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draft-sheffer-ipsec-failover-03.txt
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Network Working Group Y. Sheffer
Internet-Draft Check Point
Intended status: Experimental H. Tschofenig
Expires: September 20, 2008 Nokia Siemens Networks
L. Dondeti
V. Narayanan
QUALCOMM, Inc.
March 19, 2008
IPsec Gateway Failover Protocol
draft-sheffer-ipsec-failover-03.txt
Status of this Memo
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 20, 2008.
Abstract
The Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) protocol has
computational and communication overhead with respect to the number
of round-trips required and cryptographic operations involved. In
remote access situations, the Extensible Authentication Protocol is
used for authentication, which adds several more round trips and
therefore latency.
To re-establish security associations (SA) upon a failure recovery
Sheffer, et al. Expires September 20, 2008 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft IPsec Gateway Failover Protocol March 2008
condition is time consuming, especially when an IPsec peer, such as a
VPN gateway, needs to re-establish a large number of SAs with various
end points. A high number of concurrent sessions might cause
additional problems for an IPsec peer during SA re-establishment.
In many failure cases it would be useful to provide an efficient way
to resume an interrupted IKE/IPsec session. This document proposes
an extension to IKEv2 that allows a client to re-establish an IKE SA
with a gateway in a highly efficient manner, utilizing a previously
established IKE SA.
A client can reconnect to a gateway from which it was disconnected,
or alternatively migrate to another gateway that is associated with
the previous one. The proposed approach conveys IKEv2 state
information, in the form of an encrypted ticket, to a VPN client that
is later presented to the VPN gateway for re-authentication. The
encrypted ticket can only be decrypted by the VPN gateway in order to
restore state for faster session setup.
Sheffer, et al. Expires September 20, 2008 [Page 2]
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Non-Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Usage Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Recovering from a Remote Access Gateway Failover . . . . . 6
3.2. Recovering from an Application Server Failover . . . . . . 8
4. Protocol Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1. Requesting a Ticket . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2. Presenting a Ticket . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2.1. Protection of the IKE_SESSION_RESUME Exchange . . . . 12
4.2.2. Presenting a Ticket: The DoS Case . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2.3. Requesting a ticket during resumption . . . . . . . . 13
4.3. IKE Notifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.4. TICKET_OPAQUE Notify Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.5. TICKET_GATEWAY_LIST Notify Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.6. Processing Guidelines for IKE SA Establishment . . . . . . 15
5. The IKE Ticket . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.1. Ticket Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.2. Ticket Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.3. Ticket Identity and Lifecycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.4. Exchange of Ticket-Protecting Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.1. Stolen Tickets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.2. Forged Tickets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.3. Denial of Service Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.4. Ticket Protection Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.5. Ticket Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.6. Alternate Ticket Formats and Distribution Schemes . . . . 20
7.7. Identity Privacy, Anonymity, and Unlinkability . . . . . . 20
7.8. Replay Protection in the IKE_SESSION_RESUME Exchange . . . 20
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Appendix A. Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Appendix B. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
B.1. -03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
B.2. -02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
B.3. -01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
B.4. -00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 25
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1. Introduction
The Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) protocol has
computational and communication overhead with respect to the number
of round-trips required and cryptographic operations involved. In
particular the Extensible Authentication Protocol is used for
authentication in remote access cases, which increases latency.
To re-establish security associations (SA) upon a failure recovery
condition is time-consuming, especially when an IPsec peer, such as a
VPN gateway, needs to re-establish a large number of SAs with various
end points. A high number of concurrent sessions might cause
additional problems for an IPsec peer.
In many failure cases it would be useful to provide an efficient way
to resume an interrupted IKE/IPsec session. This document proposes
an extension to IKEv2 that allows a client to re-establish an IKE SA
with a gateway in a highly efficient manner, utilizing a previously
established IKE SA.
A client can reconnect to a gateway from which it was disconnected,
or alternatively migrate to another gateway that is associated with
the previous one. This document proposes to maintain IKEv2 state in
a "ticket", an opaque data structure created and used by a server and
stored by a client, which the client cannot understand or tamper
with. The IKEv2 protocol is extended to allow a client to request
and present a ticket. When two gateways mutually trust each other,
one can accept a ticket generated by the other.
This approach is similar to the one taken by TLS session resumption
[RFC4507] with the required adaptations for IKEv2, e.g., to
accommodate the two-phase protocol structure. We have borrowed
heavily from that specification.
1.1. Goals
The high-level goal of this extension is to provide an IPsec failover
solution, according to the requirements defined in
[I-D.vidya-ipsec-failover-ps].
Specifically, the proposed extension should allow IPsec sessions to
be recovered from failures in remote access scenarios, in a more
efficient manner than the basic IKE solution. This efficiency is
primarily on the gateway side, since the gateway might have to deal
with many thousands of concurrent requests. We should enable the
following cases:
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o Failover from one gateway to another, where the two gateways do
not share state but do have mutual trust. For example, the
gateways may be operated by the same provider and share the same
keying materials to access an encrypted ticket.
o Recovery from an intermittent connectivity, where clients
reconnect into the same gateway. In this case, the gateway would
typically have detected the clients' absence and removed the state
associated with them.
o Recovery from a gateway restart, where clients reconnect into the
same gateway.
The proposed solution should additionally meet the following goals:
o Using only symmetric cryptography to minimize CPU consumption.
o Allowing a gateway to push state to clients.
o Providing cryptographic agility.
o Having no negative impact on IKEv2 security features.
1.2. Non-Goals
The following are non-goals of this solution:
o Providing load balancing among gateways.
o Specifying how a client detects the need for a failover.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
This document uses terminology defined in [RFC4301], [RFC4306], and
[RFC4555]. In addition, this document uses the following terms:
Secure domain: A secure domain comprises a set of gateways that are
able to resume an IKEv2 session that may have been established by
any other gateway within the domain. All gateways in the secure
domain are expected to share some secrets, so that they can
generate an IKEv2 ticket, verify the validity of the ticket and
extract the IKEv2 policy and session key material from the ticket.
IKEv2 ticket: An IKEv2 ticket is a data structure that contains all
the necessary information that allows any gateway within the same
secure domain as the gateway that created the ticket to verify the
validity of the ticket and extract IKEv2 policy and session keys
to re-establish an IKEv2 session.
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Stateless failover: When the IKEv2 session state is stored at the
client, the IKEv2 responder is "stateless" until the client
restores the SA with one of the gateways within the secure domain;
thus, we refer to SA resumption with SA storage at the client as
stateless session resumption.
Stateful failover: When the infrastructure maintains IKEv2 session
state, we refer to the process of IKEv2 SA re-establishment as
stateful session resumption.
3. Usage Scenarios
This specification envisions two usage scenarios for efficient IKEv2
and IPsec SA session re-establishment.
The first is similar to the use case specified in Section 1.1.3 of
the IKEv2 specification [RFC4306], where the IPsec tunnel mode is
used to establish a secure channel between a remote access client and
a gateway; the traffic flow may be between the client and entities
beyond the gateway.
The second use case focuses on the usage of transport (or tunnel)
mode to secure the communicate between two end points (e.g., two
servers). The two endpoints have a client-server relationship with
respect to a protocol that runs using the protections afforded by the
IPsec SA.
3.1. Recovering from a Remote Access Gateway Failover
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(a)
+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+
! ! IKEv2/IKEv2-EAP ! ! Protected
! Remote !<------------------------>! Remote ! Subnet
! Access ! ! Access !<--- and/or
! Client !<------------------------>! Gateway ! Internet
! ! IPsec tunnel ! !
+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+
(b)
+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+
! ! IKE_SESSION_RESUME ! !
! Remote !<------------------------>! New/Old !
! Access ! ! Gateway !
! Client !<------------------------>! !
! ! IPsec tunnel ! !
+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 1: Remote Access Gateway Failure
In this scenario, an end-host (an entity with a host implementation
of IPsec [RFC4301] ) establishes a tunnel mode IPsec SA with a
gateway in a remote network using IKEv2. The end-host in this
scenario is sometimes referred to as a remote access client. When
the remote gateway fails, all the clients associated with the gateway
either need to re-establish IKEv2 sessions with another gateway
within the same secure domain of the original gateway, or with the
original gateway if the server is back online soon.
The clients may choose to establish IPsec SAs using a full IKEv2
exchange or the IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange (shown in Figure 1).
In this scenario, the client needs to get an IP address from the
remote network so that traffic can be encapsulated by the remote
access gateway before reaching the client. In the initial exchange,
the gateway may acquire IP addresses from the address pool of a local
DHCP server. The new gateway that a client gets associated may not
receive addresses from the same address pool. Thus, the session
resumption protocol needs to support the assignment of a new IP
address.
The protocol defined in this document supports the re-allocation of
an IP address to the client, if this capability is provided by the
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network. For example, if routing tables are modified so that traffic
is rerouted through the new gateway. This capability is implicit in
the use of the IKE Config mechanism, which allows the client to
present its existing IP address and receive the same address back, if
allowed by the gateway.
The protocol defined here supports both stateful and stateless
scenarios. In other words, tickets can be stored wholly on the
client, or the ticket can be stored on the gateway (or in a database
shared between multiple gateways), with the client only presenting a
handle that identifies a particular ticket. In fact these scenarios
are transparent to the protocols, with the only change being the non-
mandatory ticket format.
3.2. Recovering from an Application Server Failover
(a)
+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+
! App. ! IKEv2/IKEv2-EAP ! App. !
! Client !<------------------------>! Server !
! & ! ! & !
! IPsec !<------------------------>! IPsec !
! host ! IPsec transport/ ! host !
+-+-+-+-+-+ tunnel mode SA +-+-+-+-+-+
(b)
+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+
! App. ! IKE_SESSION_RESUME ! New !
! Client !<------------------------>! Server !
! & ! ! & !
! IPsec !<------------------------>! IPsec !
! host ! IPsec transport/ ! host !
+-+-+-+-+-+ tunnel mode SA +-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 2: Application Server Failover
The second usage scenario is as follows: two entities with IPsec host
implementations establish an IPsec transport or tunnel mode SA
between themselves; this is similar to the model described in Section
1.1.2. of [RFC4306]. At the application level, one of the entities
is always the client and the other is a server. From that view
point, the IKEv2 exchange is always initiated by the client. This
allows the Initiator (the client) to authenticate itself using EAP,
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as long as the Responder (or the application server) allows it.
If the application server fails, the client may find other servers
within the same secure domain for service continuity. It may use a
full IKEv2 exchange or the IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange to re-
establish the IPsec SAs for secure communication required by the
application layer signaling.
The client-server relationship at the application layer ensures that
one of the entities in this usage scenario is unambiguously always
the Initiator and the other the Responder. This role determination
also allows the Initiator to request an address in the Responder's
network using the Configuration Payload mechanism of the IKEv2
protocol. If the client has thus received an address during the
initial IKEv2 exchange, when it associates with a new server upon
failure of the original server, it needs to request an address,
specifying its assigned address. The server may allow the client to
use the original address or if it is not permitted to use that
address, assign a new address.
4. Protocol Details
This section provides protocol details and contains the normative
parts. This document defines two protocol exchanges, namely
requesting a ticket and presenting a ticket. Section 4.1 describes
the procedure to request a ticket and Section 4.2 illustrates how to
present a ticket.
4.1. Requesting a Ticket
A client MAY request a ticket in the following exchanges:
o In an IKE_AUTH exchange, as shown in the example message exchange
in Figure 3 below.
o In a CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange, when an IKE SA is rekeyed.
o In an Informational exchange, if the gateway previously replied
with an N(TICKET_ACK) instead of providing a ticket.
o In an Informational exchange, when the ticket lifetime is about to
expire.
o In an IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange, see Section 4.2.3.
Normally, a client requests a ticket in the third message of an IKEv2
exchange (the first of IKE_AUTH). Figure 3 shows the message
exchange for this typical case.
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Initiator Responder
----------- -----------
HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni -->
<-- HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr, [CERTREQ]
HDR, SK {IDi, [CERT,] [CERTREQ,] [IDr,]
AUTH, SAi2, TSi, TSr, N(TICKET_REQUEST)} -->
Figure 3: Example Message Exchange for Requesting a Ticket
The notification payloads are described in Section 4.3. The above is
an example, and IKEv2 allows a number of variants on these messages.
A complete description of IKEv2 can be found in [RFC4718].
When an IKEv2 responder receives a request for a ticket using the
N(TICKET_REQUEST) payload it MUST perform one of the following
operations if it supports the extension defined in this document:
o it creates a ticket and returns it with the N(TICKET_OPAQUE)
payload in a subsequent message towards the IKEv2 initiator. This
is shown in Figure 4.
o it returns an N(TICKET_NACK) payload, if it refuses to grant a
ticket for some reason.
o it returns an N(TICKET_ACK), if it cannot grant a ticket
immediately, e.g., due to packet size limitations. In this case
the client MAY request a ticket later using an Informational
exchange, at any time during the lifetime of the IKE SA.
Provided the IKEv2 exchange was successful, the IKEv2 initiator can
accept the requested ticket. The ticket may be used later with an
IKEv2 responder which supports this extension. Figure 4 shows how
the initiator receives the ticket.
Initiator Responder
----------- -----------
<-- HDR, SK {IDr, [CERT,] AUTH, SAr2, TSi,
TSr, N(TICKET_OPAQUE) [,N(TICKET_GATEWAY_LIST)]}
Figure 4: Receiving a Ticket
4.2. Presenting a Ticket
Following a communication failure, a client re-initiates an IKE
exchange to the same gateway or to a different one, and includes a
ticket in the first message. A client MAY initiate a regular (non-
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ticket-based) IKEv2 exchange even if it is in possession of a valid
ticket. A client MUST NOT present a ticket after the ticket's
lifetime has expired.
It is up to the client's local policy to decide when the
communication with the IKEv2 responder is seen as interrupted and a
new exchange needs to be initiated and the session resumption
procedure to be initiated.
Tickets are intended for one-time use: a client MUST NOT reuse a
ticket, either with the same or with a different gateway. A gateway
SHOULD reject a reused ticket. Note however that a gateway can elect
not to retain a list of already-used tickets. Potential replay
attacks on such gateways are mitigated by the cookie mechanism
described in Section 4.2.2.
This document specifies a new IKEv2 exchange type called
IKE_SESSION_RESUME whose value is TBA by IANA. This exchange is
somewhat similar to the IKE_AUTH exchange, and results in the
creation of a Child SA. The client SHOULD NOT use this exchange type
unless it knows that the gateway supports it, either through
configuration, by out-of-band means or by using the Gateway List
provision.
Initiator Responder
----------- -----------
HDR, Ni, N(TICKET_OPAQUE), [N+,]
SK {IDi, [IDr,] SAi2, TSi, TSr [, CP(CFG_REQUEST)]} -->
The exchange type in HDR is set to 'IKE_SESSION_RESUME'.
See Section 4.2.1 for details on computing the protected (SK)
payload.
When the IKEv2 responder receives a ticket using the N(TICKET_OPAQUE)
payload it MUST perform one of the following steps if it supports the
extension defined in this document:
o If it is willing to accept the ticket, it responds as shown in
Figure 5.
o It responds with an unprotected N(TICKET_NACK) notification, if it
rejects the ticket for any reason. In that case, the initiator
should re-initiate a regular IKE exchange. One such case is when
the responder receives a ticket for an IKE SA that has previously
been terminated on the responder itself, which may indicate
inconsistent state between the IKEv2 initiator and the responder.
However, a responder is not required to maintain the state for
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terminated sessions.
o When the responder receives a ticket for an IKE SA that is still
active and if the responder accepts it, then the old SAs SHOULD be
silently deleted without sending a DELETE informational exchange.
Initiator Responder
----------- -----------
<-- HDR, SK {IDr, Nr, SAr2, [TSi, TSr],
[CP(CFG_REPLY)]}
Figure 5: IKEv2 Responder accepts the ticket
Again, the exchange type in HDR is set to 'IKE_SESSION_RESUME'.
The SK payload is protected using the cryptographic parameters
derived from the ticket, see Section 4.2.1 below.
At this point a new IKE SA is created by both parties, see
Section 4.6. This is followed by normal derivation of a child SA,
per Sec. 2.17 of [RFC4306].
4.2.1. Protection of the IKE_SESSION_RESUME Exchange
The two messages of this exchange are protected by a "subset" IKE SA.
The key material is derived from the ticket, as follows:
{SK_d2 | SK_ai | SK_ar | SK_ei | SK_er} = prf+(SK_d_old, Ni)
where SK_d_old is the SK_d value of the original IKE SA, as retrieved
from the ticket. Ni guarantees freshness of the key material. SK_d2
is used later to derive the new IKE SA, see Section 4.6.
See [RFC4306] for the notation. "prf" is determined from the SA value
in the ticket.
4.2.2. Presenting a Ticket: The DoS Case
When receiving the first message of the IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange,
the gateway may decide that it is under a denial-of-service attack.
In such a case, the gateway SHOULD defer the establishment of session
state until it has verified the identity of the client. We use a
variation of the IKEv2 Cookie mechanism, where the cookie is
protected.
In the two messages that follow, the gateway responds that it is
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unwilling to resume the session until the client is verified, and the
client resubmits its first message, this time with the cookie:
Initiator Responder
----------- -----------
<-- HDR, SK{N(COOKIE)}
HDR, Ni, N(TICKET_OPAQUE), [N+,]
SK {N(COOKIE), IDi, [IDr,] SAi2, TSi, TSr [, CP(CFG_REQUEST)]} -->
Assuming the cookie is correct, the gateway now replies normally.
This now becomes a 4-message exchange. The entire exchange is
protected as defined in Section 4.2.1.
See Sec. 2.6 and Sec. 3.10.1 of [RFC4306] for more guidance regarding
the usage and syntax of the cookie. Note that the cookie is
completely independent of the IKEv2 ticket.
4.2.3. Requesting a ticket during resumption
When resuming a session, a client will typically request a new ticket
immediately, so it is able to resume the session again in the case of
a second failure. Therefore, the N(TICKET_REQUEST), N(TICKET_OPAQUE)
and N(TICKET_GATEWAY_LIST) notifications may be piggybacked as
protected payloads to the IKE_SESSION_RESUME exchange.
The returned ticket (if any) will correspond to the IKE SA created
per the rules described in Section 4.6.
4.3. IKE Notifications
This document defines a number of notifications. The notification
numbers are TBA by IANA.
+---------------------+--------+-----------------+
| Notification Name | Number | Data |
+---------------------+--------+-----------------+
| TICKET_OPAQUE | TBA1 | See Section 4.4 |
| TICKET_REQUEST | TBA2 | None |
| TICKET_ACK | TBA3 | None |
| TICKET_NACK | TBA4 | None |
| TICKET_GATEWAY_LIST | TBA5 | See Section 4.5 |
+---------------------+--------+-----------------+
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4.4. TICKET_OPAQUE Notify Payload
The data for the TICKET_OPAQUE Notify payload consists of the Notify
message header, a lifetime field and the ticket itself. The four
octet lifetime field contains the number of seconds until the ticket
expires as an unsigned integer. Section 5.2 describes a possible
ticket format, and Section 5.3 offers further guidelines regarding
the ticket's lifetime.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
! Next Payload !C! Reserved ! Payload Length !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
! Protocol ID ! SPI Size = 0 ! Notify Message Type !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
! Lifetime !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
! !
~ Ticket ~
! !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 6: TICKET_OPAQUE Notify Payload
4.5. TICKET_GATEWAY_LIST Notify Payload
The TICKET_GATEWAY_LIST Notify payload contains the Notify payload
header followed by a sequence of one or more gateway identifiers,
each of the format depicted in Figure 8.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
! Next Payload !C! Reserved ! Payload Length !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
! Protocol ID ! SPI Size = 0 ! Notify Message Type !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
! !
~ Gateway Identifier List ~
! !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 7: TICKET_GATEWAY_LIST Notify Payload
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
! ID Type ! Reserved ! Length !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
! !
~ Identification Data ~
! !
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 8: Gateway Identifier for One Gateway
ID Type:
The ID Type contains a restricted set of the IKEv2 ID payloads
(see [RFC4306], Section 3.5). Allowed ID types are: ID_IPV4_ADDR,
ID_IPV6_ADDR, ID_FQDN and the various reserved values.
Reserved:
This field must be sent as 0 and must be ignored when received.
Length:
The length field indicates the total size of the Identification
data.
Identification Data:
The Identification Data field is of variable length and depends on
the ID type. The length is not necessarily a multiple of 4.
4.6. Processing Guidelines for IKE SA Establishment
When a ticket is presented, the gateway parses the ticket to retrieve
the state of the old IKE SA, and the client retrieves this state from
its local store. Both peers now create state for the new IKE SA as
follows:
o The SA value (transforms etc.) is taken directly from the ticket.
o The sequence numbers are reset to 0.
o The IDi value is obtained from the ticket.
o The IDr value is obtained from the new exchange. The gateway MAY
make policy decisions based on the IDr value encoded in the
ticket.
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o The SPI values are created anew, similarly to a regular IKE
exchange. SPI values from the ticket SHOULD NOT be reused. This
restriction is to avoid problems caused by collisions with other
SPI values used already by the initiator/responder. The SPI value
should only be reused if collision avoidance can be ensured
through other means.
The cryptographic material is refreshed based on the ticket and the
nonce values, Ni, and Nr, from the current exchange. A new SKEYSEED
value is derived as follows:
SKEYSEED = prf(SK_d2, Ni | Nr)
where SK_d2 was computed earlier (Section 4.2.1).
The keys are derived as follows, unchanged from IKEv2:
{SK_d | SK_ai | SK_ar | SK_ei | SK_er | SK_pi | SK_pr} =
prf+(SKEYSEED, Ni | Nr | SPIi | SPIr)
where SPIi, SPIr are the SPI values created in the new IKE exchange.
See [RFC4306] for the notation. "prf" is determined from the SA value
in the ticket.
5. The IKE Ticket
This section lists the required contents of the ticket, and
recommends a non-normative format. This is followed by a discussion
of the ticket's lifecycle.
5.1. Ticket Contents
The ticket MUST encode at least the following state from an IKE SA.
These values MUST be encrypted and authenticated.
o IDi, IDr.
o SPIi, SPIr.
o SAr (the accepted proposal).
o SK_d.
In addition, the ticket MUST encode a protected ticket expiration
value.
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5.2. Ticket Format
This document does not specify a mandatory-to-implement or a
mandatory-to-use ticket format. The following format is RECOMMENDED,
if interoperability between gateways is desired.
struct {
[authenticated] struct {
octet format_version; // 1 for this version of the protocol
octet reserved[3]; // sent as 0, ignored by receiver.
octet key_id[8]; // arbitrary byte string
opaque IV[0..255]; // actual length (possibly 0) depends
// on the encryption algorithm
[encrypted] struct {
opaque IDi, IDr; // the full payloads
octet SPIi[8], SPIr[8];
opaque SA; // the full SAr payload
octet SK_d[0..255]; // actual length depends on SA value
int32 expiration; // an absolute time value, seconds
// since Jan. 1, 1970
} ikev2_state;
} protected_part;
opaque MAC[0..255]; // the length (possibly 0) depends
// on the integrity algorithm
} ticket;
Note that the key defined by "key_id" determines the encryption and
authentication algorithms used for this ticket. Those algorithms are
unrelated to the transforms defined by the SA payload.
The reader is referred to a recent draft
[I-D.rescorla-stateless-tokens] that recommends a similar (but not
identical) ticket format, and discusses related security
considerations in depth.
5.3. Ticket Identity and Lifecycle
Each ticket is associated with a single IKE SA. In particular, when
an IKE SA is deleted, the client MUST delete its stored ticket.
A ticket is therefore associated with the tuple (IDi, IDr). The
client MAY however use a ticket to approach other gateways that are
willing to accept it. How a client discovers such gateways is
outside the scope of this document.
The lifetime of the ticket carried in the N(TICKET_OPAQUE)
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notification should be the minimum of the IKE SA lifetime (per the
gateway's local policy) and its re-authentication time, according to
[RFC4478]. Even if neither of these are enforced by the gateway, a
finite lifetime MUST be specified for the ticket.
5.4. Exchange of Ticket-Protecting Keys
This document does not define an interoperable mechanism for the
generation and distribution of the keys that protect IKE keys. Such
a mechanism can be developed, based on the GDOI group key exchange
protocol [RFC3547]. There is on-going work to enable the generation
of non-IPsec keys by means of GDOI, e.g. to provide RSVP router
groups with a single key [I-D.weis-gdoi-for-rsvp]. This work can be
generalized for our purposes. We note that there are no significant
performance requirements on such a protocol, as key rollover can be
at a daily or even more leisurely rate.
6. IANA Considerations
This document requires a number of IKEv2 notification status types in
Section 4.3, to be registered by IANA. The corresponding registry
was established by IANA.
The document defines a new IKEv2 exchange in Section 4.2. The
corresponding registry was established by IANA.
7. Security Considerations
This section addresses security issues related to the usage of a
ticket.
7.1. Stolen Tickets
An eavesdropper or man-in-the-middle may try to obtain a ticket and
use it to establish a session with the IKEv2 responder. This can
happen in different ways: by eavesdropping on the initial
communication and copying the ticket when it is granted and before it
is used, or by listening in on a client's use of the ticket to resume
a session. However, since the ticket's contents is encrypted and the
attacker does not know the corresponding secret key (specifically,
SK_d), a stolen ticket cannot be used by an attacker to resume a
session. An IKEv2 responder MUST use strong encryption and integrity
protection of the ticket to prevent an attacker from obtaining the