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build(deps): bump pip from 23.2.1 to 23.3 in /drivers/gpu/drm/ci/xfails #4

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@dependabot dependabot bot commented on behalf of github Nov 2, 2023

Bumps pip from 23.2.1 to 23.3.

Changelog

Sourced from pip's changelog.

23.3 (2023-10-15)

Process

  • Added reference to vulnerability reporting guidelines <https://www.python.org/dev/security/>_ to pip's security policy.

Deprecations and Removals

  • Drop a fallback to using SecureTransport on macOS. It was useful when pip detected OpenSSL older than 1.0.1, but the current pip does not support any Python version supporting such old OpenSSL versions. ([#12175](https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/12175) <https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/12175>_)

Features

  • Improve extras resolution for multiple constraints on same base package. ([#11924](https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/11924) <https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/11924>_)
  • Improve use of datastructures to make candidate selection 1.6x faster. ([#12204](https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/12204) <https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/12204>_)
  • Allow pip install --dry-run to use platform and ABI overriding options. ([#12215](https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/12215) <https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/12215>_)
  • Add is_yanked boolean entry to the installation report (--report) to indicate whether the requirement was yanked from the index, but was still selected by pip conform to :pep:592. ([#12224](https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/12224) <https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/12224>_)

Bug Fixes

  • Ignore errors in temporary directory cleanup (show a warning instead). ([#11394](https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/11394) <https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/11394>_)
  • Normalize extras according to :pep:685 from package metadata in the resolver for comparison. This ensures extras are correctly compared and merged as long as the package providing the extra(s) is built with values normalized according to the standard. Note, however, that this does not solve cases where the package itself contains unnormalized extra values in the metadata. ([#11649](https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/11649) <https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/11649>_)
  • Prevent downloading sdists twice when :pep:658 metadata is present. ([#11847](https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/11847) <https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/11847>_)
  • Include all requested extras in the install report (--report). ([#11924](https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/11924) <https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/11924>_)
  • Removed uses of datetime.datetime.utcnow from non-vendored code. ([#12005](https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/12005) <https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/12005>_)
  • Consistently report whether a dependency comes from an extra. ([#12095](https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/12095) <https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/12095>_)
  • Fix completion script for zsh ([#12166](https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/12166) <https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/12166>_)
  • Fix improper handling of the new onexc argument of shutil.rmtree() in Python 3.12. ([#12187](https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/12187) <https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/12187>_)
  • Filter out yanked links from the available versions error message: "(from versions: 1.0, 2.0, 3.0)" will not contain yanked versions conform PEP 592. The yanked versions (if any) will be mentioned in a separate error message. ([#12225](https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/12225) <https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/12225>_)
  • Fix crash when the git version number contains something else than digits and dots. ([#12280](https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/12280) <https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/12280>_)
  • Use -r=... instead of -r ... to specify references with Mercurial. ([#12306](https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/12306) <https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/12306>_)
  • Redact password from URLs in some additional places. ([#12350](https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/12350) <https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/12350>_)
  • pip uses less memory when caching large packages. As a result, there is a new on-disk cache format stored in a new directory ($PIP_CACHE_DIR/http-v2). ([#2984](https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/2984) <https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/2984>_)

Vendored Libraries

  • Upgrade certifi to 2023.7.22
  • Add truststore 0.8.0
  • Upgrade urllib3 to 1.26.17

Improved Documentation

... (truncated)

Commits

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Bumps [pip](https://github.com/pypa/pip) from 23.2.1 to 23.3.
- [Changelog](https://github.com/pypa/pip/blob/main/NEWS.rst)
- [Commits](pypa/pip@23.2.1...23.3)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: pip
  dependency-type: direct:production
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
@dependabot dependabot bot added the dependencies Pull requests that update a dependency file label Nov 2, 2023
sj-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 3, 2023
…oles on aarch64

offline_pages() properly checks for memory holes and bails out.
However, we do a page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) before calling
offline_pages() when offlining a memory block.

We should not unconditionally call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) on
aarch64 in offlining code, otherwise we can trigger a BUG when hitting a
memory hole:

   kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1383!
   Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
   Modules linked in: loop processor efivarfs ip_tables x_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_mod igb nvme i2c_algo_bit mlx5_core i2c_core nvme_core firmware_class
   CPU: 13 PID: 1694 Comm: ranbug Not tainted 5.12.0-next-20210524+ #4
   Hardware name: MiTAC RAPTOR EV-883832-X3-0001/RAPTOR, BIOS 1.6 06/28/2020
   pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
   pc : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   lr : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   Call trace:
     memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
     device_offline+0x154/0x1d8
     online_store+0xa4/0x118
     dev_attr_store+0x44/0x78
     sysfs_kf_write+0xe8/0x138
     kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x26c/0x3d0
     new_sync_write+0x2bc/0x4f8
     vfs_write+0x718/0xc88
     ksys_write+0xf8/0x1e0
     __arm64_sys_write+0x74/0xa8
     invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e8
     do_el0_svc+0xe4/0x298
     el0_svc+0x20/0x30
     el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8
     el0_sync+0x178/0x180
   Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception
   SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
   Kernel Offset: disabled
   CPU features: 0x00000251,20000846
   Memory Limit: none

If nr_vmemmap_pages is set, we know that we are dealing with hotplugged
memory that doesn't have any holes.  So call
page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) only when really necessary -- when
nr_vmemmap_pages is set and we actually adjust the present pages.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210526075226.5572-1-david@redhat.com
Fixes: a08a2ae ("mm,memory_hotplug: allocate memmap from the added memory range")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Qian Cai (QUIC) <quic_qiancai@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9281305)
sj-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 8, 2023
…mplaint

[ Upstream commit bbaa6ff ]

AMD PMF driver can cause the following warning:
[  196.159546] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  196.159556] Voluntary context switch within RCU read-side critical section!
[  196.159571] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9 at kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:320 rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560
[  196.159604] Modules linked in: nvme_fabrics ccm rfcomm snd_hda_scodec_cs35l41_spi cmac algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg bnep joydev btusb btrtl uvcvideo btintel btbcm videobuf2_vmalloc intel_rapl_msr btmtk videobuf2_memops uvc videobuf2_v4l2 intel_rapl_common binfmt_misc hid_sensor_als snd_sof_amd_vangogh hid_sensor_trigger bluetooth industrialio_triggered_buffer videodev snd_sof_amd_rembrandt hid_sensor_iio_common amdgpu ecdh_generic kfifo_buf videobuf2_common hp_wmi kvm_amd sparse_keymap snd_sof_amd_renoir wmi_bmof industrialio ecc mc nls_iso8859_1 kvm snd_sof_amd_acp irqbypass snd_sof_xtensa_dsp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul mt7921e snd_sof_pci snd_ctl_led polyval_clmulni mt7921_common polyval_generic snd_sof ghash_clmulni_intel mt792x_lib mt76_connac_lib sha512_ssse3 snd_sof_utils aesni_intel snd_hda_codec_realtek crypto_simd mt76 snd_hda_codec_generic cryptd snd_soc_core snd_hda_codec_hdmi rapl ledtrig_audio input_leds snd_compress i2c_algo_bit drm_ttm_helper mac80211 snd_pci_ps hid_multitouch ttm drm_exec
[  196.159970]  drm_suballoc_helper snd_rpl_pci_acp6x amdxcp drm_buddy snd_hda_intel snd_acp_pci snd_hda_scodec_cs35l41_i2c serio_raw gpu_sched snd_hda_scodec_cs35l41 snd_acp_legacy_common snd_intel_dspcfg snd_hda_cs_dsp_ctls snd_hda_codec libarc4 drm_display_helper snd_pci_acp6x cs_dsp snd_hwdep snd_soc_cs35l41_lib video k10temp snd_pci_acp5x thunderbolt snd_hda_core drm_kms_helper cfg80211 snd_seq snd_rn_pci_acp3x snd_pcm snd_acp_config cec snd_soc_acpi snd_seq_device rc_core ccp snd_pci_acp3x snd_timer snd soundcore wmi amd_pmf platform_profile amd_pmc mac_hid serial_multi_instantiate wireless_hotkey hid_sensor_hub sch_fq_codel msr parport_pc ppdev lp parport efi_pstore ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx libcrc32c xor raid6_pq raid1 raid0 multipath linear dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log cdc_ether usbnet r8152 mii hid_generic nvme i2c_hid_acpi i2c_hid nvme_core i2c_piix4 xhci_pci amd_sfh drm xhci_pci_renesas nvme_common hid
[  196.160382] CPU: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc1 #4
[  196.160397] Hardware name: HP HP EliteBook 845 14 inch G10 Notebook PC/8B6E, BIOS V82 Ver. 01.02.00 08/24/2023
[  196.160405] Workqueue: events power_supply_changed_work
[  196.160426] RIP: 0010:rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560
[  196.160440] Code: 00 48 89 be 40 08 00 00 48 89 86 48 08 00 00 48 89 10 e9 63 fe ff ff 48 c7 c7 10 e7 b0 9e c6 05 e8 d8 20 02 01 e8 13 0f f3 ff <0f> 0b e9 27 fc ff ff a9 ff ff ff 7f 0f 84 cf fc ff ff 65 48 8b 3c
[  196.160450] RSP: 0018:ffffc900001878f0 EFLAGS: 00010046
[  196.160462] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88885e834040 RCX: 0000000000000000
[  196.160470] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[  196.160476] RBP: ffffc90000187910 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[  196.160482] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
[  196.160488] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff888100990000 R15: ffff888100990000
[  196.160495] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88885e800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  196.160504] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  196.160512] CR2: 000055cb053c8246 CR3: 000000013443a000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
[  196.160520] PKRU: 55555554
[  196.160526] Call Trace:
[  196.160532]  <TASK>
[  196.160548]  ? show_regs+0x72/0x90
[  196.160570]  ? rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560
[  196.160580]  ? __warn+0x8d/0x160
[  196.160600]  ? rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560
[  196.160613]  ? report_bug+0x1bb/0x1d0
[  196.160637]  ? handle_bug+0x46/0x90
[  196.160658]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x19/0x80
[  196.160675]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20
[  196.160709]  ? rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560
[  196.160727]  __schedule+0xb9/0x15f0
[  196.160746]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[  196.160765]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[  196.160778]  ? acpi_ns_search_one_scope+0xbe/0x270
[  196.160806]  schedule+0x68/0x110
[  196.160820]  schedule_timeout+0x151/0x160
[  196.160829]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[  196.160842]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[  196.160855]  ? acpi_ns_lookup+0x3c5/0xa90
[  196.160878]  __down_common+0xff/0x220
[  196.160905]  __down_timeout+0x16/0x30
[  196.160920]  down_timeout+0x64/0x70
[  196.160938]  acpi_os_wait_semaphore+0x85/0x200
[  196.160959]  acpi_ut_acquire_mutex+0x9e/0x280
[  196.160979]  acpi_ex_enter_interpreter+0x2d/0xb0
[  196.160992]  acpi_ns_evaluate+0x2f0/0x5f0
[  196.161005]  acpi_evaluate_object+0x172/0x490
[  196.161018]  ? acpi_os_signal_semaphore+0x8a/0xd0
[  196.161038]  acpi_evaluate_integer+0x52/0xe0
[  196.161055]  ? kfree+0x79/0x120
[  196.161071]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[  196.161089]  acpi_ac_get_state.part.0+0x27/0x80
[  196.161110]  get_ac_property+0x5c/0x70
[  196.161127]  ? __pfx___power_supply_is_system_supplied+0x10/0x10
[  196.161146]  __power_supply_is_system_supplied+0x44/0xb0
[  196.161166]  class_for_each_device+0x124/0x160
[  196.161184]  ? acpi_ac_get_state.part.0+0x27/0x80
[  196.161203]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[  196.161223]  power_supply_is_system_supplied+0x3c/0x70
[  196.161243]  amd_pmf_get_power_source+0xe/0x20 [amd_pmf]
[  196.161276]  amd_pmf_power_slider_update_event+0x49/0x90 [amd_pmf]
[  196.161310]  amd_pmf_pwr_src_notify_call+0xe7/0x100 [amd_pmf]
[  196.161340]  notifier_call_chain+0x5f/0xe0
[  196.161362]  atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x33/0x60
[  196.161378]  power_supply_changed_work+0x84/0x110
[  196.161394]  process_one_work+0x178/0x360
[  196.161412]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[  196.161424]  worker_thread+0x307/0x430
[  196.161440]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[  196.161451]  kthread+0xf4/0x130
[  196.161467]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  196.161486]  ret_from_fork+0x43/0x70
[  196.161502]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  196.161518]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
[  196.161558]  </TASK>
[  196.161562] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Since there's no guarantee that all the callbacks can work in atomic
context, switch to use blocking_notifier_call_chain to relax the
constraint.

Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Allen Zhong <allen@atr.me>
Fixes: 4c71ae4 ("platform/x86/amd/pmf: Add support SPS PMF feature")
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=217571
Reviewed-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230913033233.602986-1-kai.heng.feng@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
sj-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 8, 2023
…mplaint

[ Upstream commit bbaa6ff ]

AMD PMF driver can cause the following warning:
[  196.159546] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  196.159556] Voluntary context switch within RCU read-side critical section!
[  196.159571] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9 at kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:320 rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560
[  196.159604] Modules linked in: nvme_fabrics ccm rfcomm snd_hda_scodec_cs35l41_spi cmac algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg bnep joydev btusb btrtl uvcvideo btintel btbcm videobuf2_vmalloc intel_rapl_msr btmtk videobuf2_memops uvc videobuf2_v4l2 intel_rapl_common binfmt_misc hid_sensor_als snd_sof_amd_vangogh hid_sensor_trigger bluetooth industrialio_triggered_buffer videodev snd_sof_amd_rembrandt hid_sensor_iio_common amdgpu ecdh_generic kfifo_buf videobuf2_common hp_wmi kvm_amd sparse_keymap snd_sof_amd_renoir wmi_bmof industrialio ecc mc nls_iso8859_1 kvm snd_sof_amd_acp irqbypass snd_sof_xtensa_dsp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul mt7921e snd_sof_pci snd_ctl_led polyval_clmulni mt7921_common polyval_generic snd_sof ghash_clmulni_intel mt792x_lib mt76_connac_lib sha512_ssse3 snd_sof_utils aesni_intel snd_hda_codec_realtek crypto_simd mt76 snd_hda_codec_generic cryptd snd_soc_core snd_hda_codec_hdmi rapl ledtrig_audio input_leds snd_compress i2c_algo_bit drm_ttm_helper mac80211 snd_pci_ps hid_multitouch ttm drm_exec
[  196.159970]  drm_suballoc_helper snd_rpl_pci_acp6x amdxcp drm_buddy snd_hda_intel snd_acp_pci snd_hda_scodec_cs35l41_i2c serio_raw gpu_sched snd_hda_scodec_cs35l41 snd_acp_legacy_common snd_intel_dspcfg snd_hda_cs_dsp_ctls snd_hda_codec libarc4 drm_display_helper snd_pci_acp6x cs_dsp snd_hwdep snd_soc_cs35l41_lib video k10temp snd_pci_acp5x thunderbolt snd_hda_core drm_kms_helper cfg80211 snd_seq snd_rn_pci_acp3x snd_pcm snd_acp_config cec snd_soc_acpi snd_seq_device rc_core ccp snd_pci_acp3x snd_timer snd soundcore wmi amd_pmf platform_profile amd_pmc mac_hid serial_multi_instantiate wireless_hotkey hid_sensor_hub sch_fq_codel msr parport_pc ppdev lp parport efi_pstore ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx libcrc32c xor raid6_pq raid1 raid0 multipath linear dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log cdc_ether usbnet r8152 mii hid_generic nvme i2c_hid_acpi i2c_hid nvme_core i2c_piix4 xhci_pci amd_sfh drm xhci_pci_renesas nvme_common hid
[  196.160382] CPU: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc1 #4
[  196.160397] Hardware name: HP HP EliteBook 845 14 inch G10 Notebook PC/8B6E, BIOS V82 Ver. 01.02.00 08/24/2023
[  196.160405] Workqueue: events power_supply_changed_work
[  196.160426] RIP: 0010:rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560
[  196.160440] Code: 00 48 89 be 40 08 00 00 48 89 86 48 08 00 00 48 89 10 e9 63 fe ff ff 48 c7 c7 10 e7 b0 9e c6 05 e8 d8 20 02 01 e8 13 0f f3 ff <0f> 0b e9 27 fc ff ff a9 ff ff ff 7f 0f 84 cf fc ff ff 65 48 8b 3c
[  196.160450] RSP: 0018:ffffc900001878f0 EFLAGS: 00010046
[  196.160462] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88885e834040 RCX: 0000000000000000
[  196.160470] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[  196.160476] RBP: ffffc90000187910 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[  196.160482] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
[  196.160488] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff888100990000 R15: ffff888100990000
[  196.160495] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88885e800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  196.160504] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  196.160512] CR2: 000055cb053c8246 CR3: 000000013443a000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
[  196.160520] PKRU: 55555554
[  196.160526] Call Trace:
[  196.160532]  <TASK>
[  196.160548]  ? show_regs+0x72/0x90
[  196.160570]  ? rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560
[  196.160580]  ? __warn+0x8d/0x160
[  196.160600]  ? rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560
[  196.160613]  ? report_bug+0x1bb/0x1d0
[  196.160637]  ? handle_bug+0x46/0x90
[  196.160658]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x19/0x80
[  196.160675]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20
[  196.160709]  ? rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560
[  196.160727]  __schedule+0xb9/0x15f0
[  196.160746]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[  196.160765]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[  196.160778]  ? acpi_ns_search_one_scope+0xbe/0x270
[  196.160806]  schedule+0x68/0x110
[  196.160820]  schedule_timeout+0x151/0x160
[  196.160829]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[  196.160842]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[  196.160855]  ? acpi_ns_lookup+0x3c5/0xa90
[  196.160878]  __down_common+0xff/0x220
[  196.160905]  __down_timeout+0x16/0x30
[  196.160920]  down_timeout+0x64/0x70
[  196.160938]  acpi_os_wait_semaphore+0x85/0x200
[  196.160959]  acpi_ut_acquire_mutex+0x9e/0x280
[  196.160979]  acpi_ex_enter_interpreter+0x2d/0xb0
[  196.160992]  acpi_ns_evaluate+0x2f0/0x5f0
[  196.161005]  acpi_evaluate_object+0x172/0x490
[  196.161018]  ? acpi_os_signal_semaphore+0x8a/0xd0
[  196.161038]  acpi_evaluate_integer+0x52/0xe0
[  196.161055]  ? kfree+0x79/0x120
[  196.161071]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[  196.161089]  acpi_ac_get_state.part.0+0x27/0x80
[  196.161110]  get_ac_property+0x5c/0x70
[  196.161127]  ? __pfx___power_supply_is_system_supplied+0x10/0x10
[  196.161146]  __power_supply_is_system_supplied+0x44/0xb0
[  196.161166]  class_for_each_device+0x124/0x160
[  196.161184]  ? acpi_ac_get_state.part.0+0x27/0x80
[  196.161203]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[  196.161223]  power_supply_is_system_supplied+0x3c/0x70
[  196.161243]  amd_pmf_get_power_source+0xe/0x20 [amd_pmf]
[  196.161276]  amd_pmf_power_slider_update_event+0x49/0x90 [amd_pmf]
[  196.161310]  amd_pmf_pwr_src_notify_call+0xe7/0x100 [amd_pmf]
[  196.161340]  notifier_call_chain+0x5f/0xe0
[  196.161362]  atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x33/0x60
[  196.161378]  power_supply_changed_work+0x84/0x110
[  196.161394]  process_one_work+0x178/0x360
[  196.161412]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[  196.161424]  worker_thread+0x307/0x430
[  196.161440]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[  196.161451]  kthread+0xf4/0x130
[  196.161467]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  196.161486]  ret_from_fork+0x43/0x70
[  196.161502]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  196.161518]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
[  196.161558]  </TASK>
[  196.161562] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Since there's no guarantee that all the callbacks can work in atomic
context, switch to use blocking_notifier_call_chain to relax the
constraint.

Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Allen Zhong <allen@atr.me>
Fixes: 4c71ae4 ("platform/x86/amd/pmf: Add support SPS PMF feature")
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=217571
Reviewed-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230913033233.602986-1-kai.heng.feng@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
sj-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 8, 2023
…mplaint

[ Upstream commit bbaa6ff ]

AMD PMF driver can cause the following warning:
[  196.159546] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  196.159556] Voluntary context switch within RCU read-side critical section!
[  196.159571] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9 at kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:320 rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560
[  196.159604] Modules linked in: nvme_fabrics ccm rfcomm snd_hda_scodec_cs35l41_spi cmac algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg bnep joydev btusb btrtl uvcvideo btintel btbcm videobuf2_vmalloc intel_rapl_msr btmtk videobuf2_memops uvc videobuf2_v4l2 intel_rapl_common binfmt_misc hid_sensor_als snd_sof_amd_vangogh hid_sensor_trigger bluetooth industrialio_triggered_buffer videodev snd_sof_amd_rembrandt hid_sensor_iio_common amdgpu ecdh_generic kfifo_buf videobuf2_common hp_wmi kvm_amd sparse_keymap snd_sof_amd_renoir wmi_bmof industrialio ecc mc nls_iso8859_1 kvm snd_sof_amd_acp irqbypass snd_sof_xtensa_dsp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul mt7921e snd_sof_pci snd_ctl_led polyval_clmulni mt7921_common polyval_generic snd_sof ghash_clmulni_intel mt792x_lib mt76_connac_lib sha512_ssse3 snd_sof_utils aesni_intel snd_hda_codec_realtek crypto_simd mt76 snd_hda_codec_generic cryptd snd_soc_core snd_hda_codec_hdmi rapl ledtrig_audio input_leds snd_compress i2c_algo_bit drm_ttm_helper mac80211 snd_pci_ps hid_multitouch ttm drm_exec
[  196.159970]  drm_suballoc_helper snd_rpl_pci_acp6x amdxcp drm_buddy snd_hda_intel snd_acp_pci snd_hda_scodec_cs35l41_i2c serio_raw gpu_sched snd_hda_scodec_cs35l41 snd_acp_legacy_common snd_intel_dspcfg snd_hda_cs_dsp_ctls snd_hda_codec libarc4 drm_display_helper snd_pci_acp6x cs_dsp snd_hwdep snd_soc_cs35l41_lib video k10temp snd_pci_acp5x thunderbolt snd_hda_core drm_kms_helper cfg80211 snd_seq snd_rn_pci_acp3x snd_pcm snd_acp_config cec snd_soc_acpi snd_seq_device rc_core ccp snd_pci_acp3x snd_timer snd soundcore wmi amd_pmf platform_profile amd_pmc mac_hid serial_multi_instantiate wireless_hotkey hid_sensor_hub sch_fq_codel msr parport_pc ppdev lp parport efi_pstore ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx libcrc32c xor raid6_pq raid1 raid0 multipath linear dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log cdc_ether usbnet r8152 mii hid_generic nvme i2c_hid_acpi i2c_hid nvme_core i2c_piix4 xhci_pci amd_sfh drm xhci_pci_renesas nvme_common hid
[  196.160382] CPU: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc1 #4
[  196.160397] Hardware name: HP HP EliteBook 845 14 inch G10 Notebook PC/8B6E, BIOS V82 Ver. 01.02.00 08/24/2023
[  196.160405] Workqueue: events power_supply_changed_work
[  196.160426] RIP: 0010:rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560
[  196.160440] Code: 00 48 89 be 40 08 00 00 48 89 86 48 08 00 00 48 89 10 e9 63 fe ff ff 48 c7 c7 10 e7 b0 9e c6 05 e8 d8 20 02 01 e8 13 0f f3 ff <0f> 0b e9 27 fc ff ff a9 ff ff ff 7f 0f 84 cf fc ff ff 65 48 8b 3c
[  196.160450] RSP: 0018:ffffc900001878f0 EFLAGS: 00010046
[  196.160462] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88885e834040 RCX: 0000000000000000
[  196.160470] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[  196.160476] RBP: ffffc90000187910 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[  196.160482] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
[  196.160488] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff888100990000 R15: ffff888100990000
[  196.160495] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88885e800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  196.160504] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  196.160512] CR2: 000055cb053c8246 CR3: 000000013443a000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
[  196.160520] PKRU: 55555554
[  196.160526] Call Trace:
[  196.160532]  <TASK>
[  196.160548]  ? show_regs+0x72/0x90
[  196.160570]  ? rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560
[  196.160580]  ? __warn+0x8d/0x160
[  196.160600]  ? rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560
[  196.160613]  ? report_bug+0x1bb/0x1d0
[  196.160637]  ? handle_bug+0x46/0x90
[  196.160658]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x19/0x80
[  196.160675]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20
[  196.160709]  ? rcu_note_context_switch+0x43d/0x560
[  196.160727]  __schedule+0xb9/0x15f0
[  196.160746]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[  196.160765]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[  196.160778]  ? acpi_ns_search_one_scope+0xbe/0x270
[  196.160806]  schedule+0x68/0x110
[  196.160820]  schedule_timeout+0x151/0x160
[  196.160829]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[  196.160842]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[  196.160855]  ? acpi_ns_lookup+0x3c5/0xa90
[  196.160878]  __down_common+0xff/0x220
[  196.160905]  __down_timeout+0x16/0x30
[  196.160920]  down_timeout+0x64/0x70
[  196.160938]  acpi_os_wait_semaphore+0x85/0x200
[  196.160959]  acpi_ut_acquire_mutex+0x9e/0x280
[  196.160979]  acpi_ex_enter_interpreter+0x2d/0xb0
[  196.160992]  acpi_ns_evaluate+0x2f0/0x5f0
[  196.161005]  acpi_evaluate_object+0x172/0x490
[  196.161018]  ? acpi_os_signal_semaphore+0x8a/0xd0
[  196.161038]  acpi_evaluate_integer+0x52/0xe0
[  196.161055]  ? kfree+0x79/0x120
[  196.161071]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[  196.161089]  acpi_ac_get_state.part.0+0x27/0x80
[  196.161110]  get_ac_property+0x5c/0x70
[  196.161127]  ? __pfx___power_supply_is_system_supplied+0x10/0x10
[  196.161146]  __power_supply_is_system_supplied+0x44/0xb0
[  196.161166]  class_for_each_device+0x124/0x160
[  196.161184]  ? acpi_ac_get_state.part.0+0x27/0x80
[  196.161203]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
[  196.161223]  power_supply_is_system_supplied+0x3c/0x70
[  196.161243]  amd_pmf_get_power_source+0xe/0x20 [amd_pmf]
[  196.161276]  amd_pmf_power_slider_update_event+0x49/0x90 [amd_pmf]
[  196.161310]  amd_pmf_pwr_src_notify_call+0xe7/0x100 [amd_pmf]
[  196.161340]  notifier_call_chain+0x5f/0xe0
[  196.161362]  atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x33/0x60
[  196.161378]  power_supply_changed_work+0x84/0x110
[  196.161394]  process_one_work+0x178/0x360
[  196.161412]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[  196.161424]  worker_thread+0x307/0x430
[  196.161440]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[  196.161451]  kthread+0xf4/0x130
[  196.161467]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  196.161486]  ret_from_fork+0x43/0x70
[  196.161502]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  196.161518]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
[  196.161558]  </TASK>
[  196.161562] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Since there's no guarantee that all the callbacks can work in atomic
context, switch to use blocking_notifier_call_chain to relax the
constraint.

Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Allen Zhong <allen@atr.me>
Fixes: 4c71ae4 ("platform/x86/amd/pmf: Add support SPS PMF feature")
Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=217571
Reviewed-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230913033233.602986-1-kai.heng.feng@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
puranjaymohan pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 10, 2023
…oles on aarch64

offline_pages() properly checks for memory holes and bails out.
However, we do a page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) before calling
offline_pages() when offlining a memory block.

We should not unconditionally call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) on
aarch64 in offlining code, otherwise we can trigger a BUG when hitting a
memory hole:

   kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1383!
   Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
   Modules linked in: loop processor efivarfs ip_tables x_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_mod igb nvme i2c_algo_bit mlx5_core i2c_core nvme_core firmware_class
   CPU: 13 PID: 1694 Comm: ranbug Not tainted 5.12.0-next-20210524+ #4
   Hardware name: MiTAC RAPTOR EV-883832-X3-0001/RAPTOR, BIOS 1.6 06/28/2020
   pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
   pc : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   lr : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   Call trace:
     memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
     device_offline+0x154/0x1d8
     online_store+0xa4/0x118
     dev_attr_store+0x44/0x78
     sysfs_kf_write+0xe8/0x138
     kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x26c/0x3d0
     new_sync_write+0x2bc/0x4f8
     vfs_write+0x718/0xc88
     ksys_write+0xf8/0x1e0
     __arm64_sys_write+0x74/0xa8
     invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e8
     do_el0_svc+0xe4/0x298
     el0_svc+0x20/0x30
     el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8
     el0_sync+0x178/0x180
   Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception
   SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
   Kernel Offset: disabled
   CPU features: 0x00000251,20000846
   Memory Limit: none

If nr_vmemmap_pages is set, we know that we are dealing with hotplugged
memory that doesn't have any holes.  So call
page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) only when really necessary -- when
nr_vmemmap_pages is set and we actually adjust the present pages.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210526075226.5572-1-david@redhat.com
Fixes: a08a2ae ("mm,memory_hotplug: allocate memmap from the added memory range")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Qian Cai (QUIC) <quic_qiancai@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9281305)
sj-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 16, 2023
When LAN9303 is MDIO-connected two callchains exist into
mdio->bus->write():

1. switch ports 1&2 ("physical" PHYs):

virtual (switch-internal) MDIO bus (lan9303_switch_ops->phy_{read|write})->
  lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write} -> mdiobus_{read|write}_nested

2. LAN9303 virtual PHY:

virtual MDIO bus (lan9303_phy_{read|write}) ->
  lan9303_virt_phy_reg_{read|write} -> regmap -> lan9303_mdio_{read|write}

If the latter functions just take
mutex_lock(&sw_dev->device->bus->mdio_lock) it triggers a LOCKDEP
false-positive splat. It's false-positive because the first
mdio_lock in the second callchain above belongs to virtual MDIO bus, the
second mdio_lock belongs to physical MDIO bus.

Consequent annotation in lan9303_mdio_{read|write} as nested lock
(similar to lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write}, it's the same physical MDIO bus)
prevents the following splat:

WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.15.71 #1 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
kworker/u4:3/609 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff000011531c68 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: regmap_lock_mutex
but task is already holding lock:
ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       lock_acquire
       __mutex_lock
       mutex_lock_nested
       lan9303_mdio_read
       _regmap_read
       regmap_read
       lan9303_probe
       lan9303_mdio_probe
       mdio_probe
       really_probe
       __driver_probe_device
       driver_probe_device
       __device_attach_driver
       bus_for_each_drv
       __device_attach
       device_initial_probe
       bus_probe_device
       deferred_probe_work_func
       process_one_work
       worker_thread
       kthread
       ret_from_fork
-> #0 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       __lock_acquire
       lock_acquire.part.0
       lock_acquire
       __mutex_lock
       mutex_lock_nested
       regmap_lock_mutex
       regmap_read
       lan9303_phy_read
       dsa_slave_phy_read
       __mdiobus_read
       mdiobus_read
       get_phy_device
       mdiobus_scan
       __mdiobus_register
       dsa_register_switch
       lan9303_probe
       lan9303_mdio_probe
       mdio_probe
       really_probe
       __driver_probe_device
       driver_probe_device
       __device_attach_driver
       bus_for_each_drv
       __device_attach
       device_initial_probe
       bus_probe_device
       deferred_probe_work_func
       process_one_work
       worker_thread
       kthread
       ret_from_fork
other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:
       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&bus->mdio_lock);
                               lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock);
                               lock(&bus->mdio_lock);
  lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
5 locks held by kworker/u4:3/609:
 #0: ffff000002842938 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work
 #1: ffff80000bacbd60 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work
 #2: ffff000007645178 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __device_attach
 #3: ffff8000096e6e78 (dsa2_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dsa_register_switch
 #4: ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 609 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 5.15.71 #1
Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace
 show_stack
 dump_stack_lvl
 dump_stack
 print_circular_bug
 check_noncircular
 __lock_acquire
 lock_acquire.part.0
 lock_acquire
 __mutex_lock
 mutex_lock_nested
 regmap_lock_mutex
 regmap_read
 lan9303_phy_read
 dsa_slave_phy_read
 __mdiobus_read
 mdiobus_read
 get_phy_device
 mdiobus_scan
 __mdiobus_register
 dsa_register_switch
 lan9303_probe
 lan9303_mdio_probe
...

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: dc70058 ("net: dsa: LAN9303: add MDIO managed mode support")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231027065741.534971-1-alexander.sverdlin@siemens.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
sj-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 20, 2023
[ Upstream commit a84fbf2 ]

Generating metrics llc_code_read_mpi_demand_plus_prefetch,
llc_data_read_mpi_demand_plus_prefetch,
llc_miss_local_memory_bandwidth_read,
llc_miss_local_memory_bandwidth_write,
nllc_miss_remote_memory_bandwidth_read, memory_bandwidth_read,
memory_bandwidth_write, uncore_frequency, upi_data_transmit_bw,
C2_Pkg_Residency, C3_Core_Residency, C3_Pkg_Residency,
C6_Core_Residency, C6_Pkg_Residency, C7_Core_Residency,
C7_Pkg_Residency, UNCORE_FREQ and tma_info_system_socket_clks would
trigger an address sanitizer heap-buffer-overflows on a SkylakeX.

```
==2567752==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x5020003ed098 at pc 0x5621a816654e bp 0x7fffb55d4da0 sp 0x7fffb55d4d98
READ of size 4 at 0x5020003eee78 thread T0
    #0 0x558265d6654d in aggr_cpu_id__is_empty tools/perf/util/cpumap.c:694:12
    #1 0x558265c914da in perf_stat__get_aggr tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:1490:6
    #2 0x558265c914da in perf_stat__get_global_cached tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:1530:9
    #3 0x558265e53290 in should_skip_zero_counter tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:947:31
    #4 0x558265e53290 in print_counter_aggrdata tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:985:18
    #5 0x558265e51931 in print_counter tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:1110:3
    gregkh#6 0x558265e51931 in evlist__print_counters tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:1571:5
    gregkh#7 0x558265c8ec87 in print_counters tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:981:2
    gregkh#8 0x558265c8cc71 in cmd_stat tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:2837:3
    gregkh#9 0x558265bb9bd4 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:323:11
    gregkh#10 0x558265bb98eb in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:377:8
    gregkh#11 0x558265bb9389 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:421:2
    gregkh#12 0x558265bb9389 in main tools/perf/perf.c:537:3
```

The issue was the use of testing a cpumap with NULL rather than using
empty, as a map containing the dummy value isn't NULL and the -1
results in an empty aggr map being allocated which legitimately
overflows when any member is accessed.

Fixes: 8a96f45 ("perf stat: Avoid SEGV if core.cpus isn't set")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230906003912.3317462-1-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
sj-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 20, 2023
[ Upstream commit ede72dc ]

Fuzzing found that an invalid tracepoint name would create a memory
leak with an address sanitizer build:
```
$ perf stat -e '*:o/' true
event syntax error: '*:o/'
                       \___ parser error
Run 'perf list' for a list of valid events

 Usage: perf stat [<options>] [<command>]

    -e, --event <event>   event selector. use 'perf list' to list available events

=================================================================
==59380==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

Direct leak of 4 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f38ac07077b in __interceptor_strdup ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439
    #1 0x55f2f41be73b in str util/parse-events.l:49
    #2 0x55f2f41d08e8 in parse_events_lex util/parse-events.l:338
    #3 0x55f2f41dc3b1 in parse_events_parse util/parse-events-bison.c:1464
    #4 0x55f2f410b8b3 in parse_events__scanner util/parse-events.c:1822
    #5 0x55f2f410d1b9 in __parse_events util/parse-events.c:2094
    gregkh#6 0x55f2f410e57f in parse_events_option util/parse-events.c:2279
    gregkh#7 0x55f2f4427b56 in get_value tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:251
    gregkh#8 0x55f2f4428d98 in parse_short_opt tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:351
    gregkh#9 0x55f2f4429d80 in parse_options_step tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:539
    gregkh#10 0x55f2f442acb9 in parse_options_subcommand tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:654
    gregkh#11 0x55f2f3ec99fc in cmd_stat tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:2501
    gregkh#12 0x55f2f4093289 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:322
    gregkh#13 0x55f2f40937f5 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:375
    gregkh#14 0x55f2f4093bbd in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:419
    gregkh#15 0x55f2f409412b in main tools/perf/perf.c:535

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 4 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s).
```
Fix by adding the missing destructor.

Fixes: 865582c ("perf tools: Adds the tracepoint name parsing support")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: He Kuang <hekuang@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230914164028.363220-1-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
sj-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 20, 2023
[ Upstream commit a84fbf2 ]

Generating metrics llc_code_read_mpi_demand_plus_prefetch,
llc_data_read_mpi_demand_plus_prefetch,
llc_miss_local_memory_bandwidth_read,
llc_miss_local_memory_bandwidth_write,
nllc_miss_remote_memory_bandwidth_read, memory_bandwidth_read,
memory_bandwidth_write, uncore_frequency, upi_data_transmit_bw,
C2_Pkg_Residency, C3_Core_Residency, C3_Pkg_Residency,
C6_Core_Residency, C6_Pkg_Residency, C7_Core_Residency,
C7_Pkg_Residency, UNCORE_FREQ and tma_info_system_socket_clks would
trigger an address sanitizer heap-buffer-overflows on a SkylakeX.

```
==2567752==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x5020003ed098 at pc 0x5621a816654e bp 0x7fffb55d4da0 sp 0x7fffb55d4d98
READ of size 4 at 0x5020003eee78 thread T0
    #0 0x558265d6654d in aggr_cpu_id__is_empty tools/perf/util/cpumap.c:694:12
    #1 0x558265c914da in perf_stat__get_aggr tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:1490:6
    #2 0x558265c914da in perf_stat__get_global_cached tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:1530:9
    #3 0x558265e53290 in should_skip_zero_counter tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:947:31
    #4 0x558265e53290 in print_counter_aggrdata tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:985:18
    #5 0x558265e51931 in print_counter tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:1110:3
    gregkh#6 0x558265e51931 in evlist__print_counters tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:1571:5
    gregkh#7 0x558265c8ec87 in print_counters tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:981:2
    gregkh#8 0x558265c8cc71 in cmd_stat tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:2837:3
    gregkh#9 0x558265bb9bd4 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:323:11
    gregkh#10 0x558265bb98eb in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:377:8
    gregkh#11 0x558265bb9389 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:421:2
    gregkh#12 0x558265bb9389 in main tools/perf/perf.c:537:3
```

The issue was the use of testing a cpumap with NULL rather than using
empty, as a map containing the dummy value isn't NULL and the -1
results in an empty aggr map being allocated which legitimately
overflows when any member is accessed.

Fixes: 8a96f45 ("perf stat: Avoid SEGV if core.cpus isn't set")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230906003912.3317462-1-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
sj-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 20, 2023
[ Upstream commit ede72dc ]

Fuzzing found that an invalid tracepoint name would create a memory
leak with an address sanitizer build:
```
$ perf stat -e '*:o/' true
event syntax error: '*:o/'
                       \___ parser error
Run 'perf list' for a list of valid events

 Usage: perf stat [<options>] [<command>]

    -e, --event <event>   event selector. use 'perf list' to list available events

=================================================================
==59380==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

Direct leak of 4 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f38ac07077b in __interceptor_strdup ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439
    #1 0x55f2f41be73b in str util/parse-events.l:49
    #2 0x55f2f41d08e8 in parse_events_lex util/parse-events.l:338
    #3 0x55f2f41dc3b1 in parse_events_parse util/parse-events-bison.c:1464
    #4 0x55f2f410b8b3 in parse_events__scanner util/parse-events.c:1822
    #5 0x55f2f410d1b9 in __parse_events util/parse-events.c:2094
    gregkh#6 0x55f2f410e57f in parse_events_option util/parse-events.c:2279
    gregkh#7 0x55f2f4427b56 in get_value tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:251
    gregkh#8 0x55f2f4428d98 in parse_short_opt tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:351
    gregkh#9 0x55f2f4429d80 in parse_options_step tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:539
    gregkh#10 0x55f2f442acb9 in parse_options_subcommand tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:654
    gregkh#11 0x55f2f3ec99fc in cmd_stat tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:2501
    gregkh#12 0x55f2f4093289 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:322
    gregkh#13 0x55f2f40937f5 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:375
    gregkh#14 0x55f2f4093bbd in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:419
    gregkh#15 0x55f2f409412b in main tools/perf/perf.c:535

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 4 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s).
```
Fix by adding the missing destructor.

Fixes: 865582c ("perf tools: Adds the tracepoint name parsing support")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: He Kuang <hekuang@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230914164028.363220-1-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
sj-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 20, 2023
[ Upstream commit a84fbf2 ]

Generating metrics llc_code_read_mpi_demand_plus_prefetch,
llc_data_read_mpi_demand_plus_prefetch,
llc_miss_local_memory_bandwidth_read,
llc_miss_local_memory_bandwidth_write,
nllc_miss_remote_memory_bandwidth_read, memory_bandwidth_read,
memory_bandwidth_write, uncore_frequency, upi_data_transmit_bw,
C2_Pkg_Residency, C3_Core_Residency, C3_Pkg_Residency,
C6_Core_Residency, C6_Pkg_Residency, C7_Core_Residency,
C7_Pkg_Residency, UNCORE_FREQ and tma_info_system_socket_clks would
trigger an address sanitizer heap-buffer-overflows on a SkylakeX.

```
==2567752==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x5020003ed098 at pc 0x5621a816654e bp 0x7fffb55d4da0 sp 0x7fffb55d4d98
READ of size 4 at 0x5020003eee78 thread T0
    #0 0x558265d6654d in aggr_cpu_id__is_empty tools/perf/util/cpumap.c:694:12
    #1 0x558265c914da in perf_stat__get_aggr tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:1490:6
    #2 0x558265c914da in perf_stat__get_global_cached tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:1530:9
    #3 0x558265e53290 in should_skip_zero_counter tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:947:31
    #4 0x558265e53290 in print_counter_aggrdata tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:985:18
    #5 0x558265e51931 in print_counter tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:1110:3
    gregkh#6 0x558265e51931 in evlist__print_counters tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:1571:5
    gregkh#7 0x558265c8ec87 in print_counters tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:981:2
    gregkh#8 0x558265c8cc71 in cmd_stat tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:2837:3
    gregkh#9 0x558265bb9bd4 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:323:11
    gregkh#10 0x558265bb98eb in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:377:8
    gregkh#11 0x558265bb9389 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:421:2
    gregkh#12 0x558265bb9389 in main tools/perf/perf.c:537:3
```

The issue was the use of testing a cpumap with NULL rather than using
empty, as a map containing the dummy value isn't NULL and the -1
results in an empty aggr map being allocated which legitimately
overflows when any member is accessed.

Fixes: 8a96f45 ("perf stat: Avoid SEGV if core.cpus isn't set")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230906003912.3317462-1-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
mngyadam pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 27, 2023
…oles on aarch64

offline_pages() properly checks for memory holes and bails out.
However, we do a page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) before calling
offline_pages() when offlining a memory block.

We should not unconditionally call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) on
aarch64 in offlining code, otherwise we can trigger a BUG when hitting a
memory hole:

   kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1383!
   Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
   Modules linked in: loop processor efivarfs ip_tables x_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_mod igb nvme i2c_algo_bit mlx5_core i2c_core nvme_core firmware_class
   CPU: 13 PID: 1694 Comm: ranbug Not tainted 5.12.0-next-20210524+ #4
   Hardware name: MiTAC RAPTOR EV-883832-X3-0001/RAPTOR, BIOS 1.6 06/28/2020
   pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
   pc : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   lr : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   Call trace:
     memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
     device_offline+0x154/0x1d8
     online_store+0xa4/0x118
     dev_attr_store+0x44/0x78
     sysfs_kf_write+0xe8/0x138
     kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x26c/0x3d0
     new_sync_write+0x2bc/0x4f8
     vfs_write+0x718/0xc88
     ksys_write+0xf8/0x1e0
     __arm64_sys_write+0x74/0xa8
     invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e8
     do_el0_svc+0xe4/0x298
     el0_svc+0x20/0x30
     el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8
     el0_sync+0x178/0x180
   Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception
   SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
   Kernel Offset: disabled
   CPU features: 0x00000251,20000846
   Memory Limit: none

If nr_vmemmap_pages is set, we know that we are dealing with hotplugged
memory that doesn't have any holes.  So call
page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) only when really necessary -- when
nr_vmemmap_pages is set and we actually adjust the present pages.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210526075226.5572-1-david@redhat.com
Fixes: a08a2ae ("mm,memory_hotplug: allocate memmap from the added memory range")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Qian Cai (QUIC) <quic_qiancai@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9281305)
abuehaze14 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 28, 2023
…oles on aarch64

offline_pages() properly checks for memory holes and bails out.
However, we do a page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) before calling
offline_pages() when offlining a memory block.

We should not unconditionally call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) on
aarch64 in offlining code, otherwise we can trigger a BUG when hitting a
memory hole:

   kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1383!
   Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
   Modules linked in: loop processor efivarfs ip_tables x_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_mod igb nvme i2c_algo_bit mlx5_core i2c_core nvme_core firmware_class
   CPU: 13 PID: 1694 Comm: ranbug Not tainted 5.12.0-next-20210524+ #4
   Hardware name: MiTAC RAPTOR EV-883832-X3-0001/RAPTOR, BIOS 1.6 06/28/2020
   pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
   pc : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   lr : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   Call trace:
     memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
     device_offline+0x154/0x1d8
     online_store+0xa4/0x118
     dev_attr_store+0x44/0x78
     sysfs_kf_write+0xe8/0x138
     kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x26c/0x3d0
     new_sync_write+0x2bc/0x4f8
     vfs_write+0x718/0xc88
     ksys_write+0xf8/0x1e0
     __arm64_sys_write+0x74/0xa8
     invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e8
     do_el0_svc+0xe4/0x298
     el0_svc+0x20/0x30
     el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8
     el0_sync+0x178/0x180
   Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception
   SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
   Kernel Offset: disabled
   CPU features: 0x00000251,20000846
   Memory Limit: none

If nr_vmemmap_pages is set, we know that we are dealing with hotplugged
memory that doesn't have any holes.  So call
page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) only when really necessary -- when
nr_vmemmap_pages is set and we actually adjust the present pages.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210526075226.5572-1-david@redhat.com
Fixes: a08a2ae ("mm,memory_hotplug: allocate memmap from the added memory range")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Qian Cai (QUIC) <quic_qiancai@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9281305)
sj-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 28, 2023
commit 5a22fbc upstream.

When LAN9303 is MDIO-connected two callchains exist into
mdio->bus->write():

1. switch ports 1&2 ("physical" PHYs):

virtual (switch-internal) MDIO bus (lan9303_switch_ops->phy_{read|write})->
  lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write} -> mdiobus_{read|write}_nested

2. LAN9303 virtual PHY:

virtual MDIO bus (lan9303_phy_{read|write}) ->
  lan9303_virt_phy_reg_{read|write} -> regmap -> lan9303_mdio_{read|write}

If the latter functions just take
mutex_lock(&sw_dev->device->bus->mdio_lock) it triggers a LOCKDEP
false-positive splat. It's false-positive because the first
mdio_lock in the second callchain above belongs to virtual MDIO bus, the
second mdio_lock belongs to physical MDIO bus.

Consequent annotation in lan9303_mdio_{read|write} as nested lock
(similar to lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write}, it's the same physical MDIO bus)
prevents the following splat:

WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.15.71 #1 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
kworker/u4:3/609 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff000011531c68 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: regmap_lock_mutex
but task is already holding lock:
ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       lock_acquire
       __mutex_lock
       mutex_lock_nested
       lan9303_mdio_read
       _regmap_read
       regmap_read
       lan9303_probe
       lan9303_mdio_probe
       mdio_probe
       really_probe
       __driver_probe_device
       driver_probe_device
       __device_attach_driver
       bus_for_each_drv
       __device_attach
       device_initial_probe
       bus_probe_device
       deferred_probe_work_func
       process_one_work
       worker_thread
       kthread
       ret_from_fork
-> #0 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       __lock_acquire
       lock_acquire.part.0
       lock_acquire
       __mutex_lock
       mutex_lock_nested
       regmap_lock_mutex
       regmap_read
       lan9303_phy_read
       dsa_slave_phy_read
       __mdiobus_read
       mdiobus_read
       get_phy_device
       mdiobus_scan
       __mdiobus_register
       dsa_register_switch
       lan9303_probe
       lan9303_mdio_probe
       mdio_probe
       really_probe
       __driver_probe_device
       driver_probe_device
       __device_attach_driver
       bus_for_each_drv
       __device_attach
       device_initial_probe
       bus_probe_device
       deferred_probe_work_func
       process_one_work
       worker_thread
       kthread
       ret_from_fork
other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:
       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&bus->mdio_lock);
                               lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock);
                               lock(&bus->mdio_lock);
  lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
5 locks held by kworker/u4:3/609:
 #0: ffff000002842938 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work
 #1: ffff80000bacbd60 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work
 #2: ffff000007645178 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __device_attach
 #3: ffff8000096e6e78 (dsa2_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dsa_register_switch
 #4: ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 609 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 5.15.71 #1
Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace
 show_stack
 dump_stack_lvl
 dump_stack
 print_circular_bug
 check_noncircular
 __lock_acquire
 lock_acquire.part.0
 lock_acquire
 __mutex_lock
 mutex_lock_nested
 regmap_lock_mutex
 regmap_read
 lan9303_phy_read
 dsa_slave_phy_read
 __mdiobus_read
 mdiobus_read
 get_phy_device
 mdiobus_scan
 __mdiobus_register
 dsa_register_switch
 lan9303_probe
 lan9303_mdio_probe
...

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: dc70058 ("net: dsa: LAN9303: add MDIO managed mode support")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231027065741.534971-1-alexander.sverdlin@siemens.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
sj-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 28, 2023
commit 5a22fbc upstream.

When LAN9303 is MDIO-connected two callchains exist into
mdio->bus->write():

1. switch ports 1&2 ("physical" PHYs):

virtual (switch-internal) MDIO bus (lan9303_switch_ops->phy_{read|write})->
  lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write} -> mdiobus_{read|write}_nested

2. LAN9303 virtual PHY:

virtual MDIO bus (lan9303_phy_{read|write}) ->
  lan9303_virt_phy_reg_{read|write} -> regmap -> lan9303_mdio_{read|write}

If the latter functions just take
mutex_lock(&sw_dev->device->bus->mdio_lock) it triggers a LOCKDEP
false-positive splat. It's false-positive because the first
mdio_lock in the second callchain above belongs to virtual MDIO bus, the
second mdio_lock belongs to physical MDIO bus.

Consequent annotation in lan9303_mdio_{read|write} as nested lock
(similar to lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write}, it's the same physical MDIO bus)
prevents the following splat:

WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.15.71 #1 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
kworker/u4:3/609 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff000011531c68 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: regmap_lock_mutex
but task is already holding lock:
ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       lock_acquire
       __mutex_lock
       mutex_lock_nested
       lan9303_mdio_read
       _regmap_read
       regmap_read
       lan9303_probe
       lan9303_mdio_probe
       mdio_probe
       really_probe
       __driver_probe_device
       driver_probe_device
       __device_attach_driver
       bus_for_each_drv
       __device_attach
       device_initial_probe
       bus_probe_device
       deferred_probe_work_func
       process_one_work
       worker_thread
       kthread
       ret_from_fork
-> #0 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       __lock_acquire
       lock_acquire.part.0
       lock_acquire
       __mutex_lock
       mutex_lock_nested
       regmap_lock_mutex
       regmap_read
       lan9303_phy_read
       dsa_slave_phy_read
       __mdiobus_read
       mdiobus_read
       get_phy_device
       mdiobus_scan
       __mdiobus_register
       dsa_register_switch
       lan9303_probe
       lan9303_mdio_probe
       mdio_probe
       really_probe
       __driver_probe_device
       driver_probe_device
       __device_attach_driver
       bus_for_each_drv
       __device_attach
       device_initial_probe
       bus_probe_device
       deferred_probe_work_func
       process_one_work
       worker_thread
       kthread
       ret_from_fork
other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:
       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&bus->mdio_lock);
                               lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock);
                               lock(&bus->mdio_lock);
  lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
5 locks held by kworker/u4:3/609:
 #0: ffff000002842938 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work
 #1: ffff80000bacbd60 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work
 #2: ffff000007645178 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __device_attach
 #3: ffff8000096e6e78 (dsa2_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dsa_register_switch
 #4: ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 609 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 5.15.71 #1
Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace
 show_stack
 dump_stack_lvl
 dump_stack
 print_circular_bug
 check_noncircular
 __lock_acquire
 lock_acquire.part.0
 lock_acquire
 __mutex_lock
 mutex_lock_nested
 regmap_lock_mutex
 regmap_read
 lan9303_phy_read
 dsa_slave_phy_read
 __mdiobus_read
 mdiobus_read
 get_phy_device
 mdiobus_scan
 __mdiobus_register
 dsa_register_switch
 lan9303_probe
 lan9303_mdio_probe
...

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: dc70058 ("net: dsa: LAN9303: add MDIO managed mode support")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231027065741.534971-1-alexander.sverdlin@siemens.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
sj-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 28, 2023
commit 5a22fbc upstream.

When LAN9303 is MDIO-connected two callchains exist into
mdio->bus->write():

1. switch ports 1&2 ("physical" PHYs):

virtual (switch-internal) MDIO bus (lan9303_switch_ops->phy_{read|write})->
  lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write} -> mdiobus_{read|write}_nested

2. LAN9303 virtual PHY:

virtual MDIO bus (lan9303_phy_{read|write}) ->
  lan9303_virt_phy_reg_{read|write} -> regmap -> lan9303_mdio_{read|write}

If the latter functions just take
mutex_lock(&sw_dev->device->bus->mdio_lock) it triggers a LOCKDEP
false-positive splat. It's false-positive because the first
mdio_lock in the second callchain above belongs to virtual MDIO bus, the
second mdio_lock belongs to physical MDIO bus.

Consequent annotation in lan9303_mdio_{read|write} as nested lock
(similar to lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write}, it's the same physical MDIO bus)
prevents the following splat:

WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.15.71 #1 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
kworker/u4:3/609 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff000011531c68 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: regmap_lock_mutex
but task is already holding lock:
ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       lock_acquire
       __mutex_lock
       mutex_lock_nested
       lan9303_mdio_read
       _regmap_read
       regmap_read
       lan9303_probe
       lan9303_mdio_probe
       mdio_probe
       really_probe
       __driver_probe_device
       driver_probe_device
       __device_attach_driver
       bus_for_each_drv
       __device_attach
       device_initial_probe
       bus_probe_device
       deferred_probe_work_func
       process_one_work
       worker_thread
       kthread
       ret_from_fork
-> #0 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       __lock_acquire
       lock_acquire.part.0
       lock_acquire
       __mutex_lock
       mutex_lock_nested
       regmap_lock_mutex
       regmap_read
       lan9303_phy_read
       dsa_slave_phy_read
       __mdiobus_read
       mdiobus_read
       get_phy_device
       mdiobus_scan
       __mdiobus_register
       dsa_register_switch
       lan9303_probe
       lan9303_mdio_probe
       mdio_probe
       really_probe
       __driver_probe_device
       driver_probe_device
       __device_attach_driver
       bus_for_each_drv
       __device_attach
       device_initial_probe
       bus_probe_device
       deferred_probe_work_func
       process_one_work
       worker_thread
       kthread
       ret_from_fork
other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:
       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&bus->mdio_lock);
                               lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock);
                               lock(&bus->mdio_lock);
  lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
5 locks held by kworker/u4:3/609:
 #0: ffff000002842938 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work
 #1: ffff80000bacbd60 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work
 #2: ffff000007645178 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __device_attach
 #3: ffff8000096e6e78 (dsa2_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dsa_register_switch
 #4: ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 609 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 5.15.71 #1
Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace
 show_stack
 dump_stack_lvl
 dump_stack
 print_circular_bug
 check_noncircular
 __lock_acquire
 lock_acquire.part.0
 lock_acquire
 __mutex_lock
 mutex_lock_nested
 regmap_lock_mutex
 regmap_read
 lan9303_phy_read
 dsa_slave_phy_read
 __mdiobus_read
 mdiobus_read
 get_phy_device
 mdiobus_scan
 __mdiobus_register
 dsa_register_switch
 lan9303_probe
 lan9303_mdio_probe
...

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: dc70058 ("net: dsa: LAN9303: add MDIO managed mode support")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231027065741.534971-1-alexander.sverdlin@siemens.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
sj-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 28, 2023
commit 5a22fbc upstream.

When LAN9303 is MDIO-connected two callchains exist into
mdio->bus->write():

1. switch ports 1&2 ("physical" PHYs):

virtual (switch-internal) MDIO bus (lan9303_switch_ops->phy_{read|write})->
  lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write} -> mdiobus_{read|write}_nested

2. LAN9303 virtual PHY:

virtual MDIO bus (lan9303_phy_{read|write}) ->
  lan9303_virt_phy_reg_{read|write} -> regmap -> lan9303_mdio_{read|write}

If the latter functions just take
mutex_lock(&sw_dev->device->bus->mdio_lock) it triggers a LOCKDEP
false-positive splat. It's false-positive because the first
mdio_lock in the second callchain above belongs to virtual MDIO bus, the
second mdio_lock belongs to physical MDIO bus.

Consequent annotation in lan9303_mdio_{read|write} as nested lock
(similar to lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write}, it's the same physical MDIO bus)
prevents the following splat:

WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.15.71 #1 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
kworker/u4:3/609 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff000011531c68 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: regmap_lock_mutex
but task is already holding lock:
ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       lock_acquire
       __mutex_lock
       mutex_lock_nested
       lan9303_mdio_read
       _regmap_read
       regmap_read
       lan9303_probe
       lan9303_mdio_probe
       mdio_probe
       really_probe
       __driver_probe_device
       driver_probe_device
       __device_attach_driver
       bus_for_each_drv
       __device_attach
       device_initial_probe
       bus_probe_device
       deferred_probe_work_func
       process_one_work
       worker_thread
       kthread
       ret_from_fork
-> #0 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       __lock_acquire
       lock_acquire.part.0
       lock_acquire
       __mutex_lock
       mutex_lock_nested
       regmap_lock_mutex
       regmap_read
       lan9303_phy_read
       dsa_slave_phy_read
       __mdiobus_read
       mdiobus_read
       get_phy_device
       mdiobus_scan
       __mdiobus_register
       dsa_register_switch
       lan9303_probe
       lan9303_mdio_probe
       mdio_probe
       really_probe
       __driver_probe_device
       driver_probe_device
       __device_attach_driver
       bus_for_each_drv
       __device_attach
       device_initial_probe
       bus_probe_device
       deferred_probe_work_func
       process_one_work
       worker_thread
       kthread
       ret_from_fork
other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:
       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&bus->mdio_lock);
                               lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock);
                               lock(&bus->mdio_lock);
  lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
5 locks held by kworker/u4:3/609:
 #0: ffff000002842938 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work
 #1: ffff80000bacbd60 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work
 #2: ffff000007645178 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __device_attach
 #3: ffff8000096e6e78 (dsa2_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dsa_register_switch
 #4: ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 609 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 5.15.71 #1
Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace
 show_stack
 dump_stack_lvl
 dump_stack
 print_circular_bug
 check_noncircular
 __lock_acquire
 lock_acquire.part.0
 lock_acquire
 __mutex_lock
 mutex_lock_nested
 regmap_lock_mutex
 regmap_read
 lan9303_phy_read
 dsa_slave_phy_read
 __mdiobus_read
 mdiobus_read
 get_phy_device
 mdiobus_scan
 __mdiobus_register
 dsa_register_switch
 lan9303_probe
 lan9303_mdio_probe
...

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: dc70058 ("net: dsa: LAN9303: add MDIO managed mode support")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231027065741.534971-1-alexander.sverdlin@siemens.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
sj-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 28, 2023
commit 5a22fbc upstream.

When LAN9303 is MDIO-connected two callchains exist into
mdio->bus->write():

1. switch ports 1&2 ("physical" PHYs):

virtual (switch-internal) MDIO bus (lan9303_switch_ops->phy_{read|write})->
  lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write} -> mdiobus_{read|write}_nested

2. LAN9303 virtual PHY:

virtual MDIO bus (lan9303_phy_{read|write}) ->
  lan9303_virt_phy_reg_{read|write} -> regmap -> lan9303_mdio_{read|write}

If the latter functions just take
mutex_lock(&sw_dev->device->bus->mdio_lock) it triggers a LOCKDEP
false-positive splat. It's false-positive because the first
mdio_lock in the second callchain above belongs to virtual MDIO bus, the
second mdio_lock belongs to physical MDIO bus.

Consequent annotation in lan9303_mdio_{read|write} as nested lock
(similar to lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write}, it's the same physical MDIO bus)
prevents the following splat:

WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.15.71 #1 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
kworker/u4:3/609 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff000011531c68 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: regmap_lock_mutex
but task is already holding lock:
ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       lock_acquire
       __mutex_lock
       mutex_lock_nested
       lan9303_mdio_read
       _regmap_read
       regmap_read
       lan9303_probe
       lan9303_mdio_probe
       mdio_probe
       really_probe
       __driver_probe_device
       driver_probe_device
       __device_attach_driver
       bus_for_each_drv
       __device_attach
       device_initial_probe
       bus_probe_device
       deferred_probe_work_func
       process_one_work
       worker_thread
       kthread
       ret_from_fork
-> #0 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       __lock_acquire
       lock_acquire.part.0
       lock_acquire
       __mutex_lock
       mutex_lock_nested
       regmap_lock_mutex
       regmap_read
       lan9303_phy_read
       dsa_slave_phy_read
       __mdiobus_read
       mdiobus_read
       get_phy_device
       mdiobus_scan
       __mdiobus_register
       dsa_register_switch
       lan9303_probe
       lan9303_mdio_probe
       mdio_probe
       really_probe
       __driver_probe_device
       driver_probe_device
       __device_attach_driver
       bus_for_each_drv
       __device_attach
       device_initial_probe
       bus_probe_device
       deferred_probe_work_func
       process_one_work
       worker_thread
       kthread
       ret_from_fork
other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:
       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&bus->mdio_lock);
                               lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock);
                               lock(&bus->mdio_lock);
  lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
5 locks held by kworker/u4:3/609:
 #0: ffff000002842938 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work
 #1: ffff80000bacbd60 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work
 #2: ffff000007645178 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __device_attach
 #3: ffff8000096e6e78 (dsa2_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dsa_register_switch
 #4: ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 609 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 5.15.71 #1
Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace
 show_stack
 dump_stack_lvl
 dump_stack
 print_circular_bug
 check_noncircular
 __lock_acquire
 lock_acquire.part.0
 lock_acquire
 __mutex_lock
 mutex_lock_nested
 regmap_lock_mutex
 regmap_read
 lan9303_phy_read
 dsa_slave_phy_read
 __mdiobus_read
 mdiobus_read
 get_phy_device
 mdiobus_scan
 __mdiobus_register
 dsa_register_switch
 lan9303_probe
 lan9303_mdio_probe
...

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: dc70058 ("net: dsa: LAN9303: add MDIO managed mode support")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231027065741.534971-1-alexander.sverdlin@siemens.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
sj-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 28, 2023
commit 5a22fbc upstream.

When LAN9303 is MDIO-connected two callchains exist into
mdio->bus->write():

1. switch ports 1&2 ("physical" PHYs):

virtual (switch-internal) MDIO bus (lan9303_switch_ops->phy_{read|write})->
  lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write} -> mdiobus_{read|write}_nested

2. LAN9303 virtual PHY:

virtual MDIO bus (lan9303_phy_{read|write}) ->
  lan9303_virt_phy_reg_{read|write} -> regmap -> lan9303_mdio_{read|write}

If the latter functions just take
mutex_lock(&sw_dev->device->bus->mdio_lock) it triggers a LOCKDEP
false-positive splat. It's false-positive because the first
mdio_lock in the second callchain above belongs to virtual MDIO bus, the
second mdio_lock belongs to physical MDIO bus.

Consequent annotation in lan9303_mdio_{read|write} as nested lock
(similar to lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write}, it's the same physical MDIO bus)
prevents the following splat:

WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.15.71 #1 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
kworker/u4:3/609 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff000011531c68 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: regmap_lock_mutex
but task is already holding lock:
ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       lock_acquire
       __mutex_lock
       mutex_lock_nested
       lan9303_mdio_read
       _regmap_read
       regmap_read
       lan9303_probe
       lan9303_mdio_probe
       mdio_probe
       really_probe
       __driver_probe_device
       driver_probe_device
       __device_attach_driver
       bus_for_each_drv
       __device_attach
       device_initial_probe
       bus_probe_device
       deferred_probe_work_func
       process_one_work
       worker_thread
       kthread
       ret_from_fork
-> #0 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       __lock_acquire
       lock_acquire.part.0
       lock_acquire
       __mutex_lock
       mutex_lock_nested
       regmap_lock_mutex
       regmap_read
       lan9303_phy_read
       dsa_slave_phy_read
       __mdiobus_read
       mdiobus_read
       get_phy_device
       mdiobus_scan
       __mdiobus_register
       dsa_register_switch
       lan9303_probe
       lan9303_mdio_probe
       mdio_probe
       really_probe
       __driver_probe_device
       driver_probe_device
       __device_attach_driver
       bus_for_each_drv
       __device_attach
       device_initial_probe
       bus_probe_device
       deferred_probe_work_func
       process_one_work
       worker_thread
       kthread
       ret_from_fork
other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:
       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&bus->mdio_lock);
                               lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock);
                               lock(&bus->mdio_lock);
  lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
5 locks held by kworker/u4:3/609:
 #0: ffff000002842938 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work
 #1: ffff80000bacbd60 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work
 #2: ffff000007645178 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __device_attach
 #3: ffff8000096e6e78 (dsa2_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dsa_register_switch
 #4: ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 609 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 5.15.71 #1
Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace
 show_stack
 dump_stack_lvl
 dump_stack
 print_circular_bug
 check_noncircular
 __lock_acquire
 lock_acquire.part.0
 lock_acquire
 __mutex_lock
 mutex_lock_nested
 regmap_lock_mutex
 regmap_read
 lan9303_phy_read
 dsa_slave_phy_read
 __mdiobus_read
 mdiobus_read
 get_phy_device
 mdiobus_scan
 __mdiobus_register
 dsa_register_switch
 lan9303_probe
 lan9303_mdio_probe
...

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: dc70058 ("net: dsa: LAN9303: add MDIO managed mode support")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231027065741.534971-1-alexander.sverdlin@siemens.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
sj-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 28, 2023
…f-times'

Eduard Zingerman says:

====================
verify callbacks as if they are called unknown number of times

This series updates verifier logic for callback functions handling.
Current master simulates callback body execution exactly once,
which leads to verifier not detecting unsafe programs like below:

    static int unsafe_on_zero_iter_cb(__u32 idx, struct num_context *ctx)
    {
        ctx->i = 0;
        return 0;
    }

    SEC("?raw_tp")
    int unsafe_on_zero_iter(void *unused)
    {
        struct num_context loop_ctx = { .i = 32 };
        __u8 choice_arr[2] = { 0, 1 };

        bpf_loop(100, unsafe_on_zero_iter_cb, &loop_ctx, 0);
        return choice_arr[loop_ctx.i];
    }

This was reported previously in [0].
The basic idea of the fix is to schedule callback entry state for
verification in env->head until some identical, previously visited
state in current DFS state traversal is found. Same logic as with open
coded iterators, and builds on top recent fixes [1] for those.

The series is structured as follows:
- patches #1,2,3 update strobemeta, xdp_synproxy selftests and
  bpf_loop_bench benchmark to allow convergence of the bpf_loop
  callback states;
- patches #4,5 just shuffle the code a bit;
- patch gregkh#6 is the main part of the series;
- patch gregkh#7 adds test cases for gregkh#6;
- patch gregkh#8 extend patch gregkh#6 with same speculative scalar widening
  logic, as used for open coded iterators;
- patch gregkh#9 adds test cases for gregkh#8;
- patch gregkh#10 extends patch gregkh#6 to track maximal number of callback
  executions specifically for bpf_loop();
- patch gregkh#11 adds test cases for gregkh#10.

Veristat results comparing this series to master+patches #1,2,3 using selftests
show the following difference:

File                       Program        States (A)  States (B)  States (DIFF)
-------------------------  -------------  ----------  ----------  -------------
bpf_loop_bench.bpf.o       benchmark               1           2  +1 (+100.00%)
pyperf600_bpf_loop.bpf.o   on_event              322         407  +85 (+26.40%)
strobemeta_bpf_loop.bpf.o  on_event              113         151  +38 (+33.63%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.o    syncookie_tc          341         291  -50 (-14.66%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.o    syncookie_xdp         344         301  -43 (-12.50%)

Veristat results comparing this series to master using Tetragon BPF
files [2] also show some differences.
States diff varies from +2% to +15% on 23 programs out of 186,
no new failures.

Changelog:
- V3 [5] -> V4, changes suggested by Andrii:
  - validate mark_chain_precision() result in patch gregkh#10;
  - renaming s/cumulative_callback_depth/callback_unroll_depth/.
- V2 [4] -> V3:
  - fixes in expected log messages for test cases:
    - callback_result_precise;
    - parent_callee_saved_reg_precise_with_callback;
    - parent_stack_slot_precise_with_callback;
  - renamings (suggested by Alexei):
    - s/callback_iter_depth/cumulative_callback_depth/
    - s/is_callback_iter_next/calls_callback/
    - s/mark_callback_iter_next/mark_calls_callback/
  - prepare_func_exit() updated to exit with -EFAULT when
    callee->in_callback_fn is true but calls_callback() is not true
    for callsite;
  - test case 'bpf_loop_iter_limit_nested' rewritten to use return
    value check instead of verifier log message checks
    (suggested by Alexei).
- V1 [3] -> V2, changes suggested by Andrii:
  - small changes for error handling code in __check_func_call();
  - callback body processing log is now matched in relevant
    verifier_subprog_precision.c tests;
  - R1 passed to bpf_loop() is now always marked as precise;
  - log level 2 message for bpf_loop() iteration termination instead of
    iteration depth messages;
  - __no_msg macro removed;
  - bpf_loop_iter_limit_nested updated to avoid using __no_msg;
  - commit message for patch #3 updated according to Alexei's request.

[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CA+vRuzPChFNXmouzGG+wsy=6eMcfr1mFG0F3g7rbg-sedGKW3w@mail.gmail.com/
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231024000917.12153-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/
[2] git@github.com:cilium/tetragon.git
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231116021803.9982-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/T/#t
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231118013355.7943-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/T/#t
[5] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231120225945.11741-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/T/#t
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231121020701.26440-1-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
shaoyingxu pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 28, 2023
…oles on aarch64

offline_pages() properly checks for memory holes and bails out.
However, we do a page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) before calling
offline_pages() when offlining a memory block.

We should not unconditionally call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) on
aarch64 in offlining code, otherwise we can trigger a BUG when hitting a
memory hole:

   kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1383!
   Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
   Modules linked in: loop processor efivarfs ip_tables x_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_mod igb nvme i2c_algo_bit mlx5_core i2c_core nvme_core firmware_class
   CPU: 13 PID: 1694 Comm: ranbug Not tainted 5.12.0-next-20210524+ #4
   Hardware name: MiTAC RAPTOR EV-883832-X3-0001/RAPTOR, BIOS 1.6 06/28/2020
   pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
   pc : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   lr : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   Call trace:
     memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
     device_offline+0x154/0x1d8
     online_store+0xa4/0x118
     dev_attr_store+0x44/0x78
     sysfs_kf_write+0xe8/0x138
     kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x26c/0x3d0
     new_sync_write+0x2bc/0x4f8
     vfs_write+0x718/0xc88
     ksys_write+0xf8/0x1e0
     __arm64_sys_write+0x74/0xa8
     invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e8
     do_el0_svc+0xe4/0x298
     el0_svc+0x20/0x30
     el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8
     el0_sync+0x178/0x180
   Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception
   SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
   Kernel Offset: disabled
   CPU features: 0x00000251,20000846
   Memory Limit: none

If nr_vmemmap_pages is set, we know that we are dealing with hotplugged
memory that doesn't have any holes.  So call
page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) only when really necessary -- when
nr_vmemmap_pages is set and we actually adjust the present pages.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210526075226.5572-1-david@redhat.com
Fixes: a08a2ae ("mm,memory_hotplug: allocate memmap from the added memory range")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Qian Cai (QUIC) <quic_qiancai@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9281305)
sj-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 29, 2023
commit 5a22fbc upstream.

When LAN9303 is MDIO-connected two callchains exist into
mdio->bus->write():

1. switch ports 1&2 ("physical" PHYs):

virtual (switch-internal) MDIO bus (lan9303_switch_ops->phy_{read|write})->
  lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write} -> mdiobus_{read|write}_nested

2. LAN9303 virtual PHY:

virtual MDIO bus (lan9303_phy_{read|write}) ->
  lan9303_virt_phy_reg_{read|write} -> regmap -> lan9303_mdio_{read|write}

If the latter functions just take
mutex_lock(&sw_dev->device->bus->mdio_lock) it triggers a LOCKDEP
false-positive splat. It's false-positive because the first
mdio_lock in the second callchain above belongs to virtual MDIO bus, the
second mdio_lock belongs to physical MDIO bus.

Consequent annotation in lan9303_mdio_{read|write} as nested lock
(similar to lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write}, it's the same physical MDIO bus)
prevents the following splat:

WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.15.71 #1 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
kworker/u4:3/609 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff000011531c68 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: regmap_lock_mutex
but task is already holding lock:
ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       lock_acquire
       __mutex_lock
       mutex_lock_nested
       lan9303_mdio_read
       _regmap_read
       regmap_read
       lan9303_probe
       lan9303_mdio_probe
       mdio_probe
       really_probe
       __driver_probe_device
       driver_probe_device
       __device_attach_driver
       bus_for_each_drv
       __device_attach
       device_initial_probe
       bus_probe_device
       deferred_probe_work_func
       process_one_work
       worker_thread
       kthread
       ret_from_fork
-> #0 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       __lock_acquire
       lock_acquire.part.0
       lock_acquire
       __mutex_lock
       mutex_lock_nested
       regmap_lock_mutex
       regmap_read
       lan9303_phy_read
       dsa_slave_phy_read
       __mdiobus_read
       mdiobus_read
       get_phy_device
       mdiobus_scan
       __mdiobus_register
       dsa_register_switch
       lan9303_probe
       lan9303_mdio_probe
       mdio_probe
       really_probe
       __driver_probe_device
       driver_probe_device
       __device_attach_driver
       bus_for_each_drv
       __device_attach
       device_initial_probe
       bus_probe_device
       deferred_probe_work_func
       process_one_work
       worker_thread
       kthread
       ret_from_fork
other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:
       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&bus->mdio_lock);
                               lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock);
                               lock(&bus->mdio_lock);
  lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
5 locks held by kworker/u4:3/609:
 #0: ffff000002842938 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work
 #1: ffff80000bacbd60 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work
 #2: ffff000007645178 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __device_attach
 #3: ffff8000096e6e78 (dsa2_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dsa_register_switch
 #4: ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 609 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 5.15.71 #1
Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace
 show_stack
 dump_stack_lvl
 dump_stack
 print_circular_bug
 check_noncircular
 __lock_acquire
 lock_acquire.part.0
 lock_acquire
 __mutex_lock
 mutex_lock_nested
 regmap_lock_mutex
 regmap_read
 lan9303_phy_read
 dsa_slave_phy_read
 __mdiobus_read
 mdiobus_read
 get_phy_device
 mdiobus_scan
 __mdiobus_register
 dsa_register_switch
 lan9303_probe
 lan9303_mdio_probe
...

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: dc70058 ("net: dsa: LAN9303: add MDIO managed mode support")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231027065741.534971-1-alexander.sverdlin@siemens.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
sj-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 29, 2023
commit 5a22fbc upstream.

When LAN9303 is MDIO-connected two callchains exist into
mdio->bus->write():

1. switch ports 1&2 ("physical" PHYs):

virtual (switch-internal) MDIO bus (lan9303_switch_ops->phy_{read|write})->
  lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write} -> mdiobus_{read|write}_nested

2. LAN9303 virtual PHY:

virtual MDIO bus (lan9303_phy_{read|write}) ->
  lan9303_virt_phy_reg_{read|write} -> regmap -> lan9303_mdio_{read|write}

If the latter functions just take
mutex_lock(&sw_dev->device->bus->mdio_lock) it triggers a LOCKDEP
false-positive splat. It's false-positive because the first
mdio_lock in the second callchain above belongs to virtual MDIO bus, the
second mdio_lock belongs to physical MDIO bus.

Consequent annotation in lan9303_mdio_{read|write} as nested lock
(similar to lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write}, it's the same physical MDIO bus)
prevents the following splat:

WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.15.71 #1 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
kworker/u4:3/609 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff000011531c68 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: regmap_lock_mutex
but task is already holding lock:
ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       lock_acquire
       __mutex_lock
       mutex_lock_nested
       lan9303_mdio_read
       _regmap_read
       regmap_read
       lan9303_probe
       lan9303_mdio_probe
       mdio_probe
       really_probe
       __driver_probe_device
       driver_probe_device
       __device_attach_driver
       bus_for_each_drv
       __device_attach
       device_initial_probe
       bus_probe_device
       deferred_probe_work_func
       process_one_work
       worker_thread
       kthread
       ret_from_fork
-> #0 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       __lock_acquire
       lock_acquire.part.0
       lock_acquire
       __mutex_lock
       mutex_lock_nested
       regmap_lock_mutex
       regmap_read
       lan9303_phy_read
       dsa_slave_phy_read
       __mdiobus_read
       mdiobus_read
       get_phy_device
       mdiobus_scan
       __mdiobus_register
       dsa_register_switch
       lan9303_probe
       lan9303_mdio_probe
       mdio_probe
       really_probe
       __driver_probe_device
       driver_probe_device
       __device_attach_driver
       bus_for_each_drv
       __device_attach
       device_initial_probe
       bus_probe_device
       deferred_probe_work_func
       process_one_work
       worker_thread
       kthread
       ret_from_fork
other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:
       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&bus->mdio_lock);
                               lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock);
                               lock(&bus->mdio_lock);
  lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
5 locks held by kworker/u4:3/609:
 #0: ffff000002842938 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work
 #1: ffff80000bacbd60 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work
 #2: ffff000007645178 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __device_attach
 #3: ffff8000096e6e78 (dsa2_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dsa_register_switch
 #4: ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 609 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 5.15.71 #1
Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace
 show_stack
 dump_stack_lvl
 dump_stack
 print_circular_bug
 check_noncircular
 __lock_acquire
 lock_acquire.part.0
 lock_acquire
 __mutex_lock
 mutex_lock_nested
 regmap_lock_mutex
 regmap_read
 lan9303_phy_read
 dsa_slave_phy_read
 __mdiobus_read
 mdiobus_read
 get_phy_device
 mdiobus_scan
 __mdiobus_register
 dsa_register_switch
 lan9303_probe
 lan9303_mdio_probe
...

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: dc70058 ("net: dsa: LAN9303: add MDIO managed mode support")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231027065741.534971-1-alexander.sverdlin@siemens.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
paniakin-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 29, 2023
…oles on aarch64

offline_pages() properly checks for memory holes and bails out.
However, we do a page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) before calling
offline_pages() when offlining a memory block.

We should not unconditionally call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) on
aarch64 in offlining code, otherwise we can trigger a BUG when hitting a
memory hole:

   kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1383!
   Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
   Modules linked in: loop processor efivarfs ip_tables x_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_mod igb nvme i2c_algo_bit mlx5_core i2c_core nvme_core firmware_class
   CPU: 13 PID: 1694 Comm: ranbug Not tainted 5.12.0-next-20210524+ #4
   Hardware name: MiTAC RAPTOR EV-883832-X3-0001/RAPTOR, BIOS 1.6 06/28/2020
   pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
   pc : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   lr : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   Call trace:
     memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
     device_offline+0x154/0x1d8
     online_store+0xa4/0x118
     dev_attr_store+0x44/0x78
     sysfs_kf_write+0xe8/0x138
     kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x26c/0x3d0
     new_sync_write+0x2bc/0x4f8
     vfs_write+0x718/0xc88
     ksys_write+0xf8/0x1e0
     __arm64_sys_write+0x74/0xa8
     invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e8
     do_el0_svc+0xe4/0x298
     el0_svc+0x20/0x30
     el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8
     el0_sync+0x178/0x180
   Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception
   SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
   Kernel Offset: disabled
   CPU features: 0x00000251,20000846
   Memory Limit: none

If nr_vmemmap_pages is set, we know that we are dealing with hotplugged
memory that doesn't have any holes.  So call
page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) only when really necessary -- when
nr_vmemmap_pages is set and we actually adjust the present pages.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210526075226.5572-1-david@redhat.com
Fixes: a08a2ae ("mm,memory_hotplug: allocate memmap from the added memory range")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Qian Cai (QUIC) <quic_qiancai@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9281305)
sj-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 3, 2023
When scanning namespaces, it is possible to get valid data from the first
call to nvme_identify_ns() in nvme_alloc_ns(), but not from the second
call in nvme_update_ns_info_block().  In particular, if the NSID becomes
inactive between the two commands, a storage device may return a buffer
filled with zero as per 4.1.5.1.  In this case, we can get a kernel crash
due to a divide-by-zero in blk_stack_limits() because ns->lba_shift will
be set to zero.

PID: 326      TASK: ffff95fec3cd8000  CPU: 29   COMMAND: "kworker/u98:10"
 #0 [ffffad8f8702f9e0] machine_kexec at ffffffff91c76ec7
 #1 [ffffad8f8702fa38] __crash_kexec at ffffffff91dea4fa
 #2 [ffffad8f8702faf8] crash_kexec at ffffffff91deb788
 #3 [ffffad8f8702fb00] oops_end at ffffffff91c2e4bb
 #4 [ffffad8f8702fb20] do_trap at ffffffff91c2a4ce
 #5 [ffffad8f8702fb70] do_error_trap at ffffffff91c2a595
 gregkh#6 [ffffad8f8702fbb0] exc_divide_error at ffffffff928506e6
 gregkh#7 [ffffad8f8702fbd0] asm_exc_divide_error at ffffffff92a00926
    [exception RIP: blk_stack_limits+434]
    RIP: ffffffff92191872  RSP: ffffad8f8702fc80  RFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: ffff95efa0c91800  RCX: 0000000000000001
    RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: 0000000000000001  RDI: 0000000000000001
    RBP: 00000000ffffffff   R8: ffff95fec7df35a8   R9: 0000000000000000
    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000001  R12: 0000000000000000
    R13: 0000000000000000  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: ffff95fed33c09a8
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 gregkh#8 [ffffad8f8702fce0] nvme_update_ns_info_block at ffffffffc06d3533 [nvme_core]
 gregkh#9 [ffffad8f8702fd18] nvme_scan_ns at ffffffffc06d6fa7 [nvme_core]

This happened when the check for valid data was moved out of nvme_identify_ns()
into one of the callers.  Fix this by checking in both callers.

Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218186
Fixes: 0dd6fff ("nvme: bring back auto-removal of deleted namespaces during sequential scan")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ewan D. Milne <emilne@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
q2ven pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 5, 2023
…oles on aarch64

offline_pages() properly checks for memory holes and bails out.
However, we do a page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) before calling
offline_pages() when offlining a memory block.

We should not unconditionally call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) on
aarch64 in offlining code, otherwise we can trigger a BUG when hitting a
memory hole:

   kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1383!
   Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
   Modules linked in: loop processor efivarfs ip_tables x_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_mod igb nvme i2c_algo_bit mlx5_core i2c_core nvme_core firmware_class
   CPU: 13 PID: 1694 Comm: ranbug Not tainted 5.12.0-next-20210524+ #4
   Hardware name: MiTAC RAPTOR EV-883832-X3-0001/RAPTOR, BIOS 1.6 06/28/2020
   pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
   pc : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   lr : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   Call trace:
     memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
     device_offline+0x154/0x1d8
     online_store+0xa4/0x118
     dev_attr_store+0x44/0x78
     sysfs_kf_write+0xe8/0x138
     kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x26c/0x3d0
     new_sync_write+0x2bc/0x4f8
     vfs_write+0x718/0xc88
     ksys_write+0xf8/0x1e0
     __arm64_sys_write+0x74/0xa8
     invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e8
     do_el0_svc+0xe4/0x298
     el0_svc+0x20/0x30
     el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8
     el0_sync+0x178/0x180
   Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception
   SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
   Kernel Offset: disabled
   CPU features: 0x00000251,20000846
   Memory Limit: none

If nr_vmemmap_pages is set, we know that we are dealing with hotplugged
memory that doesn't have any holes.  So call
page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) only when really necessary -- when
nr_vmemmap_pages is set and we actually adjust the present pages.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210526075226.5572-1-david@redhat.com
Fixes: a08a2ae ("mm,memory_hotplug: allocate memmap from the added memory range")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Qian Cai (QUIC) <quic_qiancai@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9281305)
sj-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 8, 2023
commit d8b90d6 upstream.

When scanning namespaces, it is possible to get valid data from the first
call to nvme_identify_ns() in nvme_alloc_ns(), but not from the second
call in nvme_update_ns_info_block().  In particular, if the NSID becomes
inactive between the two commands, a storage device may return a buffer
filled with zero as per 4.1.5.1.  In this case, we can get a kernel crash
due to a divide-by-zero in blk_stack_limits() because ns->lba_shift will
be set to zero.

PID: 326      TASK: ffff95fec3cd8000  CPU: 29   COMMAND: "kworker/u98:10"
 #0 [ffffad8f8702f9e0] machine_kexec at ffffffff91c76ec7
 #1 [ffffad8f8702fa38] __crash_kexec at ffffffff91dea4fa
 #2 [ffffad8f8702faf8] crash_kexec at ffffffff91deb788
 #3 [ffffad8f8702fb00] oops_end at ffffffff91c2e4bb
 #4 [ffffad8f8702fb20] do_trap at ffffffff91c2a4ce
 #5 [ffffad8f8702fb70] do_error_trap at ffffffff91c2a595
 gregkh#6 [ffffad8f8702fbb0] exc_divide_error at ffffffff928506e6
 gregkh#7 [ffffad8f8702fbd0] asm_exc_divide_error at ffffffff92a00926
    [exception RIP: blk_stack_limits+434]
    RIP: ffffffff92191872  RSP: ffffad8f8702fc80  RFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: ffff95efa0c91800  RCX: 0000000000000001
    RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: 0000000000000001  RDI: 0000000000000001
    RBP: 00000000ffffffff   R8: ffff95fec7df35a8   R9: 0000000000000000
    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000001  R12: 0000000000000000
    R13: 0000000000000000  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: ffff95fed33c09a8
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 gregkh#8 [ffffad8f8702fce0] nvme_update_ns_info_block at ffffffffc06d3533 [nvme_core]
 gregkh#9 [ffffad8f8702fd18] nvme_scan_ns at ffffffffc06d6fa7 [nvme_core]

This happened when the check for valid data was moved out of nvme_identify_ns()
into one of the callers.  Fix this by checking in both callers.

Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218186
Fixes: 0dd6fff ("nvme: bring back auto-removal of deleted namespaces during sequential scan")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ewan D. Milne <emilne@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
sj-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 8, 2023
commit d8b90d6 upstream.

When scanning namespaces, it is possible to get valid data from the first
call to nvme_identify_ns() in nvme_alloc_ns(), but not from the second
call in nvme_update_ns_info_block().  In particular, if the NSID becomes
inactive between the two commands, a storage device may return a buffer
filled with zero as per 4.1.5.1.  In this case, we can get a kernel crash
due to a divide-by-zero in blk_stack_limits() because ns->lba_shift will
be set to zero.

PID: 326      TASK: ffff95fec3cd8000  CPU: 29   COMMAND: "kworker/u98:10"
 #0 [ffffad8f8702f9e0] machine_kexec at ffffffff91c76ec7
 #1 [ffffad8f8702fa38] __crash_kexec at ffffffff91dea4fa
 #2 [ffffad8f8702faf8] crash_kexec at ffffffff91deb788
 #3 [ffffad8f8702fb00] oops_end at ffffffff91c2e4bb
 #4 [ffffad8f8702fb20] do_trap at ffffffff91c2a4ce
 #5 [ffffad8f8702fb70] do_error_trap at ffffffff91c2a595
 gregkh#6 [ffffad8f8702fbb0] exc_divide_error at ffffffff928506e6
 gregkh#7 [ffffad8f8702fbd0] asm_exc_divide_error at ffffffff92a00926
    [exception RIP: blk_stack_limits+434]
    RIP: ffffffff92191872  RSP: ffffad8f8702fc80  RFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: ffff95efa0c91800  RCX: 0000000000000001
    RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: 0000000000000001  RDI: 0000000000000001
    RBP: 00000000ffffffff   R8: ffff95fec7df35a8   R9: 0000000000000000
    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000001  R12: 0000000000000000
    R13: 0000000000000000  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: ffff95fed33c09a8
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 gregkh#8 [ffffad8f8702fce0] nvme_update_ns_info_block at ffffffffc06d3533 [nvme_core]
 gregkh#9 [ffffad8f8702fd18] nvme_scan_ns at ffffffffc06d6fa7 [nvme_core]

This happened when the check for valid data was moved out of nvme_identify_ns()
into one of the callers.  Fix this by checking in both callers.

Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218186
Fixes: 0dd6fff ("nvme: bring back auto-removal of deleted namespaces during sequential scan")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ewan D. Milne <emilne@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
jaywang-amazon pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 9, 2025
…oles on aarch64

offline_pages() properly checks for memory holes and bails out.
However, we do a page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) before calling
offline_pages() when offlining a memory block.

We should not unconditionally call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) on
aarch64 in offlining code, otherwise we can trigger a BUG when hitting a
memory hole:

   kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1383!
   Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
   Modules linked in: loop processor efivarfs ip_tables x_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_mod igb nvme i2c_algo_bit mlx5_core i2c_core nvme_core firmware_class
   CPU: 13 PID: 1694 Comm: ranbug Not tainted 5.12.0-next-20210524+ #4
   Hardware name: MiTAC RAPTOR EV-883832-X3-0001/RAPTOR, BIOS 1.6 06/28/2020
   pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
   pc : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   lr : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   Call trace:
     memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
     device_offline+0x154/0x1d8
     online_store+0xa4/0x118
     dev_attr_store+0x44/0x78
     sysfs_kf_write+0xe8/0x138
     kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x26c/0x3d0
     new_sync_write+0x2bc/0x4f8
     vfs_write+0x718/0xc88
     ksys_write+0xf8/0x1e0
     __arm64_sys_write+0x74/0xa8
     invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e8
     do_el0_svc+0xe4/0x298
     el0_svc+0x20/0x30
     el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8
     el0_sync+0x178/0x180
   Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception
   SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
   Kernel Offset: disabled
   CPU features: 0x00000251,20000846
   Memory Limit: none

If nr_vmemmap_pages is set, we know that we are dealing with hotplugged
memory that doesn't have any holes.  So call
page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) only when really necessary -- when
nr_vmemmap_pages is set and we actually adjust the present pages.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210526075226.5572-1-david@redhat.com
Fixes: a08a2ae ("mm,memory_hotplug: allocate memmap from the added memory range")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Qian Cai (QUIC) <quic_qiancai@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9281305)
paniakin-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 9, 2025
…oles on aarch64

offline_pages() properly checks for memory holes and bails out.
However, we do a page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) before calling
offline_pages() when offlining a memory block.

We should not unconditionally call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) on
aarch64 in offlining code, otherwise we can trigger a BUG when hitting a
memory hole:

   kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1383!
   Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
   Modules linked in: loop processor efivarfs ip_tables x_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_mod igb nvme i2c_algo_bit mlx5_core i2c_core nvme_core firmware_class
   CPU: 13 PID: 1694 Comm: ranbug Not tainted 5.12.0-next-20210524+ #4
   Hardware name: MiTAC RAPTOR EV-883832-X3-0001/RAPTOR, BIOS 1.6 06/28/2020
   pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
   pc : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   lr : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   Call trace:
     memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
     device_offline+0x154/0x1d8
     online_store+0xa4/0x118
     dev_attr_store+0x44/0x78
     sysfs_kf_write+0xe8/0x138
     kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x26c/0x3d0
     new_sync_write+0x2bc/0x4f8
     vfs_write+0x718/0xc88
     ksys_write+0xf8/0x1e0
     __arm64_sys_write+0x74/0xa8
     invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e8
     do_el0_svc+0xe4/0x298
     el0_svc+0x20/0x30
     el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8
     el0_sync+0x178/0x180
   Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception
   SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
   Kernel Offset: disabled
   CPU features: 0x00000251,20000846
   Memory Limit: none

If nr_vmemmap_pages is set, we know that we are dealing with hotplugged
memory that doesn't have any holes.  So call
page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) only when really necessary -- when
nr_vmemmap_pages is set and we actually adjust the present pages.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210526075226.5572-1-david@redhat.com
Fixes: a08a2ae ("mm,memory_hotplug: allocate memmap from the added memory range")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Qian Cai (QUIC) <quic_qiancai@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9281305)
jaywang-amazon pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 9, 2025
…oles on aarch64

offline_pages() properly checks for memory holes and bails out.
However, we do a page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) before calling
offline_pages() when offlining a memory block.

We should not unconditionally call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) on
aarch64 in offlining code, otherwise we can trigger a BUG when hitting a
memory hole:

   kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1383!
   Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
   Modules linked in: loop processor efivarfs ip_tables x_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_mod igb nvme i2c_algo_bit mlx5_core i2c_core nvme_core firmware_class
   CPU: 13 PID: 1694 Comm: ranbug Not tainted 5.12.0-next-20210524+ #4
   Hardware name: MiTAC RAPTOR EV-883832-X3-0001/RAPTOR, BIOS 1.6 06/28/2020
   pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
   pc : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   lr : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   Call trace:
     memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
     device_offline+0x154/0x1d8
     online_store+0xa4/0x118
     dev_attr_store+0x44/0x78
     sysfs_kf_write+0xe8/0x138
     kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x26c/0x3d0
     new_sync_write+0x2bc/0x4f8
     vfs_write+0x718/0xc88
     ksys_write+0xf8/0x1e0
     __arm64_sys_write+0x74/0xa8
     invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e8
     do_el0_svc+0xe4/0x298
     el0_svc+0x20/0x30
     el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8
     el0_sync+0x178/0x180
   Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception
   SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
   Kernel Offset: disabled
   CPU features: 0x00000251,20000846
   Memory Limit: none

If nr_vmemmap_pages is set, we know that we are dealing with hotplugged
memory that doesn't have any holes.  So call
page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) only when really necessary -- when
nr_vmemmap_pages is set and we actually adjust the present pages.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210526075226.5572-1-david@redhat.com
Fixes: a08a2ae ("mm,memory_hotplug: allocate memmap from the added memory range")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Qian Cai (QUIC) <quic_qiancai@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9281305)
puranjaymohan pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 16, 2025
…oles on aarch64

offline_pages() properly checks for memory holes and bails out.
However, we do a page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) before calling
offline_pages() when offlining a memory block.

We should not unconditionally call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) on
aarch64 in offlining code, otherwise we can trigger a BUG when hitting a
memory hole:

   kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1383!
   Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
   Modules linked in: loop processor efivarfs ip_tables x_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_mod igb nvme i2c_algo_bit mlx5_core i2c_core nvme_core firmware_class
   CPU: 13 PID: 1694 Comm: ranbug Not tainted 5.12.0-next-20210524+ #4
   Hardware name: MiTAC RAPTOR EV-883832-X3-0001/RAPTOR, BIOS 1.6 06/28/2020
   pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
   pc : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   lr : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   Call trace:
     memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
     device_offline+0x154/0x1d8
     online_store+0xa4/0x118
     dev_attr_store+0x44/0x78
     sysfs_kf_write+0xe8/0x138
     kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x26c/0x3d0
     new_sync_write+0x2bc/0x4f8
     vfs_write+0x718/0xc88
     ksys_write+0xf8/0x1e0
     __arm64_sys_write+0x74/0xa8
     invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e8
     do_el0_svc+0xe4/0x298
     el0_svc+0x20/0x30
     el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8
     el0_sync+0x178/0x180
   Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception
   SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
   Kernel Offset: disabled
   CPU features: 0x00000251,20000846
   Memory Limit: none

If nr_vmemmap_pages is set, we know that we are dealing with hotplugged
memory that doesn't have any holes.  So call
page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) only when really necessary -- when
nr_vmemmap_pages is set and we actually adjust the present pages.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210526075226.5572-1-david@redhat.com
Fixes: a08a2ae ("mm,memory_hotplug: allocate memmap from the added memory range")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Qian Cai (QUIC) <quic_qiancai@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9281305)
heynemax pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 17, 2025
…oles on aarch64

offline_pages() properly checks for memory holes and bails out.
However, we do a page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) before calling
offline_pages() when offlining a memory block.

We should not unconditionally call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) on
aarch64 in offlining code, otherwise we can trigger a BUG when hitting a
memory hole:

   kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1383!
   Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
   Modules linked in: loop processor efivarfs ip_tables x_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_mod igb nvme i2c_algo_bit mlx5_core i2c_core nvme_core firmware_class
   CPU: 13 PID: 1694 Comm: ranbug Not tainted 5.12.0-next-20210524+ #4
   Hardware name: MiTAC RAPTOR EV-883832-X3-0001/RAPTOR, BIOS 1.6 06/28/2020
   pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
   pc : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   lr : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   Call trace:
     memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
     device_offline+0x154/0x1d8
     online_store+0xa4/0x118
     dev_attr_store+0x44/0x78
     sysfs_kf_write+0xe8/0x138
     kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x26c/0x3d0
     new_sync_write+0x2bc/0x4f8
     vfs_write+0x718/0xc88
     ksys_write+0xf8/0x1e0
     __arm64_sys_write+0x74/0xa8
     invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e8
     do_el0_svc+0xe4/0x298
     el0_svc+0x20/0x30
     el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8
     el0_sync+0x178/0x180
   Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception
   SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
   Kernel Offset: disabled
   CPU features: 0x00000251,20000846
   Memory Limit: none

If nr_vmemmap_pages is set, we know that we are dealing with hotplugged
memory that doesn't have any holes.  So call
page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) only when really necessary -- when
nr_vmemmap_pages is set and we actually adjust the present pages.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210526075226.5572-1-david@redhat.com
Fixes: a08a2ae ("mm,memory_hotplug: allocate memmap from the added memory range")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Qian Cai (QUIC) <quic_qiancai@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9281305)
paniakin-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 19, 2025
[ Upstream commit ee684de ]

As shown in [1], it is possible to corrupt a BPF ELF file such that
arbitrary BPF instructions are loaded by libbpf. This can be done by
setting a symbol (BPF program) section offset to a large (unsigned)
number such that <section start + symbol offset> overflows and points
before the section data in the memory.

Consider the situation below where:
- prog_start = sec_start + symbol_offset    <-- size_t overflow here
- prog_end   = prog_start + prog_size

    prog_start        sec_start        prog_end        sec_end
        |                |                 |              |
        v                v                 v              v
    .....................|################################|............

The report in [1] also provides a corrupted BPF ELF which can be used as
a reproducer:

    $ readelf -S crash
    Section Headers:
      [Nr] Name              Type             Address           Offset
           Size              EntSize          Flags  Link  Info  Align
    ...
      [ 2] uretprobe.mu[...] PROGBITS         0000000000000000  00000040
           0000000000000068  0000000000000000  AX       0     0     8

    $ readelf -s crash
    Symbol table '.symtab' contains 8 entries:
       Num:    Value          Size Type    Bind   Vis      Ndx Name
    ...
         6: ffffffffffffffb8   104 FUNC    GLOBAL DEFAULT    2 handle_tp

Here, the handle_tp prog has section offset ffffffffffffffb8, i.e. will
point before the actual memory where section 2 is allocated.

This is also reported by AddressSanitizer:

    =================================================================
    ==1232==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7c7302fe0000 at pc 0x7fc3046e4b77 bp 0x7ffe64677cd0 sp 0x7ffe64677490
    READ of size 104 at 0x7c7302fe0000 thread T0
        #0 0x7fc3046e4b76 in memcpy (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe4b76)
        #1 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__init_prog /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:856
        #2 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__add_programs /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:928
        #3 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__elf_collect /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3930
        #4 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object_open /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8067
        #5 0x00000040f176 in bpf_object__open_file /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8090
        gregkh#6 0x000000400c16 in main /poc/poc.c:8
        gregkh#7 0x7fc3043d25b4 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x35b4)
        gregkh#8 0x7fc3043d2667 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3667)
        gregkh#9 0x000000400b34 in _start (/poc/poc+0x400b34)

    0x7c7302fe0000 is located 64 bytes before 104-byte region [0x7c7302fe0040,0x7c7302fe00a8)
    allocated by thread T0 here:
        #0 0x7fc3046e716b in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe716b)
        #1 0x7fc3045ee600 in __libelf_set_rawdata_wrlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xb600)
        #2 0x7fc3045ef018 in __elf_getdata_rdlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xc018)
        #3 0x00000040642f in elf_sec_data /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3740

The problem here is that currently, libbpf only checks that the program
end is within the section bounds. There used to be a check
`while (sec_off < sec_sz)` in bpf_object__add_programs, however, it was
removed by commit 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program
sections to support overriden weak functions").

Add a check for detecting the overflow of `sec_off + prog_sz` to
bpf_object__init_prog to fix this issue.

[1] https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md

Fixes: 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions")
Reported-by: lmarch2 <2524158037@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
Link: https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250415155014.397603-1-vmalik@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
paniakin-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 19, 2025
commit c98cc97 upstream.

Running a modified trace-cmd record --nosplice where it does a mmap of the
ring buffer when '--nosplice' is set, caused the following lockdep splat:

 ======================================================
 WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
 6.15.0-rc7-test-00002-gfb7d03d8a82f #551 Not tainted
 ------------------------------------------------------
 trace-cmd/1113 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffff888100062888 (&buffer->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70

 but task is already holding lock:
 ffff888100a5f9f8 (&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ring_buffer_map+0xcf/0xe70

 which lock already depends on the new lock.

 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

 -> #5 (&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
        __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0
        ring_buffer_map+0xcf/0xe70
        tracing_buffers_mmap+0x1c4/0x3b0
        __mmap_region+0xd8d/0x1f70
        do_mmap+0x9d7/0x1010
        vm_mmap_pgoff+0x20b/0x390
        ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x2e9/0x440
        do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

 -> #4 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}:
        __might_fault+0xa5/0x110
        _copy_to_user+0x22/0x80
        _perf_ioctl+0x61b/0x1b70
        perf_ioctl+0x62/0x90
        __x64_sys_ioctl+0x134/0x190
        do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

 -> #3 (&cpuctx_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
        __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0
        perf_event_init_cpu+0x325/0x7c0
        perf_event_init+0x52a/0x5b0
        start_kernel+0x263/0x3e0
        x86_64_start_reservations+0x24/0x30
        x86_64_start_kernel+0x95/0xa0
        common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141

 -> #2 (pmus_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
        __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0
        perf_event_init_cpu+0xb7/0x7c0
        cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x2c0/0x1030
        __cpuhp_invoke_callback_range+0xbf/0x1f0
        _cpu_up+0x2e7/0x690
        cpu_up+0x117/0x170
        cpuhp_bringup_mask+0xd5/0x120
        bringup_nonboot_cpus+0x13d/0x170
        smp_init+0x2b/0xf0
        kernel_init_freeable+0x441/0x6d0
        kernel_init+0x1e/0x160
        ret_from_fork+0x34/0x70
        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

 -> #1 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}:
        cpus_read_lock+0x2a/0xd0
        ring_buffer_resize+0x610/0x14e0
        __tracing_resize_ring_buffer.part.0+0x42/0x120
        tracing_set_tracer+0x7bd/0xa80
        tracing_set_trace_write+0x132/0x1e0
        vfs_write+0x21c/0xe80
        ksys_write+0xf9/0x1c0
        do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

 -> #0 (&buffer->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
        __lock_acquire+0x1405/0x2210
        lock_acquire+0x174/0x310
        __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0
        ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70
        tracing_buffers_mmap+0x1c4/0x3b0
        __mmap_region+0xd8d/0x1f70
        do_mmap+0x9d7/0x1010
        vm_mmap_pgoff+0x20b/0x390
        ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x2e9/0x440
        do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

 other info that might help us debug this:

 Chain exists of:
   &buffer->mutex --> &mm->mmap_lock --> &cpu_buffer->mapping_lock

  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

        CPU0                    CPU1
        ----                    ----
   lock(&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock);
                                lock(&mm->mmap_lock);
                                lock(&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock);
   lock(&buffer->mutex);

  *** DEADLOCK ***

 2 locks held by trace-cmd/1113:
  #0: ffff888106b847e0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: vm_mmap_pgoff+0x192/0x390
  #1: ffff888100a5f9f8 (&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ring_buffer_map+0xcf/0xe70

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 1113 Comm: trace-cmd Not tainted 6.15.0-rc7-test-00002-gfb7d03d8a82f #551 PREEMPT
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xa0
  print_circular_bug.cold+0x178/0x1be
  check_noncircular+0x146/0x160
  __lock_acquire+0x1405/0x2210
  lock_acquire+0x174/0x310
  ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70
  ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70
  ? __mutex_lock+0x169/0x18c0
  __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0
  ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70
  ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70
  ? function_trace_call+0x296/0x370
  ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx_function_trace_call+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2d/0x50
  ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70
  ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70
  ? __mutex_lock+0x5/0x18c0
  ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70
  ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x12d/0x270
  ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2d/0x50
  ? rcu_is_watching+0x15/0xb0
  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2d/0x50
  ? trace_preempt_on+0xd0/0x110
  tracing_buffers_mmap+0x1c4/0x3b0
  __mmap_region+0xd8d/0x1f70
  ? ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x99/0xff0
  ? __pfx___mmap_region+0x10/0x10
  ? ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x99/0xff0
  ? __pfx_ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx_ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x10/0x10
  ? bpf_lsm_mmap_addr+0x4/0x10
  ? security_mmap_addr+0x46/0xd0
  ? lock_is_held_type+0xd9/0x130
  do_mmap+0x9d7/0x1010
  ? 0xffffffffc0370095
  ? __pfx_do_mmap+0x10/0x10
  vm_mmap_pgoff+0x20b/0x390
  ? __pfx_vm_mmap_pgoff+0x10/0x10
  ? 0xffffffffc0370095
  ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x2e9/0x440
  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
 RIP: 0033:0x7fb0963a7de2
 Code: 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 f7 c1 ff 0f 00 00 75 27 55 89 cd 53 48 89 fb 48 85 ff 74 3b 41 89 ea 48 89 df b8 09 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 76 5b 5d c3 0f 1f 00 48 8b 05 e1 9f 0d 00 64
 RSP: 002b:00007ffdcc8fb878 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000009
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fb0963a7de2
 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000001000 RDI: 0000000000000000
 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000006 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007ffdcc8fbe68 R14: 00007fb096628000 R15: 00005633e01a5c90
  </TASK>

The issue is that cpus_read_lock() is taken within buffer->mutex. The
memory mapped pages are taken with the mmap_lock held. The buffer->mutex
is taken within the cpu_buffer->mapping_lock. There's quite a chain with
all these locks, where the deadlock can be fixed by moving the
cpus_read_lock() outside the taking of the buffer->mutex.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250527105820.0f45d045@gandalf.local.home
Fixes: 117c392 ("ring-buffer: Introducing ring-buffer mapping functions")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
paniakin-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 19, 2025
[ Upstream commit ee684de ]

As shown in [1], it is possible to corrupt a BPF ELF file such that
arbitrary BPF instructions are loaded by libbpf. This can be done by
setting a symbol (BPF program) section offset to a large (unsigned)
number such that <section start + symbol offset> overflows and points
before the section data in the memory.

Consider the situation below where:
- prog_start = sec_start + symbol_offset    <-- size_t overflow here
- prog_end   = prog_start + prog_size

    prog_start        sec_start        prog_end        sec_end
        |                |                 |              |
        v                v                 v              v
    .....................|################################|............

The report in [1] also provides a corrupted BPF ELF which can be used as
a reproducer:

    $ readelf -S crash
    Section Headers:
      [Nr] Name              Type             Address           Offset
           Size              EntSize          Flags  Link  Info  Align
    ...
      [ 2] uretprobe.mu[...] PROGBITS         0000000000000000  00000040
           0000000000000068  0000000000000000  AX       0     0     8

    $ readelf -s crash
    Symbol table '.symtab' contains 8 entries:
       Num:    Value          Size Type    Bind   Vis      Ndx Name
    ...
         6: ffffffffffffffb8   104 FUNC    GLOBAL DEFAULT    2 handle_tp

Here, the handle_tp prog has section offset ffffffffffffffb8, i.e. will
point before the actual memory where section 2 is allocated.

This is also reported by AddressSanitizer:

    =================================================================
    ==1232==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7c7302fe0000 at pc 0x7fc3046e4b77 bp 0x7ffe64677cd0 sp 0x7ffe64677490
    READ of size 104 at 0x7c7302fe0000 thread T0
        #0 0x7fc3046e4b76 in memcpy (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe4b76)
        #1 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__init_prog /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:856
        #2 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__add_programs /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:928
        #3 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__elf_collect /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3930
        #4 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object_open /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8067
        #5 0x00000040f176 in bpf_object__open_file /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8090
        gregkh#6 0x000000400c16 in main /poc/poc.c:8
        gregkh#7 0x7fc3043d25b4 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x35b4)
        gregkh#8 0x7fc3043d2667 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3667)
        gregkh#9 0x000000400b34 in _start (/poc/poc+0x400b34)

    0x7c7302fe0000 is located 64 bytes before 104-byte region [0x7c7302fe0040,0x7c7302fe00a8)
    allocated by thread T0 here:
        #0 0x7fc3046e716b in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe716b)
        #1 0x7fc3045ee600 in __libelf_set_rawdata_wrlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xb600)
        #2 0x7fc3045ef018 in __elf_getdata_rdlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xc018)
        #3 0x00000040642f in elf_sec_data /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3740

The problem here is that currently, libbpf only checks that the program
end is within the section bounds. There used to be a check
`while (sec_off < sec_sz)` in bpf_object__add_programs, however, it was
removed by commit 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program
sections to support overriden weak functions").

Add a check for detecting the overflow of `sec_off + prog_sz` to
bpf_object__init_prog to fix this issue.

[1] https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md

Fixes: 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions")
Reported-by: lmarch2 <2524158037@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
Link: https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250415155014.397603-1-vmalik@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
paniakin-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 19, 2025
commit c98cc97 upstream.

Running a modified trace-cmd record --nosplice where it does a mmap of the
ring buffer when '--nosplice' is set, caused the following lockdep splat:

 ======================================================
 WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
 6.15.0-rc7-test-00002-gfb7d03d8a82f #551 Not tainted
 ------------------------------------------------------
 trace-cmd/1113 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffff888100062888 (&buffer->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70

 but task is already holding lock:
 ffff888100a5f9f8 (&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ring_buffer_map+0xcf/0xe70

 which lock already depends on the new lock.

 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

 -> #5 (&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
        __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0
        ring_buffer_map+0xcf/0xe70
        tracing_buffers_mmap+0x1c4/0x3b0
        __mmap_region+0xd8d/0x1f70
        do_mmap+0x9d7/0x1010
        vm_mmap_pgoff+0x20b/0x390
        ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x2e9/0x440
        do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

 -> #4 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}:
        __might_fault+0xa5/0x110
        _copy_to_user+0x22/0x80
        _perf_ioctl+0x61b/0x1b70
        perf_ioctl+0x62/0x90
        __x64_sys_ioctl+0x134/0x190
        do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

 -> #3 (&cpuctx_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
        __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0
        perf_event_init_cpu+0x325/0x7c0
        perf_event_init+0x52a/0x5b0
        start_kernel+0x263/0x3e0
        x86_64_start_reservations+0x24/0x30
        x86_64_start_kernel+0x95/0xa0
        common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141

 -> #2 (pmus_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
        __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0
        perf_event_init_cpu+0xb7/0x7c0
        cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x2c0/0x1030
        __cpuhp_invoke_callback_range+0xbf/0x1f0
        _cpu_up+0x2e7/0x690
        cpu_up+0x117/0x170
        cpuhp_bringup_mask+0xd5/0x120
        bringup_nonboot_cpus+0x13d/0x170
        smp_init+0x2b/0xf0
        kernel_init_freeable+0x441/0x6d0
        kernel_init+0x1e/0x160
        ret_from_fork+0x34/0x70
        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

 -> #1 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}:
        cpus_read_lock+0x2a/0xd0
        ring_buffer_resize+0x610/0x14e0
        __tracing_resize_ring_buffer.part.0+0x42/0x120
        tracing_set_tracer+0x7bd/0xa80
        tracing_set_trace_write+0x132/0x1e0
        vfs_write+0x21c/0xe80
        ksys_write+0xf9/0x1c0
        do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

 -> #0 (&buffer->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
        __lock_acquire+0x1405/0x2210
        lock_acquire+0x174/0x310
        __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0
        ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70
        tracing_buffers_mmap+0x1c4/0x3b0
        __mmap_region+0xd8d/0x1f70
        do_mmap+0x9d7/0x1010
        vm_mmap_pgoff+0x20b/0x390
        ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x2e9/0x440
        do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

 other info that might help us debug this:

 Chain exists of:
   &buffer->mutex --> &mm->mmap_lock --> &cpu_buffer->mapping_lock

  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

        CPU0                    CPU1
        ----                    ----
   lock(&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock);
                                lock(&mm->mmap_lock);
                                lock(&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock);
   lock(&buffer->mutex);

  *** DEADLOCK ***

 2 locks held by trace-cmd/1113:
  #0: ffff888106b847e0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: vm_mmap_pgoff+0x192/0x390
  #1: ffff888100a5f9f8 (&cpu_buffer->mapping_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ring_buffer_map+0xcf/0xe70

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 1113 Comm: trace-cmd Not tainted 6.15.0-rc7-test-00002-gfb7d03d8a82f #551 PREEMPT
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xa0
  print_circular_bug.cold+0x178/0x1be
  check_noncircular+0x146/0x160
  __lock_acquire+0x1405/0x2210
  lock_acquire+0x174/0x310
  ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70
  ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70
  ? __mutex_lock+0x169/0x18c0
  __mutex_lock+0x192/0x18c0
  ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70
  ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70
  ? function_trace_call+0x296/0x370
  ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx_function_trace_call+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2d/0x50
  ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70
  ? ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70
  ? __mutex_lock+0x5/0x18c0
  ring_buffer_map+0x11c/0xe70
  ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x12d/0x270
  ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2d/0x50
  ? rcu_is_watching+0x15/0xb0
  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2d/0x50
  ? trace_preempt_on+0xd0/0x110
  tracing_buffers_mmap+0x1c4/0x3b0
  __mmap_region+0xd8d/0x1f70
  ? ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x99/0xff0
  ? __pfx___mmap_region+0x10/0x10
  ? ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x99/0xff0
  ? __pfx_ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx_ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x10/0x10
  ? bpf_lsm_mmap_addr+0x4/0x10
  ? security_mmap_addr+0x46/0xd0
  ? lock_is_held_type+0xd9/0x130
  do_mmap+0x9d7/0x1010
  ? 0xffffffffc0370095
  ? __pfx_do_mmap+0x10/0x10
  vm_mmap_pgoff+0x20b/0x390
  ? __pfx_vm_mmap_pgoff+0x10/0x10
  ? 0xffffffffc0370095
  ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x2e9/0x440
  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x1c0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
 RIP: 0033:0x7fb0963a7de2
 Code: 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 f7 c1 ff 0f 00 00 75 27 55 89 cd 53 48 89 fb 48 85 ff 74 3b 41 89 ea 48 89 df b8 09 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 76 5b 5d c3 0f 1f 00 48 8b 05 e1 9f 0d 00 64
 RSP: 002b:00007ffdcc8fb878 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000009
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fb0963a7de2
 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000001000 RDI: 0000000000000000
 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000006 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007ffdcc8fbe68 R14: 00007fb096628000 R15: 00005633e01a5c90
  </TASK>

The issue is that cpus_read_lock() is taken within buffer->mutex. The
memory mapped pages are taken with the mmap_lock held. The buffer->mutex
is taken within the cpu_buffer->mapping_lock. There's quite a chain with
all these locks, where the deadlock can be fixed by moving the
cpus_read_lock() outside the taking of the buffer->mutex.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250527105820.0f45d045@gandalf.local.home
Fixes: 117c392 ("ring-buffer: Introducing ring-buffer mapping functions")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
paniakin-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 19, 2025
[ Upstream commit ee684de ]

As shown in [1], it is possible to corrupt a BPF ELF file such that
arbitrary BPF instructions are loaded by libbpf. This can be done by
setting a symbol (BPF program) section offset to a large (unsigned)
number such that <section start + symbol offset> overflows and points
before the section data in the memory.

Consider the situation below where:
- prog_start = sec_start + symbol_offset    <-- size_t overflow here
- prog_end   = prog_start + prog_size

    prog_start        sec_start        prog_end        sec_end
        |                |                 |              |
        v                v                 v              v
    .....................|################################|............

The report in [1] also provides a corrupted BPF ELF which can be used as
a reproducer:

    $ readelf -S crash
    Section Headers:
      [Nr] Name              Type             Address           Offset
           Size              EntSize          Flags  Link  Info  Align
    ...
      [ 2] uretprobe.mu[...] PROGBITS         0000000000000000  00000040
           0000000000000068  0000000000000000  AX       0     0     8

    $ readelf -s crash
    Symbol table '.symtab' contains 8 entries:
       Num:    Value          Size Type    Bind   Vis      Ndx Name
    ...
         6: ffffffffffffffb8   104 FUNC    GLOBAL DEFAULT    2 handle_tp

Here, the handle_tp prog has section offset ffffffffffffffb8, i.e. will
point before the actual memory where section 2 is allocated.

This is also reported by AddressSanitizer:

    =================================================================
    ==1232==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7c7302fe0000 at pc 0x7fc3046e4b77 bp 0x7ffe64677cd0 sp 0x7ffe64677490
    READ of size 104 at 0x7c7302fe0000 thread T0
        #0 0x7fc3046e4b76 in memcpy (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe4b76)
        #1 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__init_prog /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:856
        #2 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__add_programs /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:928
        #3 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__elf_collect /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3930
        #4 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object_open /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8067
        #5 0x00000040f176 in bpf_object__open_file /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8090
        gregkh#6 0x000000400c16 in main /poc/poc.c:8
        gregkh#7 0x7fc3043d25b4 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x35b4)
        gregkh#8 0x7fc3043d2667 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3667)
        gregkh#9 0x000000400b34 in _start (/poc/poc+0x400b34)

    0x7c7302fe0000 is located 64 bytes before 104-byte region [0x7c7302fe0040,0x7c7302fe00a8)
    allocated by thread T0 here:
        #0 0x7fc3046e716b in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe716b)
        #1 0x7fc3045ee600 in __libelf_set_rawdata_wrlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xb600)
        #2 0x7fc3045ef018 in __elf_getdata_rdlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xc018)
        #3 0x00000040642f in elf_sec_data /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3740

The problem here is that currently, libbpf only checks that the program
end is within the section bounds. There used to be a check
`while (sec_off < sec_sz)` in bpf_object__add_programs, however, it was
removed by commit 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program
sections to support overriden weak functions").

Add a check for detecting the overflow of `sec_off + prog_sz` to
bpf_object__init_prog to fix this issue.

[1] https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md

Fixes: 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions")
Reported-by: lmarch2 <2524158037@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
Link: https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250415155014.397603-1-vmalik@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
bjoernd pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 20, 2025
…oles on aarch64

offline_pages() properly checks for memory holes and bails out.
However, we do a page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) before calling
offline_pages() when offlining a memory block.

We should not unconditionally call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) on
aarch64 in offlining code, otherwise we can trigger a BUG when hitting a
memory hole:

   kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1383!
   Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
   Modules linked in: loop processor efivarfs ip_tables x_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_mod igb nvme i2c_algo_bit mlx5_core i2c_core nvme_core firmware_class
   CPU: 13 PID: 1694 Comm: ranbug Not tainted 5.12.0-next-20210524+ #4
   Hardware name: MiTAC RAPTOR EV-883832-X3-0001/RAPTOR, BIOS 1.6 06/28/2020
   pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
   pc : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   lr : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   Call trace:
     memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
     device_offline+0x154/0x1d8
     online_store+0xa4/0x118
     dev_attr_store+0x44/0x78
     sysfs_kf_write+0xe8/0x138
     kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x26c/0x3d0
     new_sync_write+0x2bc/0x4f8
     vfs_write+0x718/0xc88
     ksys_write+0xf8/0x1e0
     __arm64_sys_write+0x74/0xa8
     invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e8
     do_el0_svc+0xe4/0x298
     el0_svc+0x20/0x30
     el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8
     el0_sync+0x178/0x180
   Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception
   SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
   Kernel Offset: disabled
   CPU features: 0x00000251,20000846
   Memory Limit: none

If nr_vmemmap_pages is set, we know that we are dealing with hotplugged
memory that doesn't have any holes.  So call
page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) only when really necessary -- when
nr_vmemmap_pages is set and we actually adjust the present pages.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210526075226.5572-1-david@redhat.com
Fixes: a08a2ae ("mm,memory_hotplug: allocate memmap from the added memory range")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Qian Cai (QUIC) <quic_qiancai@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9281305)
paniakin-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 21, 2025
Before the commit under the Fixes tag below, bnxt_ulp_stop() and
bnxt_ulp_start() were always invoked in pairs.  After that commit,
the new bnxt_ulp_restart() can be invoked after bnxt_ulp_stop()
has been called.  This may result in the RoCE driver's aux driver
.suspend() method being invoked twice.  The 2nd bnxt_re_suspend()
call will crash when it dereferences a NULL pointer:

(NULL ib_device): Handle device suspend call
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000b78
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 20 UID: 0 PID: 181 Comm: kworker/u96:5 Tainted: G S                  6.15.0-rc1 #4 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.4.3 01/17/2017
Workqueue: bnxt_pf_wq bnxt_sp_task [bnxt_en]
RIP: 0010:bnxt_re_suspend+0x45/0x1f0 [bnxt_re]
Code: 8b 05 a7 3c 5b f5 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 49 8b 5c 24 08 4d 8b 2c 24 e8 ea 06 0a f4 48 c7 c6 04 60 52 c0 48 89 df e8 1b ce f9 ff <48> 8b 83 78 0b 00 00 48 8b 80 38 03 00 00 a8 40 0f 85 b5 00 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffa2e84084fd88 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffb4b6b934 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
RBP: ffffa1760954c9c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c0000000ffffdfff
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffa2e84084fb50 R12: ffffa176031ef070
R13: ffffa17609775000 R14: ffffa17603adc180 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa17daa397000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000b78 CR3: 00000004aaa30003 CR4: 00000000003706f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
bnxt_ulp_stop+0x69/0x90 [bnxt_en]
bnxt_sp_task+0x678/0x920 [bnxt_en]
? __schedule+0x514/0xf50
process_scheduled_works+0x9d/0x400
worker_thread+0x11c/0x260
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0xfe/0x1e0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x2b/0x40
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

Check the BNXT_EN_FLAG_ULP_STOPPED flag and do not proceed if the flag
is already set.  This will preserve the original symmetrical
bnxt_ulp_stop() and bnxt_ulp_start().

Also, inside bnxt_ulp_start(), clear the BNXT_EN_FLAG_ULP_STOPPED
flag after taking the mutex to avoid any race condition.  And for
symmetry, only proceed in bnxt_ulp_start() if the
BNXT_EN_FLAG_ULP_STOPPED is set.

Fixes: 3c163f3 ("bnxt_en: Optimize recovery path ULP locking in the driver")
Signed-off-by: Kalesh AP <kalesh-anakkur.purayil@broadcom.com>
Co-developed-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250613231841.377988-2-michael.chan@broadcom.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
aahmed71 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 24, 2025
…oles on aarch64

offline_pages() properly checks for memory holes and bails out.
However, we do a page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) before calling
offline_pages() when offlining a memory block.

We should not unconditionally call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) on
aarch64 in offlining code, otherwise we can trigger a BUG when hitting a
memory hole:

   kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1383!
   Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
   Modules linked in: loop processor efivarfs ip_tables x_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_mod igb nvme i2c_algo_bit mlx5_core i2c_core nvme_core firmware_class
   CPU: 13 PID: 1694 Comm: ranbug Not tainted 5.12.0-next-20210524+ #4
   Hardware name: MiTAC RAPTOR EV-883832-X3-0001/RAPTOR, BIOS 1.6 06/28/2020
   pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
   pc : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   lr : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   Call trace:
     memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
     device_offline+0x154/0x1d8
     online_store+0xa4/0x118
     dev_attr_store+0x44/0x78
     sysfs_kf_write+0xe8/0x138
     kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x26c/0x3d0
     new_sync_write+0x2bc/0x4f8
     vfs_write+0x718/0xc88
     ksys_write+0xf8/0x1e0
     __arm64_sys_write+0x74/0xa8
     invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e8
     do_el0_svc+0xe4/0x298
     el0_svc+0x20/0x30
     el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8
     el0_sync+0x178/0x180
   Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception
   SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
   Kernel Offset: disabled
   CPU features: 0x00000251,20000846
   Memory Limit: none

If nr_vmemmap_pages is set, we know that we are dealing with hotplugged
memory that doesn't have any holes.  So call
page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) only when really necessary -- when
nr_vmemmap_pages is set and we actually adjust the present pages.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210526075226.5572-1-david@redhat.com
Fixes: a08a2ae ("mm,memory_hotplug: allocate memmap from the added memory range")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Qian Cai (QUIC) <quic_qiancai@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9281305)
mngyadam pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 27, 2025
…oles on aarch64

offline_pages() properly checks for memory holes and bails out.
However, we do a page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) before calling
offline_pages() when offlining a memory block.

We should not unconditionally call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) on
aarch64 in offlining code, otherwise we can trigger a BUG when hitting a
memory hole:

   kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1383!
   Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
   Modules linked in: loop processor efivarfs ip_tables x_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_mod igb nvme i2c_algo_bit mlx5_core i2c_core nvme_core firmware_class
   CPU: 13 PID: 1694 Comm: ranbug Not tainted 5.12.0-next-20210524+ #4
   Hardware name: MiTAC RAPTOR EV-883832-X3-0001/RAPTOR, BIOS 1.6 06/28/2020
   pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
   pc : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   lr : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   Call trace:
     memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
     device_offline+0x154/0x1d8
     online_store+0xa4/0x118
     dev_attr_store+0x44/0x78
     sysfs_kf_write+0xe8/0x138
     kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x26c/0x3d0
     new_sync_write+0x2bc/0x4f8
     vfs_write+0x718/0xc88
     ksys_write+0xf8/0x1e0
     __arm64_sys_write+0x74/0xa8
     invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e8
     do_el0_svc+0xe4/0x298
     el0_svc+0x20/0x30
     el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8
     el0_sync+0x178/0x180
   Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception
   SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
   Kernel Offset: disabled
   CPU features: 0x00000251,20000846
   Memory Limit: none

If nr_vmemmap_pages is set, we know that we are dealing with hotplugged
memory that doesn't have any holes.  So call
page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) only when really necessary -- when
nr_vmemmap_pages is set and we actually adjust the present pages.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210526075226.5572-1-david@redhat.com
Fixes: a08a2ae ("mm,memory_hotplug: allocate memmap from the added memory range")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Qian Cai (QUIC) <quic_qiancai@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9281305)
paniakin-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 27, 2025
[ Upstream commit d4b2173 ]

Create necessary functions to encode/decode aarch64 barrier
instructions.

DSB needs special case handling as it has multiple encodings.

Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry <jthierry@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210303170536.1838032-7-jthierry@redhat.com
[will: Don't reject DSB #4]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
paniakin-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 27, 2025
commit be6e843 upstream.

When migrating a THP, concurrent access to the PMD migration entry during
a deferred split scan can lead to an invalid address access, as
illustrated below.  To prevent this invalid access, it is necessary to
check the PMD migration entry and return early.  In this context, there is
no need to use pmd_to_swp_entry and pfn_swap_entry_to_page to verify the
equality of the target folio.  Since the PMD migration entry is locked, it
cannot be served as the target.

Mailing list discussion and explanation from Hugh Dickins: "An anon_vma
lookup points to a location which may contain the folio of interest, but
might instead contain another folio: and weeding out those other folios is
precisely what the "folio != pmd_folio((*pmd)" check (and the "risk of
replacing the wrong folio" comment a few lines above it) is for."

BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffea60001db008
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 2199114 Comm: tee Not tainted 6.14.0+ #4 NONE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:split_huge_pmd_locked+0x3b5/0x2b60
Call Trace:
<TASK>
try_to_migrate_one+0x28c/0x3730
rmap_walk_anon+0x4f6/0x770
unmap_folio+0x196/0x1f0
split_huge_page_to_list_to_order+0x9f6/0x1560
deferred_split_scan+0xac5/0x12a0
shrinker_debugfs_scan_write+0x376/0x470
full_proxy_write+0x15c/0x220
vfs_write+0x2fc/0xcb0
ksys_write+0x146/0x250
do_syscall_64+0x6a/0x120
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

The bug is found by syzkaller on an internal kernel, then confirmed on
upstream.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250421113536.3682201-1-gavinguo@igalia.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250414072737.1698513-1-gavinguo@igalia.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250418085802.2973519-1-gavinguo@igalia.com/
Fixes: 84c3fc4 ("mm: thp: check pmd migration entry in common path")
Signed-off-by: Gavin Guo <gavinguo@igalia.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Acked-by: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Cc: Florent Revest <revest@google.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
[gavin: backport the migration checking logic to __split_huge_pmd]
Signed-off-by: Gavin Guo <gavinguo@igalia.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
paniakin-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 27, 2025
[ Upstream commit eedf3e3 ]

ACPICA commit 1c28da2242783579d59767617121035dafba18c3

This was originally done in NetBSD:
NetBSD/src@b69d1ac
and is the correct alternative to the smattering of `memcpy`s I
previously contributed to this repository.

This also sidesteps the newly strict checks added in UBSAN:
llvm/llvm-project@7926744

Before this change we see the following UBSAN stack trace in Fuchsia:

  #0    0x000021afcfdeca5e in acpi_rs_get_address_common(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsaddr.c:329 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6aca5e
  #1.2  0x000021982bc4af3c in ubsan_get_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:41 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c
  #1.1  0x000021982bc4af3c in maybe_print_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:51 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c
  #1    0x000021982bc4af3c in ~scoped_report() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:395 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c
  #2    0x000021982bc4bb6f in handletype_mismatch_impl() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:137 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x42b6f
  #3    0x000021982bc4b723 in __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1 compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:142 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x42723
  #4    0x000021afcfdeca5e in acpi_rs_get_address_common(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsaddr.c:329 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6aca5e
  #5    0x000021afcfdf2089 in acpi_rs_convert_aml_to_resource(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*, struct acpi_rsconvert_info*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsmisc.c:355 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b2089
  gregkh#6    0x000021afcfded169 in acpi_rs_convert_aml_to_resources(u8*, u32, u32, u8, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rslist.c:137 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6ad169
  gregkh#7    0x000021afcfe2d24a in acpi_ut_walk_aml_resources(struct acpi_walk_state*, u8*, acpi_size, acpi_walk_aml_callback, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/utilities/utresrc.c:237 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6ed24a
  gregkh#8    0x000021afcfde66b7 in acpi_rs_create_resource_list(union acpi_operand_object*, struct acpi_buffer*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rscreate.c:199 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6a66b7
  gregkh#9    0x000021afcfdf6979 in acpi_rs_get_method_data(acpi_handle, const char*, struct acpi_buffer*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsutils.c:770 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b6979
  gregkh#10   0x000021afcfdf708f in acpi_walk_resources(acpi_handle, char*, acpi_walk_resource_callback, void*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsxface.c:731 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b708f
  gregkh#11   0x000021afcfa95dcf in acpi::acpi_impl::walk_resources(acpi::acpi_impl*, acpi_handle, const char*, acpi::Acpi::resources_callable) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/acpi-impl.cc:41 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x355dcf
  gregkh#12   0x000021afcfaa8278 in acpi::device_builder::gather_resources(acpi::device_builder*, acpi::Acpi*, fidl::any_arena&, acpi::Manager*, acpi::device_builder::gather_resources_callback) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/device-builder.cc:84 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x368278
  gregkh#13   0x000021afcfbddb87 in acpi::Manager::configure_discovered_devices(acpi::Manager*) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/manager.cc:75 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x49db87
  gregkh#14   0x000021afcf99091d in publish_acpi_devices(acpi::Manager*, zx_device_t*, zx_device_t*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/acpi-nswalk.cc:95 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x25091d
  gregkh#15   0x000021afcf9c1d4e in x86::X86::do_init(x86::X86*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:60 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x281d4e
  gregkh#16   0x000021afcf9e33ad in λ(x86::X86::ddk_init::(anon class)*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:77 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a33ad
  gregkh#17   0x000021afcf9e313e in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:76:19), false, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void>::invoke(void*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:183 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a313e
  gregkh#18   0x000021afcfbab4c7 in fit::internal::function_base<16UL, false, void(), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<16UL, false, void (), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x46b4c7
  gregkh#19   0x000021afcfbab342 in fit::function_impl<16UL, false, void(), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(const fit::function_impl<16UL, false, void (), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:315 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x46b342
  gregkh#20   0x000021afcfcd98c3 in async::internal::retained_task::Handler(async_dispatcher_t*, async_task_t*, zx_status_t) ../../sdk/lib/async/task.cc:24 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x5998c3
  gregkh#21   0x00002290f9924616 in λ(const driver_runtime::Dispatcher::post_task::(anon class)*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, zx_status_t) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:789 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x10a616
  #22   0x00002290f9924323 in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:788:7), true, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int>::invoke(void*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:128 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x10a323
  #23   0x00002290f9904b76 in fit::internal::function_base<24UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<24UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xeab76
  #24   0x00002290f9904831 in fit::callback_impl<24UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(fit::callback_impl<24UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:471 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xea831
  #25   0x00002290f98d5adc in driver_runtime::callback_request::Call(driver_runtime::callback_request*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, zx_status_t) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/callback_request.h:74 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xbbadc
  #26   0x00002290f98e1e58 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::dispatch_callback(driver_runtime::Dispatcher*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1248 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xc7e58
  #27   0x00002290f98e4159 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::dispatch_callbacks(driver_runtime::Dispatcher*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1308 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xca159
  #28   0x00002290f9918414 in λ(const driver_runtime::Dispatcher::create_with_adder::(anon class)*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:353 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe414
  #29   0x00002290f991812d in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:351:7), true, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>>::invoke(void*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:128 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe12d
  #30   0x00002290f9906fc7 in fit::internal::function_base<8UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<8UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xecfc7
  #31   0x00002290f9906c66 in fit::function_impl<8UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(const fit::function_impl<8UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:315 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xecc66
  #32   0x00002290f98e73d9 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter::invoke_callback(driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.h:543 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xcd3d9
  #33   0x00002290f98e700d in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter::handle_event(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, async_dispatcher_t*, async::wait_base*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1442 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xcd00d
  #34   0x00002290f9918983 in async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>::handle_event(async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>*, async_dispatcher_t*, async::wait_base*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/async_loop_owned_event_handler.h:59 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe983
  #35   0x00002290f9918b9e in async::wait_method<async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>, &async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>::handle_event>::call_handler(async_dispatcher_t*, async_wait_t*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../sdk/lib/async/include/lib/async/cpp/wait.h:201 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfeb9e
  #36   0x00002290f99bf509 in async_loop_dispatch_wait(async_loop_t*, async_wait_t*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:394 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x1a5509
  #37   0x00002290f99b9958 in async_loop_run_once(async_loop_t*, zx_time_t) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:343 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x19f958
  #38   0x00002290f99b9247 in async_loop_run(async_loop_t*, zx_time_t, _Bool) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:301 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x19f247
  #39   0x00002290f99ba962 in async_loop_run_thread(void*) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:860 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x1a0962
  #40   0x000041afd176ef30 in start_c11(void*) ../../zircon/third_party/ulib/musl/pthread/pthread_create.c:63 <libc.so>+0x84f30
  #41   0x000041afd18a448d in thread_trampoline(uintptr_t, uintptr_t) ../../zircon/system/ulib/runtime/thread.cc:100 <libc.so>+0x1ba48d

Link: acpica/acpica@1c28da22
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/4664267.LvFx2qVVIh@rjwysocki.net
Signed-off-by: Tamir Duberstein <tamird@gmail.com>
[ rjw: Pick up the tag from Tamir ]
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
paniakin-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 27, 2025
[ Upstream commit 1e9ac33 ]

Before the commit under the Fixes tag below, bnxt_ulp_stop() and
bnxt_ulp_start() were always invoked in pairs.  After that commit,
the new bnxt_ulp_restart() can be invoked after bnxt_ulp_stop()
has been called.  This may result in the RoCE driver's aux driver
.suspend() method being invoked twice.  The 2nd bnxt_re_suspend()
call will crash when it dereferences a NULL pointer:

(NULL ib_device): Handle device suspend call
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000b78
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 20 UID: 0 PID: 181 Comm: kworker/u96:5 Tainted: G S                  6.15.0-rc1 #4 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.4.3 01/17/2017
Workqueue: bnxt_pf_wq bnxt_sp_task [bnxt_en]
RIP: 0010:bnxt_re_suspend+0x45/0x1f0 [bnxt_re]
Code: 8b 05 a7 3c 5b f5 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 49 8b 5c 24 08 4d 8b 2c 24 e8 ea 06 0a f4 48 c7 c6 04 60 52 c0 48 89 df e8 1b ce f9 ff <48> 8b 83 78 0b 00 00 48 8b 80 38 03 00 00 a8 40 0f 85 b5 00 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffa2e84084fd88 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffb4b6b934 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
RBP: ffffa1760954c9c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c0000000ffffdfff
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffa2e84084fb50 R12: ffffa176031ef070
R13: ffffa17609775000 R14: ffffa17603adc180 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa17daa397000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000b78 CR3: 00000004aaa30003 CR4: 00000000003706f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
bnxt_ulp_stop+0x69/0x90 [bnxt_en]
bnxt_sp_task+0x678/0x920 [bnxt_en]
? __schedule+0x514/0xf50
process_scheduled_works+0x9d/0x400
worker_thread+0x11c/0x260
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0xfe/0x1e0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x2b/0x40
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

Check the BNXT_EN_FLAG_ULP_STOPPED flag and do not proceed if the flag
is already set.  This will preserve the original symmetrical
bnxt_ulp_stop() and bnxt_ulp_start().

Also, inside bnxt_ulp_start(), clear the BNXT_EN_FLAG_ULP_STOPPED
flag after taking the mutex to avoid any race condition.  And for
symmetry, only proceed in bnxt_ulp_start() if the
BNXT_EN_FLAG_ULP_STOPPED is set.

Fixes: 3c163f3 ("bnxt_en: Optimize recovery path ULP locking in the driver")
Signed-off-by: Kalesh AP <kalesh-anakkur.purayil@broadcom.com>
Co-developed-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250613231841.377988-2-michael.chan@broadcom.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
paniakin-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 27, 2025
[ Upstream commit ee684de ]

As shown in [1], it is possible to corrupt a BPF ELF file such that
arbitrary BPF instructions are loaded by libbpf. This can be done by
setting a symbol (BPF program) section offset to a large (unsigned)
number such that <section start + symbol offset> overflows and points
before the section data in the memory.

Consider the situation below where:
- prog_start = sec_start + symbol_offset    <-- size_t overflow here
- prog_end   = prog_start + prog_size

    prog_start        sec_start        prog_end        sec_end
        |                |                 |              |
        v                v                 v              v
    .....................|################################|............

The report in [1] also provides a corrupted BPF ELF which can be used as
a reproducer:

    $ readelf -S crash
    Section Headers:
      [Nr] Name              Type             Address           Offset
           Size              EntSize          Flags  Link  Info  Align
    ...
      [ 2] uretprobe.mu[...] PROGBITS         0000000000000000  00000040
           0000000000000068  0000000000000000  AX       0     0     8

    $ readelf -s crash
    Symbol table '.symtab' contains 8 entries:
       Num:    Value          Size Type    Bind   Vis      Ndx Name
    ...
         6: ffffffffffffffb8   104 FUNC    GLOBAL DEFAULT    2 handle_tp

Here, the handle_tp prog has section offset ffffffffffffffb8, i.e. will
point before the actual memory where section 2 is allocated.

This is also reported by AddressSanitizer:

    =================================================================
    ==1232==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7c7302fe0000 at pc 0x7fc3046e4b77 bp 0x7ffe64677cd0 sp 0x7ffe64677490
    READ of size 104 at 0x7c7302fe0000 thread T0
        #0 0x7fc3046e4b76 in memcpy (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe4b76)
        #1 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__init_prog /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:856
        #2 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__add_programs /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:928
        #3 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__elf_collect /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3930
        #4 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object_open /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8067
        #5 0x00000040f176 in bpf_object__open_file /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8090
        gregkh#6 0x000000400c16 in main /poc/poc.c:8
        gregkh#7 0x7fc3043d25b4 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x35b4)
        gregkh#8 0x7fc3043d2667 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3667)
        gregkh#9 0x000000400b34 in _start (/poc/poc+0x400b34)

    0x7c7302fe0000 is located 64 bytes before 104-byte region [0x7c7302fe0040,0x7c7302fe00a8)
    allocated by thread T0 here:
        #0 0x7fc3046e716b in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe716b)
        #1 0x7fc3045ee600 in __libelf_set_rawdata_wrlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xb600)
        #2 0x7fc3045ef018 in __elf_getdata_rdlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xc018)
        #3 0x00000040642f in elf_sec_data /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3740

The problem here is that currently, libbpf only checks that the program
end is within the section bounds. There used to be a check
`while (sec_off < sec_sz)` in bpf_object__add_programs, however, it was
removed by commit 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program
sections to support overriden weak functions").

Add a check for detecting the overflow of `sec_off + prog_sz` to
bpf_object__init_prog to fix this issue.

[1] https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md

Fixes: 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions")
Reported-by: lmarch2 <2524158037@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
Link: https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250415155014.397603-1-vmalik@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
paniakin-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 27, 2025
commit be6e843 upstream.

When migrating a THP, concurrent access to the PMD migration entry during
a deferred split scan can lead to an invalid address access, as
illustrated below.  To prevent this invalid access, it is necessary to
check the PMD migration entry and return early.  In this context, there is
no need to use pmd_to_swp_entry and pfn_swap_entry_to_page to verify the
equality of the target folio.  Since the PMD migration entry is locked, it
cannot be served as the target.

Mailing list discussion and explanation from Hugh Dickins: "An anon_vma
lookup points to a location which may contain the folio of interest, but
might instead contain another folio: and weeding out those other folios is
precisely what the "folio != pmd_folio((*pmd)" check (and the "risk of
replacing the wrong folio" comment a few lines above it) is for."

BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffea60001db008
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 2199114 Comm: tee Not tainted 6.14.0+ #4 NONE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:split_huge_pmd_locked+0x3b5/0x2b60
Call Trace:
<TASK>
try_to_migrate_one+0x28c/0x3730
rmap_walk_anon+0x4f6/0x770
unmap_folio+0x196/0x1f0
split_huge_page_to_list_to_order+0x9f6/0x1560
deferred_split_scan+0xac5/0x12a0
shrinker_debugfs_scan_write+0x376/0x470
full_proxy_write+0x15c/0x220
vfs_write+0x2fc/0xcb0
ksys_write+0x146/0x250
do_syscall_64+0x6a/0x120
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

The bug is found by syzkaller on an internal kernel, then confirmed on
upstream.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250421113536.3682201-1-gavinguo@igalia.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250414072737.1698513-1-gavinguo@igalia.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250418085802.2973519-1-gavinguo@igalia.com/
Fixes: 84c3fc4 ("mm: thp: check pmd migration entry in common path")
Signed-off-by: Gavin Guo <gavinguo@igalia.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Acked-by: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Cc: Florent Revest <revest@google.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
[gavin: backport the migration checking logic to __split_huge_pmd]
Signed-off-by: Gavin Guo <gavinguo@igalia.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
paniakin-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 27, 2025
[ Upstream commit eedf3e3 ]

ACPICA commit 1c28da2242783579d59767617121035dafba18c3

This was originally done in NetBSD:
NetBSD/src@b69d1ac
and is the correct alternative to the smattering of `memcpy`s I
previously contributed to this repository.

This also sidesteps the newly strict checks added in UBSAN:
llvm/llvm-project@7926744

Before this change we see the following UBSAN stack trace in Fuchsia:

  #0    0x000021afcfdeca5e in acpi_rs_get_address_common(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsaddr.c:329 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6aca5e
  #1.2  0x000021982bc4af3c in ubsan_get_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:41 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c
  #1.1  0x000021982bc4af3c in maybe_print_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:51 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c
  #1    0x000021982bc4af3c in ~scoped_report() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:395 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x41f3c
  #2    0x000021982bc4bb6f in handletype_mismatch_impl() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:137 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x42b6f
  #3    0x000021982bc4b723 in __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1 compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:142 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x42723
  #4    0x000021afcfdeca5e in acpi_rs_get_address_common(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsaddr.c:329 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6aca5e
  #5    0x000021afcfdf2089 in acpi_rs_convert_aml_to_resource(struct acpi_resource*, union aml_resource*, struct acpi_rsconvert_info*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsmisc.c:355 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b2089
  gregkh#6    0x000021afcfded169 in acpi_rs_convert_aml_to_resources(u8*, u32, u32, u8, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rslist.c:137 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6ad169
  gregkh#7    0x000021afcfe2d24a in acpi_ut_walk_aml_resources(struct acpi_walk_state*, u8*, acpi_size, acpi_walk_aml_callback, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/utilities/utresrc.c:237 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6ed24a
  gregkh#8    0x000021afcfde66b7 in acpi_rs_create_resource_list(union acpi_operand_object*, struct acpi_buffer*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rscreate.c:199 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6a66b7
  gregkh#9    0x000021afcfdf6979 in acpi_rs_get_method_data(acpi_handle, const char*, struct acpi_buffer*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsutils.c:770 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b6979
  gregkh#10   0x000021afcfdf708f in acpi_walk_resources(acpi_handle, char*, acpi_walk_resource_callback, void*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/resources/rsxface.c:731 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x6b708f
  gregkh#11   0x000021afcfa95dcf in acpi::acpi_impl::walk_resources(acpi::acpi_impl*, acpi_handle, const char*, acpi::Acpi::resources_callable) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/acpi-impl.cc:41 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x355dcf
  gregkh#12   0x000021afcfaa8278 in acpi::device_builder::gather_resources(acpi::device_builder*, acpi::Acpi*, fidl::any_arena&, acpi::Manager*, acpi::device_builder::gather_resources_callback) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/device-builder.cc:84 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x368278
  gregkh#13   0x000021afcfbddb87 in acpi::Manager::configure_discovered_devices(acpi::Manager*) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/manager.cc:75 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x49db87
  gregkh#14   0x000021afcf99091d in publish_acpi_devices(acpi::Manager*, zx_device_t*, zx_device_t*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/acpi-nswalk.cc:95 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x25091d
  gregkh#15   0x000021afcf9c1d4e in x86::X86::do_init(x86::X86*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:60 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x281d4e
  gregkh#16   0x000021afcf9e33ad in λ(x86::X86::ddk_init::(anon class)*) ../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:77 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a33ad
  gregkh#17   0x000021afcf9e313e in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/board/drivers/x86/x86.cc:76:19), false, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void>::invoke(void*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:183 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a313e
  gregkh#18   0x000021afcfbab4c7 in fit::internal::function_base<16UL, false, void(), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<16UL, false, void (), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x46b4c7
  gregkh#19   0x000021afcfbab342 in fit::function_impl<16UL, false, void(), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(const fit::function_impl<16UL, false, void (), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:315 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x46b342
  gregkh#20   0x000021afcfcd98c3 in async::internal::retained_task::Handler(async_dispatcher_t*, async_task_t*, zx_status_t) ../../sdk/lib/async/task.cc:24 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x5998c3
  gregkh#21   0x00002290f9924616 in λ(const driver_runtime::Dispatcher::post_task::(anon class)*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, zx_status_t) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:789 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x10a616
  #22   0x00002290f9924323 in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:788:7), true, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int>::invoke(void*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:128 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x10a323
  #23   0x00002290f9904b76 in fit::internal::function_base<24UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<24UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xeab76
  #24   0x00002290f9904831 in fit::callback_impl<24UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request>>, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(fit::callback_impl<24UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, int) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:471 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xea831
  #25   0x00002290f98d5adc in driver_runtime::callback_request::Call(driver_runtime::callback_request*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >, zx_status_t) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/callback_request.h:74 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xbbadc
  #26   0x00002290f98e1e58 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::dispatch_callback(driver_runtime::Dispatcher*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::callback_request, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::callback_request> >) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1248 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xc7e58
  #27   0x00002290f98e4159 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::dispatch_callbacks(driver_runtime::Dispatcher*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1308 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xca159
  #28   0x00002290f9918414 in λ(const driver_runtime::Dispatcher::create_with_adder::(anon class)*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:353 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe414
  #29   0x00002290f991812d in fit::internal::target<(lambda at../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:351:7), true, false, std::__2::allocator<std::byte>, void, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>>::invoke(void*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:128 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe12d
  #30   0x00002290f9906fc7 in fit::internal::function_base<8UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::invoke(const fit::internal::function_base<8UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/internal/function.h:522 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xecfc7
  #31   0x00002290f9906c66 in fit::function_impl<8UL, true, void(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>>, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte>>::operator()(const fit::function_impl<8UL, true, void (std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>), std::__2::allocator<std::byte> >*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../sdk/lib/fit/include/lib/fit/function.h:315 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xecc66
  #32   0x00002290f98e73d9 in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter::invoke_callback(driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter*, std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, fbl::ref_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher>) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.h:543 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xcd3d9
  #33   0x00002290f98e700d in driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter::handle_event(std::__2::unique_ptr<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter, std::__2::default_delete<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter> >, async_dispatcher_t*, async::wait_base*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/dispatcher.cc:1442 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xcd00d
  #34   0x00002290f9918983 in async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>::handle_event(async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>*, async_dispatcher_t*, async::wait_base*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../src/devices/bin/driver_runtime/async_loop_owned_event_handler.h:59 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfe983
  #35   0x00002290f9918b9e in async::wait_method<async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>, &async_loop_owned_event_handler<driver_runtime::Dispatcher::event_waiter>::handle_event>::call_handler(async_dispatcher_t*, async_wait_t*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../sdk/lib/async/include/lib/async/cpp/wait.h:201 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0xfeb9e
  #36   0x00002290f99bf509 in async_loop_dispatch_wait(async_loop_t*, async_wait_t*, zx_status_t, zx_packet_signal_t const*) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:394 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x1a5509
  #37   0x00002290f99b9958 in async_loop_run_once(async_loop_t*, zx_time_t) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:343 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x19f958
  #38   0x00002290f99b9247 in async_loop_run(async_loop_t*, zx_time_t, _Bool) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:301 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x19f247
  #39   0x00002290f99ba962 in async_loop_run_thread(void*) ../../sdk/lib/async-loop/loop.c:860 <libdriver_runtime.so>+0x1a0962
  #40   0x000041afd176ef30 in start_c11(void*) ../../zircon/third_party/ulib/musl/pthread/pthread_create.c:63 <libc.so>+0x84f30
  #41   0x000041afd18a448d in thread_trampoline(uintptr_t, uintptr_t) ../../zircon/system/ulib/runtime/thread.cc:100 <libc.so>+0x1ba48d

Link: acpica/acpica@1c28da22
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/4664267.LvFx2qVVIh@rjwysocki.net
Signed-off-by: Tamir Duberstein <tamird@gmail.com>
[ rjw: Pick up the tag from Tamir ]
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
paniakin-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 27, 2025
[ Upstream commit 1e9ac33 ]

Before the commit under the Fixes tag below, bnxt_ulp_stop() and
bnxt_ulp_start() were always invoked in pairs.  After that commit,
the new bnxt_ulp_restart() can be invoked after bnxt_ulp_stop()
has been called.  This may result in the RoCE driver's aux driver
.suspend() method being invoked twice.  The 2nd bnxt_re_suspend()
call will crash when it dereferences a NULL pointer:

(NULL ib_device): Handle device suspend call
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000b78
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 20 UID: 0 PID: 181 Comm: kworker/u96:5 Tainted: G S                  6.15.0-rc1 #4 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.4.3 01/17/2017
Workqueue: bnxt_pf_wq bnxt_sp_task [bnxt_en]
RIP: 0010:bnxt_re_suspend+0x45/0x1f0 [bnxt_re]
Code: 8b 05 a7 3c 5b f5 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 49 8b 5c 24 08 4d 8b 2c 24 e8 ea 06 0a f4 48 c7 c6 04 60 52 c0 48 89 df e8 1b ce f9 ff <48> 8b 83 78 0b 00 00 48 8b 80 38 03 00 00 a8 40 0f 85 b5 00 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffa2e84084fd88 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffb4b6b934 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
RBP: ffffa1760954c9c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c0000000ffffdfff
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffa2e84084fb50 R12: ffffa176031ef070
R13: ffffa17609775000 R14: ffffa17603adc180 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa17daa397000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000b78 CR3: 00000004aaa30003 CR4: 00000000003706f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
bnxt_ulp_stop+0x69/0x90 [bnxt_en]
bnxt_sp_task+0x678/0x920 [bnxt_en]
? __schedule+0x514/0xf50
process_scheduled_works+0x9d/0x400
worker_thread+0x11c/0x260
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0xfe/0x1e0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x2b/0x40
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

Check the BNXT_EN_FLAG_ULP_STOPPED flag and do not proceed if the flag
is already set.  This will preserve the original symmetrical
bnxt_ulp_stop() and bnxt_ulp_start().

Also, inside bnxt_ulp_start(), clear the BNXT_EN_FLAG_ULP_STOPPED
flag after taking the mutex to avoid any race condition.  And for
symmetry, only proceed in bnxt_ulp_start() if the
BNXT_EN_FLAG_ULP_STOPPED is set.

Fixes: 3c163f3 ("bnxt_en: Optimize recovery path ULP locking in the driver")
Signed-off-by: Kalesh AP <kalesh-anakkur.purayil@broadcom.com>
Co-developed-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250613231841.377988-2-michael.chan@broadcom.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
paniakin-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 27, 2025
commit be6e843 upstream.

When migrating a THP, concurrent access to the PMD migration entry during
a deferred split scan can lead to an invalid address access, as
illustrated below.  To prevent this invalid access, it is necessary to
check the PMD migration entry and return early.  In this context, there is
no need to use pmd_to_swp_entry and pfn_swap_entry_to_page to verify the
equality of the target folio.  Since the PMD migration entry is locked, it
cannot be served as the target.

Mailing list discussion and explanation from Hugh Dickins: "An anon_vma
lookup points to a location which may contain the folio of interest, but
might instead contain another folio: and weeding out those other folios is
precisely what the "folio != pmd_folio((*pmd)" check (and the "risk of
replacing the wrong folio" comment a few lines above it) is for."

BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffea60001db008
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 2199114 Comm: tee Not tainted 6.14.0+ #4 NONE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:split_huge_pmd_locked+0x3b5/0x2b60
Call Trace:
<TASK>
try_to_migrate_one+0x28c/0x3730
rmap_walk_anon+0x4f6/0x770
unmap_folio+0x196/0x1f0
split_huge_page_to_list_to_order+0x9f6/0x1560
deferred_split_scan+0xac5/0x12a0
shrinker_debugfs_scan_write+0x376/0x470
full_proxy_write+0x15c/0x220
vfs_write+0x2fc/0xcb0
ksys_write+0x146/0x250
do_syscall_64+0x6a/0x120
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

The bug is found by syzkaller on an internal kernel, then confirmed on
upstream.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250421113536.3682201-1-gavinguo@igalia.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250414072737.1698513-1-gavinguo@igalia.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250418085802.2973519-1-gavinguo@igalia.com/
Fixes: 84c3fc4 ("mm: thp: check pmd migration entry in common path")
Signed-off-by: Gavin Guo <gavinguo@igalia.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Acked-by: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Cc: Florent Revest <revest@google.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
[gavin: backport the migration checking logic to __split_huge_pmd]
Signed-off-by: Gavin Guo <gavinguo@igalia.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
paniakin-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 27, 2025
[ Upstream commit ee684de ]

As shown in [1], it is possible to corrupt a BPF ELF file such that
arbitrary BPF instructions are loaded by libbpf. This can be done by
setting a symbol (BPF program) section offset to a large (unsigned)
number such that <section start + symbol offset> overflows and points
before the section data in the memory.

Consider the situation below where:
- prog_start = sec_start + symbol_offset    <-- size_t overflow here
- prog_end   = prog_start + prog_size

    prog_start        sec_start        prog_end        sec_end
        |                |                 |              |
        v                v                 v              v
    .....................|################################|............

The report in [1] also provides a corrupted BPF ELF which can be used as
a reproducer:

    $ readelf -S crash
    Section Headers:
      [Nr] Name              Type             Address           Offset
           Size              EntSize          Flags  Link  Info  Align
    ...
      [ 2] uretprobe.mu[...] PROGBITS         0000000000000000  00000040
           0000000000000068  0000000000000000  AX       0     0     8

    $ readelf -s crash
    Symbol table '.symtab' contains 8 entries:
       Num:    Value          Size Type    Bind   Vis      Ndx Name
    ...
         6: ffffffffffffffb8   104 FUNC    GLOBAL DEFAULT    2 handle_tp

Here, the handle_tp prog has section offset ffffffffffffffb8, i.e. will
point before the actual memory where section 2 is allocated.

This is also reported by AddressSanitizer:

    =================================================================
    ==1232==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7c7302fe0000 at pc 0x7fc3046e4b77 bp 0x7ffe64677cd0 sp 0x7ffe64677490
    READ of size 104 at 0x7c7302fe0000 thread T0
        #0 0x7fc3046e4b76 in memcpy (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe4b76)
        #1 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__init_prog /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:856
        #2 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__add_programs /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:928
        #3 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object__elf_collect /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3930
        #4 0x00000040df3e in bpf_object_open /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8067
        #5 0x00000040f176 in bpf_object__open_file /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:8090
        gregkh#6 0x000000400c16 in main /poc/poc.c:8
        gregkh#7 0x7fc3043d25b4 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x35b4)
        gregkh#8 0x7fc3043d2667 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3667)
        gregkh#9 0x000000400b34 in _start (/poc/poc+0x400b34)

    0x7c7302fe0000 is located 64 bytes before 104-byte region [0x7c7302fe0040,0x7c7302fe00a8)
    allocated by thread T0 here:
        #0 0x7fc3046e716b in malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe716b)
        #1 0x7fc3045ee600 in __libelf_set_rawdata_wrlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xb600)
        #2 0x7fc3045ef018 in __elf_getdata_rdlock (/lib64/libelf.so.1+0xc018)
        #3 0x00000040642f in elf_sec_data /src/libbpf/src/libbpf.c:3740

The problem here is that currently, libbpf only checks that the program
end is within the section bounds. There used to be a check
`while (sec_off < sec_sz)` in bpf_object__add_programs, however, it was
removed by commit 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program
sections to support overriden weak functions").

Add a check for detecting the overflow of `sec_off + prog_sz` to
bpf_object__init_prog to fix this issue.

[1] https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md

Fixes: 6245947 ("libbpf: Allow gaps in BPF program sections to support overriden weak functions")
Reported-by: lmarch2 <2524158037@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
Link: https://github.com/lmarch2/poc/blob/main/libbpf/libbpf.md
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250415155014.397603-1-vmalik@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
paniakin-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 27, 2025
commit be6e843 upstream.

When migrating a THP, concurrent access to the PMD migration entry during
a deferred split scan can lead to an invalid address access, as
illustrated below.  To prevent this invalid access, it is necessary to
check the PMD migration entry and return early.  In this context, there is
no need to use pmd_to_swp_entry and pfn_swap_entry_to_page to verify the
equality of the target folio.  Since the PMD migration entry is locked, it
cannot be served as the target.

Mailing list discussion and explanation from Hugh Dickins: "An anon_vma
lookup points to a location which may contain the folio of interest, but
might instead contain another folio: and weeding out those other folios is
precisely what the "folio != pmd_folio((*pmd)" check (and the "risk of
replacing the wrong folio" comment a few lines above it) is for."

BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffea60001db008
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 2199114 Comm: tee Not tainted 6.14.0+ #4 NONE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:split_huge_pmd_locked+0x3b5/0x2b60
Call Trace:
<TASK>
try_to_migrate_one+0x28c/0x3730
rmap_walk_anon+0x4f6/0x770
unmap_folio+0x196/0x1f0
split_huge_page_to_list_to_order+0x9f6/0x1560
deferred_split_scan+0xac5/0x12a0
shrinker_debugfs_scan_write+0x376/0x470
full_proxy_write+0x15c/0x220
vfs_write+0x2fc/0xcb0
ksys_write+0x146/0x250
do_syscall_64+0x6a/0x120
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

The bug is found by syzkaller on an internal kernel, then confirmed on
upstream.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250421113536.3682201-1-gavinguo@igalia.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250414072737.1698513-1-gavinguo@igalia.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250418085802.2973519-1-gavinguo@igalia.com/
Fixes: 84c3fc4 ("mm: thp: check pmd migration entry in common path")
Signed-off-by: Gavin Guo <gavinguo@igalia.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Acked-by: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Cc: Florent Revest <revest@google.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
[gavin: backport the migration checking logic to __split_huge_pmd]
Signed-off-by: Gavin Guo <gavinguo@igalia.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
paniakin-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 27, 2025
commit be6e843 upstream.

When migrating a THP, concurrent access to the PMD migration entry during
a deferred split scan can lead to an invalid address access, as
illustrated below.  To prevent this invalid access, it is necessary to
check the PMD migration entry and return early.  In this context, there is
no need to use pmd_to_swp_entry and pfn_swap_entry_to_page to verify the
equality of the target folio.  Since the PMD migration entry is locked, it
cannot be served as the target.

Mailing list discussion and explanation from Hugh Dickins: "An anon_vma
lookup points to a location which may contain the folio of interest, but
might instead contain another folio: and weeding out those other folios is
precisely what the "folio != pmd_folio((*pmd)" check (and the "risk of
replacing the wrong folio" comment a few lines above it) is for."

BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffea60001db008
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 2199114 Comm: tee Not tainted 6.14.0+ #4 NONE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:split_huge_pmd_locked+0x3b5/0x2b60
Call Trace:
<TASK>
try_to_migrate_one+0x28c/0x3730
rmap_walk_anon+0x4f6/0x770
unmap_folio+0x196/0x1f0
split_huge_page_to_list_to_order+0x9f6/0x1560
deferred_split_scan+0xac5/0x12a0
shrinker_debugfs_scan_write+0x376/0x470
full_proxy_write+0x15c/0x220
vfs_write+0x2fc/0xcb0
ksys_write+0x146/0x250
do_syscall_64+0x6a/0x120
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

The bug is found by syzkaller on an internal kernel, then confirmed on
upstream.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250421113536.3682201-1-gavinguo@igalia.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250414072737.1698513-1-gavinguo@igalia.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250418085802.2973519-1-gavinguo@igalia.com/
Fixes: 84c3fc4 ("mm: thp: check pmd migration entry in common path")
Signed-off-by: Gavin Guo <gavinguo@igalia.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Acked-by: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Cc: Florent Revest <revest@google.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
[gavin: backport the migration checking logic to __split_huge_pmd]
Signed-off-by: Gavin Guo <gavinguo@igalia.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
nathan-zcgao pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 27, 2025
…oles on aarch64

offline_pages() properly checks for memory holes and bails out.
However, we do a page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) before calling
offline_pages() when offlining a memory block.

We should not unconditionally call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) on
aarch64 in offlining code, otherwise we can trigger a BUG when hitting a
memory hole:

   kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1383!
   Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
   Modules linked in: loop processor efivarfs ip_tables x_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_mod igb nvme i2c_algo_bit mlx5_core i2c_core nvme_core firmware_class
   CPU: 13 PID: 1694 Comm: ranbug Not tainted 5.12.0-next-20210524+ #4
   Hardware name: MiTAC RAPTOR EV-883832-X3-0001/RAPTOR, BIOS 1.6 06/28/2020
   pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
   pc : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   lr : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   Call trace:
     memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
     device_offline+0x154/0x1d8
     online_store+0xa4/0x118
     dev_attr_store+0x44/0x78
     sysfs_kf_write+0xe8/0x138
     kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x26c/0x3d0
     new_sync_write+0x2bc/0x4f8
     vfs_write+0x718/0xc88
     ksys_write+0xf8/0x1e0
     __arm64_sys_write+0x74/0xa8
     invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e8
     do_el0_svc+0xe4/0x298
     el0_svc+0x20/0x30
     el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8
     el0_sync+0x178/0x180
   Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception
   SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
   Kernel Offset: disabled
   CPU features: 0x00000251,20000846
   Memory Limit: none

If nr_vmemmap_pages is set, we know that we are dealing with hotplugged
memory that doesn't have any holes.  So call
page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) only when really necessary -- when
nr_vmemmap_pages is set and we actually adjust the present pages.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210526075226.5572-1-david@redhat.com
Fixes: a08a2ae ("mm,memory_hotplug: allocate memmap from the added memory range")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Qian Cai (QUIC) <quic_qiancai@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9281305)
nathan-zcgao pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 27, 2025
…oles on aarch64

offline_pages() properly checks for memory holes and bails out.
However, we do a page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) before calling
offline_pages() when offlining a memory block.

We should not unconditionally call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) on
aarch64 in offlining code, otherwise we can trigger a BUG when hitting a
memory hole:

   kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1383!
   Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
   Modules linked in: loop processor efivarfs ip_tables x_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_mod igb nvme i2c_algo_bit mlx5_core i2c_core nvme_core firmware_class
   CPU: 13 PID: 1694 Comm: ranbug Not tainted 5.12.0-next-20210524+ #4
   Hardware name: MiTAC RAPTOR EV-883832-X3-0001/RAPTOR, BIOS 1.6 06/28/2020
   pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
   pc : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   lr : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   Call trace:
     memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
     device_offline+0x154/0x1d8
     online_store+0xa4/0x118
     dev_attr_store+0x44/0x78
     sysfs_kf_write+0xe8/0x138
     kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x26c/0x3d0
     new_sync_write+0x2bc/0x4f8
     vfs_write+0x718/0xc88
     ksys_write+0xf8/0x1e0
     __arm64_sys_write+0x74/0xa8
     invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e8
     do_el0_svc+0xe4/0x298
     el0_svc+0x20/0x30
     el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8
     el0_sync+0x178/0x180
   Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception
   SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
   Kernel Offset: disabled
   CPU features: 0x00000251,20000846
   Memory Limit: none

If nr_vmemmap_pages is set, we know that we are dealing with hotplugged
memory that doesn't have any holes.  So call
page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) only when really necessary -- when
nr_vmemmap_pages is set and we actually adjust the present pages.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210526075226.5572-1-david@redhat.com
Fixes: a08a2ae ("mm,memory_hotplug: allocate memmap from the added memory range")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Qian Cai (QUIC) <quic_qiancai@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9281305)
paniakin-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 1, 2025
…oles on aarch64

offline_pages() properly checks for memory holes and bails out.
However, we do a page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) before calling
offline_pages() when offlining a memory block.

We should not unconditionally call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) on
aarch64 in offlining code, otherwise we can trigger a BUG when hitting a
memory hole:

   kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1383!
   Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
   Modules linked in: loop processor efivarfs ip_tables x_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_mod igb nvme i2c_algo_bit mlx5_core i2c_core nvme_core firmware_class
   CPU: 13 PID: 1694 Comm: ranbug Not tainted 5.12.0-next-20210524+ #4
   Hardware name: MiTAC RAPTOR EV-883832-X3-0001/RAPTOR, BIOS 1.6 06/28/2020
   pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
   pc : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   lr : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   Call trace:
     memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
     device_offline+0x154/0x1d8
     online_store+0xa4/0x118
     dev_attr_store+0x44/0x78
     sysfs_kf_write+0xe8/0x138
     kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x26c/0x3d0
     new_sync_write+0x2bc/0x4f8
     vfs_write+0x718/0xc88
     ksys_write+0xf8/0x1e0
     __arm64_sys_write+0x74/0xa8
     invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e8
     do_el0_svc+0xe4/0x298
     el0_svc+0x20/0x30
     el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8
     el0_sync+0x178/0x180
   Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception
   SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
   Kernel Offset: disabled
   CPU features: 0x00000251,20000846
   Memory Limit: none

If nr_vmemmap_pages is set, we know that we are dealing with hotplugged
memory that doesn't have any holes.  So call
page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) only when really necessary -- when
nr_vmemmap_pages is set and we actually adjust the present pages.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210526075226.5572-1-david@redhat.com
Fixes: a08a2ae ("mm,memory_hotplug: allocate memmap from the added memory range")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Qian Cai (QUIC) <quic_qiancai@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9281305)
paniakin-aws pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 1, 2025
…oles on aarch64

offline_pages() properly checks for memory holes and bails out.
However, we do a page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) before calling
offline_pages() when offlining a memory block.

We should not unconditionally call page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) on
aarch64 in offlining code, otherwise we can trigger a BUG when hitting a
memory hole:

   kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1383!
   Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
   Modules linked in: loop processor efivarfs ip_tables x_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 dm_mod igb nvme i2c_algo_bit mlx5_core i2c_core nvme_core firmware_class
   CPU: 13 PID: 1694 Comm: ranbug Not tainted 5.12.0-next-20210524+ #4
   Hardware name: MiTAC RAPTOR EV-883832-X3-0001/RAPTOR, BIOS 1.6 06/28/2020
   pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
   pc : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   lr : memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
   Call trace:
     memory_subsys_offline+0x1f8/0x250
     device_offline+0x154/0x1d8
     online_store+0xa4/0x118
     dev_attr_store+0x44/0x78
     sysfs_kf_write+0xe8/0x138
     kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x26c/0x3d0
     new_sync_write+0x2bc/0x4f8
     vfs_write+0x718/0xc88
     ksys_write+0xf8/0x1e0
     __arm64_sys_write+0x74/0xa8
     invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e8
     do_el0_svc+0xe4/0x298
     el0_svc+0x20/0x30
     el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8
     el0_sync+0x178/0x180
   Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception
   SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
   Kernel Offset: disabled
   CPU features: 0x00000251,20000846
   Memory Limit: none

If nr_vmemmap_pages is set, we know that we are dealing with hotplugged
memory that doesn't have any holes.  So call
page_zone(pfn_to_page(start_pfn)) only when really necessary -- when
nr_vmemmap_pages is set and we actually adjust the present pages.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210526075226.5572-1-david@redhat.com
Fixes: a08a2ae ("mm,memory_hotplug: allocate memmap from the added memory range")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Qian Cai (QUIC) <quic_qiancai@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9281305)
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