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Security: TracineHQ/convo

Security

Report a vulnerability

SECURITY.md

Security policy

Supported versions

The latest minor release receives security fixes. The v0.1.x line is the current supported series.

Version Supported
0.1.x yes
< 0.1 no

Reporting a vulnerability

Do not open a public issue for security reports.

Use GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting:

https://github.com/TracineHQ/convo/security/advisories/new

Please include:

  • A description of the issue and its impact.
  • Reproduction steps (commands, inputs, environment).
  • Affected version (convo --version).
  • Contact info for follow-up.

Response targets

  • Acknowledgement: within 72 hours of report.
  • High-severity fix: within 30 days of triage.
  • Coordinated disclosure: roughly a 7-day public-update window after the fix lands, to give users time to upgrade before details become public.

Threat model

convo reads Claude Code session JSONLs from ~/.claude/projects/ and persists their content to a local SQLite database. Inputs are user-controlled but the JSONLs themselves can carry attacker-influenceable text — pasted prompts, fetched web content, MCP tool responses. The intake pipeline is written with that in mind:

  • JSONL parsing is stdlib json.loads; no eval/exec/pickle.
  • Per-file errors are contained: a malformed line aborts that file's transaction only, never the tree run.
  • All SQL parameters are bound via ?-placeholders. Constants interpolated via f-strings are typed literals (e.g. integer table limits, float SECONDS_PER_DAY).
  • The live DB and snapshot files are written 0o600 on POSIX; WAL/SHM sidecars are chmodded to match. On Windows, POSIX mode bits are ignored by the OS — os.open(..., 0o600) and Path.chmod(0o600) succeed but do not restrict access. The DB inherits the parent directory's ACL, which is owner-only for the typical %USERPROFILE%\.claude\ install but not guaranteed for shared-user or CI environments. Tightening to per-user ACL on Windows is a known limitation.
  • Restore is atomic-replace and same-filesystem only; staging files are unlinked on partial failure.

What's in scope

  • The convo Python package and CLI.
  • The CI configuration and pre-commit hooks shipped in this repo.
  • The Claude Code plugin manifest under .claude-plugin/.

What's out of scope

  • Issues in upstream dependencies (file those upstream and link the advisory here once available).
  • The contents of users' local Claude Code session files.
  • Arbitrary input to the FTS5 query parser is treated as a search query; malformed FTS5 syntax is a UX issue, not a security one.

There aren't any published security advisories