You signed in with another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You signed out in another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You switched accounts on another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.Dismiss alert
Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: README.md
+24-4Lines changed: 24 additions & 4 deletions
Display the source diff
Display the rich diff
Original file line number
Diff line number
Diff line change
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
1
1
# PyWSUS
2
-
*New name but same old.*
2
+
3
3
4
4
## Summary
5
-
TODO
5
+
As a standalone implementation, the principal idea of this tool is only to be a mock copy of a legitimate WSUS server responding to clients. The MiTM attack should be done from other tools like Bettercap.
From our perspective, the best way to avoid exploitability of this issue would be to switch WSUS deployments over a secured HTTPS channel. The certificate presented by the WSUS server must be validated by the client. Error in validating the certificate will result in the wupdate client closing the connection.
33
+
34
+
The three major ways of generating a certificate for your WSUS server are:
35
+
- Using an internal PKI for which a Root CA certificate is deployed on domain computers and a certificate signed by that Root CA is used to serve WSUS updates
36
+
- Purchasing a certificate signed by a third-party CA authority trusted in the Windows OS trust store
37
+
- Using a self-signed certificate and push a copy of this certificate on all domain computers using a GPO
38
+
39
+
On the detection side, a client enrolled with WSUS will report their installed updates inventory periodically. Looking for installed updates that stand-out from the ones approved and deployed could be a way to detect such an attack. This is a preliminary idea that we have not explored yet. Let us know on Twitter or LinkedIn if you have any experience doing this kind of installed patches differential analysis at the scale of an organization.
40
+
41
+
## Acknowledgements
42
+
For their contributions to this research and blogpost.
43
+
* Olivier Bilodeau from GoSecure
44
+
* Romain Carnus from GoSecure
45
+
* Laurent Desaulniers from GoSecure
46
+
* Maxime Nadeau from GoSecure
47
+
* Mathieu Novis from SecureOps
48
+
49
+
For writing and researching the original proxy PoC
50
+
* Paul Stone and Alex Chapman from Context Information Security
0 commit comments