diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-09-11-cooperation-in-great-power-rivalry.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-09-11-cooperation-in-great-power-rivalry.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..b5510c5c --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-09-11-cooperation-in-great-power-rivalry.md @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : Coop. In Great Power Rivalry +author: Melvyn P. Leffler +date : 2023-09-11 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/N3QVCsR.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_As one of the most harrowing crises in human history wound down over the Russian installation of missiles in Cuba, Nikita Khrushchev, the chairman of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, wrote to President John F. Kennedy: “There is no evil without good. Evil has brought some good. The good is that now people have felt more tangibly the breathing of the burning flames of thermonuclear war and have a more clear realization of the threat looming over them if the arms race is not stopped.”_ _But arms alone were not on Khrushchev’s mind. “The people of the world,” he wrote in another letter, “expect from us energetic efforts aimed at the solution of urgent problems.” In these personal letters, Khrushchev beseeched the president and specified the issues that merited attention — including a nuclear test ban, the dissolution of hostile blocs, the peaceful settlement of differences over Germany, the threat of nuclear proliferation, and the admission of the People’s Republic of China into the United Nations._ + +On June 10, 1963, President Kennedy responded publicly with one of the most eloquent speeches of his presidency. He began by addressing a topic “on which ignorance too often abounds and the truth is too rarely perceived.” The topic, he emphasized, was world peace. Peace had to be “the rational end of rational men.” And Americans had a vital stake in recognizing the legitimate security interests of their greatest adversary, the Soviet Union, even while they pursued their own interests and kept true to their own values. Kennedy then announced a series of steps he would take to mitigate tensions, open communication with the Kremlin, invigorate disarmament talks, prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and modulate harm to the environment. Nothing he would do, Kennedy emphasized, would endanger U.S. allies or injure U.S. interests. + +President Kennedy realized — as did Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard M. Nixon, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan — that in the midst of competition with a great power rival and an ideological foe, cooperation could augment U.S. wellbeing and security. Cooperation could boost U.S. interests, underscore American values, and enhance the country’s long-term ability to compete while showing sensitivity to an adversary’s vital interests and catering to the yearnings of people everywhere for peace. Rivalry, policymakers grasped, was not the end in itself. The Soviet Union had to be contained, but peace, prosperity, and freedom of the American people were the overriding goals; competitive impulses must not hinder concrete objectives. + +Throughout the Cold War, without losing sight of the fundamental rivalry, U.S. presidents grasped the value of modulating competition and seeking cooperation with the Soviet Union in order to serve U.S. interests and values. They recognized that they must avoid nuclear conflict; control the spread of atomic weapons; preserve order; and promote the fiscal, financial, and economic health of the United States. In order to achieve these ends, cooperation assumed various forms, from formal agreements to informal understandings. U.S. officials signed numerous bilateral and multilateral treaties with the Soviet Union, including the Austrian State Treaty (1955), the Lacy-Zarubin cultural agreement (1958), the Antarctic Treaty (1959), the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963), the Outer Space Treaty (1967), the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968), the Seabed Treaty (1971), the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on the High Seas and the Air Space Above Them (1972), the SALT and ABM treaties (1972), the Helsinki Accords (1975), and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (1987). The aims of these were to mitigate the arms race, modulate sources of friction, lessen the chances of confrontation, address shared problems, and build trust and understanding. U.S. policymakers also managed their containment policy adroitly to avoid challenging the adversary in areas that Kremlin leaders deemed vital to their security. In return, Soviet officials learned not to cross the United States’ own red lines — as Khrushchev did when he tried to sneak missiles into Cuba. Never again during the Cold War would Soviet leaders try to put nuclear weapons on the U.S. periphery; tacitly and informally, Kennedy returned the favor by secretly withdrawing U.S. Jupiter missiles from Turkey. + + +### The Onset of the Cold War + +> #### Competing and Learning + +Cooperation evolved as Washington and Moscow recognized the vital interests of one another and accepted, however grudgingly, the results, precedents, and informal rules arising from their interactions, “especially those from their conflictual relations.” At the very onset of the Cold War, even as President Truman and his advisers embraced the doctrine of containment, they did not challenge the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Understanding its vital strategic importance to an emerging adversary, U.S. officials regarded Soviet behavior in this region as a litmus test of Soviet intentions elsewhere — a test the Kremlin woefully failed. Acquiescing to Soviet behavior in this region, Truman and his advisers defined their own vital security interests and identified the western zones of occupied Germany, France, and Britain as such. + +This assessment set the framework for the initiation of the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe and to integrate West Germany into an economic orbit that would resuscitate a region deemed vital to U.S. security. When Soviet leader Joseph Stalin made it clear that he would not tolerate any Western capitalist penetration of his zone of vital interests in Eastern Europe, the United States proceeded to focus on its core goals in the western part of the continent. Stalin challenged those efforts with a blockade of Berlin — parts of which were still occupied and governed by the British, French, and Americans — and the United States responded with an airlift. Stalin then backed down and ended the blockade rather than risk war, and the Truman administration acquiesced to Soviet consolidation of its own sphere of vital interest in Eastern Europe. Even when revolutions subsequently broke out in East Germany (1953), Hungary (1956), and Poland (1956), the Republican administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower refused to intervene. Slowly, grudgingly, the two adversaries acknowledged the vital interests of one another and labored to establish formal and informal rules of behavior. Each grasped that it was engaged in a zero-sum strategic contest with the other yet recognized that direct confrontation did not serve the interests of either Washington or Moscow. + +This was highlighted during the Korean War, when the United States intervened militarily on the peninsula to thwart North Korea’s aggression against South Korea — an action that was interpreted in Washington as orchestrated by the Kremlin and designed to expand Communist influence and Soviet power. Yet when the new Communist regime in China intervened to aid North Korea, Truman and Eisenhower did not attack China directly lest Washington provoke Stalin to aid his new ally in Beijing. At the same time, Stalin tried to shroud his assistance to his Communist allies lest he provoke U.S. retaliation and a worldwide conflagration. Both Moscow and Washington were learning informal rules of behavior and carefully assessing the core interests and sensibilities of the other to avert a third world war. Such an outcome, leaders in both nations grasped, did not serve anyone’s interest. Prudent behavior had to temper strategic competition lest the competition itself undercut the most vital interests of both nations: avoiding World War III. + +___`Slowly, grudgingly, the two adversaries acknowledged the vital interests of one another and labored to establish formal and informal rules of behavior.`___ + +Nonetheless, the strategic competition assumed a dynamic of its own as both sides believed they were engaged in an existential ideological struggle for the soul of humankind. No document better illustrated the U.S. view of the competition than NSC 68, the national security strategy statement written by Truman’s key advisers in the winter and spring of 1950, just preceding the outbreak of fighting in Korea. Paul Nitze, the head of the policy planning staff at the Department of State, was the principal author of that document. He believed that the Kremlin lusted for world domination and that the United States needed to reckon with the new totalitarian threat, a threat more dangerous to democratic capitalism than anything previously encountered. Nitze and his colleagues urged a massive military buildup of conventional and strategic weapons, including the development of a hydrogen bomb. They dwelled on the recent Soviet explosion of an atomic warhead and predicted that the Kremlin would have an arsenal of 200 atomic bombs by the mid-1950s. Nitze acknowledged that this buildup did not portend premeditated Soviet aggression. He worried, however, that Soviet atomic capabilities might neutralize the diplomatic shadows heretofore cast by the U.S. atomic monopoly. Enemies and allies might doubt U.S. willingness to risk nuclear war over limited issues (like the blockade of Berlin). Nitze believed that the United States had to undertake a host of risky new initiatives, like rearming West Germany and bringing it into the European Defense Community, signing a peace treaty with Japan, and thwarting the spread of Communism in Southeast Asia. These actions, Nitze insisted, required “an adequate military shield under which they can develop.” He wrote that “without superior aggregate military strength, in being and readily mobilizable, a policy of containment — which is in effect a policy of calculated and gradual coercion — is no more than a policy of bluff. + +NSC 68 inaugurated a radical shift in U.S. military expenditures and catalyzed a vast acceleration of U.S. strategic air and atomic capabilities. The U.S. military budget more than tripled in a few short years and the number of atomic warheads in its arsenal increased from 110 in 1948 to 369 in 1950, then to 1436 in 1953. “The United States and the Soviet Union are engaged in a struggle for preponderant power,” insisted Truman’s policy planning staff. “To seek less than preponderant power would be to opt for defeat. Preponderant power must be the object of US policy.” + + +### The Trajectory of Cooperation across the Cold War + +> #### Ideas and Initiatives + +#### The Eisenhower Administration + +But the costs — both financial and environmental — of that policy were exorbitant. President Eisenhower believed that this trajectory portended financial ruin for the United States. “I most firmly believe,” Ike wrote a close friend in May 1952, “that the financial solvency and economic soundness of the United States constitute together the first requisite to collective security and the free world. That comes before all else.” The newly elected Republican president recognized that, locked in a Cold War with an inveterate enemy, the United States required military strength to support effective diplomacy, but he also believed that fiscal prudence and economic vitality were the foundations of national well-being. In pursuit of victory in a strategic competition, Eisenhower believed it was imperative not to undermine the pillars of the U.S. free enterprise system. With Stalin dead (in March 1953), he hoped there would be a chance for peace. Peace could be nurtured, Eisenhower declared in a famous speech, “not by weapons of war but by wheat and by cotton, by milk and by wool, by meat and by timber and by rice. These are words that translate into every language on earth. These are needs that challenge the world in arms.” If the United States and the Soviet Union could find areas to cooperate, Eisenhower continued, if Moscow and Washington could muster the courage to curb the arms race, they might generate the resources to fund reconstruction around the world, stimulate free and fair trade, and allow peoples everywhere to “know the blessing of productive freedom.” + +Rejecting a strategy of rollback of Soviet power because it was too costly and too provocative, Eisenhower sought to contain Soviet and Communist expansion and to explore prospects for cooperation. Under his watch, however, the arms race intensified, new technologies spawned new weapons systems, the testing of atomic and hydrogen warheads approached catastrophic proportions, and crises percolated over the competitive thrusts of each side in Germany, Indochina, the Taiwan Straits, and the Middle East. But at the same time Eisenhower recognized the dangers that lurked in such competition and sought areas of cooperation. He put the finishing touches on a treaty that unified and neutralized Austria. He stunned observers at the Geneva Summit Conference in 1955 when he called upon both governments to share blueprints of their military establishments and allow aerial photography in order to build confidence that neither side was preparing a surprise attack. In 1959, he signed the Antarctic Treaty, obligating the 12 signatories to keep that continent demilitarized and free of nuclear weapons. Eisenhower also supported the negotiation and implementation of a bilateral cultural exchange agreement with the Soviet Union. For the first time, Soviet and U.S. educational, scientific, and athletic exchanges would take place under the official auspices of both governments. At the American National Exhibition in Sokolniki Park, the United States chose not to display its military prowess but to highlight the appeal of its culture of consumption. + +___`Rejecting a strategy of rollback of Soviet power because it was too costly and too provocative, Eisenhower sought to contain Soviet and Communist expansion and to explore prospects for cooperation.`___ + +#### The Kennedy Administration and the Appeal of Détente + +In his farewell address, Eisenhower did more than warn against a military-industrial complex. He underscored the importance of balance between competing impulses. He stressed that “disarmament, with mutual honor and confidence, is a continuing imperative. Together we must learn how to compose difference, not with arms, but with intellect and decent purpose.” He acknowledged disappointment. “As one who has witnessed the horror and the lingering sadness of war — as one who knows that another war could utterly destroy the civilization which has been so slowly and painfully built over thousands of years — I wish I could say that a lasting peace was in sight.” + +But it wasn’t. The Soviet threat mounted as the Kremlin capitalized upon its own scientific and technological accomplishments, built up its long-range strategic weapons, and exploited revolutionary ferment and decolonization in the Third World to promote its own interests and ideological appeal. Nobody took this competition more seriously than John F. Kennedy, the youthful Democratic candidate who defeated Richard M. Nixon, Eisenhower’s vice president, in the elections of 1960. “Let every nation know,” Kennedy declared in his inaugural address, that “we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.” He was determined to meet the Soviet challenge in the Third World, thwart Soviet moves to bolster the legitimacy of the East German Communist regime, and reverse the perception of Soviet technological superiority stemming from its stunning launch of the Sputnik satellite in 1957 and its ability to put the first man into space. Close to home, Kennedy aspired to eradicate the Communist regime in Cuba and prevent the Kremlin from stationing missiles and nuclear warheads there. But the confrontation with Khrushchev in October 1962 — and the realization that the two countries were indeed on the brink of nuclear war — chastened him. + +Kennedy grasped that competition might be enduring, but that cooperation could serve U.S. interests. Nuclear testing was polluting the atmosphere and inspiring millions of people to protest the radiological fallout. The arms race was preposterously expensive. The struggles in the Third World were portentous. “The Family of Man,” he told a New York audience three weeks before his assassination in 1963, resides in more than 100 nations. “Most of its members are not white. Most of them are not Christians. Most of them know nothing about free enterprise. . . . Most of them are engulfed in anticolonial wars, or regional strife, or religious and ethnic conflict.” They are “not faring very well,” he concluded. And they could ensnare the United States and the Soviet Union into conflicts unrelated to their vital interests. + +Faced with these issues, Kennedy saw the appeal of détente, of cooperation. He negotiated a Limited Test Ban Treaty that prohibited testing in the atmosphere, in space, and beneath the seas. Its primary purpose, said the president, was “to halt or delay the development of an atomic capability by the Chinese Communists.” Khrushchev not only agreed that the two governments had a common interest in stopping China’s nuclear ambitions but also that the agreement augured well for the settlement of other issues. The test ban treaty, Khrushchev informed Kennedy, “could lead to a real turning point, and the end of the cold war.” + +___`Kennedy grasped that competition might be enduring, but that cooperation could serve U.S. interests.`___ + +Kennedy was not so certain, yet he too recognized that Moscow and Washington had mutual interests even as they competed for influence around the world. Consequently, the president responded positively to Khrushchev’s request to buy U.S. wheat, knowing that the deal also helped American farmers and the U.S. economy. More surprisingly, Kennedy also reversed his position on space exploration. Heretofore he had been eager to beat the Kremlin in the race to the Moon. But now he told a meeting of the UN General Assembly that the thaw in relations required new approaches — that the two nations should cooperate “to keep weapons of mass destruction out of outer space.” He continued, “if this pause in the Cold War leads to its renewal and not to its end, then the indictment of posterity will rightly point its finger at us all.” + +When Kennedy was assassinated in November 1963, a more formal agenda of cooperation was evolving around arms control, nonproliferation, space, and trade. Even the friction over the interpretation of the rights of access to Berlin and the rules for quadripartite governance of East and West Germany receded once the East Germans built a wall in August 1961 to stop the outflow of refugees — and the Americans and West Germans did not tear it down. Officials in Moscow and Washington could not admit it publicly, but they shared a common interest in the division of Germany and the control of German power. Each side worried that a reunified Germany might again gather strength, tilt to one side or the other, and undermine the informal balance of power that had evolved. + +#### The Johnson Years: Converging Interests amid New Geopolitical Turbulence + +Nonetheless, cooperation was halting. Lyndon Johnson, Kennedy’s successor, blamed Moscow for supporting the North Vietnamese Communists in their struggle to control all of Vietnam. And Kremlin leaders felt, as strongly as those in Washington, that they needed to bargain from a position of strength. Forced to back down and withdraw their missiles from Cuba, worried about the growth of Chinese adventurism, fearful of the ambitions of some West Germans to acquire nuclear weapons of their own, Soviet officials rebuffed overtures to negotiate and accelerated their buildup of strategic weapons, achieving virtual parity by the late 1960s or early 1970s. + +The United States was too enmeshed in the conflict in Indochina and too burdened by the expenses of that conflict to focus on matching the Soviet buildup in the mid-1960s. In fact, after Kennedy’s assassination, President Johnson’s worries gravitated increasingly to the behavior of Communist China. Beijing detonated its own atomic bomb in 1964, gradually escalated its assistance to the North Vietnamese Communists, and projected its influence into Southeast Asia and Africa at the expense of both its former Communist ally in Moscow and its capitalist imperialist adversaries in Paris, London, and Washington. Faced with China’s bellicose behavior, many of Johnson’s advisers now realized that Soviet and U.S. interests converged around the importance of thwarting the spread of nuclear weapons in an increasingly multipolar world. Faced with common danger, Moscow and Washington collaborated to ratify the non-proliferation treaty in 1968. + +By the late 1960s, officials on both sides of the Cold War realized that they were facing a turbulent new era. Each superpower felt beleaguered by restless allies who clamored for more autonomy, as well as by proud and adventurous leaders of newly independent nations in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East who wanted aid but were determined to pursue their own interests. In Western Europe, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) yearned to act more independently and challenged U.S. domination of the North Atlantic alliance. In the Communist world, Beijing denounced Moscow’s cowardly behavior and disloyalty, while ferment and rebellion seethed in Eastern Europe. Once again, the Kremlin decided to intervene militarily and clamp down on a rebellious satellite, this time Czechoslovakia. + +___`Faced with common danger, Moscow and Washington collaborated to ratify the non-proliferation treaty in 1968.`___ + +Soviet actions and North Vietnamese defiance slowed Lyndon Johnson’s penchant to mitigate competition with his great power rival, but it did not end it. Committed to building a “Great Society” at home — a grand vision that included Medicare, Medicaid, and a host of other domestic programs — Johnson recognized that the United States could not easily bear the costs of a hugely expensive domestic agenda while engaged in an arms race with the Kremlin and a war in Vietnam. Johnson wanted to work with Khrushchev’s successors, Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksei Kosygin, to pursue mutual goals, like the outlawing of nuclear weapons in space and the nonproliferation of them on earth. He saw mutual advantage in cooperative efforts to deal with space biology and medicine, satellite communications, and the sharing of meteorological information. Bilateral agreements (1964) and an international treaty (1967) on these subjects were negotiated and signed, and Johnson would have done more if he had stayed in office and if the Kremlin had tempered its actions abroad. On signing the Outer Space Treaty on January 27, 1967, Johnson declared that the agreement “holds promise that the same wisdom and good will which gave us this space treaty will continue to guide us as we seek solutions to the many problems that we have here on this earth.” But beleaguered by domestic unrest and a tenacious adversary in Hanoi, Johnson decided not to run for reelection. His decision created havoc in the Democratic Party and enabled former vice president Richard Nixon to win the presidency in 1968. + +#### Interest-Driven Cooperation during the Nixon Administration + +Nixon and Henry Kissinger, his national security advisor, recognized that strategic competition and the arms race with Soviet Russia, if left unchecked, posed a grave threat to U.S. national security. Grappling with creeping inflation, a gold drain, budget deficits, and an unruly Congress, they realized that the United States could not bear the costs of an unrestricted arms race because the American people would not pay the price. Nixon believed that the relative military power of the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet Union had been eroding since the early 1960s and would continue to decline because of public opinion and legislative constraints. He lamented, “We simply can’t get from Congress the additional funds needed to continue the arms race with the Soviet [Union] in either the defensive or offensive missile category. + +Seeking cooperation and negotiating a strategic arms limitation agreement and an anti-ballistic missile treaty therefore made sense. Nixon grasped that the United States and the Soviet Union were still locked in a strategic competition, but that each side had reason to curb the arms race, focus on rivals abroad (like China), and grapple with domestic problems and pressures. It made political and strategic sense to set limits and cooperate when competitive gains were unlikely, and when the other side might want an agreement as much as you did. With great fanfare, Nixon signed these treaties at a summit meeting in Moscow in May 1972. + +Nixon, however, also believed that the source of friction between the two countries was not armaments, but geopolitics. In February 1969, in one of his first meetings with the Soviet ambassador, he declared: “History makes clear that wars result from political differences and political problems.” Nixon worried that smaller nations might ensnare the two great powers in a confrontation unrelated to their vital interests. He also realized that freezing strategic arms and limiting defensive missiles alone would not end the rivalry. “It is incumbent on us, therefore . . . to de-fuse critical political situations such as the Middle East and Viet-Nam.” U.S. and Soviet diplomats labored to formulate rules of competition. At their summit meeting in 1972, Nixon and Brezhnev signed an agreement on the “Basic Principles” of their evolving cooperative relationship of détente. Despite their acknowledged differences in ideology, they would conduct their relations “on principles of sovereignty, equality, non-interference in mutual affairs, and mutual advantage.” They would seek to coexist and avoid actions designed to garner unilateral advantage. Most of all, “they would do their utmost to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war.” To this end they signed, among other better-known accords like SALT and the ABM Treaty, an agreement to prevent incidents on the high seas and the skies above them, the aim of which was to avoid accidental confrontations that might precipitate war. + +In seeking to relax tensions and cooperate with their great power rival, Nixon and Kissinger never lost sight of the competitive underpinnings of the Soviet-U.S. relationship and its ideological foundations. While they signed additional multilateral treaties to eliminate biological weapons and to outlaw nuclear weapons from ocean floors, they assigned rather little importance to those agreements. They cared more about the bilateral trade agreement. They realized that more trade might allow the United States to exert more leverage. They knew that Brezhnev desired to promote commercial relations and to purchase U.S. wheat, and they hoped to exploit Soviet economic vulnerabilities and promote agricultural sales that would be popular in the American hinterland. When Senator Henry Jackson linked trade to the emigration of Russian Jews and when the administration poorly handled its first big grain deal, prospects for exploiting this leverage declined. But what all of this illustrated was that détente was regarded as a means to pursue fundamental interests when the United States’ competitive edge appeared to be eroding. Cooperation meant efforts to avoid war; mitigate tensions; reduce arms expenditures; thwart the acquisition of nuclear weapons by smaller powers; and make the seas, outer space, and Antarctica safe from nuclear weapons and environmental degradation. But it also involved linkage — efforts to leverage U.S. strengths against Soviet vulnerabilities. + +Détente and the relaxation of tensions initially involved very popular initiatives that garnered much praise in the United States and abroad. Nixon pursued détente with vigor because he believed it would redound to his popularity and help get him reelected. But his policies were also a calculated response to French and West German efforts to reconfigure relations between East and West. Those initiatives worried U.S. leaders because they reflected the desires of their allies to break out of the bipolar Cold War international order that reduced their freedom of action. These allies wanted to engage more freely with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. They desired to expand trade, investments, travel, and educational and cultural exchanges. West German leaders, in particular, pursued détente with the Kremlin and with their counterparts in East Berlin in order to overcome the division of their country and to allow families to reunite and see one another. In many ways, Nixon and Kissinger were playing catch-up. In order to retain allied cohesion, Nixon and Kissinger knew they needed to relax tensions and pursue détente with the Kremlin. Strategic calculations — the unity of NATO — required a more cooperative approach to the adversary in Moscow. + +Nothing illustrates this better than the negotiations that led to the Helsinki accords of 1975, the high-water mark of cooperation during the Cold War. For decades the Kremlin had wanted an agreement that would ratify the territorial arrangements that grew out of World War II, including the division of Germany, the borders of Poland, the incorporation of the Baltic states inside the Soviet Union, and the dominant Soviet position over Eastern Europe. Neutral nations in Europe and some of their West European friends engaged the Kremlin in such talks and presented their own desires for more trade, cultural exchanges, and the protection of human rights in all prospective signatories of any agreements. Neither Nixon nor Kissinger were enthusiastic supporters of these negotiations, but they were carried along by the momentum of events. The Helsinki Final Act, signed by 35 nations, including the United States and Canada, contained four “baskets” of agreements. The Kremlin more or less got what it wanted in terms of ratifying borders (subject to peaceful change) but assented to demands to honor the rights of individuals; to allow for the freer flow of goods, investments, technology, people, and ideas; and to increase transparency and ease fears of a surprise attack by providing advanced notification of any sizeable troop movements. + +By the time the Helsinki Final Act was signed in August 1975, its critics in Washington were gaining traction. They mocked the human rights provisions, condemned the territorial concessions that catered to Moscow’s security demands, and warned against the growing military prowess of the country’s Cold War rival. They ridiculed the alleged naivete inherent to the cooperative thrust of these accords and warned against the growing Soviet military menace. They remonstrated against the burgeoning financial and commercial ties between East and West Europe and between East and West Germany. They predicted that these ties would lead to the Finlandization or neutralization of the United States’ West European allies and weaken the NATO alliance. Their allegations gained credence as the Soviet Union flouted the human rights provisions, deployed new weapons systems, supported leftist movements in Africa and Central America, and then deployed troops to Afghanistan to support a newly installed Communist government. The Soviet-American détente collapsed. Notional ideas about cooperating with a great power rival were challenged. + +#### Reagan and the End of the Cold War + +Ronald Reagan won the presidency in 1980 condemning détente and promising a bolder, more assertive foreign policy. Quoting Eugene Rostow, Reagan declared that the Cold War was not over. The Soviet Union, he wrote, “is engaged in a policy of imperial expansion all over the world, despite the supposedly benign influence of Salt I, and its various commitments of cooperation in the name of détente.” Reagan wanted to repudiate Nixon’s treaties and Jimmy Carter’s follow-on initiatives. He wanted to build strength and negotiate a new set of agreements aimed at redressing the strategic balance (which he said was now in Russia’s favor) and reversing Soviet inroads in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and elsewhere. + +What Reagan did not see was the subversive role that détente had played in the Communist world. When oil prices skyrocketed in the 1970s, OPEC nations deposited their revenues in Western banks, and the latter made greater and greater loans to Communist governments in Eastern Europe. These regimes lusted for new money to develop industry and to finance their social welfare programs. Trade and debt increasingly bound East and West Germany, Eastern and Western Europe. Cooperation had not compromised Western values and interests but had promoted them by subverting Communist regimes and increasing their dependence on Western economic and financial ties. When oil prices plummeted in the mid-1980s and Soviet Russia could no longer underwrite the economic wherewithal of its East European subordinates, ferment grew and the Communist regimes tottered. The economic and financial ties spawned by the relaxation of tensions and the cooperative norms of intercourse and exchange catalyzed by détente exposed Communist governments in Eastern Europe to relentless pressure and agonizing choices when loans fell due and austerity loomed. The Kremlin would neither support their comrades financially nor intervene militarily to keep them in power. By the end of the 1980s, the East European Communist governments collapsed. + +Reagan began his presidency watching the Polish regime succumb to Soviet pressure and remonstrating against the economic ties that bound West Germany to Soviet Russia. He finished his second term as president watching the Polish Communists prepare to relinquish power and observing the growing dependence of the Kremlin on West German loans — loans that in 1990 purchased Soviet acceptance of German unification inside NATO and the end of the Cold War in Europe. None of this would have happened had West Europeans and U.S. financiers forsaken détente; little of this could have been imagined without the work of human rights activists, nongovernmental organizations, and peace groups empowered by the Helsinki accords and inspired by the fear of nuclear war. + +Triumphalists in the United States declared that Reagan’s determination to build military strength, intimidate the Kremlin, and subvert Communism won the Cold War. They believed that his repudiation of détente and his commitment to a zero-sum competitive mindset vanquished an inveterate foe. Reagan, however, knew the story was far more nuanced. He realized that strength alone would not prevail. Although he believed from the outset that Communists lied, cheated, and wanted to rule the world, he recognized that Soviet leaders nonetheless had legitimate security imperatives. In a six-page letter to Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko in 1984, he added a hand-written postscript to make certain that his Soviet counterpart grasped his personal imprimatur: “In thinking through this letter,” Reagan wrote, “I have reflected at some length on the tragedy and scale of Soviet losses in wartime through the ages. Surely those losses which are beyond description must affect your thinking today. I want you to know that neither I nor the American people hold any offensive intentions toward you or the Soviet people. . . . Our constant & urgent intention must be . . . a lasting reduction of tensions between us. I pledge to you my profound commitment to that end.” + +To the American people, Reagan also spoke candidly along these lines, although all too frequently his conciliatory words were overshadowed by his tirades against an “evil empire.” But the belligerent rhetoric, Reagan knew, did not produce the results he yearned to achieve. In a major speech on January 16, 1984, he acknowledged that “Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the differences between our two societies and our philosophies.” But, he then continued, “the fact that neither of us likes the other system is no reason to refuse to talk. Living in this nuclear age makes it imperative that we do talk.” He therefore committed his administration to a policy “of credible deterrence, peaceful competition, and constructive cooperation.” + +He stressed, “We want more than deterrence. We want genuine cooperation. We seek progress for peace. Cooperation begins with communication.” + +Reagan uttered these words before he met Mikhail Gorbachev. In fact, he gave Vice President George H. W. Bush a message to present to the incoming Soviet leader when they were scheduled to meet after the funeral of Chernenko in March 1985. “I bring with me, a message of peace,” Bush was scripted to say. “We know this is a time of difficulty; we would like it to be a time of opportunity.” Notwithstanding the differences in our systems and the competitive nature of our interactions, the United States and the Soviet Union must “compete and resolve problems in peaceful ways, and to build a more stable and constructive relationship.” Be assured, Bush was supposed to tell Gorbachev, “that neither the American government nor the American people has hostile intentions towards you.” Americans “recognize you have suffered a great deal, and struggled a great deal, throughout your history.” Opportunities for peace had been squandered in the past, but now they could be rekindled. The two governments could make serious headway. “We think it is a time to be more energetic, to tackle larger issues, to set higher goals. . . . We should strive to eliminate nuclear weapons from the face of the earth.” We should aim for “a stable deterrence based on non-nuclear defense. . . . We should approach the other issues between us with the same energy and vision. We should seek to rid the world of the threat or use of force in international relations.” + +Reagan grasped that amid great power rivalry, even with an ideological adversary with great military capabilities, the ultimate goals were the peace and prosperity of the American people. Toward these ends, the United States had to compete, but it also had to cooperate. It had to acknowledge the legitimate strategic imperatives of an adversary while demanding respect for its own. It had to negotiate from strength, but it had to negotiate, build trust, and allow an adversary to save face. Coaxing and maneuvering an adversary to cooperate toward mutual goals was as important as competing on disputatious issues that had zero-sum outcomes. + +___`Reagan grasped that amid great power rivalry, even with an ideological adversary with great military capabilities, the ultimate goals were the peace and prosperity of the American people.`___ + +Throughout the Cold War, through formal agreements and informal understandings, U.S. officials sought to cooperate with the Soviet Union because they grasped that the two adversaries had common interests, not the least of which was avoiding direct confrontation and nuclear war. When Ronald Reagan uniquely combined strength and understanding and when he fortuitously wound up negotiating with a Soviet leader no one could have imagined, his unique sensibilities and qualities produced almost unimaginable results — the end of the Cold War. This was a product of his strength, tenacity, and empathy. This was the consequence of understanding that rivalry did not trump interests; that rivalry was about competing for tangible goods and principles, and that oftentimes, cooperation was as instrumental as competition. + + +### Conclusion + +> #### Lessons for Cooperation among Great Powers Today + +When thinking about the new great power rivalry with China today, the Cold War experience offers critical lessons. Leaders in Washington and Beijing must realize, as did their predecessors during the Cold War, that even more important than the rivalry between them is the avoidance of direct confrontation and nuclear war. From their conflictual interactions, U.S. and Chinese officials must discover the red lines they must not cross, as did U.S. and Russian leaders during the 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s. Like their predecessors, policymakers in both countries must learn to respect one another’s vital interests, modulate their ideological differences, and establish informal rules of competition. Should they fail to do so, they could find themselves going eyeball to eyeball, as happened during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. They also must recognize that, while competing, they must not lose sight of the goals they share — like preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons; averting an arms race in outer space and Antarctica; protecting seabeds; promoting trade; thwarting the spread of infectious diseases; mitigating carbon emissions and greenhouse gases; and promoting transparency about the movements of naval vessels, aircraft, and troops. To achieve these objectives, U.S. and Chinese officials must cooperate. + +___`Leaders in Washington and Beijing must realize, as did their predecessors during the Cold War, that even more important than the rivalry between them is the avoidance of direct confrontation and nuclear war.`___ + +Today, these shared goals are far more compelling than during the Cold War because the economies of the United States and China are infinitely more interwoven and their prosperity so much more codependent than had been the case of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Moreover, the shared dangers that lie ahead — the threats emanating from climate change and pandemics, from cyberattacks and artificial intelligence — are so much more grave and more certain than ever before, arguably far graver than the threats either country presents to one another. So when thinking about the meaning of the Cold War rivalry for today’s challenges, three overriding lessons must not be forgotten: competition must be kept in bounds; ideological antipathy must be modulated; and cooperation must comprise an indispensable element of national security policy. A fourth, more surprising lesson — one that should generate optimism — is that cooperation, smartly pursued, can help lay the basis for victory in the rivalry itself. After all, cooperation not only structured the competitive landscape during the Cold War and reduced points of conflict and sources of friction; it also bought time during a critical period, 1965 to 1975, when the United States was beleaguered with social, political, and financial strife at home and a debilitating war in Indochina. That time helped the United States to heal, recalibrate, and triumph in a Cold War rivalry whose end hardly anyone had foreseen. + +--- + +__Melvyn P. Leffler__ is emeritus professor of American history at the University of Virginia. He is the author of several books on the Cold War and on U.S. relations with Europe, including For the Soul of Mankind (Hill and Wang, 2007), which won the George Louis Beer Prize from the American Historical Association, and A Preponderance of Power (Stanford University Press, 1993), which won the Bancroft, Hoover, and Ferrell Prizes. diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-09-13-greyzone-lawfare.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-09-13-greyzone-lawfare.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..14493c4e --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-09-13-greyzone-lawfare.md @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : Greyzone Lawfare +author: Giangiuseppe Pili, et al. +date : 2023-09-13 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/hryWSYo.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "Russia and the Voyages of the SPARTA IV" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_Russia’s likely use of the SPARTA IV, an alleged civilian vessel, to transport military materiel from Tartus, Syria to its port in Novorossiysk is yet another example of Moscow’s penchant for manipulating international law to satisfy its wartime agenda._ + + + +Less than a week after Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu announced that his government would be utilising its power granted by the 1936 Montreux Convention to severely restrict the passage of military and auxiliary vessels through the Bosporus Strait. + +This closure should have prevented the movement of wartime vessels through the Bosporus, preventing illicit redeployment of any military materiel. However, as in the case of the SPARTA IV (IMO: 9743033), certain Russian vessels appear to continue regularly transiting the Bosporus with military materiel, in breach of international law. + +Using a diverse range of data sources, analytical techniques and intelligence methods for accurate data analysis, this open source intelligence (OSINT) investigation unearths the truth behind Russia’s attempt to manipulate international law to sustain its unjustified invasion of Ukraine. + + +### To and from Russia, with Love + +Automatic identification system (AIS) data provided by Geollect, a close partner of RUSI’s Open Source Intelligence and Analysis (OSIA) research group, and satellite imagery sourced by OSIA from Planet Labs, Maxar Technologies and Airbus Defence and Space confirms the SPARTA IV’s voyages between the ports of Tartus, Syria and Novorossiysk, Russia, and seemingly identifies some of the vessel’s intended cargo. + +![image01](https://i.imgur.com/skRsfXV.jpg) +_▲ Figure 1: The SPARTA IV’s journey between Tartus and Novorossiysk_ + +In 2023, the SPARTA IV has completed at least six voyages between Russia’s military ports in Tartus, Syria and Novorossiysk, Russia: + +- 14 January 2023: The SPARTA IV’s first voyage from Tartus to Novorossiysk of 2023 began. After 11 days of sailing, it arrived in Novorossiysk on 25 January, where it stayed for 22 days before embarking on its return voyage. + +- 1 March 2023: The SPARTA IV again departed from Tartus and arrived in Novorossiysk five days later. On 30 March, it left the port to return to Tartus. + +- 8 April 2023: The SPARTA IV’s next voyage began, arriving in Novorossiysk on 15 April. It remained in port for 21 days before sailing back to Tartus on 6 May. + +- 16 May 2023: The SPARTA IV’s fourth departure from Tartus toward Novorossiysk began. It arrived on 6 June and stayed until 15 June, when it left for the return voyage and arrived back in Tartus on 21 June. + +- 15 July 2023: The ship was imaged by a high-resolution satellite tasked by Planet Labs. The resulting images likely show the ship unloading military material in Novorossiysk after another journey from Tartus. + +- 10 August 2023 (estimated): The SPARTA IV made a return trip to Tartus that was unable to be corroborated by AIS data. The vessel had a significant period of AIS darkness lasting for 292 hours off Lemnos in the Aegean Sea from 3 to 15 August. This signified a change in tradecraft, using much longer periods of AIS darkness to conceal movements. During this period of darkness, satellite imagery confirmed the SPARTA IV in the Tartus port from at least 7 to 10 August, before it sailed back toward Novorossiysk. + +![image02](https://i.imgur.com/wjXL3iQ.jpg) +_▲ Figure 2: 292 hours of AIS darkness_ + +Critically, on each of these visits, the SPARTA IV only docked in Russia’s naval base terminals, despite claims from the vessel’s owner that it carries commercial goods. + +![image03](https://i.imgur.com/aM74noh.jpg) +_▲ Figure 3: The SPARTA IV in Russia’s military ports in Tartus (top) and Novorossiysk (bottom)_ + + +### A Trojan Seahorse + +Russia has consistently used the SPARTA IV as a reliable go-to vessel for sensitive maritime logistical operations. + +The SPARTA IV’s construction, certifications and capacity make it an excellent transit vessel for large military materiel, and it maintains reputational and business indicators of this behaviour. + +![image04](https://i.imgur.com/O6SEAoN.jpg) +_▲ Figure 4: The SPARTA IV_ + +The vessel is a Russian-flagged general cargo ship weighing 8,870 deadweight tonnes and measuring 122 metres in length by 18 metres in breadth that can reach 14 knots. Its volumetric capacity, its two cranes capable of lifting up to “55 tons”, and the overall displacement imply that the ship could easily transport heavy military goods, such as battlefield T-90 tanks deployed in Syria on behalf of the Russian government. + +For example, high-resolution satellite imagery over Tartus from 26 February 2022 seems to show 17 vehicles with measurements (approximately 8 m in length by 2.5 m in width) compatible with those of a KAMAZ-5350 tactical truck. + +The KAMAZ-5350 appears to measure 7.85 m in length, 2.5 m in width and 3.29 m in height, and has a volume of 64.56 m3. A refrigerated container of 40 tons measures 5.450 m (length), 2.285 m (width) and 2.160 m (height), for a volume of 26.89 m3. The ship can move up to 44 refrigerated containers with a total volume of 1,183 m3, equivalent to over 18 KAMAZ-5350s. + +More recently, the SPARTA IV appeared to be loading or unloading dozens of military pieces in Tartus in early August. + +![image05](https://i.imgur.com/b0G7dyd.jpg) +_▲ Figure 5: Rendering the SPARTA IV’s cargo capacity_ + +Before its current route between Tartus and Novorossiysk, the SPARTA IV lived up to the claim it can “walk across three seas”, transporting cargo for Russia through the Arctic, Baltic and South Asian regions. Essentially, if the Russian Ministry of Defence needed maritime logistics somewhere, the SPARTA IV appeared nearby. + + +### Treacherous Ties + +The SPARTA IV’s engagement in military transport comes as no surprise; the ship’s ownership structure includes sanctioned Russian defence companies and ties to a preeminent Russian politician. + +Oboronlogistics LLC, a Moscow-based company allegedly created to oversee logistics for the Russian Minstry of Defence, is the group owner of the SPARTA IV. The company has been sanctioned by the UK, the US, Canada, Australia and Ukraine for aiding Russia’s 2014 and 2022 invasions of Ukraine. Notably, Oboronlogistics’ website features a video of the SPARTA IV loading military cargo. + +The SPARTA IV is directly operated, managed and owned by the Novorossiysk-based SC-South LLC, an Oboronlogistics affiliate which is sanctioned by the UK, Ukraine and the US for delivering maritime goods on behalf of the Russian Ministry of Defence. + +Another Oboronlogistics subsidiary, OBL-Shipping LLC, is the SPARTA IV’s technical manager. One of OBL-Shipping’s former shareholders was the Chief Directorate for Troop Accommodations JSC, the CEO and director of which was Timur Vadimovich Ivanov, Russia’s deputy defence minister. Ivanov is allegedly “responsible for the procurement of military goods and the construction of military facilities”, and has been sanctioned by the EU for financially benefiting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. + + +### Uncharted Waters? + +As it continues to unfold, the case of the SPARTA IV reveals Russia’s continued willingness to bend international law and to prioritise military logistics over adherence to international agreements. The SPARTA IV is much more than a cargo vessel and is not operating alone; other vessels with similar patterns of life and ownership structures continue to illegally transit the Bosporus, likely carrying Russian military materiel into the Black Sea. These ships must and can be stopped. + +Reporting on the SPARTA IV underscores OSINT’s ability to identify breaches of international law almost instantaneously, offering an opportunity for observation and identification to align with political will from Western governments to enforce compliance in real time. + +--- + +__Giangiuseppe Pili__ is an Assistant Professor in the Intelligence Analysis Program at James Madison University. He was a Research Fellow at Open Source Intelligence and Analysis at the Royal United Services Institute. He is an external member of Intelligence Lab – Calabria University and a former lecturer in intelligence studies. + +__Jack Crawford__ is a transatlantic security specialist and Research Analyst with the Open Source Intelligence and Analysis research group. Prior to his current role, Jack acted as Research Assistant and Project Officer for the Proliferation and Nuclear Policy research group’s UK Project on Nuclear Issues. + +__Nick Loxton__ is Head of Intelligence Delivery at Geollect, responsible for bridging customer and client needs with the effective delivery of intelligence products. He is an ex-British Army officer, having served nearly nine years with The Rifles. diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-09-18-degration-everywhere.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-09-18-degration-everywhere.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..516eded3 --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-09-18-degration-everywhere.md @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : Degradation Everywhere +author: Darya Dolzikova +date : 2023-09-18 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/E1LX59B.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "The Long-Term Risks at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Plant" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_Situated on the front line of the war in Ukraine, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant poses ongoing risks. These relate not only to the threat of Russian sabotage, but also to the gradual deterioration of the facility under the extreme operating conditions._ + + + +Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the safety of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants and facilities has been a source of concern. Ukraine hosts four operational nuclear power plants (NPP), including Europe’s largest – the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). It is also home to Europe’s most infamous NPP, at Chornobyl – the site of the major 1986 disaster which saw the eventual displacement of 350,000 people and resulted in the spread of radioactive particles around the world. The continued occupation of the ZNPP by Russian forces and its precarious location on the front line of the war have raised fears across Europe and around the world of a repeat of the 1986 Chornobyl disaster. There have been a number of inflection points over the last year and a half when concerns over the potential for a large-scale radioactive disaster at the ZNPP have reached fever pitch – most recently in early July, in light of warnings from both the Russians and the Ukrainians that the other side was preparing an imminent attack on the plant. While the potential for an engineered incident or attack resulting in radioactive release at the ZNPP cannot be ruled out, the more salient and probable – yet less headline-grabbing – threat to the ZNPP is the slow degradation of the plant’s systems and the consequent safety and economic implications of this chronic deterioration. + +Ultimately, while the ZNPP remains under occupation by Russian forces – who have shown little consideration for human life, nuclear safety or international law – the potential for the site to be used as a giant dirty bomb cannot and should not be ruled out. Moscow may decide to purposefully engineer a malfunctioning of key safety systems or strike parts of the facility to release radioactive material into the surrounding areas. The fact that the facility is on the front line of a military conflict and is already operating under exceptional stress – to its key operating systems (namely, water and electricity supply) as well as to its Ukrainian staff (who have faced harassment and are working in an active warzone) – also means that it would be relatively easy for Russia to write off an engineered incident as a no-fault accident or to place blame on the Ukrainian military or personnel. The ongoing military activity in the vicinity of the ZNPP also raises the possibility that key systems and equipment at the plant could be damaged in a strike. + +Most nuclear experts agree that, under the ZNPP’s current operating conditions, any radioactive release in case of an attack or accident at the site would not equate to the 1986 Chornobyl disaster. An incident on the scale of the 2011 accident at Japan’s Fukushima-Daiichi NPP is a more appropriate comparison, but also unlikely under the current circumstances. However, depending on the scale and nature of the actual incident, as well as the efforts put into managing the emergency, there is some risk of radioactive release. Such a release of radioactivity – or fears of a release – could be weaponised by Russian forces to tie up Ukrainian military resources in responding to the radioactive contamination, to prevent access to the facility by advancing Ukrainian troops, as well as to sow widespread panic among the Ukrainian population. Threats to cause an incident or exacerbate one, or offers to stop one from happening or from escalating, could also be used by Moscow to create leverage and secure concessions from Ukraine and its allies elsewhere in the conflict – either on the battlefield or in the diplomatic space. + +___`Under the current circumstances, the plant is likely to be more useful to Moscow as a source of leverage and a means of sowing public anxiety than as a giant dirty bomb`___ + +Yet, causing an incident at the facility while they continue to occupy it would presumably make little sense for Russia. However, this is not – as some have pointed out – because an accident at the ZNPP would put parts of Russia’s territory and population at risk. Moscow is not known for its concern for the general Russian population, and blaming Ukraine for an accident – as Moscow undoubtedly would – would likely only galvanise support for the invasion among the Russian population. And, as mentioned earlier, an incident at the ZNPP does not necessarily need to result in major radioactive spread. + +If Russian forces wanted to continue operating at or around the ZNPP, generating an incident at the facility would leave Moscow having to deal with at least some of the clean-up of the released radiological material – tying up resources and making operation around the facility more challenging. Depending on the nature of the incident, the plant may also be left inoperable, thus undermining reported Russian intentions to eventually connect the ZNPP to the Crimean and Russian energy grid (although plans to do so appear to have stalled or to have been abandoned for the time being). Russia would instead be left with a huge, damaged installation in need of repair or decommissioning. Under the current circumstances, the plant is thus likely to be more useful to Moscow as a source of leverage to extract concessions from Ukraine and its partners and to sow public anxiety than as a giant dirty bomb. + +However, that calculation will almost certainly change in the instance of a Russian withdrawal from the ZNPP. On their departure, Russian forces will have little incentive to leave the plant operational and plenty of reasons to engineer an incident at the site. In addition to the strain on military and economic resources from having to deal with a radioactive release, as well as the implications for freedom of military movement at and around a contaminated facility, a damaged ZNPP would in turn leave Kyiv managing a massive piece of damaged critical infrastructure, with significant long-term safety and economic implications. + +In fact, there may not be a need for Russia to engineer a system malfunction or directly attack the ZNPP to turn the site into an economic liability and safety hazard for Ukraine after its recapture. A year and a half of military occupation is threatening to do that already. NPPs are robust things, with multiple redundancies and safety systems built in to keep them operating safely under extreme conditions. But no NPP is built to withstand extended operations in an active warzone. The ZNPP has had to put up with mine explosions and fire; it is regularly disconnected from the external power grid; it has been depending on a backup water supply for months; some of its reactors have been held in hot shutdown for months (well beyond the regulatory time limits for operation in this state); and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reported on shortages of maintenance staff and supply chain challenges. At a recent meeting with journalists in early September, Petro Kotin – the head of Ukraine’s nuclear energy utility Energoatom – noted: “It is degradation everywhere … Everything is degraded – equipment, components and personnel. Everything is in very bad condition”. At a press conference on 11 September, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi noted his concerns over “technical issues that are starting to arise”, appearing to suggest that some may be related to the long-term shutdown of the plant. + +___`There is no guarantee that Russia will not attack or otherwise seek to generate a radiological release at the plant, despite it not being in Moscow’s interest`___ + +Should the military situation around the ZNPP ease enough in the future to allow the facility’s reactors to be brought out of their shutdown state and to begin generating energy again, a thorough inspection and servicing of the facility will be necessary. This will be a massive undertaking. The site is a massive complex; in addition to its six reactors, auxiliary buildings and other support and staff infrastructure, it also hosts a dry spent fuel storage site and a training facility. The whole of the site will have to go through a demining operation, and its reactors will need to undergo a top-to-bottom review to ensure that all is in working order. + +Some have even suggested that the site may not be redeemable at all after the occupation, which would require the decommissioning of the NPP. This may become true, depending on the length of the occupation and the state in which the Russian occupiers leave the site. This, too, would incur significant costs; while decommissioning costs for nuclear facilities depend on a range of factors, the IAEA estimates that the decommissioning of a single nuclear power reactor, including costs for associated waste management, comes with a price tag of between $500 million and $2 billion and typically takes 15 to 20 years. These figures, combined with the rendering inoperable of a facility that – prior to the large-scale invasion of Ukraine – was responsible for 25% of the country’s energy supply, would have colossal economic implications for post-war Ukraine, which will already be facing massive reconstruction costs and logistical challenges. + +Ultimately, trying to predict Russian thinking in Ukraine is a fool’s errand. There is no guarantee that Russia will not attack or otherwise seek to generate a radiological release at the ZNPP, despite it not being in Moscow’s interest; in fact, in the event of a Russian withdrawal from the ZNPP, the risk of sabotage at the site will be acute. Ukraine’s allies in the UK, the US, Europe and elsewhere should continue to remain ready to support Ukraine in case of an emergency and radiological release at the ZNPP, through the supply of CBRN equipment and training as requested by Kyiv, as well as the provision of mental health support. They should also continue to make clear that any incident at the ZNPP resulting from Russian action (or inaction) will not go unanswered, and coordinate with Ukraine on an appropriate and credible deterrent and plan of response. Yet, while an engineered incident at the ZNPP remains possible, the massive strain on economic resources – as well as the longer-term safety implications – resulting from the degradation of the ZNPP’s systems are a certainty. As such, it is critical that the response of Ukraine’s partners to the situation at the ZNPP includes allocating the economic resources and technical assistance that will be needed following de-occupation to ensure the safe operation of Europe’s largest NPP. + +--- + +__Darya Dolzikova__ is a Research Fellow with RUSI’s Proliferation and Nuclear Policy programme. Her work focuses on understanding and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including proliferation financing and other illicit trade by actors of proliferation concern. Her research areas include the Iranian nuclear programme and related diplomacy, Iranian and North Korean proliferation-related sanctions evasion, as well as other issues concerning nuclear technology and proliferation. diff --git a/_collections/_hkers/2023-09-18-sellers-remorse.md b/_collections/_hkers/2023-09-18-sellers-remorse.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9acf58fc --- /dev/null +++ b/_collections/_hkers/2023-09-18-sellers-remorse.md @@ -0,0 +1,258 @@ +--- +layout: post +title : Seller’s Remorse +author: Max Bergmann, et al. +date : 2023-09-18 12:00:00 +0800 +image : https://i.imgur.com/fiQK5lu.jpg +#image_caption: "" +description: "The Challenges Facing Russia’s Arms Exports" +excerpt_separator: +--- + +_Russia’s role as a major global arms supplier is under threat. This report analyzes how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the concomitant Western sanctions have affected the status of its role._ _The Russian arms export industry has been declining in its international competitiveness since the early 2010s due to previous packages of Western sanctions aimed at deterring third countries from purchasing Russian weapons, as well as the efforts by China and India to strengthen their domestic arms production. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the subsequent sanctions have aggravated these issues by straining Russia’s defense production capacity, negatively affecting the reputation of Russian arms, and complicating payment options for the Kremlin’s existing customers. Russia is struggling to meet its arms sales commitment to its partners, calling into question its reliability._ + +While Moscow still retains its competitiveness in areas such as missile and air defense systems, aircraft, armored vehicles, naval systems, and engines, recent trends suggest that Russian arms exports in virtually all of these major weapons categories will decline. Available evidence also signals that Russia’s biggest customers, including India and China, will most likely become less reliant on Russian arms exports due to ongoing import substitution and diversification efforts in these countries, which have been strengthened since 2022 because of the growing instability of Russia’s defense industrial base affecting Russian arms deliveries worldwide. Therefore, Russia will struggle to compete for sales in the high-value market for advanced military systems. However, Moscow will likely continue to maintain its strong position in the lower-cost market, as Russian systems remain widely used, relatively reliable, and not cost prohibitive. While those deliveries will likely have little monetary value and thus limited ability to insulate Russia’s declining arms export industry, they will continue to bring diplomatic benefits to the Kremlin, particularly in Africa. + + +### Introduction + +This report examines historical trends in Russia’s arms exports, including the impacts of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent sanctions regime on its arms sales globally. Recent trends have not been favorable to Moscow. It has been losing old markets, and its weapons have become less desirable to potential purchasers due in part to new, technologically superior alternatives. While Moscow has generally been considered the second-largest arms exporter following the United States, recent data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) shows that France surpassed Russia in the years 2021 and 2022 as the world’s second-largest arms exporter, and China may also outstrip Russia in the near future. + +Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has dramatically accelerated these trends by putting an additional strain on its industrial base and technological capacity, damaging the reputation of Russian weapons as high-quality and durable products and undermining its credibility as a reliable arms supplier. While Moscow will likely remain a major arms exporter in the next few years, its international position will keep deteriorating. Russia’s decline in global market share, however, predates the war in Ukraine. U.S. sanctions against the Russian defense sector after 2014 and the implementation of the 2017 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) increased the potential costs — both economic and diplomatic — of buying Russian arms. Now, with the need to sustain a massive war effort in the face of unprecedented Western sanctions, Russia’s defense industrial capacity has been significantly strained — the Kremlin has even been forced to buy back Russian-made weapons systems, spare parts, and components from some of its purchasing countries. + +Thus, it is likely that Moscow’s share of the global arms market will deteriorate further. This has significant foreign policy ramifications for Russia and other arms-producing countries. Arms sales have been a major tool of Russian foreign policy, as the sale of weapons to another countries helps build longer-term strategic partnerships. Former U.S. assistant secretary of state Andrew Shapiro outlined the critical role arms transfers can play in binding countries: + +> One way to conceptualize the transfer of an advanced defense system, such as a fighter aircraft, is to think about the sale of a new smartphone. When someone buys a smartphone, they are not simply buying a piece of hardware; they are buying a system that includes the operating system; the system’s software for email, photos, and music; as well as access to many other available applications. Therefore, an individual is in fact entering into a relationship with a particular smartphone company over the life of that phone. Similarly, when a country buys a fighter jet or other advanced defense system from a U.S. company, they are not just getting the hardware; they are buying a larger system, one that will need to be updated and repaired throughout its lifespan, which in the case of a fighter jet can be as long as 40 years. This means that in purchasing the hardware, the buyer is actually committing to a broader long-term relationship with the United States. + +Similarly, Russian arms sales have helped cement the Kremlin’s relationships around the world. For instance, a major reason for Indian reticence to sanction or critique Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is that New Delhi and Moscow have a long-term diplomatic partnership rooted in India’s dependence on Russia’s defense sector. + +Indeed, for years, Russia has serviced both ends of the global arms market. It has produced high-end systems, such as advanced aircraft, air defense, and modern battle tanks for its larger and wealthier clients, while also being the supplier of choice to the lower-end market, producing relatively inexpensive, yet reliable systems to lower-income countries. This report highlights that Russia is getting squeezed out of the higher-end market, as sanctions, questions of reliability and performance, and doubts about the existing Russian production capacity are causing the Kremlin to lose its international market share. However, Moscow may prove more resilient at the lower end of the market. Russia’s ability to provide low-quality weapons systems and its willingness to do so with limited strings attached, especially related to human rights and end-use requirements, can make it an attractive partner, particularly to conflict-affected countries and autocratic regimes, including in Africa. Additionally, the militaries of many countries often have a long history of engagement with the Russian or Soviet defense industrial sector and have immense familiarity with Russian-origin equipment. While the Russian defense industry is expected to struggle to supply its forces fighting in Ukraine, the diplomatic importance of maintaining defense industrial ties, particularly with African states and other long-standing partners, will likely ensure that Moscow will continue to meet the demands of its loyal customers. + +___`Russia is getting squeezed out of the higher-end market, as sanctions, questions of reliability and performance, and doubts about the existing Russian production capacity are causing the Kremlin to lose its international market share.`___ + +Moreover, Western nations, which often produce expensive, higher-end systems, are not well positioned to take advantage of the market gap. The U.S. defense industry, for instance, focuses its efforts on meeting the high-end needs of the U.S. military and rarely focuses on lower-cost systems. The United States, in contrast to Russia and other competitors, also does not have flexible financing mechanisms for lower- or middle-income countries. Instead, it provides security assistance in the form of grants that are used to procure from the U.S. defense companies. However, this funding is rarely flexible enough to seize new opportunities, as it would have to be redirected from one recipient country to another, forcing difficult trade-offs. Congress could allocate more funding to the Department of State, which oversees the Foreign Military Financing program, or the Department of Defense, which in the last decade has established its own security assistance funding program. But U.S. transfers come with conditions attached, and, inevitably, Russia provides weapons to countries to which the United States will be unwilling to transfer weapons. Nevertheless, there may be opportunities for Washington to incentivize countries to move off of Russian equipment by providing targeted assistance or through other security assistance programs, such as the Excess Defense Articles program, which provides for transfer of older U.S. military equipment to partners. + +Should Moscow lose its dominant position in its major foreign arms markets, Russia’s entire defense sector will be negatively impacted. While revenues from arms trade constitute a relatively small part of the Russian state budget, foreign sales help fund its defense sector and incentivize further innovation. It also forces Russia’s military industrial base to meet the higher standards often demanded by a purchasing country with significant leverage on the Kremlin, such as India or China. Therefore, examining where and in what capacity Moscow will continue its arms trade is central to understanding its international standing as well as the state of its military research and development (R&D) sector going forward. + +This report analyzes how the changes in Russia’s defense industrial capacity, as a result of Western sanctions and embargoes, affect its status as the second-largest supplier in the global arms trade, which it has kept in the last decades. It first overviews the historical dynamics of Russian arms sales, starting from the collapse of the Soviet Union to before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Then it outlines key trends observed in Russian arms exports amid the war in Ukraine and the allied sanctions regime. The report then examines Moscow’s most exported weapons categories and top purchasing countries before analyzing possible future trends in Russian arms sales and making policy recommendations for Western policymakers. + + +### Historical Dynamics of Russian Arms Sales + +Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian arms transfers came to a brief halt. However, exports to large purchasers such as India and China resumed in 1992 and, by the end of the 1990s, Russia reestablished itself as one of the top arms-exporting nations in the world. And while its overall capacity to export arms was comparable to that of the United States (see Figure 1), its overall volume of transfers translated into a much larger amount of hardware exported abroad because of the relative cheapness of Russian equipment compared to Western alternatives. + +Arms sales comprise a relatively small amount of Russia’s overall trade. According to Russian media sources, in the last 10 years, revenue from arms transfers constituted around $14–15 billion per year, or only 2 to 5 percent of its overall exports. But while the arms trade has hardly been a significant source of revenue, Russia has relied on it as a soft-power tool to build patronage networks and advance its economic and strategic objectives around the globe. In the 2000s, Moscow began expanding its role as an exporter of choice for revisionist and rogue leaders, such as Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez and Syria’s Bashar al-Assad. Russia’s arms transfers to Syria spiked from 2010 to 2013 as the West imposed arms embargoes on Damascus. These policies contributed to a successful expansion of Russia’s arms trade by the late 2000s (see Figure 1). + +However, the upward trend started to change in the last decade. While the Kremlin’s official reports claim that the level of arms sales have remained stable over the last 10 years, alternative sources suggest that growth in Russian arms sales has slowed down, especially following the 2014 Russia-Ukraine war. According to SIPRI, between 2012 and 2016, Russian arms exports grew by only 4.7 percent, compared to a global average of 8.4 percent, a decline when adjusted for inflation. This occurred despite the fact that the global arms trade kept growing, reaching its highest level since the end of the Cold War in 2019. + +![image01](https://i.imgur.com/9yddcft.png) +_▲ __Figure 1: Russia’s Arms Sales Compared to the United States, France, and China, 1992–2022.__ Source: [“Importer/Exporter TIV Tables,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Arms Transfers Database, June 2023](https://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php)._ + +As mentioned above, Russian arms exports were negatively impacted due to pressure from the West on third countries not to buy Russian arms following its invasion of Ukraine in 2014. Subsequent years have witnessed an even more pronounced decrease in Russian arms sales. Moscow’s share of global arms exports fell from an average of 22 percent between 2013 and 2017 to 16 percent between 2018 and 2022, a 31 percent decrease. Meanwhile, the market share of Russia’s immediate competitors grew. While Russian arms exports nearly matched U.S. arms exports in 2011 and were distributed to 35 different countries, they had fallen by nearly 70 percent by 2022, with deliveries to just 12 countries. As the gap between Russia and the United States, the world’s largest arms supplier, significantly widened, the gap between Russia and France, the third-largest arms supplier, narrowed. Eventually, as Figure 1 demonstrates, in 2021 and 2022, France even surpassed Russia. If this trend continues over the next few years, Russia risks falling behind China as well, currently the fourth-largest arms supplier. + +A number of factors have contributed to the decline in the Kremlin’s arms trade in the last five years, including an increased focus of Russia’s defense industry on fulfilling domestic orders, as well as important steps taken by Russia’s key arms purchasers toward indigenization of weapons production and diversification of arms imports. Another important factor contributing to the decline has been the imposition of CAATSA, which the U.S. Congress passed in 2017 in response to Russia’s 2014 Crimea annexation and meddling in the 2016 U.S. elections. Section 231 of CAATSA authorized secondary sanctions on countries engaged in “significant transactions” with Russia’s defense sector. This provision, while sparingly enforced, still deterred many potential purchasers from concluding big-ticket arms deals with Moscow. Russian officials even acknowledged that sanctions were posing difficulties for Moscow’s arms exports and potential clients. + +Turkey is one example of CAATSA enforcement. In 2017, President Erdoğan brokered a $2.5 billion deal with Russia for the purchase of the S-400 surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. Turkey then accepted the first of the four missile batteries in July 2019, despite warnings from the United States and other NATO allies. Subsequently, Washington sanctioned Turkey’s Defense Industry Agency (SSB) for knowingly engaging in a significant transaction with Rosoboronexport, Russia’s main arms export entity. The sanctions included a ban on all U.S. export licenses and authorizations to SSB, as well as asset freezes and visa restrictions on SSB’s president and other officers. Ankara was also removed from the U.S. F-35 program. Along with Turkey, the only other country sanctioned to date has been China. In a largely symbolic move, the United States sanctioned the Chinese Equipment Development Department and its director for engaging in “significant transactions” with Rosoboronexport for purchasing two S-400 SAM systems and 10 Sukhoi fighter aircraft in late 2017 after CAATSA had entered into force. + +Despite not being consistently enforced — for example, in the view of its strategic partnership with India, the United States waived sanctions on New Delhi despite it purchasing five S-400 SAM systems from Russia in 2018 — CAATSA had a chilling effect on many smaller Russian arms purchasers. Naturally, there are many factors that go into a country’s arms acquisition decisions, making it difficult to pinpoint the exact impact of CAATSA sanctions on decisionmaking. Nevertheless, the potential threat of U.S. sanctions has given U.S. diplomats a powerful tool to push against Russian arms purchases in a number of countries. In recent years, states such as Egypt, the Philippines, and Indonesia have scaled down or canceled orders of Russian weapons in the face of potential CAATSA sanctions. For example, Indonesia acknowledged that it abandoned its plan to acquire Russian Su-35 aircraft due to the threat of sanctions and considered purchasing U.S. and French systems instead. Thus, CAATSA punitive measures worked best when complemented with other incentives. The combination of suitable, competitively priced Western alternatives to meet buyers’ security needs with the threat of sanctions is particularly effective in dissuading countries from purchasing Russian arms. In sum, CAATSA has increased the potential costs of purchasing Russian weapons and has contributed to the decline of the profile of Moscow’s arms purchasers. + + +### Key Trends following Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine + +Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the subsequent sanctions have aggravated issues faced by the Kremlin’s arms exports industry, including significantly straining Russia’s defense production capacity, negatively affecting the reputation of Russian arms, and complicating payment options for Moscow’s existing customers. + +#### Strained Defense Production Capacity + +Due to the protracted nature of the war in Ukraine, Russia’s defense production has substantially increased since 2022. However, the war has forced the Russian arms industry to refocus inwards by prioritizing supplies for its own armed forces. There have been reports in the Russian media that the fulfillment of some export contracts is being delayed — such as aircrafts for Algeria and artillery systems for Vietnam — to prioritize production for Russia’s own armed forces. + +The lack of excess production capacity has contributed to Moscow’s declining position in arms exports. This production crunch has created additional security risks for Russia’s remaining customers, forcing them to diversify their suppliers. For instance, since the invasion began in 2022, Vietnam, a country historically highly reliant on imports of Russian arms and spare parts, has found its national security jeopardized by the lack of reliability of Russian deliveries. It has sought to increase domestic production, building armored vehicles, small arms, as well as drones and anti-ship missiles. Additionally, Vietnam has begun exploring alternative suppliers of military hardware, including European nations, the United States, Israel, India, Turkey, South Korea, and Japan. + +Furthermore, in a radical turn of events, Russia has now begun to try to purchase back much-needed military components and technology from countries such as India and Myanmar. In late 2022, Russian tanks manufacturer Uralvagonzavod reportedly imported $24 million worth of military products that it had previously produced for Myanmar’s armed forces, including sighting telescopes and cameras for installation in tanks. In August and November 2022, Russia also purchased six components related to night-vision sight for its ground-to-air missiles from the Indian Ministry of Defense. This reflects Moscow’s struggles to domestically produce critical defense equipment as a result of sanctions. + +#### Negative Demonstration Effects + +For years, the fact that Russian-made weapons were tried and tested in combat was good for marketing purposes. Syria, for instance, became an advertisement for the efficacy of Russian arms, helping Moscow boost its status as a major arms producer and exporter. The invasion of Ukraine was similarly supposed to allow Russia’s new generation of weapons to be “tested in combat conditions.” However, contrary to Syria, the war in Ukraine undermined the reputation of many Russian weapons systems, often demonstrating their ineffectiveness and obsolescence. For example, a sizable share of Russian tanks and other armored vehicles have turned out to be particularly susceptible to modern anti-tank weapons used by the Ukrainian armed forces. Other instances include Russia’s theoretically superior (in terms of technology and quantity) fighter jets and helicopters being shot down by Ukrainian ground-based air-defense systems; the loss of Russian SAM systems to Ukrainian air strikes; and reports of high failure rates for Russian missiles. + +While such Russian military struggles may often have more to do with the poor personnel training or deficiencies with command and control, they nevertheless create the perception of a deficient Russian military system and provide more reasons for prospective buyers to look elsewhere. This is particularly true for Russian-made aircraft and air defense systems because these weapons have historically been the most exported arms categories for Moscow and therefore their less than desirable performance record on the battlefield in Ukraine could potentially affect their export rates going forward. + +![image02](https://i.imgur.com/Xw5SuDt.png) +_▲ A man walks past a destroyed Russian helicopter in Kyiv, Ukraine, in May 2022._ + +#### Sanctions and Sanctions-Linked Payment Issues + +Following the 2022 invasion, CAATSA has been reinvigorated, inflicting further chilling effects on the remaining purchasers of Russian weapons. As a result, by 2023, Russia had a very low level of pending deliveries. Some potential purchases appear to be on hold, as importers fear falling afoul of U.S. sanctions. For instance, while Turkey has signed a deal with Russia to buy a second batch of S-400 SAM systems, no new developments have yet been observed in this regard. The Philippines has also canceled a contract for 16 Mi-17 helicopters to avoid U.S. sanctions. In 2022, Russia made no deliveries to Egypt and its volume of deliveries to China fell substantially. + +Furthermore, the trade of combat aircraft and helicopters, Russia’s main arms exports since 1992, also appears to be affected. Between 2018 and 2022, trade in this area accounted for roughly 40 percent of Russian arms sales. But by the end of 2022, Moscow had pending deliveries for only 84 combat aircraft and helicopters, as opposed to the United States and France, which had 1,371 and 210, respectively. Standing orders are similarly low when it comes to SAM systems and tanks, for which Russia has 13 and 444 pending deliveries, respectively. In addition, Russia currently has no known artillery orders, while South Korea, for example, has 1,232 orders on file. One exception is Russian-origin engines, exports of which increased in 2022, in large part due to Chinese reliance on Russian engines discussed in the following sections of this report. + +Sanctions have also led to a reduction in Russia’s client base when it comes to providing components and repair services. While no country among those that sanctioned Russia was a major buyer of Russian weapons, a number of them, such as Greece, Finland, Cyprus, and countries in Central and Eastern Europe, had continued to use Soviet- and Russian-style systems and thus consistently relied on Russian-manufactured components and repair services. Moscow lost these markets in 2022. + +Further impact from sanctions appears through Russia’s lack of access to high-tech components. A recent CSIS report highlighted Russia’s struggle to import much-needed components and spare parts, such as optical systems, bearings, machine tools, engines, and microchips. In the eyes of many current and potential buyers, this limitation creates risks for a sustainable long-term defense partnership. Even prior to 2022, Moscow struggled to develop military R&D, and this trend is likely to worsen in the future. For example, the latest Russian aircraft designs are incapable of achieving the fifth-generation benchmark and have fallen behind even countries such as China. These challenges will be worsened by the ongoing war. Russia already has suspended the contract for the supply of two Ka-32 helicopters to Serbia, allegedly due to Western sanctions and war-related shortages of military equipment. Going forward, Russia will find it increasingly difficult to deliver updates to the weaponry, components, and infrastructure of its customers as long as the sanctions remain in place. + +These risks are further exacerbated by Moscow’s de facto disconnect from the international financial system, which makes it hard for its clients to pay for Russian arms supplies. Moscow’s current customers are forced to find alternative schemes, including transitioning to payments in national currencies. As a result, Russia’s supplies of defense equipment to India, for instance, have stalled recently due to the fear of sanctions, as both countries have struggled to find an alternative payment solution. While India is reluctant to settle payments in U.S. dollars or Chinese yuan, Russia has turned down India’s request to make payments in rupees, which is not a fully convertible currency. + + +### Top Arms Exports from Russia + +Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation has exported a wide range of weapons systems, with aircraft, missiles, armored vehicles, ships, and air defense systems being the top five weapons categories from 1992 to 2022 in terms of the volume of transfers, based on the SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIV) database (see Figure 2). The TIV figures represent “the transfer of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer” and they therefore “are best used as the raw data for calculating trends in international arms transfers over periods of time, global percentages for suppliers and recipients, and percentages for the volume of transfers to or from particular states.” Interestingly, per the TIV database, demand for Russian-made engines has increased significantly since the early 2010s, with this component gradually becoming central to Russia’s arms exports. Between 2017 and 2022, engines were one of the most exported weapons categories, only second to aircraft in terms of TIV, and they even surpassed the volume of aircraft transfers in 2022, according to SIPRI. + +This section examines the Kremlin’s most exported weapons and technologies and the areas where Russia has retained a competitive edge. It also analyzes the impact of the Ukraine war and the 2022 sanctions regime on Russia’s likelihood to prioritize defense production for its own armed forces over defense exports. Overall, current trends, including the volume of pending deliveries Russia had by the end of 2022, suggest that Russian arms exports in virtually all major weapons categories will continue to decrease. + +#### Aircraft + +Aircraft exports make up around 50 percent of Russia’s total arms trade. Moscow offers different Soviet-era and more advanced aircraft to its customers, including MiG-29 fighter jets; Su-27, Su-30, and Su-35 fighters; and Yak-130 jet trainers, among others. Deliveries have historically gone primarily to India, China, Vietnam, Algeria, Egypt, and a number of other countries across the globe. + +![image03](https://i.imgur.com/RF3CGQY.png) +_▲ __Figure 2: Top Russian Arms and Technology Exports, 1992–2022.__ Source: “Importer/Exporter TIV Tables,” SIPRI._ + +The Su-35 is Russia’s most advanced fourth-generation fighter jet to date, often described by the Russians as “fourth generation++,” meaning that due to the extent of its upgrades the plane’s attributes have been pushed well beyond standard fourth-generation capabilities. Yet, even before the February 2022 invasion, the Kremlin was having difficulty finding buyers for its Su-35, in large part due to CAATSA, which played an important role in deterring large arms importers such as Algeria, Egypt, and Indonesia from acquiring the plane. While Russia has delivered the Su-35s to China and is now expected to sell them to Iran, low production rates, aggravated by the need to prioritize war-related production, as well as ongoing war and sanctions, will make it increasingly difficult for Moscow to manufacture new batches of the Su-35 for export purposes or provide necessary maintenance and upgrades. According to the available Russian open-source estimates, Russia allegedly was able to produce only five Su-35 aircraft in 2021, with a goal to deliver seven more by the end of 2022. + +In addition to the Su-35s, Moscow has also been marketing two new fifth-generation fighters, the Su-57 and Su-75 Checkmate, intended to compete with the U.S.-made F-22 and F-35 combat aircraft, respectively. However, with Russian aviation becoming one of the industries hardest hit by the war and export control restrictions, experts believe Moscow’s capacity to finish and mass produce such high-tech fighters will be significantly curtailed in the near term. While the Russian air force has recently claimed that it received a new batch of the Su-35 fighters — albeit without specifying the exact number — and was on track toward acquiring the Su-57 aircraft within a year, analysts still question the Kremlin’s ability to produce enough to export abroad. + +#### Engines + +Russia started selling engines in significant volumes in the early 2010s. In 2022, engines accounted for 32 percent of Moscow’s total arms trade, making them the most exported Russian equipment. There is a particularly high demand on Russian-made engines for military aircraft. According to Rosoboronexport, a Russian state agency dealing with defense-related exports and imports, Moscow offers the following main aircraft engine types for sale: + +- the AI-222-25 engine, used to power the Yak-130 training aircraft, which the Russians have claimed can replicate characteristics of some fourth- and fifth-generation fighter aircraft; + +- the AL-31F, installed on the Su-27, Su-30, and Su-33 fighters; + +- the AL-41F-1S, used to power fourth-generation aircraft such as the Su-35; and + +- the RD-33 and its variation RD-33MK, designed for the MiG-29 and MiG-35 fighters. + +China has been one of the key recipients of Russian-made aircraft engines such as the RD-33MK and AL-31F, which have been installed on the Chinese-made fighters as well as imported Russian fighters. However, as discussed in the next section, since the start of the 2022 invasion, Beijing has been concerned with Moscow’s capacity to produce and deliver capable aircraft engines on time, as the inability to do so would have a devastating impact on the Chinese aviation industry, which remains highly dependent on Russian-made engines. Indeed, Russia has been facing issues with engine production for some time and especially since 2014 due to its reliance on Ukrainian manufactures such as Motor Sich and Zorya-Mashproekt, which used to provide key components in Russia’s engine production. It is likely that the 2022 sanctions regime will further limit the Kremlin’s ability to build high-quality aircraft engines in the foreseeable future, forcing China to take concrete steps toward indigenization of the engine industry. + +#### Missiles and Air Defense Systems + +After aircraft, missiles and air defense systems have been Russia’s most widely exported systems since 1992. SIPRI differentiates between these two weapons categories. It defines missiles as “(a) all powered, guided missiles and torpedoes with conventional warheads, and (b) all unpowered but guided bombs and shells. This includes man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) and guided anti-tank missiles.” Under the air defense systems, SIPRI includes “(a) all land-based surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, and (b) all anti-aircraft guns with a caliber of more than 40 mm or with multiple barrels with a combined caliber of at least 70 mm.” For the purposes of this paper, these two categories are discussed together. + +Russia offers a wide range of air defense systems to its customers, such as upgraded versions of the S-300, as well as the newer and more advanced S-350, S-400, and Pantsir SAM systems. Before the Ukraine war, the Kremlin sold these systems to a number of countries globally, including S-300s to China, Algeria, Vietnam, and Azerbaijan; S-400s to India, Turkey, and China; and Pantsir-S1s to Algeria, Serbia, the United Arab Emirates, and Syria, among others. In 2019 — amid major defense agreements, which also included a $2 billion arms deal signed between Moscow and Ankara on the delivery of S-400 SAM systems — Dmitry Shugaev, director of Russia’s Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, declared that the share of air defense systems in Russian arms exports had grown to 20 percent within a year. + +Yet this trend was negatively affected by the 2022 invasion and concomitant sanctions regime. Based on SIPRI estimates, Moscow had only 13 pending deliveries of its SAM systems by the end of 2022, while the United States, Israel, and Germany had 40, 26, and 25, respectively. Naturally, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine can in large part explain Moscow’s low volume of pending deliveries last year. Since the start of the invasion, Russia has expended thousands of missiles and lost at least 130 air defense systems in Ukraine that, together with the allied export restrictions, have strained its defense industrial capacity to manufacture extra systems for export. However, despite sanctions and the remarkable performance of Ukraine’s air defenses, Moscow has been able to access much-needed Western and Chinese components to sustain current systems and manufacture new missiles and air defense systems — and has inflicted significant damage to Kyiv. Going forward, it is likely that Russia will prioritize war-related defense production over export-related manufacturing, yet it may still sell some missiles and other air defense systems in much lower volumes to states vital to Russian foreign policy (such as China) or to its satellite regimes (such as Belarus). + +#### Armored Vehicles + +Russia exports a wide variety of armored vehicles, including different models of the T-72 and T-90 main battle tanks (MBTs); BMP-2 and BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs); and BTR-80 and BTR-82A armored personnel carriers (APCs). Prior to the 2022 invasion, Russian-made tanks, and especially modernized versions, enjoyed popularity among Moscow’s loyal customers. For instance, the T-90s, first introduced in 1992 and incorporating the best design principles from the previous T-72 and T-80 MBTs, have been purchased by a number of countries across the world, including in the former Soviet Union (e.g., Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan), Africa (e.g., Algeria and Libya), and South and Southeast Asia (e.g., India, Myanmar, and Vietnam). India and Algeria have been particularly important purchasers of Russian armored vehicles, and especially the T-90s. At one point, Russian tank manufacturer Uralvagonzavod may have been the most active tank factory in the world due to large export orders coming from these two countries. + +The ongoing war in Ukraine, resulting in significant losses of armored vehicles, is likely keeping Uralvagonzavod even busier. Russia has lost at least 2,000 tanks of various kinds — two-thirds of its fleet, by some estimates — which is putting a significant strain on Uralvagonzavod’s capacity to refurbish old MBTs and manufacture new ones for both war- and export-related purposes. In the summer of 2022, Russian news agencies wrote that Rosoboronexport had rolled out the export version of Russia’s “cutting-edge” T-14 Armata MBT developed by Uralvagonzavod — thus implying that the country’s chief tank manufacturer had enough capacity to produce advanced MBTs amid sanctions and the war — but evidence recently emerged suggesting that Uralvagonzavod might actually be facing significant issues with its production capacity. Allegedly, the factory reimported components originally made on its premises, including 6,775 sighting telescopes and 200 cameras for installation in tanks, from Myanmar in December 2022. This fact, coupled with sanctions and a weak performance of Russian tanks on the battlefield in Ukraine, already resulted in lower volumes of armor-related exports and pending deliveries (444 tanks on order) from Russia by the end of 2022, especially when compared to the volume of pending deliveries for U.S., Chinese, and South Korean tanks (634, 717, and 990, respectively). This trend will likely continue in the foreseeable future, especially as China, Russia’s chief competitor in cost-effective MBTs, ramps up its own tank production. + +#### Naval Systems + +Although ships remain among the top five most exported Russian weapons categories, Moscow has not made any deliveries of large vessels for four consecutive years. Instead, it has placed an emphasis on the development of smaller vessels able to carry a variety of missiles, such as the Project 22800 Karakurt corvettes and Project 22160 patrol ships. However, area specialists note that the Russian shipbuilding industry’s aging infrastructure, which in 2022 was also cut off from access to advanced Western components and humiliated by the sinking of the Moskva missile cruiser, will likely further hinder Moscow’s naval exports. In addition to ships, Russia is also facing issues marketing its Kilo-class attack submarines. While experts believe the Russian-made submarines retain significant undersea capabilities, such as launching effective conventional cruise missile and undersea infrastructure attacks against adversary fleets, the war and sanctions seem to be impacting Moscow’s defense industrial capacity to manufacture submarines for export purposes. A recent example, also discussed in the next section, includes India choosing Germany over Russia to coproduce new submarines, allegedly due to the growing unpredictability of arms exports from Moscow amid sanctions and the invasion. + + +### Russia’s Key Export Destinations + +Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has exported its arms to around 100 countries worldwide, with India, China, Algeria, Vietnam, and Egypt composing the top five purchasers of Russian weapons systems throughout this time (see Figure 3). According to Paul Schwartz, a non-resident senior associate with CSIS, “Russian arms sales are very diverse but also concentrated. Diverse because Russia has exported arms to nearly 100 countries since 2000 and highly concentrated because its top 10 arms clients traditionally account for the vast majority of Russian arms sales in any given year.” This section analyzes Moscow’s chief arms markets and how the ongoing war in Ukraine together with the allied sanctions and export regulations are impacting Russia’s ability to remain the key supplier of weapons and technology to those countries. + +To its customers, Russia’s arms have remained attractive for several reasons. First, for many countries, they are buying what they know. Past purchases have created a path for dependence. For long-time purchasers of Soviet weapons, costs of training and maintenance requirements of Russian weapons are much lower. Second, Russian military hardware has often been cheaper and easier to operate and maintain than Western analogues. Third, Russia has tended to offer generous financing, such as loans with extended repayment plans. This is in stark contrast to the United States, which lacks flexible financing mechanisms that are often necessary for lower-income purchasers. Fourth, Russia is a more straightforward seller, due in part to the lack of bureaucratic or legislative oversight that countries such as the United States require to ensure proper end user and human rights conditions. This enables Russia to make deals more quickly and with fewer conditions than Western nations. Finally, in contrast to U.S. arms sales, Russia has remained attractive to non-democratic regimes due to its willingness to sell weapons without stressing democratic values, human rights records, or internal political situations, as Western countries often do. + +![image04](https://i.imgur.com/a2vlXMJ.png) +_▲ __Figure 3: Top Recipients of Russian Weapons Systems, 1992–2022.__ Source: “Importer/Exporter TIV Tables,” SIPRI._ + +![image05](https://i.imgur.com/YHOVruz.png) +_▲ __Figure 4: Top Recipients of Russian Weapons Systems, 2022.__ Source: “Importer/Exporter TIV Tables,” SIPRI._ + +In recent years, Russia has been forced to increasingly concentrate on the states interested in lower-cost systems (up to $300 million), such as South Africa, Eswatini (formerly Swaziland), Angola, and Eritrea, among others. Low (and at times insignificant) volumes of sales with these countries, coupled with Moscow’s deepening isolation from the Western nations and their allies, can largely explain why, by the end of 2022, 91 percent of all Russian arms exports were flowing to just four countries: India, China, Belarus, and Myanmar (see Figure 4). + +In the near term, available evidence suggests that Russia’s biggest customers, including India and China but also Algeria and Egypt, will most likely strive to become less reliant on Russian arms exports due to ongoing import substitution or diversification efforts in these countries and risk of sanctions. Since February 2022, such efforts have been aggravated by the growing instability of Russia’s defense industrial base, affecting the quality and frequency of Russian arms deliveries worldwide. While it is likely that Moscow will continue selling older Russian equipment and technology to a number of conflict-affected countries or authoritarian regimes across Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and the former Soviet Union, those deliveries will have limited ability to insulate Russia’s declining arms export industry. + +#### India + +With a 9 percent share of total global arms imports, India has been the world’s largest purchaser of major weapons systems between 1992 and 2022. Russia has been its biggest supplier throughout this time, followed by France and the United States. Yet Moscow’s exports to New Delhi began to steadily decline from 2014. Russia’s share of total Indian arms imports fell from 64 percent in 2013–2017 to 45 percent in 2018–2022. A number of factors have affected Moscow’s position as New Delhi’s key arms supplier, including growing competition from other exporter countries, India’s plan to reinvigorate its domestic arms production, and, most recently, the constraints on Russia’s military industrial complex induced by the 2022 invasion of Ukraine and subsequent sanctions. + +Recent years have seen India increase attempts to diversify its arms imports away from Russia and engage more closely with major Western suppliers, including EU countries and the United States, among others. For instance, arms exports from France rose by 489 percent between the two five-year periods, 2013–2017 and 2018–2022, based on SIPRI estimates. Such a significant increase in sales has in large part been attributed to France landing several big-ticket arms deals with India, including the 2016 $8.8 billion inter-government agreement, within which Paris delivered 36 Rafale fighter jets to New Delhi by December 2022. Besides France, Germany has also made steps to expand ties with India on weapons procurement and counter Russia as a major arms supplier to the South Asian nation. In June 2023, the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding that is expected to be followed by a multibillion-euro deal, according to which Berlin and New Delhi will co-produce six submarines for the Indian navy. Submarines will be built under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “Make in India” initiative, designed to reduce military imports and increase domestic procurement and production. Similar to its EU partners, the United States has also expressed its readiness to reinforce “the major defense partnership” and support India’s ambitious goal of turning into a significant arms exporter in the near future by fast-tracking “technology cooperation and co-production in areas such as air combat and land mobility systems; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; munitions; and the undersea domain.” According to a Reuters exclusive, the Biden administration is set to allow General Electric, a U.S.-based conglomerate, to produce jet engines in India for Indian combat aircraft. + +New Delhi’s efforts at bolstering codevelopment and coproduction of defense systems with its Western partners have intensified against the backdrop of a declining Russian military industrial complex, strained by the allied sanctions and the ongoing invasion. The struggles of Russia’s military industrial complex could in turn have a significant impact on India’s defense sector. According to various estimates, around 60 to 85 percent of major weapons systems in the Indian military originate from Russia. For instance, 97 percent of India’s MBTs are Russian-made variants (2,418 T-72s and 1,200 T-90s). Furthermore, more than half of India’s combat-capable aircraft come from Russia, including 263 Su-30MKIs, between 50 to 146 MiG-21s (based on different estimates), and over 100 MiG-29s. New Delhi also possesses seven Russian Kilo-class submarines and three S-400 missile defense systems. All these weapons require regular maintenance and upgrades, which India worries Moscow may be unable to provide. + +In May 2022, New Delhi reportedly suspended plans to upgrade its Su-30MKIs with Russian assistance, instead aiming to equip the fleet with indigenous products, including Indian-made radar and avionics, to reduce dependence on Moscow. In March 2023, the Indian Air Force (IAF) declared that Russia would be unable to meet arms delivery commitments for the current year due to the war and sanctions. The IAF also stated that the invasion had a significant impact on its arms supplies, causing it to slash projected capital expenditure on modernization for FY 2024 by nearly a third compared to the previous fiscal year. Besides India’s aviation and air defense sectors, it has also been reported that New Delhi’s plans to lease another Russian nuclear attack submarine could be delayed beyond the planned 2025 delivery date due to the ongoing war. Furthermore, according to some recent reports, beyond Russia’s inability to deliver new systems, it has been repurchasing spare parts for tanks and missiles that it had originally exported to India. Even when Russia is able to meet its delivery commitments — such as deliveries of S-400 systems in 2022 — other issues arise, including finding a payment mechanism for India that would not violate U.S. sanctions. + +Despite these challenges, Russian officials continue to claim that the Russo-Indian defense partnership is not affected by the war and sanctions. In February 2023, Vladimir Drozhzhov, deputy head of the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, declared that Moscow and New Delhi are in talks over additional Su-30MKI fighter jets, which will be produced under a Russian license in India and will cost New Delhi $1.4 billion. Rosoboronexport has also announced that Russia is ready to produce Ka-226T helicopters together with Indian defense companies as part of the “Make in India” initiative. However, none of these plans have thus far been crystallized. In fact, according to scholars Vasabjit Banerjee and Benjamin Tkach, in the short run, India will most likely focus on partnering with countries that have experience manufacturing spare parts and upgrades for Russian-origin weapons. These may include Israel, Bulgaria, and Poland, among others. In the long run, New Delhi will “move ahead with its stated intention of developing a stronger indigenous defense industry.” Siemon Wezeman, a senior researcher with the SIPRI Arms Transfers Program, also believes that issues with the quality of Russian arms deliveries together with India’s ongoing import diversification efforts and pivot to domestic production will most likely contribute to Russia losing India as its chief arms importer in the coming decade. + +#### China + +China has been the second-largest importer of Russian arms and equipment since 1992, yet the nature and type of deliveries have changed significantly over this time. In the early 2000s, Russian arms played a central role in the development and modernization of the Chinese military, and particularly its navy and air force. Beijing purchased numerous classes of missiles, aircraft, and submarines from Moscow, including the S-300 surface-to-air missiles, Su-27S and Su-30MKI fighter aircraft, and Project 636 Varshavyanka submarines. Even though those systems were capable, they still represented “Russia’s older, second-best ones and did not include more-advanced technologies.” + +After 2006, Russian exports to China started to decrease (but remained significant) for multiple reasons. A decline in part resulted from Moscow’s growing frustration with Beijing’s continued attempts to steal Russian military technology and intellectual property, especially in aerospace, through espionage and hacking as well as by reverse-engineering Russian equipment to produce Chinese equivalents. For instance, China developed its own J-11 fighter jet and the HQ-9 surface-to-air missile based on Russian prototypes, the Su-27 fighter jet and S-300 missile system, respectively. In 2019, in a rare public display of frustration, Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec accused Beijing of copying “aircraft engines, Sukhoi planes, deck jets, air defense systems, portable air defense missiles, and analogs of the Pantsir medium-range surface-to-air systems.” Consequently, as China’s domestic defense industry continued to develop, in large part thanks to the earlier Russian arms exports, it became less willing to purchase older Russian-made technology, instead focusing on acquiring newer and more advanced Russian weapons such as the Su-35S combat aircraft and S-400 air defense system. + +Furthermore, starting from 2014 when the West first imposed sanctions against Moscow, followed by the 2022 allied sanctions regime, the nature of the Sino-Russian defense partnership has changed, with Beijing becoming a vital source of components and spare parts that the Kremlin has often been unable to officially obtain from the Western nations, such as machine tools and microchips. In recent reports, Ukrainian experts and officials have argued that Chinese-made components are now discovered in captured Russian navigation systems, drones, and tanks. According to Vladyslav Vlasiuk, a senior adviser in President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s office, Ukraine now finds “less Western-made components” and instead more Chinese components. As the war continues, Russian dependence on Chinese-made spare parts will likely grow, even if a significant share of these components turns out to be defective or of lower quality. + +At the same time, even though Beijing has strengthened domestic defense production and reduced arms deliveries from Moscow, it still relies on imports of the most advanced Russian weapons systems and technologies, especially in the aviation sector. For instance, between 2018 and 2022, 83 percent of Chinese arms imports came from Russia, with most deliveries consisting of helicopters and engines for aircraft that China has had difficulties producing. The key issue for Beijing remains the development of powerful fighter engines, as Moscow has so far managed to protect its advanced technology from being copied by China. Additionally, according to area experts, it is difficult to reverse-engineer this equipment. Up to 40 percent of China’s air force fleet depends on Russian-made engines, which will create issues for Beijing if Russia becomes unable to provide these parts for the Chinese aviation industry due to the ongoing sanctions and war in Ukraine. This may incentivize China to redouble its efforts to produce combat aircraft and engines. In fact, Beijing has already made strides in recent years in developing advanced aircraft, such as the J-16 and J-20 fighters, and has even provided upgrades to its engines. For instance, it modernized its WS-10 engines to power the J-20 aircraft. However, Chinese efforts in this area are still limited due to the lack of domestic expertise; Beijing reportedly has struggled to develop its WS-15 engine, which is expected to give the J-20 supercruise capability. Going forward, China may leverage Russia’s growing economic and security dependence to in turn gain access to long-desired Russian engine technology. Therefore, benefits derived from existing arms trade between the two countries may be greater for Beijing than for Moscow in the near term. + +___`Going forward, China may leverage Russia’s growing economic and security dependence to in turn gain access to long-desired Russian engine technology.`___ + +Overall, it is expected that the Sino-Russian defense industrial partnership will continue. Yet Moscow’s technological utility to Beijing will be significantly weakened due to Russia’s impaired defense production capacity and China’s strengthened emphasis on indigenizing production and increasing its self-reliance. + +#### Africa + +Russia has been the chief arms supplier to Africa, surpassing U.S., European, and Chinese arms deliveries in the region by a significant margin for well over a decade. For instance, between 2018 and 2022, Moscow accounted for 40 percent of African imports of major weapons systems, which exceeded the continent’s combined arms imports from the United States (16 percent), China (9.8 percent), and France (7.6 percent) during the same time period. There are a number of reasons that explain the dependency of African countries on Russian-made weapons and equipment. Modern Russian arms are usually cheaper — at least in the shorter term — than their Western alternatives and are compatible with Soviet-era stocks retained by many states in the region due to the strong military-security ties shared between Africa and the Soviet Union during the Cold War era. Additionally, unlike major Western arms suppliers, the Kremlin does not make its arms deliveries contingent upon adherence to human rights principles or respecting the rule of law. Russia has sent weapons to different conflict-affected countries in Africa where the United States and its allies have usually avoided such exports, including Libya, Mali, Sudan, and the Central African Republic (CAR), among others. Yet, while Moscow sells its weapons to a number of countries across the continent, these deliveries are usually marginal in value and resemble more military assistance than arms trade, according to SIPRI’s Siemon Wezeman. Although these sales may have little monetary value, they have significant diplomatic and geopolitical value, as they have helped solidify Russia’s relationship with many African countries. + +Russia has only two sizable arms importers in Africa: Algeria and Egypt. From 1992 onwards, both countries have been among the top five purchasers of Russian military equipment and technology globally, with Egypt replacing Algeria as Russia’s third-largest arms market during the last five years. Overall, Algeria has accounted for 8 percent of total Russian arms exports since 1992, while Egypt has accounted for 3 percent, based on the SIPRI data. Both states have signed several multimillion-dollar agreements with Moscow to purchase Russian-made defense technology and equipment, including combat aircraft, armor, and air defense systems, thus making their militaries dependent on Russian arms deliveries, maintenance, and upgrades. Egypt retains obsolete Soviet-era systems, such as the MiG-21 aircraft first issued in the 1950s, yet it has also made steps toward upgrading its aging fleet with somewhat newer Russian equipment, including the fourth-generation MiG-29M aircraft, Ka-52 attack helicopters, and the S-300 missile defense system. By contrast, Algeria has purchased more modern and advanced Russian weapons, including the Pantsir-S1 air defense system, the latest versions of the T-90 MBT, and Kilo-class submarines. + +Both countries buy from other countries as well. For instance, Egypt has sourced combat aircraft from France, submarines from Germany, and unmanned aerial vehicles from China. Furthermore, Egypt receives $1.3 billion in U.S. security assistance annually. The Egyptian Ministry of Defense has also assembled certain types of weapons locally, including over 1,000 M1A1 MBTs from U.S.-supplied kits. Similarly, since the early 2010s, Algeria has begun to diversify its arms imports and has made investments toward strengthening the domestic defense industry, leading to joint ventures with several Western arms exporters, including a deal with Italy to produce seven modern helicopters and agreements with Germany to deliver a tank assembly plant and armor personnel carriers. + +Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine and the allied sanctions regime have further pressured the two countries to lessen defense ties with Russia. In 2022, amid a rising fear of Western sanctions, Egypt rejected a deal to buy Russian Su-35 combat aircraft, which later were purchased by Iran. Algeria also finds itself in a political-security conundrum. In 2021, it reportedly signed a deal worth more than $7 billion with Moscow to purchase Su-57 fighter jets, air defense systems, and other advanced Russian equipment, with deliveries expected in the next several years. However, with Russia depleting its stockpile of arms and facing challenges to produce advanced weapons systems, Algeria worries Moscow may not be able to provide new arms deliveries or necessary upgrades for its existing Russian-made defense inventories. This has allegedly forced the Algerian authorities to raise the army’s budget to a record $23 billion to find alternative suppliers, including France and Brazil. + +Despite the increased unpredictability of a long-term defense partnership with contemporary Russia, as mentioned above, smaller scale African purchasers of Russian weaponry will likely continue to place orders with Russian firms. Sudan and the CAR fit this description. Both countries have established defense partnerships with Moscow, including particularly well-publicized contracts with the Wagner Group (though the future of this private military company and its operations around the world, including in Africa, is now in question following Wagner chief Prigozhin’s death in August 2023). Both the CAR and Sudan are countries experiencing intense domestic instability and violence, which give added urgency to their purchasing of Russian matériel. In the case of Sudan, Russia has accounted for around 45 percent of Sudanese arms imports since 1997. The CAR’s volume is much smaller, with only 5 percent of arms deliveries coming from Moscow (although it should be noted that the volume of major arms imports to the CAR has been historically low due to the country’s inability to purchase advanced weapons and related matériel and the United Nations’ arms embargo imposed on the republic since 2013). However, in both countries, the major value for Russia is not the financial scale of these transactions but the political influence and Russian access to key natural resources these defense partnerships enable — particularly within the context of utilizing extractive industries, including gold and diamond mining, to evade international sanctions. + +![image06](https://i.imgur.com/AuTrmtC.png) +_▲ A Russian armored personnel carrier seen driving in the streets of the capital Bangui during the delivery of Russian-made armored vehicles to the CAR army in October 2020._ + +A more complicated example is oil-rich Angola, which since 1993 has imported around 37 percent of its arms from Moscow, including Mi-171Sh helicopters and Su-30K fighter jets. Russia’s relations with post-independence Angola go back to the Soviet period, when Moscow backed the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) during the resource-rich country’s fight for decolonization. Angola will likely continue its partnerships with Russia, as the country hosts Wagner Group mercenaries, and an early 2023 visit by Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov indicated the launch of a potential deal to build a Russian nuclear power plant in the country. However, in December 2022, Angola had already announced its interest in purchasing weapons from the United States, despite a previous 2019 announcement that the country would be constructing factories for the domestic production of Russian weapons. This stated desire to purchase American weaponry comes in the wake of increasing defense ties between Angola and the United States such as Angola’s March 2022 participation in a U.S.-led maritime exercise, and a November 2022 high-level visit to Angola by General Michael Langley, the commander of United States Africa Command — demonstrating that the contest between Washington and Moscow for influence in the country remains more open-ended than history would suggest. + +It is likely that these trends will only intensify going forward. According to Bhaso Ndzendze, an associate professor at the University of Johannesburg, while the Kremlin will continue selling its arms to conflict-affected countries across Africa, those deliveries will likely be limited to obsolete Soviet-era equipment, such as Soviet-era tanks, and cheaper weapons, including battle rifles, grenades, and signal and communications systems. Therefore, such sales will remain marginal in terms of their direct monetary value. However, such limited defense relationships will most likely continue to yield significant geopolitical benefits for the Kremlin in the region. At the same time, the two key arms importers on the continent, Egypt and Algeria, will probably proceed with their efforts to diversify away from Russia, thus impacting the share of Russian arms exports globally. However, the large quantities of previously acquired Russian equipment in both countries are likely to sustain ties at some level. + +#### Southeast Asia: The Cases of Vietnam and Myanmar + +Both Vietnam and Myanmar have existing defense partnerships with Russia, and the future course of these relationships could serve as an important indicator of the Russian defense industry’s international reach post-2022. + +In the context of what many believe to be China’s increasingly aggressive behavior in the South China Sea, Vietnam has leaned into international arms imports to support its military’s efforts to deter potential Chinese military action. Having launched a brief invasion of Vietnam in 1979, China remains an ongoing security concern for the government in Hanoi, as described in a noteworthy and long-awaited defense white paper released by the Vietnamese government in 2019. While Russia has historically been Vietnam’s primary arms provider, the government in Hanoi has increasingly tried to diversify its supply of defense systems, including from Israel, Canada, Spain, the Netherlands, and South Korea. Notably, during a widely publicized presidential visit to Vietnam in 2016, President Barack Obama announced an end to the United States’ Cold War–era arms embargo on the country, which some analysts perceived as part of a broader U.S. strategy to strengthen ties with Hanoi as a potential counter to Chinese efforts at hegemony in the Indo-Pacific, despite U.S. claims to the contrary. For instance, in 2021, the United States transferred a refurbished Hamilton-class Coast Guard cutter to the Vietnamese navy. + +However, given the scale of Vietnam’s purchases going back to the emergence of post-Soviet Russia in 1991, the country will remain dependent on Moscow for spare parts, technology upgrades, and long-term maintenance arrangements for already purchased systems. Since 1995, an overwhelming 82 percent of Vietnam’s arms imports have originated from Russia. These purchases have included everything from aircraft and air defense systems to critical components and systems needed to maintain these weapons. The Vietnamese military reportedly has 1,383 Russian MBTs in its reserves, ranging from long-outdated models such as the T-34 to the newer and more advanced T-90S. The Vietnamese air defense reserves include the Russian S-300 system, with the Su-30MK2 acting as a key model within Hanoi’s reserve of fighter jets. There have long been reports that Vietnam is interested in acquiring more advanced Russian fighter jets, such as the Su-35 or even the Su-57. + +But despite Vietnam’s long-held dependence on Russia for military equipment, it has recently announced new plans to develop the country’s domestic defense industry, including reforms of the General Department of Defence Industry, a state-owned conglomerate. Additionally, in December 2022, Hanoi organized its first-ever international defense exhibition, which observers interpreted as a major push by the Vietnamese leadership to expand the country’s range of foreign defense partnerships away from Russia. Given Russia’s expanded domestic defense needs to supply its war in Ukraine, combined with the ongoing risk of Russian defense production bottlenecks caused by international sanctions, these moves by Hanoi to diversify its means of defense procurement away from Russian firms appear well timed. + +As with Vietnam, Russian defense firms have an established export relationship with the military of Myanmar, which rules the country. Russia has been second to China in terms of defense-related exports to Myanmar since 1995, accounting for 35 percent of arms deliveries. Like Russia, Myanmar faces its own set of international sanctions due to the ruling military junta’s coup and human rights violations in the ongoing civil war. Myanmar’s military junta remains interested in Russian weaponry and combat know-how to assist in its efforts to crush opposition to its 2021 coup and help fight various armed resistance groups that oppose the central government. Myanmar’s political isolation and ongoing domestic turmoil limit the country’s defense import options, making continued reliance on Russian weapons, technology, and upgrades likely over the medium term. + +In 2023, Russia reportedly requested to buy back matériel it had sold to Myanmar in order to help fill supply gaps related to Moscow’s war effort in Ukraine. Russian tank producer Uralvagonzavod apparently purchased $24 million worth of military components, including an estimated 6,775 sighting telescopes and 200 cameras. This purchase is logical, given the Russian military’s now well-known challenge of replacing their previously Western-supplied optical systems. Sanctions enforcers should track Myanmar as a potential source of needed components for the Russian military and continue to crack down on existing loopholes that enable these kinds of defense-related transactions by the military leadership. + + +### Conclusion and Policy Recommendations + +Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russian military industrial complex has faced the dual challenge of supplying the Kremlin’s troops for the war in Ukraine while circumventing international sanctions to gain access to critical components required to maintain the necessary levels of production. As Russian defense firms are forced to prioritize supplying the war effort, they are facing the inevitable choice between expending critical components and resources on fulfilling contracts for the Russian Ministry of Defense and using those same inputs for the production of weapons systems ordered by customers abroad. To add to the Russian defense industry’s troubles, Russia’s often lackluster performance on the battlefield in Ukraine, in comparison to the fierce resistance of Ukrainian troops armed with cutting-edge Western systems, serves as a powerful global advertising campaign in favor of Western arms over their Russian competitors. + +However, the challenges facing Moscow’s arms industry predate the February 2022 invasion, which has in fact aggravated already existing problems within a domestic sector declining in its international competitiveness. Russia’s post-Soviet arms sales began to decrease in the early 2010s due to Western sanctions on third countries purchasing Russian weapons, a collapse in the purchasing power of particular countries such as Venezuela, and the efforts of the massive Chinese and Indian markets to strengthen their domestic arms production, increase arms exports (especially in the case of China), and diversify international partnerships. + +To be clear, Russia is still competitive in areas such as missile and air defense systems, aircraft, armored vehicles (including different models of battle tanks), submarines, and engines. Current trends, however, indicate that Russian arms exports in virtually all major weapons categories will continue to decrease. + +China’s rise as a competitive arms manufacturer represents one of the largest challenges to the Russian defense industry. Chinese defense technology is increasingly on par with Russian exports and proves to be a particularly challenging competitor for Russian arms exports in less wealthy regional markets such as Africa. Given Russia’s growing macroeconomic and political-security dependence on China after the launch of the 2022 invasion, it has significantly less leverage to resist China’s long-term efforts at acquiring — or stealing — highly protected Russian defense technology. Increasingly, reports are emerging about Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) arresting Russian scientists for allegedly spying for Beijing. These high-profile charges may serve as a signaling mechanism to warn Russia’s defense industry workers to be on guard when collaborating with China and that Russian intelligence will be watching. + +But while the Kremlin may have qualms about its defense industry’s vulnerability to Chinese penetration, Russian weapons manufacturers will nonetheless be increasingly dependent on the Chinese and Indian markets, as the two Asian powers remain among the small circle of countries that are still purchasing Russian arms in bulk. Russia will try to maintain its existing defense export markets, leveraging its long-standing diplomatic and military relationships in the Global South and offering unique security partnerships via investment deals and contracts with Russian private military companies such as the Wagner Group (or its alternatives). Moscow will likely maintain a role as the chief supplier to rogue states, as countries locked out of the global arms market will often find Russia a willing supplier. + +However, despite the Russian defense industry’s existing vulnerabilities, the experience of fighting the war in Ukraine under international sanctions may lead to the emergence of important innovations that Russia can then market to Global South purchasers as a competitive alternative to Western technologies. For example, Russia’s effective use of kamikaze drones, in particular the Lancet, may turn out to be a future Russian defense industry success. Russia is already expanding its domestic production of attack drones, and the intermittent hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia demonstrate that states can overpower their regional rivals with effectively deployed, low-cost drone technology. Russian drones could become a weapon of choice for lower-budget militaries or proxy forces such as those funded by Iran throughout the Middle East. + +___`The experience of fighting the war in Ukraine under international sanctions may lead to the emergence of important innovations that Russia can then market to Global South purchasers as a competitive alternative to Western technologies.`___ + +With those considerations in mind, there are ways for the West to further accelerate and deepen existing negative trends in Russia’s arms exports: + +- __Play the long game.__ Recognize that shifting nonaligned countries away from Russian military equipment is a long-term diplomatic effort that requires not just pursuing sales but strengthening bilateral relationships between countries. Deepening dialogue and developing strategic partnerships with major regional players who continue to maintain close ties with Russia will allow the West to assess opportunities for more attractive substitutes or diversification options for arms supply. Recent engagement with India offers one successful example in that regard. + +- __Develop a targeted strategy to squeeze Russian arms sales, including through the allocation of new security assistance funding for this effort.__ The United States should seek to engage countries that buy Russian weapons and highlight that doing business with the Russian defense industry would merit U.S. sanctions and offer an alternative. For some countries, this may mean pushing that country to buy from the United States or allied countries. For others, the United States could offer security assistance to help acquire U.S.-origin systems. Given the need and demand, this may merit additional congressional funding for State or Defense Department security assistance programs. However, there are a number of countries to which, due to foreign policy concerns, the United States would not be willing to transfer weapons. Nevertheless, Washington should still press these states that a step toward rebuilding relations and trust with the United States begins by foregoing future arms purchases. + +- __Highlight Russia’s military failures with the states dependent on Russian equipment.__ In many of the countries where Russia still maintains a competitive advantage, perceptions of the war often stem from a gap in knowledge about Ukraine, which Russia fills with its wartime propaganda. The West could help amplify Ukraine’s position in these countries and undermine Russia’s by coordinating messaging and public diplomacy. + +- __Close sanctions loopholes when they emerge and be willing to sanction countries for buying Russian weapons__. Sanctions enforcement agencies remain grossly understaffed and underresourced. Their capacity is not remotely sufficient for the economic warfare mission that policymakers have thrust upon them. Likewise, these agencies do not receive the information flow to execute their mission. The internet has incredible open-source resources, far too few of which make it to enforcement offices. Instead, these offices rely on highly classified information from the intelligence community. The classified nature of such information makes it difficult to speak about, but it also leaves gaps in coverage. Additionally, the United States should be less reticent to sanction countries for buying Russian arms. While there will be hard cases, such as India, sanctioning countries, even partners, such as Turkey, sends a signal to others that buying Russian weapons comes with significant additional economic costs beyond what is needed to pay for the specific system. The threat of sanctions has clearly deterred states from purchasing Russian arms, and the United States needs to make countries understand that it is willing to deploy sanctions. + +- __Closely monitor Russian efforts to buy back Russian-made or licensed equipment from partner countries.__ A recent news report highlighted efforts from Moscow to buy back weapon components, especially those used in tank and missile production, from its current customers such as India and Myanmar, showcasing war- and sanctions-induced struggles faced by Russian defense industry. If true, this could also point to a potential path for Russia to augment its own struggling domestic defense industrial production by outsourcing production to partners through providing licenses to them to manufacture certain arms and components. For instance, Moscow has given permission to New Delhi to manufacture T-90 tanks, as well as MiG-21 and MiG-23/27 fighters. Considering Russia’s outstanding equipment shortages, the Kremlin could conceivably seek to buy back some of those weapons and systems. While there is no evidence that Russia has thus far attempted to do this, New Delhi’s desire to access or lease advanced foreign technology to boost its domestic defense industry, coupled with Moscow’s readiness to provide more relaxed rules for technology transfers, make such cooperation probable. Likewise, the Kremlin may introduce or revisit its licensing deals with other partners such as China or Iran. Therefore, Western policymakers should closely monitor Russia’s licensing agreements with its militarily capable partners, including India, as well as China and Iran, and develop targeted solutions highlighted above to avert such future scenarios. + +- __Finally, continue supplying to Ukraine.__ As CSIS has argued earlier, it should remain a priority for the West to provide Ukraine with continuous supplies of higher-end military equipment at a pace that exceeds Russia’s production rate. Attrition will make it harder for Russia to simultaneously maintain domestic production while exporting arms globally. Additionally, the West should consider granting Ukrainian manufacturers rights to use selected Western technologies for licensed domestic production of selected weapons systems, component parts, and/or ammunition needed to wage the ground war in Ukraine. + +--- + +__Max Bergmann__ is the director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and the Stuart Center in Euro-Atlantic and Northern European Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). + +__Maria Snegovaya__ is a senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS and a postdoctoral fellow in Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service. + +__Tina Dolbaia__ is a research associate with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS, where she examines and analyzes political, economic, and security developments in Russia and Eurasia. + +__Nick Fenton__ is a program coordinator and research assistant with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS, where he supports the program’s event management, outreach, and research agenda.