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@Seyi007 Seyi007 commented Jan 3, 2025

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@Seyi007 Seyi007 force-pushed the convert-unittest-2-clar branch 5 times, most recently from 5f70ba7 to 6fde578 Compare January 8, 2025 11:40
Adapt the hash test functions to clar framework by using clar
assertions where necessary. Following the consensus to convert
the unit-tests scripts found in the t/unit-tests folder to clar driven by
Patrick Steinhardt. Test functions are structured as a standalone to
test individual hash string and literal case.

Mentored-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Seyi Kuforiji <kuforiji98@gmail.com>
@Seyi007 Seyi007 force-pushed the convert-unittest-2-clar branch from 6fde578 to fcc2a37 Compare January 9, 2025 15:15
Seyi007 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 21, 2025
There's a race with LSan when spawning threads and one of the threads
calls die(). We worked around one such problem with index-pack in the
previous commit, but it exists in git-grep, too. You can see it with:

  make SANITIZE=leak THREAD_BARRIER_PTHREAD=YesOnLinux
  cd t
  ./t0003-attributes.sh --stress

which fails pretty quickly with:

  ==git==4096424==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

  Direct leak of 32 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
      #0 0x7f906de14556 in realloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:98
      #1 0x7f906dc9d2c1 in __pthread_getattr_np nptl/pthread_getattr_np.c:180
      #2 0x7f906de2500d in __sanitizer::GetThreadStackTopAndBottom(bool, unsigned long*, unsigned long*) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux_libcdep.cpp:150
      #3 0x7f906de25187 in __sanitizer::GetThreadStackAndTls(bool, unsigned long*, unsigned long*, unsigned long*, unsigned long*) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux_libcdep.cpp:614
      #4 0x7f906de17d18 in __lsan::ThreadStart(unsigned int, unsigned long long, __sanitizer::ThreadType) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_posix.cpp:53
      #5 0x7f906de143a9 in ThreadStartFunc<false> ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:431
      git#6 0x7f906dc9bf51 in start_thread nptl/pthread_create.c:447
      #7 0x7f906dd1a677 in __clone3 ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone3.S:78

As with the previous commit, we can fix this by inserting a barrier that
makes sure all threads have finished their setup before continuing. But
there's one twist in this case: the thread which calls die() is not one
of the worker threads, but the main thread itself!

So we need the main thread to wait in the barrier, too, until all
threads have gotten to it. And thus we initialize the barrier for
num_threads+1, to account for all of the worker threads plus the main
one.

If we then test as above, t0003 should run indefinitely.

Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Seyi007 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 21, 2025
In 1b9e9be (csum-file.c: use unsafe SHA-1 implementation when
available, 2024-09-26) we have converted our `struct hashfile` to use
the unsafe SHA1 backend, which results in a significant speedup. One
needs to be careful with how to use that structure now though because
callers need to consistently use either the safe or unsafe variants of
SHA1, as otherwise one can easily trigger corruption.

As it turns out, we have one inconsistent usage in our tree because we
directly initialize `struct hashfile_checkpoint::ctx` with the safe
variant of SHA1, but end up writing to that context with the unsafe
ones. This went unnoticed so far because our CI systems do not exercise
different hash functions for these two backends, and consequently safe
and unsafe variants are equivalent. But when using SHA1DC as safe and
OpenSSL as unsafe backend this leads to a crash an t1050:

    ++ git -c core.compression=0 add large1
    AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL
    =================================================================
    ==1367==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000040 (pc 0x7ffff7a01a99 bp 0x507000000db0 sp 0x7fffffff5690 T0)
    ==1367==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
    ==1367==Hint: address points to the zero page.
        #0 0x7ffff7a01a99 in EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex (/nix/store/h1ydpxkw9qhjdxjpic1pdc2nirggyy6f-openssl-3.3.2/lib/libcrypto.so.3+0x201a99) (BuildId: 41746a580d39075fc85e8c8065b6c07fb34e97d4)
        #1 0x555555ddde56 in openssl_SHA1_Clone ../sha1/openssl.h:40:2
        #2 0x555555dce2fc in git_hash_sha1_clone_unsafe ../object-file.c:123:2
        #3 0x555555c2d5f8 in hashfile_checkpoint ../csum-file.c:211:2
        #4 0x555555b9905d in deflate_blob_to_pack ../bulk-checkin.c:286:4
        #5 0x555555b98ae9 in index_blob_bulk_checkin ../bulk-checkin.c:362:15
        git#6 0x555555ddab62 in index_blob_stream ../object-file.c:2756:9
        #7 0x555555dda420 in index_fd ../object-file.c:2778:9
        git#8 0x555555ddad76 in index_path ../object-file.c:2796:7
        git#9 0x555555e947f3 in add_to_index ../read-cache.c:771:7
        git#10 0x555555e954a4 in add_file_to_index ../read-cache.c:804:9
        git#11 0x5555558b5c39 in add_files ../builtin/add.c:355:7
        git#12 0x5555558b412e in cmd_add ../builtin/add.c:578:18
        git#13 0x555555b1f493 in run_builtin ../git.c:480:11
        git#14 0x555555b1bfef in handle_builtin ../git.c:740:9
        git#15 0x555555b1e6f4 in run_argv ../git.c:807:4
        git#16 0x555555b1b87a in cmd_main ../git.c:947:19
        git#17 0x5555561649e6 in main ../common-main.c:64:11
        git#18 0x7ffff742a1fb in __libc_start_call_main (/nix/store/65h17wjrrlsj2rj540igylrx7fqcd6vq-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a1fb) (BuildId: bf320110569c8ec2425e9a0c5e4eb7e97f1fb6e4)
        git#19 0x7ffff742a2b8 in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/nix/store/65h17wjrrlsj2rj540igylrx7fqcd6vq-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a2b8) (BuildId: bf320110569c8ec2425e9a0c5e4eb7e97f1fb6e4)
        git#20 0x555555772c84 in _start (git+0x21ec84)

    ==1367==Register values:
    rax = 0x0000511000001080  rbx = 0x0000000000000000  rcx = 0x000000000000000c  rdx = 0x0000000000000000
    rdi = 0x0000000000000000  rsi = 0x0000507000000db0  rbp = 0x0000507000000db0  rsp = 0x00007fffffff5690
     r8 = 0x0000000000000000   r9 = 0x0000000000000000  r10 = 0x0000000000000000  r11 = 0x00007ffff7a01a30
    r12 = 0x0000000000000000  r13 = 0x00007fffffff6b38  r14 = 0x00007ffff7ffd000  r15 = 0x00005555563b9910
    AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info.
    SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/nix/store/h1ydpxkw9qhjdxjpic1pdc2nirggyy6f-openssl-3.3.2/lib/libcrypto.so.3+0x201a99) (BuildId: 41746a580d39075fc85e8c8065b6c07fb34e97d4) in EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex
    ==1367==ABORTING
    ./test-lib.sh: line 1023:  1367 Aborted                 git $config add large1
    error: last command exited with $?=134
    not ok 4 - add with -c core.compression=0

Fix the issue by using the unsafe variant instead.

Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Seyi007 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 21, 2025
Same as with the preceding commit, git-fast-import(1) is using the safe
variant to initialize a hashfile checkpoint. This leads to a segfault
when passing the checkpoint into the hashfile subsystem because it would
use the unsafe variants instead:

    ++ git --git-dir=R/.git fast-import --big-file-threshold=1
    AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL
    =================================================================
    ==577126==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000040 (pc 0x7ffff7a01a99 bp 0x5070000009c0 sp 0x7fffffff5b30 T0)
    ==577126==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
    ==577126==Hint: address points to the zero page.
        #0 0x7ffff7a01a99 in EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex (/nix/store/h1ydpxkw9qhjdxjpic1pdc2nirggyy6f-openssl-3.3.2/lib/libcrypto.so.3+0x201a99) (BuildId: 41746a580d39075fc85e8c8065b6c07fb34e97d4)
        #1 0x555555ddde56 in openssl_SHA1_Clone ../sha1/openssl.h:40:2
        #2 0x555555dce2fc in git_hash_sha1_clone_unsafe ../object-file.c:123:2
        #3 0x555555c2d5f8 in hashfile_checkpoint ../csum-file.c:211:2
        #4 0x5555559647d1 in stream_blob ../builtin/fast-import.c:1110:2
        #5 0x55555596247b in parse_and_store_blob ../builtin/fast-import.c:2031:3
        git#6 0x555555967f91 in file_change_m ../builtin/fast-import.c:2408:5
        #7 0x55555595d8a2 in parse_new_commit ../builtin/fast-import.c:2768:4
        git#8 0x55555595bb7a in cmd_fast_import ../builtin/fast-import.c:3614:4
        git#9 0x555555b1f493 in run_builtin ../git.c:480:11
        git#10 0x555555b1bfef in handle_builtin ../git.c:740:9
        git#11 0x555555b1e6f4 in run_argv ../git.c:807:4
        git#12 0x555555b1b87a in cmd_main ../git.c:947:19
        git#13 0x5555561649e6 in main ../common-main.c:64:11
        git#14 0x7ffff742a1fb in __libc_start_call_main (/nix/store/65h17wjrrlsj2rj540igylrx7fqcd6vq-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a1fb) (BuildId: bf320110569c8ec2425e9a0c5e4eb7e97f1fb6e4)
        git#15 0x7ffff742a2b8 in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/nix/store/65h17wjrrlsj2rj540igylrx7fqcd6vq-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a2b8) (BuildId: bf320110569c8ec2425e9a0c5e4eb7e97f1fb6e4)
        git#16 0x555555772c84 in _start (git+0x21ec84)

    ==577126==Register values:
    rax = 0x0000511000000cc0  rbx = 0x0000000000000000  rcx = 0x000000000000000c  rdx = 0x0000000000000000
    rdi = 0x0000000000000000  rsi = 0x00005070000009c0  rbp = 0x00005070000009c0  rsp = 0x00007fffffff5b30
     r8 = 0x0000000000000000   r9 = 0x0000000000000000  r10 = 0x0000000000000000  r11 = 0x00007ffff7a01a30
    r12 = 0x0000000000000000  r13 = 0x00007fffffff6b60  r14 = 0x00007ffff7ffd000  r15 = 0x00005555563b9910
    AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info.
    SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/nix/store/h1ydpxkw9qhjdxjpic1pdc2nirggyy6f-openssl-3.3.2/lib/libcrypto.so.3+0x201a99) (BuildId: 41746a580d39075fc85e8c8065b6c07fb34e97d4) in EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex
    ==577126==ABORTING
    ./test-lib.sh: line 1039: 577126 Aborted                 git --git-dir=R/.git fast-import --big-file-threshold=1 < input
    error: last command exited with $?=134
    not ok 167 - R: blob bigger than threshold

The segfault is only exposed in case the unsafe and safe backends are
different from one another.

Fix the issue by initializing the context with the unsafe SHA1 variant.

Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Seyi007 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 21, 2025
Our CI jobs sometimes see false positive leaks like this:

        =================================================================
        ==3904583==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

        Direct leak of 32 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
            #0 0x7fa790d01986 in __interceptor_realloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:98
            #1 0x7fa790add769 in __pthread_getattr_np nptl/pthread_getattr_np.c:180
            #2 0x7fa790d117c5 in __sanitizer::GetThreadStackTopAndBottom(bool, unsigned long*, unsigned long*) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux_libcdep.cpp:150
            #3 0x7fa790d11957 in __sanitizer::GetThreadStackAndTls(bool, unsigned long*, unsigned long*, unsigned long*, unsigned long*) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux_libcdep.cpp:598
            #4 0x7fa790d03fe8 in __lsan::ThreadStart(unsigned int, unsigned long long, __sanitizer::ThreadType) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_posix.cpp:51
            #5 0x7fa790d013fd in __lsan_thread_start_func ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:440
            git#6 0x7fa790adc3eb in start_thread nptl/pthread_create.c:444
            #7 0x7fa790b5ca5b in clone3 ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone3.S:81

This is not a leak in our code, but appears to be a race between one
thread calling exit() while another one is in LSan's stack setup code.
You can reproduce it easily by running t0003 or t5309 with --stress
(these trigger it because of the threading in git-grep and index-pack
respectively).

This may be a bug in LSan, but regardless of whether it is eventually
fixed, it is useful to work around it so that we stop seeing these false
positives.

We can recognize it by the mention of the sanitizer functions in the
DEDUP_TOKEN line. With this patch, the scripts mentioned above should
run with --stress indefinitely.

Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Seyi007 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 11, 2025
When trying to create a Unix socket in a path that exceeds the maximum
socket name length we try to first change the directory into the parent
folder before creating the socket to reduce the length of the name. When
this fails we error out of `unix_sockaddr_init()` with an error code,
which indicates to the caller that the context has not been initialized.
Consequently, they don't release that context.

This leads to a memory leak: when we have already populated the context
with the original directory that we need to chdir(3p) back into, but
then the chdir(3p) into the socket's parent directory fails, then we
won't release the original directory's path. The leak is exposed by
t0301, but only when running tests in a directory hierarchy whose path
is long enough to make the socket name length exceed the maximum socket
name length:

    Direct leak of 129 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
        #0 0x5555555e85c6 in realloc.part.0 lsan_interceptors.cpp.o
        #1 0x55555590e3d6 in xrealloc ../wrapper.c:140:8
        #2 0x5555558c8fc6 in strbuf_grow ../strbuf.c:114:2
        #3 0x5555558cacab in strbuf_getcwd ../strbuf.c:605:3
        #4 0x555555923ff6 in unix_sockaddr_init ../unix-socket.c:65:7
        #5 0x555555923e42 in unix_stream_connect ../unix-socket.c:84:6
        git#6 0x55555562a984 in send_request ../builtin/credential-cache.c:46:11
        #7 0x55555562a89e in do_cache ../builtin/credential-cache.c:108:6
        git#8 0x55555562a655 in cmd_credential_cache ../builtin/credential-cache.c:178:3
        git#9 0x555555700547 in run_builtin ../git.c:480:11
        git#10 0x5555556ff0e0 in handle_builtin ../git.c:740:9
        git#11 0x5555556ffee8 in run_argv ../git.c:807:4
        git#12 0x5555556fee6b in cmd_main ../git.c:947:19
        git#13 0x55555593f689 in main ../common-main.c:64:11
        git#14 0x7ffff7a2a1fb in __libc_start_call_main (/nix/store/h7zcxabfxa7v5xdna45y2hplj31ncf8a-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a1fb) (BuildId: 0a855678aa0cb573cecbb2bcc73ab8239ec472d0)
        git#15 0x7ffff7a2a2b8 in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/nix/store/h7zcxabfxa7v5xdna45y2hplj31ncf8a-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a2b8) (BuildId: 0a855678aa0cb573cecbb2bcc73ab8239ec472d0)
        git#16 0x5555555ad1d4 in _start (git+0x591d4)

    DEDUP_TOKEN: ___interceptor_realloc.part.0--xrealloc--strbuf_grow--strbuf_getcwd--unix_sockaddr_init--unix_stream_connect--send_request--do_cache--cmd_credential_cache--run_builtin--handle_builtin--run_argv--cmd_main--main--__libc_start_call_main--__libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5--_start
    SUMMARY: LeakSanitizer: 129 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).

Fix this leak.

Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Seyi007 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 11, 2025
We don't free the result of `remote_default_branch()`, leading to a
memory leak. This leak is exposed by t9211, but only when run with Meson
with the `-Db_sanitize=leak` option:

    Direct leak of 5 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
        #0 0x5555555cfb93 in malloc (scalar+0x7bb93)
        #1 0x5555556b05c2 in do_xmalloc ../wrapper.c:55:8
        #2 0x5555556b06c4 in do_xmallocz ../wrapper.c:89:8
        #3 0x5555556b0656 in xmallocz ../wrapper.c:97:9
        #4 0x5555556b0728 in xmemdupz ../wrapper.c:113:16
        #5 0x5555556b07a7 in xstrndup ../wrapper.c:119:9
        git#6 0x5555555d3a4b in remote_default_branch ../scalar.c:338:14
        #7 0x5555555d20e6 in cmd_clone ../scalar.c:493:28
        git#8 0x5555555d196b in cmd_main ../scalar.c:992:14
        git#9 0x5555557c4059 in main ../common-main.c:64:11
        git#10 0x7ffff7a2a1fb in __libc_start_call_main (/nix/store/h7zcxabfxa7v5xdna45y2hplj31ncf8a-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a1fb) (BuildId: 0a855678aa0cb573cecbb2bcc73ab8239ec472d0)
        git#11 0x7ffff7a2a2b8 in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/nix/store/h7zcxabfxa7v5xdna45y2hplj31ncf8a-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a2b8) (BuildId: 0a855678aa0cb573cecbb2bcc73ab8239ec472d0)
        git#12 0x555555592054 in _start (scalar+0x3e054)

    DEDUP_TOKEN: __interceptor_malloc--do_xmalloc--do_xmallocz--xmallocz--xmemdupz--xstrndup--remote_default_branch--cmd_clone--cmd_main--main--__libc_start_call_main--__libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5--_start
    SUMMARY: LeakSanitizer: 5 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).

As the `branch` variable may contain a string constant obtained from
parsing command line arguments we cannot free the leaking variable
directly. Instead, introduce a new `branch_to_free` variable that only
ever gets assigned the allocated string and free that one to plug the
leak.

It is unclear why the leak isn't flagged when running the test via our
Makefile.

Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Seyi007 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 4, 2025
Submodule merges are, in general, similar to other merges based on oid
three-way-merge. When a conflict happens, however, Git has two special
cases (introduced in 68d03e4) on handling the conflict before
yielding it to the user. From the merge-ort and merge-recursive sources:

- "Case #1: a is contained in b or vice versa": both strategies try to
perform a fast-forward in the submodules if the commit referred by the
conflicted submodule is descendant of another;

- "Case #2: There are one or more merges that contain a and b in the
submodule.  If there is only one, then present it as a suggestion to the
user, but leave it marked unmerged so the user needs to confirm the
resolution."

Add a small paragraph on merge-strategies.adoc describing this behavior.

Helped-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Helped-by: Elijah Newren <newren@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Lucas Seiki Oshiro <lucasseikioshiro@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
@Seyi007 Seyi007 closed this May 30, 2025
Seyi007 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 1, 2025
The GitHub's CI workflow uses 'actions/checkout@v4' to checkout the
repository. This action defaults to using the GitHub REST API to obtain
the repository if the `git` executable isn't available.

The step to build Git in the GitHub workflow can be summarized as:

  ...
  - uses: actions/checkout@v4 #1
  - run: ci/install-dependencies.sh #2
  ...
  - run: sudo --preserve-env --set-home --user=builder ci/run-build-and-tests.sh #3
  ...

Step #1, clones the repository, since the `git` executable isn't present
at this step, it uses GitHub's REST API to obtain a tar of the
repository.

Step #2, installs all dependencies, which includes the `git` executable.

Step #3, sets up the build, which includes setting up meson in the meson
job. At this point the `git` executable is present.

This means while the `git` executable is present, the repository doesn't
contain the '.git' folder. To keep both the CI's (GitLab and GitHub)
behavior consistent and to ensure that the build is performed on a
real-world scenario, install `git` before the repository is checked out.
This ensures that 'actions/checkout@v4' will clone the repository
instead of using a tarball. We also update the package cache while
installing `git`, this is because some distros will fail to locate the
package without updating the cache.

Helped-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood123@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Karthik Nayak <karthik.188@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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