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jlindgren90
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…ata and not linked with libtraceevent
When we have a perf.data file with tracepoints, such as:
# perf evlist -f
probe_perf:lzma_decompress_to_file
# Tip: use 'perf evlist --trace-fields' to show fields for tracepoint events
#
We end up segfaulting when using perf built with NO_LIBTRACEEVENT=1 by
trying to find an evsel with a NULL 'event_name' variable:
(gdb) run report --stdio -f
Starting program: /root/bin/perf report --stdio -f
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x000000000055219d in find_evsel (evlist=0xfda7b0, event_name=0x0) at util/sort.c:2830
warning: Source file is more recent than executable.
2830 if (event_name[0] == '%') {
Missing separate debuginfos, use: dnf debuginfo-install bzip2-libs-1.0.8-11.fc36.x86_64 cyrus-sasl-lib-2.1.27-18.fc36.x86_64 elfutils-debuginfod-client-0.188-3.fc36.x86_64 elfutils-libelf-0.188-3.fc36.x86_64 elfutils-libs-0.188-3.fc36.x86_64 glibc-2.35-20.fc36.x86_64 keyutils-libs-1.6.1-4.fc36.x86_64 krb5-libs-1.19.2-12.fc36.x86_64 libbrotli-1.0.9-7.fc36.x86_64 libcap-2.48-4.fc36.x86_64 libcom_err-1.46.5-2.fc36.x86_64 libcurl-7.82.0-12.fc36.x86_64 libevent-2.1.12-6.fc36.x86_64 libgcc-12.2.1-4.fc36.x86_64 libidn2-2.3.4-1.fc36.x86_64 libnghttp2-1.51.0-1.fc36.x86_64 libpsl-0.21.1-5.fc36.x86_64 libselinux-3.3-4.fc36.x86_64 libssh-0.9.6-4.fc36.x86_64 libstdc++-12.2.1-4.fc36.x86_64 libunistring-1.0-1.fc36.x86_64 libunwind-1.6.2-2.fc36.x86_64 libxcrypt-4.4.33-4.fc36.x86_64 libzstd-1.5.2-2.fc36.x86_64 numactl-libs-2.0.14-5.fc36.x86_64 opencsd-1.2.0-1.fc36.x86_64 openldap-2.6.3-1.fc36.x86_64 openssl-libs-3.0.5-2.fc36.x86_64 slang-2.3.2-11.fc36.x86_64 xz-libs-5.2.5-9.fc36.x86_64 zlib-1.2.11-33.fc36.x86_64
(gdb) bt
#0 0x000000000055219d in find_evsel (evlist=0xfda7b0, event_name=0x0) at util/sort.c:2830
archlinux#1 0x0000000000552416 in add_dynamic_entry (evlist=0xfda7b0, tok=0xffb6eb "trace", level=2) at util/sort.c:2976
archlinux#2 0x0000000000552d26 in sort_dimension__add (list=0xf93e00 <perf_hpp_list>, tok=0xffb6eb "trace", evlist=0xfda7b0, level=2) at util/sort.c:3193
archlinux#3 0x0000000000552e1c in setup_sort_list (list=0xf93e00 <perf_hpp_list>, str=0xffb6eb "trace", evlist=0xfda7b0) at util/sort.c:3227
archlinux#4 0x00000000005532fa in __setup_sorting (evlist=0xfda7b0) at util/sort.c:3381
archlinux#5 0x0000000000553cdc in setup_sorting (evlist=0xfda7b0) at util/sort.c:3608
archlinux#6 0x000000000042eb9f in cmd_report (argc=0, argv=0x7fffffffe470) at builtin-report.c:1596
archlinux#7 0x00000000004aee7e in run_builtin (p=0xf64ca0 <commands+288>, argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe470) at perf.c:330
archlinux#8 0x00000000004af0f2 in handle_internal_command (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe470) at perf.c:384
archlinux#9 0x00000000004af241 in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffe29c, argv=0x7fffffffe290) at perf.c:428
torvalds#10 0x00000000004af5fc in main (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe470) at perf.c:562
(gdb)
So check if we have tracepoint events in add_dynamic_entry() and bail
out instead:
# perf report --stdio -f
This perf binary isn't linked with libtraceevent, can't process probe_perf:lzma_decompress_to_file
Error:
Unknown --sort key: `trace'
#
Fixes: 378ef0f ("perf build: Use libtraceevent from the system")
Acked-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Y7MDb7kRaHZB6APC@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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The inline assembly for arm64's cmpxchg_double*() implementations use a +Q constraint to hazard against other accesses to the memory location being exchanged. However, the pointer passed to the constraint is a pointer to unsigned long, and thus the hazard only applies to the first 8 bytes of the location. GCC can take advantage of this, assuming that other portions of the location are unchanged, leading to a number of potential problems. This is similar to what we fixed back in commit: fee960b ("arm64: xchg: hazard against entire exchange variable") ... but we forgot to adjust cmpxchg_double*() similarly at the same time. The same problem applies, as demonstrated with the following test: | struct big { | u64 lo, hi; | } __aligned(128); | | unsigned long foo(struct big *b) | { | u64 hi_old, hi_new; | | hi_old = b->hi; | cmpxchg_double_local(&b->lo, &b->hi, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78); | hi_new = b->hi; | | return hi_old ^ hi_new; | } ... which GCC 12.1.0 compiles as: | 0000000000000000 <foo>: | 0: d503233f paciasp | 4: aa0003e4 mov x4, x0 | 8: 1400000e b 40 <foo+0x40> | c: d2800240 mov x0, #0x12 // torvalds#18 | 10: d2800681 mov x1, #0x34 // #52 | 14: aa0003e5 mov x5, x0 | 18: aa0103e6 mov x6, x1 | 1c: d2800ac2 mov x2, #0x56 // torvalds#86 | 20: d2800f03 mov x3, #0x78 // torvalds#120 | 24: 48207c82 casp x0, x1, x2, x3, [x4] | 28: ca050000 eor x0, x0, x5 | 2c: ca060021 eor x1, x1, x6 | 30: aa010000 orr x0, x0, x1 | 34: d2800000 mov x0, #0x0 // #0 <--- BANG | 38: d50323bf autiasp | 3c: d65f03c0 ret | 40: d2800240 mov x0, #0x12 // torvalds#18 | 44: d2800681 mov x1, #0x34 // #52 | 48: d2800ac2 mov x2, #0x56 // torvalds#86 | 4c: d2800f03 mov x3, #0x78 // torvalds#120 | 50: f9800091 prfm pstl1strm, [x4] | 54: c87f1885 ldxp x5, x6, [x4] | 58: ca0000a5 eor x5, x5, x0 | 5c: ca0100c6 eor x6, x6, x1 | 60: aa0600a6 orr x6, x5, x6 | 64: b5000066 cbnz x6, 70 <foo+0x70> | 68: c8250c82 stxp w5, x2, x3, [x4] | 6c: 35ffff45 cbnz w5, 54 <foo+0x54> | 70: d2800000 mov x0, #0x0 // #0 <--- BANG | 74: d50323bf autiasp | 78: d65f03c0 ret Notice that at the lines with "BANG" comments, GCC has assumed that the higher 8 bytes are unchanged by the cmpxchg_double() call, and that `hi_old ^ hi_new` can be reduced to a constant zero, for both LSE and LL/SC versions of cmpxchg_double(). This patch fixes the issue by passing a pointer to __uint128_t into the +Q constraint, ensuring that the compiler hazards against the entire 16 bytes being modified. With this change, GCC 12.1.0 compiles the above test as: | 0000000000000000 <foo>: | 0: f9400407 ldr x7, [x0, archlinux#8] | 4: d503233f paciasp | 8: aa0003e4 mov x4, x0 | c: 1400000f b 48 <foo+0x48> | 10: d2800240 mov x0, #0x12 // torvalds#18 | 14: d2800681 mov x1, #0x34 // #52 | 18: aa0003e5 mov x5, x0 | 1c: aa0103e6 mov x6, x1 | 20: d2800ac2 mov x2, #0x56 // torvalds#86 | 24: d2800f03 mov x3, #0x78 // torvalds#120 | 28: 48207c82 casp x0, x1, x2, x3, [x4] | 2c: ca050000 eor x0, x0, x5 | 30: ca060021 eor x1, x1, x6 | 34: aa010000 orr x0, x0, x1 | 38: f9400480 ldr x0, [x4, archlinux#8] | 3c: d50323bf autiasp | 40: ca0000e0 eor x0, x7, x0 | 44: d65f03c0 ret | 48: d2800240 mov x0, #0x12 // torvalds#18 | 4c: d2800681 mov x1, #0x34 // #52 | 50: d2800ac2 mov x2, #0x56 // torvalds#86 | 54: d2800f03 mov x3, #0x78 // torvalds#120 | 58: f9800091 prfm pstl1strm, [x4] | 5c: c87f1885 ldxp x5, x6, [x4] | 60: ca0000a5 eor x5, x5, x0 | 64: ca0100c6 eor x6, x6, x1 | 68: aa0600a6 orr x6, x5, x6 | 6c: b5000066 cbnz x6, 78 <foo+0x78> | 70: c8250c82 stxp w5, x2, x3, [x4] | 74: 35ffff45 cbnz w5, 5c <foo+0x5c> | 78: f9400480 ldr x0, [x4, archlinux#8] | 7c: d50323bf autiasp | 80: ca0000e0 eor x0, x7, x0 | 84: d65f03c0 ret ... sampling the high 8 bytes before and after the cmpxchg, and performing an EOR, as we'd expect. For backporting, I've tested this atop linux-4.9.y with GCC 5.5.0. Note that linux-4.9.y is oldest currently supported stable release, and mandates GCC 5.1+. Unfortunately I couldn't get a GCC 5.1 binary to run on my machines due to library incompatibilities. I've also used a standalone test to check that we can use a __uint128_t pointer in a +Q constraint at least as far back as GCC 4.8.5 and LLVM 3.9.1. Fixes: 5284e1b ("arm64: xchg: Implement cmpxchg_double") Fixes: e9a4b79 ("arm64: cmpxchg_dbl: patch in lse instructions when supported by the CPU") Reported-by: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Y6DEfQXymYVgL3oJ@boqun-archlinux/ Reported-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Y6GXoO4qmH9OIZ5Q@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net/ Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Steve Capper <steve.capper@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230104151626.3262137-1-mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
jlindgren90
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In Google internal bug 265639009 we've received an (as yet) unreproducible crash report from an aarch64 GKI 5.10.149-android13 running device. AFAICT the source code is at: https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/common/+/refs/tags/ASB-2022-12-05_13-5.10 The call stack is: ncm_close() -> ncm_notify() -> ncm_do_notify() with the crash at: ncm_do_notify+0x98/0x270 Code: 79000d0b b9000a6c f940012a f9400269 (b9405d4) Which I believe disassembles to (I don't know ARM assembly, but it looks sane enough to me...): // halfword (16-bit) store presumably to event->wLength (at offset 6 of struct usb_cdc_notification) 0B 0D 00 79 strh w11, [x8, archlinux#6] // word (32-bit) store presumably to req->Length (at offset 8 of struct usb_request) 6C 0A 00 B9 str w12, [x19, archlinux#8] // x10 (NULL) was read here from offset 0 of valid pointer x9 // IMHO we're reading 'cdev->gadget' and getting NULL // gadget is indeed at offset 0 of struct usb_composite_dev 2A 01 40 F9 ldr x10, [x9] // loading req->buf pointer, which is at offset 0 of struct usb_request 69 02 40 F9 ldr x9, [x19] // x10 is null, crash, appears to be attempt to read cdev->gadget->max_speed 4B 5D 40 B9 ldr w11, [x10, #0x5c] which seems to line up with ncm_do_notify() case NCM_NOTIFY_SPEED code fragment: event->wLength = cpu_to_le16(8); req->length = NCM_STATUS_BYTECOUNT; /* SPEED_CHANGE data is up/down speeds in bits/sec */ data = req->buf + sizeof *event; data[0] = cpu_to_le32(ncm_bitrate(cdev->gadget)); My analysis of registers and NULL ptr deref crash offset (Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 000000000000005c) heavily suggests that the crash is due to 'cdev->gadget' being NULL when executing: data[0] = cpu_to_le32(ncm_bitrate(cdev->gadget)); which calls: ncm_bitrate(NULL) which then calls: gadget_is_superspeed(NULL) which reads ((struct usb_gadget *)NULL)->max_speed and hits a panic. AFAICT, if I'm counting right, the offset of max_speed is indeed 0x5C. (remember there's a GKI KABI reservation of 16 bytes in struct work_struct) It's not at all clear to me how this is all supposed to work... but returning 0 seems much better than panic-ing... Cc: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org> Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com> Cc: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com> Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230117131839.1138208-1-maze@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
jlindgren90
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The driver shutdown callback (which sends EDL_SOC_RESET to the device over serdev) should not be invoked when HCI device is not open (e.g. if hci_dev_open_sync() failed), because the serdev and its TTY are not open either. Also skip this step if device is powered off (qca_power_shutdown()). The shutdown callback causes use-after-free during system reboot with Qualcomm Atheros Bluetooth: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0072662f67726fd7 ... CPU: 6 PID: 1 Comm: systemd-shutdow Tainted: G W 6.1.0-rt5-00325-g8a5f56bcfcca archlinux#8 Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. Robotics RB5 (DT) Call trace: tty_driver_flush_buffer+0x4/0x30 serdev_device_write_flush+0x24/0x34 qca_serdev_shutdown+0x80/0x130 [hci_uart] device_shutdown+0x15c/0x260 kernel_restart+0x48/0xac KASAN report: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tty_driver_flush_buffer+0x1c/0x50 Read of size 8 at addr ffff16270c2e0018 by task systemd-shutdow/1 CPU: 7 PID: 1 Comm: systemd-shutdow Not tainted 6.1.0-next-20221220-00014-gb85aaf97fb01-dirty torvalds#28 Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. Robotics RB5 (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace.part.0+0xdc/0xf0 show_stack+0x18/0x30 dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84 print_report+0x188/0x488 kasan_report+0xa4/0xf0 __asan_load8+0x80/0xac tty_driver_flush_buffer+0x1c/0x50 ttyport_write_flush+0x34/0x44 serdev_device_write_flush+0x48/0x60 qca_serdev_shutdown+0x124/0x274 device_shutdown+0x1e8/0x350 kernel_restart+0x48/0xb0 __do_sys_reboot+0x244/0x2d0 __arm64_sys_reboot+0x54/0x70 invoke_syscall+0x60/0x190 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x7c/0x160 do_el0_svc+0x44/0xf0 el0_svc+0x2c/0x6c el0t_64_sync_handler+0xbc/0x140 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 Fixes: 7e7bbdd ("Bluetooth: hci_qca: Fix qca6390 enable failure after warm reboot") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
heftig
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code path:
ocfs2_ioctl_move_extents
ocfs2_move_extents
ocfs2_defrag_extent
__ocfs2_move_extent
+ ocfs2_journal_access_di
+ ocfs2_split_extent //sub-paths call jbd2_journal_restart
+ ocfs2_journal_dirty //crash by jbs2 ASSERT
crash stacks:
PID: 11297 TASK: ffff974a676dcd00 CPU: 67 COMMAND: "defragfs.ocfs2"
#0 [ffffb25d8dad3900] machine_kexec at ffffffff8386fe01
#1 [ffffb25d8dad3958] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8395959d
#2 [ffffb25d8dad3a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff8395a45d
#3 [ffffb25d8dad3a38] oops_end at ffffffff83836d3f
#4 [ffffb25d8dad3a58] do_trap at ffffffff83833205
#5 [ffffb25d8dad3aa0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff83833aa6
#6 [ffffb25d8dad3ac0] invalid_op at ffffffff84200d18
[exception RIP: jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata+0x2ba]
RIP: ffffffffc09ca54a RSP: ffffb25d8dad3b70 RFLAGS: 00010207
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9706eedc5248 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff97337029ea28 RDI: ffff9706eedc5250
RBP: ffff9703c3520200 R8: 000000000f46b0b2 R9: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000001000000fe R12: ffff97337029ea28
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9703de59bf60 R15: ffff9706eedc5250
ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018
#7 [ffffb25d8dad3ba8] ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc137fb95 [ocfs2]
#8 [ffffb25d8dad3be8] __ocfs2_move_extent at ffffffffc139a950 [ocfs2]
#9 [ffffb25d8dad3c80] ocfs2_defrag_extent at ffffffffc139b2d2 [ocfs2]
Analysis
This bug has the same root cause of 'commit 7f27ec9 ("ocfs2: call
ocfs2_journal_access_di() before ocfs2_journal_dirty() in
ocfs2_write_end_nolock()")'. For this bug, jbd2_journal_restart() is
called by ocfs2_split_extent() during defragmenting.
How to fix
For ocfs2_split_extent() can handle journal operations totally by itself.
Caller doesn't need to call journal access/dirty pair, and caller only
needs to call journal start/stop pair. The fix method is to remove
journal access/dirty from __ocfs2_move_extent().
The discussion for this patch:
https://oss.oracle.com/pipermail/ocfs2-devel/2023-February/000647.html
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230217003717.32469-1-heming.zhao@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
heftig
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When a system with E810 with existing VFs gets rebooted the following hang may be observed. Pid 1 is hung in iavf_remove(), part of a network driver: PID: 1 TASK: ffff965400e5a340 CPU: 24 COMMAND: "systemd-shutdow" #0 [ffffaad04005fa50] __schedule at ffffffff8b3239cb #1 [ffffaad04005fae8] schedule at ffffffff8b323e2d #2 [ffffaad04005fb00] schedule_hrtimeout_range_clock at ffffffff8b32cebc #3 [ffffaad04005fb80] usleep_range_state at ffffffff8b32c930 #4 [ffffaad04005fbb0] iavf_remove at ffffffffc12b9b4c [iavf] #5 [ffffaad04005fbf0] pci_device_remove at ffffffff8add7513 #6 [ffffaad04005fc10] device_release_driver_internal at ffffffff8af08baa #7 [ffffaad04005fc40] pci_stop_bus_device at ffffffff8adcc5fc #8 [ffffaad04005fc60] pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device at ffffffff8adcc81e #9 [ffffaad04005fc70] pci_iov_remove_virtfn at ffffffff8adf9429 torvalds#10 [ffffaad04005fca8] sriov_disable at ffffffff8adf98e4 torvalds#11 [ffffaad04005fcc8] ice_free_vfs at ffffffffc04bb2c8 [ice] torvalds#12 [ffffaad04005fd10] ice_remove at ffffffffc04778fe [ice] torvalds#13 [ffffaad04005fd38] ice_shutdown at ffffffffc0477946 [ice] torvalds#14 [ffffaad04005fd50] pci_device_shutdown at ffffffff8add58f1 torvalds#15 [ffffaad04005fd70] device_shutdown at ffffffff8af05386 torvalds#16 [ffffaad04005fd98] kernel_restart at ffffffff8a92a870 torvalds#17 [ffffaad04005fda8] __do_sys_reboot at ffffffff8a92abd6 torvalds#18 [ffffaad04005fee0] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8b317159 torvalds#19 [ffffaad04005ff08] __context_tracking_enter at ffffffff8b31b6fc torvalds#20 [ffffaad04005ff18] syscall_exit_to_user_mode at ffffffff8b31b50d torvalds#21 [ffffaad04005ff28] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8b317169 torvalds#22 [ffffaad04005ff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff8b40009b RIP: 00007f1baa5c13d7 RSP: 00007fffbcc55a98 RFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f1baa5c13d7 RDX: 0000000001234567 RSI: 0000000028121969 RDI: 00000000fee1dead RBP: 00007fffbcc55ca0 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 00007fffbcc54e90 R10: 00007fffbcc55050 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000005 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fffbcc55af0 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a9 CS: 0033 SS: 002b During reboot all drivers PM shutdown callbacks are invoked. In iavf_shutdown() the adapter state is changed to __IAVF_REMOVE. In ice_shutdown() the call chain above is executed, which at some point calls iavf_remove(). However iavf_remove() expects the VF to be in one of the states __IAVF_RUNNING, __IAVF_DOWN or __IAVF_INIT_FAILED. If that's not the case it sleeps forever. So if iavf_shutdown() gets invoked before iavf_remove() the system will hang indefinitely because the adapter is already in state __IAVF_REMOVE. Fix this by returning from iavf_remove() if the state is __IAVF_REMOVE, as we already went through iavf_shutdown(). Fixes: 9745780 ("iavf: Add waiting so the port is initialized in remove") Fixes: a841733 ("iavf: Fix race condition between iavf_shutdown and iavf_remove") Reported-by: Marius Cornea <mcornea@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Assmann <sassmann@kpanic.de> Reviewed-by: Michal Kubiak <michal.kubiak@intel.com> Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <rafal.romanowski@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
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Apr 12, 2023
[ Upstream commit 4e264be ] When a system with E810 with existing VFs gets rebooted the following hang may be observed. Pid 1 is hung in iavf_remove(), part of a network driver: PID: 1 TASK: ffff965400e5a340 CPU: 24 COMMAND: "systemd-shutdow" #0 [ffffaad04005fa50] __schedule at ffffffff8b3239cb archlinux#1 [ffffaad04005fae8] schedule at ffffffff8b323e2d archlinux#2 [ffffaad04005fb00] schedule_hrtimeout_range_clock at ffffffff8b32cebc archlinux#3 [ffffaad04005fb80] usleep_range_state at ffffffff8b32c930 archlinux#4 [ffffaad04005fbb0] iavf_remove at ffffffffc12b9b4c [iavf] archlinux#5 [ffffaad04005fbf0] pci_device_remove at ffffffff8add7513 archlinux#6 [ffffaad04005fc10] device_release_driver_internal at ffffffff8af08baa archlinux#7 [ffffaad04005fc40] pci_stop_bus_device at ffffffff8adcc5fc archlinux#8 [ffffaad04005fc60] pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device at ffffffff8adcc81e archlinux#9 [ffffaad04005fc70] pci_iov_remove_virtfn at ffffffff8adf9429 torvalds#10 [ffffaad04005fca8] sriov_disable at ffffffff8adf98e4 torvalds#11 [ffffaad04005fcc8] ice_free_vfs at ffffffffc04bb2c8 [ice] torvalds#12 [ffffaad04005fd10] ice_remove at ffffffffc04778fe [ice] torvalds#13 [ffffaad04005fd38] ice_shutdown at ffffffffc0477946 [ice] torvalds#14 [ffffaad04005fd50] pci_device_shutdown at ffffffff8add58f1 torvalds#15 [ffffaad04005fd70] device_shutdown at ffffffff8af05386 torvalds#16 [ffffaad04005fd98] kernel_restart at ffffffff8a92a870 torvalds#17 [ffffaad04005fda8] __do_sys_reboot at ffffffff8a92abd6 torvalds#18 [ffffaad04005fee0] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8b317159 torvalds#19 [ffffaad04005ff08] __context_tracking_enter at ffffffff8b31b6fc torvalds#20 [ffffaad04005ff18] syscall_exit_to_user_mode at ffffffff8b31b50d torvalds#21 [ffffaad04005ff28] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8b317169 torvalds#22 [ffffaad04005ff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff8b40009b RIP: 00007f1baa5c13d7 RSP: 00007fffbcc55a98 RFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f1baa5c13d7 RDX: 0000000001234567 RSI: 0000000028121969 RDI: 00000000fee1dead RBP: 00007fffbcc55ca0 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 00007fffbcc54e90 R10: 00007fffbcc55050 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000005 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fffbcc55af0 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a9 CS: 0033 SS: 002b During reboot all drivers PM shutdown callbacks are invoked. In iavf_shutdown() the adapter state is changed to __IAVF_REMOVE. In ice_shutdown() the call chain above is executed, which at some point calls iavf_remove(). However iavf_remove() expects the VF to be in one of the states __IAVF_RUNNING, __IAVF_DOWN or __IAVF_INIT_FAILED. If that's not the case it sleeps forever. So if iavf_shutdown() gets invoked before iavf_remove() the system will hang indefinitely because the adapter is already in state __IAVF_REMOVE. Fix this by returning from iavf_remove() if the state is __IAVF_REMOVE, as we already went through iavf_shutdown(). Fixes: 9745780 ("iavf: Add waiting so the port is initialized in remove") Fixes: a841733 ("iavf: Fix race condition between iavf_shutdown and iavf_remove") Reported-by: Marius Cornea <mcornea@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Assmann <sassmann@kpanic.de> Reviewed-by: Michal Kubiak <michal.kubiak@intel.com> Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <rafal.romanowski@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Sai Krishna says: ==================== octeontx2: Miscellaneous fixes This patchset includes following fixes. Patch #1 Fix for the race condition while updating APR table Patch #2 Fix end bit position in NPC scan config Patch #3 Fix depth of CAM, MEM table entries Patch #4 Fix in increase the size of DMAC filter flows Patch #5 Fix driver crash resulting from invalid interface type information retrieved from firmware Patch #6 Fix incorrect mask used while installing filters involving fragmented packets Patch #7 Fixes for NPC field hash extract w.r.t IPV6 hash reduction, IPV6 filed hash configuration. Patch #8 Fix for NPC hardware parser configuration destination address hash, IPV6 endianness issues. Patch #9 Fix for skipping mbox initialization for PFs disabled by firmware. Patch torvalds#10 Fix disabling packet I/O in case of mailbox timeout. Patch torvalds#11 Fix detaching LF resources in case of VF probe fail. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Each physical partition can provide multiple services each with UUID. Each such service can be presented as logical partition with a unique combination of VM ID and UUID. The number of distinct UUID in a system will be less than or equal to the number of logical partitions. However, currently it fails to register more than one logical partition or service within a physical partition as the device name contains only VM ID while both VM ID and UUID are maintained in the partition information. The kernel complains with the below message: | sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/devices/arm-ffa-8001' | CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc7 #8 | Hardware name: FVP Base RevC (DT) | Call trace: | dump_backtrace+0xf8/0x118 | show_stack+0x18/0x24 | dump_stack_lvl+0x50/0x68 | dump_stack+0x18/0x24 | sysfs_create_dir_ns+0xe0/0x13c | kobject_add_internal+0x220/0x3d4 | kobject_add+0x94/0x100 | device_add+0x144/0x5d8 | device_register+0x20/0x30 | ffa_device_register+0x88/0xd8 | ffa_setup_partitions+0x108/0x1b8 | ffa_init+0x2ec/0x3a4 | do_one_initcall+0xcc/0x240 | do_initcall_level+0x8c/0xac | do_initcalls+0x54/0x94 | do_basic_setup+0x1c/0x28 | kernel_init_freeable+0x100/0x16c | kernel_init+0x20/0x1a0 | ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 | kobject_add_internal failed for arm-ffa-8001 with -EEXIST, don't try to | register things with the same name in the same directory. | arm_ffa arm-ffa: unable to register device arm-ffa-8001 err=-17 | ARM FF-A: ffa_setup_partitions: failed to register partition ID 0x8001 By virtue of being random enough to avoid collisions when generated in a distributed system, there is no way to compress UUID keys to the number of bits required to identify each. We can eliminate '-' in the name but it is not worth eliminating 4 bytes and add unnecessary logic for doing that. Also v1.0 doesn't provide the UUID of the partitions which makes it hard to use the same for the device name. So to keep it simple, let us alloc an ID using ida_alloc() and append the same to "arm-ffa" to make up a unique device name. Also stash the id value in ffa_dev to help freeing the ID later when the device is destroyed. Fixes: e781858 ("firmware: arm_ffa: Add initial FFA bus support for device enumeration") Reported-by: Lucian Paul-Trifu <lucian.paul-trifu@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230419-ffa_fixes_6-4-v2-3-d9108e43a176@arm.com Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
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Jun 5, 2023
The cited commit adds a compeletion to remove dependency on rtnl lock. But it causes a deadlock for multiple encapsulations: crash> bt ffff8aece8a64000 PID: 1514557 TASK: ffff8aece8a64000 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "tc" #0 [ffffa6d14183f368] __schedule at ffffffffb8ba7f45 #1 [ffffa6d14183f3f8] schedule at ffffffffb8ba8418 #2 [ffffa6d14183f418] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffb8ba8898 #3 [ffffa6d14183f428] __mutex_lock at ffffffffb8baa7f8 #4 [ffffa6d14183f4d0] mutex_lock_nested at ffffffffb8baabeb #5 [ffffa6d14183f4e0] mlx5e_attach_encap at ffffffffc0f48c17 [mlx5_core] #6 [ffffa6d14183f628] mlx5e_tc_add_fdb_flow at ffffffffc0f39680 [mlx5_core] #7 [ffffa6d14183f688] __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow at ffffffffc0f3b636 [mlx5_core] #8 [ffffa6d14183f6f0] mlx5e_tc_add_flow at ffffffffc0f3bcdf [mlx5_core] #9 [ffffa6d14183f728] mlx5e_configure_flower at ffffffffc0f3c1d1 [mlx5_core] torvalds#10 [ffffa6d14183f790] mlx5e_rep_setup_tc_cls_flower at ffffffffc0f3d529 [mlx5_core] torvalds#11 [ffffa6d14183f7a0] mlx5e_rep_setup_tc_cb at ffffffffc0f3d714 [mlx5_core] torvalds#12 [ffffa6d14183f7b0] tc_setup_cb_add at ffffffffb8931bb8 torvalds#13 [ffffa6d14183f810] fl_hw_replace_filter at ffffffffc0dae901 [cls_flower] torvalds#14 [ffffa6d14183f8d8] fl_change at ffffffffc0db5c57 [cls_flower] torvalds#15 [ffffa6d14183f970] tc_new_tfilter at ffffffffb8936047 torvalds#16 [ffffa6d14183fac8] rtnetlink_rcv_msg at ffffffffb88c7c31 torvalds#17 [ffffa6d14183fb50] netlink_rcv_skb at ffffffffb8942853 torvalds#18 [ffffa6d14183fbc0] rtnetlink_rcv at ffffffffb88c1835 torvalds#19 [ffffa6d14183fbd0] netlink_unicast at ffffffffb8941f27 torvalds#20 [ffffa6d14183fc18] netlink_sendmsg at ffffffffb8942245 torvalds#21 [ffffa6d14183fc98] sock_sendmsg at ffffffffb887d482 torvalds#22 [ffffa6d14183fcb8] ____sys_sendmsg at ffffffffb887d81a torvalds#23 [ffffa6d14183fd38] ___sys_sendmsg at ffffffffb88806e2 torvalds#24 [ffffa6d14183fe90] __sys_sendmsg at ffffffffb88807a2 torvalds#25 [ffffa6d14183ff28] __x64_sys_sendmsg at ffffffffb888080f torvalds#26 [ffffa6d14183ff38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffffb8b9b6a8 torvalds#27 [ffffa6d14183ff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffffb8c0007c crash> bt 0xffff8aeb07544000 PID: 1110766 TASK: ffff8aeb07544000 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "kworker/u20:9" #0 [ffffa6d14e6b7bd8] __schedule at ffffffffb8ba7f45 #1 [ffffa6d14e6b7c68] schedule at ffffffffb8ba8418 #2 [ffffa6d14e6b7c88] schedule_timeout at ffffffffb8baef88 #3 [ffffa6d14e6b7d10] wait_for_completion at ffffffffb8ba968b #4 [ffffa6d14e6b7d60] mlx5e_take_all_encap_flows at ffffffffc0f47ec4 [mlx5_core] #5 [ffffa6d14e6b7da0] mlx5e_rep_update_flows at ffffffffc0f3e734 [mlx5_core] #6 [ffffa6d14e6b7df8] mlx5e_rep_neigh_update at ffffffffc0f400bb [mlx5_core] #7 [ffffa6d14e6b7e50] process_one_work at ffffffffb80acc9c #8 [ffffa6d14e6b7ed0] worker_thread at ffffffffb80ad012 #9 [ffffa6d14e6b7f10] kthread at ffffffffb80b615d torvalds#10 [ffffa6d14e6b7f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffffb8001b2f After the first encap is attached, flow will be added to encap entry's flows list. If neigh update is running at this time, the following encaps of the flow can't hold the encap_tbl_lock and sleep. If neigh update thread is waiting for that flow's init_done, deadlock happens. Fix it by holding lock outside of the for loop. If neigh update is running, prevent encap flows from offloading. Since the lock is held outside of the for loop, concurrent creation of encap entries is not allowed. So remove unnecessary wait_for_completion call for res_ready. Fixes: 95435ad ("net/mlx5e: Only access fully initialized flows in neigh update") Signed-off-by: Chris Mi <cmi@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Roi Dayan <roid@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
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Currently, the per cpu upcall counters are allocated after the vport is created and inserted into the system. This could lead to the datapath accessing the counters before they are allocated resulting in a kernel Oops. Here is an example: PID: 59693 TASK: ffff0005f4f51500 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "ovs-vswitchd" #0 [ffff80000a39b5b0] __switch_to at ffffb70f0629f2f4 #1 [ffff80000a39b5d0] __schedule at ffffb70f0629f5cc #2 [ffff80000a39b650] preempt_schedule_common at ffffb70f0629fa60 #3 [ffff80000a39b670] dynamic_might_resched at ffffb70f0629fb58 #4 [ffff80000a39b680] mutex_lock_killable at ffffb70f062a1388 #5 [ffff80000a39b6a0] pcpu_alloc at ffffb70f0594460c #6 [ffff80000a39b750] __alloc_percpu_gfp at ffffb70f05944e68 #7 [ffff80000a39b760] ovs_vport_cmd_new at ffffb70ee6961b90 [openvswitch] ... PID: 58682 TASK: ffff0005b2f0bf00 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "kworker/0:3" #0 [ffff80000a5d2f40] machine_kexec at ffffb70f056a0758 #1 [ffff80000a5d2f70] __crash_kexec at ffffb70f057e2994 #2 [ffff80000a5d3100] crash_kexec at ffffb70f057e2ad8 #3 [ffff80000a5d3120] die at ffffb70f0628234c #4 [ffff80000a5d31e0] die_kernel_fault at ffffb70f062828a8 #5 [ffff80000a5d3210] __do_kernel_fault at ffffb70f056a31f4 #6 [ffff80000a5d3240] do_bad_area at ffffb70f056a32a4 #7 [ffff80000a5d3260] do_translation_fault at ffffb70f062a9710 #8 [ffff80000a5d3270] do_mem_abort at ffffb70f056a2f74 #9 [ffff80000a5d32a0] el1_abort at ffffb70f06297dac torvalds#10 [ffff80000a5d32d0] el1h_64_sync_handler at ffffb70f06299b24 torvalds#11 [ffff80000a5d3410] el1h_64_sync at ffffb70f056812dc torvalds#12 [ffff80000a5d3430] ovs_dp_upcall at ffffb70ee6963c84 [openvswitch] torvalds#13 [ffff80000a5d3470] ovs_dp_process_packet at ffffb70ee6963fdc [openvswitch] torvalds#14 [ffff80000a5d34f0] ovs_vport_receive at ffffb70ee6972c78 [openvswitch] torvalds#15 [ffff80000a5d36f0] netdev_port_receive at ffffb70ee6973948 [openvswitch] torvalds#16 [ffff80000a5d3720] netdev_frame_hook at ffffb70ee6973a28 [openvswitch] torvalds#17 [ffff80000a5d3730] __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0 at ffffb70f06079f90 We moved the per cpu upcall counter allocation to the existing vport alloc and free functions to solve this. Fixes: 95637d9 ("net: openvswitch: release vport resources on failure") Fixes: 1933ea3 ("net: openvswitch: Add support to count upcall packets") Signed-off-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com> Acked-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Jun 16, 2023
[ Upstream commit 05bb016 ] ACPICA commit 770653e3ba67c30a629ca7d12e352d83c2541b1e Before this change we see the following UBSAN stack trace in Fuchsia: #0 0x000021e4213b3302 in acpi_ds_init_aml_walk(struct acpi_walk_state*, union acpi_parse_object*, struct acpi_namespace_node*, u8*, u32, struct acpi_evaluate_info*, u8) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/dispatcher/dswstate.c:682 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x233302 archlinux#1.2 0x000020d0f660777f in ubsan_get_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:41 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x3d77f archlinux#1.1 0x000020d0f660777f in maybe_print_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:51 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x3d77f archlinux#1 0x000020d0f660777f in ~scoped_report() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:387 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x3d77f archlinux#2 0x000020d0f660b96d in handlepointer_overflow_impl() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:809 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x4196d archlinux#3 0x000020d0f660b50d in compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:815 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x4150d archlinux#4 0x000021e4213b3302 in acpi_ds_init_aml_walk(struct acpi_walk_state*, union acpi_parse_object*, struct acpi_namespace_node*, u8*, u32, struct acpi_evaluate_info*, u8) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/dispatcher/dswstate.c:682 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x233302 archlinux#5 0x000021e4213e2369 in acpi_ds_call_control_method(struct acpi_thread_state*, struct acpi_walk_state*, union acpi_parse_object*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/dispatcher/dsmethod.c:605 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x262369 archlinux#6 0x000021e421437fac in acpi_ps_parse_aml(struct acpi_walk_state*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/parser/psparse.c:550 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2b7fac archlinux#7 0x000021e4214464d2 in acpi_ps_execute_method(struct acpi_evaluate_info*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/parser/psxface.c:244 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2c64d2 archlinux#8 0x000021e4213aa052 in acpi_ns_evaluate(struct acpi_evaluate_info*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nseval.c:250 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x22a052 archlinux#9 0x000021e421413dd8 in acpi_ns_init_one_device(acpi_handle, u32, void*, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nsinit.c:735 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x293dd8 torvalds#10 0x000021e421429e98 in acpi_ns_walk_namespace(acpi_object_type, acpi_handle, u32, u32, acpi_walk_callback, acpi_walk_callback, void*, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nswalk.c:298 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a9e98 torvalds#11 0x000021e4214131ac in acpi_ns_initialize_devices(u32) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nsinit.c:268 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2931ac torvalds#12 0x000021e42147c40d in acpi_initialize_objects(u32) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/utilities/utxfinit.c:304 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2fc40d torvalds#13 0x000021e42126d603 in acpi::acpi_impl::initialize_acpi(acpi::acpi_impl*) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/acpi-impl.cc:224 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0xed603 Add a simple check that avoids incrementing a pointer by zero, but otherwise behaves as before. Note that our findings are against ACPICA 20221020, but the same code exists on master. Link: acpica/acpica@770653e3 Signed-off-by: Bob Moore <robert.moore@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 19b8766 upstream. Each physical partition can provide multiple services each with UUID. Each such service can be presented as logical partition with a unique combination of VM ID and UUID. The number of distinct UUID in a system will be less than or equal to the number of logical partitions. However, currently it fails to register more than one logical partition or service within a physical partition as the device name contains only VM ID while both VM ID and UUID are maintained in the partition information. The kernel complains with the below message: | sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/devices/arm-ffa-8001' | CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc7 archlinux#8 | Hardware name: FVP Base RevC (DT) | Call trace: | dump_backtrace+0xf8/0x118 | show_stack+0x18/0x24 | dump_stack_lvl+0x50/0x68 | dump_stack+0x18/0x24 | sysfs_create_dir_ns+0xe0/0x13c | kobject_add_internal+0x220/0x3d4 | kobject_add+0x94/0x100 | device_add+0x144/0x5d8 | device_register+0x20/0x30 | ffa_device_register+0x88/0xd8 | ffa_setup_partitions+0x108/0x1b8 | ffa_init+0x2ec/0x3a4 | do_one_initcall+0xcc/0x240 | do_initcall_level+0x8c/0xac | do_initcalls+0x54/0x94 | do_basic_setup+0x1c/0x28 | kernel_init_freeable+0x100/0x16c | kernel_init+0x20/0x1a0 | ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 | kobject_add_internal failed for arm-ffa-8001 with -EEXIST, don't try to | register things with the same name in the same directory. | arm_ffa arm-ffa: unable to register device arm-ffa-8001 err=-17 | ARM FF-A: ffa_setup_partitions: failed to register partition ID 0x8001 By virtue of being random enough to avoid collisions when generated in a distributed system, there is no way to compress UUID keys to the number of bits required to identify each. We can eliminate '-' in the name but it is not worth eliminating 4 bytes and add unnecessary logic for doing that. Also v1.0 doesn't provide the UUID of the partitions which makes it hard to use the same for the device name. So to keep it simple, let us alloc an ID using ida_alloc() and append the same to "arm-ffa" to make up a unique device name. Also stash the id value in ffa_dev to help freeing the ID later when the device is destroyed. Fixes: e781858 ("firmware: arm_ffa: Add initial FFA bus support for device enumeration") Reported-by: Lucian Paul-Trifu <lucian.paul-trifu@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230419-ffa_fixes_6-4-v2-3-d9108e43a176@arm.com Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Jun 16, 2023
[ Upstream commit 37c3b9f ] The cited commit adds a compeletion to remove dependency on rtnl lock. But it causes a deadlock for multiple encapsulations: crash> bt ffff8aece8a64000 PID: 1514557 TASK: ffff8aece8a64000 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "tc" #0 [ffffa6d14183f368] __schedule at ffffffffb8ba7f45 archlinux#1 [ffffa6d14183f3f8] schedule at ffffffffb8ba8418 archlinux#2 [ffffa6d14183f418] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffb8ba8898 archlinux#3 [ffffa6d14183f428] __mutex_lock at ffffffffb8baa7f8 archlinux#4 [ffffa6d14183f4d0] mutex_lock_nested at ffffffffb8baabeb archlinux#5 [ffffa6d14183f4e0] mlx5e_attach_encap at ffffffffc0f48c17 [mlx5_core] archlinux#6 [ffffa6d14183f628] mlx5e_tc_add_fdb_flow at ffffffffc0f39680 [mlx5_core] archlinux#7 [ffffa6d14183f688] __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow at ffffffffc0f3b636 [mlx5_core] archlinux#8 [ffffa6d14183f6f0] mlx5e_tc_add_flow at ffffffffc0f3bcdf [mlx5_core] archlinux#9 [ffffa6d14183f728] mlx5e_configure_flower at ffffffffc0f3c1d1 [mlx5_core] torvalds#10 [ffffa6d14183f790] mlx5e_rep_setup_tc_cls_flower at ffffffffc0f3d529 [mlx5_core] torvalds#11 [ffffa6d14183f7a0] mlx5e_rep_setup_tc_cb at ffffffffc0f3d714 [mlx5_core] torvalds#12 [ffffa6d14183f7b0] tc_setup_cb_add at ffffffffb8931bb8 torvalds#13 [ffffa6d14183f810] fl_hw_replace_filter at ffffffffc0dae901 [cls_flower] torvalds#14 [ffffa6d14183f8d8] fl_change at ffffffffc0db5c57 [cls_flower] torvalds#15 [ffffa6d14183f970] tc_new_tfilter at ffffffffb8936047 torvalds#16 [ffffa6d14183fac8] rtnetlink_rcv_msg at ffffffffb88c7c31 torvalds#17 [ffffa6d14183fb50] netlink_rcv_skb at ffffffffb8942853 torvalds#18 [ffffa6d14183fbc0] rtnetlink_rcv at ffffffffb88c1835 torvalds#19 [ffffa6d14183fbd0] netlink_unicast at ffffffffb8941f27 torvalds#20 [ffffa6d14183fc18] netlink_sendmsg at ffffffffb8942245 torvalds#21 [ffffa6d14183fc98] sock_sendmsg at ffffffffb887d482 torvalds#22 [ffffa6d14183fcb8] ____sys_sendmsg at ffffffffb887d81a torvalds#23 [ffffa6d14183fd38] ___sys_sendmsg at ffffffffb88806e2 torvalds#24 [ffffa6d14183fe90] __sys_sendmsg at ffffffffb88807a2 torvalds#25 [ffffa6d14183ff28] __x64_sys_sendmsg at ffffffffb888080f torvalds#26 [ffffa6d14183ff38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffffb8b9b6a8 torvalds#27 [ffffa6d14183ff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffffb8c0007c crash> bt 0xffff8aeb07544000 PID: 1110766 TASK: ffff8aeb07544000 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "kworker/u20:9" #0 [ffffa6d14e6b7bd8] __schedule at ffffffffb8ba7f45 archlinux#1 [ffffa6d14e6b7c68] schedule at ffffffffb8ba8418 archlinux#2 [ffffa6d14e6b7c88] schedule_timeout at ffffffffb8baef88 archlinux#3 [ffffa6d14e6b7d10] wait_for_completion at ffffffffb8ba968b archlinux#4 [ffffa6d14e6b7d60] mlx5e_take_all_encap_flows at ffffffffc0f47ec4 [mlx5_core] archlinux#5 [ffffa6d14e6b7da0] mlx5e_rep_update_flows at ffffffffc0f3e734 [mlx5_core] archlinux#6 [ffffa6d14e6b7df8] mlx5e_rep_neigh_update at ffffffffc0f400bb [mlx5_core] archlinux#7 [ffffa6d14e6b7e50] process_one_work at ffffffffb80acc9c archlinux#8 [ffffa6d14e6b7ed0] worker_thread at ffffffffb80ad012 archlinux#9 [ffffa6d14e6b7f10] kthread at ffffffffb80b615d torvalds#10 [ffffa6d14e6b7f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffffb8001b2f After the first encap is attached, flow will be added to encap entry's flows list. If neigh update is running at this time, the following encaps of the flow can't hold the encap_tbl_lock and sleep. If neigh update thread is waiting for that flow's init_done, deadlock happens. Fix it by holding lock outside of the for loop. If neigh update is running, prevent encap flows from offloading. Since the lock is held outside of the for loop, concurrent creation of encap entries is not allowed. So remove unnecessary wait_for_completion call for res_ready. Fixes: 95435ad ("net/mlx5e: Only access fully initialized flows in neigh update") Signed-off-by: Chris Mi <cmi@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Roi Dayan <roid@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
quietvoid
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Jun 16, 2023
[ Upstream commit de9df6c ] Currently, the per cpu upcall counters are allocated after the vport is created and inserted into the system. This could lead to the datapath accessing the counters before they are allocated resulting in a kernel Oops. Here is an example: PID: 59693 TASK: ffff0005f4f51500 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "ovs-vswitchd" #0 [ffff80000a39b5b0] __switch_to at ffffb70f0629f2f4 archlinux#1 [ffff80000a39b5d0] __schedule at ffffb70f0629f5cc archlinux#2 [ffff80000a39b650] preempt_schedule_common at ffffb70f0629fa60 archlinux#3 [ffff80000a39b670] dynamic_might_resched at ffffb70f0629fb58 archlinux#4 [ffff80000a39b680] mutex_lock_killable at ffffb70f062a1388 archlinux#5 [ffff80000a39b6a0] pcpu_alloc at ffffb70f0594460c archlinux#6 [ffff80000a39b750] __alloc_percpu_gfp at ffffb70f05944e68 archlinux#7 [ffff80000a39b760] ovs_vport_cmd_new at ffffb70ee6961b90 [openvswitch] ... PID: 58682 TASK: ffff0005b2f0bf00 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "kworker/0:3" #0 [ffff80000a5d2f40] machine_kexec at ffffb70f056a0758 archlinux#1 [ffff80000a5d2f70] __crash_kexec at ffffb70f057e2994 archlinux#2 [ffff80000a5d3100] crash_kexec at ffffb70f057e2ad8 archlinux#3 [ffff80000a5d3120] die at ffffb70f0628234c archlinux#4 [ffff80000a5d31e0] die_kernel_fault at ffffb70f062828a8 archlinux#5 [ffff80000a5d3210] __do_kernel_fault at ffffb70f056a31f4 archlinux#6 [ffff80000a5d3240] do_bad_area at ffffb70f056a32a4 archlinux#7 [ffff80000a5d3260] do_translation_fault at ffffb70f062a9710 archlinux#8 [ffff80000a5d3270] do_mem_abort at ffffb70f056a2f74 archlinux#9 [ffff80000a5d32a0] el1_abort at ffffb70f06297dac torvalds#10 [ffff80000a5d32d0] el1h_64_sync_handler at ffffb70f06299b24 torvalds#11 [ffff80000a5d3410] el1h_64_sync at ffffb70f056812dc torvalds#12 [ffff80000a5d3430] ovs_dp_upcall at ffffb70ee6963c84 [openvswitch] torvalds#13 [ffff80000a5d3470] ovs_dp_process_packet at ffffb70ee6963fdc [openvswitch] torvalds#14 [ffff80000a5d34f0] ovs_vport_receive at ffffb70ee6972c78 [openvswitch] torvalds#15 [ffff80000a5d36f0] netdev_port_receive at ffffb70ee6973948 [openvswitch] torvalds#16 [ffff80000a5d3720] netdev_frame_hook at ffffb70ee6973a28 [openvswitch] torvalds#17 [ffff80000a5d3730] __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0 at ffffb70f06079f90 We moved the per cpu upcall counter allocation to the existing vport alloc and free functions to solve this. Fixes: 95637d9 ("net: openvswitch: release vport resources on failure") Fixes: 1933ea3 ("net: openvswitch: Add support to count upcall packets") Signed-off-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com> Acked-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
adonespitogo
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Aug 6, 2023
[ Upstream commit 99d4850 ] Found by leak sanitizer: ``` ==1632594==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 21 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f2953a7077b in __interceptor_strdup ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439 archlinux#1 0x556701d6fbbf in perf_env__read_cpuid util/env.c:369 archlinux#2 0x556701d70589 in perf_env__cpuid util/env.c:465 archlinux#3 0x55670204bba2 in x86__is_amd_cpu arch/x86/util/env.c:14 archlinux#4 0x5567020487a2 in arch__post_evsel_config arch/x86/util/evsel.c:83 archlinux#5 0x556701d8f78b in evsel__config util/evsel.c:1366 archlinux#6 0x556701ef5872 in evlist__config util/record.c:108 archlinux#7 0x556701cd6bcd in test__PERF_RECORD tests/perf-record.c:112 archlinux#8 0x556701cacd07 in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:236 archlinux#9 0x556701cacfac in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:265 torvalds#10 0x556701cadddb in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:402 torvalds#11 0x556701caf2aa in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:559 torvalds#12 0x556701d3b557 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:323 torvalds#13 0x556701d3bac8 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:377 torvalds#14 0x556701d3be90 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:421 torvalds#15 0x556701d3c3f8 in main tools/perf/perf.c:537 torvalds#16 0x7f2952a46189 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 21 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). ``` Fixes: f7b58cb ("perf mem/c2c: Add load store event mappings for AMD") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Acked-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613235416.1650755-1-irogers@google.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
adonespitogo
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Aug 6, 2023
[ Upstream commit b684c09 ] ppc_save_regs() skips one stack frame while saving the CPU register states. Instead of saving current R1, it pulls the previous stack frame pointer. When vmcores caused by direct panic call (such as `echo c > /proc/sysrq-trigger`), are debugged with gdb, gdb fails to show the backtrace correctly. On further analysis, it was found that it was because of mismatch between r1 and NIP. GDB uses NIP to get current function symbol and uses corresponding debug info of that function to unwind previous frames, but due to the mismatching r1 and NIP, the unwinding does not work, and it fails to unwind to the 2nd frame and hence does not show the backtrace. GDB backtrace with vmcore of kernel without this patch: --------- (gdb) bt #0 0xc0000000002a53e8 in crash_setup_regs (oldregs=<optimized out>, newregs=0xc000000004f8f8d8) at ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/kexec.h:69 archlinux#1 __crash_kexec (regs=<optimized out>) at kernel/kexec_core.c:974 archlinux#2 0x0000000000000063 in ?? () archlinux#3 0xc000000003579320 in ?? () --------- Further analysis revealed that the mismatch occurred because "ppc_save_regs" was saving the previous stack's SP instead of the current r1. This patch fixes this by storing current r1 in the saved pt_regs. GDB backtrace with vmcore of patched kernel: -------- (gdb) bt #0 0xc0000000002a53e8 in crash_setup_regs (oldregs=0x0, newregs=0xc00000000670b8d8) at ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/kexec.h:69 archlinux#1 __crash_kexec (regs=regs@entry=0x0) at kernel/kexec_core.c:974 archlinux#2 0xc000000000168918 in panic (fmt=fmt@entry=0xc000000001654a60 "sysrq triggered crash\n") at kernel/panic.c:358 archlinux#3 0xc000000000b735f8 in sysrq_handle_crash (key=<optimized out>) at drivers/tty/sysrq.c:155 archlinux#4 0xc000000000b742cc in __handle_sysrq (key=key@entry=99, check_mask=check_mask@entry=false) at drivers/tty/sysrq.c:602 archlinux#5 0xc000000000b7506c in write_sysrq_trigger (file=<optimized out>, buf=<optimized out>, count=2, ppos=<optimized out>) at drivers/tty/sysrq.c:1163 archlinux#6 0xc00000000069a7bc in pde_write (ppos=<optimized out>, count=<optimized out>, buf=<optimized out>, file=<optimized out>, pde=0xc00000000362cb40) at fs/proc/inode.c:340 archlinux#7 proc_reg_write (file=<optimized out>, buf=<optimized out>, count=<optimized out>, ppos=<optimized out>) at fs/proc/inode.c:352 archlinux#8 0xc0000000005b3bbc in vfs_write (file=file@entry=0xc000000006aa6b00, buf=buf@entry=0x61f498b4f60 <error: Cannot access memory at address 0x61f498b4f60>, count=count@entry=2, pos=pos@entry=0xc00000000670bda0) at fs/read_write.c:582 archlinux#9 0xc0000000005b4264 in ksys_write (fd=<optimized out>, buf=0x61f498b4f60 <error: Cannot access memory at address 0x61f498b4f60>, count=2) at fs/read_write.c:637 torvalds#10 0xc00000000002ea2c in system_call_exception (regs=0xc00000000670be80, r0=<optimized out>) at arch/powerpc/kernel/syscall.c:171 torvalds#11 0xc00000000000c270 in system_call_vectored_common () at arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt_64.S:192 -------- Nick adds: So this now saves regs as though it was an interrupt taken in the caller, at the instruction after the call to ppc_save_regs, whereas previously the NIP was there, but R1 came from the caller's caller and that mismatch is what causes gdb's dwarf unwinder to go haywire. Signed-off-by: Aditya Gupta <adityag@linux.ibm.com> Fixes: d16a58f ("powerpc: Improve ppc_save_regs()") Reivewed-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20230615091047.90433-1-adityag@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
heftig
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Aug 8, 2023
The cited commit holds encap tbl lock unconditionally when setting up dests. But it may cause the following deadlock: PID: 1063722 TASK: ffffa062ca5d0000 CPU: 13 COMMAND: "handler8" #0 [ffffb14de05b7368] __schedule at ffffffffa1d5aa91 #1 [ffffb14de05b7410] schedule at ffffffffa1d5afdb #2 [ffffb14de05b7430] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffa1d5b528 #3 [ffffb14de05b7440] __mutex_lock at ffffffffa1d5d6cb #4 [ffffb14de05b74e8] mutex_lock_nested at ffffffffa1d5ddeb #5 [ffffb14de05b74f8] mlx5e_tc_tun_encap_dests_set at ffffffffc12f2096 [mlx5_core] #6 [ffffb14de05b7568] post_process_attr at ffffffffc12d9fc5 [mlx5_core] #7 [ffffb14de05b75a0] mlx5e_tc_add_fdb_flow at ffffffffc12de877 [mlx5_core] #8 [ffffb14de05b75f0] __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow at ffffffffc12e0eef [mlx5_core] #9 [ffffb14de05b7660] mlx5e_tc_add_flow at ffffffffc12e12f7 [mlx5_core] torvalds#10 [ffffb14de05b76b8] mlx5e_configure_flower at ffffffffc12e1686 [mlx5_core] torvalds#11 [ffffb14de05b7720] mlx5e_rep_indr_offload at ffffffffc12e3817 [mlx5_core] torvalds#12 [ffffb14de05b7730] mlx5e_rep_indr_setup_tc_cb at ffffffffc12e388a [mlx5_core] torvalds#13 [ffffb14de05b7740] tc_setup_cb_add at ffffffffa1ab2ba8 torvalds#14 [ffffb14de05b77a0] fl_hw_replace_filter at ffffffffc0bdec2f [cls_flower] torvalds#15 [ffffb14de05b7868] fl_change at ffffffffc0be6caa [cls_flower] torvalds#16 [ffffb14de05b7908] tc_new_tfilter at ffffffffa1ab71f0 [1031218.028143] wait_for_completion+0x24/0x30 [1031218.028589] mlx5e_update_route_decap_flows+0x9a/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] [1031218.029256] mlx5e_tc_fib_event_work+0x1ad/0x300 [mlx5_core] [1031218.029885] process_one_work+0x24e/0x510 Actually no need to hold encap tbl lock if there is no encap action. Fix it by checking if encap action exists or not before holding encap tbl lock. Fixes: 37c3b9f ("net/mlx5e: Prevent encap offload when neigh update is running") Signed-off-by: Chris Mi <cmi@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
heftig
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Aug 19, 2023
Normally, x->replay_esn and x->preplay_esn should be allocated at xfrm_alloc_replay_state_esn(...) in xfrm_state_construct(...), hence the xfrm_update_ae_params(...) is okay to update them. However, the current implementation of xfrm_new_ae(...) allows a malicious user to directly dereference a NULL pointer and crash the kernel like below. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 PGD 8253067 P4D 8253067 PUD 8e0e067 PMD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 98 Comm: poc.npd Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7-00072-gdad9774deaf1 #8 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.o4 RIP: 0010:memcpy_orig+0xad/0x140 Code: e8 4c 89 5f e0 48 8d 7f e0 73 d2 83 c2 20 48 29 d6 48 29 d7 83 fa 10 72 34 4c 8b 06 4c 8b 4e 08 c RSP: 0018:ffff888008f57658 EFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888008bd0000 RCX: ffffffff8238e571 RDX: 0000000000000018 RSI: ffff888007f64844 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888008f57818 R13: ffff888007f64aa4 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00000000014013c0(0000) GS:ffff88806d600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000054d8000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x1f/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x1e8/0x500 ? __pfx_is_prefetch.constprop.0+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_page_fault_oops+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x11/0x40 ? fixup_exception+0x36/0x460 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x11/0x40 ? exc_page_fault+0x5e/0xc0 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? xfrm_update_ae_params+0xd1/0x260 ? memcpy_orig+0xad/0x140 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_bh+0x10/0x10 xfrm_update_ae_params+0xe7/0x260 xfrm_new_ae+0x298/0x4e0 ? __pfx_xfrm_new_ae+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_xfrm_new_ae+0x10/0x10 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x25a/0x410 ? __pfx_xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 ? __alloc_skb+0xcf/0x210 ? stack_trace_save+0x90/0xd0 ? filter_irq_stacks+0x1c/0x70 ? __stack_depot_save+0x39/0x4e0 ? __kasan_slab_free+0x10a/0x190 ? kmem_cache_free+0x9c/0x340 ? netlink_recvmsg+0x23c/0x660 ? sock_recvmsg+0xeb/0xf0 ? __sys_recvfrom+0x13c/0x1f0 ? __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x71/0x90 ? do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc ? copyout+0x3e/0x50 netlink_rcv_skb+0xd6/0x210 ? __pfx_xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_netlink_rcv_skb+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_sock_has_perm+0x10/0x10 ? mutex_lock+0x8d/0xe0 ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x44/0x50 netlink_unicast+0x36f/0x4c0 ? __pfx_netlink_unicast+0x10/0x10 ? netlink_recvmsg+0x500/0x660 netlink_sendmsg+0x3b7/0x700 This Null-ptr-deref bug is assigned CVE-2023-3772. And this commit adds additional NULL check in xfrm_update_ae_params to fix the NPD. Fixes: d8647b7 ("xfrm: Add user interface for esn and big anti-replay windows") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn> Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
heftig
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Aug 29, 2023
The following lockdep warning appears during boot on a Xen dom0 system: [ 96.388794] ====================================================== [ 96.388797] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 96.388799] 6.4.0-rc5-default+ #8 Tainted: G EL [ 96.388803] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 96.388804] xenconsoled/1330 is trying to acquire lock: [ 96.388808] ffffffff82acdd10 (xs_watch_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: register_xenbus_watch+0x45/0x140 [ 96.388847] but task is already holding lock: [ 96.388849] ffff888100c92068 (&u->msgbuffer_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: xenbus_file_write+0x2c/0x600 [ 96.388862] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 96.388864] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 96.388866] -> #2 (&u->msgbuffer_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 96.388874] __mutex_lock+0x85/0xb30 [ 96.388885] xenbus_dev_queue_reply+0x48/0x2b0 [ 96.388890] xenbus_thread+0x1d7/0x950 [ 96.388897] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 96.388905] ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50 [ 96.388914] -> #1 (xs_response_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 96.388923] __mutex_lock+0x85/0xb30 [ 96.388930] xenbus_backend_ioctl+0x56/0x1c0 [ 96.388935] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x90/0xd0 [ 96.388942] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90 [ 96.388950] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc [ 96.388957] -> #0 (xs_watch_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}: [ 96.388965] __lock_acquire+0x1538/0x2260 [ 96.388972] lock_acquire+0xc6/0x2b0 [ 96.388976] down_read+0x2d/0x160 [ 96.388983] register_xenbus_watch+0x45/0x140 [ 96.388990] xenbus_file_write+0x53d/0x600 [ 96.388994] vfs_write+0xe4/0x490 [ 96.389003] ksys_write+0xb8/0xf0 [ 96.389011] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90 [ 96.389017] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc [ 96.389023] other info that might help us debug this: [ 96.389025] Chain exists of: xs_watch_rwsem --> xs_response_mutex --> &u->msgbuffer_mutex [ 96.413429] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 96.413430] CPU0 CPU1 [ 96.413430] ---- ---- [ 96.413431] lock(&u->msgbuffer_mutex); [ 96.413432] lock(xs_response_mutex); [ 96.413433] lock(&u->msgbuffer_mutex); [ 96.413434] rlock(xs_watch_rwsem); [ 96.413436] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 96.413436] 1 lock held by xenconsoled/1330: [ 96.413438] #0: ffff888100c92068 (&u->msgbuffer_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: xenbus_file_write+0x2c/0x600 [ 96.413446] An ioctl call IOCTL_XENBUS_BACKEND_SETUP (record #1 in the report) results in calling xenbus_alloc() -> xs_suspend() which introduces ordering xs_watch_rwsem --> xs_response_mutex. The xenbus_thread() operation (record #2) creates xs_response_mutex --> &u->msgbuffer_mutex. An XS_WATCH write to the xenbus file then results in a complain about the opposite lock order &u->msgbuffer_mutex --> xs_watch_rwsem. The dependency xs_watch_rwsem --> xs_response_mutex is spurious. Avoid it and the warning by changing the ordering in xs_suspend(), first acquire xs_response_mutex and then xs_watch_rwsem. Reverse also the unlocking order in xs_suspend_cancel() for consistency, but keep xs_resume() as is because it needs to have xs_watch_rwsem unlocked only after exiting xs suspend and re-adding all watches. Signed-off-by: Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230607123624.15739-1-petr.pavlu@suse.com Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
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…failure to add a probe
Building perf with EXTRA_CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address" a leak is detect
when trying to add a probe to a non-existent function:
# perf probe -x ~/bin/perf dso__neW
Probe point 'dso__neW' not found.
Error: Failed to add events.
=================================================================
==296634==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks
Direct leak of 128 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7f67642ba097 in calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xba097)
#1 0x7f67641a76f1 in allocate_cfi (/lib64/libdw.so.1+0x3f6f1)
Direct leak of 65 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7f67642b95b5 in __interceptor_realloc.part.0 (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xb95b5)
#1 0x6cac75 in strbuf_grow util/strbuf.c:64
#2 0x6ca934 in strbuf_init util/strbuf.c:25
#3 0x9337d2 in synthesize_perf_probe_point util/probe-event.c:2018
#4 0x92be51 in try_to_find_probe_trace_events util/probe-event.c:964
#5 0x93d5c6 in convert_to_probe_trace_events util/probe-event.c:3512
#6 0x93d6d5 in convert_perf_probe_events util/probe-event.c:3529
#7 0x56f37f in perf_add_probe_events /var/home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-probe.c:354
#8 0x572fbc in __cmd_probe /var/home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-probe.c:738
#9 0x5730f2 in cmd_probe /var/home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-probe.c:766
torvalds#10 0x635d81 in run_builtin /var/home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:323
torvalds#11 0x6362c1 in handle_internal_command /var/home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:377
torvalds#12 0x63667a in run_argv /var/home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:421
torvalds#13 0x636b8d in main /var/home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:537
torvalds#14 0x7f676302950f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2950f)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 193 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s).
#
synthesize_perf_probe_point() returns a "detachec" strbuf, i.e. a
malloc'ed string that needs to be free'd.
An audit will be performed to find other such cases.
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZM0l1Oxamr4SVjfY@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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Fix an error detected by memory sanitizer:
```
==4033==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x55fb0fbedfc7 in read_alias_info tools/perf/util/pmu.c:457:6
#1 0x55fb0fbea339 in check_info_data tools/perf/util/pmu.c:1434:2
#2 0x55fb0fbea339 in perf_pmu__check_alias tools/perf/util/pmu.c:1504:9
#3 0x55fb0fbdca85 in parse_events_add_pmu tools/perf/util/parse-events.c:1429:32
#4 0x55fb0f965230 in parse_events_parse tools/perf/util/parse-events.y:299:6
#5 0x55fb0fbdf6b2 in parse_events__scanner tools/perf/util/parse-events.c:1822:8
#6 0x55fb0fbdf8c1 in __parse_events tools/perf/util/parse-events.c:2094:8
#7 0x55fb0fa8ffa9 in parse_events tools/perf/util/parse-events.h:41:9
#8 0x55fb0fa8ffa9 in test_event tools/perf/tests/parse-events.c:2393:8
#9 0x55fb0fa8f458 in test__pmu_events tools/perf/tests/parse-events.c:2551:15
torvalds#10 0x55fb0fa6d93f in run_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:242:9
torvalds#11 0x55fb0fa6d93f in test_and_print tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:271:8
torvalds#12 0x55fb0fa6d082 in __cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:442:5
torvalds#13 0x55fb0fa6d082 in cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:564:9
torvalds#14 0x55fb0f942720 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:322:11
torvalds#15 0x55fb0f942486 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:375:8
torvalds#16 0x55fb0f941dab in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:419:2
torvalds#17 0x55fb0f941dab in main tools/perf/perf.c:535:3
```
Fixes: 7b723db ("perf pmu: Be lazy about loading event info files from sysfs")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230914022425.1489035-1-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
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The following call trace shows a deadlock issue due to recursive locking of mutex "device_mutex". First lock acquire is in target_for_each_device() and second in target_free_device(). PID: 148266 TASK: ffff8be21ffb5d00 CPU: 10 COMMAND: "iscsi_ttx" #0 [ffffa2bfc9ec3b18] __schedule at ffffffffa8060e7f #1 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ba0] schedule at ffffffffa8061224 #2 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bb8] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffa80615ee #3 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bc8] __mutex_lock at ffffffffa8062fd7 #4 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c40] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffffa80631d3 #5 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c50] mutex_lock at ffffffffa806320c #6 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c68] target_free_device at ffffffffc0935998 [target_core_mod] #7 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c90] target_core_dev_release at ffffffffc092f975 [target_core_mod] #8 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ca0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d250f #9 [ffffa2bfc9ec3cd0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d2583 torvalds#10 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ce0] target_devices_idr_iter at ffffffffc0933f3a [target_core_mod] torvalds#11 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d00] idr_for_each at ffffffffa803f6fc torvalds#12 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d60] target_for_each_device at ffffffffc0935670 [target_core_mod] torvalds#13 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d98] transport_deregister_session at ffffffffc0946408 [target_core_mod] torvalds#14 [ffffa2bfc9ec3dc8] iscsit_close_session at ffffffffc09a44a6 [iscsi_target_mod] torvalds#15 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df0] iscsit_close_connection at ffffffffc09a4a88 [iscsi_target_mod] torvalds#16 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df8] finish_task_switch at ffffffffa76e5d07 torvalds#17 [ffffa2bfc9ec3e78] iscsit_take_action_for_connection_exit at ffffffffc0991c23 [iscsi_target_mod] torvalds#18 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ea0] iscsi_target_tx_thread at ffffffffc09a403b [iscsi_target_mod] torvalds#19 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f08] kthread at ffffffffa76d8080 torvalds#20 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffffa8200364 Fixes: 36d4cb4 ("scsi: target: Avoid that EXTENDED COPY commands trigger lock inversion") Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230918225848.66463-1-junxiao.bi@oracle.com Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <michael.christie@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
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…f-times'
Eduard Zingerman says:
====================
verify callbacks as if they are called unknown number of times
This series updates verifier logic for callback functions handling.
Current master simulates callback body execution exactly once,
which leads to verifier not detecting unsafe programs like below:
static int unsafe_on_zero_iter_cb(__u32 idx, struct num_context *ctx)
{
ctx->i = 0;
return 0;
}
SEC("?raw_tp")
int unsafe_on_zero_iter(void *unused)
{
struct num_context loop_ctx = { .i = 32 };
__u8 choice_arr[2] = { 0, 1 };
bpf_loop(100, unsafe_on_zero_iter_cb, &loop_ctx, 0);
return choice_arr[loop_ctx.i];
}
This was reported previously in [0].
The basic idea of the fix is to schedule callback entry state for
verification in env->head until some identical, previously visited
state in current DFS state traversal is found. Same logic as with open
coded iterators, and builds on top recent fixes [1] for those.
The series is structured as follows:
- patches #1,2,3 update strobemeta, xdp_synproxy selftests and
bpf_loop_bench benchmark to allow convergence of the bpf_loop
callback states;
- patches #4,5 just shuffle the code a bit;
- patch #6 is the main part of the series;
- patch #7 adds test cases for #6;
- patch #8 extend patch #6 with same speculative scalar widening
logic, as used for open coded iterators;
- patch #9 adds test cases for #8;
- patch torvalds#10 extends patch #6 to track maximal number of callback
executions specifically for bpf_loop();
- patch torvalds#11 adds test cases for torvalds#10.
Veristat results comparing this series to master+patches #1,2,3 using selftests
show the following difference:
File Program States (A) States (B) States (DIFF)
------------------------- ------------- ---------- ---------- -------------
bpf_loop_bench.bpf.o benchmark 1 2 +1 (+100.00%)
pyperf600_bpf_loop.bpf.o on_event 322 407 +85 (+26.40%)
strobemeta_bpf_loop.bpf.o on_event 113 151 +38 (+33.63%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.o syncookie_tc 341 291 -50 (-14.66%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.o syncookie_xdp 344 301 -43 (-12.50%)
Veristat results comparing this series to master using Tetragon BPF
files [2] also show some differences.
States diff varies from +2% to +15% on 23 programs out of 186,
no new failures.
Changelog:
- V3 [5] -> V4, changes suggested by Andrii:
- validate mark_chain_precision() result in patch torvalds#10;
- renaming s/cumulative_callback_depth/callback_unroll_depth/.
- V2 [4] -> V3:
- fixes in expected log messages for test cases:
- callback_result_precise;
- parent_callee_saved_reg_precise_with_callback;
- parent_stack_slot_precise_with_callback;
- renamings (suggested by Alexei):
- s/callback_iter_depth/cumulative_callback_depth/
- s/is_callback_iter_next/calls_callback/
- s/mark_callback_iter_next/mark_calls_callback/
- prepare_func_exit() updated to exit with -EFAULT when
callee->in_callback_fn is true but calls_callback() is not true
for callsite;
- test case 'bpf_loop_iter_limit_nested' rewritten to use return
value check instead of verifier log message checks
(suggested by Alexei).
- V1 [3] -> V2, changes suggested by Andrii:
- small changes for error handling code in __check_func_call();
- callback body processing log is now matched in relevant
verifier_subprog_precision.c tests;
- R1 passed to bpf_loop() is now always marked as precise;
- log level 2 message for bpf_loop() iteration termination instead of
iteration depth messages;
- __no_msg macro removed;
- bpf_loop_iter_limit_nested updated to avoid using __no_msg;
- commit message for patch #3 updated according to Alexei's request.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CA+vRuzPChFNXmouzGG+wsy=6eMcfr1mFG0F3g7rbg-sedGKW3w@mail.gmail.com/
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231024000917.12153-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/
[2] git@github.com:cilium/tetragon.git
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231116021803.9982-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/T/#t
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231118013355.7943-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/T/#t
[5] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231120225945.11741-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/T/#t
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231121020701.26440-1-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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When scanning namespaces, it is possible to get valid data from the first call to nvme_identify_ns() in nvme_alloc_ns(), but not from the second call in nvme_update_ns_info_block(). In particular, if the NSID becomes inactive between the two commands, a storage device may return a buffer filled with zero as per 4.1.5.1. In this case, we can get a kernel crash due to a divide-by-zero in blk_stack_limits() because ns->lba_shift will be set to zero. PID: 326 TASK: ffff95fec3cd8000 CPU: 29 COMMAND: "kworker/u98:10" #0 [ffffad8f8702f9e0] machine_kexec at ffffffff91c76ec7 #1 [ffffad8f8702fa38] __crash_kexec at ffffffff91dea4fa #2 [ffffad8f8702faf8] crash_kexec at ffffffff91deb788 #3 [ffffad8f8702fb00] oops_end at ffffffff91c2e4bb #4 [ffffad8f8702fb20] do_trap at ffffffff91c2a4ce #5 [ffffad8f8702fb70] do_error_trap at ffffffff91c2a595 #6 [ffffad8f8702fbb0] exc_divide_error at ffffffff928506e6 #7 [ffffad8f8702fbd0] asm_exc_divide_error at ffffffff92a00926 [exception RIP: blk_stack_limits+434] RIP: ffffffff92191872 RSP: ffffad8f8702fc80 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff95efa0c91800 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 00000000ffffffff R8: ffff95fec7df35a8 R9: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff95fed33c09a8 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #8 [ffffad8f8702fce0] nvme_update_ns_info_block at ffffffffc06d3533 [nvme_core] #9 [ffffad8f8702fd18] nvme_scan_ns at ffffffffc06d6fa7 [nvme_core] This happened when the check for valid data was moved out of nvme_identify_ns() into one of the callers. Fix this by checking in both callers. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218186 Fixes: 0dd6fff ("nvme: bring back auto-removal of deleted namespaces during sequential scan") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ewan D. Milne <emilne@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
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When creating ceq_0 during probing irdma, cqp.sc_cqp will be sent as a cqp_request to cqp->sc_cqp.sq_ring. If the request is pending when removing the irdma driver or unplugging its aux device, cqp.sc_cqp will be dereferenced as wrong struct in irdma_free_pending_cqp_request(). PID: 3669 TASK: ffff88aef892c000 CPU: 28 COMMAND: "kworker/28:0" #0 [fffffe0000549e38] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff810e3a34 #1 [fffffe0000549e40] nmi_handle at ffffffff810788b2 #2 [fffffe0000549ea0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8107938f #3 [fffffe0000549eb8] do_nmi at ffffffff81079582 #4 [fffffe0000549ef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff82e016b4 [exception RIP: native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+1291] RIP: ffffffff8127e72b RSP: ffff88aa841ef778 RFLAGS: 00000046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88b01f849700 RCX: ffffffff8127e47e RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff83857ec0 RBP: ffff88afe3e4efc8 R8: ffffed15fc7c9dfa R9: ffffed15fc7c9dfa R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed15fc7c9df9 R12: 0000000000740000 R13: ffff88b01f849708 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: ffffed1603f092e1 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0000 -- <NMI exception stack> -- #5 [ffff88aa841ef778] native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8127e72b #6 [ffff88aa841ef7b0] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff82c22aa4 #7 [ffff88aa841ef7c8] __wake_up_common_lock at ffffffff81257363 #8 [ffff88aa841ef888] irdma_free_pending_cqp_request at ffffffffa0ba12cc [irdma] #9 [ffff88aa841ef958] irdma_cleanup_pending_cqp_op at ffffffffa0ba1469 [irdma] torvalds#10 [ffff88aa841ef9c0] irdma_ctrl_deinit_hw at ffffffffa0b2989f [irdma] torvalds#11 [ffff88aa841efa28] irdma_remove at ffffffffa0b252df [irdma] torvalds#12 [ffff88aa841efae8] auxiliary_bus_remove at ffffffff8219afdb torvalds#13 [ffff88aa841efb00] device_release_driver_internal at ffffffff821882e6 torvalds#14 [ffff88aa841efb38] bus_remove_device at ffffffff82184278 torvalds#15 [ffff88aa841efb88] device_del at ffffffff82179d23 torvalds#16 [ffff88aa841efc48] ice_unplug_aux_dev at ffffffffa0eb1c14 [ice] torvalds#17 [ffff88aa841efc68] ice_service_task at ffffffffa0d88201 [ice] torvalds#18 [ffff88aa841efde8] process_one_work at ffffffff811c589a torvalds#19 [ffff88aa841efe60] worker_thread at ffffffff811c71ff torvalds#20 [ffff88aa841eff10] kthread at ffffffff811d87a0 torvalds#21 [ffff88aa841eff50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff82e0022f Fixes: 44d9e52 ("RDMA/irdma: Implement device initialization definitions") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231130081415.891006-1-lishifeng@sangfor.com.cn Suggested-by: "Ismail, Mustafa" <mustafa.ismail@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Shifeng Li <lishifeng@sangfor.com.cn> Reviewed-by: Shiraz Saleem <shiraz.saleem@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
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[ Upstream commit a84fbf2 ] Generating metrics llc_code_read_mpi_demand_plus_prefetch, llc_data_read_mpi_demand_plus_prefetch, llc_miss_local_memory_bandwidth_read, llc_miss_local_memory_bandwidth_write, nllc_miss_remote_memory_bandwidth_read, memory_bandwidth_read, memory_bandwidth_write, uncore_frequency, upi_data_transmit_bw, C2_Pkg_Residency, C3_Core_Residency, C3_Pkg_Residency, C6_Core_Residency, C6_Pkg_Residency, C7_Core_Residency, C7_Pkg_Residency, UNCORE_FREQ and tma_info_system_socket_clks would trigger an address sanitizer heap-buffer-overflows on a SkylakeX. ``` ==2567752==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x5020003ed098 at pc 0x5621a816654e bp 0x7fffb55d4da0 sp 0x7fffb55d4d98 READ of size 4 at 0x5020003eee78 thread T0 #0 0x558265d6654d in aggr_cpu_id__is_empty tools/perf/util/cpumap.c:694:12 #1 0x558265c914da in perf_stat__get_aggr tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:1490:6 #2 0x558265c914da in perf_stat__get_global_cached tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:1530:9 #3 0x558265e53290 in should_skip_zero_counter tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:947:31 #4 0x558265e53290 in print_counter_aggrdata tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:985:18 #5 0x558265e51931 in print_counter tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:1110:3 #6 0x558265e51931 in evlist__print_counters tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:1571:5 #7 0x558265c8ec87 in print_counters tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:981:2 #8 0x558265c8cc71 in cmd_stat tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:2837:3 #9 0x558265bb9bd4 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:323:11 torvalds#10 0x558265bb98eb in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:377:8 torvalds#11 0x558265bb9389 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:421:2 torvalds#12 0x558265bb9389 in main tools/perf/perf.c:537:3 ``` The issue was the use of testing a cpumap with NULL rather than using empty, as a map containing the dummy value isn't NULL and the -1 results in an empty aggr map being allocated which legitimately overflows when any member is accessed. Fixes: 8a96f45 ("perf stat: Avoid SEGV if core.cpus isn't set") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230906003912.3317462-1-irogers@google.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
heftig
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Oct 10, 2024
commit 9af2efe upstream. The fields in the hist_entry are filled on-demand which means they only have meaningful values when relevant sort keys are used. So if neither of 'dso' nor 'sym' sort keys are used, the map/symbols in the hist entry can be garbage. So it shouldn't access it unconditionally. I got a segfault, when I wanted to see cgroup profiles. $ sudo perf record -a --all-cgroups --synth=cgroup true $ sudo perf report -s cgroup Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x00005555557a8d90 in map__dso (map=0x0) at util/map.h:48 48 return RC_CHK_ACCESS(map)->dso; (gdb) bt #0 0x00005555557a8d90 in map__dso (map=0x0) at util/map.h:48 #1 0x00005555557aa39b in map__load (map=0x0) at util/map.c:344 #2 0x00005555557aa592 in map__find_symbol (map=0x0, addr=140736115941088) at util/map.c:385 #3 0x00005555557ef000 in hists__findnew_entry (hists=0x555556039d60, entry=0x7fffffffa4c0, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, sample_self=true) at util/hist.c:644 #4 0x00005555557ef61c in __hists__add_entry (hists=0x555556039d60, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, sym_parent=0x0, bi=0x0, mi=0x0, ki=0x0, block_info=0x0, sample=0x7fffffffaa90, sample_self=true, ops=0x0) at util/hist.c:761 #5 0x00005555557ef71f in hists__add_entry (hists=0x555556039d60, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, sym_parent=0x0, bi=0x0, mi=0x0, ki=0x0, sample=0x7fffffffaa90, sample_self=true) at util/hist.c:779 #6 0x00005555557f00fb in iter_add_single_normal_entry (iter=0x7fffffffa900, al=0x7fffffffa8c0) at util/hist.c:1015 #7 0x00005555557f09a7 in hist_entry_iter__add (iter=0x7fffffffa900, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, max_stack_depth=127, arg=0x7fffffffbce0) at util/hist.c:1260 #8 0x00005555555ba7ce in process_sample_event (tool=0x7fffffffbce0, event=0x7ffff7c14128, sample=0x7fffffffaa90, evsel=0x555556039ad0, machine=0x5555560388e8) at builtin-report.c:334 #9 0x00005555557b30c8 in evlist__deliver_sample (evlist=0x555556039010, tool=0x7fffffffbce0, event=0x7ffff7c14128, sample=0x7fffffffaa90, evsel=0x555556039ad0, machine=0x5555560388e8) at util/session.c:1232 torvalds#10 0x00005555557b32bc in machines__deliver_event (machines=0x5555560388e8, evlist=0x555556039010, event=0x7ffff7c14128, sample=0x7fffffffaa90, tool=0x7fffffffbce0, file_offset=110888, file_path=0x555556038ff0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1271 torvalds#11 0x00005555557b3848 in perf_session__deliver_event (session=0x5555560386d0, event=0x7ffff7c14128, tool=0x7fffffffbce0, file_offset=110888, file_path=0x555556038ff0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1354 torvalds#12 0x00005555557affaf in ordered_events__deliver_event (oe=0x555556038e60, event=0x555556135aa0) at util/session.c:132 torvalds#13 0x00005555557bb605 in do_flush (oe=0x555556038e60, show_progress=false) at util/ordered-events.c:245 torvalds#14 0x00005555557bb95c in __ordered_events__flush (oe=0x555556038e60, how=OE_FLUSH__ROUND, timestamp=0) at util/ordered-events.c:324 torvalds#15 0x00005555557bba46 in ordered_events__flush (oe=0x555556038e60, how=OE_FLUSH__ROUND) at util/ordered-events.c:342 torvalds#16 0x00005555557b1b3b in perf_event__process_finished_round (tool=0x7fffffffbce0, event=0x7ffff7c15bb8, oe=0x555556038e60) at util/session.c:780 torvalds#17 0x00005555557b3b27 in perf_session__process_user_event (session=0x5555560386d0, event=0x7ffff7c15bb8, file_offset=117688, file_path=0x555556038ff0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1406 As you can see the entry->ms.map was NULL even if he->ms.map has a value. This is because 'sym' sort key is not given, so it cannot assume whether he->ms.sym and entry->ms.sym is the same. I only checked the 'sym' sort key here as it implies 'dso' behavior (so maps are the same). Fixes: ac01c8c ("perf hist: Update hist symbol when updating maps") Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@readmodwrite.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240826221045.1202305-2-namhyung@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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On the node of an NFS client, some files saved in the mountpoint of the NFS server were copied to another location of the same NFS server. Accidentally, the nfs42_complete_copies() got a NULL-pointer dereference crash with the following syslog: [232064.838881] NFSv4: state recovery failed for open file nfs/pvc-12b5200d-cd0f-46a3-b9f0-af8f4fe0ef64.qcow2, error = -116 [232064.839360] NFSv4: state recovery failed for open file nfs/pvc-12b5200d-cd0f-46a3-b9f0-af8f4fe0ef64.qcow2, error = -116 [232066.588183] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000058 [232066.588586] Mem abort info: [232066.588701] ESR = 0x0000000096000007 [232066.588862] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [232066.589084] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [232066.589216] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [232066.589340] FSC = 0x07: level 3 translation fault [232066.589559] Data abort info: [232066.589683] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007 [232066.589842] CM = 0, WnR = 0 [232066.589967] user pgtable: 64k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00002000956ff400 [232066.590231] [0000000000000058] pgd=08001100ae100003, p4d=08001100ae100003, pud=08001100ae100003, pmd=08001100b3c00003, pte=0000000000000000 [232066.590757] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP [232066.590958] Modules linked in: rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace fscache netfs ocfs2_dlmfs ocfs2_stack_o2cb ocfs2_dlm vhost_net vhost vhost_iotlb tap tun ipt_rpfilter xt_multiport ip_set_hash_ip ip_set_hash_net xfrm_interface xfrm6_tunnel tunnel4 tunnel6 esp4 ah4 wireguard libcurve25519_generic veth xt_addrtype xt_set nf_conntrack_netlink ip_set_hash_ipportnet ip_set_hash_ipportip ip_set_bitmap_port ip_set_hash_ipport dummy ip_set ip_vs_sh ip_vs_wrr ip_vs_rr ip_vs iptable_filter sch_ingress nfnetlink_cttimeout vport_gre ip_gre ip_tunnel gre vport_geneve geneve vport_vxlan vxlan ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel openvswitch nf_conncount dm_round_robin dm_service_time dm_multipath xt_nat xt_MASQUERADE nft_chain_nat nf_nat xt_mark xt_conntrack xt_comment nft_compat nft_counter nf_tables nfnetlink ocfs2 ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ipmi_ssif nbd overlay 8021q garp mrp bonding tls rfkill sunrpc ext4 mbcache jbd2 [232066.591052] vfat fat cas_cache cas_disk ses enclosure scsi_transport_sas sg acpi_ipmi ipmi_si ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler ip_tables vfio_pci vfio_pci_core vfio_virqfd vfio_iommu_type1 vfio dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 br_netfilter bridge stp llc fuse xfs libcrc32c ast drm_vram_helper qla2xxx drm_kms_helper syscopyarea crct10dif_ce sysfillrect ghash_ce sysimgblt sha2_ce fb_sys_fops cec sha256_arm64 sha1_ce drm_ttm_helper ttm nvme_fc igb sbsa_gwdt nvme_fabrics drm nvme_core i2c_algo_bit i40e scsi_transport_fc megaraid_sas aes_neon_bs [232066.596953] CPU: 6 PID: 4124696 Comm: 10.253.166.125- Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.15.131-9.cl9_ocfs2.aarch64 #1 [232066.597356] Hardware name: Great Wall .\x93\x8e...RF6260 V5/GWMSSE2GL1T, BIOS T656FBE_V3.0.18 2024-01-06 [232066.597721] pstate: 20400009 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [232066.598034] pc : nfs4_reclaim_open_state+0x220/0x800 [nfsv4] [232066.598327] lr : nfs4_reclaim_open_state+0x12c/0x800 [nfsv4] [232066.598595] sp : ffff8000f568fc70 [232066.598731] x29: ffff8000f568fc70 x28: 0000000000001000 x27: ffff21003db33000 [232066.599030] x26: ffff800005521ae0 x25: ffff0100f98fa3f0 x24: 0000000000000001 [232066.599319] x23: ffff800009920008 x22: ffff21003db33040 x21: ffff21003db33050 [232066.599628] x20: ffff410172fe9e40 x19: ffff410172fe9e00 x18: 0000000000000000 [232066.599914] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000004 x15: 0000000000000000 [232066.600195] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffff800008e685a8 x12: 00000000eac0c6e6 [232066.600498] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000008 x9 : ffff8000054e5828 [232066.600784] x8 : 00000000ffffffbf x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 000000000a9eb14a [232066.601062] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : ffff70ff8a14a800 x3 : 0000000000000058 [232066.601348] x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 54dce46366daa6c6 x0 : 0000000000000000 [232066.601636] Call trace: [232066.601749] nfs4_reclaim_open_state+0x220/0x800 [nfsv4] [232066.601998] nfs4_do_reclaim+0x1b8/0x28c [nfsv4] [232066.602218] nfs4_state_manager+0x928/0x10f0 [nfsv4] [232066.602455] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x78/0x1b0 [nfsv4] [232066.602690] kthread+0x110/0x114 [232066.602830] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [232066.602985] Code: 1400000d f9403f20 f9402e61 91016003 (f9402c00) [232066.603284] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs [232066.606936] Starting crashdump kernel... [232066.607146] Bye! Analysing the vmcore, we know that nfs4_copy_state listed by destination nfs_server->ss_copies was added by the field copies in handle_async_copy(), and we found a waiting copy process with the stack as: PID: 3511963 TASK: ffff710028b47e00 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "cp" #0 [ffff8001116ef740] __switch_to at ffff8000081b92f4 #1 [ffff8001116ef760] __schedule at ffff800008dd0650 #2 [ffff8001116ef7c0] schedule at ffff800008dd0a00 #3 [ffff8001116ef7e0] schedule_timeout at ffff800008dd6aa0 #4 [ffff8001116ef860] __wait_for_common at ffff800008dd166c #5 [ffff8001116ef8e0] wait_for_completion_interruptible at ffff800008dd1898 #6 [ffff8001116ef8f0] handle_async_copy at ffff8000055142f4 [nfsv4] #7 [ffff8001116ef970] _nfs42_proc_copy at ffff8000055147c8 [nfsv4] #8 [ffff8001116efa80] nfs42_proc_copy at ffff800005514cf0 [nfsv4] #9 [ffff8001116efc50] __nfs4_copy_file_range.constprop.0 at ffff8000054ed694 [nfsv4] The NULL-pointer dereference was due to nfs42_complete_copies() listed the nfs_server->ss_copies by the field ss_copies of nfs4_copy_state. So the nfs4_copy_state address ffff0100f98fa3f0 was offset by 0x10 and the data accessed through this pointer was also incorrect. Generally, the ordered list nfs4_state_owner->so_states indicate open(O_RDWR) or open(O_WRITE) states are reclaimed firstly by nfs4_reclaim_open_state(). When destination state reclaim is failed with NFS_STATE_RECOVERY_FAILED and copies are not deleted in nfs_server->ss_copies, the source state may be passed to the nfs42_complete_copies() process earlier, resulting in this crash scene finally. To solve this issue, we add a list_head nfs_server->ss_src_copies for a server-to-server copy specially. Fixes: 0e65a32 ("NFS: handle source server reboot") Signed-off-by: Yanjun Zhang <zhangyanjun@cestc.cn> Reviewed-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@oracle.com>
heftig
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[ Upstream commit a848c29 ] On the node of an NFS client, some files saved in the mountpoint of the NFS server were copied to another location of the same NFS server. Accidentally, the nfs42_complete_copies() got a NULL-pointer dereference crash with the following syslog: [232064.838881] NFSv4: state recovery failed for open file nfs/pvc-12b5200d-cd0f-46a3-b9f0-af8f4fe0ef64.qcow2, error = -116 [232064.839360] NFSv4: state recovery failed for open file nfs/pvc-12b5200d-cd0f-46a3-b9f0-af8f4fe0ef64.qcow2, error = -116 [232066.588183] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000058 [232066.588586] Mem abort info: [232066.588701] ESR = 0x0000000096000007 [232066.588862] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [232066.589084] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [232066.589216] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [232066.589340] FSC = 0x07: level 3 translation fault [232066.589559] Data abort info: [232066.589683] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007 [232066.589842] CM = 0, WnR = 0 [232066.589967] user pgtable: 64k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00002000956ff400 [232066.590231] [0000000000000058] pgd=08001100ae100003, p4d=08001100ae100003, pud=08001100ae100003, pmd=08001100b3c00003, pte=0000000000000000 [232066.590757] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP [232066.590958] Modules linked in: rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace fscache netfs ocfs2_dlmfs ocfs2_stack_o2cb ocfs2_dlm vhost_net vhost vhost_iotlb tap tun ipt_rpfilter xt_multiport ip_set_hash_ip ip_set_hash_net xfrm_interface xfrm6_tunnel tunnel4 tunnel6 esp4 ah4 wireguard libcurve25519_generic veth xt_addrtype xt_set nf_conntrack_netlink ip_set_hash_ipportnet ip_set_hash_ipportip ip_set_bitmap_port ip_set_hash_ipport dummy ip_set ip_vs_sh ip_vs_wrr ip_vs_rr ip_vs iptable_filter sch_ingress nfnetlink_cttimeout vport_gre ip_gre ip_tunnel gre vport_geneve geneve vport_vxlan vxlan ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel openvswitch nf_conncount dm_round_robin dm_service_time dm_multipath xt_nat xt_MASQUERADE nft_chain_nat nf_nat xt_mark xt_conntrack xt_comment nft_compat nft_counter nf_tables nfnetlink ocfs2 ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ipmi_ssif nbd overlay 8021q garp mrp bonding tls rfkill sunrpc ext4 mbcache jbd2 [232066.591052] vfat fat cas_cache cas_disk ses enclosure scsi_transport_sas sg acpi_ipmi ipmi_si ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler ip_tables vfio_pci vfio_pci_core vfio_virqfd vfio_iommu_type1 vfio dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 br_netfilter bridge stp llc fuse xfs libcrc32c ast drm_vram_helper qla2xxx drm_kms_helper syscopyarea crct10dif_ce sysfillrect ghash_ce sysimgblt sha2_ce fb_sys_fops cec sha256_arm64 sha1_ce drm_ttm_helper ttm nvme_fc igb sbsa_gwdt nvme_fabrics drm nvme_core i2c_algo_bit i40e scsi_transport_fc megaraid_sas aes_neon_bs [232066.596953] CPU: 6 PID: 4124696 Comm: 10.253.166.125- Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.15.131-9.cl9_ocfs2.aarch64 #1 [232066.597356] Hardware name: Great Wall .\x93\x8e...RF6260 V5/GWMSSE2GL1T, BIOS T656FBE_V3.0.18 2024-01-06 [232066.597721] pstate: 20400009 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [232066.598034] pc : nfs4_reclaim_open_state+0x220/0x800 [nfsv4] [232066.598327] lr : nfs4_reclaim_open_state+0x12c/0x800 [nfsv4] [232066.598595] sp : ffff8000f568fc70 [232066.598731] x29: ffff8000f568fc70 x28: 0000000000001000 x27: ffff21003db33000 [232066.599030] x26: ffff800005521ae0 x25: ffff0100f98fa3f0 x24: 0000000000000001 [232066.599319] x23: ffff800009920008 x22: ffff21003db33040 x21: ffff21003db33050 [232066.599628] x20: ffff410172fe9e40 x19: ffff410172fe9e00 x18: 0000000000000000 [232066.599914] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000004 x15: 0000000000000000 [232066.600195] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffff800008e685a8 x12: 00000000eac0c6e6 [232066.600498] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000008 x9 : ffff8000054e5828 [232066.600784] x8 : 00000000ffffffbf x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 000000000a9eb14a [232066.601062] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : ffff70ff8a14a800 x3 : 0000000000000058 [232066.601348] x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 54dce46366daa6c6 x0 : 0000000000000000 [232066.601636] Call trace: [232066.601749] nfs4_reclaim_open_state+0x220/0x800 [nfsv4] [232066.601998] nfs4_do_reclaim+0x1b8/0x28c [nfsv4] [232066.602218] nfs4_state_manager+0x928/0x10f0 [nfsv4] [232066.602455] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x78/0x1b0 [nfsv4] [232066.602690] kthread+0x110/0x114 [232066.602830] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [232066.602985] Code: 1400000d f9403f20 f9402e61 91016003 (f9402c00) [232066.603284] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs [232066.606936] Starting crashdump kernel... [232066.607146] Bye! Analysing the vmcore, we know that nfs4_copy_state listed by destination nfs_server->ss_copies was added by the field copies in handle_async_copy(), and we found a waiting copy process with the stack as: PID: 3511963 TASK: ffff710028b47e00 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "cp" #0 [ffff8001116ef740] __switch_to at ffff8000081b92f4 #1 [ffff8001116ef760] __schedule at ffff800008dd0650 #2 [ffff8001116ef7c0] schedule at ffff800008dd0a00 #3 [ffff8001116ef7e0] schedule_timeout at ffff800008dd6aa0 #4 [ffff8001116ef860] __wait_for_common at ffff800008dd166c #5 [ffff8001116ef8e0] wait_for_completion_interruptible at ffff800008dd1898 #6 [ffff8001116ef8f0] handle_async_copy at ffff8000055142f4 [nfsv4] #7 [ffff8001116ef970] _nfs42_proc_copy at ffff8000055147c8 [nfsv4] #8 [ffff8001116efa80] nfs42_proc_copy at ffff800005514cf0 [nfsv4] #9 [ffff8001116efc50] __nfs4_copy_file_range.constprop.0 at ffff8000054ed694 [nfsv4] The NULL-pointer dereference was due to nfs42_complete_copies() listed the nfs_server->ss_copies by the field ss_copies of nfs4_copy_state. So the nfs4_copy_state address ffff0100f98fa3f0 was offset by 0x10 and the data accessed through this pointer was also incorrect. Generally, the ordered list nfs4_state_owner->so_states indicate open(O_RDWR) or open(O_WRITE) states are reclaimed firstly by nfs4_reclaim_open_state(). When destination state reclaim is failed with NFS_STATE_RECOVERY_FAILED and copies are not deleted in nfs_server->ss_copies, the source state may be passed to the nfs42_complete_copies() process earlier, resulting in this crash scene finally. To solve this issue, we add a list_head nfs_server->ss_src_copies for a server-to-server copy specially. Fixes: 0e65a32 ("NFS: handle source server reboot") Signed-off-by: Yanjun Zhang <zhangyanjun@cestc.cn> Reviewed-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 73f3508 ] When creating a trace_probe we would set nr_args prior to truncating the arguments to MAX_TRACE_ARGS. However, we would only initialize arguments up to the limit. This caused invalid memory access when attempting to set up probes with more than 128 fetchargs. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1769 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.11.0-rc7+ #8 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-1.fc39 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__set_print_fmt+0x134/0x330 Resolve the issue by applying the MAX_TRACE_ARGS limit earlier. Return an error when there are too many arguments instead of silently truncating. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240930202656.292869-1-mikel@mikelr.com/ Fixes: 035ba76 ("tracing/probes: cleanup: Set trace_probe::nr_args at trace_probe_init") Signed-off-by: Mikel Rychliski <mikel@mikelr.com> Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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When creating a trace_probe we would set nr_args prior to truncating the arguments to MAX_TRACE_ARGS. However, we would only initialize arguments up to the limit. This caused invalid memory access when attempting to set up probes with more than 128 fetchargs. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1769 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.11.0-rc7+ #8 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-1.fc39 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__set_print_fmt+0x134/0x330 Resolve the issue by applying the MAX_TRACE_ARGS limit earlier. Return an error when there are too many arguments instead of silently truncating. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240930202656.292869-1-mikel@mikelr.com/ Fixes: 035ba76 ("tracing/probes: cleanup: Set trace_probe::nr_args at trace_probe_init") Signed-off-by: Mikel Rychliski <mikel@mikelr.com> Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
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The referenced commits introduced a two-step process for deleting FTEs: - Lock the FTE, delete it from hardware, set the hardware deletion function to NULL and unlock the FTE. - Lock the parent flow group, delete the software copy of the FTE, and remove it from the xarray. However, this approach encounters a race condition if a rule with the same match value is added simultaneously. In this scenario, fs_core may set the hardware deletion function to NULL prematurely, causing a panic during subsequent rule deletions. To prevent this, ensure the active flag of the FTE is checked under a lock, which will prevent the fs_core layer from attaching a new steering rule to an FTE that is in the process of deletion. [ 438.967589] MOSHE: 2496 mlx5_del_flow_rules del_hw_func [ 438.968205] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 438.968654] refcount_t: decrement hit 0; leaking memory. [ 438.969249] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 8957 at lib/refcount.c:31 refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x110 [ 438.970054] Modules linked in: act_mirred cls_flower act_gact sch_ingress openvswitch nsh mlx5_vdpa vringh vhost_iotlb vdpa mlx5_ib mlx5_core xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat br_netfilter rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss oid_registry overlay rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_umad rdma_cm ib_ipoib iw_cm ib_cm ib_uverbs ib_core zram zsmalloc fuse [last unloaded: cls_flower] [ 438.973288] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 8957 Comm: tc Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1+ #8 [ 438.973888] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 438.974874] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x110 [ 438.975363] Code: 40 66 3b 82 c6 05 16 e9 4d 01 01 e8 1f 7c a0 ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 10 66 3b 82 c6 05 fd e8 4d 01 01 e8 05 7c a0 ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 90 [ 438.976947] RSP: 0018:ffff888124a53610 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 438.977446] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888119d56de0 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 438.978090] RDX: ffff88852c828700 RSI: ffff88852c81b3c0 RDI: ffff88852c81b3c0 [ 438.978721] RBP: ffff888120fa0e88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff888124a534b0 [ 438.979353] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888119d56de0 [ 438.979979] R13: ffff888120fa0ec0 R14: ffff888120fa0ee8 R15: ffff888119d56de0 [ 438.980607] FS: 00007fe6dcc0f800(0000) GS:ffff88852c800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 438.983984] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 438.984544] CR2: 00000000004275e0 CR3: 0000000186982001 CR4: 0000000000372eb0 [ 438.985205] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 438.985842] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 438.986507] Call Trace: [ 438.986799] <TASK> [ 438.987070] ? __warn+0x7d/0x110 [ 438.987426] ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x110 [ 438.987877] ? report_bug+0x17d/0x190 [ 438.988261] ? prb_read_valid+0x17/0x20 [ 438.988659] ? handle_bug+0x53/0x90 [ 438.989054] ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70 [ 438.989458] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 [ 438.989883] ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x110 [ 438.990348] mlx5_del_flow_rules+0x2f7/0x340 [mlx5_core] [ 438.990932] __mlx5_eswitch_del_rule+0x49/0x170 [mlx5_core] [ 438.991519] ? mlx5_lag_is_sriov+0x3c/0x50 [mlx5_core] [ 438.992054] ? xas_load+0x9/0xb0 [ 438.992407] mlx5e_tc_rule_unoffload+0x45/0xe0 [mlx5_core] [ 438.993037] mlx5e_tc_del_fdb_flow+0x2a6/0x2e0 [mlx5_core] [ 438.993623] mlx5e_flow_put+0x29/0x60 [mlx5_core] [ 438.994161] mlx5e_delete_flower+0x261/0x390 [mlx5_core] [ 438.994728] tc_setup_cb_destroy+0xb9/0x190 [ 438.995150] fl_hw_destroy_filter+0x94/0xc0 [cls_flower] [ 438.995650] fl_change+0x11a4/0x13c0 [cls_flower] [ 438.996105] tc_new_tfilter+0x347/0xbc0 [ 438.996503] ? ___slab_alloc+0x70/0x8c0 [ 438.996929] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0xf9/0x3e0 [ 438.997339] ? __netlink_sendskb+0x4c/0x70 [ 438.997751] ? netlink_unicast+0x286/0x2d0 [ 438.998171] ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 [ 438.998625] netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 [ 438.999020] netlink_unicast+0x203/0x2d0 [ 438.999421] netlink_sendmsg+0x1e4/0x420 [ 438.999820] __sock_sendmsg+0xa1/0xb0 [ 439.000203] ____sys_sendmsg+0x207/0x2a0 [ 439.000600] ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x6d/0xa0 [ 439.001072] ___sys_sendmsg+0x80/0xc0 [ 439.001459] ? ___sys_recvmsg+0x8b/0xc0 [ 439.001848] ? generic_update_time+0x4d/0x60 [ 439.002282] __sys_sendmsg+0x51/0x90 [ 439.002658] do_syscall_64+0x50/0x110 [ 439.003040] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Fixes: 718ce4d ("net/mlx5: Consolidate update FTE for all removal changes") Fixes: cefc235 ("net/mlx5: Fix FTE cleanup") Signed-off-by: Mark Bloch <mbloch@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Maor Gottlieb <maorg@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241107183527.676877-4-tariqt@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Kernel will hang on destroy admin_q while we create ctrl failed, such as following calltrace: PID: 23644 TASK: ff2d52b40f439fc0 CPU: 2 COMMAND: "nvme" #0 [ff61d23de260fb78] __schedule at ffffffff8323bc15 #1 [ff61d23de260fc08] schedule at ffffffff8323c014 #2 [ff61d23de260fc28] blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait at ffffffff82a3dba1 #3 [ff61d23de260fc78] blk_freeze_queue at ffffffff82a4113a #4 [ff61d23de260fc90] blk_cleanup_queue at ffffffff82a33006 #5 [ff61d23de260fcb0] nvme_rdma_destroy_admin_queue at ffffffffc12686ce #6 [ff61d23de260fcc8] nvme_rdma_setup_ctrl at ffffffffc1268ced #7 [ff61d23de260fd28] nvme_rdma_create_ctrl at ffffffffc126919b #8 [ff61d23de260fd68] nvmf_dev_write at ffffffffc024f362 #9 [ff61d23de260fe38] vfs_write at ffffffff827d5f25 RIP: 00007fda7891d574 RSP: 00007ffe2ef06958 RFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055e8122a4d90 RCX: 00007fda7891d574 RDX: 000000000000012b RSI: 000055e8122a4d90 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007ffe2ef079c0 R8: 000000000000012b R9: 000055e8122a4d90 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000004 R13: 000055e8122923c0 R14: 000000000000012b R15: 00007fda78a54500 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 CS: 0033 SS: 002b This due to we have quiesced admi_q before cancel requests, but forgot to unquiesce before destroy it, as a result we fail to drain the pending requests, and hang on blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait() forever. Here try to reuse nvme_rdma_teardown_admin_queue() to fix this issue and simplify the code. Fixes: 958dc1d ("nvme-rdma: add clean action for failed reconnection") Reported-by: Yingfu.zhou <yingfu.zhou@shopee.com> Signed-off-by: Chunguang.xu <chunguang.xu@shopee.com> Signed-off-by: Yue.zhao <yue.zhao@shopee.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
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Hou Tao says: ==================== This patch set fixes several issues for LPM trie. These issues were found during adding new test cases or were reported by syzbot. The patch set is structured as follows: Patch #1~#2 are clean-ups for lpm_trie_update_elem(). Patch #3 handles BPF_EXIST and BPF_NOEXIST correctly for LPM trie. Patch #4 fixes the accounting of n_entries when doing in-place update. Patch #5 fixes the exact match condition in trie_get_next_key() and it may skip keys when the passed key is not found in the map. Patch #6~#7 switch from kmalloc() to bpf memory allocator for LPM trie to fix several lock order warnings reported by syzbot. It also enables raw_spinlock_t for LPM trie again. After these changes, the LPM trie will be closer to being usable in any context (though the reentrance check of trie->lock is still missing, but it is on my todo list). Patch #8: move test_lpm_map to map_tests to make it run regularly. Patch #9: add test cases for the issues fixed by patch #3~#5. Please see individual patches for more details. Comments are always welcome. Change Log: v3: * patch #2: remove the unnecessary NULL-init for im_node * patch #6: alloc the leaf node before disabling IRQ to low the possibility of -ENOMEM when leaf_size is large; Free these nodes outside the trie lock (Suggested by Alexei) * collect review and ack tags (Thanks for Toke & Daniel) v2: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241127004641.1118269-1-houtao@huaweicloud.com/ * collect review tags (Thanks for Toke) * drop "Add bpf_mem_cache_is_mergeable() helper" patch * patch #3~#4: add fix tag * patch #4: rename the helper to trie_check_add_elem() and increase n_entries in it. * patch #6: use one bpf mem allocator and update commit message to clarify that using bpf mem allocator is more appropriate. * patch #7: update commit message to add the possible max running time for update operation. * patch #9: update commit message to specify the purpose of these test cases. v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241118010808.2243555-1-houtao@huaweicloud.com/ ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241206110622.1161752-1-houtao@huaweicloud.com/ Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5858b68 ] Kernel will hang on destroy admin_q while we create ctrl failed, such as following calltrace: PID: 23644 TASK: ff2d52b40f439fc0 CPU: 2 COMMAND: "nvme" #0 [ff61d23de260fb78] __schedule at ffffffff8323bc15 #1 [ff61d23de260fc08] schedule at ffffffff8323c014 #2 [ff61d23de260fc28] blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait at ffffffff82a3dba1 #3 [ff61d23de260fc78] blk_freeze_queue at ffffffff82a4113a #4 [ff61d23de260fc90] blk_cleanup_queue at ffffffff82a33006 #5 [ff61d23de260fcb0] nvme_rdma_destroy_admin_queue at ffffffffc12686ce #6 [ff61d23de260fcc8] nvme_rdma_setup_ctrl at ffffffffc1268ced #7 [ff61d23de260fd28] nvme_rdma_create_ctrl at ffffffffc126919b #8 [ff61d23de260fd68] nvmf_dev_write at ffffffffc024f362 #9 [ff61d23de260fe38] vfs_write at ffffffff827d5f25 RIP: 00007fda7891d574 RSP: 00007ffe2ef06958 RFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055e8122a4d90 RCX: 00007fda7891d574 RDX: 000000000000012b RSI: 000055e8122a4d90 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007ffe2ef079c0 R8: 000000000000012b R9: 000055e8122a4d90 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000004 R13: 000055e8122923c0 R14: 000000000000012b R15: 00007fda78a54500 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 CS: 0033 SS: 002b This due to we have quiesced admi_q before cancel requests, but forgot to unquiesce before destroy it, as a result we fail to drain the pending requests, and hang on blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait() forever. Here try to reuse nvme_rdma_teardown_admin_queue() to fix this issue and simplify the code. Fixes: 958dc1d ("nvme-rdma: add clean action for failed reconnection") Reported-by: Yingfu.zhou <yingfu.zhou@shopee.com> Signed-off-by: Chunguang.xu <chunguang.xu@shopee.com> Signed-off-by: Yue.zhao <yue.zhao@shopee.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Its used from trace__run(), for the 'perf trace' live mode, i.e. its
strace-like, non-perf.data file processing mode, the most common one.
The trace__run() function will set trace->host using machine__new_host()
that is supposed to give a machine instance representing the running
machine, and since we'll use perf_env__arch_strerrno() to get the right
errno -> string table, we need to use machine->env, so initialize it in
machine__new_host().
Before the patch:
(gdb) run trace --errno-summary -a sleep 1
<SNIP>
Summary of events:
gvfs-afc-volume (3187), 2 events, 0.0%
syscall calls errors total min avg max stddev
(msec) (msec) (msec) (msec) (%)
--------------- -------- ------ -------- --------- --------- --------- ------
pselect6 1 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00%
GUsbEventThread (3519), 2 events, 0.0%
syscall calls errors total min avg max stddev
(msec) (msec) (msec) (msec) (%)
--------------- -------- ------ -------- --------- --------- --------- ------
poll 1 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00%
<SNIP>
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x00000000005caba0 in perf_env__arch_strerrno (env=0x0, err=110) at util/env.c:478
478 if (env->arch_strerrno == NULL)
(gdb) bt
#0 0x00000000005caba0 in perf_env__arch_strerrno (env=0x0, err=110) at util/env.c:478
#1 0x00000000004b75d2 in thread__dump_stats (ttrace=0x14f58f0, trace=0x7fffffffa5b0, fp=0x7ffff6ff74e0 <_IO_2_1_stderr_>) at builtin-trace.c:4673
#2 0x00000000004b78bf in trace__fprintf_thread (fp=0x7ffff6ff74e0 <_IO_2_1_stderr_>, thread=0x10fa0b0, trace=0x7fffffffa5b0) at builtin-trace.c:4708
#3 0x00000000004b7ad9 in trace__fprintf_thread_summary (trace=0x7fffffffa5b0, fp=0x7ffff6ff74e0 <_IO_2_1_stderr_>) at builtin-trace.c:4747
#4 0x00000000004b656e in trace__run (trace=0x7fffffffa5b0, argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at builtin-trace.c:4456
#5 0x00000000004ba43e in cmd_trace (argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at builtin-trace.c:5487
#6 0x00000000004c0414 in run_builtin (p=0xec3068 <commands+648>, argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at perf.c:351
#7 0x00000000004c06bb in handle_internal_command (argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at perf.c:404
#8 0x00000000004c0814 in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffdc4c, argv=0x7fffffffdc40) at perf.c:448
#9 0x00000000004c0b5d in main (argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at perf.c:560
(gdb)
After:
root@number:~# perf trace -a --errno-summary sleep 1
<SNIP>
pw-data-loop (2685), 1410 events, 16.0%
syscall calls errors total min avg max stddev
(msec) (msec) (msec) (msec) (%)
--------------- -------- ------ -------- --------- --------- --------- ------
epoll_wait 188 0 983.428 0.000 5.231 15.595 8.68%
ioctl 94 0 0.811 0.004 0.009 0.016 2.82%
read 188 0 0.322 0.001 0.002 0.006 5.15%
write 141 0 0.280 0.001 0.002 0.018 8.39%
timerfd_settime 94 0 0.138 0.001 0.001 0.007 6.47%
gnome-control-c (179406), 1848 events, 20.9%
syscall calls errors total min avg max stddev
(msec) (msec) (msec) (msec) (%)
--------------- -------- ------ -------- --------- --------- --------- ------
poll 222 0 959.577 0.000 4.322 21.414 11.40%
recvmsg 150 0 0.539 0.001 0.004 0.013 5.12%
write 300 0 0.442 0.001 0.001 0.007 3.29%
read 150 0 0.183 0.001 0.001 0.009 5.53%
getpid 102 0 0.101 0.000 0.001 0.008 7.82%
root@number:~#
Fixes: 54373b5 ("perf env: Introduce perf_env__arch_strerrno()")
Reported-by: Veronika Molnarova <vmolnaro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Veronika Molnarova <vmolnaro@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Z0XffUgNSv_9OjOi@x1
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 88a6e2f ] Its used from trace__run(), for the 'perf trace' live mode, i.e. its strace-like, non-perf.data file processing mode, the most common one. The trace__run() function will set trace->host using machine__new_host() that is supposed to give a machine instance representing the running machine, and since we'll use perf_env__arch_strerrno() to get the right errno -> string table, we need to use machine->env, so initialize it in machine__new_host(). Before the patch: (gdb) run trace --errno-summary -a sleep 1 <SNIP> Summary of events: gvfs-afc-volume (3187), 2 events, 0.0% syscall calls errors total min avg max stddev (msec) (msec) (msec) (msec) (%) --------------- -------- ------ -------- --------- --------- --------- ------ pselect6 1 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00% GUsbEventThread (3519), 2 events, 0.0% syscall calls errors total min avg max stddev (msec) (msec) (msec) (msec) (%) --------------- -------- ------ -------- --------- --------- --------- ------ poll 1 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00% <SNIP> Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x00000000005caba0 in perf_env__arch_strerrno (env=0x0, err=110) at util/env.c:478 478 if (env->arch_strerrno == NULL) (gdb) bt #0 0x00000000005caba0 in perf_env__arch_strerrno (env=0x0, err=110) at util/env.c:478 #1 0x00000000004b75d2 in thread__dump_stats (ttrace=0x14f58f0, trace=0x7fffffffa5b0, fp=0x7ffff6ff74e0 <_IO_2_1_stderr_>) at builtin-trace.c:4673 #2 0x00000000004b78bf in trace__fprintf_thread (fp=0x7ffff6ff74e0 <_IO_2_1_stderr_>, thread=0x10fa0b0, trace=0x7fffffffa5b0) at builtin-trace.c:4708 #3 0x00000000004b7ad9 in trace__fprintf_thread_summary (trace=0x7fffffffa5b0, fp=0x7ffff6ff74e0 <_IO_2_1_stderr_>) at builtin-trace.c:4747 #4 0x00000000004b656e in trace__run (trace=0x7fffffffa5b0, argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at builtin-trace.c:4456 #5 0x00000000004ba43e in cmd_trace (argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at builtin-trace.c:5487 #6 0x00000000004c0414 in run_builtin (p=0xec3068 <commands+648>, argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at perf.c:351 #7 0x00000000004c06bb in handle_internal_command (argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at perf.c:404 #8 0x00000000004c0814 in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffdc4c, argv=0x7fffffffdc40) at perf.c:448 #9 0x00000000004c0b5d in main (argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at perf.c:560 (gdb) After: root@number:~# perf trace -a --errno-summary sleep 1 <SNIP> pw-data-loop (2685), 1410 events, 16.0% syscall calls errors total min avg max stddev (msec) (msec) (msec) (msec) (%) --------------- -------- ------ -------- --------- --------- --------- ------ epoll_wait 188 0 983.428 0.000 5.231 15.595 8.68% ioctl 94 0 0.811 0.004 0.009 0.016 2.82% read 188 0 0.322 0.001 0.002 0.006 5.15% write 141 0 0.280 0.001 0.002 0.018 8.39% timerfd_settime 94 0 0.138 0.001 0.001 0.007 6.47% gnome-control-c (179406), 1848 events, 20.9% syscall calls errors total min avg max stddev (msec) (msec) (msec) (msec) (%) --------------- -------- ------ -------- --------- --------- --------- ------ poll 222 0 959.577 0.000 4.322 21.414 11.40% recvmsg 150 0 0.539 0.001 0.004 0.013 5.12% write 300 0 0.442 0.001 0.001 0.007 3.29% read 150 0 0.183 0.001 0.001 0.009 5.53% getpid 102 0 0.101 0.000 0.001 0.008 7.82% root@number:~# Fixes: 54373b5 ("perf env: Introduce perf_env__arch_strerrno()") Reported-by: Veronika Molnarova <vmolnaro@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Acked-by: Veronika Molnarova <vmolnaro@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com> Tested-by: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Z0XffUgNSv_9OjOi@x1 Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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…le_direct_reclaim() The task sometimes continues looping in throttle_direct_reclaim() because allow_direct_reclaim(pgdat) keeps returning false. #0 [ffff80002cb6f8d0] __switch_to at ffff8000080095ac #1 [ffff80002cb6f900] __schedule at ffff800008abbd1c #2 [ffff80002cb6f990] schedule at ffff800008abc50c #3 [ffff80002cb6f9b0] throttle_direct_reclaim at ffff800008273550 #4 [ffff80002cb6fa20] try_to_free_pages at ffff800008277b68 #5 [ffff80002cb6fae0] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffff8000082c4660 #6 [ffff80002cb6fc50] alloc_pages_vma at ffff8000082e4a98 #7 [ffff80002cb6fca0] do_anonymous_page at ffff80000829f5a8 #8 [ffff80002cb6fce0] __handle_mm_fault at ffff8000082a5974 #9 [ffff80002cb6fd90] handle_mm_fault at ffff8000082a5bd4 At this point, the pgdat contains the following two zones: NODE: 4 ZONE: 0 ADDR: ffff00817fffe540 NAME: "DMA32" SIZE: 20480 MIN/LOW/HIGH: 11/28/45 VM_STAT: NR_FREE_PAGES: 359 NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_ANON: 18813 NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_ANON: 0 NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_FILE: 50 NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_FILE: 0 NR_ZONE_UNEVICTABLE: 0 NR_ZONE_WRITE_PENDING: 0 NR_MLOCK: 0 NR_BOUNCE: 0 NR_ZSPAGES: 0 NR_FREE_CMA_PAGES: 0 NODE: 4 ZONE: 1 ADDR: ffff00817fffec00 NAME: "Normal" SIZE: 8454144 PRESENT: 98304 MIN/LOW/HIGH: 68/166/264 VM_STAT: NR_FREE_PAGES: 146 NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_ANON: 94668 NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_ANON: 3 NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_FILE: 735 NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_FILE: 78 NR_ZONE_UNEVICTABLE: 0 NR_ZONE_WRITE_PENDING: 0 NR_MLOCK: 0 NR_BOUNCE: 0 NR_ZSPAGES: 0 NR_FREE_CMA_PAGES: 0 In allow_direct_reclaim(), while processing ZONE_DMA32, the sum of inactive/active file-backed pages calculated in zone_reclaimable_pages() based on the result of zone_page_state_snapshot() is zero. Additionally, since this system lacks swap, the calculation of inactive/ active anonymous pages is skipped. crash> p nr_swap_pages nr_swap_pages = $1937 = { counter = 0 } As a result, ZONE_DMA32 is deemed unreclaimable and skipped, moving on to the processing of the next zone, ZONE_NORMAL, despite ZONE_DMA32 having free pages significantly exceeding the high watermark. The problem is that the pgdat->kswapd_failures hasn't been incremented. crash> px ((struct pglist_data *) 0xffff00817fffe540)->kswapd_failures $1935 = 0x0 This is because the node deemed balanced. The node balancing logic in balance_pgdat() evaluates all zones collectively. If one or more zones (e.g., ZONE_DMA32) have enough free pages to meet their watermarks, the entire node is deemed balanced. This causes balance_pgdat() to exit early before incrementing the kswapd_failures, as it considers the overall memory state acceptable, even though some zones (like ZONE_NORMAL) remain under significant pressure. The patch ensures that zone_reclaimable_pages() includes free pages (NR_FREE_PAGES) in its calculation when no other reclaimable pages are available (e.g., file-backed or anonymous pages). This change prevents zones like ZONE_DMA32, which have sufficient free pages, from being mistakenly deemed unreclaimable. By doing so, the patch ensures proper node balancing, avoids masking pressure on other zones like ZONE_NORMAL, and prevents infinite loops in throttle_direct_reclaim() caused by allow_direct_reclaim(pgdat) repeatedly returning false. The kernel hangs due to a task stuck in throttle_direct_reclaim(), caused by a node being incorrectly deemed balanced despite pressure in certain zones, such as ZONE_NORMAL. This issue arises from zone_reclaimable_pages() returning 0 for zones without reclaimable file- backed or anonymous pages, causing zones like ZONE_DMA32 with sufficient free pages to be skipped. The lack of swap or reclaimable pages results in ZONE_DMA32 being ignored during reclaim, masking pressure in other zones. Consequently, pgdat->kswapd_failures remains 0 in balance_pgdat(), preventing fallback mechanisms in allow_direct_reclaim() from being triggered, leading to an infinite loop in throttle_direct_reclaim(). This patch modifies zone_reclaimable_pages() to account for free pages (NR_FREE_PAGES) when no other reclaimable pages exist. This ensures zones with sufficient free pages are not skipped, enabling proper balancing and reclaim behavior. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style cleanups] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241130164346.436469-1-snishika@redhat.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241130161236.433747-2-snishika@redhat.com Fixes: 5a1c84b ("mm: remove reclaim and compaction retry approximations") Signed-off-by: Seiji Nishikawa <snishika@redhat.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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…le_direct_reclaim() commit 6aaced5 upstream. The task sometimes continues looping in throttle_direct_reclaim() because allow_direct_reclaim(pgdat) keeps returning false. #0 [ffff80002cb6f8d0] __switch_to at ffff8000080095ac #1 [ffff80002cb6f900] __schedule at ffff800008abbd1c #2 [ffff80002cb6f990] schedule at ffff800008abc50c #3 [ffff80002cb6f9b0] throttle_direct_reclaim at ffff800008273550 #4 [ffff80002cb6fa20] try_to_free_pages at ffff800008277b68 #5 [ffff80002cb6fae0] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffff8000082c4660 #6 [ffff80002cb6fc50] alloc_pages_vma at ffff8000082e4a98 #7 [ffff80002cb6fca0] do_anonymous_page at ffff80000829f5a8 #8 [ffff80002cb6fce0] __handle_mm_fault at ffff8000082a5974 #9 [ffff80002cb6fd90] handle_mm_fault at ffff8000082a5bd4 At this point, the pgdat contains the following two zones: NODE: 4 ZONE: 0 ADDR: ffff00817fffe540 NAME: "DMA32" SIZE: 20480 MIN/LOW/HIGH: 11/28/45 VM_STAT: NR_FREE_PAGES: 359 NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_ANON: 18813 NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_ANON: 0 NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_FILE: 50 NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_FILE: 0 NR_ZONE_UNEVICTABLE: 0 NR_ZONE_WRITE_PENDING: 0 NR_MLOCK: 0 NR_BOUNCE: 0 NR_ZSPAGES: 0 NR_FREE_CMA_PAGES: 0 NODE: 4 ZONE: 1 ADDR: ffff00817fffec00 NAME: "Normal" SIZE: 8454144 PRESENT: 98304 MIN/LOW/HIGH: 68/166/264 VM_STAT: NR_FREE_PAGES: 146 NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_ANON: 94668 NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_ANON: 3 NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_FILE: 735 NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_FILE: 78 NR_ZONE_UNEVICTABLE: 0 NR_ZONE_WRITE_PENDING: 0 NR_MLOCK: 0 NR_BOUNCE: 0 NR_ZSPAGES: 0 NR_FREE_CMA_PAGES: 0 In allow_direct_reclaim(), while processing ZONE_DMA32, the sum of inactive/active file-backed pages calculated in zone_reclaimable_pages() based on the result of zone_page_state_snapshot() is zero. Additionally, since this system lacks swap, the calculation of inactive/ active anonymous pages is skipped. crash> p nr_swap_pages nr_swap_pages = $1937 = { counter = 0 } As a result, ZONE_DMA32 is deemed unreclaimable and skipped, moving on to the processing of the next zone, ZONE_NORMAL, despite ZONE_DMA32 having free pages significantly exceeding the high watermark. The problem is that the pgdat->kswapd_failures hasn't been incremented. crash> px ((struct pglist_data *) 0xffff00817fffe540)->kswapd_failures $1935 = 0x0 This is because the node deemed balanced. The node balancing logic in balance_pgdat() evaluates all zones collectively. If one or more zones (e.g., ZONE_DMA32) have enough free pages to meet their watermarks, the entire node is deemed balanced. This causes balance_pgdat() to exit early before incrementing the kswapd_failures, as it considers the overall memory state acceptable, even though some zones (like ZONE_NORMAL) remain under significant pressure. The patch ensures that zone_reclaimable_pages() includes free pages (NR_FREE_PAGES) in its calculation when no other reclaimable pages are available (e.g., file-backed or anonymous pages). This change prevents zones like ZONE_DMA32, which have sufficient free pages, from being mistakenly deemed unreclaimable. By doing so, the patch ensures proper node balancing, avoids masking pressure on other zones like ZONE_NORMAL, and prevents infinite loops in throttle_direct_reclaim() caused by allow_direct_reclaim(pgdat) repeatedly returning false. The kernel hangs due to a task stuck in throttle_direct_reclaim(), caused by a node being incorrectly deemed balanced despite pressure in certain zones, such as ZONE_NORMAL. This issue arises from zone_reclaimable_pages() returning 0 for zones without reclaimable file- backed or anonymous pages, causing zones like ZONE_DMA32 with sufficient free pages to be skipped. The lack of swap or reclaimable pages results in ZONE_DMA32 being ignored during reclaim, masking pressure in other zones. Consequently, pgdat->kswapd_failures remains 0 in balance_pgdat(), preventing fallback mechanisms in allow_direct_reclaim() from being triggered, leading to an infinite loop in throttle_direct_reclaim(). This patch modifies zone_reclaimable_pages() to account for free pages (NR_FREE_PAGES) when no other reclaimable pages exist. This ensures zones with sufficient free pages are not skipped, enabling proper balancing and reclaim behavior. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style cleanups] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241130164346.436469-1-snishika@redhat.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241130161236.433747-2-snishika@redhat.com Fixes: 5a1c84b ("mm: remove reclaim and compaction retry approximations") Signed-off-by: Seiji Nishikawa <snishika@redhat.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c7b87ce ] libtraceevent parses and returns an array of argument fields, sometimes larger than RAW_SYSCALL_ARGS_NUM (6) because it includes "__syscall_nr", idx will traverse to index 6 (7th element) whereas sc->fmt->arg holds 6 elements max, creating an out-of-bounds access. This runtime error is found by UBsan. The error message: $ sudo UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1 ./perf trace -a --max-events=1 builtin-trace.c:1966:35: runtime error: index 6 out of bounds for type 'syscall_arg_fmt [6]' #0 0x5c04956be5fe in syscall__alloc_arg_fmts /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:1966 #1 0x5c04956c0510 in trace__read_syscall_info /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2110 #2 0x5c04956c372b in trace__syscall_info /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2436 #3 0x5c04956d2f39 in trace__init_syscalls_bpf_prog_array_maps /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3897 #4 0x5c04956d6d25 in trace__run /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:4335 #5 0x5c04956e112e in cmd_trace /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5502 #6 0x5c04956eda7d in run_builtin /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:351 #7 0x5c04956ee0a8 in handle_internal_command /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:404 #8 0x5c04956ee37f in run_argv /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:448 #9 0x5c04956ee8e9 in main /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:556 torvalds#10 0x79eb3622a3b7 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 torvalds#11 0x79eb3622a47a in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360 torvalds#12 0x5c04955422d4 in _start (/home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf+0x4e02d4) (BuildId: 5b6cab2d59e96a4341741765ad6914a4d784dbc6) 0.000 ( 0.014 ms): Chrome_ChildIO/117244 write(fd: 238, buf: !, count: 1) = 1 Fixes: 5e58fcf ("perf trace: Allow allocating sc->arg_fmt even without the syscall tracepoint") Signed-off-by: Howard Chu <howardchu95@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250122025519.361873-1-howardchu95@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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If getting acl_default fails, acl_access and acl_default will be released simultaneously. However, acl_access will still retain a pointer pointing to the released posix_acl, which will trigger a WARNING in nfs3svc_release_getacl like this: ------------[ cut here ]------------ refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 26 PID: 3199 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xb5/0x170 Modules linked in: CPU: 26 UID: 0 PID: 3199 Comm: nfsd Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-00079-g04ae226af01f-dirty #8 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xb5/0x170 Code: cc cc 0f b6 1d b3 20 a5 03 80 fb 01 0f 87 65 48 d8 00 83 e3 01 75 e4 48 c7 c7 c0 3b 9b 85 c6 05 97 20 a5 03 01 e8 fb 3e 30 ff <0f> 0b eb cd 0f b6 1d 8a3 RSP: 0018:ffffc90008637cd8 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff83904fde RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88871ed36380 RBP: ffff888158beeb40 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffff520010c6f56 R10: ffffc90008637ab7 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffff888140e77400 R14: ffff888140e77408 R15: ffffffff858b42c0 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88871ed00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000562384d32158 CR3: 000000055cc6a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xb5/0x170 ? __warn+0xa5/0x140 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xb5/0x170 ? report_bug+0x1b1/0x1e0 ? handle_bug+0x53/0xa0 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x40 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? tick_nohz_tick_stopped+0x1e/0x40 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xb5/0x170 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xb5/0x170 nfs3svc_release_getacl+0xc9/0xe0 svc_process_common+0x5db/0xb60 ? __pfx_svc_process_common+0x10/0x10 ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x69/0xa0 ? __pfx_nfsd_dispatch+0x10/0x10 ? svc_xprt_received+0xa1/0x120 ? xdr_init_decode+0x11d/0x190 svc_process+0x2a7/0x330 svc_handle_xprt+0x69d/0x940 svc_recv+0x180/0x2d0 nfsd+0x168/0x200 ? __pfx_nfsd+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x1a2/0x1e0 ? kthread+0xf4/0x1e0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x60 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel: panic_on_warn set ... Clear acl_access/acl_default after posix_acl_release is called to prevent UAF from being triggered. Fixes: a257cdd ("[PATCH] NFSD: Add server support for NFSv3 ACLs.") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241107014705.2509463-1-lilingfeng@huaweicloud.com/ Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Rick Macklem <rmacklem@uoguelph.ca> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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We have several places across the kernel where we want to access another
task's syscall arguments, such as ptrace(2), seccomp(2), etc., by making
a call to syscall_get_arguments().
This works for register arguments right away by accessing the task's
`regs' member of `struct pt_regs', however for stack arguments seen with
32-bit/o32 kernels things are more complicated. Technically they ought
to be obtained from the user stack with calls to an access_remote_vm(),
but we have an easier way available already.
So as to be able to access syscall stack arguments as regular function
arguments following the MIPS calling convention we copy them over from
the user stack to the kernel stack in arch/mips/kernel/scall32-o32.S, in
handle_sys(), to the current stack frame's outgoing argument space at
the top of the stack, which is where the handler called expects to see
its incoming arguments. This area is also pointed at by the `pt_regs'
pointer obtained by task_pt_regs().
Make the o32 stack argument space a proper member of `struct pt_regs'
then, by renaming the existing member from `pad0' to `args' and using
generated offsets to access the space. No functional change though.
With the change in place the o32 kernel stack frame layout at the entry
to a syscall handler invoked by handle_sys() is therefore as follows:
$sp + 68 -> | ... | <- pt_regs.regs[9]
+---------------------+
$sp + 64 -> | $t0 | <- pt_regs.regs[8]
+---------------------+
$sp + 60 -> | $a3/argument #4 | <- pt_regs.regs[7]
+---------------------+
$sp + 56 -> | $a2/argument #3 | <- pt_regs.regs[6]
+---------------------+
$sp + 52 -> | $a1/argument #2 | <- pt_regs.regs[5]
+---------------------+
$sp + 48 -> | $a0/argument #1 | <- pt_regs.regs[4]
+---------------------+
$sp + 44 -> | $v1 | <- pt_regs.regs[3]
+---------------------+
$sp + 40 -> | $v0 | <- pt_regs.regs[2]
+---------------------+
$sp + 36 -> | $at | <- pt_regs.regs[1]
+---------------------+
$sp + 32 -> | $zero | <- pt_regs.regs[0]
+---------------------+
$sp + 28 -> | stack argument #8 | <- pt_regs.args[7]
+---------------------+
$sp + 24 -> | stack argument #7 | <- pt_regs.args[6]
+---------------------+
$sp + 20 -> | stack argument #6 | <- pt_regs.args[5]
+---------------------+
$sp + 16 -> | stack argument #5 | <- pt_regs.args[4]
+---------------------+
$sp + 12 -> | psABI space for $a3 | <- pt_regs.args[3]
+---------------------+
$sp + 8 -> | psABI space for $a2 | <- pt_regs.args[2]
+---------------------+
$sp + 4 -> | psABI space for $a1 | <- pt_regs.args[1]
+---------------------+
$sp + 0 -> | psABI space for $a0 | <- pt_regs.args[0]
+---------------------+
holding user data received and with the first 4 frame slots reserved by
the psABI for the compiler to spill the incoming arguments from $a0-$a3
registers (which it sometimes does according to its needs) and the next
4 frame slots designated by the psABI for any stack function arguments
that follow. This data is also available for other tasks to peek/poke
at as reqired and where permitted.
Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@orcam.me.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
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This makes ptrace/get_syscall_info selftest pass on mips o32 and mips64 o32 by fixing the following two test assertions: 1. get_syscall_info test assertion on mips o32: # get_syscall_info.c:218:get_syscall_info:Expected exp_args[5] (3134521044) == info.entry.args[4] (4911432) # get_syscall_info.c:219:get_syscall_info:wait #1: entry stop mismatch 2. get_syscall_info test assertion on mips64 o32: # get_syscall_info.c:209:get_syscall_info:Expected exp_args[2] (3134324433) == info.entry.args[1] (18446744072548908753) # get_syscall_info.c:210:get_syscall_info:wait #1: entry stop mismatch The first assertion happens due to mips_get_syscall_arg() trying to access another task's context but failing to do it properly because get_user() it calls just peeks at the current task's context. It usually does not crash because the default user stack always gets assigned the same VMA, but it is pure luck which mips_get_syscall_arg() wouldn't have if e.g. the stack was switched (via setcontext(3) or however) or a non-default process's thread peeked at, and in any case irrelevant data is obtained just as observed with the test case. mips_get_syscall_arg() ought to be using access_remote_vm() instead to retrieve the other task's stack contents, but given that the data has been already obtained and saved in `struct pt_regs' it would be an overkill. The first assertion is fixed for mips o32 by using struct pt_regs.args instead of get_user() to obtain syscall arguments. This approach works due to this piece in arch/mips/kernel/scall32-o32.S: /* * Ok, copy the args from the luser stack to the kernel stack. */ .set push .set noreorder .set nomacro load_a4: user_lw(t5, 16(t0)) # argument #5 from usp load_a5: user_lw(t6, 20(t0)) # argument #6 from usp load_a6: user_lw(t7, 24(t0)) # argument #7 from usp load_a7: user_lw(t8, 28(t0)) # argument #8 from usp loads_done: sw t5, PT_ARG4(sp) # argument #5 to ksp sw t6, PT_ARG5(sp) # argument #6 to ksp sw t7, PT_ARG6(sp) # argument #7 to ksp sw t8, PT_ARG7(sp) # argument #8 to ksp .set pop .section __ex_table,"a" PTR_WD load_a4, bad_stack_a4 PTR_WD load_a5, bad_stack_a5 PTR_WD load_a6, bad_stack_a6 PTR_WD load_a7, bad_stack_a7 .previous arch/mips/kernel/scall64-o32.S has analogous code for mips64 o32 that allows fixing the issue by obtaining syscall arguments from struct pt_regs.regs[4..11] instead of the erroneous use of get_user(). The second assertion is fixed by truncating 64-bit values to 32-bit syscall arguments. Fixes: c0ff3c5 ("MIPS: Enable HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK.") Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@strace.io> Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
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KMSAN reported a use-after-free issue in eth_skb_pkt_type()[1]. The cause of the issue was that eth_skb_pkt_type() accessed skb's data that didn't contain an Ethernet header. This occurs when bpf_prog_test_run_xdp() passes an invalid value as the user_data argument to bpf_test_init(). Fix this by returning an error when user_data is less than ETH_HLEN in bpf_test_init(). Additionally, remove the check for "if (user_size > size)" as it is unnecessary. [1] BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in eth_skb_pkt_type include/linux/etherdevice.h:627 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in eth_type_trans+0x4ee/0x980 net/ethernet/eth.c:165 eth_skb_pkt_type include/linux/etherdevice.h:627 [inline] eth_type_trans+0x4ee/0x980 net/ethernet/eth.c:165 __xdp_build_skb_from_frame+0x5a8/0xa50 net/core/xdp.c:635 xdp_recv_frames net/bpf/test_run.c:272 [inline] xdp_test_run_batch net/bpf/test_run.c:361 [inline] bpf_test_run_xdp_live+0x2954/0x3330 net/bpf/test_run.c:390 bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0x148e/0x1b10 net/bpf/test_run.c:1318 bpf_prog_test_run+0x5b7/0xa30 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4371 __sys_bpf+0x6a6/0xe20 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5777 __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5866 [inline] __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5864 [inline] __x64_sys_bpf+0xa4/0xf0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5864 x64_sys_call+0x2ea0/0x3d90 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:322 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Uninit was created at: free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1056 [inline] free_unref_page+0x156/0x1320 mm/page_alloc.c:2657 __free_pages+0xa3/0x1b0 mm/page_alloc.c:4838 bpf_ringbuf_free kernel/bpf/ringbuf.c:226 [inline] ringbuf_map_free+0xff/0x1e0 kernel/bpf/ringbuf.c:235 bpf_map_free kernel/bpf/syscall.c:838 [inline] bpf_map_free_deferred+0x17c/0x310 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:862 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa2b/0x1b60 kernel/workqueue.c:3310 worker_thread+0xedf/0x1550 kernel/workqueue.c:3391 kthread+0x535/0x6b0 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x6e/0x90 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 17276 Comm: syz.1.16450 Not tainted 6.12.0-05490-g9bb88c659673 #8 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014 Fixes: be3d72a ("bpf: move user_size out of bpf_test_init") Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Suggested-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Shigeru Yoshida <syoshida@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@fomichev.me> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250121150643.671650-1-syoshida@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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commit 7faf14a upstream. If getting acl_default fails, acl_access and acl_default will be released simultaneously. However, acl_access will still retain a pointer pointing to the released posix_acl, which will trigger a WARNING in nfs3svc_release_getacl like this: ------------[ cut here ]------------ refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 26 PID: 3199 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xb5/0x170 Modules linked in: CPU: 26 UID: 0 PID: 3199 Comm: nfsd Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-00079-g04ae226af01f-dirty #8 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xb5/0x170 Code: cc cc 0f b6 1d b3 20 a5 03 80 fb 01 0f 87 65 48 d8 00 83 e3 01 75 e4 48 c7 c7 c0 3b 9b 85 c6 05 97 20 a5 03 01 e8 fb 3e 30 ff <0f> 0b eb cd 0f b6 1d 8a3 RSP: 0018:ffffc90008637cd8 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff83904fde RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88871ed36380 RBP: ffff888158beeb40 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffff520010c6f56 R10: ffffc90008637ab7 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffff888140e77400 R14: ffff888140e77408 R15: ffffffff858b42c0 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88871ed00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000562384d32158 CR3: 000000055cc6a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xb5/0x170 ? __warn+0xa5/0x140 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xb5/0x170 ? report_bug+0x1b1/0x1e0 ? handle_bug+0x53/0xa0 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x40 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? tick_nohz_tick_stopped+0x1e/0x40 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xb5/0x170 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xb5/0x170 nfs3svc_release_getacl+0xc9/0xe0 svc_process_common+0x5db/0xb60 ? __pfx_svc_process_common+0x10/0x10 ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x69/0xa0 ? __pfx_nfsd_dispatch+0x10/0x10 ? svc_xprt_received+0xa1/0x120 ? xdr_init_decode+0x11d/0x190 svc_process+0x2a7/0x330 svc_handle_xprt+0x69d/0x940 svc_recv+0x180/0x2d0 nfsd+0x168/0x200 ? __pfx_nfsd+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x1a2/0x1e0 ? kthread+0xf4/0x1e0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x60 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel: panic_on_warn set ... Clear acl_access/acl_default after posix_acl_release is called to prevent UAF from being triggered. Fixes: a257cdd ("[PATCH] NFSD: Add server support for NFSv3 ACLs.") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241107014705.2509463-1-lilingfeng@huaweicloud.com/ Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Rick Macklem <rmacklem@uoguelph.ca> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6b3d638 ] KMSAN reported a use-after-free issue in eth_skb_pkt_type()[1]. The cause of the issue was that eth_skb_pkt_type() accessed skb's data that didn't contain an Ethernet header. This occurs when bpf_prog_test_run_xdp() passes an invalid value as the user_data argument to bpf_test_init(). Fix this by returning an error when user_data is less than ETH_HLEN in bpf_test_init(). Additionally, remove the check for "if (user_size > size)" as it is unnecessary. [1] BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in eth_skb_pkt_type include/linux/etherdevice.h:627 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in eth_type_trans+0x4ee/0x980 net/ethernet/eth.c:165 eth_skb_pkt_type include/linux/etherdevice.h:627 [inline] eth_type_trans+0x4ee/0x980 net/ethernet/eth.c:165 __xdp_build_skb_from_frame+0x5a8/0xa50 net/core/xdp.c:635 xdp_recv_frames net/bpf/test_run.c:272 [inline] xdp_test_run_batch net/bpf/test_run.c:361 [inline] bpf_test_run_xdp_live+0x2954/0x3330 net/bpf/test_run.c:390 bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0x148e/0x1b10 net/bpf/test_run.c:1318 bpf_prog_test_run+0x5b7/0xa30 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4371 __sys_bpf+0x6a6/0xe20 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5777 __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5866 [inline] __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5864 [inline] __x64_sys_bpf+0xa4/0xf0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5864 x64_sys_call+0x2ea0/0x3d90 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:322 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Uninit was created at: free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1056 [inline] free_unref_page+0x156/0x1320 mm/page_alloc.c:2657 __free_pages+0xa3/0x1b0 mm/page_alloc.c:4838 bpf_ringbuf_free kernel/bpf/ringbuf.c:226 [inline] ringbuf_map_free+0xff/0x1e0 kernel/bpf/ringbuf.c:235 bpf_map_free kernel/bpf/syscall.c:838 [inline] bpf_map_free_deferred+0x17c/0x310 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:862 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa2b/0x1b60 kernel/workqueue.c:3310 worker_thread+0xedf/0x1550 kernel/workqueue.c:3391 kthread+0x535/0x6b0 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x6e/0x90 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 17276 Comm: syz.1.16450 Not tainted 6.12.0-05490-g9bb88c659673 #8 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014 Fixes: be3d72a ("bpf: move user_size out of bpf_test_init") Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Suggested-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Shigeru Yoshida <syoshida@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@fomichev.me> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250121150643.671650-1-syoshida@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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napi_schedule() is expected to be called either: * From an interrupt, where raised softirqs are handled on IRQ exit * From a softirq disabled section, where raised softirqs are handled on the next call to local_bh_enable(). * From a softirq handler, where raised softirqs are handled on the next round in do_softirq(), or further deferred to a dedicated kthread. Other bare tasks context may end up ignoring the raised NET_RX vector until the next random softirq handling opportunity, which may not happen before a while if the CPU goes idle afterwards with the tick stopped. Such "misuses" have been detected on several places thanks to messages of the kind: "NOHZ tick-stop error: local softirq work is pending, handler #8!!!" For example: __raise_softirq_irqoff __napi_schedule rtl8152_runtime_resume.isra.0 rtl8152_resume usb_resume_interface.isra.0 usb_resume_both __rpm_callback rpm_callback rpm_resume __pm_runtime_resume usb_autoresume_device usb_remote_wakeup hub_event process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork ret_from_fork_asm And also: * drivers/net/usb/r8152.c::rtl_work_func_t * drivers/net/netdevsim/netdev.c::nsim_start_xmit There is a long history of issues of this kind: 019edd0 ("ath10k: sdio: Add missing BH locking around napi_schdule()") 3300685 ("idpf: disable local BH when scheduling napi for marker packets") e3d5d70 ("net: lan78xx: fix "softirq work is pending" error") e55c27e ("mt76: mt7615: add missing bh-disable around rx napi schedule") c0182aa ("mt76: mt7915: add missing bh-disable around tx napi enable/schedule") 970be1d ("mt76: disable BH around napi_schedule() calls") 019edd0 ("ath10k: sdio: Add missing BH locking around napi_schdule()") 30bfec4 ("can: rx-offload: can_rx_offload_threaded_irq_finish(): add new function to be called from threaded interrupt") e63052a ("mlx5e: add add missing BH locking around napi_schdule()") 83a0c6e ("i40e: Invoke softirqs after napi_reschedule") bd4ce94 ("mlx4: Invoke softirqs after napi_reschedule") 8cf699e ("mlx4: do not call napi_schedule() without care") ec13ee8 ("virtio_net: invoke softirqs after __napi_schedule") This shows that relying on the caller to arrange a proper context for the softirqs to be handled while calling napi_schedule() is very fragile and error prone. Also fixing them can also prove challenging if the caller may be called from different kinds of contexts. Therefore fix this from napi_schedule() itself with waking up ksoftirqd when softirqs are raised from task contexts. Reported-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de> Reported-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Reported-by: Francois Romieu <romieu@fr.zoreil.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/354a2690-9bbf-4ccb-8769-fa94707a9340@molgen.mpg.de/ Cc: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250223221708.27130-1-frederic@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 888751e ] perf test 11 hwmon fails on s390 with this error # ./perf test -Fv 11 --- start --- ---- end ---- 11.1: Basic parsing test : Ok --- start --- Testing 'temp_test_hwmon_event1' Using CPUID IBM,3931,704,A01,3.7,002f temp_test_hwmon_event1 -> hwmon_a_test_hwmon_pmu/temp_test_hwmon_event1/ FAILED tests/hwmon_pmu.c:189 Unexpected config for 'temp_test_hwmon_event1', 292470092988416 != 655361 ---- end ---- 11.2: Parsing without PMU name : FAILED! --- start --- Testing 'hwmon_a_test_hwmon_pmu/temp_test_hwmon_event1/' FAILED tests/hwmon_pmu.c:189 Unexpected config for 'hwmon_a_test_hwmon_pmu/temp_test_hwmon_event1/', 292470092988416 != 655361 ---- end ---- 11.3: Parsing with PMU name : FAILED! # The root cause is in member test_event::config which is initialized to 0xA0001 or 655361. During event parsing a long list event parsing functions are called and end up with this gdb call stack: #0 hwmon_pmu__config_term (hwm=0x168dfd0, attr=0x3ffffff5ee8, term=0x168db60, err=0x3ffffff81c8) at util/hwmon_pmu.c:623 #1 hwmon_pmu__config_terms (pmu=0x168dfd0, attr=0x3ffffff5ee8, terms=0x3ffffff5ea8, err=0x3ffffff81c8) at util/hwmon_pmu.c:662 #2 0x00000000012f870c in perf_pmu__config_terms (pmu=0x168dfd0, attr=0x3ffffff5ee8, terms=0x3ffffff5ea8, zero=false, apply_hardcoded=false, err=0x3ffffff81c8) at util/pmu.c:1519 #3 0x00000000012f88a4 in perf_pmu__config (pmu=0x168dfd0, attr=0x3ffffff5ee8, head_terms=0x3ffffff5ea8, apply_hardcoded=false, err=0x3ffffff81c8) at util/pmu.c:1545 #4 0x00000000012680c4 in parse_events_add_pmu (parse_state=0x3ffffff7fb8, list=0x168dc00, pmu=0x168dfd0, const_parsed_terms=0x3ffffff6090, auto_merge_stats=true, alternate_hw_config=10) at util/parse-events.c:1508 #5 0x00000000012684c6 in parse_events_multi_pmu_add (parse_state=0x3ffffff7fb8, event_name=0x168ec10 "temp_test_hwmon_event1", hw_config=10, const_parsed_terms=0x0, listp=0x3ffffff6230, loc_=0x3ffffff70e0) at util/parse-events.c:1592 #6 0x00000000012f0e4e in parse_events_parse (_parse_state=0x3ffffff7fb8, scanner=0x16878c0) at util/parse-events.y:293 #7 0x00000000012695a0 in parse_events__scanner (str=0x3ffffff81d8 "temp_test_hwmon_event1", input=0x0, parse_state=0x3ffffff7fb8) at util/parse-events.c:1867 #8 0x000000000126a1e8 in __parse_events (evlist=0x168b580, str=0x3ffffff81d8 "temp_test_hwmon_event1", pmu_filter=0x0, err=0x3ffffff81c8, fake_pmu=false, warn_if_reordered=true, fake_tp=false) at util/parse-events.c:2136 #9 0x00000000011e36aa in parse_events (evlist=0x168b580, str=0x3ffffff81d8 "temp_test_hwmon_event1", err=0x3ffffff81c8) at /root/linux/tools/perf/util/parse-events.h:41 torvalds#10 0x00000000011e3e64 in do_test (i=0, with_pmu=false, with_alias=false) at tests/hwmon_pmu.c:164 torvalds#11 0x00000000011e422c in test__hwmon_pmu (with_pmu=false) at tests/hwmon_pmu.c:219 torvalds#12 0x00000000011e431c in test__hwmon_pmu_without_pmu (test=0x1610368 <suite.hwmon_pmu>, subtest=1) at tests/hwmon_pmu.c:23 where the attr::config is set to value 292470092988416 or 0x10a0000000000 in line 625 of file ./util/hwmon_pmu.c: attr->config = key.type_and_num; However member key::type_and_num is defined as union and bit field: union hwmon_pmu_event_key { long type_and_num; struct { int num :16; enum hwmon_type type :8; }; }; s390 is big endian and Intel is little endian architecture. The events for the hwmon dummy pmu have num = 1 or num = 2 and type is set to HWMON_TYPE_TEMP (which is 10). On s390 this assignes member key::type_and_num the value of 0x10a0000000000 (which is 292470092988416) as shown in above trace output. Fix this and export the structure/union hwmon_pmu_event_key so the test shares the same implementation as the event parsing functions for union and bit fields. This should avoid endianess issues on all platforms. Output after: # ./perf test -F 11 11.1: Basic parsing test : Ok 11.2: Parsing without PMU name : Ok 11.3: Parsing with PMU name : Ok # Fixes: 531ee0f ("perf test: Add hwmon "PMU" test") Signed-off-by: Thomas Richter <tmricht@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250131112400.568975-1-tmricht@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 053f3ff ] v2: - Created a single error handling unlock and exit in veth_pool_store - Greatly expanded commit message with previous explanatory-only text Summary: Use rtnl_mutex to synchronize veth_pool_store with itself, ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open, preventing multiple calls in a row to napi_disable. Background: Two (or more) threads could call veth_pool_store through writing to /sys/devices/vio/30000002/pool*/*. You can do this easily with a little shell script. This causes a hang. I configured LOCKDEP, compiled ibmveth.c with DEBUG, and built a new kernel. I ran this test again and saw: Setting pool0/active to 0 Setting pool1/active to 1 [ 73.911067][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting Setting pool1/active to 1 Setting pool1/active to 0 [ 73.911367][ T4366] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting [ 73.916056][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close complete [ 73.916064][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: open starting [ 110.808564][ T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification. [ 230.808495][ T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification. [ 243.683786][ T123] INFO: task stress.sh:4365 blocked for more than 122 seconds. [ 243.683827][ T123] Not tainted 6.14.0-01103-g2df0c02dab82-dirty #8 [ 243.683833][ T123] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 243.683838][ T123] task:stress.sh state:D stack:28096 pid:4365 tgid:4365 ppid:4364 task_flags:0x400040 flags:0x00042000 [ 243.683852][ T123] Call Trace: [ 243.683857][ T123] [c00000000c38f690] [0000000000000001] 0x1 (unreliable) [ 243.683868][ T123] [c00000000c38f840] [c00000000001f908] __switch_to+0x318/0x4e0 [ 243.683878][ T123] [c00000000c38f8a0] [c000000001549a70] __schedule+0x500/0x12a0 [ 243.683888][ T123] [c00000000c38f9a0] [c00000000154a878] schedule+0x68/0x210 [ 243.683896][ T123] [c00000000c38f9d0] [c00000000154ac80] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x30/0x50 [ 243.683904][ T123] [c00000000c38fa00] [c00000000154dbb0] __mutex_lock+0x730/0x10f0 [ 243.683913][ T123] [c00000000c38fb10] [c000000001154d40] napi_enable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.683921][ T123] [c00000000c38fb40] [c000000000f4ae94] ibmveth_open+0x68/0x5dc [ 243.683928][ T123] [c00000000c38fbe0] [c000000000f4aa20] veth_pool_store+0x220/0x270 [ 243.683936][ T123] [c00000000c38fc70] [c000000000826278] sysfs_kf_write+0x68/0xb0 [ 243.683944][ T123] [c00000000c38fcb0] [c0000000008240b8] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x198/0x2d0 [ 243.683951][ T123] [c00000000c38fd00] [c00000000071b9ac] vfs_write+0x34c/0x650 [ 243.683958][ T123] [c00000000c38fdc0] [c00000000071bea8] ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.683966][ T123] [c00000000c38fe10] [c0000000000317f4] system_call_exception+0x124/0x340 [ 243.683973][ T123] [c00000000c38fe50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec ... [ 243.684087][ T123] Showing all locks held in the system: [ 243.684095][ T123] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/123: [ 243.684099][ T123] #0: c00000000278e370 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x50/0x248 [ 243.684114][ T123] 4 locks held by stress.sh/4365: [ 243.684119][ T123] #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.684132][ T123] #1: c000000041aea888 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0 [ 243.684143][ T123] #2: c0000000366fb9a8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0 [ 243.684155][ T123] #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_enable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.684166][ T123] 5 locks held by stress.sh/4366: [ 243.684170][ T123] #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.684183][ T123] #1: c00000000aee2288 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0 [ 243.684194][ T123] #2: c0000000366f4ba8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0 [ 243.684205][ T123] #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_disable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.684216][ T123] #4: c0000003ff9bbf18 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __schedule+0x138/0x12a0 From the ibmveth debug, two threads are calling veth_pool_store, which calls ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open. Here's the sequence: T4365 T4366 ----------------- ----------------- --------- veth_pool_store veth_pool_store ibmveth_close ibmveth_close napi_disable napi_disable ibmveth_open napi_enable <- HANG ibmveth_close calls napi_disable at the top and ibmveth_open calls napi_enable at the top. https://docs.kernel.org/networking/napi.html]] says The control APIs are not idempotent. Control API calls are safe against concurrent use of datapath APIs but an incorrect sequence of control API calls may result in crashes, deadlocks, or race conditions. For example, calling napi_disable() multiple times in a row will deadlock. In the normal open and close paths, rtnl_mutex is acquired to prevent other callers. This is missing from veth_pool_store. Use rtnl_mutex in veth_pool_store fixes these hangs. Signed-off-by: Dave Marquardt <davemarq@linux.ibm.com> Fixes: 860f242 ("[PATCH] ibmveth change buffer pools dynamically") Reviewed-by: Nick Child <nnac123@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250402154403.386744-1-davemarq@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit ee684de ] As shown in [1], it is possible to corrupt a BPF ELF file such that arbitrary BPF instructions are loaded by libbpf. This can be done by setting a symbol (BPF program) section offset to a large (unsigned) number such that <section start + symbol offset> overflows and points before the section data in the memory. Consider the situation below where: - prog_start = sec_start + symbol_offset <-- size_t overflow here - prog_end = prog_start + prog_size prog_start sec_start prog_end sec_end | | | | v v v v .....................|################################|............ The report in [1] also provides a corrupted BPF ELF which can be used as a reproducer: $ readelf -S crash Section Headers: [Nr] Name Type Address Offset Size EntSize Flags Link Info Align ... [ 2] uretprobe.mu[...] PROGBITS 0000000000000000 00000040 0000000000000068 0000000000000000 AX 0 0 8 $ readelf -s crash Symbol table '.symtab' contains 8 entries: Num: Value Size Type Bind Vis Ndx Name ... 6: ffffffffffffffb8 104 FUNC GLOBAL DEFAULT 2 handle_tp Here, the handle_tp prog has section offset ffffffffffffffb8, i.e. will point before the actual memory where section 2 is allocated. This is also reported by AddressSanitizer: ================================================================= ==1232==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7c7302fe0000 at pc 0x7fc3046e4b77 bp 0x7ffe64677cd0 sp 0x7ffe64677490 READ of size 104 at 0x7c7302fe0000 thread T0 #0 0x7fc3046e4b76 in memcpy (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe4b76) #1 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__init_prog /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:856 #2 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__add_programs /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:928 #3 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__elf_collect /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3930 #4 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object_open /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8067 #5 0x00000040f176 in bpf_object__open_file /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8090 #6 0x000000400c16 in main /poc/poc.c:8 #7 0x7fc3043d25b4 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x35b4) #8 0x7fc3043d2667 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3667) #9 0x000000400b34 in _start (/poc/poc+0x400b34) 0x7c7302fe0000 is located 64 bytes before 104-byte region [0x7c7302fe0040,0x7c7302fe00a8) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fc3046e716b in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe716b) #1 0x7fc3045ee600 in __libelf_set_rawdata_wrlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xb600) #2 0x7fc3045ef018 in __elf_getdata_rdlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xc018) #3 0x00000040642f in elf_sec_data /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3740 The problem here is that currently, libbpf only checks that the program end is within the section bounds. There used to be a check `while (sec_off < sec_sz)` in bpf_object__add_programs, however, it was removed by commit 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions"). Add a check for detecting the overflow of `sec_off + prog_sz` to bpf_object__init_prog to fix this issue. [1] https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md Fixes: 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions") Reported-by: lmarch2 <2524158037@qq.com> Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com> Link: https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250415155014.397603-1-vmalik@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit bed18f0 ] ACPICA commit 8829e70e1360c81e7a5a901b5d4f48330e021ea5 I'm Seunghun Han, and I work for National Security Research Institute of South Korea. I have been doing a research on ACPI and found an ACPI cache leak in ACPI early abort cases. Boot log of ACPI cache leak is as follows: [ 0.352414] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device) [ 0.353182] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device) [ 0.353182] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions) [ 0.353182] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device) [ 0.356028] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter [ 0.356799] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler (20170303/evmisc-281) [ 0.360215] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-State: Slab cache still has objects [ 0.360648] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 4.12.0-rc4-next-20170608+ torvalds#10 [ 0.361273] Hardware name: innotek gmb_h virtual_box/virtual_box, BIOS virtual_box 12/01/2006 [ 0.361873] Call Trace: [ 0.362243] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81 [ 0.362591] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0 [ 0.362944] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27 [ 0.363296] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10 [ 0.363646] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x6d/0x7b [ 0.364000] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14 [ 0.364000] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f [ 0.364000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80 [ 0.364000] ? video_setup+0x7f/0x7f [ 0.364000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27 [ 0.364000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0 [ 0.364000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x189/0x20a [ 0.364000] ? rest_init+0xc0/0xc0 [ 0.364000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100 [ 0.364000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30 I analyzed this memory leak in detail. I found that “Acpi-State” cache and “Acpi-Parse” cache were merged because the size of cache objects was same slab cache size. I finally found “Acpi-Parse” cache and “Acpi-parse_ext” cache were leaked using SLAB_NEVER_MERGE flag in kmem_cache_create() function. Real ACPI cache leak point is as follows: [ 0.360101] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device) [ 0.360101] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device) [ 0.360101] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions) [ 0.361043] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device) [ 0.364016] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter [ 0.365061] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler (20170303/evmisc-281) [ 0.368174] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Parse: Slab cache still has objects [ 0.369332] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 4.12.0-rc4-next-20170608+ #8 [ 0.371256] Hardware name: innotek gmb_h virtual_box/virtual_box, BIOS virtual_box 12/01/2006 [ 0.372000] Call Trace: [ 0.372000] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81 [ 0.372000] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0 [ 0.372000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27 [ 0.372000] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10 [ 0.372000] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x56/0x7b [ 0.372000] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14 [ 0.372000] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f [ 0.372000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80 [ 0.372000] ? video_setup+0x7f/0x7f [ 0.372000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27 [ 0.372000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0 [ 0.372000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x189/0x20a [ 0.372000] ? rest_init+0xc0/0xc0 [ 0.372000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100 [ 0.372000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30 [ 0.388039] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-parse_ext: Slab cache still has objects [ 0.389063] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 4.12.0-rc4-next-20170608+ #8 [ 0.390557] Hardware name: innotek gmb_h virtual_box/virtual_box, BIOS virtual_box 12/01/2006 [ 0.392000] Call Trace: [ 0.392000] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81 [ 0.392000] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0 [ 0.392000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27 [ 0.392000] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10 [ 0.392000] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x6d/0x7b [ 0.392000] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14 [ 0.392000] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f [ 0.392000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80 [ 0.392000] ? video_setup+0x7f/0x7f [ 0.392000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27 [ 0.392000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0 [ 0.392000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x189/0x20a [ 0.392000] ? rest_init+0xc0/0xc0 [ 0.392000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100 [ 0.392000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30 When early abort is occurred due to invalid ACPI information, Linux kernel terminates ACPI by calling acpi_terminate() function. The function calls acpi_ut_delete_caches() function to delete local caches (acpi_gbl_namespace_ cache, state_cache, operand_cache, ps_node_cache, ps_node_ext_cache). But the deletion codes in acpi_ut_delete_caches() function only delete slab caches using kmem_cache_destroy() function, therefore the cache objects should be flushed before acpi_ut_delete_caches() function. "Acpi-Parse" cache and "Acpi-ParseExt" cache are used in an AML parse function, acpi_ps_parse_loop(). The function should complete all ops using acpi_ps_complete_final_op() when an error occurs due to invalid AML codes. However, the current implementation of acpi_ps_complete_final_op() does not complete all ops when it meets some errors and this cause cache leak. This cache leak has a security threat because an old kernel (<= 4.9) shows memory locations of kernel functions in stack dump. Some malicious users could use this information to neutralize kernel ASLR. To fix ACPI cache leak for enhancing security, I made a patch to complete all ops unconditionally for acpi_ps_complete_final_op() function. I hope that this patch improves the security of Linux kernel. Thank you. Link: acpica/acpica@8829e70e Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/2363774.ElGaqSPkdT@rjwysocki.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit eedf3e3 ] ACPICA commit 1c28da2242783579d59767617121035dafba18c3 This was originally done in NetBSD: NetBSD/src@b69d1ac and is the correct alternative to the smattering of `memcpy`s I previously contributed to this repository. This also sidesteps the newly strict checks added in UBSAN: llvm/llvm-project@7926744 Before this change we see the following UBSAN stack trace in Fuchsia: #0 0x000021afcfdeca5e in acpi_rs_get_address_common(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsaddr.c:329 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6aca5e #1.2 0x000021982bc4af3c in ubsan_get_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:41 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c #1.1 0x000021982bc4af3c in maybe_print_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:51 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c #1 0x000021982bc4af3c in ~scoped_report() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:395 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c #2 0x000021982bc4bb6f in handletype_mismatch_impl() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:137 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x42b6f #3 0x000021982bc4b723 in __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1 compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:142 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x42723 #4 0x000021afcfdeca5e in acpi_rs_get_address_common(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsaddr.c:329 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6aca5e #5 0x000021afcfdf2089 in acpi_rs_convert_aml_to_resource(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*, struct acpi_rsconvert_info*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsmisc.c:355 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b2089 #6 0x000021afcfded169 in acpi_rs_convert_aml_to_resources(u8*, u32, u32, u8, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rslist.c:137 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6ad169 #7 0x000021afcfe2d24a in acpi_ut_walk_aml_resources(struct acpi_walk_state*, u8*, acpi_size, acpi_walk_aml_callback, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/utilities/utresrc.c:237 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6ed24a #8 0x000021afcfde66b7 in acpi_rs_create_resource_list(union acpi_operand_object*, struct acpi_buffer*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rscreate.c:199 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6a66b7 #9 0x000021afcfdf6979 in acpi_rs_get_method_data(acpi_handle, const char*, struct acpi_buffer*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsutils.c:770 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b6979 torvalds#10 0x000021afcfdf708f in acpi_walk_resources(acpi_handle, char*, acpi_walk_resource_callback, void*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsxface.c:731 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b708f torvalds#11 0x000021afcfa95dcf in acpi::acpi_impl::walk_resources(acpi::acpi_impl*, acpi_handle, const char*, acpi::Acpi::resources_callable) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/acpi-impl.cc:41 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x355dcf torvalds#12 0x000021afcfaa8278 in acpi::device_builder::gather_resources(acpi::device_builder*, acpi::Acpi*, fidl::any_arena&, acpi::Manager*, acpi::device_builder::gather_resources_callback) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/device-builder.cc:84 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x368278 torvalds#13 0x000021afcfbddb87 in acpi::Manager::configure_discovered_devices(acpi::Manager*) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/manager.cc:75 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x49db87 torvalds#14 0x000021afcf99091d in publish_acpi_devices(acpi::Manager*, zx_device_t*, zx_device_t*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/acpi-nswalk.cc:95 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x25091d torvalds#15 0x000021afcf9c1d4e in x86::X86::do_init(x86::X86*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:60 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x281d4e torvalds#16 0x000021afcf9e33ad in λ(x86::X86::ddk_init::(anon class)*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:77 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a33ad torvalds#17 0x000021afcf9e313e in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:76:19), false, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void>::invoke(void*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:183 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a313e torvalds#18 0x000021afcfbab4c7 in fit::internal::function_base<16UL, false, void(), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<16UL, false, void (), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x46b4c7 torvalds#19 0x000021afcfbab342 in fit::function_impl<16UL, false, void(), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(const fit::function_impl<16UL, false, void (), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:315 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x46b342 torvalds#20 0x000021afcfcd98c3 in async::internal::retained_task::Handler(async_dispatcher_t*, async_task_t*, zx_status_t) ../../sdk/lib/async/task.cc:24 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x5998c3 torvalds#21 0x00002290f9924616 in λ(const driver_runtime::Dispatcher::post_task::(anon class)*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, zx_status_t) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:789 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x10a616 torvalds#22 0x00002290f9924323 in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:788:7), true, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int>::invoke(void*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:128 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x10a323 torvalds#23 0x00002290f9904b76 in fit::internal::function_base<24UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<24UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xeab76 torvalds#24 0x00002290f9904831 in fit::callback_impl<24UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(fit::callback_impl<24UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:471 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xea831 torvalds#25 0x00002290f98d5adc in driver_runtime::callback_request::Call(driver_runtime::callback_request*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, zx_status_t) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/callback_request.h:74 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xbbadc torvalds#26 0x00002290f98e1e58 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::dispatch_callback(driver_runtime::Dispatcher*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1248 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xc7e58 torvalds#27 0x00002290f98e4159 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::dispatch_callbacks(driver_runtime::Dispatcher*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1308 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xca159 torvalds#28 0x00002290f9918414 in λ(const driver_runtime::Dispatcher::create_with_adder::(anon class)*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:353 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe414 torvalds#29 0x00002290f991812d in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:351:7), true, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>>::invoke(void*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:128 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe12d torvalds#30 0x00002290f9906fc7 in fit::internal::function_base<8UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<8UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xecfc7 torvalds#31 0x00002290f9906c66 in fit::function_impl<8UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(const fit::function_impl<8UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:315 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xecc66 torvalds#32 0x00002290f98e73d9 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter::invoke_callback(driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.h:543 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xcd3d9 torvalds#33 0x00002290f98e700d in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter::handle_event(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, async_dispatcher_t*, async::wait_base*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1442 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xcd00d torvalds#34 0x00002290f9918983 in async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>::handle_event(async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>*, async_dispatcher_t*, async::wait_base*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/async_loop_owned_event_handler.h:59 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe983 torvalds#35 0x00002290f9918b9e in async::wait_method<async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>, &async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>::handle_event>::call_handler(async_dispatcher_t*, async_wait_t*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../sdk/lib/async/include/lib/async/cpp/wait.h:201 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfeb9e torvalds#36 0x00002290f99bf509 in async_loop_dispatch_wait(async_loop_t*, async_wait_t*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:394 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x1a5509 torvalds#37 0x00002290f99b9958 in async_loop_run_once(async_loop_t*, zx_time_t) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:343 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x19f958 torvalds#38 0x00002290f99b9247 in async_loop_run(async_loop_t*, zx_time_t, _Bool) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:301 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x19f247 torvalds#39 0x00002290f99ba962 in async_loop_run_thread(void*) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:860 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x1a0962 torvalds#40 0x000041afd176ef30 in start_c11(void*) ../../zircon/third_party/ulib/musl/pthread/pthread_create.c:63 <libc.so>+0x84f30 torvalds#41 0x000041afd18a448d in thread_trampoline(uintptr_t, uintptr_t) ../../zircon/system/ulib/runtime/thread.cc:100 <libc.so>+0x1ba48d Link: acpica/acpica@1c28da22 Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/4664267.LvFx2qVVIh@rjwysocki.net Signed-off-by: Tamir Duberstein <tamird@gmail.com> [ rjw: Pick up the tag from Tamir ] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
heftig
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Jun 27, 2025
Jann Horn reported a use-after-free in unix_stream_read_generic().
The following sequences reproduce the issue:
$ python3
from socket import *
s1, s2 = socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM)
s1.send(b'x', MSG_OOB)
s2.recv(1, MSG_OOB) # leave a consumed OOB skb
s1.send(b'y', MSG_OOB)
s2.recv(1, MSG_OOB) # leave a consumed OOB skb
s1.send(b'z', MSG_OOB)
s2.recv(1) # recv 'z' illegally
s2.recv(1, MSG_OOB) # access 'z' skb (use-after-free)
Even though a user reads OOB data, the skb holding the data stays on
the recv queue to mark the OOB boundary and break the next recv().
After the last send() in the scenario above, the sk2's recv queue has
2 leading consumed OOB skbs and 1 real OOB skb.
Then, the following happens during the next recv() without MSG_OOB
1. unix_stream_read_generic() peeks the first consumed OOB skb
2. manage_oob() returns the next consumed OOB skb
3. unix_stream_read_generic() fetches the next not-yet-consumed OOB skb
4. unix_stream_read_generic() reads and frees the OOB skb
, and the last recv(MSG_OOB) triggers KASAN splat.
The 3. above occurs because of the SO_PEEK_OFF code, which does not
expect unix_skb_len(skb) to be 0, but this is true for such consumed
OOB skbs.
while (skip >= unix_skb_len(skb)) {
skip -= unix_skb_len(skb);
skb = skb_peek_next(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue);
...
}
In addition to this use-after-free, there is another issue that
ioctl(SIOCATMARK) does not function properly with consecutive consumed
OOB skbs.
So, nothing good comes out of such a situation.
Instead of complicating manage_oob(), ioctl() handling, and the next
ECONNRESET fix by introducing a loop for consecutive consumed OOB skbs,
let's not leave such consecutive OOB unnecessarily.
Now, while receiving an OOB skb in unix_stream_recv_urg(), if its
previous skb is a consumed OOB skb, it is freed.
[0]:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in unix_stream_read_actor (net/unix/af_unix.c:3027)
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888106ef2904 by task python3/315
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 315 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc1-00407-gec315832f6f9 #8 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-4.fc42 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:122)
print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:409 mm/kasan/report.c:521)
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:636)
unix_stream_read_actor (net/unix/af_unix.c:3027)
unix_stream_read_generic (net/unix/af_unix.c:2708 net/unix/af_unix.c:2847)
unix_stream_recvmsg (net/unix/af_unix.c:3048)
sock_recvmsg (net/socket.c:1063 (discriminator 20) net/socket.c:1085 (discriminator 20))
__sys_recvfrom (net/socket.c:2278)
__x64_sys_recvfrom (net/socket.c:2291 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2287 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2287 (discriminator 1))
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 (discriminator 1))
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
RIP: 0033:0x7f8911fcea06
Code: 5d e8 41 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 75 19 83 e2 39 83 fa 08 75 11 e8 26 ff ff ff 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 45 10 0f 05 <48> 8b 5d f8 c9 c3 0f 1f 40 00 f3 0f 1e fa 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 08
RSP: 002b:00007fffdb0dccb0 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002d
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fffdb0dcdc8 RCX: 00007f8911fcea06
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007f8911a5e060 RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 00007fffdb0dccd0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007f89119a7d20
R13: ffffffffc4653600 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
</TASK>
Allocated by task 315:
kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:48)
kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:60 (discriminator 1) mm/kasan/common.c:69 (discriminator 1))
__kasan_slab_alloc (mm/kasan/common.c:348)
kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof (./include/linux/kasan.h:250 mm/slub.c:4148 mm/slub.c:4197 mm/slub.c:4249)
__alloc_skb (net/core/skbuff.c:660 (discriminator 4))
alloc_skb_with_frags (./include/linux/skbuff.h:1336 net/core/skbuff.c:6668)
sock_alloc_send_pskb (net/core/sock.c:2993)
unix_stream_sendmsg (./include/net/sock.h:1847 net/unix/af_unix.c:2256 net/unix/af_unix.c:2418)
__sys_sendto (net/socket.c:712 (discriminator 20) net/socket.c:727 (discriminator 20) net/socket.c:2226 (discriminator 20))
__x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2233 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2229 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2229 (discriminator 1))
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 (discriminator 1))
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
Freed by task 315:
kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:48)
kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:60 (discriminator 1) mm/kasan/common.c:69 (discriminator 1))
kasan_save_free_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:579 (discriminator 1))
__kasan_slab_free (mm/kasan/common.c:271)
kmem_cache_free (mm/slub.c:4643 (discriminator 3) mm/slub.c:4745 (discriminator 3))
unix_stream_read_generic (net/unix/af_unix.c:3010)
unix_stream_recvmsg (net/unix/af_unix.c:3048)
sock_recvmsg (net/socket.c:1063 (discriminator 20) net/socket.c:1085 (discriminator 20))
__sys_recvfrom (net/socket.c:2278)
__x64_sys_recvfrom (net/socket.c:2291 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2287 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2287 (discriminator 1))
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 (discriminator 1))
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888106ef28c0
which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 224
The buggy address is located 68 bytes inside of
freed 224-byte region [ffff888106ef28c0, ffff888106ef29a0)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888106ef3cc0 pfn:0x106ef2
head: order:1 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
flags: 0x200000000000040(head|node=0|zone=2)
page_type: f5(slab)
raw: 0200000000000040 ffff8881001d28c0 ffffea000422fe00 0000000000000004
raw: ffff888106ef3cc0 0000000080190010 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
head: 0200000000000040 ffff8881001d28c0 ffffea000422fe00 0000000000000004
head: ffff888106ef3cc0 0000000080190010 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
head: 0200000000000001 ffffea00041bbc81 00000000ffffffff 00000000ffffffff
head: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888106ef2800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc
ffff888106ef2880: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff888106ef2900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff888106ef2980: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff888106ef2a00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
Fixes: 314001f ("af_unix: Add OOB support")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250619041457.1132791-2-kuni1840@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
heftig
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jul 6, 2025
[ Upstream commit 32ca245 ] Jann Horn reported a use-after-free in unix_stream_read_generic(). The following sequences reproduce the issue: $ python3 from socket import * s1, s2 = socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM) s1.send(b'x', MSG_OOB) s2.recv(1, MSG_OOB) # leave a consumed OOB skb s1.send(b'y', MSG_OOB) s2.recv(1, MSG_OOB) # leave a consumed OOB skb s1.send(b'z', MSG_OOB) s2.recv(1) # recv 'z' illegally s2.recv(1, MSG_OOB) # access 'z' skb (use-after-free) Even though a user reads OOB data, the skb holding the data stays on the recv queue to mark the OOB boundary and break the next recv(). After the last send() in the scenario above, the sk2's recv queue has 2 leading consumed OOB skbs and 1 real OOB skb. Then, the following happens during the next recv() without MSG_OOB 1. unix_stream_read_generic() peeks the first consumed OOB skb 2. manage_oob() returns the next consumed OOB skb 3. unix_stream_read_generic() fetches the next not-yet-consumed OOB skb 4. unix_stream_read_generic() reads and frees the OOB skb , and the last recv(MSG_OOB) triggers KASAN splat. The 3. above occurs because of the SO_PEEK_OFF code, which does not expect unix_skb_len(skb) to be 0, but this is true for such consumed OOB skbs. while (skip >= unix_skb_len(skb)) { skip -= unix_skb_len(skb); skb = skb_peek_next(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue); ... } In addition to this use-after-free, there is another issue that ioctl(SIOCATMARK) does not function properly with consecutive consumed OOB skbs. So, nothing good comes out of such a situation. Instead of complicating manage_oob(), ioctl() handling, and the next ECONNRESET fix by introducing a loop for consecutive consumed OOB skbs, let's not leave such consecutive OOB unnecessarily. Now, while receiving an OOB skb in unix_stream_recv_urg(), if its previous skb is a consumed OOB skb, it is freed. [0]: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in unix_stream_read_actor (net/unix/af_unix.c:3027) Read of size 4 at addr ffff888106ef2904 by task python3/315 CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 315 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc1-00407-gec315832f6f9 #8 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-4.fc42 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:122) print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:409 mm/kasan/report.c:521) kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:636) unix_stream_read_actor (net/unix/af_unix.c:3027) unix_stream_read_generic (net/unix/af_unix.c:2708 net/unix/af_unix.c:2847) unix_stream_recvmsg (net/unix/af_unix.c:3048) sock_recvmsg (net/socket.c:1063 (discriminator 20) net/socket.c:1085 (discriminator 20)) __sys_recvfrom (net/socket.c:2278) __x64_sys_recvfrom (net/socket.c:2291 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2287 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2287 (discriminator 1)) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 (discriminator 1)) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) RIP: 0033:0x7f8911fcea06 Code: 5d e8 41 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 75 19 83 e2 39 83 fa 08 75 11 e8 26 ff ff ff 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 45 10 0f 05 <48> 8b 5d f8 c9 c3 0f 1f 40 00 f3 0f 1e fa 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 08 RSP: 002b:00007fffdb0dccb0 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002d RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fffdb0dcdc8 RCX: 00007f8911fcea06 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007f8911a5e060 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 00007fffdb0dccd0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007f89119a7d20 R13: ffffffffc4653600 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> Allocated by task 315: kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:48) kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:60 (discriminator 1) mm/kasan/common.c:69 (discriminator 1)) __kasan_slab_alloc (mm/kasan/common.c:348) kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof (./include/linux/kasan.h:250 mm/slub.c:4148 mm/slub.c:4197 mm/slub.c:4249) __alloc_skb (net/core/skbuff.c:660 (discriminator 4)) alloc_skb_with_frags (./include/linux/skbuff.h:1336 net/core/skbuff.c:6668) sock_alloc_send_pskb (net/core/sock.c:2993) unix_stream_sendmsg (./include/net/sock.h:1847 net/unix/af_unix.c:2256 net/unix/af_unix.c:2418) __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:712 (discriminator 20) net/socket.c:727 (discriminator 20) net/socket.c:2226 (discriminator 20)) __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2233 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2229 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2229 (discriminator 1)) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 (discriminator 1)) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) Freed by task 315: kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:48) kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:60 (discriminator 1) mm/kasan/common.c:69 (discriminator 1)) kasan_save_free_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:579 (discriminator 1)) __kasan_slab_free (mm/kasan/common.c:271) kmem_cache_free (mm/slub.c:4643 (discriminator 3) mm/slub.c:4745 (discriminator 3)) unix_stream_read_generic (net/unix/af_unix.c:3010) unix_stream_recvmsg (net/unix/af_unix.c:3048) sock_recvmsg (net/socket.c:1063 (discriminator 20) net/socket.c:1085 (discriminator 20)) __sys_recvfrom (net/socket.c:2278) __x64_sys_recvfrom (net/socket.c:2291 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2287 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2287 (discriminator 1)) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 (discriminator 1)) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888106ef28c0 which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 224 The buggy address is located 68 bytes inside of freed 224-byte region [ffff888106ef28c0, ffff888106ef29a0) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888106ef3cc0 pfn:0x106ef2 head: order:1 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 flags: 0x200000000000040(head|node=0|zone=2) page_type: f5(slab) raw: 0200000000000040 ffff8881001d28c0 ffffea000422fe00 0000000000000004 raw: ffff888106ef3cc0 0000000080190010 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000 head: 0200000000000040 ffff8881001d28c0 ffffea000422fe00 0000000000000004 head: ffff888106ef3cc0 0000000080190010 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000 head: 0200000000000001 ffffea00041bbc81 00000000ffffffff 00000000ffffffff head: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888106ef2800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc ffff888106ef2880: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff888106ef2900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff888106ef2980: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff888106ef2a00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb Fixes: 314001f ("af_unix: Add OOB support") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250619041457.1132791-2-kuni1840@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
heftig
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Jul 17, 2025
A crash in conntrack was reported while trying to unlink the conntrack
entry from the hash bucket list:
[exception RIP: __nf_ct_delete_from_lists+172]
[..]
#7 [ff539b5a2b043aa0] nf_ct_delete at ffffffffc124d421 [nf_conntrack]
#8 [ff539b5a2b043ad0] nf_ct_gc_expired at ffffffffc124d999 [nf_conntrack]
#9 [ff539b5a2b043ae0] __nf_conntrack_find_get at ffffffffc124efbc [nf_conntrack]
[..]
The nf_conn struct is marked as allocated from slab but appears to be in
a partially initialised state:
ct hlist pointer is garbage; looks like the ct hash value
(hence crash).
ct->status is equal to IPS_CONFIRMED|IPS_DYING, which is expected
ct->timeout is 30000 (=30s), which is unexpected.
Everything else looks like normal udp conntrack entry. If we ignore
ct->status and pretend its 0, the entry matches those that are newly
allocated but not yet inserted into the hash:
- ct hlist pointers are overloaded and store/cache the raw tuple hash
- ct->timeout matches the relative time expected for a new udp flow
rather than the absolute 'jiffies' value.
If it were not for the presence of IPS_CONFIRMED,
__nf_conntrack_find_get() would have skipped the entry.
Theory is that we did hit following race:
cpu x cpu y cpu z
found entry E found entry E
E is expired <preemption>
nf_ct_delete()
return E to rcu slab
init_conntrack
E is re-inited,
ct->status set to 0
reply tuplehash hnnode.pprev
stores hash value.
cpu y found E right before it was deleted on cpu x.
E is now re-inited on cpu z. cpu y was preempted before
checking for expiry and/or confirm bit.
->refcnt set to 1
E now owned by skb
->timeout set to 30000
If cpu y were to resume now, it would observe E as
expired but would skip E due to missing CONFIRMED bit.
nf_conntrack_confirm gets called
sets: ct->status |= CONFIRMED
This is wrong: E is not yet added
to hashtable.
cpu y resumes, it observes E as expired but CONFIRMED:
<resumes>
nf_ct_expired()
-> yes (ct->timeout is 30s)
confirmed bit set.
cpu y will try to delete E from the hashtable:
nf_ct_delete() -> set DYING bit
__nf_ct_delete_from_lists
Even this scenario doesn't guarantee a crash:
cpu z still holds the table bucket lock(s) so y blocks:
wait for spinlock held by z
CONFIRMED is set but there is no
guarantee ct will be added to hash:
"chaintoolong" or "clash resolution"
logic both skip the insert step.
reply hnnode.pprev still stores the
hash value.
unlocks spinlock
return NF_DROP
<unblocks, then
crashes on hlist_nulls_del_rcu pprev>
In case CPU z does insert the entry into the hashtable, cpu y will unlink
E again right away but no crash occurs.
Without 'cpu y' race, 'garbage' hlist is of no consequence:
ct refcnt remains at 1, eventually skb will be free'd and E gets
destroyed via: nf_conntrack_put -> nf_conntrack_destroy -> nf_ct_destroy.
To resolve this, move the IPS_CONFIRMED assignment after the table
insertion but before the unlock.
Pablo points out that the confirm-bit-store could be reordered to happen
before hlist add resp. the timeout fixup, so switch to set_bit and
before_atomic memory barrier to prevent this.
It doesn't matter if other CPUs can observe a newly inserted entry right
before the CONFIRMED bit was set:
Such event cannot be distinguished from above "E is the old incarnation"
case: the entry will be skipped.
Also change nf_ct_should_gc() to first check the confirmed bit.
The gc sequence is:
1. Check if entry has expired, if not skip to next entry
2. Obtain a reference to the expired entry.
3. Call nf_ct_should_gc() to double-check step 1.
nf_ct_should_gc() is thus called only for entries that already failed an
expiry check. After this patch, once the confirmed bit check passes
ct->timeout has been altered to reflect the absolute 'best before' date
instead of a relative time. Step 3 will therefore not remove the entry.
Without this change to nf_ct_should_gc() we could still get this sequence:
1. Check if entry has expired.
2. Obtain a reference.
3. Call nf_ct_should_gc() to double-check step 1:
4 - entry is still observed as expired
5 - meanwhile, ct->timeout is corrected to absolute value on other CPU
and confirm bit gets set
6 - confirm bit is seen
7 - valid entry is removed again
First do check 6), then 4) so the gc expiry check always picks up either
confirmed bit unset (entry gets skipped) or expiry re-check failure for
re-inited conntrack objects.
This change cannot be backported to releases before 5.19. Without
commit 8a75a2c ("netfilter: conntrack: remove unconfirmed list")
|= IPS_CONFIRMED line cannot be moved without further changes.
Cc: Razvan Cojocaru <rzvncj@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/20250627142758.25664-1-fw@strlen.de/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/4239da15-83ff-4ca4-939d-faef283471bb@gmail.com/
Fixes: 1397af5 ("netfilter: conntrack: remove the percpu dying list")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
heftig
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jul 24, 2025
It is reported that on Acer Nitro V15 suspend only works properly if the keyboard backlight is turned off. In looking through the issue Acer Nitro V15 has a GPIO (#8) specified in _AEI but it has no matching notify device in _EVT. The values for GPIO #8 change as keyboard backlight is turned on and off. This makes it seem that GPIO #8 is actually supposed to be solely for keyboard backlight. Turning off the interrupt for this GPIO fixes the issue. Add a quirk that does just that. Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/4169 Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com> Acked-by: Mika Westerberg <westeri@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
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