250.242842]  ? lock_acquire+0x30/0x80
[  250.243474]  ? __timer_delete_sync+0xc6/0x120
[  250.244262]  __timer_delete_sync+0x98/0x120
[  250.245015]  HFC_cleanup+0x10/0x20 [hfcpci]
[  250.245704]  __do_sys_delete_module+0x348/0x510
[  250.246461]  ? __pfx___do_sys_delete_module+0x10/0x10
[  250.247338]  do_syscall_64+0xc1/0x360
[  250.247924]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Fix this by initializing hfc_tl timer with DEFINE_TIMER macro.
Also, use mod_timer instead of manual timeout update.

Fixes: 87c5fa1 ("mISDN: Add different different timer settings for hfc-pci")
Fixes: 175302f ("mISDN: hfcpci: Fix use-after-free bug in hfcpci_softirq")
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Riabchun <ferr.lambarginio@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/aKiy2D_LiWpQ5kXq@vova-pc
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 9, 2025
commit 198f36f upstream.

If preparing a write bio fails then blk_zone_wplug_bio_work() calls
bio_endio() with zwplug->lock held. If a device mapper driver is stacked
on top of the zoned block device then this results in nested locking of
zwplug->lock. The resulting lockdep complaint is a false positive
because this is nested locking and not recursive locking. Suppress this
false positive by calling blk_zone_wplug_bio_io_error() without holding
zwplug->lock. This is safe because no code in
blk_zone_wplug_bio_io_error() depends on zwplug->lock being held. This
patch suppresses the following lockdep complaint:

WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
--------------------------------------------
kworker/3:0H/46 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffff882968b830 (&zwplug->lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: blk_zone_write_plug_bio_endio+0x64/0x1f0

but task is already holding lock:
ffffff88315bc230 (&zwplug->lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: blk_zone_wplug_bio_work+0x8c/0x48c

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&zwplug->lock);
  lock(&zwplug->lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

 May be due to missing lock nesting notation

3 locks held by kworker/3:0H/46:
 #0: ffffff8809486758 ((wq_completion)sdd_zwplugs){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1bc/0x65c
 #1: ffffffc085de3d70 ((work_completion)(&zwplug->bio_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1e4/0x65c
 #2: ffffff88315bc230 (&zwplug->lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: blk_zone_wplug_bio_work+0x8c/0x48c

stack backtrace:
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 46 Comm: kworker/3:0H Tainted: G        W  OE      6.12.38-android16-5-maybe-dirty-4k #1 8b362b6f76e3645a58cd27d86982bce10d150025
Tainted: [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: Spacecraft board based on MALIBU (DT)
Workqueue: sdd_zwplugs blk_zone_wplug_bio_work
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace+0xfc/0x17c
 show_stack+0x18/0x28
 dump_stack_lvl+0x40/0xa0
 dump_stack+0x18/0x24
 print_deadlock_bug+0x38c/0x398
 __lock_acquire+0x13e8/0x2e1c
 lock_acquire+0x134/0x2b4
 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80
 blk_zone_write_plug_bio_endio+0x64/0x1f0
 bio_endio+0x9c/0x240
 __dm_io_complete+0x214/0x260
 clone_endio+0xe8/0x214
 bio_endio+0x218/0x240
 blk_zone_wplug_bio_work+0x204/0x48c
 process_one_work+0x26c/0x65c
 worker_thread+0x33c/0x498
 kthread+0x110/0x134
 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Fixes: dd291d7 ("block: Introduce zone write plugging")
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250825182720.1697203-1-bvanassche@acm.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 11, 2025
When the "proxy" option is enabled on a VXLAN device, the device will
suppress ARP requests and IPv6 Neighbor Solicitation messages if it is
able to reply on behalf of the remote host. That is, if a matching and
valid neighbor entry is configured on the VXLAN device whose MAC address
is not behind the "any" remote (0.0.0.0 / ::).

The code currently assumes that the FDB entry for the neighbor's MAC
address points to a valid remote destination, but this is incorrect if
the entry is associated with an FDB nexthop group. This can result in a
NPD [1][3] which can be reproduced using [2][4].

Fix by checking that the remote destination exists before dereferencing
it.

[1]
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[...]
CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 365 Comm: arping Not tainted 6.17.0-rc2-virtme-g2a89cb21162c #2 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-4.fc41 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:vxlan_xmit+0xb58/0x15f0
[...]
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x5d/0x1c0
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x246/0xfd0
 packet_sendmsg+0x113a/0x1850
 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x70
 __sys_sendto+0x126/0x180
 __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30
 do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

[2]
 #!/bin/bash

 ip address add 192.0.2.1/32 dev lo

 ip nexthop add id 1 via 192.0.2.2 fdb
 ip nexthop add id 10 group 1 fdb

 ip link add name vx0 up type vxlan id 10010 local 192.0.2.1 dstport 4789 proxy

 ip neigh add 192.0.2.3 lladdr 00:11:22:33:44:55 nud perm dev vx0

 bridge fdb add 00:11:22:33:44:55 dev vx0 self static nhid 10

 arping -b -c 1 -s 192.0.2.1 -I vx0 192.0.2.3

[3]
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[...]
CPU: 13 UID: 0 PID: 372 Comm: ndisc6 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc2-virtmne-g6ee90cb26014 #3 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1v996), BIOS 1.17.0-4.fc41 04/01/2x014
RIP: 0010:vxlan_xmit+0x803/0x1600
[...]
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x5d/0x1c0
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x246/0xfd0
 ip6_finish_output2+0x210/0x6c0
 ip6_finish_output+0x1af/0x2b0
 ip6_mr_output+0x92/0x3e0
 ip6_send_skb+0x30/0x90
 rawv6_sendmsg+0xe6e/0x12e0
 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x70
 __sys_sendto+0x126/0x180
 __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30
 do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x7f383422ec77

[4]
 #!/bin/bash

 ip address add 2001:db8:1::1/128 dev lo

 ip nexthop add id 1 via 2001:db8:1::1 fdb
 ip nexthop add id 10 group 1 fdb

 ip link add name vx0 up type vxlan id 10010 local 2001:db8:1::1 dstport 4789 proxy

 ip neigh add 2001:db8:1::3 lladdr 00:11:22:33:44:55 nud perm dev vx0

 bridge fdb add 00:11:22:33:44:55 dev vx0 self static nhid 10

 ndisc6 -r 1 -s 2001:db8:1::1 -w 1 2001:db8:1::3 vx0

Fixes: 1274e1c ("vxlan: ecmp support for mac fdb entries")
Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250901065035.159644-3-idosch@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 11, 2025
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
vxlan: Fix NPDs when using nexthop objects

With FDB nexthop groups, VXLAN FDB entries do not necessarily point to
a remote destination but rather to an FDB nexthop group. This means that
first_remote_{rcu,rtnl}() can return NULL and a few places in the driver
were not ready for that, resulting in NULL pointer dereferences.
Patches #1-#2 fix these NPDs.

Note that vxlan_fdb_find_uc() still dereferences the remote returned by
first_remote_rcu() without checking that it is not NULL, but this
function is only invoked by a single driver which vetoes the creation of
FDB nexthop groups. I will patch this in net-next to make the code less
fragile.

Patch #3 adds a selftests which exercises these code paths and tests
basic Tx functionality with FDB nexthop groups. I verified that the test
crashes the kernel without the first two patches.
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250901065035.159644-1-idosch@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 11, 2025
When transmitting a PTP frame which is timestamp using 2 step, the
following warning appears if CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING is enabled:
=============================
[ BUG: Invalid wait context ]
6.17.0-rc1-00326-ge6160462704e torvalds#427 Not tainted
-----------------------------
ptp4l/119 is trying to lock:
c2a44ed4 (&vsc8531->ts_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: vsc85xx_txtstamp+0x50/0xac
other info that might help us debug this:
context-{4:4}
4 locks held by ptp4l/119:
 #0: c145f068 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x58/0x1440
 #1: c29df974 (dev->qdisc_tx_busylock ?: &qdisc_tx_busylock){+...}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x5c4/0x1440
 #2: c2aaaad0 (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sch_direct_xmit+0x108/0x350
 #3: c2aac170 (&lan966x->tx_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: lan966x_port_xmit+0xd0/0x350
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 119 Comm: ptp4l Not tainted 6.17.0-rc1-00326-ge6160462704e torvalds#427 NONE
Hardware name: Generic DT based system
Call trace:
 unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x10/0x14
 show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x7c/0xac
 dump_stack_lvl from __lock_acquire+0x8e8/0x29dc
 __lock_acquire from lock_acquire+0x108/0x38c
 lock_acquire from __mutex_lock+0xb0/0xe78
 __mutex_lock from mutex_lock_nested+0x1c/0x24
 mutex_lock_nested from vsc85xx_txtstamp+0x50/0xac
 vsc85xx_txtstamp from lan966x_fdma_xmit+0xd8/0x3a8
 lan966x_fdma_xmit from lan966x_port_xmit+0x1bc/0x350
 lan966x_port_xmit from dev_hard_start_xmit+0xc8/0x2c0
 dev_hard_start_xmit from sch_direct_xmit+0x8c/0x350
 sch_direct_xmit from __dev_queue_xmit+0x680/0x1440
 __dev_queue_xmit from packet_sendmsg+0xfa4/0x1568
 packet_sendmsg from __sys_sendto+0x110/0x19c
 __sys_sendto from sys_send+0x18/0x20
 sys_send from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c
Exception stack(0xf0b05fa8 to 0xf0b05ff0)
5fa0:                   00000001 0000000 0000000 0004b47a 0000003a 00000000
5fc0: 00000001 0000000 00000000 00000121 0004af58 00044874 00000000 00000000
5fe0: 00000001 bee9d420 00025a10 b6e75c7c

So, instead of using the ts_lock for tx_queue, use the spinlock that
skb_buff_head has.

Reviewed-by: Vadim Fedorenko <vadim.fedorenko@linux.dev>
Fixes: 7d272e6 ("net: phy: mscc: timestamping and PHC support")
Signed-off-by: Horatiu Vultur <horatiu.vultur@microchip.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250902121259.3257536-1-horatiu.vultur@microchip.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 12, 2025
[ Upstream commit 1f5d2fd ]

When the "proxy" option is enabled on a VXLAN device, the device will
suppress ARP requests and IPv6 Neighbor Solicitation messages if it is
able to reply on behalf of the remote host. That is, if a matching and
valid neighbor entry is configured on the VXLAN device whose MAC address
is not behind the "any" remote (0.0.0.0 / ::).

The code currently assumes that the FDB entry for the neighbor's MAC
address points to a valid remote destination, but this is incorrect if
the entry is associated with an FDB nexthop group. This can result in a
NPD [1][3] which can be reproduced using [2][4].

Fix by checking that the remote destination exists before dereferencing
it.

[1]
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[...]
CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 365 Comm: arping Not tainted 6.17.0-rc2-virtme-g2a89cb21162c #2 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-4.fc41 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:vxlan_xmit+0xb58/0x15f0
[...]
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x5d/0x1c0
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x246/0xfd0
 packet_sendmsg+0x113a/0x1850
 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x70
 __sys_sendto+0x126/0x180
 __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30
 do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

[2]
 #!/bin/bash

 ip address add 192.0.2.1/32 dev lo

 ip nexthop add id 1 via 192.0.2.2 fdb
 ip nexthop add id 10 group 1 fdb

 ip link add name vx0 up type vxlan id 10010 local 192.0.2.1 dstport 4789 proxy

 ip neigh add 192.0.2.3 lladdr 00:11:22:33:44:55 nud perm dev vx0

 bridge fdb add 00:11:22:33:44:55 dev vx0 self static nhid 10

 arping -b -c 1 -s 192.0.2.1 -I vx0 192.0.2.3

[3]
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[...]
CPU: 13 UID: 0 PID: 372 Comm: ndisc6 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc2-virtmne-g6ee90cb26014 #3 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1v996), BIOS 1.17.0-4.fc41 04/01/2x014
RIP: 0010:vxlan_xmit+0x803/0x1600
[...]
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x5d/0x1c0
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x246/0xfd0
 ip6_finish_output2+0x210/0x6c0
 ip6_finish_output+0x1af/0x2b0
 ip6_mr_output+0x92/0x3e0
 ip6_send_skb+0x30/0x90
 rawv6_sendmsg+0xe6e/0x12e0
 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x70
 __sys_sendto+0x126/0x180
 __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30
 do_syscall_64+0xa4/0x260
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x7f383422ec77

[4]
 #!/bin/bash

 ip address add 2001:db8:1::1/128 dev lo

 ip nexthop add id 1 via 2001:db8:1::1 fdb
 ip nexthop add id 10 group 1 fdb

 ip link add name vx0 up type vxlan id 10010 local 2001:db8:1::1 dstport 4789 proxy

 ip neigh add 2001:db8:1::3 lladdr 00:11:22:33:44:55 nud perm dev vx0

 bridge fdb add 00:11:22:33:44:55 dev vx0 self static nhid 10

 ndisc6 -r 1 -s 2001:db8:1::1 -w 1 2001:db8:1::3 vx0

Fixes: 1274e1c ("vxlan: ecmp support for mac fdb entries")
Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250901065035.159644-3-idosch@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 12, 2025
[ Upstream commit 9b2bfdb ]

When transmitting a PTP frame which is timestamp using 2 step, the
following warning appears if CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING is enabled:
=============================
[ BUG: Invalid wait context ]
6.17.0-rc1-00326-ge6160462704e torvalds#427 Not tainted
-----------------------------
ptp4l/119 is trying to lock:
c2a44ed4 (&vsc8531->ts_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: vsc85xx_txtstamp+0x50/0xac
other info that might help us debug this:
context-{4:4}
4 locks held by ptp4l/119:
 #0: c145f068 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x58/0x1440
 #1: c29df974 (dev->qdisc_tx_busylock ?: &qdisc_tx_busylock){+...}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x5c4/0x1440
 #2: c2aaaad0 (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sch_direct_xmit+0x108/0x350
 #3: c2aac170 (&lan966x->tx_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: lan966x_port_xmit+0xd0/0x350
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 119 Comm: ptp4l Not tainted 6.17.0-rc1-00326-ge6160462704e torvalds#427 NONE
Hardware name: Generic DT based system
Call trace:
 unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x10/0x14
 show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x7c/0xac
 dump_stack_lvl from __lock_acquire+0x8e8/0x29dc
 __lock_acquire from lock_acquire+0x108/0x38c
 lock_acquire from __mutex_lock+0xb0/0xe78
 __mutex_lock from mutex_lock_nested+0x1c/0x24
 mutex_lock_nested from vsc85xx_txtstamp+0x50/0xac
 vsc85xx_txtstamp from lan966x_fdma_xmit+0xd8/0x3a8
 lan966x_fdma_xmit from lan966x_port_xmit+0x1bc/0x350
 lan966x_port_xmit from dev_hard_start_xmit+0xc8/0x2c0
 dev_hard_start_xmit from sch_direct_xmit+0x8c/0x350
 sch_direct_xmit from __dev_queue_xmit+0x680/0x1440
 __dev_queue_xmit from packet_sendmsg+0xfa4/0x1568
 packet_sendmsg from __sys_sendto+0x110/0x19c
 __sys_sendto from sys_send+0x18/0x20
 sys_send from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c
Exception stack(0xf0b05fa8 to 0xf0b05ff0)
5fa0:                   00000001 0000000 0000000 0004b47a 0000003a 00000000
5fc0: 00000001 0000000 00000000 00000121 0004af58 00044874 00000000 00000000
5fe0: 00000001 bee9d420 00025a10 b6e75c7c

So, instead of using the ts_lock for tx_queue, use the spinlock that
skb_buff_head has.

Reviewed-by: Vadim Fedorenko <vadim.fedorenko@linux.dev>
Fixes: 7d272e6 ("net: phy: mscc: timestamping and PHC support")
Signed-off-by: Horatiu Vultur <horatiu.vultur@microchip.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250902121259.3257536-1-horatiu.vultur@microchip.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 16, 2025
The commit ced17ee ("Revert "virtio: reject shm region if length is zero"")
exposes the following DAX page fault bug (this fix the failure that getting shm
region alway returns false because of zero length):

The commit 21aa65b ("mm: remove callers of pfn_t functionality") handles
the DAX physical page address incorrectly: the removed macro 'phys_to_pfn_t()'
should be replaced with 'PHYS_PFN()'.

[    1.390321] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffd3fb40000008
[    1.390875] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[    1.391257] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[    1.391509] PGD 0 P4D 0
[    1.391626] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[    1.391806] CPU: 6 UID: 1000 PID: 162 Comm: weston Not tainted 6.17.0-rc3-WSL2-STABLE #2 PREEMPT(none)
[    1.392361] RIP: 0010:dax_to_folio+0x14/0x60
[    1.392653] Code: 52 c9 c3 00 66 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 c1 ef 05 48 c1 e7 06 48 03 3d 34 b5 31 01 <48> 8b 57 08 48 89 f8 f6 c2 01 75 2b 66 90 c3 cc cc cc cc f7 c7 ff
[    1.393727] RSP: 0000:ffffaf7d04407aa8 EFLAGS: 00010086
[    1.394003] RAX: 000000a000000000 RBX: ffffaf7d04407bb0 RCX: 0000000000000000
[    1.394524] RDX: ffffd17b40000008 RSI: 0000000000000083 RDI: ffffd3fb40000000
[    1.394967] RBP: 0000000000000011 R08: 000000a000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[    1.395400] R10: 0000000000001000 R11: ffffaf7d04407c10 R12: 0000000000000000
[    1.395806] R13: ffffa020557be9c0 R14: 0000014000000001 R15: 0000725970e94000
[    1.396268] FS:  000072596d6d2ec0(0000) GS:ffffa0222dc59000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[    1.396715] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[    1.397100] CR2: ffffd3fb40000008 CR3: 000000011579c005 CR4: 0000000000372ef0
[    1.397518] Call Trace:
[    1.397663]  <TASK>
[    1.397900]  dax_insert_entry+0x13b/0x390
[    1.398179]  dax_fault_iter+0x2a5/0x6c0
[    1.398443]  dax_iomap_pte_fault+0x193/0x3c0
[    1.398750]  __fuse_dax_fault+0x8b/0x270
[    1.398997]  ? vm_mmap_pgoff+0x161/0x210
[    1.399175]  __do_fault+0x30/0x180
[    1.399360]  do_fault+0xc4/0x550
[    1.399547]  __handle_mm_fault+0x8e3/0xf50
[    1.399731]  ? do_syscall_64+0x72/0x1e0
[    1.399958]  handle_mm_fault+0x192/0x2f0
[    1.400204]  do_user_addr_fault+0x20e/0x700
[    1.400418]  exc_page_fault+0x66/0x150
[    1.400602]  asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
[    1.400831] RIP: 0033:0x72596d1bf703
[    1.401076] Code: 31 f6 45 31 e4 48 8d 15 b3 73 00 00 e8 06 03 00 00 8b 83 68 01 00 00 e9 8e fa ff ff 0f 1f 00 48 8b 44 24 08 4c 89 ee 48 89 df <c7> 00 21 43 34 12 e8 72 09 00 00 e9 6a fa ff ff 0f 1f 44 00 00 e8
[    1.402172] RSP: 002b:00007ffc350f6dc0 EFLAGS: 00010202
[    1.402488] RAX: 0000725970e94000 RBX: 00005b7c642c2560 RCX: 0000725970d359a7
[    1.402898] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 00007ffc350f6dc0 RDI: 00005b7c642c2560
[    1.403284] RBP: 00007ffc350f6e90 R08: 000000000000000d R09: 0000000000000000
[    1.403634] R10: 00007ffc350f6dd8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
[    1.404078] R13: 00007ffc350f6dc0 R14: 0000725970e29ce0 R15: 0000000000000003
[    1.404450]  </TASK>
[    1.404570] Modules linked in:
[    1.404821] CR2: ffffd3fb40000008
[    1.405029] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[    1.405323] RIP: 0010:dax_to_folio+0x14/0x60
[    1.405556] Code: 52 c9 c3 00 66 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 c1 ef 05 48 c1 e7 06 48 03 3d 34 b5 31 01 <48> 8b 57 08 48 89 f8 f6 c2 01 75 2b 66 90 c3 cc cc cc cc f7 c7 ff
[    1.406639] RSP: 0000:ffffaf7d04407aa8 EFLAGS: 00010086
[    1.406910] RAX: 000000a000000000 RBX: ffffaf7d04407bb0 RCX: 0000000000000000
[    1.407379] RDX: ffffd17b40000008 RSI: 0000000000000083 RDI: ffffd3fb40000000
[    1.407800] RBP: 0000000000000011 R08: 000000a000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[    1.408246] R10: 0000000000001000 R11: ffffaf7d04407c10 R12: 0000000000000000
[    1.408666] R13: ffffa020557be9c0 R14: 0000014000000001 R15: 0000725970e94000
[    1.409170] FS:  000072596d6d2ec0(0000) GS:ffffa0222dc59000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[    1.409608] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[    1.409977] CR2: ffffd3fb40000008 CR3: 000000011579c005 CR4: 0000000000372ef0
[    1.410437] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[    1.410857] Kernel Offset: 0xc000000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff)

Fixes: 21aa65b ("mm: remove callers of pfn_t functionality")
Signed-off-by: Haiyue Wang <haiyuewa@163.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250904120339.972-1-haiyuewa@163.com
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 16, 2025
Problem description
===================

Lockdep reports a possible circular locking dependency (AB/BA) between
&pl->state_mutex and &phy->lock, as follows.

phylink_resolve() // acquires &pl->state_mutex
-> phylink_major_config()
   -> phy_config_inband() // acquires &pl->phydev->lock

whereas all the other call sites where &pl->state_mutex and
&pl->phydev->lock have the locking scheme reversed. Everywhere else,
&pl->phydev->lock is acquired at the top level, and &pl->state_mutex at
the lower level. A clear example is phylink_bringup_phy().

The outlier is the newly introduced phy_config_inband() and the existing
lock order is the correct one. To understand why it cannot be the other
way around, it is sufficient to consider phylink_phy_change(), phylink's
callback from the PHY device's phy->phy_link_change() virtual method,
invoked by the PHY state machine.

phy_link_up() and phy_link_down(), the (indirect) callers of
phylink_phy_change(), are called with &phydev->lock acquired.
Then phylink_phy_change() acquires its own &pl->state_mutex, to
serialize changes made to its pl->phy_state and pl->link_config.
So all other instances of &pl->state_mutex and &phydev->lock must be
consistent with this order.

Problem impact
==============

I think the kernel runs a serious deadlock risk if an existing
phylink_resolve() thread, which results in a phy_config_inband() call,
is concurrent with a phy_link_up() or phy_link_down() call, which will
deadlock on &pl->state_mutex in phylink_phy_change(). Practically
speaking, the impact may be limited by the slow speed of the medium
auto-negotiation protocol, which makes it unlikely for the current state
to still be unresolved when a new one is detected, but I think the
problem is there. Nonetheless, the problem was discovered using lockdep.

Proposed solution
=================

Practically speaking, the phy_config_inband() requirement of having
phydev->lock acquired must transfer to the caller (phylink is the only
caller). There, it must bubble up until immediately before
&pl->state_mutex is acquired, for the cases where that takes place.

Solution details, considerations, notes
=======================================

This is the phy_config_inband() call graph:

                          sfp_upstream_ops :: connect_phy()
                          |
                          v
                          phylink_sfp_connect_phy()
                          |
                          v
                          phylink_sfp_config_phy()
                          |
                          |   sfp_upstream_ops :: module_insert()
                          |   |
                          |   v
                          |   phylink_sfp_module_insert()
                          |   |
                          |   |   sfp_upstream_ops :: module_start()
                          |   |   |
                          |   |   v
                          |   |   phylink_sfp_module_start()
                          |   |   |
                          |   v   v
                          |   phylink_sfp_config_optical()
 phylink_start()          |   |
   |   phylink_resume()   v   v
   |   |  phylink_sfp_set_config()
   |   |  |
   v   v  v
 phylink_mac_initial_config()
   |   phylink_resolve()
   |   |  phylink_ethtool_ksettings_set()
   v   v  v
   phylink_major_config()
            |
            v
    phy_config_inband()

phylink_major_config() caller #1, phylink_mac_initial_config(), does not
acquire &pl->state_mutex nor do its callers. It must acquire
&pl->phydev->lock prior to calling phylink_major_config().

phylink_major_config() caller #2, phylink_resolve() acquires
&pl->state_mutex, thus also needs to acquire &pl->phydev->lock.

phylink_major_config() caller #3, phylink_ethtool_ksettings_set(), is
completely uninteresting, because it only calls phylink_major_config()
if pl->phydev is NULL (otherwise it calls phy_ethtool_ksettings_set()).
We need to change nothing there.

Other solutions
===============

The lock inversion between &pl->state_mutex and &pl->phydev->lock has
occurred at least once before, as seen in commit c718af2 ("net:
phylink: fix ethtool -A with attached PHYs"). The solution there was to
simply not call phy_set_asym_pause() under the &pl->state_mutex. That
cannot be extended to our case though, where the phy_config_inband()
call is much deeper inside the &pl->state_mutex section.

Fixes: 5fd0f1a ("net: phylink: add negotiation of in-band capabilities")
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250904125238.193990-2-vladimir.oltean@nxp.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 16, 2025
5da3d94 ("PCI: mvebu: Use for_each_of_range() iterator for parsing
"ranges"") simplified code by using the for_each_of_range() iterator, but
it broke PCI enumeration on Turris Omnia (and probably other mvebu
targets).

Issue #1:

To determine range.flags, of_pci_range_parser_one() uses bus->get_flags(),
which resolves to of_bus_pci_get_flags(), which already returns an
IORESOURCE bit field, and NOT the original flags from the "ranges"
resource.

Then mvebu_get_tgt_attr() attempts the very same conversion again.  Remove
the misinterpretation of range.flags in mvebu_get_tgt_attr(), to restore
the intended behavior.

Issue #2:

The driver needs target and attributes, which are encoded in the raw
address values of the "/soc/pcie/ranges" resource. According to
of_pci_range_parser_one(), the raw values are stored in range.bus_addr and
range.parent_bus_addr, respectively. range.cpu_addr is a translated version
of range.parent_bus_addr, and not relevant here.

Use the correct range structure member, to extract target and attributes.
This restores the intended behavior.

Fixes: 5da3d94 ("PCI: mvebu: Use for_each_of_range() iterator for parsing "ranges"")
Reported-by: Jan Palus <jpalus@fastmail.com>
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=220479
Signed-off-by: Klaus Kudielka <klaus.kudielka@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Tested-by: Tony Dinh <mibodhi@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Jan Palus <jpalus@fastmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250907102303.29735-1-klaus.kudielka@gmail.com
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 22, 2025
…ostcopy

When you run a KVM guest with vhost-net and migrate that guest to
another host, and you immediately enable postcopy after starting the
migration, there is a big chance that the network connection of the
guest won't work anymore on the destination side after the migration.

With a debug kernel v6.16.0, there is also a call trace that looks
like this:

 FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY missing 881
 CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 549 Comm: kworker/6:2 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.16.0 torvalds#56 NONE
 Hardware name: IBM 3931 LA1 400 (LPAR)
 Workqueue: events irqfd_inject [kvm]
 Call Trace:
  [<00003173cbecc634>] dump_stack_lvl+0x104/0x168
  [<00003173cca69588>] handle_userfault+0xde8/0x1310
  [<00003173cc756f0c>] handle_pte_fault+0x4fc/0x760
  [<00003173cc759212>] __handle_mm_fault+0x452/0xa00
  [<00003173cc7599ba>] handle_mm_fault+0x1fa/0x6a0
  [<00003173cc73409a>] __get_user_pages+0x4aa/0xba0
  [<00003173cc7349e8>] get_user_pages_remote+0x258/0x770
  [<000031734be6f052>] get_map_page+0xe2/0x190 [kvm]
  [<000031734be6f910>] adapter_indicators_set+0x50/0x4a0 [kvm]
  [<000031734be7f674>] set_adapter_int+0xc4/0x170 [kvm]
  [<000031734be2f268>] kvm_set_irq+0x228/0x3f0 [kvm]
  [<000031734be27000>] irqfd_inject+0xd0/0x150 [kvm]
  [<00003173cc00c9ec>] process_one_work+0x87c/0x1490
  [<00003173cc00dda6>] worker_thread+0x7a6/0x1010
  [<00003173cc02dc36>] kthread+0x3b6/0x710
  [<00003173cbed2f0c>] __ret_from_fork+0xdc/0x7f0
  [<00003173cdd737ca>] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x30
 3 locks held by kworker/6:2/549:
  #0: 00000000800bc958 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x7ee/0x1490
  #1: 000030f3d527fbd0 ((work_completion)(&irqfd->inject)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x81c/0x1490
  #2: 00000000f99862b0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: get_map_page+0xa8/0x190 [kvm]

The "FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY missing" indicates that handle_userfaultfd()
saw a page fault request without ALLOW_RETRY flag set, hence userfaultfd
cannot remotely resolve it (because the caller was asking for an immediate
resolution, aka, FAULT_FLAG_NOWAIT, while remote faults can take time).
With that, get_map_page() failed and the irq was lost.

We should not be strictly in an atomic environment here and the worker
should be sleepable (the call is done during an ioctl from userspace),
so we can allow adapter_indicators_set() to just sleep waiting for the
remote fault instead.

Link: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-42486
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
[thuth: Assembled patch description and fixed some cosmetical issues]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Fixes: f654706 ("KVM: s390/interrupt: do not pin adapter interrupt pages")
[frankja: Added fixes tag]
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 22, 2025
syzkaller has caught us red-handed once more, this time nesting regular
spinlocks behind raw spinlocks:

  =============================
  [ BUG: Invalid wait context ]
  6.16.0-rc3-syzkaller-g7b8346bd9fce #0 Not tainted
  -----------------------------
  syz.0.29/3743 is trying to lock:
  a3ff80008e2e9e18 (&xa->xa_lock#20){....}-{3:3}, at: vgic_put_irq+0xb4/0x190 arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic.c:137
  other info that might help us debug this:
  context-{5:5}
  3 locks held by syz.0.29/3743:
   #0: a3ff80008e2e90a8 (&kvm->slots_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kvm_vgic_destroy+0x50/0x624 arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c:499
   #1: a3ff80008e2e9fa0 (&kvm->arch.config_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kvm_vgic_destroy+0x5c/0x624 arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c:500
   #2: 58f0000021be1428 (&vgic_cpu->ap_list_lock){....}-{2:2}, at: vgic_flush_pending_lpis+0x3c/0x31c arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic.c:150
  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3743 Comm: syz.0.29 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc3-syzkaller-g7b8346bd9fce #0 PREEMPT
  Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
  Call trace:
   show_stack+0x2c/0x3c arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:466 (C)
   __dump_stack+0x30/0x40 lib/dump_stack.c:94
   dump_stack_lvl+0xd8/0x12c lib/dump_stack.c:120
   dump_stack+0x1c/0x28 lib/dump_stack.c:129
   print_lock_invalid_wait_context kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4833 [inline]
   check_wait_context kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4905 [inline]
   __lock_acquire+0x978/0x299c kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5190
   lock_acquire+0x14c/0x2e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5871
   __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline]
   _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x7c kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162
   vgic_put_irq+0xb4/0x190 arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic.c:137
   vgic_flush_pending_lpis+0x24c/0x31c arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic.c:158
   __kvm_vgic_vcpu_destroy+0x44/0x500 arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c:455
   kvm_vgic_destroy+0x100/0x624 arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c:505
   kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x80/0x138 arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c:244
   kvm_destroy_vm virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1308 [inline]
   kvm_put_kvm+0x800/0xff8 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1344
   kvm_vm_release+0x58/0x78 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1367
   __fput+0x4ac/0x980 fs/file_table.c:465
   ____fput+0x20/0x58 fs/file_table.c:493
   task_work_run+0x1bc/0x254 kernel/task_work.c:227
   resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline]
   do_notify_resume+0x1b4/0x270 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:151
   exit_to_user_mode_prepare arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:169 [inline]
   exit_to_user_mode arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:178 [inline]
   el0_svc+0xb4/0x160 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:768
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:786
   el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:600

This is of course no good, but is at odds with how LPI refcounts are
managed. Solve the locking mess by deferring the release of unreferenced
LPIs after the ap_list_lock is released. Mark these to-be-released LPIs
specially to avoid racing with vgic_put_irq() and causing a double-free.

Since references can only be taken on LPIs with a nonzero refcount,
extending the lifetime of freed LPIs is still safe.

Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Reported-by: syzbot+cef594105ac7e60c6d93@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/kvmarm/68acd0d9.a00a0220.33401d.048b.GAE@google.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250905100531.282980-5-oliver.upton@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 29, 2025
This attemps to fix possible UAFs caused by struct mgmt_pending being
freed while still being processed like in the following trace, in order
to fix mgmt_pending_valid is introduce and use to check if the
mgmt_pending hasn't been removed from the pending list, on the complete
callbacks it is used to check and in addtion remove the cmd from the list
while holding mgmt_pending_lock to avoid TOCTOU problems since if the cmd
is left on the list it can still be accessed and freed.

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mgmt_add_adv_patterns_monitor_sync+0x35/0x50 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5223
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880709d4dc0 by task kworker/u11:0/55

CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 55 Comm: kworker/u11:0 Not tainted 6.16.4 #2 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
 print_report+0xca/0x240 mm/kasan/report.c:482
 kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595
 mgmt_add_adv_patterns_monitor_sync+0x35/0x50 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5223
 hci_cmd_sync_work+0x210/0x3a0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:332
 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3238 [inline]
 process_scheduled_works+0xade/0x17b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3321
 worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3402
 kthread+0x711/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:464
 ret_from_fork+0x3fc/0x770 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 home/kwqcheii/source/fuzzing/kernel/kasan/linux-6.16.4/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
 </TASK>

Allocated by task 12210:
 kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
 kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394
 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline]
 __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x230/0x3d0 mm/slub.c:4364
 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:905 [inline]
 kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1039 [inline]
 mgmt_pending_new+0x65/0x1e0 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:269
 mgmt_pending_add+0x35/0x140 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:296
 __add_adv_patterns_monitor+0x130/0x200 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5247
 add_adv_patterns_monitor+0x214/0x360 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5364
 hci_mgmt_cmd+0x9c9/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1719
 hci_sock_sendmsg+0x6ca/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1839
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg+0x219/0x270 net/socket.c:729
 sock_write_iter+0x258/0x330 net/socket.c:1133
 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline]
 vfs_write+0x5c9/0xb30 fs/read_write.c:686
 ksys_write+0x145/0x250 fs/read_write.c:738
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Freed by task 12221:
 kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
 kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
 kasan_save_free_info+0x46/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:576
 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline]
 __kasan_slab_free+0x62/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:264
 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline]
 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2381 [inline]
 slab_free mm/slub.c:4648 [inline]
 kfree+0x18e/0x440 mm/slub.c:4847
 mgmt_pending_free net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:311 [inline]
 mgmt_pending_foreach+0x30d/0x380 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:257
 __mgmt_power_off+0x169/0x350 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:9444
 hci_dev_close_sync+0x754/0x1330 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5290
 hci_dev_do_close net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:501 [inline]
 hci_dev_close+0x108/0x200 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:526
 sock_do_ioctl+0xd9/0x300 net/socket.c:1192
 sock_ioctl+0x576/0x790 net/socket.c:1313
 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
 __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline]
 __se_sys_ioctl+0xf9/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Fixes: cf75ad8 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_SET_POWERED")
Fixes: 2bd1b23 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SET_DISCOVERABLE to use cmd_sync")
Fixes: f056a65 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SET_CONNECTABLE to use cmd_sync")
Fixes: 3244845 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SSP")
Fixes: d81a494 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SET_LE")
Fixes: b338d91 ("Bluetooth: Implement support for Mesh")
Fixes: 6f6ff38 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SET_LOCAL_NAME")
Fixes: 71efbb0 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SET_PHY_CONFIGURATION")
Fixes: b747a83 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Refactor add Adv Monitor")
Fixes: abfeea4 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_START_DISCOVERY")
Fixes: 26ac4c5 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Convert MGMT_OP_SET_ADVERTISING")
Reported-by: cen zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 29, 2025
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
nexthop: Various fixes

Patch #1 fixes a NPD that was recently reported by syzbot.

Patch #2 fixes an issue in the existing FIB nexthop selftest.

Patch #3 extends the selftest with test cases for the bug that was fixed
in the first patch.
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250921150824.149157-1-idosch@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 19, 2025
[ Upstream commit 0b2cd50 ]

generic/091 may fail, then it bisects to the bad commit ba8dac3
("f2fs: fix to zero post-eof page").

What will cause generic/091 to fail is something like below Testcase #1:
1. write 16k as compressed blocks
2. truncate to 12k
3. truncate to 20k
4. verify data in range of [12k, 16k], however data is not zero as
expected

Script of Testcase #1
mkfs.f2fs -f -O extra_attr,compression /dev/vdb
mount -t f2fs -o compress_extension=* /dev/vdb /mnt/f2fs
dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/f2fs/file bs=12k count=1
dd if=/dev/random of=/mnt/f2fs/file bs=4k count=1 seek=3 conv=notrunc
sync
truncate -s $((12*1024)) /mnt/f2fs/file
truncate -s $((20*1024)) /mnt/f2fs/file
dd if=/mnt/f2fs/file of=/mnt/f2fs/data bs=4k count=1 skip=3
od /mnt/f2fs/data
umount /mnt/f2fs

Analisys:
in step 2), we will redirty all data pages from #0 to #3 in compressed
cluster, and zero page #3,
in step 3), f2fs_setattr() will call f2fs_zero_post_eof_page() to drop
all page cache post eof, includeing dirtied page #3,
in step 4) when we read data from page #3, it will decompressed cluster
and extra random data to page #3, finally, we hit the non-zeroed data
post eof.

However, the commit ba8dac3 ("f2fs: fix to zero post-eof page") just
let the issue be reproduced easily, w/o the commit, it can reproduce this
bug w/ below Testcase #2:
1. write 16k as compressed blocks
2. truncate to 8k
3. truncate to 12k
4. truncate to 20k
5. verify data in range of [12k, 16k], however data is not zero as
expected

Script of Testcase #2
mkfs.f2fs -f -O extra_attr,compression /dev/vdb
mount -t f2fs -o compress_extension=* /dev/vdb /mnt/f2fs
dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/f2fs/file bs=12k count=1
dd if=/dev/random of=/mnt/f2fs/file bs=4k count=1 seek=3 conv=notrunc
sync
truncate -s $((8*1024)) /mnt/f2fs/file
truncate -s $((12*1024)) /mnt/f2fs/file
truncate -s $((20*1024)) /mnt/f2fs/file
echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
dd if=/mnt/f2fs/file of=/mnt/f2fs/data bs=4k count=1 skip=3
od /mnt/f2fs/data
umount /mnt/f2fs

Anlysis:
in step 2), we will redirty all data pages from #0 to #3 in compressed
cluster, and zero page #2 and #3,
in step 3), we will truncate page #3 in page cache,
in step 4), expand file size,
in step 5), hit random data post eof w/ the same reason in Testcase #1.

Root Cause:
In f2fs_truncate_partial_cluster(), after we truncate partial data block
on compressed cluster, all pages in cluster including the one post eof
will be dirtied, after another tuncation, dirty page post eof will be
dropped, however on-disk compressed cluster is still valid, it may
include non-zero data post eof, result in exposing previous non-zero data
post eof while reading.

Fix:
In f2fs_truncate_partial_cluster(), let change as below to fix:
- call filemap_write_and_wait_range() to flush dirty page
- call truncate_pagecache() to drop pages or zero partial page post eof
- call f2fs_do_truncate_blocks() to truncate non-compress cluster to
  last valid block

Fixes: 3265d3d ("f2fs: support partial truncation on compressed inode")
Reported-by: Jan Prusakowski <jprusakowski@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 19, 2025
[ Upstream commit 570f945 ]

Lockdep gives a splat [1] when ser_hdl_work item is executed.  It is
scheduled at mac80211 workqueue via ieee80211_queue_work() and takes a
wiphy lock inside.  However, this workqueue can be flushed when e.g.
closing the interface and wiphy lock is already taken in that case.

Choosing wiphy_work_queue() for SER is likely not suitable.  Back on to
the global workqueue.

[1]:

 WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
 6.17.0-rc2 #17 Not tainted
 ------------------------------------------------------
 kworker/u32:1/61 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffff88811bc00768 (&rdev->wiphy.mtx){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ser_state_run+0x5e/0x180 [rtw89_core]

 but task is already holding lock:
 ffffc9000048fd30 ((work_completion)(&ser->ser_hdl_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x7b5/0x1450

 which lock already depends on the new lock.

 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

 -> #2 ((work_completion)(&ser->ser_hdl_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
        process_one_work+0x7c6/0x1450
        worker_thread+0x49e/0xd00
        kthread+0x313/0x640
        ret_from_fork+0x221/0x300
        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

 -> #1 ((wq_completion)phy0){+.+.}-{0:0}:
        touch_wq_lockdep_map+0x8e/0x180
        __flush_workqueue+0x129/0x10d0
        ieee80211_stop_device+0xa8/0x110
        ieee80211_do_stop+0x14ce/0x2880
        ieee80211_stop+0x13a/0x2c0
        __dev_close_many+0x18f/0x510
        __dev_change_flags+0x25f/0x670
        netif_change_flags+0x7b/0x160
        do_setlink.isra.0+0x1640/0x35d0
        rtnl_newlink+0xd8c/0x1d30
        rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x700/0xb80
        netlink_rcv_skb+0x11d/0x350
        netlink_unicast+0x49a/0x7a0
        netlink_sendmsg+0x759/0xc20
        ____sys_sendmsg+0x812/0xa00
        ___sys_sendmsg+0xf7/0x180
        __sys_sendmsg+0x11f/0x1b0
        do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x360
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

 -> #0 (&rdev->wiphy.mtx){+.+.}-{4:4}:
        __lock_acquire+0x124c/0x1d20
        lock_acquire+0x154/0x2e0
        __mutex_lock+0x17b/0x12f0
        ser_state_run+0x5e/0x180 [rtw89_core]
        rtw89_ser_hdl_work+0x119/0x220 [rtw89_core]
        process_one_work+0x82d/0x1450
        worker_thread+0x49e/0xd00
        kthread+0x313/0x640
        ret_from_fork+0x221/0x300
        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

 other info that might help us debug this:

 Chain exists of:
   &rdev->wiphy.mtx --> (wq_completion)phy0 --> (work_completion)(&ser->ser_hdl_work)

  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

        CPU0                    CPU1
        ----                    ----
   lock((work_completion)(&ser->ser_hdl_work));
                                lock((wq_completion)phy0);
                                lock((work_completion)(&ser->ser_hdl_work));
   lock(&rdev->wiphy.mtx);

  *** DEADLOCK ***

 2 locks held by kworker/u32:1/61:
  #0: ffff888103835148 ((wq_completion)phy0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0xefa/0x1450
  #1: ffffc9000048fd30 ((work_completion)(&ser->ser_hdl_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x7b5/0x1450

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 61 Comm: kworker/u32:1 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc2 #17 PREEMPT(voluntary)
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS edk2-20250523-14.fc42 05/23/2025
 Workqueue: phy0 rtw89_ser_hdl_work [rtw89_core]
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80
  print_circular_bug.cold+0x178/0x1be
  check_noncircular+0x14c/0x170
  __lock_acquire+0x124c/0x1d20
  lock_acquire+0x154/0x2e0
  __mutex_lock+0x17b/0x12f0
  ser_state_run+0x5e/0x180 [rtw89_core]
  rtw89_ser_hdl_work+0x119/0x220 [rtw89_core]
  process_one_work+0x82d/0x1450
  worker_thread+0x49e/0xd00
  kthread+0x313/0x640
  ret_from_fork+0x221/0x300
  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
  </TASK>

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org).

Fixes: ebfc919 ("wifi: rtw89: add wiphy_lock() to work that isn't held wiphy_lock() yet")
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru>
Acked-by: Ping-Ke Shih <pkshih@realtek.com>
Signed-off-by: Ping-Ke Shih <pkshih@realtek.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250919210852.823912-5-pchelkin@ispras.ru
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 19, 2025
[ Upstream commit edf7e90 ]

As JY reported in bugzilla [1],

Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
pc : [0xffffffe51d249484] f2fs_is_cp_guaranteed+0x70/0x98
lr : [0xffffffe51d24adbc] f2fs_merge_page_bio+0x520/0x6d4
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 6790 Comm: kworker/u16:3 Tainted: P    B   W  OE      6.12.30-android16-5-maybe-dirty-4k #1 5f7701c9cbf727d1eebe77c89bbbeb3371e895e5
Tainted: [P]=PROPRIETARY_MODULE, [B]=BAD_PAGE, [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-254:49)
Call trace:
 f2fs_is_cp_guaranteed+0x70/0x98
 f2fs_inplace_write_data+0x174/0x2f4
 f2fs_do_write_data_page+0x214/0x81c
 f2fs_write_single_data_page+0x28c/0x764
 f2fs_write_data_pages+0x78c/0xce4
 do_writepages+0xe8/0x2fc
 __writeback_single_inode+0x4c/0x4b4
 writeback_sb_inodes+0x314/0x540
 __writeback_inodes_wb+0xa4/0xf4
 wb_writeback+0x160/0x448
 wb_workfn+0x2f0/0x5dc
 process_scheduled_works+0x1c8/0x458
 worker_thread+0x334/0x3f0
 kthread+0x118/0x1ac
 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

[1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=220575

The panic was caused by UAF issue w/ below race condition:

kworker
- writepages
 - f2fs_write_cache_pages
  - f2fs_write_single_data_page
   - f2fs_do_write_data_page
    - f2fs_inplace_write_data
     - f2fs_merge_page_bio
      - add_inu_page
      : cache page #1 into bio & cache bio in
        io->bio_list
  - f2fs_write_single_data_page
   - f2fs_do_write_data_page
    - f2fs_inplace_write_data
     - f2fs_merge_page_bio
      - add_inu_page
      : cache page #2 into bio which is linked
        in io->bio_list
						write
						- f2fs_write_begin
						: write page #1
						 - f2fs_folio_wait_writeback
						  - f2fs_submit_merged_ipu_write
						   - f2fs_submit_write_bio
						   : submit bio which inclues page #1 and #2

						software IRQ
						- f2fs_write_end_io
						 - fscrypt_free_bounce_page
						 : freed bounced page which belongs to page #2
      - inc_page_count( , WB_DATA_TYPE(data_folio), false)
      : data_folio points to fio->encrypted_page
        the bounced page can be freed before
        accessing it in f2fs_is_cp_guarantee()

It can reproduce w/ below testcase:
Run below script in shell #1:
for ((i=1;i>0;i++)) do xfs_io -f /mnt/f2fs/enc/file \
-c "pwrite 0 32k" -c "fdatasync"

Run below script in shell #2:
for ((i=1;i>0;i++)) do xfs_io -f /mnt/f2fs/enc/file \
-c "pwrite 0 32k" -c "fdatasync"

So, in f2fs_merge_page_bio(), let's avoid using fio->encrypted_page after
commit page into internal ipu cache.

Fixes: 0b20fce ("f2fs: cache global IPU bio")
Reported-by: JY <JY.Ho@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 20, 2025
[ Upstream commit 48918ca ]

The test starts a workload and then opens events. If the events fail
to open, for example because of perf_event_paranoid, the gopipe of the
workload is leaked and the file descriptor leak check fails when the
test exits. To avoid this cancel the workload when opening the events
fails.

Before:
```
$ perf test -vv 7
  7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields:
 --- start ---
test child forked, pid 1189568
Using CPUID GenuineIntel-6-B7-1
 ------------------------------------------------------------
perf_event_attr:
  type                    	   0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE)
  config                  	   0xa00000000 (cpu_atom/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/)
  disabled                	   1
 ------------------------------------------------------------
sys_perf_event_open: pid 0  cpu -1  group_fd -1  flags 0x8
sys_perf_event_open failed, error -13
 ------------------------------------------------------------
perf_event_attr:
  type                             0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE)
  config                           0xa00000000 (cpu_atom/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/)
  disabled                         1
  exclude_kernel                   1
 ------------------------------------------------------------
sys_perf_event_open: pid 0  cpu -1  group_fd -1  flags 0x8 = 3
 ------------------------------------------------------------
perf_event_attr:
  type                             0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE)
  config                           0x400000000 (cpu_core/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/)
  disabled                         1
 ------------------------------------------------------------
sys_perf_event_open: pid 0  cpu -1  group_fd -1  flags 0x8
sys_perf_event_open failed, error -13
 ------------------------------------------------------------
perf_event_attr:
  type                             0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE)
  config                           0x400000000 (cpu_core/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/)
  disabled                         1
  exclude_kernel                   1
 ------------------------------------------------------------
sys_perf_event_open: pid 0  cpu -1  group_fd -1  flags 0x8 = 3
Attempt to add: software/cpu-clock/
..after resolving event: software/config=0/
cpu-clock -> software/cpu-clock/
 ------------------------------------------------------------
perf_event_attr:
  type                             1 (PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE)
  size                             136
  config                           0x9 (PERF_COUNT_SW_DUMMY)
  sample_type                      IP|TID|TIME|CPU
  read_format                      ID|LOST
  disabled                         1
  inherit                          1
  mmap                             1
  comm                             1
  enable_on_exec                   1
  task                             1
  sample_id_all                    1
  mmap2                            1
  comm_exec                        1
  ksymbol                          1
  bpf_event                        1
  { wakeup_events, wakeup_watermark } 1
 ------------------------------------------------------------
sys_perf_event_open: pid 1189569  cpu 0  group_fd -1  flags 0x8
sys_perf_event_open failed, error -13
perf_evlist__open: Permission denied
 ---- end(-2) ----
Leak of file descriptor 6 that opened: 'pipe:[14200347]'
 ---- unexpected signal (6) ----
iFailed to read build ID for //anon
Failed to read build ID for //anon
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Failed to read build ID for //anon
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Failed to read build ID for //anon
Failed to read build ID for //anon
Failed to read build ID for //anon
Failed to read build ID for //anon
Failed to read build ID for //anon
Failed to read build ID for //anon
Failed to read build ID for //anon
Failed to read build ID for //anon
Failed to read build ID for //anon
Failed to read build ID for //anon
Failed to read build ID for //anon
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Failed to read build ID for //anon
    #0 0x565358f6666e in child_test_sig_handler builtin-test.c:311
    #1 0x7f29ce849df0 in __restore_rt libc_sigaction.c:0
    #2 0x7f29ce89e95c in __pthread_kill_implementation pthread_kill.c:44
    #3 0x7f29ce849cc2 in raise raise.c:27
    #4 0x7f29ce8324ac in abort abort.c:81
    #5 0x565358f662d4 in check_leaks builtin-test.c:226
    #6 0x565358f6682e in run_test_child builtin-test.c:344
    #7 0x565358ef7121 in start_command run-command.c:128
    #8 0x565358f67273 in start_test builtin-test.c:545
    #9 0x565358f6771d in __cmd_test builtin-test.c:647
    #10 0x565358f682bd in cmd_test builtin-test.c:849
    #11 0x565358ee5ded in run_builtin perf.c:349
    #12 0x565358ee6085 in handle_internal_command perf.c:401
    #13 0x565358ee61de in run_argv perf.c:448
    #14 0x565358ee6527 in main perf.c:555
    #15 0x7f29ce833ca8 in __libc_start_call_main libc_start_call_main.h:74
    #16 0x7f29ce833d65 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 libc-start.c:128
    #17 0x565358e391c1 in _start perf[851c1]
  7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields                       : FAILED!
```

After:
```
$ perf test 7
  7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields                       : Skip (permissions)
```

Fixes: 16d00fe ("perf tests: Move test__PERF_RECORD into separate object")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Chun-Tse Shao <ctshao@google.com>
Cc: Howard Chu <howardchu95@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@linaro.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 20, 2025
commit 0dccbc7 upstream.

When running as an SNP or TDX guest under KVM, force the legacy PCI hole,
i.e. memory between Top of Lower Usable DRAM and 4GiB, to be mapped as UC
via a forced variable MTRR range.

In most KVM-based setups, legacy devices such as the HPET and TPM are
enumerated via ACPI.  ACPI enumeration includes a Memory32Fixed entry, and
optionally a SystemMemory descriptor for an OperationRegion, e.g. if the
device needs to be accessed via a Control Method.

If a SystemMemory entry is present, then the kernel's ACPI driver will
auto-ioremap the region so that it can be accessed at will.  However, the
ACPI spec doesn't provide a way to enumerate the memory type of
SystemMemory regions, i.e. there's no way to tell software that a region
must be mapped as UC vs. WB, etc.  As a result, Linux's ACPI driver always
maps SystemMemory regions using ioremap_cache(), i.e. as WB on x86.

The dedicated device drivers however, e.g. the HPET driver and TPM driver,
want to map their associated memory as UC or WC, as accessing PCI devices
using WB is unsupported.

On bare metal and non-CoCO, the conflicting requirements "work" as firmware
configures the PCI hole (and other device memory) to be UC in the MTRRs.
So even though the ACPI mappings request WB, they are forced to UC- in the
kernel's tracking due to the kernel properly handling the MTRR overrides,
and thus are compatible with the drivers' requested WC/UC-.

With force WB MTRRs on SNP and TDX guests, the ACPI mappings get their
requested WB if the ACPI mappings are established before the dedicated
driver code attempts to initialize the device.  E.g. if acpi_init()
runs before the corresponding device driver is probed, ACPI's WB mapping
will "win", and result in the driver's ioremap() failing because the
existing WB mapping isn't compatible with the requested WC/UC-.

E.g. when a TPM is emulated by the hypervisor (ignoring the security
implications of relying on what is allegedly an untrusted entity to store
measurements), the TPM driver will request UC and fail:

  [  1.730459] ioremap error for 0xfed40000-0xfed45000, requested 0x2, got 0x0
  [  1.732780] tpm_tis MSFT0101:00: probe with driver tpm_tis failed with error -12

Note, the '0x2' and '0x0' values refer to "enum page_cache_mode", not x86's
memtypes (which frustratingly are an almost pure inversion; 2 == WB, 0 == UC).
E.g. tracing mapping requests for TPM TIS yields:

 Mapping TPM TIS with req_type = 0
 WARNING: CPU: 22 PID: 1 at arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c:530 memtype_reserve+0x2ab/0x460
 Modules linked in:
 CPU: 22 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G        W           6.16.0-rc7+ #2 VOLUNTARY
 Tainted: [W]=WARN
 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/29/2025
 RIP: 0010:memtype_reserve+0x2ab/0x460
  __ioremap_caller+0x16d/0x3d0
  ioremap_cache+0x17/0x30
  x86_acpi_os_ioremap+0xe/0x20
  acpi_os_map_iomem+0x1f3/0x240
  acpi_os_map_memory+0xe/0x20
  acpi_ex_system_memory_space_handler+0x273/0x440
  acpi_ev_address_space_dispatch+0x176/0x4c0
  acpi_ex_access_region+0x2ad/0x530
  acpi_ex_field_datum_io+0xa2/0x4f0
  acpi_ex_extract_from_field+0x296/0x3e0
  acpi_ex_read_data_from_field+0xd1/0x460
  acpi_ex_resolve_node_to_value+0x2ee/0x530
  acpi_ex_resolve_to_value+0x1f2/0x540
  acpi_ds_evaluate_name_path+0x11b/0x190
  acpi_ds_exec_end_op+0x456/0x960
  acpi_ps_parse_loop+0x27a/0xa50
  acpi_ps_parse_aml+0x226/0x600
  acpi_ps_execute_method+0x172/0x3e0
  acpi_ns_evaluate+0x175/0x5f0
  acpi_evaluate_object+0x213/0x490
  acpi_evaluate_integer+0x6d/0x140
  acpi_bus_get_status+0x93/0x150
  acpi_add_single_object+0x43a/0x7c0
  acpi_bus_check_add+0x149/0x3a0
  acpi_bus_check_add_1+0x16/0x30
  acpi_ns_walk_namespace+0x22c/0x360
  acpi_walk_namespace+0x15c/0x170
  acpi_bus_scan+0x1dd/0x200
  acpi_scan_init+0xe5/0x2b0
  acpi_init+0x264/0x5b0
  do_one_initcall+0x5a/0x310
  kernel_init_freeable+0x34f/0x4f0
  kernel_init+0x1b/0x200
  ret_from_fork+0x186/0x1b0
  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
  </TASK>

The above traces are from a Google-VMM based VM, but the same behavior
happens with a QEMU based VM that is modified to add a SystemMemory range
for the TPM TIS address space.

The only reason this doesn't cause problems for HPET, which appears to
require a SystemMemory region, is because HPET gets special treatment via
x86_init.timers.timer_init(), and so gets a chance to create its UC-
mapping before acpi_init() clobbers things.  Disabling the early call to
hpet_time_init() yields the same behavior for HPET:

  [  0.318264] ioremap error for 0xfed00000-0xfed01000, requested 0x2, got 0x0

Hack around the ACPI gap by forcing the legacy PCI hole to UC when
overriding the (virtual) MTRRs for CoCo guest, so that ioremap handling
of MTRRs naturally kicks in and forces the ACPI mappings to be UC.

Note, the requested/mapped memtype doesn't actually matter in terms of
accessing the device.  In practically every setup, legacy PCI devices are
emulated by the hypervisor, and accesses are intercepted and handled as
emulated MMIO, i.e. never access physical memory and thus don't have an
effective memtype.

Even in a theoretical setup where such devices are passed through by the
host, i.e. point at real MMIO memory, it is KVM's (as the hypervisor)
responsibility to force the memory to be WC/UC, e.g. via EPT memtype
under TDX or real hardware MTRRs under SNP.  Not doing so cannot work,
and the hypervisor is highly motivated to do the right thing as letting
the guest access hardware MMIO with WB would likely result in a variety
of fatal #MCs.

In other words, forcing the range to be UC is all about coercing the
kernel's tracking into thinking that it has established UC mappings, so
that the ioremap code doesn't reject mappings from e.g. the TPM driver and
thus prevent the driver from loading and the device from functioning.

Note #2, relying on guest firmware to handle this scenario, e.g. by setting
virtual MTRRs and then consuming them in Linux, is not a viable option, as
the virtual MTRR state is managed by the untrusted hypervisor, and because
OVMF at least has stopped programming virtual MTRRs when running as a TDX
guest.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/8137d98e-8825-415b-9282-1d2a115bb51a@linux.intel.com
Fixes: 8e690b8 ("x86/kvm: Override default caching mode for SEV-SNP and TDX")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Jürgen Groß <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Korakit Seemakhupt <korakit@google.com>
Cc: Jianxiong Gao <jxgao@google.com>
Cc: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Suggested-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Korakit Seemakhupt <korakit@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250828005249.39339-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 20, 2025
commit 0570327 upstream.

Before disabling SR-IOV via config space accesses to the parent PF,
sriov_disable() first removes the PCI devices representing the VFs.

Since commit 9d16947 ("PCI: Add global pci_lock_rescan_remove()")
such removal operations are serialized against concurrent remove and
rescan using the pci_rescan_remove_lock. No such locking was ever added
in sriov_disable() however. In particular when commit 18f9e9d
("PCI/IOV: Factor out sriov_add_vfs()") factored out the PCI device
removal into sriov_del_vfs() there was still no locking around the
pci_iov_remove_virtfn() calls.

On s390 the lack of serialization in sriov_disable() may cause double
remove and list corruption with the below (amended) trace being observed:

  PSW:  0704c00180000000 0000000c914e4b38 (klist_put+56)
  GPRS: 000003800313fb48 0000000000000000 0000000100000001 0000000000000001
	00000000f9b520a8 0000000000000000 0000000000002fbd 00000000f4cc9480
	0000000000000001 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000180692828
	00000000818e8000 000003800313fe2c 000003800313fb20 000003800313fad8
  #0 [3800313fb20] device_del at c9158ad5c
  #1 [3800313fb88] pci_remove_bus_device at c915105ba
  #2 [3800313fbd0] pci_iov_remove_virtfn at c9152f198
  #3 [3800313fc28] zpci_iov_remove_virtfn at c90fb67c0
  #4 [3800313fc60] zpci_bus_remove_device at c90fb6104
  #5 [3800313fca0] __zpci_event_availability at c90fb3dca
  #6 [3800313fd08] chsc_process_sei_nt0 at c918fe4a2
  #7 [3800313fd60] crw_collect_info at c91905822
  #8 [3800313fe10] kthread at c90feb390
  #9 [3800313fe68] __ret_from_fork at c90f6aa64
  #10 [3800313fe98] ret_from_fork at c9194f3f2.

This is because in addition to sriov_disable() removing the VFs, the
platform also generates hot-unplug events for the VFs. This being the
reverse operation to the hotplug events generated by sriov_enable() and
handled via pdev->no_vf_scan. And while the event processing takes
pci_rescan_remove_lock and checks whether the struct pci_dev still exists,
the lack of synchronization makes this checking racy.

Other races may also be possible of course though given that this lack of
locking persisted so long observable races seem very rare. Even on s390 the
list corruption was only observed with certain devices since the platform
events are only triggered by config accesses after the removal, so as long
as the removal finished synchronously they would not race. Either way the
locking is missing so fix this by adding it to the sriov_del_vfs() helper.

Just like PCI rescan-remove, locking is also missing in sriov_add_vfs()
including for the error case where pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device() is
called without the PCI rescan-remove lock being held. Even in the non-error
case, adding new PCI devices and buses should be serialized via the PCI
rescan-remove lock. Add the necessary locking.

Fixes: 18f9e9d ("PCI/IOV: Factor out sriov_add_vfs()")
Signed-off-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Block <bblock@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Farhan Ali <alifm@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Julian Ruess <julianr@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250826-pci_fix_sriov_disable-v1-1-2d0bc938f2a3@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 21, 2025
Expand the prefault memory selftest to add a regression test for a KVM bug
where KVM's retry logic would result in (breakable) deadlock due to the
memslot deletion waiting on prefaulting to release SRCU, and prefaulting
waiting on the memslot to fully disappear (KVM uses a two-step process to
delete memslots, and KVM x86 retries page faults if a to-be-deleted, a.k.a.
INVALID, memslot is encountered).

To exercise concurrent memslot remove, spawn a second thread to initiate
memslot removal at roughly the same time as prefaulting.  Test memslot
removal for all testcases, i.e. don't limit concurrent removal to only the
success case.  There are essentially three prefault scenarios (so far)
that are of interest:

 1. Success
 2. ENOENT due to no memslot
 3. EAGAIN due to INVALID memslot

For all intents and purposes, #1 and #2 are mutually exclusive, or rather,
easier to test via separate testcases since writing to non-existent memory
is trivial.  But for #3, making it mutually exclusive with #1 _or_ #2 is
actually more complex than testing memslot removal for all scenarios.  The
only requirement to let memslot removal coexist with other scenarios is a
way to guarantee a stable result, e.g. that the "no memslot" test observes
ENOENT, not EAGAIN, for the final checks.

So, rather than make memslot removal mutually exclusive with the ENOENT
scenario, simply restore the memslot and retry prefaulting.  For the "no
memslot" case, KVM_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY should be idempotent, i.e. should
always fail with ENOENT regardless of how many times userspace attempts
prefaulting.

Pass in both the base GPA and the offset (instead of the "full" GPA) so
that the worker can recreate the memslot.

Signed-off-by: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250924174255.2141847-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 21, 2025
Since blamed commit, unregister_netdevice_many_notify() takes the netdev
mutex if the device needs it.

If the device list is too long, this will lock more device mutexes than
lockdep can handle:

unshare -n \
 bash -c 'for i in $(seq 1 100);do ip link add foo$i type dummy;done'

BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low!
turning off the locking correctness validator.
depth: 48  max: 48!
48 locks held by kworker/u16:1/69:
 #0: ..148 ((wq_completion)netns){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work
 #1: ..d40 (net_cleanup_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work
 #2: ..bd0 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: cleanup_net
 #3: ..aa8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: default_device_exit_batch
 #4: ..cb0 (&dev_instance_lock_key#3){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: unregister_netdevice_many_notify
[..]

Add a helper to close and then unlock a list of net_devices.
Devices that are not up have to be skipped - netif_close_many always
removes them from the list without any other actions taken, so they'd
remain in locked state.

Close devices whenever we've used up half of the tracking slots or we
processed entire list without hitting the limit.

Fixes: 7e4d784 ("net: hold netdev instance lock during rtnetlink operations")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251013185052.14021-1-fw@strlen.de
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 3, 2025
The original code causes a circular locking dependency found by lockdep.

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.16.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-pw-151626v3+ #1 Tainted: G S   U
------------------------------------------------------
xe_fault_inject/5091 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888156815688 ((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x25d/0x660

but task is already holding lock:

ffff888156815620 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_coredump_put+0x3f/0xa0
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #2 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       mutex_lock_nested+0x4e/0xc0
       devcd_data_write+0x27/0x90
       sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x80/0xf0
       kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220
       vfs_write+0x293/0x560
       ksys_write+0x72/0xf0
       __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30
       x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660
       do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
-> #1 (kn->active#236){++++}-{0:0}:
       kernfs_drain+0x1e2/0x200
       __kernfs_remove+0xae/0x400
       kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x5d/0xc0
       remove_files+0x54/0x70
       sysfs_remove_group+0x3d/0xa0
       sysfs_remove_groups+0x2e/0x60
       device_remove_attrs+0xc7/0x100
       device_del+0x15d/0x3b0
       devcd_del+0x19/0x30
       process_one_work+0x22b/0x6f0
       worker_thread+0x1e8/0x3d0
       kthread+0x11c/0x250
       ret_from_fork+0x26c/0x2e0
       ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
-> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
       __lock_acquire+0x1661/0x2860
       lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0
       __flush_work+0x27a/0x660
       flush_delayed_work+0x5d/0xa0
       dev_coredump_put+0x63/0xa0
       xe_driver_devcoredump_fini+0x12/0x20 [xe]
       devm_action_release+0x12/0x30
       release_nodes+0x3a/0x120
       devres_release_all+0x8a/0xd0
       device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80
       device_release_driver_internal+0x23a/0x280
       device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20
       unbind_store+0xaf/0xc0
       drv_attr_store+0x21/0x50
       sysfs_kf_write+0x4a/0x80
       kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220
       vfs_write+0x293/0x560
       ksys_write+0x72/0xf0
       __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30
       x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660
       do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of: (work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work) --> kn->active#236 --> &devcd->mutex
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:
       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&devcd->mutex);
                               lock(kn->active#236);
                               lock(&devcd->mutex);
  lock((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work));
 *** DEADLOCK ***
5 locks held by xe_fault_inject/5091:
 #0: ffff8881129f9488 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x72/0xf0
 #1: ffff88810c755078 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x123/0x220
 #2: ffff8881054811a0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x55/0x280
 #3: ffff888156815620 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_coredump_put+0x3f/0xa0
 #4: ffffffff8359e020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __flush_work+0x72/0x660
stack backtrace:
CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 5091 Comm: xe_fault_inject Tainted: G S   U              6.16.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-pw-151626v3+ #1 PREEMPT_{RT,(lazy)}
Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [U]=USER
Hardware name: Micro-Star International Co., Ltd. MS-7D25/PRO Z690-A DDR4(MS-7D25), BIOS 1.10 12/13/2021
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0
 dump_stack+0x10/0x20
 print_circular_bug+0x285/0x360
 check_noncircular+0x135/0x150
 ? register_lock_class+0x48/0x4a0
 __lock_acquire+0x1661/0x2860
 lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0
 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660
 ? mark_held_locks+0x46/0x90
 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660
 __flush_work+0x27a/0x660
 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660
 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1e/0xd0
 ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10
 flush_delayed_work+0x5d/0xa0
 dev_coredump_put+0x63/0xa0
 xe_driver_devcoredump_fini+0x12/0x20 [xe]
 devm_action_release+0x12/0x30
 release_nodes+0x3a/0x120
 devres_release_all+0x8a/0xd0
 device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80
 device_release_driver_internal+0x23a/0x280
 ? bus_find_device+0xa8/0xe0
 device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20
 unbind_store+0xaf/0xc0
 drv_attr_store+0x21/0x50
 sysfs_kf_write+0x4a/0x80
 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220
 vfs_write+0x293/0x560
 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0
 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30
 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660
 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60
 ? __f_unlock_pos+0x15/0x20
 ? __x64_sys_getdents64+0x9b/0x130
 ? __pfx_filldir64+0x10/0x10
 ? do_syscall_64+0x1a2/0xb60
 ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80
 ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x76e292edd574
Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d d5 ea 0e 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 48 89
RSP: 002b:00007fffe247a828 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000076e292edd574
RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: 00006267f6306063 RDI: 000000000000000b
RBP: 000000000000000c R08: 000076e292fc4b20 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00006267f6306063
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00006267e6859c00 R15: 000076e29322a000
 </TASK>
xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] Xe device coredump has been deleted.

Fixes: 01daccf ("devcoredump : Serialize devcd_del work")
Cc: Mukesh Ojha <quic_mojha@quicinc.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael@kernel.org>
Cc: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.1+
Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <dev@lankhorst.se>
Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Acked-by: Mukesh Ojha <mukesh.ojha@oss.qualcomm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250723142416.1020423-1-dev@lankhorst.se
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 10, 2025
On completion of i915_vma_pin_ww(), a synchronous variant of
dma_fence_work_commit() is called.  When pinning a VMA to GGTT address
space on a Cherry View family processor, or on a Broxton generation SoC
with VTD enabled, i.e., when stop_machine() is then called from
intel_ggtt_bind_vma(), that can potentially lead to lock inversion among
reservation_ww and cpu_hotplug locks.

[86.861179] ======================================================
[86.861193] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[86.861209] 6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ #1 Tainted: G     U
[86.861226] ------------------------------------------------------
[86.861238] i915_module_loa/1432 is trying to acquire lock:
[86.861252] ffffffff83489090 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: stop_machine+0x1c/0x50
[86.861290]
but task is already holding lock:
[86.861303] ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915]
[86.862233]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
[86.862251]
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[86.862265]
-> #5 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[86.862292]        dma_resv_lockdep+0x19a/0x390
[86.862315]        do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0
[86.862334]        kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680
[86.862353]        kernel_init+0x1b/0x200
[86.862369]        ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70
[86.862383]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[86.862399]
-> #4 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}:
[86.862425]        dma_resv_lockdep+0x178/0x390
[86.862440]        do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0
[86.862454]        kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680
[86.862470]        kernel_init+0x1b/0x200
[86.862482]        ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70
[86.862495]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[86.862509]
-> #3 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}:
[86.862531]        down_read_killable+0x46/0x1e0
[86.862546]        lock_mm_and_find_vma+0xa2/0x280
[86.862561]        do_user_addr_fault+0x266/0x8e0
[86.862578]        exc_page_fault+0x8a/0x2f0
[86.862593]        asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30
[86.862607]        filldir64+0xeb/0x180
[86.862620]        kernfs_fop_readdir+0x118/0x480
[86.862635]        iterate_dir+0xcf/0x2b0
[86.862648]        __x64_sys_getdents64+0x84/0x140
[86.862661]        x64_sys_call+0x1058/0x2660
[86.862675]        do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90
[86.862689]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[86.862703]
-> #2 (&root->kernfs_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}:
[86.862725]        down_write+0x3e/0xf0
[86.862738]        kernfs_add_one+0x30/0x3c0
[86.862751]        kernfs_create_dir_ns+0x53/0xb0
[86.862765]        internal_create_group+0x134/0x4c0
[86.862779]        sysfs_create_group+0x13/0x20
[86.862792]        topology_add_dev+0x1d/0x30
[86.862806]        cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x4b5/0x850
[86.862822]        cpuhp_issue_call+0xbf/0x1f0
[86.862836]        __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x111/0x320
[86.862852]        __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220
[86.862866]        topology_sysfs_init+0x30/0x50
[86.862879]        do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0
[86.862893]        kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680
[86.862908]        kernel_init+0x1b/0x200
[86.862921]        ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70
[86.862934]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[86.862947]
-> #1 (cpuhp_state_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[86.862969]        __mutex_lock+0xaa/0xed0
[86.862982]        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[86.862995]        __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x67/0x320
[86.863012]        __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220
[86.863026]        page_alloc_init_cpuhp+0x2d/0x60
[86.863041]        mm_core_init+0x22/0x2d0
[86.863054]        start_kernel+0x576/0xbd0
[86.863068]        x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30
[86.863084]        x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110
[86.863098]        common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141
[86.863114]
-> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}:
[86.863135]        __lock_acquire+0x1635/0x2810
[86.863152]        lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0
[86.863166]        cpus_read_lock+0x41/0x100
[86.863180]        stop_machine+0x1c/0x50
[86.863194]        bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x3b/0x60 [i915]
[86.863987]        intel_ggtt_bind_vma+0x43/0x70 [i915]
[86.864735]        __vma_bind+0x55/0x70 [i915]
[86.865510]        fence_work+0x26/0xa0 [i915]
[86.866248]        fence_notify+0xa1/0x140 [i915]
[86.866983]        __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x8f/0x270 [i915]
[86.867719]        i915_sw_fence_commit+0x39/0x60 [i915]
[86.868453]        i915_vma_pin_ww+0x462/0x1360 [i915]
[86.869228]        i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x133/0x1d0 [i915]
[86.870001]        initial_plane_vma+0x307/0x840 [i915]
[86.870774]        intel_initial_plane_config+0x33f/0x670 [i915]
[86.871546]        intel_display_driver_probe_nogem+0x1c6/0x260 [i915]
[86.872330]        i915_driver_probe+0x7fa/0xe80 [i915]
[86.873057]        i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915]
[86.873782]        local_pci_probe+0x47/0xb0
[86.873802]        pci_device_probe+0xf3/0x260
[86.873817]        really_probe+0xf1/0x3c0
[86.873833]        __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180
[86.873848]        driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0
[86.873862]        __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220
[86.873876]        bus_for_each_dev+0x7f/0xe0
[86.873892]        driver_attach+0x1e/0x30
[86.873904]        bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290
[86.873917]        driver_register+0x5e/0x130
[86.873931]        __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90
[86.873945]        i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915]
[86.874678]        i915_init+0x37/0x120 [i915]
[86.875347]        do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0
[86.875369]        do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0
[86.875385]        load_module+0x2c54/0x2d80
[86.875398]        init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0
[86.875413]        idempotent_init_module+0x117/0x330
[86.875426]        __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100
[86.875440]        x64_sys_call+0x24de/0x2660
[86.875454]        do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90
[86.875470]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[86.875486]
other info that might help us debug this:
[86.875502] Chain exists of:
  cpu_hotplug_lock --> reservation_ww_class_acquire --> reservation_ww_class_mutex
[86.875539]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[86.875552]        CPU0                    CPU1
[86.875563]        ----                    ----
[86.875573]   lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex);
[86.875588]                                lock(reservation_ww_class_acquire);
[86.875606]                                lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex);
[86.875624]   rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock);
[86.875637]
 *** DEADLOCK ***
[86.875650] 3 locks held by i915_module_loa/1432:
[86.875663]  #0: ffff888101f5c1b0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __driver_attach+0x104/0x220
[86.875699]  #1: ffffc90002e0b4a0 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915]
[86.876512]  #2: ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915]
[86.877305]
stack backtrace:
[86.877326] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1432 Comm: i915_module_loa Tainted: G     U              6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[86.877334] Tainted: [U]=USER
[86.877336] Hardware name:  /NUC5CPYB, BIOS PYBSWCEL.86A.0079.2020.0420.1316 04/20/2020
[86.877339] Call Trace:
[86.877344]  <TASK>
[86.877353]  dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0
[86.877364]  dump_stack+0x10/0x20
[86.877369]  print_circular_bug+0x285/0x360
[86.877379]  check_noncircular+0x135/0x150
[86.877390]  __lock_acquire+0x1635/0x2810
[86.877403]  lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0
[86.877408]  ? stop_machine+0x1c/0x50
[86.877422]  ? __pfx_bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__cb+0x10/0x10 [i915]
[86.878173]  cpus_read_lock+0x41/0x100
[86.878182]  ? stop_machine+0x1c/0x50
[86.878191]  ? __pfx_bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__cb+0x10/0x10 [i915]
[86.878916]  stop_machine+0x1c/0x50
[86.878927]  bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x3b/0x60 [i915]
[86.879652]  intel_ggtt_bind_vma+0x43/0x70 [i915]
[86.880375]  __vma_bind+0x55/0x70 [i915]
[86.881133]  fence_work+0x26/0xa0 [i915]
[86.881851]  fence_notify+0xa1/0x140 [i915]
[86.882566]  __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x8f/0x270 [i915]
[86.883286]  i915_sw_fence_commit+0x39/0x60 [i915]
[86.884003]  i915_vma_pin_ww+0x462/0x1360 [i915]
[86.884756]  ? i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x6c/0x1d0 [i915]
[86.885513]  i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x133/0x1d0 [i915]
[86.886281]  initial_plane_vma+0x307/0x840 [i915]
[86.887049]  intel_initial_plane_config+0x33f/0x670 [i915]
[86.887819]  intel_display_driver_probe_nogem+0x1c6/0x260 [i915]
[86.888587]  i915_driver_probe+0x7fa/0xe80 [i915]
[86.889293]  ? mutex_unlock+0x12/0x20
[86.889301]  ? drm_privacy_screen_get+0x171/0x190
[86.889308]  ? acpi_dev_found+0x66/0x80
[86.889321]  i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915]
[86.890038]  local_pci_probe+0x47/0xb0
[86.890049]  pci_device_probe+0xf3/0x260
[86.890058]  really_probe+0xf1/0x3c0
[86.890067]  __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180
[86.890072]  driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0
[86.890078]  __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220
[86.890083]  ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10
[86.890088]  bus_for_each_dev+0x7f/0xe0
[86.890097]  driver_attach+0x1e/0x30
[86.890101]  bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290
[86.890107]  driver_register+0x5e/0x130
[86.890113]  __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90
[86.890119]  i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915]
[86.890833]  i915_init+0x37/0x120 [i915]
[86.891482]  ? __pfx_i915_init+0x10/0x10 [i915]
[86.892135]  do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0
[86.892145]  ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x33f/0x470
[86.892157]  do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0
[86.892164]  load_module+0x2c54/0x2d80
[86.892168]  ? __kernel_read+0x15c/0x300
[86.892185]  ? kernel_read_file+0x2b1/0x320
[86.892195]  init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0
[86.892199]  ? init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0
[86.892211]  idempotent_init_module+0x117/0x330
[86.892224]  __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100
[86.892230]  x64_sys_call+0x24de/0x2660
[86.892236]  do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90
[86.892243]  ? irqentry_exit+0x77/0xb0
[86.892249]  ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x57/0xc0
[86.892256]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[86.892261] RIP: 0033:0x7303e1b2725d
[86.892271] Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 8b bb 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[86.892276] RSP: 002b:00007ffddd1fdb38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
[86.892281] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005d771d88fd90 RCX: 00007303e1b2725d
[86.892285] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00005d771d893aa0 RDI: 000000000000000c
[86.892287] RBP: 00007ffddd1fdbf0 R08: 0000000000000040 R09: 00007ffddd1fdb80
[86.892289] R10: 00007303e1c03b20 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005d771d893aa0
[86.892292] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00005d771d88f0d0 R15: 00005d771d895710
[86.892304]  </TASK>

Call asynchronous variant of dma_fence_work_commit() in that case.

v3: Provide more verbose in-line comment (Andi),
  - mention target environments in commit message.

Fixes: 7d1c261 ("drm/i915: Take reservation lock around i915_vma_pin.")
Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/i915/kernel/-/issues/14985
Cc: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Janusz Krzysztofik <janusz.krzysztofik@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Sebastian Brzezinka <sebastian.brzezinka@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Karas <krzysztof.karas@intel.com>
Acked-by: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251023082925.351307-6-janusz.krzysztofik@linux.intel.com
(cherry picked from commit 648ef13)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 10, 2025
When a connector is connected but inactive (e.g., disabled by desktop
environments), pipe_ctx->stream_res.tg will be destroyed. Then, reading
odm_combine_segments causes kernel NULL pointer dereference.

 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
 #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
 PGD 0 P4D 0
 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
 CPU: 16 UID: 0 PID: 26474 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.17.0+ #2 PREEMPT(lazy)  e6a17af9ee6db7c63e9d90dbe5b28ccab67520c6
 Hardware name: LENOVO 21Q4/LNVNB161216, BIOS PXCN25WW 03/27/2025
 RIP: 0010:odm_combine_segments_show+0x93/0xf0 [amdgpu]
 Code: 41 83 b8 b0 00 00 00 01 75 6e 48 98 ba a1 ff ff ff 48 c1 e0 0c 48 8d 8c 07 d8 02 00 00 48 85 c9 74 2d 48 8b bc 07 f0 08 00 00 <48> 8b 07 48 8b 80 08 02 00>
 RSP: 0018:ffffd1bf4b953c58 EFLAGS: 00010286
 RAX: 0000000000005000 RBX: ffff8e35976b02d0 RCX: ffff8e3aeed052d8
 RDX: 00000000ffffffa1 RSI: ffff8e35a3120800 RDI: 0000000000000000
 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff8e3580eb0000 R09: ffff8e35976b02d0
 R10: ffffd1bf4b953c78 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffd1bf4b953d08
 R13: 0000000000040000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001
 FS:  00007f44d3f9f740(0000) GS:ffff8e3caa47f000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000006485c2000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0
 PKRU: 55555554
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  seq_read_iter+0x125/0x490
  ? __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x18f/0x350
  seq_read+0x12c/0x170
  full_proxy_read+0x51/0x80
  vfs_read+0xbc/0x390
  ? __handle_mm_fault+0xa46/0xef0
  ? do_syscall_64+0x71/0x900
  ksys_read+0x73/0xf0
  do_syscall_64+0x71/0x900
  ? count_memcg_events+0xc2/0x190
  ? handle_mm_fault+0x1d7/0x2d0
  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x21a/0x690
  ? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x1a0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74
 RIP: 0033:0x7f44d4031687
 Code: 48 89 fa 4c 89 df e8 58 b3 00 00 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 74 1a 5b c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 44 24 10 0f 05 <5b> c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00>
 RSP: 002b:00007ffdb4b5f0b0 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f44d3f9f740 RCX: 00007f44d4031687
 RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: 00007f44d3f5e000 RDI: 0000000000000003
 RBP: 0000000000040000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007f44d3f5e000
 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000040000
  </TASK>
 Modules linked in: tls tcp_diag inet_diag xt_mark ccm snd_hrtimer snd_seq_dummy snd_seq_midi snd_seq_oss snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi snd_seq snd_seq_device x>
  snd_hda_codec_atihdmi snd_hda_codec_realtek_lib lenovo_wmi_helpers think_lmi snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_soc_core kvm snd_compress uvcvideo sn>
  platform_profile joydev amd_pmc mousedev mac_hid sch_fq_codel uinput i2c_dev parport_pc ppdev lp parport nvme_fabrics loop nfnetlink ip_tables x_tables dm_cryp>
 CR2: 0000000000000000
 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
 RIP: 0010:odm_combine_segments_show+0x93/0xf0 [amdgpu]
 Code: 41 83 b8 b0 00 00 00 01 75 6e 48 98 ba a1 ff ff ff 48 c1 e0 0c 48 8d 8c 07 d8 02 00 00 48 85 c9 74 2d 48 8b bc 07 f0 08 00 00 <48> 8b 07 48 8b 80 08 02 00>
 RSP: 0018:ffffd1bf4b953c58 EFLAGS: 00010286
 RAX: 0000000000005000 RBX: ffff8e35976b02d0 RCX: ffff8e3aeed052d8
 RDX: 00000000ffffffa1 RSI: ffff8e35a3120800 RDI: 0000000000000000
 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff8e3580eb0000 R09: ffff8e35976b02d0
 R10: ffffd1bf4b953c78 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffd1bf4b953d08
 R13: 0000000000040000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001
 FS:  00007f44d3f9f740(0000) GS:ffff8e3caa47f000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000006485c2000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0
 PKRU: 55555554

Fix this by checking pipe_ctx->stream_res.tg before dereferencing.

Fixes: 07926ba ("drm/amd/display: Add debugfs interface for ODM combine info")
Signed-off-by: Rong Zhang <i@rong.moe>
Reviewed-by: Mario Limoncello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
(cherry picked from commit f19bbec)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
chewitt pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 10, 2025
Michael Chan says:

====================
bnxt_en: Bug fixes

Patches 1, 3, and 4 are bug fixes related to the FW log tracing driver
coredump feature recently added in 6.13.  Patch #1 adds the necessary
call to shutdown the FW logging DMA during PCI shutdown.  Patch #3 fixes
a possible null pointer derefernce when using early versions of the FW
with this feature.  Patch #4 adds the coredump header information
unconditionally to make it more robust.

Patch #2 fixes a possible memory leak during PTP shutdown.  Patch #5
eliminates a dmesg warning when doing devlink reload.
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251104005700.542174-1-michael.chan@broadcom.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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