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|  | 1 | +<!DOCTYPE qhelp PUBLIC | 
|  | 2 | +"-//Semmle//qhelp//EN" | 
|  | 3 | +"qhelp.dtd"> | 
|  | 4 | +<qhelp> | 
|  | 5 | + | 
|  | 6 | +<overview> | 
|  | 7 | +	<p> | 
|  | 8 | + | 
|  | 9 | +		A server can send the | 
|  | 10 | +		<code>"Access-Control-Allow-Credentials"</code> CORS header to control | 
|  | 11 | +		when a browser may send user credentials in Cross-Origin HTTP | 
|  | 12 | +		requests. | 
|  | 13 | + | 
|  | 14 | +	</p> | 
|  | 15 | +	<p> | 
|  | 16 | + | 
|  | 17 | +		When the <code>Access-Control-Allow-Credentials</code> header | 
|  | 18 | +		is <code>"true"</code>, the <code>Access-Control-Allow-Origin</code> | 
|  | 19 | +		header must have a value different from <code>"*"</code> in order to | 
|  | 20 | +		make browsers accept the header. Therefore, to allow multiple origins | 
|  | 21 | +		for Cross-Origin requests with credentials, the server must | 
|  | 22 | +		dynamically compute the value of the | 
|  | 23 | +		<code>"Access-Control-Allow-Origin"</code> header. Computing this | 
|  | 24 | +		header value from information in the request to the server can | 
|  | 25 | +		therefore potentially allow an attacker to control the origins that | 
|  | 26 | +		the browser sends credentials to. | 
|  | 27 | + | 
|  | 28 | +	</p> | 
|  | 29 | + | 
|  | 30 | + | 
|  | 31 | + | 
|  | 32 | +</overview> | 
|  | 33 | + | 
|  | 34 | +<recommendation> | 
|  | 35 | +	<p> | 
|  | 36 | + | 
|  | 37 | +		When the <code>Access-Control-Allow-Credentials</code> header | 
|  | 38 | +		value is <code>"true"</code>, a dynamic computation of the | 
|  | 39 | +		<code>Access-Control-Allow-Origin</code> header must involve | 
|  | 40 | +		sanitization if it relies on user-controlled input. | 
|  | 41 | + | 
|  | 42 | + | 
|  | 43 | +	</p> | 
|  | 44 | +	<p> | 
|  | 45 | + | 
|  | 46 | +		Since the <code>"null"</code> origin is easy to obtain for an | 
|  | 47 | +		attacker, it is never safe to use <code>"null"</code> as the value of | 
|  | 48 | +		the <code>Access-Control-Allow-Origin</code> header when the | 
|  | 49 | +		<code>Access-Control-Allow-Credentials</code> header value is | 
|  | 50 | +		<code>"true"</code>. | 
|  | 51 | + | 
|  | 52 | +	</p> | 
|  | 53 | +</recommendation> | 
|  | 54 | + | 
|  | 55 | +<example> | 
|  | 56 | +	<p> | 
|  | 57 | + | 
|  | 58 | +		In the example below, the server allows the browser to send | 
|  | 59 | +		user credentials in a Cross-Origin request. The request header | 
|  | 60 | +		<code>origins</code> controls the allowed origins for such a | 
|  | 61 | +		Cross-Origin request. | 
|  | 62 | + | 
|  | 63 | +	</p> | 
|  | 64 | + | 
|  | 65 | +	<sample src="examples/CorsBad.cs"/> | 
|  | 66 | + | 
|  | 67 | +	<p> | 
|  | 68 | + | 
|  | 69 | +		This is not secure, since an attacker can choose the value of | 
|  | 70 | +		the <code>origin</code> request header to make the browser send | 
|  | 71 | +		credentials to their own server. The use of a allowlist containing | 
|  | 72 | +		allowed origins for the Cross-Origin request fixes the issue: | 
|  | 73 | + | 
|  | 74 | +	</p> | 
|  | 75 | + | 
|  | 76 | +	<sample src="examples/CorsGood.cs"/> | 
|  | 77 | +</example> | 
|  | 78 | + | 
|  | 79 | +<references> | 
|  | 80 | +	<li>Mozilla Developer Network: <a href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Access-Control-Allow-Origin">CORS, Access-Control-Allow-Origin</a>.</li> | 
|  | 81 | +	<li>Mozilla Developer Network: <a href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Access-Control-Allow-Credentials">CORS, Access-Control-Allow-Credentials</a>.</li> | 
|  | 82 | +	<li>PortSwigger: <a href="http://blog.portswigger.net/2016/10/exploiting-cors-misconfigurations-for.html">Exploiting CORS Misconfigurations for Bitcoins and Bounties</a></li> | 
|  | 83 | +	<li>W3C: <a href="https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-cors-for-developers/#resources">CORS for developers, Advice for Resource Owners</a></li> | 
|  | 84 | +</references> | 
|  | 85 | +</qhelp> | 
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