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server_classic.c
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/*
Copyright 2022 Northern.tech AS
This file is part of CFEngine 3 - written and maintained by Northern.tech AS.
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
Free Software Foundation; version 3.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
To the extent this program is licensed as part of the Enterprise
versions of CFEngine, the applicable Commercial Open Source License
(COSL) may apply to this file if you as a licensee so wish it. See
included file COSL.txt.
*/
#include <platform.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h> /* BN_* */
#include <openssl/err.h> /* ERR_get_error */
#include <libcrypto-compat.h>
#include <cf3.defs.h>
#include <item_lib.h> /* IsMatchItemIn */
#include <matching.h> /* IsRegexItemIn */
#include <net.h> /* ReceiveTransaction,SendTransaction */
#include <signals.h>
#include <string_lib.h> /* ToLowerStrInplace */
#include <regex.h> /* StringMatchFull */
#include <lastseen.h> /* LastSaw1 */
#include <hash.h> /* HashString */
#include <crypto.h> /* HavePublicKey */
#include <cf-serverd-enterprise-stubs.h> /* ReceiveCollectCall */
#include <tls_generic.h>
#include "server.h" /* ServerConnectionState */
#include "server_common.h" /* ListPersistentClasses */
/* Functionality needed exclusively for the classic protocol. */
//*******************************************************************
// COMMANDS
//*******************************************************************
typedef enum
{
PROTOCOL_COMMAND_EXEC,
PROTOCOL_COMMAND_AUTH,
PROTOCOL_COMMAND_GET,
PROTOCOL_COMMAND_OPENDIR,
PROTOCOL_COMMAND_SYNC,
PROTOCOL_COMMAND_CONTEXTS,
PROTOCOL_COMMAND_MD5,
PROTOCOL_COMMAND_MD5_SECURE,
PROTOCOL_COMMAND_AUTH_PLAIN,
PROTOCOL_COMMAND_AUTH_SECURE,
PROTOCOL_COMMAND_SYNC_SECURE,
PROTOCOL_COMMAND_GET_SECURE,
PROTOCOL_COMMAND_VERSION,
PROTOCOL_COMMAND_OPENDIR_SECURE,
PROTOCOL_COMMAND_VAR,
PROTOCOL_COMMAND_VAR_SECURE,
PROTOCOL_COMMAND_CONTEXT,
PROTOCOL_COMMAND_CONTEXT_SECURE,
PROTOCOL_COMMAND_QUERY_SECURE,
PROTOCOL_COMMAND_CALL_ME_BACK,
PROTOCOL_COMMAND_BAD
} ProtocolCommandClassic;
static const char *PROTOCOL_CLASSIC[] =
{
"EXEC",
"AUTH", /* old protocol */
"GET",
"OPENDIR",
"SYNCH",
"CLASSES",
"MD5",
"SMD5",
"CAUTH",
"SAUTH",
"SSYNCH",
"SGET",
"VERSION",
"SOPENDIR",
"VAR",
"SVAR",
"CONTEXT",
"SCONTEXT",
"SQUERY",
"SCALLBACK",
NULL
};
static ProtocolCommandClassic GetCommandClassic(char *str)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; PROTOCOL_CLASSIC[i] != NULL; i++)
{
int cmdlen = strlen(PROTOCOL_CLASSIC[i]);
if ((strncmp(str, PROTOCOL_CLASSIC[i], cmdlen) == 0) &&
(str[cmdlen] == ' ' || str[cmdlen] == '\0'))
{
return i;
}
}
assert (i == PROTOCOL_COMMAND_BAD);
return i;
}
/* 'resolved' argument needs to be at least CF_BUFSIZE long */
static bool ResolveFilename(const char *req_path, char *res_path)
{
#if !defined _WIN32
if (realpath(req_path, res_path) == NULL)
{
return false;
}
#else
memset(res_path, 0, CF_BUFSIZE);
CompressPath(res_path, CF_BUFSIZE, req_path);
#endif
/* Adjust for forward slashes */
MapName(res_path);
/* NT has case-insensitive path names */
#ifdef __MINGW32__
int i;
for (i = 0; i < strlen(res_path); i++)
{
res_path[i] = ToLower(res_path[i]);
}
#endif /* __MINGW32__ */
return true;
}
static bool PathMatch(const char *stem, const char *request)
{
const size_t stemlen = strlen(stem);
if (strcmp(stem, FILE_SEPARATOR_STR) == 0)
{
/* Matches everything: */
return true;
}
if (strcmp(stem, request) == 0)
{
/* An exact match is a match: */
return true;
}
/* Otherwise, match only if stem names a parent directory of request: */
return (strlen(request) > stemlen &&
request[stemlen] == FILE_SEPARATOR &&
strncmp(stem, request, stemlen) == 0);
}
static bool AccessControl(EvalContext *ctx, const char *req_path, ServerConnectionState *conn, int encrypt)
{
bool access = false;
char transrequest[CF_BUFSIZE];
struct stat statbuf;
char translated_req_path[CF_BUFSIZE];
char transpath[CF_BUFSIZE];
/*
* /var/cfengine -> $workdir translation.
*/
TranslatePath(req_path, translated_req_path, sizeof(translated_req_path));
if (ResolveFilename(translated_req_path, transrequest))
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, "Filename %s is resolved to %s", translated_req_path, transrequest);
}
else if ((lstat(translated_req_path, &statbuf) == -1) && !S_ISLNK(statbuf.st_mode))
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_INFO, "Couldn't resolve (realpath: %s) filename: %s",
GetErrorStr(), translated_req_path);
return false; /* can't continue without transrequest */
}
else
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, "Requested file is a dead symbolic link (filename: %s)", translated_req_path);
strlcpy(transrequest, translated_req_path, CF_BUFSIZE);
}
if (lstat(transrequest, &statbuf) == -1)
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_INFO, "Couldn't stat (lstat: %s) filename: %s",
GetErrorStr(), transrequest);
return false;
}
Log(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, "AccessControl, match (%s,%s) encrypt request = %d", transrequest, conn->hostname, encrypt);
if (SERVER_ACCESS.admit == NULL)
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_INFO, "cf-serverd access list is empty, no files are visible");
return false;
}
conn->maproot = false;
for (Auth *ap = SERVER_ACCESS.admit; ap != NULL; ap = ap->next)
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, "Examining rule in access list (%s,%s)", transrequest, ap->path);
/* TODO MapName when constructing this list. */
strlcpy(transpath, ap->path, CF_BUFSIZE);
MapName(transpath);
if (PathMatch(transpath, transrequest))
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, "Found a matching rule in access list (%s in %s)", transrequest, transpath);
if (stat(transpath, &statbuf) == -1)
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_INFO,
"Warning cannot stat file object %s in admit/grant, or access list refers to dangling link",
transpath);
continue;
}
if (!encrypt && ap->encrypt)
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_ERR, "File %s requires encrypt connection...will not serve", transpath);
access = false;
}
else
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, "Checking whether to map root privileges..");
if (IsMatchItemIn(ap->maproot, conn->ipaddr) ||
IsRegexItemIn(ctx, ap->maproot, conn->hostname))
{
conn->maproot = true;
Log(LOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, "Mapping root privileges to access non-root files");
}
if (IsMatchItemIn(ap->accesslist, conn->ipaddr) ||
IsRegexItemIn(ctx, ap->accesslist, conn->hostname))
{
access = true;
Log(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, "Access granted to host: %s", conn->ipaddr);
}
}
break;
}
}
for (Auth *dp = SERVER_ACCESS.deny; dp != NULL; dp = dp->next)
{
strlcpy(transpath, dp->path, CF_BUFSIZE);
MapName(transpath);
if (PathMatch(transpath, transrequest))
{
if ((IsMatchItemIn(dp->accesslist, conn->ipaddr)) ||
(IsRegexItemIn(ctx, dp->accesslist, conn->hostname)))
{
access = false;
Log(LOG_LEVEL_INFO,
"Host '%s' in deny list, explicitly denying access to '%s' in '%s'",
conn->ipaddr, transrequest, transpath);
break;
}
}
}
if (access)
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, "Host %s granted access to %s", conn->hostname, req_path);
if (encrypt && LOGENCRYPT)
{
/* Log files that were marked as requiring encryption */
Log(LOG_LEVEL_INFO, "Host %s granted access to %s", conn->hostname, req_path);
}
}
else
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_INFO, "Host %s denied access to %s", conn->hostname, req_path);
}
return access;
}
/* Checks the "varadmit" legacy ACL. */
static int LiteralAccessControl(EvalContext *ctx, char *in, ServerConnectionState *conn, int encrypt)
{
Auth *ap;
int access = false;
char name[CF_BUFSIZE];
name[0] = '\0';
if (strncmp(in, "VAR", 3) == 0)
{
sscanf(in, "VAR %255[^\n]", name);
}
else if (strncmp(in, "CALL_ME_BACK", strlen("CALL_ME_BACK")) == 0)
{
sscanf(in, "CALL_ME_BACK %255[^\n]", name);
}
else
{
sscanf(in, "QUERY %128s", name);
}
conn->maproot = false;
for (ap = SERVER_ACCESS.varadmit; ap != NULL; ap = ap->next)
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, "Examining rule in access list (%s,%s)?", name, ap->path);
if (strcmp(ap->path, name) == 0) /* exact match */
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, "Found a matching rule in access list (%s in %s)", name, ap->path);
if ((!ap->literal) && (!ap->variable))
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_ERR,
"Variable/query '%s' requires a literal server item...cannot set variable directly by path",
ap->path);
access = false;
break;
}
if (!encrypt && ap->encrypt)
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_ERR, "Variable %s requires encrypt connection...will not serve", name);
access = false;
break;
}
else
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, "Checking whether to map root privileges");
if ((IsMatchItemIn(ap->maproot, conn->ipaddr)) ||
(IsRegexItemIn(ctx, ap->maproot, conn->hostname)))
{
conn->maproot = true;
Log(LOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, "Mapping root privileges");
}
else
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, "No root privileges granted");
}
if ((IsMatchItemIn(ap->accesslist, conn->ipaddr))
|| (IsRegexItemIn(ctx, ap->accesslist, conn->hostname)))
{
access = true;
Log(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, "Access privileges - match found");
}
}
}
}
for (ap = SERVER_ACCESS.vardeny; ap != NULL; ap = ap->next)
{
if (strcmp(ap->path, name) == 0)
{
if ((IsMatchItemIn(ap->accesslist, conn->ipaddr))
|| (IsRegexItemIn(ctx, ap->accesslist, conn->hostname)))
{
access = false;
Log(LOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, "Host %s explicitly denied access to %s", conn->hostname, name);
break;
}
}
}
if (access)
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, "Host %s granted access to literal '%s'", conn->hostname, name);
if (encrypt && LOGENCRYPT)
{
/* Log files that were marked as requiring encryption */
Log(LOG_LEVEL_INFO, "Host %s granted access to literal '%s'", conn->hostname, name);
}
}
else
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, "Host %s denied access to literal '%s'", conn->hostname, name);
}
return access;
}
/* Checks the "varadmit" legacy ACL. */
static Item *ContextAccessControl(EvalContext *ctx, char *in, ServerConnectionState *conn, int encrypt)
{
Auth *ap;
int access = false;
char client_regex[CF_BUFSIZE];
Item *ip, *matches = NULL;
int ret = sscanf(in, "CONTEXT %255[^\n]", client_regex);
Item *persistent_classes = ListPersistentClasses();
if (ret != 1 || persistent_classes == NULL)
{
return NULL;
}
for (ip = persistent_classes; ip != NULL; ip = ip->next)
{
/* Does the class match the regex that the agent requested? */
if (StringMatchFull(client_regex, ip->name))
{
for (ap = SERVER_ACCESS.varadmit; ap != NULL; ap = ap->next)
{
/* Does the class match any of the regex in ACLs? */
if (StringMatchFull(ap->path, ip->name))
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE,
"Found a matching rule in access list (%s in %s)",
ip->name, ap->path);
if (!ap->classpattern)
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_ERR,
"Context %s requires a literal server item... "
"cannot set variable directly by path",
ap->path);
access = false;
continue;
}
if (!encrypt && ap->encrypt)
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_ERR,
"Context %s requires encrypt connection... "
"will not serve",
ip->name);
access = false;
break;
}
else
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG,
"Checking whether to map root privileges");
if ((IsMatchItemIn(ap->maproot, conn->ipaddr))
|| (IsRegexItemIn(ctx, ap->maproot, conn->hostname)))
{
conn->maproot = true;
Log(LOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE,
"Mapping root privileges");
}
else
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE,
"No root privileges granted");
}
if ((IsMatchItemIn(ap->accesslist, conn->ipaddr))
|| (IsRegexItemIn(ctx, ap->accesslist, conn->hostname)))
{
access = true;
Log(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG,
"Access privileges - match found");
}
}
}
}
for (ap = SERVER_ACCESS.vardeny; ap != NULL; ap = ap->next)
{
if (strcmp(ap->path, ip->name) == 0)
{
if ((IsMatchItemIn(ap->accesslist, conn->ipaddr))
|| (IsRegexItemIn(ctx, ap->accesslist, conn->hostname)))
{
access = false;
Log(LOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE,
"Host %s explicitly denied access to context %s",
conn->hostname, ip->name);
break;
}
}
}
if (access)
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE,
"Host %s granted access to context '%s'",
conn->hostname, ip->name);
AppendItem(&matches, ip->name, NULL);
if (encrypt && LOGENCRYPT)
{
/* Log files that were marked as requiring encryption */
Log(LOG_LEVEL_INFO,
"Host %s granted access to context '%s'",
conn->hostname, ip->name);
}
}
else
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE,
"Host %s denied access to context '%s'",
conn->hostname, ip->name);
}
}
}
DeleteItemList(persistent_classes);
return matches;
}
static int cfscanf(char *in, int len1, int len2, char *out1, char *out2, char *out3)
{
int len3 = 0;
char *sp;
sp = in;
memcpy(out1, sp, len1);
out1[len1] = '\0';
sp += len1 + 1;
memcpy(out2, sp, len2);
sp += len2 + 1;
len3 = strlen(sp);
memcpy(out3, sp, len3);
out3[len3] = '\0';
return (len1 + len2 + len3 + 2);
}
static void SetConnectionData(ServerConnectionState *conn, char *buf)
{
char ipstring[CF_MAXVARSIZE], fqname[CF_MAXVARSIZE], username[CF_MAXVARSIZE];
Log(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, "Connecting host identifies itself as '%s'", buf);
memset(ipstring, 0, CF_MAXVARSIZE);
memset(fqname, 0, CF_MAXVARSIZE);
memset(username, 0, CF_MAXVARSIZE);
sscanf(buf, "%255s %255s %255s", ipstring, fqname, username);
/* The "ipstring" that the client sends is currently *ignored* as
* conn->ipaddr is always set from the connecting socket address. */
Log(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, "(ipstring=[%s],fqname=[%s],username=[%s],socket=[%s])",
ipstring, fqname, username, conn->ipaddr);
ToLowerStrInplace(fqname);
strlcpy(conn->hostname, fqname, CF_MAXVARSIZE);
SetConnIdentity(conn, username);
}
static bool CheckStoreKey(ServerConnectionState *conn, RSA *key)
{
RSA *savedkey;
const char *udigest = KeyPrintableHash(ConnectionInfoKey(conn->conn_info));
assert(udigest != NULL);
if ((savedkey = HavePublicKey(conn->username, conn->ipaddr, udigest)))
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE,
"A public key was already known from %s/%s - no trust required",
conn->hostname, conn->ipaddr);
const BIGNUM *key_n, *key_e, *savedkey_n, *savedkey_e;
RSA_get0_key(key, &key_n, &key_e, NULL);
RSA_get0_key(savedkey, &savedkey_n, &savedkey_e, NULL);
if ((BN_cmp(savedkey_e, key_e) == 0) && (BN_cmp(savedkey_n, key_n) == 0))
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE,
"The public key identity was confirmed as %s@%s",
conn->username, conn->hostname);
SendTransaction(conn->conn_info, "OK: key accepted", 0, CF_DONE);
RSA_free(savedkey);
return true;
}
}
/* Finally, if we're still here then the key is new (not in ppkeys
* directory): Allow access only if host is listed in "trustkeysfrom" body
* server control option. */
if ((SERVER_ACCESS.trustkeylist != NULL) &&
(IsMatchItemIn(SERVER_ACCESS.trustkeylist, conn->ipaddr)))
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE,
"Host %s/%s was found in the list of hosts to trust",
conn->hostname, conn->ipaddr);
SendTransaction(conn->conn_info,
"OK: unknown key was accepted on trust", 0, CF_DONE);
SavePublicKey(conn->username, udigest, key);
return true;
}
else
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE,
"No previous key found, and unable to accept this one on trust");
SendTransaction(conn->conn_info,
"BAD: key could not be accepted on trust",
0, CF_DONE);
return false;
}
}
static bool AuthenticationDialogue(ServerConnectionState *conn, char *recvbuffer, unsigned int recvlen)
{
unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + 1] = { 0 };
if (PRIVKEY == NULL || PUBKEY == NULL)
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_ERR, "No public/private key pair is loaded,"
" please create one using cf-key");
return false;
}
int PRIVKEY_size = RSA_size(PRIVKEY);
int digestLen;
HashMethod digestType;
if (FIPS_MODE)
{
digestType = CF_DEFAULT_DIGEST;
digestLen = CF_DEFAULT_DIGEST_LEN;
}
else
{
digestType = HASH_METHOD_MD5;
digestLen = CF_MD5_LEN;
}
/* parameters received in SAUTH command */
char iscrypt, enterprise_field;
/* proposition C1 - SAUTH command */
{
char sauth[10] = { 0 };
unsigned int crypt_len; /* received encrypted challenge length */
unsigned int challenge_len; /* challenge length after decryption */
int nparam = sscanf(recvbuffer, "%9s %c %u %u %c",
sauth, &iscrypt, &crypt_len,
&challenge_len, &enterprise_field);
if (nparam >= 1 && strcmp(sauth, "SAUTH") != 0)
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_ERR, "Authentication failure: "
"was expecting SAUTH command but got '%s'",
sauth);
return false;
}
if (nparam != 5 && nparam != 4)
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_ERR, "Authentication failure: "
"peer sent only %d arguments to SAUTH command",
nparam - 1);
return false;
}
/* CFEngine 2 had no enterprise/community differentiation. */
if (nparam == 4)
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE,
"Peer sent only 4 parameters, "
"assuming it is a legacy community client");
enterprise_field = 'c';
}
if ((challenge_len == 0) || (crypt_len == 0))
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_ERR,
"Authentication failure: received unexpected challenge length "
"(%u that decrypts to %u bytes)",
challenge_len, crypt_len);
return false;
}
if (crypt_len > CF_NONCELEN * 2)
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_ERR, "Authentication failure: "
"received encrypted challenge is too long "
"(%d bytes)", crypt_len);
return false;
}
if (challenge_len > CF_NONCELEN * 2)
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_ERR, "Authentication failure: "
"received challenge is too long (%u bytes)",
challenge_len);
return false;
}
Log(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG,
"Challenge encryption = %c, challenge_len = %u, crypt_len = %u",
iscrypt, challenge_len, crypt_len);
char *challenge;
char decrypted_challenge[PRIVKEY_size];
if (iscrypt == 'y') /* challenge came encrypted */
{
if (recvlen < CF_RSA_PROTO_OFFSET + crypt_len)
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_ERR, "Authentication failure: peer sent only %d "
"bytes as encrypted challenge but claims to have sent %u bytes",
recvlen - CF_RSA_PROTO_OFFSET, crypt_len);
}
int ret = RSA_private_decrypt(
crypt_len,
(const unsigned char *) recvbuffer + CF_RSA_PROTO_OFFSET,
(unsigned char *) decrypted_challenge,
PRIVKEY,
RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
if (ret < 0)
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_ERR, "Authentication failure: "
"private decrypt of received challenge failed (%s)",
CryptoLastErrorString());
Log(LOG_LEVEL_ERR,
"Probably the client has wrong public key for this server");
return false;
}
if ((unsigned int) ret != challenge_len)
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_ERR, "Authentication failure: "
"private decrypt of received challenge (%u bytes) "
"resulted in %d bytes instead of promised %u bytes",
crypt_len, ret, challenge_len);
return false;
}
challenge = decrypted_challenge;
}
else /* challenge came unencrypted */
{
if (challenge_len != crypt_len)
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_ERR,
"Authentication failure: peer sent illegal challenge "
"(challenge_len %u != crypt_len %u)",
challenge_len, crypt_len);
return false;
}
if (recvlen < CF_RSA_PROTO_OFFSET + challenge_len)
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_ERR,
"Authentication failure: peer sent only %d "
"bytes as challenge but claims to have sent %u bytes",
recvlen - CF_RSA_PROTO_OFFSET, challenge_len);
return false;
}
challenge = &recvbuffer[CF_RSA_PROTO_OFFSET];
}
/* Client's ID is now established by key or trusted, reply with digest */
HashString(challenge, challenge_len, digest, digestType);
}
BIGNUM *newkey_n, *newkey_e;
/* proposition C2 - Receive client's public key modulus */
{
int len_n = ReceiveTransaction(conn->conn_info, recvbuffer, NULL);
if (len_n == -1)
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_ERR, "Authentication failure: "
"error while receiving public key modulus");
return false;
}
if ((newkey_n = BN_mpi2bn((unsigned char *) recvbuffer, len_n, NULL)) == NULL)
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_ERR, "Authentication failure: "
"private decrypt of received public key modulus failed "
"(%s)", CryptoLastErrorString());
return false;
}
}
/* proposition C3 - Receive client's public key exponent. */
{
int len_e = ReceiveTransaction(conn->conn_info, recvbuffer, NULL);
if (len_e == -1)
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_ERR, "Authentication failure: "
"error while receiving public key exponent");
return false;
}
if ((newkey_e = BN_mpi2bn((unsigned char *) recvbuffer, len_e, NULL)) == NULL)
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_ERR, "Authentication failure: "
"private decrypt of received public key exponent failed "
"(%s)", CryptoLastErrorString());
BN_free(newkey_n);
return false;
}
}
RSA *newkey = RSA_new();
if (newkey == NULL)
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_ERR, "Failed to allocate RSA key: %s",
TLSErrorString(ERR_get_error()));
BN_free(newkey_n);
BN_free(newkey_e);
return false;
}
if (RSA_set0_key(newkey, newkey_n, newkey_e, NULL) != 1)
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_ERR, "Failed to set RSA key: %s",
TLSErrorString(ERR_get_error()));
BN_free(newkey_n);
BN_free(newkey_e);
RSA_free(newkey);
return false;
}
/* Compute and store hash of the client's public key. */
{
Key *key = KeyNew(newkey, CF_DEFAULT_DIGEST);
conn->conn_info->remote_key = key;
Log(LOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, "Peer's identity is: %s",
KeyPrintableHash(key));
LastSaw1(conn->ipaddr, KeyPrintableHash(key),
LAST_SEEN_ROLE_ACCEPT);
/* Do we want to trust the received key? */
if (!CheckStoreKey(conn, newkey)) /* conceals proposition S1 */
{
return false;
}
}
/* proposition S2 - reply with digest of challenge. */
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, "Sending challenge response");
SendTransaction(conn->conn_info, (const char *) digest, digestLen, CF_DONE);
}
/* proposition S3 - send counter-challenge */
{
BIGNUM *counter_challenge_BN = BN_new();
if (counter_challenge_BN == NULL)
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_ERR, "Authentication failure: "
"cannot allocate BIGNUM structure for counter-challenge");
return false;
}
BN_rand(counter_challenge_BN, CF_NONCELEN, 0, 0);
unsigned char counter_challenge[CF_BUFSIZE];
int counter_challenge_len = BN_bn2mpi(counter_challenge_BN, counter_challenge);
BN_free(counter_challenge_BN);
/* Compute counter-challenge digest. */
HashString((const char *) counter_challenge, counter_challenge_len, digest, digestType);
/* Encryption buffer is always RSA_size(key) and buffer needs 11 bytes,
* see RSA_public_encrypt manual. */
int encrypted_len = RSA_size(newkey);
unsigned char encrypted_counter_challenge[encrypted_len];
assert(counter_challenge_len < encrypted_len - 11);
int ret = RSA_public_encrypt(counter_challenge_len, counter_challenge,
encrypted_counter_challenge, newkey,
RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
if (ret != encrypted_len)
{
if (ret == -1)
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_ERR, "Authentication failure: "
"public encryption of counter-challenge failed "
"(%s)", CryptoLastErrorString());
}
else
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_ERR, "Authentication failure: "
"public encryption of counter-challenge failed "
"(result length %d but should be %d)",
ret, encrypted_len);
}
return false;
}
Log(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, "Sending counter-challenge");
SendTransaction(conn->conn_info, (const char *) encrypted_counter_challenge,
encrypted_len, CF_DONE);
}
/* proposition S4, S5 - If the client doesn't have our public key, send it. */
{
if (iscrypt != 'y')
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, "Sending server's public key");
unsigned char bignum_buf[CF_BUFSIZE] = { 0 };
const BIGNUM *n, *e;
RSA_get0_key(PUBKEY, &n, &e, NULL);
/* proposition S4 - conditional */
int len_n = BN_bn2mpi(n, bignum_buf);
SendTransaction(conn->conn_info, (const char *) bignum_buf, len_n, CF_DONE);
/* proposition S5 - conditional */
int len_e = BN_bn2mpi(e, bignum_buf);
SendTransaction(conn->conn_info, (const char *) bignum_buf, len_e, CF_DONE);
}
}
/* proposition C4 - Receive counter-challenge response. */
{
unsigned char recv_buf[CF_BUFSIZE] = { 0 };
int recv_len = ReceiveTransaction(conn->conn_info, (char *) recv_buf, NULL);
if (recv_len < digestLen)
{
if (recv_len == -1)
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_ERR, "Authentication failure: "
"error receiving counter-challenge response; "
"maybe the client does not trust our key?");
}
else /* 0 < recv_len < expected_len */
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_ERR, "Authentication failure: "
"error receiving counter-challenge response, "
"only got %d out of %d bytes",
recv_len, digestLen);
}
return false;
}
if (HashesMatch(digest, recv_buf, digestType))
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE,
"Authentication of client %s/%s achieved",
conn->hostname, conn->ipaddr);
}
else
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_ERR, "Authentication failure: "
"counter-challenge response was incorrect");
return false;
}
}
/* proposition C5 - Receive session key */
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, "Receiving session key from client...");
unsigned char session_key[CF_BUFSIZE] = { 0 };
int session_key_size = CfSessionKeySize(enterprise_field);
int keylen = ReceiveTransaction(conn->conn_info, (char *) session_key, NULL);
Log(LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG,
"Received encrypted session key of %d bytes, "
"should decrypt to %d bytes",
keylen, session_key_size);
if (keylen == -1)
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_ERR, "Authentication failure: "
"error receiving session key");
return false;
}
if (keylen > CF_BUFSIZE / 2)
{
Log(LOG_LEVEL_ERR, "Authentication failure: "