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commoncap.c
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/* Common capabilities, needed by capability.o.
*/
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/swap.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/netlink.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/prctl.h>
#include <linux/securebits.h>
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
/*
* If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in
* !secure(SECURE_NOROOT) mode, then we raise capabilities.
* However if fE is also set, then the intent is for only
* the file capabilities to be applied, and the setuid-root
* bit is left on either to change the uid (plausible) or
* to get full privilege on a kernel without file capabilities
* support. So in that case we do not raise capabilities.
*
* Warn if that happens, once per boot.
*/
static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(const char *fname)
{
static int warned;
if (!warned) {
printk(KERN_INFO "warning: `%s' has both setuid-root and"
" effective capabilities. Therefore not raising all"
" capabilities.\n", fname);
warned = 1;
}
}
/**
* cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
* @cred: The credentials to use
* @ns: The user namespace in which we need the capability
* @cap: The capability to check for
* @opts: Bitmask of options defined in include/linux/security.h
*
* Determine whether the nominated task has the specified capability amongst
* its effective set, returning 0 if it does, -ve if it does not.
*
* NOTE WELL: cap_has_capability() cannot be used like the kernel's capable()
* and has_capability() functions. That is, it has the reverse semantics:
* cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the
* kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case.
*/
int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts)
{
struct user_namespace *ns = targ_ns;
/* See if cred has the capability in the target user namespace
* by examining the target user namespace and all of the target
* user namespace's parents.
*/
for (;;) {
/* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */
if (ns == cred->user_ns)
return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM;
/*
* If we're already at a lower level than we're looking for,
* we're done searching.
*/
if (ns->level <= cred->user_ns->level)
return -EPERM;
/*
* The owner of the user namespace in the parent of the
* user namespace has all caps.
*/
if ((ns->parent == cred->user_ns) && uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid))
return 0;
/*
* If you have a capability in a parent user ns, then you have
* it over all children user namespaces as well.
*/
ns = ns->parent;
}
/* We never get here */
}
/**
* cap_settime - Determine whether the current process may set the system clock
* @ts: The time to set
* @tz: The timezone to set
*
* Determine whether the current process may set the system clock and timezone
* information, returning 0 if permission granted, -ve if denied.
*/
int cap_settime(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz)
{
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TIME))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
/**
* cap_ptrace_access_check - Determine whether the current process may access
* another
* @child: The process to be accessed
* @mode: The mode of attachment.
*
* If we are in the same or an ancestor user_ns and have all the target
* task's capabilities, then ptrace access is allowed.
* If we have the ptrace capability to the target user_ns, then ptrace
* access is allowed.
* Else denied.
*
* Determine whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission
* granted, -ve if denied.
*/
int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
{
int ret = 0;
const struct cred *cred, *child_cred;
const kernel_cap_t *caller_caps;
rcu_read_lock();
cred = current_cred();
child_cred = __task_cred(child);
if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS)
caller_caps = &cred->cap_effective;
else
caller_caps = &cred->cap_permitted;
if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns &&
cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, *caller_caps))
goto out;
if (ns_capable(child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
goto out;
ret = -EPERM;
out:
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
/**
* cap_ptrace_traceme - Determine whether another process may trace the current
* @parent: The task proposed to be the tracer
*
* If parent is in the same or an ancestor user_ns and has all current's
* capabilities, then ptrace access is allowed.
* If parent has the ptrace capability to current's user_ns, then ptrace
* access is allowed.
* Else denied.
*
* Determine whether the nominated task is permitted to trace the current
* process, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
*/
int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
{
int ret = 0;
const struct cred *cred, *child_cred;
rcu_read_lock();
cred = __task_cred(parent);
child_cred = current_cred();
if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns &&
cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted))
goto out;
if (has_ns_capability(parent, child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
goto out;
ret = -EPERM;
out:
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
/**
* cap_capget - Retrieve a task's capability sets
* @target: The task from which to retrieve the capability sets
* @effective: The place to record the effective set
* @inheritable: The place to record the inheritable set
* @permitted: The place to record the permitted set
*
* This function retrieves the capabilities of the nominated task and returns
* them to the caller.
*/
int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
const struct cred *cred;
/* Derived from kernel/capability.c:sys_capget. */
rcu_read_lock();
cred = __task_cred(target);
*effective = cred->cap_effective;
*inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable;
*permitted = cred->cap_permitted;
rcu_read_unlock();
return 0;
}
/*
* Determine whether the inheritable capabilities are limited to the old
* permitted set. Returns 1 if they are limited, 0 if they are not.
*/
static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
{
/* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP
* capability
*/
if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user_ns,
CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_OPT_NONE) == 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
/**
* cap_capset - Validate and apply proposed changes to current's capabilities
* @new: The proposed new credentials; alterations should be made here
* @old: The current task's current credentials
* @effective: A pointer to the proposed new effective capabilities set
* @inheritable: A pointer to the proposed new inheritable capabilities set
* @permitted: A pointer to the proposed new permitted capabilities set
*
* This function validates and applies a proposed mass change to the current
* process's capability sets. The changes are made to the proposed new
* credentials, and assuming no error, will be committed by the caller of LSM.
*/
int cap_capset(struct cred *new,
const struct cred *old,
const kernel_cap_t *effective,
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
if (cap_inh_is_capped() &&
!cap_issubset(*inheritable,
cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable,
old->cap_permitted)))
/* incapable of using this inheritable set */
return -EPERM;
if (!cap_issubset(*inheritable,
cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable,
old->cap_bset)))
/* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */
return -EPERM;
/* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */
if (!cap_issubset(*permitted, old->cap_permitted))
return -EPERM;
/* verify the _new_Effective_ is a subset of the _new_Permitted_ */
if (!cap_issubset(*effective, *permitted))
return -EPERM;
new->cap_effective = *effective;
new->cap_inheritable = *inheritable;
new->cap_permitted = *permitted;
/*
* Mask off ambient bits that are no longer both permitted and
* inheritable.
*/
new->cap_ambient = cap_intersect(new->cap_ambient,
cap_intersect(*permitted,
*inheritable));
if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new)))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
/**
* cap_inode_need_killpriv - Determine if inode change affects privileges
* @dentry: The inode/dentry in being changed with change marked ATTR_KILL_PRIV
*
* Determine if an inode having a change applied that's marked ATTR_KILL_PRIV
* affects the security markings on that inode, and if it is, should
* inode_killpriv() be invoked or the change rejected.
*
* Returns 1 if security.capability has a value, meaning inode_killpriv()
* is required, 0 otherwise, meaning inode_killpriv() is not required.
*/
int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
int error;
error = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, NULL, 0);
return error > 0;
}
/**
* cap_inode_killpriv - Erase the security markings on an inode
* @dentry: The inode/dentry to alter
*
* Erase the privilege-enhancing security markings on an inode.
*
* Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error.
*/
int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
{
int error;
error = __vfs_removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS);
if (error == -EOPNOTSUPP)
error = 0;
return error;
}
static bool rootid_owns_currentns(kuid_t kroot)
{
struct user_namespace *ns;
if (!uid_valid(kroot))
return false;
for (ns = current_user_ns(); ; ns = ns->parent) {
if (from_kuid(ns, kroot) == 0)
return true;
if (ns == &init_user_ns)
break;
}
return false;
}
static __u32 sansflags(__u32 m)
{
return m & ~VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE;
}
static bool is_v2header(size_t size, const struct vfs_cap_data *cap)
{
if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2)
return false;
return sansflags(le32_to_cpu(cap->magic_etc)) == VFS_CAP_REVISION_2;
}
static bool is_v3header(size_t size, const struct vfs_cap_data *cap)
{
if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3)
return false;
return sansflags(le32_to_cpu(cap->magic_etc)) == VFS_CAP_REVISION_3;
}
/*
* getsecurity: We are called for security.* before any attempt to read the
* xattr from the inode itself.
*
* This gives us a chance to read the on-disk value and convert it. If we
* return -EOPNOTSUPP, then vfs_getxattr() will call the i_op handler.
*
* Note we are not called by vfs_getxattr_alloc(), but that is only called
* by the integrity subsystem, which really wants the unconverted values -
* so that's good.
*/
int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer,
bool alloc)
{
int size, ret;
kuid_t kroot;
u32 nsmagic, magic;
uid_t root, mappedroot;
char *tmpbuf = NULL;
struct vfs_cap_data *cap;
struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap = NULL;
struct dentry *dentry;
struct user_namespace *fs_ns;
if (strcmp(name, "capability") != 0)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
if (!dentry)
return -EINVAL;
size = sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data);
ret = (int) vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS,
&tmpbuf, size, GFP_NOFS);
dput(dentry);
if (ret < 0 || !tmpbuf)
return ret;
fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
cap = (struct vfs_cap_data *) tmpbuf;
if (is_v2header((size_t) ret, cap)) {
root = 0;
} else if (is_v3header((size_t) ret, cap)) {
nscap = (struct vfs_ns_cap_data *) tmpbuf;
root = le32_to_cpu(nscap->rootid);
} else {
size = -EINVAL;
goto out_free;
}
kroot = make_kuid(fs_ns, root);
/* If the root kuid maps to a valid uid in current ns, then return
* this as a nscap. */
mappedroot = from_kuid(current_user_ns(), kroot);
if (mappedroot != (uid_t)-1 && mappedroot != (uid_t)0) {
size = sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data);
if (alloc) {
if (!nscap) {
/* v2 -> v3 conversion */
nscap = kzalloc(size, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!nscap) {
size = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free;
}
nsmagic = VFS_CAP_REVISION_3;
magic = le32_to_cpu(cap->magic_etc);
if (magic & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE)
nsmagic |= VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE;
memcpy(&nscap->data, &cap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32);
nscap->magic_etc = cpu_to_le32(nsmagic);
} else {
/* use allocated v3 buffer */
tmpbuf = NULL;
}
nscap->rootid = cpu_to_le32(mappedroot);
*buffer = nscap;
}
goto out_free;
}
if (!rootid_owns_currentns(kroot)) {
size = -EOVERFLOW;
goto out_free;
}
/* This comes from a parent namespace. Return as a v2 capability */
size = sizeof(struct vfs_cap_data);
if (alloc) {
if (nscap) {
/* v3 -> v2 conversion */
cap = kzalloc(size, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!cap) {
size = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free;
}
magic = VFS_CAP_REVISION_2;
nsmagic = le32_to_cpu(nscap->magic_etc);
if (nsmagic & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE)
magic |= VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE;
memcpy(&cap->data, &nscap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32);
cap->magic_etc = cpu_to_le32(magic);
} else {
/* use unconverted v2 */
tmpbuf = NULL;
}
*buffer = cap;
}
out_free:
kfree(tmpbuf);
return size;
}
static kuid_t rootid_from_xattr(const void *value, size_t size,
struct user_namespace *task_ns)
{
const struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap = value;
uid_t rootid = 0;
if (size == XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3)
rootid = le32_to_cpu(nscap->rootid);
return make_kuid(task_ns, rootid);
}
static bool validheader(size_t size, const struct vfs_cap_data *cap)
{
return is_v2header(size, cap) || is_v3header(size, cap);
}
/*
* User requested a write of security.capability. If needed, update the
* xattr to change from v2 to v3, or to fixup the v3 rootid.
*
* If all is ok, we return the new size, on error return < 0.
*/
int cap_convert_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, void **ivalue, size_t size)
{
struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap;
uid_t nsrootid;
const struct vfs_cap_data *cap = *ivalue;
__u32 magic, nsmagic;
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
struct user_namespace *task_ns = current_user_ns(),
*fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
kuid_t rootid;
size_t newsize;
if (!*ivalue)
return -EINVAL;
if (!validheader(size, cap))
return -EINVAL;
if (!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_SETFCAP))
return -EPERM;
if (size == XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2)
if (ns_capable(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, CAP_SETFCAP))
/* user is privileged, just write the v2 */
return size;
rootid = rootid_from_xattr(*ivalue, size, task_ns);
if (!uid_valid(rootid))
return -EINVAL;
nsrootid = from_kuid(fs_ns, rootid);
if (nsrootid == -1)
return -EINVAL;
newsize = sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data);
nscap = kmalloc(newsize, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!nscap)
return -ENOMEM;
nscap->rootid = cpu_to_le32(nsrootid);
nsmagic = VFS_CAP_REVISION_3;
magic = le32_to_cpu(cap->magic_etc);
if (magic & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE)
nsmagic |= VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE;
nscap->magic_etc = cpu_to_le32(nsmagic);
memcpy(&nscap->data, &cap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32);
kvfree(*ivalue);
*ivalue = nscap;
return newsize;
}
/*
* Calculate the new process capability sets from the capability sets attached
* to a file.
*/
static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps,
struct linux_binprm *bprm,
bool *effective,
bool *has_fcap)
{
struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
unsigned i;
int ret = 0;
if (caps->magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE)
*effective = true;
if (caps->magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK)
*has_fcap = true;
CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
__u32 permitted = caps->permitted.cap[i];
__u32 inheritable = caps->inheritable.cap[i];
/*
* pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI)
* The addition of pA' is handled later.
*/
new->cap_permitted.cap[i] =
(new->cap_bset.cap[i] & permitted) |
(new->cap_inheritable.cap[i] & inheritable);
if (permitted & ~new->cap_permitted.cap[i])
/* insufficient to execute correctly */
ret = -EPERM;
}
/*
* For legacy apps, with no internal support for recognizing they
* do not have enough capabilities, we return an error if they are
* missing some "forced" (aka file-permitted) capabilities.
*/
return *effective ? ret : 0;
}
/*
* Extract the on-exec-apply capability sets for an executable file.
*/
int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps)
{
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
__u32 magic_etc;
unsigned tocopy, i;
int size;
struct vfs_ns_cap_data data, *nscaps = &data;
struct vfs_cap_data *caps = (struct vfs_cap_data *) &data;
kuid_t rootkuid;
struct user_namespace *fs_ns;
memset(cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data));
if (!inode)
return -ENODATA;
fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
size = __vfs_getxattr((struct dentry *)dentry, inode,
XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &data, XATTR_CAPS_SZ);
if (size == -ENODATA || size == -EOPNOTSUPP)
/* no data, that's ok */
return -ENODATA;
if (size < 0)
return size;
if (size < sizeof(magic_etc))
return -EINVAL;
cpu_caps->magic_etc = magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps->magic_etc);
rootkuid = make_kuid(fs_ns, 0);
switch (magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) {
case VFS_CAP_REVISION_1:
if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_1)
return -EINVAL;
tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_1;
break;
case VFS_CAP_REVISION_2:
if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2)
return -EINVAL;
tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_2;
break;
case VFS_CAP_REVISION_3:
if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3)
return -EINVAL;
tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_3;
rootkuid = make_kuid(fs_ns, le32_to_cpu(nscaps->rootid));
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
/* Limit the caps to the mounter of the filesystem
* or the more limited uid specified in the xattr.
*/
if (!rootid_owns_currentns(rootkuid))
return -ENODATA;
CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
if (i >= tocopy)
break;
cpu_caps->permitted.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps->data[i].permitted);
cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps->data[i].inheritable);
}
cpu_caps->permitted.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
cpu_caps->rootid = rootkuid;
return 0;
}
/*
* Attempt to get the on-exec apply capability sets for an executable file from
* its xattrs and, if present, apply them to the proposed credentials being
* constructed by execve().
*/
static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file,
bool *effective, bool *has_fcap)
{
int rc = 0;
struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
cap_clear(bprm->cred->cap_permitted);
if (!file_caps_enabled)
return 0;
if (!mnt_may_suid(file->f_path.mnt))
return 0;
/*
* This check is redundant with mnt_may_suid() but is kept to make
* explicit that capability bits are limited to s_user_ns and its
* descendants.
*/
if (!current_in_userns(file->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns))
return 0;
rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
if (rc < 0) {
if (rc == -EINVAL)
printk(KERN_NOTICE "Invalid argument reading file caps for %s\n",
bprm->filename);
else if (rc == -ENODATA)
rc = 0;
goto out;
}
rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_fcap);
out:
if (rc)
cap_clear(bprm->cred->cap_permitted);
return rc;
}
static inline bool root_privileged(void) { return !issecure(SECURE_NOROOT); }
static inline bool __is_real(kuid_t uid, struct cred *cred)
{ return uid_eq(cred->uid, uid); }
static inline bool __is_eff(kuid_t uid, struct cred *cred)
{ return uid_eq(cred->euid, uid); }
static inline bool __is_suid(kuid_t uid, struct cred *cred)
{ return !__is_real(uid, cred) && __is_eff(uid, cred); }
/*
* handle_privileged_root - Handle case of privileged root
* @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds
* @has_fcap: Are any file capabilities set?
* @effective: Do we have effective root privilege?
* @root_uid: This namespace' root UID WRT initial USER namespace
*
* Handle the case where root is privileged and hasn't been neutered by
* SECURE_NOROOT. If file capabilities are set, they won't be combined with
* set UID root and nothing is changed. If we are root, cap_permitted is
* updated. If we have become set UID root, the effective bit is set.
*/
static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap,
bool *effective, kuid_t root_uid)
{
const struct cred *old = current_cred();
struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
if (!root_privileged())
return;
/*
* If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs
* for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it
* for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
*/
if (has_fcap && __is_suid(root_uid, new)) {
warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
return;
}
/*
* To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
* executables under compatibility mode, we override the
* capability sets for the file.
*/
if (__is_eff(root_uid, new) || __is_real(root_uid, new)) {
/* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */
new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset,
old->cap_inheritable);
}
/*
* If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective bit.
*/
if (__is_eff(root_uid, new))
*effective = true;
}
#define __cap_gained(field, target, source) \
!cap_issubset(target->cap_##field, source->cap_##field)
#define __cap_grew(target, source, cred) \
!cap_issubset(cred->cap_##target, cred->cap_##source)
#define __cap_full(field, cred) \
cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, cred->cap_##field)
static inline bool __is_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{ return !uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid); }
static inline bool __is_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{ return !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid); }
/*
* 1) Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set
*
* We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true:
* 1) cap_effective has all caps
* 2) we became root *OR* are were already root
* 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT)
* Since this is just a normal root execing a process.
*
* Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think
* that is interesting information to audit.
*
* A number of other conditions require logging:
* 2) something prevented setuid root getting all caps
* 3) non-setuid root gets fcaps
* 4) non-setuid root gets ambient
*/
static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
kuid_t root, bool has_fcap)
{
bool ret = false;
if ((__cap_grew(effective, ambient, new) &&
!(__cap_full(effective, new) &&
(__is_eff(root, new) || __is_real(root, new)) &&
root_privileged())) ||
(root_privileged() &&
__is_suid(root, new) &&
!__cap_full(effective, new)) ||
(!__is_setuid(new, old) &&
((has_fcap &&
__cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) ||
__cap_gained(ambient, new, old))))
ret = true;
return ret;
}
/**
* cap_bprm_creds_from_file - Set up the proposed credentials for execve().
* @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds
* @file: The file to pull the credentials from
*
* Set up the proposed credentials for a new execution context being
* constructed by execve(). The proposed creds in @bprm->cred is altered,
* which won't take effect immediately. Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error.
*/
int cap_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file)
{
/* Process setpcap binaries and capabilities for uid 0 */
const struct cred *old = current_cred();
struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
bool effective = false, has_fcap = false, is_setid;
int ret;
kuid_t root_uid;
if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(old)))
return -EPERM;
ret = get_file_caps(bprm, file, &effective, &has_fcap);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0);
handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_fcap, &effective, root_uid);
/* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */
if (__cap_gained(permitted, new, old))
bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
/* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised
* credentials unless they have the appropriate permit.
*
* In addition, if NO_NEW_PRIVS, then ensure we get no new privs.
*/
is_setid = __is_setuid(new, old) || __is_setgid(new, old);
if ((is_setid || __cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) &&
((bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) ||
!ptracer_capable(current, new->user_ns))) {
/* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */
if (!ns_capable(new->user_ns, CAP_SETUID) ||
(bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS)) {
new->euid = new->uid;
new->egid = new->gid;
}
new->cap_permitted = cap_intersect(new->cap_permitted,
old->cap_permitted);
}
new->suid = new->fsuid = new->euid;
new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid;
/* File caps or setid cancels ambient. */
if (has_fcap || is_setid)
cap_clear(new->cap_ambient);
/*
* Now that we've computed pA', update pP' to give:
* pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) | pA'
*/
new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(new->cap_permitted, new->cap_ambient);
/*
* Set pE' = (fE ? pP' : pA'). Because pA' is zero if fE is set,
* this is the same as pE' = (fE ? pP' : 0) | pA'.
*/
if (effective)
new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted;
else
new->cap_effective = new->cap_ambient;
if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new)))
return -EPERM;
if (nonroot_raised_pE(new, old, root_uid, has_fcap)) {
ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new)))
return -EPERM;
/* Check for privilege-elevated exec. */
if (is_setid ||
(!__is_real(root_uid, new) &&
(effective ||
__cap_grew(permitted, ambient, new))))
bprm->secureexec = 1;
return 0;
}
/**
* cap_inode_setxattr - Determine whether an xattr may be altered
* @dentry: The inode/dentry being altered
* @name: The name of the xattr to be changed
* @value: The value that the xattr will be changed to
* @size: The size of value
* @flags: The replacement flag
*
* Determine whether an xattr may be altered or set on an inode, returning 0 if
* permission is granted, -ve if denied.
*
* This is used to make sure security xattrs don't get updated or set by those
* who aren't privileged to do so.
*/
int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct user_namespace *user_ns = dentry->d_sb->s_user_ns;
/* Ignore non-security xattrs */
if (strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN) != 0)
return 0;
/*
* For XATTR_NAME_CAPS the check will be done in
* cap_convert_nscap(), called by setxattr()
*/
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS) == 0)
return 0;
if (!ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
/**
* cap_inode_removexattr - Determine whether an xattr may be removed
* @dentry: The inode/dentry being altered
* @name: The name of the xattr to be changed
*
* Determine whether an xattr may be removed from an inode, returning 0 if
* permission is granted, -ve if denied.
*
* This is used to make sure security xattrs don't get removed by those who
* aren't privileged to remove them.
*/
int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
{
struct user_namespace *user_ns = dentry->d_sb->s_user_ns;
/* Ignore non-security xattrs */
if (strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN) != 0)
return 0;
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS) == 0) {
/* security.capability gets namespaced */
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
if (!inode)
return -EINVAL;
if (!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_SETFCAP))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
if (!ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
/*
* cap_emulate_setxuid() fixes the effective / permitted capabilities of
* a process after a call to setuid, setreuid, or setresuid.
*
* 1) When set*uiding _from_ one of {r,e,s}uid == 0 _to_ all of
* {r,e,s}uid != 0, the permitted and effective capabilities are
* cleared.
*
* 2) When set*uiding _from_ euid == 0 _to_ euid != 0, the effective
* capabilities of the process are cleared.
*
* 3) When set*uiding _from_ euid != 0 _to_ euid == 0, the effective