6.5: tcp patches #3
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Adds a lot of overhead. Signed-off-by: Kazuki Hashimoto <kazukih0205@gmail.com>
…tency `TCP_NODELAY` will disable Nagle's algorithm, which basically collects small outgoing packets to send all at once. Thus `TCP_NODELAY` will send the data whenever it is available without waiting for any period to collect packets. It will basically optimize network video games and applications using chatty protocols (source: ExtraHop[1], RedHat[2]) [1]: https://www.extrahop.com/company/blog/2016/tcp-nodelay-nagle-quickack-best-practices/#:~:text=The%20TCP_NODELAY%20socket%20option%20allows,buffer%2C%20whatever%20the%20packet%20size. [2]: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux_for_real_time/7/html/tuning_guide/tcp_nodelay_and_small_buffer_writes Signed-off-by: Panchajanya1999 <panchajanya@azure-dev.live> [Rasenkai: forward-port to 5.4] Signed-off-by: Rasenkai <rasenkai99@gmail.com> Change-Id: I2518d04969975c69c61d5e0acab7295702190b0d
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Hou Tao says: ==================== Fix the unmatched unit_size of bpf_mem_cache From: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com> Hi, The patchset aims to fix the reported warning [0] when the unit_size of bpf_mem_cache is mismatched with the object size of underly slab-cache. Patch #1 fixes the warning by adjusting size_index according to the value of KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE, so bpf_mem_cache with unit_size which is smaller than KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE or is not aligned with KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE will be redirected to bpf_mem_cache with bigger unit_size. Patch #2 doesn't do prefill for these redirected bpf_mem_cache to save memory. Patch #3 adds further error check in bpf_mem_alloc_init() to ensure the unit_size and object_size are always matched and to prevent potential issues due to the mismatch. Please see individual patches for more details. And comments are always welcome. [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/87jztjmmy4.fsf@all.your.base.are.belong.to.us ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230908133923.2675053-1-houtao@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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macb_set_tx_clk() is called under a spinlock but itself calls clk_set_rate() which can sleep. This results in: | BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:580 | pps pps1: new PPS source ptp1 | in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 40, name: kworker/u4:3 | preempt_count: 1, expected: 0 | RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 | 4 locks held by kworker/u4:3/40: | #0: ffff000003409148 | macb ff0c000.ethernet: gem-ptp-timer ptp clock registered. | ((wq_completion)events_power_efficient){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x14c/0x51c | #1: ffff8000833cbdd8 ((work_completion)(&pl->resolve)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x14c/0x51c | #2: ffff000004f01578 (&pl->state_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: phylink_resolve+0x44/0x4e8 | #3: ffff000004f06f50 (&bp->lock){....}-{3:3}, at: macb_mac_link_up+0x40/0x2ac | irq event stamp: 113998 | hardirqs last enabled at (113997): [<ffff800080e8503c>] _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x30/0x64 | hardirqs last disabled at (113998): [<ffff800080e84478>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xac/0xc8 | softirqs last enabled at (113608): [<ffff800080010630>] __do_softirq+0x430/0x4e4 | softirqs last disabled at (113597): [<ffff80008001614c>] ____do_softirq+0x10/0x1c | CPU: 0 PID: 40 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 6.5.0-11717-g9355ce8b2f50-dirty torvalds#368 | Hardware name: ... ZynqMP ... (DT) | Workqueue: events_power_efficient phylink_resolve | Call trace: | dump_backtrace+0x98/0xf0 | show_stack+0x18/0x24 | dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0xac | dump_stack+0x18/0x24 | __might_resched+0x144/0x24c | __might_sleep+0x48/0x98 | __mutex_lock+0x58/0x7b0 | mutex_lock_nested+0x24/0x30 | clk_prepare_lock+0x4c/0xa8 | clk_set_rate+0x24/0x8c | macb_mac_link_up+0x25c/0x2ac | phylink_resolve+0x178/0x4e8 | process_one_work+0x1ec/0x51c | worker_thread+0x1ec/0x3e4 | kthread+0x120/0x124 | ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 The obvious fix is to move the call to macb_set_tx_clk() out of the protected area. This seems safe as rx and tx are both disabled anyway at this point. It is however not entirely clear what the spinlock shall protect. It could be the read-modify-write access to the NCFGR register, but this is accessed in macb_set_rx_mode() and macb_set_rxcsum_feature() as well without holding the spinlock. It could also be the register accesses done in mog_init_rings() or macb_init_buffers(), but again these functions are called without holding the spinlock in macb_hresp_error_task(). The locking seems fishy in this driver and it might deserve another look before this patch is applied. Fixes: 633e98a ("net: macb: use resolved link config in mac_link_up()") Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230908112913.1701766-1-s.hauer@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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Fix an error detected by memory sanitizer:
```
==4033==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x55fb0fbedfc7 in read_alias_info tools/perf/util/pmu.c:457:6
#1 0x55fb0fbea339 in check_info_data tools/perf/util/pmu.c:1434:2
#2 0x55fb0fbea339 in perf_pmu__check_alias tools/perf/util/pmu.c:1504:9
#3 0x55fb0fbdca85 in parse_events_add_pmu tools/perf/util/parse-events.c:1429:32
#4 0x55fb0f965230 in parse_events_parse tools/perf/util/parse-events.y:299:6
#5 0x55fb0fbdf6b2 in parse_events__scanner tools/perf/util/parse-events.c:1822:8
#6 0x55fb0fbdf8c1 in __parse_events tools/perf/util/parse-events.c:2094:8
torvalds#7 0x55fb0fa8ffa9 in parse_events tools/perf/util/parse-events.h:41:9
torvalds#8 0x55fb0fa8ffa9 in test_event tools/perf/tests/parse-events.c:2393:8
torvalds#9 0x55fb0fa8f458 in test__pmu_events tools/perf/tests/parse-events.c:2551:15
torvalds#10 0x55fb0fa6d93f in run_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:242:9
torvalds#11 0x55fb0fa6d93f in test_and_print tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:271:8
torvalds#12 0x55fb0fa6d082 in __cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:442:5
torvalds#13 0x55fb0fa6d082 in cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:564:9
torvalds#14 0x55fb0f942720 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:322:11
torvalds#15 0x55fb0f942486 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:375:8
torvalds#16 0x55fb0f941dab in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:419:2
torvalds#17 0x55fb0f941dab in main tools/perf/perf.c:535:3
```
Fixes: 7b723db ("perf pmu: Be lazy about loading event info files from sysfs")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230914022425.1489035-1-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
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Syzkaller reported a sleep in atomic context bug relating to the HASHCHK handler logic: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c:1518 in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 25040, name: syz-executor preempt_count: 0, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 no locks held by syz-executor/25040. irq event stamp: 34 hardirqs last enabled at (33): [<c000000000048b38>] prep_irq_for_enabled_exit arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c:56 [inline] hardirqs last enabled at (33): [<c000000000048b38>] interrupt_exit_user_prepare_main+0x148/0x600 arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c:230 hardirqs last disabled at (34): [<c00000000003e6a4>] interrupt_enter_prepare+0x144/0x4f0 arch/powerpc/include/asm/interrupt.h:176 softirqs last enabled at (0): [<c000000000281954>] copy_process+0x16e4/0x4750 kernel/fork.c:2436 softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 CPU: 15 PID: 25040 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.5.0-rc5-00001-g3ccdff6bb06d #3 Hardware name: IBM,9105-22A POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1040.00 (NL1040_021) hv:phyp pSeries Call Trace: [c0000000a8247ce0] [c00000000032b0e4] __might_resched+0x3b4/0x400 kernel/sched/core.c:10189 [c0000000a8247d80] [c0000000008c7dc8] __might_fault+0xa8/0x170 mm/memory.c:5853 [c0000000a8247dc0] [c00000000004160c] do_program_check+0x32c/0xb20 arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c:1518 [c0000000a8247e50] [c000000000009b2c] program_check_common_virt+0x3bc/0x3c0 To determine if a trap was caused by a HASHCHK instruction, we inspect the user instruction that triggered the trap. However this may sleep if the page needs to be faulted in (get_user_instr() reaches __get_user(), which calls might_fault() and triggers the bug message). Move the HASHCHK handler logic to after we allow IRQs, which is fine because we are only interested in HASHCHK if it's a user space trap. Fixes: 5bcba4e ("powerpc/dexcr: Handle hashchk exception") Signed-off-by: Benjamin Gray <bgray@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20230915034604.45393-1-bgray@linux.ibm.com
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Sebastian Andrzej Siewior says: ==================== net: hsr: Properly parse HSRv1 supervisor frames. this is a follow-up to https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230825153111.228768-1-lukma@denx.de/ replacing https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230914124731.1654059-1-lukma@denx.de/ by grabing/ adding tags and reposting with a commit message plus a missing __packed to a struct (#2) plus extending the testsuite to sover HSRv1 which is what broke here (#3-#5). HSRv0 is (was) not affected. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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[ Upstream commit c3f4309 ] Syzkaller reported a sleep in atomic context bug relating to the HASHCHK handler logic: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c:1518 in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 25040, name: syz-executor preempt_count: 0, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 no locks held by syz-executor/25040. irq event stamp: 34 hardirqs last enabled at (33): [<c000000000048b38>] prep_irq_for_enabled_exit arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c:56 [inline] hardirqs last enabled at (33): [<c000000000048b38>] interrupt_exit_user_prepare_main+0x148/0x600 arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c:230 hardirqs last disabled at (34): [<c00000000003e6a4>] interrupt_enter_prepare+0x144/0x4f0 arch/powerpc/include/asm/interrupt.h:176 softirqs last enabled at (0): [<c000000000281954>] copy_process+0x16e4/0x4750 kernel/fork.c:2436 softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 CPU: 15 PID: 25040 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.5.0-rc5-00001-g3ccdff6bb06d #3 Hardware name: IBM,9105-22A POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1040.00 (NL1040_021) hv:phyp pSeries Call Trace: [c0000000a8247ce0] [c00000000032b0e4] __might_resched+0x3b4/0x400 kernel/sched/core.c:10189 [c0000000a8247d80] [c0000000008c7dc8] __might_fault+0xa8/0x170 mm/memory.c:5853 [c0000000a8247dc0] [c00000000004160c] do_program_check+0x32c/0xb20 arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c:1518 [c0000000a8247e50] [c000000000009b2c] program_check_common_virt+0x3bc/0x3c0 To determine if a trap was caused by a HASHCHK instruction, we inspect the user instruction that triggered the trap. However this may sleep if the page needs to be faulted in (get_user_instr() reaches __get_user(), which calls might_fault() and triggers the bug message). Move the HASHCHK handler logic to after we allow IRQs, which is fine because we are only interested in HASHCHK if it's a user space trap. Fixes: 5bcba4e ("powerpc/dexcr: Handle hashchk exception") Signed-off-by: Benjamin Gray <bgray@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20230915034604.45393-1-bgray@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Fix the deadlock by refactoring the MR cache cleanup flow to flush the workqueue without holding the rb_lock. This adds a race between cache cleanup and creation of new entries which we solve by denied creation of new entries after cache cleanup started. Lockdep: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 2785.326074 ] 6.2.0-rc6_for_upstream_debug_2023_01_31_14_02 #1 Not tainted [ 2785.339778 ] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 2785.340848 ] devlink/53872 is trying to acquire lock: [ 2785.341701 ] ffff888124f8c0c8 ((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0xc8/0x900 [ 2785.343403 ] [ 2785.343403 ] but task is already holding lock: [ 2785.344464 ] ffff88817e8f1260 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_mkey_cache_cleanup+0x77/0x250 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.346273 ] [ 2785.346273 ] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 2785.346273 ] [ 2785.347720 ] [ 2785.347720 ] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 2785.349003 ] [ 2785.349003 ] -> #1 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 2785.350160 ] __mutex_lock+0x14c/0x15c0 [ 2785.350962 ] delayed_cache_work_func+0x2d1/0x610 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.352044 ] process_one_work+0x7c2/0x1310 [ 2785.352879 ] worker_thread+0x59d/0xec0 [ 2785.353636 ] kthread+0x28f/0x330 [ 2785.354370 ] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 2785.355135 ] [ 2785.355135 ] -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 2785.356515 ] __lock_acquire+0x2d8a/0x5fe0 [ 2785.357349 ] lock_acquire+0x1c1/0x540 [ 2785.358121 ] __flush_work+0xe8/0x900 [ 2785.358852 ] __cancel_work_timer+0x2c7/0x3f0 [ 2785.359711 ] mlx5_mkey_cache_cleanup+0xfb/0x250 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.360781 ] mlx5_ib_stage_pre_ib_reg_umr_cleanup+0x16/0x30 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.361969 ] __mlx5_ib_remove+0x68/0x120 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.362960 ] mlx5r_remove+0x63/0x80 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.363870 ] auxiliary_bus_remove+0x52/0x70 [ 2785.364715 ] device_release_driver_internal+0x3c1/0x600 [ 2785.365695 ] bus_remove_device+0x2a5/0x560 [ 2785.366525 ] device_del+0x492/0xb80 [ 2785.367276 ] mlx5_detach_device+0x1a9/0x360 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.368615 ] mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x5a/0x110 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.369934 ] mlx5_devlink_reload_down+0x292/0x580 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.371292 ] devlink_reload+0x439/0x590 [ 2785.372075 ] devlink_nl_cmd_reload+0xaef/0xff0 [ 2785.372973 ] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.0+0x1bd/0x290 [ 2785.374011 ] genl_rcv_msg+0x3ca/0x6c0 [ 2785.374798 ] netlink_rcv_skb+0x12c/0x360 [ 2785.375612 ] genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 [ 2785.376295 ] netlink_unicast+0x438/0x710 [ 2785.377121 ] netlink_sendmsg+0x7a1/0xca0 [ 2785.377926 ] sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 [ 2785.378668 ] __sys_sendto+0x1bc/0x290 [ 2785.379440 ] __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0 [ 2785.380255 ] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 [ 2785.381031 ] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 [ 2785.381967 ] [ 2785.381967 ] other info that might help us debug this: [ 2785.381967 ] [ 2785.383448 ] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 2785.383448 ] [ 2785.384544 ] CPU0 CPU1 [ 2785.385383 ] ---- ---- [ 2785.386193 ] lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock); [ 2785.386940 ] lock((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)); [ 2785.388327 ] lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock); [ 2785.389425 ] lock((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)); [ 2785.390414 ] [ 2785.390414 ] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 2785.390414 ] [ 2785.391579 ] 6 locks held by devlink/53872: [ 2785.392341 ] #0: ffffffff84c17a50 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv+0x15/0x40 [ 2785.393630 ] #1: ffff888142280218 (&devlink->lock_key){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: devlink_get_from_attrs_lock+0x12d/0x2d0 [ 2785.395324 ] #2: ffff8881422d3c38 (&dev->lock_key){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x4a/0x110 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.397322 ] #3: ffffffffa0e59068 (mlx5_intf_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_detach_device+0x60/0x360 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.399231 ] #4: ffff88810e3cb0e8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x8d/0x600 [ 2785.400864 ] #5: ffff88817e8f1260 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_mkey_cache_cleanup+0x77/0x250 [mlx5_ib] Fixes: b958451 ("RDMA/mlx5: Change the cache structure to an RB-tree") Signed-off-by: Shay Drory <shayd@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Guralnik <michaelgur@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
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The following call trace shows a deadlock issue due to recursive locking of mutex "device_mutex". First lock acquire is in target_for_each_device() and second in target_free_device(). PID: 148266 TASK: ffff8be21ffb5d00 CPU: 10 COMMAND: "iscsi_ttx" #0 [ffffa2bfc9ec3b18] __schedule at ffffffffa8060e7f #1 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ba0] schedule at ffffffffa8061224 #2 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bb8] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffa80615ee #3 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bc8] __mutex_lock at ffffffffa8062fd7 #4 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c40] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffffa80631d3 #5 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c50] mutex_lock at ffffffffa806320c #6 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c68] target_free_device at ffffffffc0935998 [target_core_mod] torvalds#7 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c90] target_core_dev_release at ffffffffc092f975 [target_core_mod] torvalds#8 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ca0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d250f torvalds#9 [ffffa2bfc9ec3cd0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d2583 torvalds#10 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ce0] target_devices_idr_iter at ffffffffc0933f3a [target_core_mod] torvalds#11 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d00] idr_for_each at ffffffffa803f6fc torvalds#12 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d60] target_for_each_device at ffffffffc0935670 [target_core_mod] torvalds#13 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d98] transport_deregister_session at ffffffffc0946408 [target_core_mod] torvalds#14 [ffffa2bfc9ec3dc8] iscsit_close_session at ffffffffc09a44a6 [iscsi_target_mod] torvalds#15 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df0] iscsit_close_connection at ffffffffc09a4a88 [iscsi_target_mod] torvalds#16 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df8] finish_task_switch at ffffffffa76e5d07 torvalds#17 [ffffa2bfc9ec3e78] iscsit_take_action_for_connection_exit at ffffffffc0991c23 [iscsi_target_mod] torvalds#18 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ea0] iscsi_target_tx_thread at ffffffffc09a403b [iscsi_target_mod] torvalds#19 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f08] kthread at ffffffffa76d8080 torvalds#20 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffffa8200364 Fixes: 36d4cb4 ("scsi: target: Avoid that EXTENDED COPY commands trigger lock inversion") Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230918225848.66463-1-junxiao.bi@oracle.com Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <michael.christie@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
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[ Upstream commit a154f5f ] The following call trace shows a deadlock issue due to recursive locking of mutex "device_mutex". First lock acquire is in target_for_each_device() and second in target_free_device(). PID: 148266 TASK: ffff8be21ffb5d00 CPU: 10 COMMAND: "iscsi_ttx" #0 [ffffa2bfc9ec3b18] __schedule at ffffffffa8060e7f #1 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ba0] schedule at ffffffffa8061224 #2 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bb8] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffa80615ee #3 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bc8] __mutex_lock at ffffffffa8062fd7 #4 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c40] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffffa80631d3 #5 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c50] mutex_lock at ffffffffa806320c #6 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c68] target_free_device at ffffffffc0935998 [target_core_mod] torvalds#7 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c90] target_core_dev_release at ffffffffc092f975 [target_core_mod] torvalds#8 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ca0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d250f torvalds#9 [ffffa2bfc9ec3cd0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d2583 torvalds#10 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ce0] target_devices_idr_iter at ffffffffc0933f3a [target_core_mod] torvalds#11 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d00] idr_for_each at ffffffffa803f6fc torvalds#12 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d60] target_for_each_device at ffffffffc0935670 [target_core_mod] torvalds#13 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d98] transport_deregister_session at ffffffffc0946408 [target_core_mod] torvalds#14 [ffffa2bfc9ec3dc8] iscsit_close_session at ffffffffc09a44a6 [iscsi_target_mod] torvalds#15 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df0] iscsit_close_connection at ffffffffc09a4a88 [iscsi_target_mod] torvalds#16 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df8] finish_task_switch at ffffffffa76e5d07 torvalds#17 [ffffa2bfc9ec3e78] iscsit_take_action_for_connection_exit at ffffffffc0991c23 [iscsi_target_mod] torvalds#18 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ea0] iscsi_target_tx_thread at ffffffffc09a403b [iscsi_target_mod] torvalds#19 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f08] kthread at ffffffffa76d8080 torvalds#20 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffffa8200364 Fixes: 36d4cb4 ("scsi: target: Avoid that EXTENDED COPY commands trigger lock inversion") Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230918225848.66463-1-junxiao.bi@oracle.com Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <michael.christie@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 374012b upstream. Fix the deadlock by refactoring the MR cache cleanup flow to flush the workqueue without holding the rb_lock. This adds a race between cache cleanup and creation of new entries which we solve by denied creation of new entries after cache cleanup started. Lockdep: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 2785.326074 ] 6.2.0-rc6_for_upstream_debug_2023_01_31_14_02 #1 Not tainted [ 2785.339778 ] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 2785.340848 ] devlink/53872 is trying to acquire lock: [ 2785.341701 ] ffff888124f8c0c8 ((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0xc8/0x900 [ 2785.343403 ] [ 2785.343403 ] but task is already holding lock: [ 2785.344464 ] ffff88817e8f1260 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_mkey_cache_cleanup+0x77/0x250 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.346273 ] [ 2785.346273 ] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 2785.346273 ] [ 2785.347720 ] [ 2785.347720 ] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 2785.349003 ] [ 2785.349003 ] -> #1 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 2785.350160 ] __mutex_lock+0x14c/0x15c0 [ 2785.350962 ] delayed_cache_work_func+0x2d1/0x610 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.352044 ] process_one_work+0x7c2/0x1310 [ 2785.352879 ] worker_thread+0x59d/0xec0 [ 2785.353636 ] kthread+0x28f/0x330 [ 2785.354370 ] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 2785.355135 ] [ 2785.355135 ] -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 2785.356515 ] __lock_acquire+0x2d8a/0x5fe0 [ 2785.357349 ] lock_acquire+0x1c1/0x540 [ 2785.358121 ] __flush_work+0xe8/0x900 [ 2785.358852 ] __cancel_work_timer+0x2c7/0x3f0 [ 2785.359711 ] mlx5_mkey_cache_cleanup+0xfb/0x250 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.360781 ] mlx5_ib_stage_pre_ib_reg_umr_cleanup+0x16/0x30 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.361969 ] __mlx5_ib_remove+0x68/0x120 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.362960 ] mlx5r_remove+0x63/0x80 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.363870 ] auxiliary_bus_remove+0x52/0x70 [ 2785.364715 ] device_release_driver_internal+0x3c1/0x600 [ 2785.365695 ] bus_remove_device+0x2a5/0x560 [ 2785.366525 ] device_del+0x492/0xb80 [ 2785.367276 ] mlx5_detach_device+0x1a9/0x360 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.368615 ] mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x5a/0x110 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.369934 ] mlx5_devlink_reload_down+0x292/0x580 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.371292 ] devlink_reload+0x439/0x590 [ 2785.372075 ] devlink_nl_cmd_reload+0xaef/0xff0 [ 2785.372973 ] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.0+0x1bd/0x290 [ 2785.374011 ] genl_rcv_msg+0x3ca/0x6c0 [ 2785.374798 ] netlink_rcv_skb+0x12c/0x360 [ 2785.375612 ] genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 [ 2785.376295 ] netlink_unicast+0x438/0x710 [ 2785.377121 ] netlink_sendmsg+0x7a1/0xca0 [ 2785.377926 ] sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 [ 2785.378668 ] __sys_sendto+0x1bc/0x290 [ 2785.379440 ] __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0 [ 2785.380255 ] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 [ 2785.381031 ] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 [ 2785.381967 ] [ 2785.381967 ] other info that might help us debug this: [ 2785.381967 ] [ 2785.383448 ] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 2785.383448 ] [ 2785.384544 ] CPU0 CPU1 [ 2785.385383 ] ---- ---- [ 2785.386193 ] lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock); [ 2785.386940 ] lock((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)); [ 2785.388327 ] lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock); [ 2785.389425 ] lock((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)); [ 2785.390414 ] [ 2785.390414 ] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 2785.390414 ] [ 2785.391579 ] 6 locks held by devlink/53872: [ 2785.392341 ] #0: ffffffff84c17a50 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv+0x15/0x40 [ 2785.393630 ] #1: ffff888142280218 (&devlink->lock_key){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: devlink_get_from_attrs_lock+0x12d/0x2d0 [ 2785.395324 ] #2: ffff8881422d3c38 (&dev->lock_key){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x4a/0x110 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.397322 ] #3: ffffffffa0e59068 (mlx5_intf_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_detach_device+0x60/0x360 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.399231 ] #4: ffff88810e3cb0e8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x8d/0x600 [ 2785.400864 ] #5: ffff88817e8f1260 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_mkey_cache_cleanup+0x77/0x250 [mlx5_ib] Fixes: b958451 ("RDMA/mlx5: Change the cache structure to an RB-tree") Signed-off-by: Shay Drory <shayd@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Guralnik <michaelgur@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit a84fbf2 ] Generating metrics llc_code_read_mpi_demand_plus_prefetch, llc_data_read_mpi_demand_plus_prefetch, llc_miss_local_memory_bandwidth_read, llc_miss_local_memory_bandwidth_write, nllc_miss_remote_memory_bandwidth_read, memory_bandwidth_read, memory_bandwidth_write, uncore_frequency, upi_data_transmit_bw, C2_Pkg_Residency, C3_Core_Residency, C3_Pkg_Residency, C6_Core_Residency, C6_Pkg_Residency, C7_Core_Residency, C7_Pkg_Residency, UNCORE_FREQ and tma_info_system_socket_clks would trigger an address sanitizer heap-buffer-overflows on a SkylakeX. ``` ==2567752==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x5020003ed098 at pc 0x5621a816654e bp 0x7fffb55d4da0 sp 0x7fffb55d4d98 READ of size 4 at 0x5020003eee78 thread T0 #0 0x558265d6654d in aggr_cpu_id__is_empty tools/perf/util/cpumap.c:694:12 #1 0x558265c914da in perf_stat__get_aggr tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:1490:6 #2 0x558265c914da in perf_stat__get_global_cached tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:1530:9 #3 0x558265e53290 in should_skip_zero_counter tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:947:31 #4 0x558265e53290 in print_counter_aggrdata tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:985:18 #5 0x558265e51931 in print_counter tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:1110:3 #6 0x558265e51931 in evlist__print_counters tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:1571:5 torvalds#7 0x558265c8ec87 in print_counters tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:981:2 torvalds#8 0x558265c8cc71 in cmd_stat tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:2837:3 torvalds#9 0x558265bb9bd4 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:323:11 torvalds#10 0x558265bb98eb in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:377:8 torvalds#11 0x558265bb9389 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:421:2 torvalds#12 0x558265bb9389 in main tools/perf/perf.c:537:3 ``` The issue was the use of testing a cpumap with NULL rather than using empty, as a map containing the dummy value isn't NULL and the -1 results in an empty aggr map being allocated which legitimately overflows when any member is accessed. Fixes: 8a96f45 ("perf stat: Avoid SEGV if core.cpus isn't set") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230906003912.3317462-1-irogers@google.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit ede72dc ] Fuzzing found that an invalid tracepoint name would create a memory leak with an address sanitizer build: ``` $ perf stat -e '*:o/' true event syntax error: '*:o/' \___ parser error Run 'perf list' for a list of valid events Usage: perf stat [<options>] [<command>] -e, --event <event> event selector. use 'perf list' to list available events ================================================================= ==59380==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 4 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f38ac07077b in __interceptor_strdup ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439 #1 0x55f2f41be73b in str util/parse-events.l:49 #2 0x55f2f41d08e8 in parse_events_lex util/parse-events.l:338 #3 0x55f2f41dc3b1 in parse_events_parse util/parse-events-bison.c:1464 #4 0x55f2f410b8b3 in parse_events__scanner util/parse-events.c:1822 #5 0x55f2f410d1b9 in __parse_events util/parse-events.c:2094 #6 0x55f2f410e57f in parse_events_option util/parse-events.c:2279 torvalds#7 0x55f2f4427b56 in get_value tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:251 torvalds#8 0x55f2f4428d98 in parse_short_opt tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:351 torvalds#9 0x55f2f4429d80 in parse_options_step tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:539 torvalds#10 0x55f2f442acb9 in parse_options_subcommand tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:654 torvalds#11 0x55f2f3ec99fc in cmd_stat tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:2501 torvalds#12 0x55f2f4093289 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:322 torvalds#13 0x55f2f40937f5 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:375 torvalds#14 0x55f2f4093bbd in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:419 torvalds#15 0x55f2f409412b in main tools/perf/perf.c:535 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 4 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s). ``` Fix by adding the missing destructor. Fixes: 865582c ("perf tools: Adds the tracepoint name parsing support") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: He Kuang <hekuang@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230914164028.363220-1-irogers@google.com Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit d45c4b4 ] A thread started via eg. user_mode_thread() runs in the kernel to begin with and then may later return to userspace. While it's running in the kernel it has a pt_regs at the base of its kernel stack, but that pt_regs is all zeroes. If the thread oopses in that state, it leads to an ugly stack trace with a big block of zero GPRs, as reported by Joel: Kernel panic - not syncing: VFS: Unable to mount root fs on unknown-block(0,0) CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc7-00004-gf7757129e3de-dirty #3 Hardware name: IBM PowerNV (emulated by qemu) POWER9 0x4e1200 opal:v7.0 PowerNV Call Trace: [c0000000036afb00] [c0000000010dd058] dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x9c (unreliable) [c0000000036afb30] [c00000000013c524] panic+0x178/0x424 [c0000000036afbd0] [c000000002005100] mount_root_generic+0x250/0x324 [c0000000036afca0] [c0000000020057d0] prepare_namespace+0x2d4/0x344 [c0000000036afd20] [c0000000020049c0] kernel_init_freeable+0x358/0x3ac [c0000000036afdf0] [c0000000000111b0] kernel_init+0x30/0x1a0 [c0000000036afe50] [c00000000000debc] ret_from_kernel_user_thread+0x14/0x1c --- interrupt: 0 at 0x0 NIP: 0000000000000000 LR: 0000000000000000 CTR: 0000000000000000 REGS: c0000000036afe80 TRAP: 0000 Not tainted (6.5.0-rc7-00004-gf7757129e3de-dirty) MSR: 0000000000000000 <> CR: 00000000 XER: 00000000 CFAR: 0000000000000000 IRQMASK: 0 GPR00: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR04: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR08: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR12: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR24: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR28: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 NIP [0000000000000000] 0x0 LR [0000000000000000] 0x0 --- interrupt: 0 The all-zero pt_regs looks ugly and conveys no useful information, other than its presence. So detect that case and just show the presence of the frame by printing the interrupt marker, eg: Kernel panic - not syncing: VFS: Unable to mount root fs on unknown-block(0,0) CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc3-00126-g18e9506562a0-dirty torvalds#301 Hardware name: IBM pSeries (emulated by qemu) POWER9 (raw) 0x4e1202 0xf000005 of:SLOF,HEAD hv:linux,kvm pSeries Call Trace: [c000000003aabb00] [c000000001143db8] dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x9c (unreliable) [c000000003aabb30] [c00000000014c624] panic+0x178/0x424 [c000000003aabbd0] [c0000000020050fc] mount_root_generic+0x250/0x324 [c000000003aabca0] [c0000000020057cc] prepare_namespace+0x2d4/0x344 [c000000003aabd20] [c0000000020049bc] kernel_init_freeable+0x358/0x3ac [c000000003aabdf0] [c0000000000111b0] kernel_init+0x30/0x1a0 [c000000003aabe50] [c00000000000debc] ret_from_kernel_user_thread+0x14/0x1c --- interrupt: 0 at 0x0 To avoid ever suppressing a valid pt_regs make sure the pt_regs has a zero MSR and TRAP value, and is located at the very base of the stack. Fixes: 6895dfc ("powerpc: copy_thread fill in interrupt frame marker and back chain") Reported-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au> Reported-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20230824064210.907266-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 34c4eff ] KMSAN reported the following uninit-value access issue: ===================================================== BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in virtio_transport_recv_pkt+0x1dfb/0x26a0 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:1421 virtio_transport_recv_pkt+0x1dfb/0x26a0 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:1421 vsock_loopback_work+0x3bb/0x5a0 net/vmw_vsock/vsock_loopback.c:120 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2630 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xff6/0x1e60 kernel/workqueue.c:2703 worker_thread+0xeca/0x14d0 kernel/workqueue.c:2784 kthread+0x3cc/0x520 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x66/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304 Uninit was stored to memory at: virtio_transport_space_update net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:1274 [inline] virtio_transport_recv_pkt+0x1ee8/0x26a0 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:1415 vsock_loopback_work+0x3bb/0x5a0 net/vmw_vsock/vsock_loopback.c:120 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2630 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xff6/0x1e60 kernel/workqueue.c:2703 worker_thread+0xeca/0x14d0 kernel/workqueue.c:2784 kthread+0x3cc/0x520 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x66/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304 Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook+0x105/0xad0 mm/slab.h:767 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3478 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x5a2/0xaf0 mm/slub.c:3523 kmalloc_reserve+0x13c/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:559 __alloc_skb+0x2fd/0x770 net/core/skbuff.c:650 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1286 [inline] virtio_vsock_alloc_skb include/linux/virtio_vsock.h:66 [inline] virtio_transport_alloc_skb+0x90/0x11e0 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:58 virtio_transport_reset_no_sock net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:957 [inline] virtio_transport_recv_pkt+0x1279/0x26a0 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:1387 vsock_loopback_work+0x3bb/0x5a0 net/vmw_vsock/vsock_loopback.c:120 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2630 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xff6/0x1e60 kernel/workqueue.c:2703 worker_thread+0xeca/0x14d0 kernel/workqueue.c:2784 kthread+0x3cc/0x520 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x66/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304 CPU: 1 PID: 10664 Comm: kworker/1:5 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc3-00146-g9f3ebbef746f #3 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-1.fc38 04/01/2014 Workqueue: vsock-loopback vsock_loopback_work ===================================================== The following simple reproducer can cause the issue described above: int main(void) { int sock; struct sockaddr_vm addr = { .svm_family = AF_VSOCK, .svm_cid = VMADDR_CID_ANY, .svm_port = 1234, }; sock = socket(AF_VSOCK, SOCK_STREAM, 0); connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)); return 0; } This issue occurs because the `buf_alloc` and `fwd_cnt` fields of the `struct virtio_vsock_hdr` are not initialized when a new skb is allocated in `virtio_transport_init_hdr()`. This patch resolves the issue by initializing these fields during allocation. Fixes: 71dc9ec ("virtio/vsock: replace virtio_vsock_pkt with sk_buff") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+0c8ce1da0ac31abbadcd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=0c8ce1da0ac31abbadcd Signed-off-by: Shigeru Yoshida <syoshida@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231104150531.257952-1-syoshida@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Andrii Nakryiko says: ==================== BPF control flow graph and precision backtrack fixes A small fix to BPF verifier's CFG logic around handling and reporting ldimm64 instructions. Patch #1 was previously submitted separately ([0]), and so this patch set supersedes that patch. Second patch is fixing obscure corner case in mark_chain_precise() logic. See patch for details. Patch #3 adds a dedicated test, however fragile it might. [0] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/patch/20231101205626.119243-1-andrii@kernel.org/ ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231110002638.4168352-1-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Nov 27, 2023
This allows it to break the following circular locking dependency. Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ====================================================== Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: 6.4.0-rc7+ torvalds#10 Not tainted Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ------------------------------------------------------ Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: wireplumber/2236 is trying to acquire lock: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ffff8fca5320da18 (&fctx->lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler+0x2b/0x100 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: but task is already holding lock: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ffff8fca41208610 (&event->list_lock#2){-...}-{2:2}, at: nvkm_event_ntfy+0x50/0xf0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: which lock already depends on the new lock. Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: -> #3 (&event->list_lock#2){-...}-{2:2}: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4b/0x70 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_event_ntfy+0x50/0xf0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ga100_fifo_nonstall_intr+0x24/0x30 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_intr+0x12c/0x240 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x88/0x240 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: handle_irq_event+0x38/0x80 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: handle_edge_irq+0xa3/0x240 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __common_interrupt+0x72/0x160 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: common_interrupt+0x60/0xe0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: -> #2 (&device->intr.lock){-...}-{2:2}: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4b/0x70 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_inth_allow+0x2c/0x80 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_event_ntfy_state+0x181/0x250 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_event_ntfy_allow+0x63/0xd0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_uevent_mthd+0x4d/0x70 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_ioctl+0x10b/0x250 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvif_object_mthd+0xa8/0x1f0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvif_event_allow+0x2a/0xa0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_fence_enable_signaling+0x78/0x80 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __dma_fence_enable_signaling+0x5e/0x100 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: dma_fence_add_callback+0x4b/0xd0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_cli_work_queue+0xae/0x110 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_gem_object_close+0x1d1/0x2a0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: drm_gem_handle_delete+0x70/0xe0 [drm] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: drm_ioctl_kernel+0xa5/0x150 [drm] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: drm_ioctl+0x256/0x490 [drm] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_drm_ioctl+0x5a/0xb0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __x64_sys_ioctl+0x91/0xd0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x90 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: -> #1 (&event->refs_lock#4){....}-{2:2}: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4b/0x70 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_event_ntfy_state+0x37/0x250 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_event_ntfy_allow+0x63/0xd0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_uevent_mthd+0x4d/0x70 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_ioctl+0x10b/0x250 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvif_object_mthd+0xa8/0x1f0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvif_event_allow+0x2a/0xa0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_fence_enable_signaling+0x78/0x80 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __dma_fence_enable_signaling+0x5e/0x100 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: dma_fence_add_callback+0x4b/0xd0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_cli_work_queue+0xae/0x110 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_gem_object_close+0x1d1/0x2a0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: drm_gem_handle_delete+0x70/0xe0 [drm] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: drm_ioctl_kernel+0xa5/0x150 [drm] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: drm_ioctl+0x256/0x490 [drm] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_drm_ioctl+0x5a/0xb0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __x64_sys_ioctl+0x91/0xd0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x90 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: -> #0 (&fctx->lock){-...}-{2:2}: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __lock_acquire+0x14e3/0x2240 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: lock_acquire+0xc8/0x2a0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4b/0x70 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler+0x2b/0x100 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_client_event+0xf/0x20 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_event_ntfy+0x9b/0xf0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ga100_fifo_nonstall_intr+0x24/0x30 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_intr+0x12c/0x240 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x88/0x240 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: handle_irq_event+0x38/0x80 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: handle_edge_irq+0xa3/0x240 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __common_interrupt+0x72/0x160 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: common_interrupt+0x60/0xe0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: other info that might help us debug this: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: Chain exists of: &fctx->lock --> &device->intr.lock --> &event->list_lock#2 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: Possible unsafe locking scenario: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: CPU0 CPU1 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ---- ---- Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: lock(&event->list_lock#2); Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: lock(&device->intr.lock); Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: lock(&event->list_lock#2); Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: lock(&fctx->lock); Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: *** DEADLOCK *** Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: 2 locks held by wireplumber/2236: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: #0: ffff8fca53177bf8 (&device->intr.lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: nvkm_intr+0x29/0x240 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: #1: ffff8fca41208610 (&event->list_lock#2){-...}-{2:2}, at: nvkm_event_ntfy+0x50/0xf0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: stack backtrace: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: CPU: 6 PID: 2236 Comm: wireplumber Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7+ torvalds#10 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. Z390 I AORUS PRO WIFI/Z390 I AORUS PRO WIFI-CF, BIOS F8 11/05/2021 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: Call Trace: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: <TASK> Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: dump_stack_lvl+0x5b/0x90 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: check_noncircular+0xe2/0x110 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __lock_acquire+0x14e3/0x2240 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: lock_acquire+0xc8/0x2a0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ? nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler+0x2b/0x100 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ? lock_acquire+0xc8/0x2a0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4b/0x70 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ? nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler+0x2b/0x100 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler+0x2b/0x100 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_client_event+0xf/0x20 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_event_ntfy+0x9b/0xf0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ga100_fifo_nonstall_intr+0x24/0x30 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_intr+0x12c/0x240 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x88/0x240 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: handle_irq_event+0x38/0x80 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: handle_edge_irq+0xa3/0x240 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __common_interrupt+0x72/0x160 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: common_interrupt+0x60/0xe0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: RIP: 0033:0x7fb66174d700 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: Code: c1 e2 05 29 ca 8d 0c 10 0f be 07 84 c0 75 eb 89 c8 c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa e9 d7 0f fc ff 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 <f3> 0f 1e fa e9 c7 0f fc> Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: RSP: 002b:00007ffdd3c48438 EFLAGS: 00000206 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: RAX: 000055bb758763c0 RBX: 000055bb758752c0 RCX: 00000000000028b0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: RDX: 000055bb758752c0 RSI: 000055bb75887490 RDI: 000055bb75862950 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: RBP: 00007ffdd3c48490 R08: 000055bb75873b10 R09: 0000000000000001 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 000055bb7587f000 R12: 000055bb75887490 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: R13: 000055bb757f6280 R14: 000055bb758875c0 R15: 000055bb757f6280 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: </TASK> Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> Tested-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231107053255.2257079-1-airlied@gmail.com
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…f-times'
Eduard Zingerman says:
====================
verify callbacks as if they are called unknown number of times
This series updates verifier logic for callback functions handling.
Current master simulates callback body execution exactly once,
which leads to verifier not detecting unsafe programs like below:
static int unsafe_on_zero_iter_cb(__u32 idx, struct num_context *ctx)
{
ctx->i = 0;
return 0;
}
SEC("?raw_tp")
int unsafe_on_zero_iter(void *unused)
{
struct num_context loop_ctx = { .i = 32 };
__u8 choice_arr[2] = { 0, 1 };
bpf_loop(100, unsafe_on_zero_iter_cb, &loop_ctx, 0);
return choice_arr[loop_ctx.i];
}
This was reported previously in [0].
The basic idea of the fix is to schedule callback entry state for
verification in env->head until some identical, previously visited
state in current DFS state traversal is found. Same logic as with open
coded iterators, and builds on top recent fixes [1] for those.
The series is structured as follows:
- patches #1,2,3 update strobemeta, xdp_synproxy selftests and
bpf_loop_bench benchmark to allow convergence of the bpf_loop
callback states;
- patches #4,5 just shuffle the code a bit;
- patch #6 is the main part of the series;
- patch torvalds#7 adds test cases for #6;
- patch torvalds#8 extend patch #6 with same speculative scalar widening
logic, as used for open coded iterators;
- patch torvalds#9 adds test cases for torvalds#8;
- patch torvalds#10 extends patch #6 to track maximal number of callback
executions specifically for bpf_loop();
- patch torvalds#11 adds test cases for torvalds#10.
Veristat results comparing this series to master+patches #1,2,3 using selftests
show the following difference:
File Program States (A) States (B) States (DIFF)
------------------------- ------------- ---------- ---------- -------------
bpf_loop_bench.bpf.o benchmark 1 2 +1 (+100.00%)
pyperf600_bpf_loop.bpf.o on_event 322 407 +85 (+26.40%)
strobemeta_bpf_loop.bpf.o on_event 113 151 +38 (+33.63%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.o syncookie_tc 341 291 -50 (-14.66%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.o syncookie_xdp 344 301 -43 (-12.50%)
Veristat results comparing this series to master using Tetragon BPF
files [2] also show some differences.
States diff varies from +2% to +15% on 23 programs out of 186,
no new failures.
Changelog:
- V3 [5] -> V4, changes suggested by Andrii:
- validate mark_chain_precision() result in patch torvalds#10;
- renaming s/cumulative_callback_depth/callback_unroll_depth/.
- V2 [4] -> V3:
- fixes in expected log messages for test cases:
- callback_result_precise;
- parent_callee_saved_reg_precise_with_callback;
- parent_stack_slot_precise_with_callback;
- renamings (suggested by Alexei):
- s/callback_iter_depth/cumulative_callback_depth/
- s/is_callback_iter_next/calls_callback/
- s/mark_callback_iter_next/mark_calls_callback/
- prepare_func_exit() updated to exit with -EFAULT when
callee->in_callback_fn is true but calls_callback() is not true
for callsite;
- test case 'bpf_loop_iter_limit_nested' rewritten to use return
value check instead of verifier log message checks
(suggested by Alexei).
- V1 [3] -> V2, changes suggested by Andrii:
- small changes for error handling code in __check_func_call();
- callback body processing log is now matched in relevant
verifier_subprog_precision.c tests;
- R1 passed to bpf_loop() is now always marked as precise;
- log level 2 message for bpf_loop() iteration termination instead of
iteration depth messages;
- __no_msg macro removed;
- bpf_loop_iter_limit_nested updated to avoid using __no_msg;
- commit message for patch #3 updated according to Alexei's request.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CA+vRuzPChFNXmouzGG+wsy=6eMcfr1mFG0F3g7rbg-sedGKW3w@mail.gmail.com/
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231024000917.12153-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/
[2] git@github.com:cilium/tetragon.git
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231116021803.9982-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/T/#t
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231118013355.7943-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/T/#t
[5] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231120225945.11741-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/T/#t
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231121020701.26440-1-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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commit dd976a9 upstream. The smp_processor_id() shouldn't be called from preemptible code. Instead use get_cpu() and put_cpu() which disables preemption in addition to getting the processor id. Enable preemption back after calling schedule_work() to make sure that the work gets scheduled on all cores other than the current core. We want to avoid a scenario where current core's stack trace is printed multiple times and one core's stack trace isn't printed because of scheduling of current task. This fixes the following bug: [ 119.143590] sysrq: Show backtrace of all active CPUs [ 119.143902] BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: bash/873 [ 119.144586] caller is debug_smp_processor_id+0x20/0x30 [ 119.144827] CPU: 6 PID: 873 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.10.124-dirty #3 [ 119.144861] Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS 2023.05-1 07/22/2023 [ 119.145053] Call trace: [ 119.145093] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1a0 [ 119.145122] show_stack+0x18/0x70 [ 119.145141] dump_stack+0xc4/0x11c [ 119.145159] check_preemption_disabled+0x100/0x110 [ 119.145175] debug_smp_processor_id+0x20/0x30 [ 119.145195] sysrq_handle_showallcpus+0x20/0xc0 [ 119.145211] __handle_sysrq+0x8c/0x1a0 [ 119.145227] write_sysrq_trigger+0x94/0x12c [ 119.145247] proc_reg_write+0xa8/0xe4 [ 119.145266] vfs_write+0xec/0x280 [ 119.145282] ksys_write+0x6c/0x100 [ 119.145298] __arm64_sys_write+0x20/0x30 [ 119.145315] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x78/0x1e4 [ 119.145332] do_el0_svc+0x24/0x8c [ 119.145348] el0_svc+0x10/0x20 [ 119.145364] el0_sync_handler+0x134/0x140 [ 119.145381] el0_sync+0x180/0x1c0 Cc: jirislaby@kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 47cab6a ("debug lockups: Improve lockup detection, fix generic arch fallback") Signed-off-by: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231009162021.3607632-1-usama.anjum@collabora.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 807252f upstream. Running smb2.rename test from Samba smbtorture suite against a kernel built with lockdep triggers a "possible recursive locking detected" warning. This is because mnt_want_write() is called twice with no mnt_drop_write() in between: -> ksmbd_vfs_mkdir() -> ksmbd_vfs_kern_path_create() -> kern_path_create() -> filename_create() -> mnt_want_write() -> mnt_want_write() Fix this by removing the mnt_want_write/mnt_drop_write calls from vfs helpers that call kern_path_create(). Full lockdep trace below: ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.6.0-rc5 torvalds#775 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- kworker/1:1/32 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888005ac83f8 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksmbd_vfs_mkdir+0xe1/0x410 but task is already holding lock: ffff888005ac83f8 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: filename_create+0xb6/0x260 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(sb_writers#5); lock(sb_writers#5); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 4 locks held by kworker/1:1/32: #0: ffff8880064e4138 ((wq_completion)ksmbd-io){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x40e/0x980 #1: ffff888005b0fdd0 ((work_completion)(&work->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x40e/0x980 #2: ffff888005ac83f8 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: filename_create+0xb6/0x260 #3: ffff8880057ce760 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#3/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: filename_create+0x123/0x260 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 40b268d ("ksmbd: add mnt_want_write to ksmbd vfs functions") Signed-off-by: Marios Makassikis <mmakassikis@freebox.fr> Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Nov 29, 2023
commit 5a22fbc upstream. When LAN9303 is MDIO-connected two callchains exist into mdio->bus->write(): 1. switch ports 1&2 ("physical" PHYs): virtual (switch-internal) MDIO bus (lan9303_switch_ops->phy_{read|write})-> lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write} -> mdiobus_{read|write}_nested 2. LAN9303 virtual PHY: virtual MDIO bus (lan9303_phy_{read|write}) -> lan9303_virt_phy_reg_{read|write} -> regmap -> lan9303_mdio_{read|write} If the latter functions just take mutex_lock(&sw_dev->device->bus->mdio_lock) it triggers a LOCKDEP false-positive splat. It's false-positive because the first mdio_lock in the second callchain above belongs to virtual MDIO bus, the second mdio_lock belongs to physical MDIO bus. Consequent annotation in lan9303_mdio_{read|write} as nested lock (similar to lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write}, it's the same physical MDIO bus) prevents the following splat: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.15.71 #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kworker/u4:3/609 is trying to acquire lock: ffff000011531c68 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: regmap_lock_mutex but task is already holding lock: ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire __mutex_lock mutex_lock_nested lan9303_mdio_read _regmap_read regmap_read lan9303_probe lan9303_mdio_probe mdio_probe really_probe __driver_probe_device driver_probe_device __device_attach_driver bus_for_each_drv __device_attach device_initial_probe bus_probe_device deferred_probe_work_func process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork -> #0 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire lock_acquire.part.0 lock_acquire __mutex_lock mutex_lock_nested regmap_lock_mutex regmap_read lan9303_phy_read dsa_slave_phy_read __mdiobus_read mdiobus_read get_phy_device mdiobus_scan __mdiobus_register dsa_register_switch lan9303_probe lan9303_mdio_probe mdio_probe really_probe __driver_probe_device driver_probe_device __device_attach_driver bus_for_each_drv __device_attach device_initial_probe bus_probe_device deferred_probe_work_func process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&bus->mdio_lock); lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock); lock(&bus->mdio_lock); lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by kworker/u4:3/609: #0: ffff000002842938 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work #1: ffff80000bacbd60 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work #2: ffff000007645178 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __device_attach #3: ffff8000096e6e78 (dsa2_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dsa_register_switch #4: ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 609 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 5.15.71 #1 Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func Call trace: dump_backtrace show_stack dump_stack_lvl dump_stack print_circular_bug check_noncircular __lock_acquire lock_acquire.part.0 lock_acquire __mutex_lock mutex_lock_nested regmap_lock_mutex regmap_read lan9303_phy_read dsa_slave_phy_read __mdiobus_read mdiobus_read get_phy_device mdiobus_scan __mdiobus_register dsa_register_switch lan9303_probe lan9303_mdio_probe ... Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: dc70058 ("net: dsa: LAN9303: add MDIO managed mode support") Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@siemens.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231027065741.534971-1-alexander.sverdlin@siemens.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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When scanning namespaces, it is possible to get valid data from the first call to nvme_identify_ns() in nvme_alloc_ns(), but not from the second call in nvme_update_ns_info_block(). In particular, if the NSID becomes inactive between the two commands, a storage device may return a buffer filled with zero as per 4.1.5.1. In this case, we can get a kernel crash due to a divide-by-zero in blk_stack_limits() because ns->lba_shift will be set to zero. PID: 326 TASK: ffff95fec3cd8000 CPU: 29 COMMAND: "kworker/u98:10" #0 [ffffad8f8702f9e0] machine_kexec at ffffffff91c76ec7 #1 [ffffad8f8702fa38] __crash_kexec at ffffffff91dea4fa #2 [ffffad8f8702faf8] crash_kexec at ffffffff91deb788 #3 [ffffad8f8702fb00] oops_end at ffffffff91c2e4bb #4 [ffffad8f8702fb20] do_trap at ffffffff91c2a4ce #5 [ffffad8f8702fb70] do_error_trap at ffffffff91c2a595 #6 [ffffad8f8702fbb0] exc_divide_error at ffffffff928506e6 torvalds#7 [ffffad8f8702fbd0] asm_exc_divide_error at ffffffff92a00926 [exception RIP: blk_stack_limits+434] RIP: ffffffff92191872 RSP: ffffad8f8702fc80 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff95efa0c91800 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 00000000ffffffff R8: ffff95fec7df35a8 R9: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff95fed33c09a8 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 torvalds#8 [ffffad8f8702fce0] nvme_update_ns_info_block at ffffffffc06d3533 [nvme_core] torvalds#9 [ffffad8f8702fd18] nvme_scan_ns at ffffffffc06d6fa7 [nvme_core] This happened when the check for valid data was moved out of nvme_identify_ns() into one of the callers. Fix this by checking in both callers. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218186 Fixes: 0dd6fff ("nvme: bring back auto-removal of deleted namespaces during sequential scan") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ewan D. Milne <emilne@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
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Dec 8, 2023
commit d8b90d6 upstream. When scanning namespaces, it is possible to get valid data from the first call to nvme_identify_ns() in nvme_alloc_ns(), but not from the second call in nvme_update_ns_info_block(). In particular, if the NSID becomes inactive between the two commands, a storage device may return a buffer filled with zero as per 4.1.5.1. In this case, we can get a kernel crash due to a divide-by-zero in blk_stack_limits() because ns->lba_shift will be set to zero. PID: 326 TASK: ffff95fec3cd8000 CPU: 29 COMMAND: "kworker/u98:10" #0 [ffffad8f8702f9e0] machine_kexec at ffffffff91c76ec7 #1 [ffffad8f8702fa38] __crash_kexec at ffffffff91dea4fa #2 [ffffad8f8702faf8] crash_kexec at ffffffff91deb788 #3 [ffffad8f8702fb00] oops_end at ffffffff91c2e4bb #4 [ffffad8f8702fb20] do_trap at ffffffff91c2a4ce #5 [ffffad8f8702fb70] do_error_trap at ffffffff91c2a595 #6 [ffffad8f8702fbb0] exc_divide_error at ffffffff928506e6 torvalds#7 [ffffad8f8702fbd0] asm_exc_divide_error at ffffffff92a00926 [exception RIP: blk_stack_limits+434] RIP: ffffffff92191872 RSP: ffffad8f8702fc80 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff95efa0c91800 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 00000000ffffffff R8: ffff95fec7df35a8 R9: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff95fed33c09a8 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 torvalds#8 [ffffad8f8702fce0] nvme_update_ns_info_block at ffffffffc06d3533 [nvme_core] torvalds#9 [ffffad8f8702fd18] nvme_scan_ns at ffffffffc06d6fa7 [nvme_core] This happened when the check for valid data was moved out of nvme_identify_ns() into one of the callers. Fix this by checking in both callers. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218186 Fixes: 0dd6fff ("nvme: bring back auto-removal of deleted namespaces during sequential scan") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ewan D. Milne <emilne@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Dec 11, 2023
When creating ceq_0 during probing irdma, cqp.sc_cqp will be sent as a cqp_request to cqp->sc_cqp.sq_ring. If the request is pending when removing the irdma driver or unplugging its aux device, cqp.sc_cqp will be dereferenced as wrong struct in irdma_free_pending_cqp_request(). PID: 3669 TASK: ffff88aef892c000 CPU: 28 COMMAND: "kworker/28:0" #0 [fffffe0000549e38] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff810e3a34 #1 [fffffe0000549e40] nmi_handle at ffffffff810788b2 #2 [fffffe0000549ea0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8107938f #3 [fffffe0000549eb8] do_nmi at ffffffff81079582 #4 [fffffe0000549ef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff82e016b4 [exception RIP: native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+1291] RIP: ffffffff8127e72b RSP: ffff88aa841ef778 RFLAGS: 00000046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88b01f849700 RCX: ffffffff8127e47e RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff83857ec0 RBP: ffff88afe3e4efc8 R8: ffffed15fc7c9dfa R9: ffffed15fc7c9dfa R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed15fc7c9df9 R12: 0000000000740000 R13: ffff88b01f849708 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: ffffed1603f092e1 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0000 -- <NMI exception stack> -- #5 [ffff88aa841ef778] native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8127e72b #6 [ffff88aa841ef7b0] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff82c22aa4 torvalds#7 [ffff88aa841ef7c8] __wake_up_common_lock at ffffffff81257363 torvalds#8 [ffff88aa841ef888] irdma_free_pending_cqp_request at ffffffffa0ba12cc [irdma] torvalds#9 [ffff88aa841ef958] irdma_cleanup_pending_cqp_op at ffffffffa0ba1469 [irdma] torvalds#10 [ffff88aa841ef9c0] irdma_ctrl_deinit_hw at ffffffffa0b2989f [irdma] torvalds#11 [ffff88aa841efa28] irdma_remove at ffffffffa0b252df [irdma] torvalds#12 [ffff88aa841efae8] auxiliary_bus_remove at ffffffff8219afdb torvalds#13 [ffff88aa841efb00] device_release_driver_internal at ffffffff821882e6 torvalds#14 [ffff88aa841efb38] bus_remove_device at ffffffff82184278 torvalds#15 [ffff88aa841efb88] device_del at ffffffff82179d23 torvalds#16 [ffff88aa841efc48] ice_unplug_aux_dev at ffffffffa0eb1c14 [ice] torvalds#17 [ffff88aa841efc68] ice_service_task at ffffffffa0d88201 [ice] torvalds#18 [ffff88aa841efde8] process_one_work at ffffffff811c589a torvalds#19 [ffff88aa841efe60] worker_thread at ffffffff811c71ff torvalds#20 [ffff88aa841eff10] kthread at ffffffff811d87a0 torvalds#21 [ffff88aa841eff50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff82e0022f Fixes: 44d9e52 ("RDMA/irdma: Implement device initialization definitions") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231130081415.891006-1-lishifeng@sangfor.com.cn Suggested-by: "Ismail, Mustafa" <mustafa.ismail@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Shifeng Li <lishifeng@sangfor.com.cn> Reviewed-by: Shiraz Saleem <shiraz.saleem@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
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When working on LED support for r8169 I got the following lockdep warning. Easiest way to prevent this scenario seems to be to take the RTNL lock before the trigger_data lock in set_device_name(). ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.7.0-rc2-next-20231124+ #2 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ bash/383 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888103aa1c68 (&trigger_data->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: netdev_trig_notify+0xec/0x190 [ledtrig_netdev] but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8cddf808 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rtnl_lock+0x12/0x20 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x9b/0xb50 mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 rtnl_lock+0x12/0x20 set_device_name+0xa9/0x120 [ledtrig_netdev] netdev_trig_activate+0x1a1/0x230 [ledtrig_netdev] led_trigger_set+0x172/0x2c0 led_trigger_write+0xf1/0x140 sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x5d/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x15d/0x210 vfs_write+0x1f0/0x510 ksys_write+0x6c/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x14/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x3f/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74 -> #0 (&trigger_data->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x1459/0x25a0 lock_acquire+0xc8/0x2d0 __mutex_lock+0x9b/0xb50 mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 netdev_trig_notify+0xec/0x190 [ledtrig_netdev] call_netdevice_register_net_notifiers+0x5a/0x100 register_netdevice_notifier+0x85/0x120 netdev_trig_activate+0x1d4/0x230 [ledtrig_netdev] led_trigger_set+0x172/0x2c0 led_trigger_write+0xf1/0x140 sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x5d/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x15d/0x210 vfs_write+0x1f0/0x510 ksys_write+0x6c/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x14/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x3f/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(rtnl_mutex); lock(&trigger_data->lock); lock(rtnl_mutex); lock(&trigger_data->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 8 locks held by bash/383: #0: ffff888103ff33f0 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x6c/0xf0 #1: ffff888103aa1e88 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x114/0x210 #2: ffff8881036f1890 (kn->active#82){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x11d/0x210 #3: ffff888108e2c358 (&led_cdev->led_access){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: led_trigger_write+0x30/0x140 #4: ffffffff8cdd9e10 (triggers_list_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: led_trigger_write+0x75/0x140 #5: ffff888108e2c270 (&led_cdev->trigger_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: led_trigger_write+0xe3/0x140 #6: ffffffff8cdde3d0 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: register_netdevice_notifier+0x1c/0x120 torvalds#7: ffffffff8cddf808 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rtnl_lock+0x12/0x20 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 383 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.7.0-rc2-next-20231124+ #2 Hardware name: Default string Default string/Default string, BIOS ADLN.M6.SODIMM.ZB.CY.015 08/08/2023 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x5c/0xd0 dump_stack+0x10/0x20 print_circular_bug+0x2dd/0x410 check_noncircular+0x131/0x150 __lock_acquire+0x1459/0x25a0 lock_acquire+0xc8/0x2d0 ? netdev_trig_notify+0xec/0x190 [ledtrig_netdev] __mutex_lock+0x9b/0xb50 ? netdev_trig_notify+0xec/0x190 [ledtrig_netdev] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20 ? netdev_trig_notify+0xec/0x190 [ledtrig_netdev] ? __cancel_work_timer+0x11c/0x1b0 ? __mutex_lock+0x123/0xb50 mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 ? mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 netdev_trig_notify+0xec/0x190 [ledtrig_netdev] call_netdevice_register_net_notifiers+0x5a/0x100 register_netdevice_notifier+0x85/0x120 netdev_trig_activate+0x1d4/0x230 [ledtrig_netdev] led_trigger_set+0x172/0x2c0 ? preempt_count_add+0x49/0xc0 led_trigger_write+0xf1/0x140 sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x5d/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x15d/0x210 vfs_write+0x1f0/0x510 ksys_write+0x6c/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x14/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x3f/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74 RIP: 0033:0x7f269055d034 Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d 35 c3 0d 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffddb7ef748 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000007 RCX: 00007f269055d034 RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: 000055bf5f4af3c0 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 000055bf5f4af3c0 R08: 0000000000000073 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000007 R13: 00007f26906325c0 R14: 00007f269062ff20 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> Fixes: d5e0126 ("leds: trigger: netdev: add additional specific link speed mode") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch> Acked-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/fb5c8294-2a10-4bf5-8f10-3d2b77d2757e@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit a2e36cd ] This allows it to break the following circular locking dependency. Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ====================================================== Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: 6.4.0-rc7+ torvalds#10 Not tainted Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ------------------------------------------------------ Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: wireplumber/2236 is trying to acquire lock: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ffff8fca5320da18 (&fctx->lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler+0x2b/0x100 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: but task is already holding lock: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ffff8fca41208610 (&event->list_lock#2){-...}-{2:2}, at: nvkm_event_ntfy+0x50/0xf0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: which lock already depends on the new lock. Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: -> #3 (&event->list_lock#2){-...}-{2:2}: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4b/0x70 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_event_ntfy+0x50/0xf0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ga100_fifo_nonstall_intr+0x24/0x30 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_intr+0x12c/0x240 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x88/0x240 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: handle_irq_event+0x38/0x80 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: handle_edge_irq+0xa3/0x240 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __common_interrupt+0x72/0x160 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: common_interrupt+0x60/0xe0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: -> #2 (&device->intr.lock){-...}-{2:2}: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4b/0x70 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_inth_allow+0x2c/0x80 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_event_ntfy_state+0x181/0x250 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_event_ntfy_allow+0x63/0xd0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_uevent_mthd+0x4d/0x70 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_ioctl+0x10b/0x250 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvif_object_mthd+0xa8/0x1f0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvif_event_allow+0x2a/0xa0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_fence_enable_signaling+0x78/0x80 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __dma_fence_enable_signaling+0x5e/0x100 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: dma_fence_add_callback+0x4b/0xd0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_cli_work_queue+0xae/0x110 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_gem_object_close+0x1d1/0x2a0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: drm_gem_handle_delete+0x70/0xe0 [drm] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: drm_ioctl_kernel+0xa5/0x150 [drm] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: drm_ioctl+0x256/0x490 [drm] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_drm_ioctl+0x5a/0xb0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __x64_sys_ioctl+0x91/0xd0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x90 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: -> #1 (&event->refs_lock#4){....}-{2:2}: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4b/0x70 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_event_ntfy_state+0x37/0x250 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_event_ntfy_allow+0x63/0xd0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_uevent_mthd+0x4d/0x70 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_ioctl+0x10b/0x250 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvif_object_mthd+0xa8/0x1f0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvif_event_allow+0x2a/0xa0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_fence_enable_signaling+0x78/0x80 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __dma_fence_enable_signaling+0x5e/0x100 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: dma_fence_add_callback+0x4b/0xd0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_cli_work_queue+0xae/0x110 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_gem_object_close+0x1d1/0x2a0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: drm_gem_handle_delete+0x70/0xe0 [drm] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: drm_ioctl_kernel+0xa5/0x150 [drm] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: drm_ioctl+0x256/0x490 [drm] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_drm_ioctl+0x5a/0xb0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __x64_sys_ioctl+0x91/0xd0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x90 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: -> #0 (&fctx->lock){-...}-{2:2}: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __lock_acquire+0x14e3/0x2240 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: lock_acquire+0xc8/0x2a0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4b/0x70 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler+0x2b/0x100 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_client_event+0xf/0x20 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_event_ntfy+0x9b/0xf0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ga100_fifo_nonstall_intr+0x24/0x30 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_intr+0x12c/0x240 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x88/0x240 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: handle_irq_event+0x38/0x80 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: handle_edge_irq+0xa3/0x240 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __common_interrupt+0x72/0x160 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: common_interrupt+0x60/0xe0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: other info that might help us debug this: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: Chain exists of: &fctx->lock --> &device->intr.lock --> &event->list_lock#2 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: Possible unsafe locking scenario: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: CPU0 CPU1 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ---- ---- Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: lock(&event->list_lock#2); Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: lock(&device->intr.lock); Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: lock(&event->list_lock#2); Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: lock(&fctx->lock); Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: *** DEADLOCK *** Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: 2 locks held by wireplumber/2236: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: #0: ffff8fca53177bf8 (&device->intr.lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: nvkm_intr+0x29/0x240 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: #1: ffff8fca41208610 (&event->list_lock#2){-...}-{2:2}, at: nvkm_event_ntfy+0x50/0xf0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: stack backtrace: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: CPU: 6 PID: 2236 Comm: wireplumber Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7+ torvalds#10 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. Z390 I AORUS PRO WIFI/Z390 I AORUS PRO WIFI-CF, BIOS F8 11/05/2021 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: Call Trace: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: <TASK> Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: dump_stack_lvl+0x5b/0x90 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: check_noncircular+0xe2/0x110 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __lock_acquire+0x14e3/0x2240 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: lock_acquire+0xc8/0x2a0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ? nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler+0x2b/0x100 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ? lock_acquire+0xc8/0x2a0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4b/0x70 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ? nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler+0x2b/0x100 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler+0x2b/0x100 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_client_event+0xf/0x20 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_event_ntfy+0x9b/0xf0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ga100_fifo_nonstall_intr+0x24/0x30 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_intr+0x12c/0x240 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x88/0x240 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: handle_irq_event+0x38/0x80 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: handle_edge_irq+0xa3/0x240 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __common_interrupt+0x72/0x160 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: common_interrupt+0x60/0xe0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: RIP: 0033:0x7fb66174d700 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: Code: c1 e2 05 29 ca 8d 0c 10 0f be 07 84 c0 75 eb 89 c8 c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa e9 d7 0f fc ff 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 <f3> 0f 1e fa e9 c7 0f fc> Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: RSP: 002b:00007ffdd3c48438 EFLAGS: 00000206 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: RAX: 000055bb758763c0 RBX: 000055bb758752c0 RCX: 00000000000028b0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: RDX: 000055bb758752c0 RSI: 000055bb75887490 RDI: 000055bb75862950 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: RBP: 00007ffdd3c48490 R08: 000055bb75873b10 R09: 0000000000000001 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 000055bb7587f000 R12: 000055bb75887490 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: R13: 000055bb757f6280 R14: 000055bb758875c0 R15: 000055bb757f6280 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: </TASK> Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> Tested-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231107053255.2257079-1-airlied@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
ptr1337
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[ Upstream commit e3e82fc ] When creating ceq_0 during probing irdma, cqp.sc_cqp will be sent as a cqp_request to cqp->sc_cqp.sq_ring. If the request is pending when removing the irdma driver or unplugging its aux device, cqp.sc_cqp will be dereferenced as wrong struct in irdma_free_pending_cqp_request(). PID: 3669 TASK: ffff88aef892c000 CPU: 28 COMMAND: "kworker/28:0" #0 [fffffe0000549e38] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff810e3a34 #1 [fffffe0000549e40] nmi_handle at ffffffff810788b2 #2 [fffffe0000549ea0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8107938f #3 [fffffe0000549eb8] do_nmi at ffffffff81079582 #4 [fffffe0000549ef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff82e016b4 [exception RIP: native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+1291] RIP: ffffffff8127e72b RSP: ffff88aa841ef778 RFLAGS: 00000046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88b01f849700 RCX: ffffffff8127e47e RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff83857ec0 RBP: ffff88afe3e4efc8 R8: ffffed15fc7c9dfa R9: ffffed15fc7c9dfa R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed15fc7c9df9 R12: 0000000000740000 R13: ffff88b01f849708 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: ffffed1603f092e1 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0000 -- <NMI exception stack> -- #5 [ffff88aa841ef778] native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8127e72b #6 [ffff88aa841ef7b0] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff82c22aa4 torvalds#7 [ffff88aa841ef7c8] __wake_up_common_lock at ffffffff81257363 torvalds#8 [ffff88aa841ef888] irdma_free_pending_cqp_request at ffffffffa0ba12cc [irdma] torvalds#9 [ffff88aa841ef958] irdma_cleanup_pending_cqp_op at ffffffffa0ba1469 [irdma] torvalds#10 [ffff88aa841ef9c0] irdma_ctrl_deinit_hw at ffffffffa0b2989f [irdma] torvalds#11 [ffff88aa841efa28] irdma_remove at ffffffffa0b252df [irdma] torvalds#12 [ffff88aa841efae8] auxiliary_bus_remove at ffffffff8219afdb torvalds#13 [ffff88aa841efb00] device_release_driver_internal at ffffffff821882e6 torvalds#14 [ffff88aa841efb38] bus_remove_device at ffffffff82184278 torvalds#15 [ffff88aa841efb88] device_del at ffffffff82179d23 torvalds#16 [ffff88aa841efc48] ice_unplug_aux_dev at ffffffffa0eb1c14 [ice] torvalds#17 [ffff88aa841efc68] ice_service_task at ffffffffa0d88201 [ice] torvalds#18 [ffff88aa841efde8] process_one_work at ffffffff811c589a torvalds#19 [ffff88aa841efe60] worker_thread at ffffffff811c71ff torvalds#20 [ffff88aa841eff10] kthread at ffffffff811d87a0 torvalds#21 [ffff88aa841eff50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff82e0022f Fixes: 44d9e52 ("RDMA/irdma: Implement device initialization definitions") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231130081415.891006-1-lishifeng@sangfor.com.cn Suggested-by: "Ismail, Mustafa" <mustafa.ismail@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Shifeng Li <lishifeng@sangfor.com.cn> Reviewed-by: Shiraz Saleem <shiraz.saleem@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
ptr1337
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commit fe2b122 upstream. When working on LED support for r8169 I got the following lockdep warning. Easiest way to prevent this scenario seems to be to take the RTNL lock before the trigger_data lock in set_device_name(). ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.7.0-rc2-next-20231124+ #2 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ bash/383 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888103aa1c68 (&trigger_data->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: netdev_trig_notify+0xec/0x190 [ledtrig_netdev] but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8cddf808 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rtnl_lock+0x12/0x20 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x9b/0xb50 mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 rtnl_lock+0x12/0x20 set_device_name+0xa9/0x120 [ledtrig_netdev] netdev_trig_activate+0x1a1/0x230 [ledtrig_netdev] led_trigger_set+0x172/0x2c0 led_trigger_write+0xf1/0x140 sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x5d/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x15d/0x210 vfs_write+0x1f0/0x510 ksys_write+0x6c/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x14/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x3f/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74 -> #0 (&trigger_data->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x1459/0x25a0 lock_acquire+0xc8/0x2d0 __mutex_lock+0x9b/0xb50 mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 netdev_trig_notify+0xec/0x190 [ledtrig_netdev] call_netdevice_register_net_notifiers+0x5a/0x100 register_netdevice_notifier+0x85/0x120 netdev_trig_activate+0x1d4/0x230 [ledtrig_netdev] led_trigger_set+0x172/0x2c0 led_trigger_write+0xf1/0x140 sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x5d/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x15d/0x210 vfs_write+0x1f0/0x510 ksys_write+0x6c/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x14/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x3f/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(rtnl_mutex); lock(&trigger_data->lock); lock(rtnl_mutex); lock(&trigger_data->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 8 locks held by bash/383: #0: ffff888103ff33f0 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x6c/0xf0 #1: ffff888103aa1e88 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x114/0x210 #2: ffff8881036f1890 (kn->active#82){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x11d/0x210 #3: ffff888108e2c358 (&led_cdev->led_access){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: led_trigger_write+0x30/0x140 #4: ffffffff8cdd9e10 (triggers_list_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: led_trigger_write+0x75/0x140 #5: ffff888108e2c270 (&led_cdev->trigger_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: led_trigger_write+0xe3/0x140 #6: ffffffff8cdde3d0 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: register_netdevice_notifier+0x1c/0x120 torvalds#7: ffffffff8cddf808 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rtnl_lock+0x12/0x20 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 383 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.7.0-rc2-next-20231124+ #2 Hardware name: Default string Default string/Default string, BIOS ADLN.M6.SODIMM.ZB.CY.015 08/08/2023 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x5c/0xd0 dump_stack+0x10/0x20 print_circular_bug+0x2dd/0x410 check_noncircular+0x131/0x150 __lock_acquire+0x1459/0x25a0 lock_acquire+0xc8/0x2d0 ? netdev_trig_notify+0xec/0x190 [ledtrig_netdev] __mutex_lock+0x9b/0xb50 ? netdev_trig_notify+0xec/0x190 [ledtrig_netdev] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20 ? netdev_trig_notify+0xec/0x190 [ledtrig_netdev] ? __cancel_work_timer+0x11c/0x1b0 ? __mutex_lock+0x123/0xb50 mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 ? mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 netdev_trig_notify+0xec/0x190 [ledtrig_netdev] call_netdevice_register_net_notifiers+0x5a/0x100 register_netdevice_notifier+0x85/0x120 netdev_trig_activate+0x1d4/0x230 [ledtrig_netdev] led_trigger_set+0x172/0x2c0 ? preempt_count_add+0x49/0xc0 led_trigger_write+0xf1/0x140 sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x5d/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x15d/0x210 vfs_write+0x1f0/0x510 ksys_write+0x6c/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x14/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x3f/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74 RIP: 0033:0x7f269055d034 Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d 35 c3 0d 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffddb7ef748 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000007 RCX: 00007f269055d034 RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: 000055bf5f4af3c0 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 000055bf5f4af3c0 R08: 0000000000000073 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000007 R13: 00007f26906325c0 R14: 00007f269062ff20 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> Fixes: d5e0126 ("leds: trigger: netdev: add additional specific link speed mode") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch> Acked-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/fb5c8294-2a10-4bf5-8f10-3d2b77d2757e@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Problem description
===================
Lockdep reports a possible circular locking dependency (AB/BA) between
&pl->state_mutex and &phy->lock, as follows.
phylink_resolve() // acquires &pl->state_mutex
-> phylink_major_config()
-> phy_config_inband() // acquires &pl->phydev->lock
whereas all the other call sites where &pl->state_mutex and
&pl->phydev->lock have the locking scheme reversed. Everywhere else,
&pl->phydev->lock is acquired at the top level, and &pl->state_mutex at
the lower level. A clear example is phylink_bringup_phy().
The outlier is the newly introduced phy_config_inband() and the existing
lock order is the correct one. To understand why it cannot be the other
way around, it is sufficient to consider phylink_phy_change(), phylink's
callback from the PHY device's phy->phy_link_change() virtual method,
invoked by the PHY state machine.
phy_link_up() and phy_link_down(), the (indirect) callers of
phylink_phy_change(), are called with &phydev->lock acquired.
Then phylink_phy_change() acquires its own &pl->state_mutex, to
serialize changes made to its pl->phy_state and pl->link_config.
So all other instances of &pl->state_mutex and &phydev->lock must be
consistent with this order.
Problem impact
==============
I think the kernel runs a serious deadlock risk if an existing
phylink_resolve() thread, which results in a phy_config_inband() call,
is concurrent with a phy_link_up() or phy_link_down() call, which will
deadlock on &pl->state_mutex in phylink_phy_change(). Practically
speaking, the impact may be limited by the slow speed of the medium
auto-negotiation protocol, which makes it unlikely for the current state
to still be unresolved when a new one is detected, but I think the
problem is there. Nonetheless, the problem was discovered using lockdep.
Proposed solution
=================
Practically speaking, the phy_config_inband() requirement of having
phydev->lock acquired must transfer to the caller (phylink is the only
caller). There, it must bubble up until immediately before
&pl->state_mutex is acquired, for the cases where that takes place.
Solution details, considerations, notes
=======================================
This is the phy_config_inband() call graph:
sfp_upstream_ops :: connect_phy()
|
v
phylink_sfp_connect_phy()
|
v
phylink_sfp_config_phy()
|
| sfp_upstream_ops :: module_insert()
| |
| v
| phylink_sfp_module_insert()
| |
| | sfp_upstream_ops :: module_start()
| | |
| | v
| | phylink_sfp_module_start()
| | |
| v v
| phylink_sfp_config_optical()
phylink_start() | |
| phylink_resume() v v
| | phylink_sfp_set_config()
| | |
v v v
phylink_mac_initial_config()
| phylink_resolve()
| | phylink_ethtool_ksettings_set()
v v v
phylink_major_config()
|
v
phy_config_inband()
phylink_major_config() caller CachyOS#1, phylink_mac_initial_config(), does not
acquire &pl->state_mutex nor do its callers. It must acquire
&pl->phydev->lock prior to calling phylink_major_config().
phylink_major_config() caller CachyOS#2, phylink_resolve() acquires
&pl->state_mutex, thus also needs to acquire &pl->phydev->lock.
phylink_major_config() caller CachyOS#3, phylink_ethtool_ksettings_set(), is
completely uninteresting, because it only calls phylink_major_config()
if pl->phydev is NULL (otherwise it calls phy_ethtool_ksettings_set()).
We need to change nothing there.
Other solutions
===============
The lock inversion between &pl->state_mutex and &pl->phydev->lock has
occurred at least once before, as seen in commit c718af2 ("net:
phylink: fix ethtool -A with attached PHYs"). The solution there was to
simply not call phy_set_asym_pause() under the &pl->state_mutex. That
cannot be extended to our case though, where the phy_config_inband()
call is much deeper inside the &pl->state_mutex section.
Fixes: 5fd0f1a ("net: phylink: add negotiation of in-band capabilities")
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250904125238.193990-2-vladimir.oltean@nxp.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Sep 19, 2025
[ Upstream commit e2a10da ] Problem description =================== Lockdep reports a possible circular locking dependency (AB/BA) between &pl->state_mutex and &phy->lock, as follows. phylink_resolve() // acquires &pl->state_mutex -> phylink_major_config() -> phy_config_inband() // acquires &pl->phydev->lock whereas all the other call sites where &pl->state_mutex and &pl->phydev->lock have the locking scheme reversed. Everywhere else, &pl->phydev->lock is acquired at the top level, and &pl->state_mutex at the lower level. A clear example is phylink_bringup_phy(). The outlier is the newly introduced phy_config_inband() and the existing lock order is the correct one. To understand why it cannot be the other way around, it is sufficient to consider phylink_phy_change(), phylink's callback from the PHY device's phy->phy_link_change() virtual method, invoked by the PHY state machine. phy_link_up() and phy_link_down(), the (indirect) callers of phylink_phy_change(), are called with &phydev->lock acquired. Then phylink_phy_change() acquires its own &pl->state_mutex, to serialize changes made to its pl->phy_state and pl->link_config. So all other instances of &pl->state_mutex and &phydev->lock must be consistent with this order. Problem impact ============== I think the kernel runs a serious deadlock risk if an existing phylink_resolve() thread, which results in a phy_config_inband() call, is concurrent with a phy_link_up() or phy_link_down() call, which will deadlock on &pl->state_mutex in phylink_phy_change(). Practically speaking, the impact may be limited by the slow speed of the medium auto-negotiation protocol, which makes it unlikely for the current state to still be unresolved when a new one is detected, but I think the problem is there. Nonetheless, the problem was discovered using lockdep. Proposed solution ================= Practically speaking, the phy_config_inband() requirement of having phydev->lock acquired must transfer to the caller (phylink is the only caller). There, it must bubble up until immediately before &pl->state_mutex is acquired, for the cases where that takes place. Solution details, considerations, notes ======================================= This is the phy_config_inband() call graph: sfp_upstream_ops :: connect_phy() | v phylink_sfp_connect_phy() | v phylink_sfp_config_phy() | | sfp_upstream_ops :: module_insert() | | | v | phylink_sfp_module_insert() | | | | sfp_upstream_ops :: module_start() | | | | | v | | phylink_sfp_module_start() | | | | v v | phylink_sfp_config_optical() phylink_start() | | | phylink_resume() v v | | phylink_sfp_set_config() | | | v v v phylink_mac_initial_config() | phylink_resolve() | | phylink_ethtool_ksettings_set() v v v phylink_major_config() | v phy_config_inband() phylink_major_config() caller #1, phylink_mac_initial_config(), does not acquire &pl->state_mutex nor do its callers. It must acquire &pl->phydev->lock prior to calling phylink_major_config(). phylink_major_config() caller #2, phylink_resolve() acquires &pl->state_mutex, thus also needs to acquire &pl->phydev->lock. phylink_major_config() caller #3, phylink_ethtool_ksettings_set(), is completely uninteresting, because it only calls phylink_major_config() if pl->phydev is NULL (otherwise it calls phy_ethtool_ksettings_set()). We need to change nothing there. Other solutions =============== The lock inversion between &pl->state_mutex and &pl->phydev->lock has occurred at least once before, as seen in commit c718af2 ("net: phylink: fix ethtool -A with attached PHYs"). The solution there was to simply not call phy_set_asym_pause() under the &pl->state_mutex. That cannot be extended to our case though, where the phy_config_inband() call is much deeper inside the &pl->state_mutex section. Fixes: 5fd0f1a ("net: phylink: add negotiation of in-band capabilities") Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250904125238.193990-2-vladimir.oltean@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
pongo1231
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Sep 20, 2025
…ux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 changes for 6.17, round CachyOS#3 - Invalidate nested MMUs upon freeing the PGD to avoid WARNs when visiting from an MMU notifier - Fixes to the TLB match process and TLB invalidation range for managing the VCNR pseudo-TLB - Prevent SPE from erroneously profiling guests due to UNKNOWN reset values in PMSCR_EL1 - Fix save/restore of host MDCR_EL2 to account for eagerly programming at vcpu_load() on VHE systems - Correct lock ordering when dealing with VGIC LPIs, avoiding scenarios where an xarray's spinlock was nested with a *raw* spinlock - Permit stage-2 read permission aborts which are possible in the case of NV depending on the guest hypervisor's stage-2 translation - Call raw_spin_unlock() instead of the internal spinlock API - Fix parameter ordering when assigning VBAR_EL1
ptr1337
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Sep 29, 2025
This fixes the following UAF caused by not properly locking hdev when processing HCI_EV_NUM_COMP_PKTS: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hci_conn_tx_dequeue+0x1be/0x220 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:3036 Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880740f0940 by task kworker/u11:0/54 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 54 Comm: kworker/u11:0 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc7 #3 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: hci1 hci_rx_work Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xca/0x230 mm/kasan/report.c:480 kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:593 hci_conn_tx_dequeue+0x1be/0x220 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:3036 hci_num_comp_pkts_evt+0x1c8/0xa50 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:4404 hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7477 [inline] hci_event_packet+0x7e0/0x1200 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7531 hci_rx_work+0x46a/0xe80 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4070 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3238 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xae1/0x17b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3321 worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3402 kthread+0x70e/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:464 ret_from_fork+0x3fc/0x770 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 home/kwqcheii/source/fuzzing/kernel/kasan/linux-6.16-rc7/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK> Allocated by task 54: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x230/0x3d0 mm/slub.c:4359 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:905 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1039 [inline] __hci_conn_add+0x233/0x1b30 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:939 le_conn_complete_evt+0x3d6/0x1220 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:5628 hci_le_enh_conn_complete_evt+0x189/0x470 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:5794 hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7474 [inline] hci_event_packet+0x78c/0x1200 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7531 hci_rx_work+0x46a/0xe80 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4070 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3238 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xae1/0x17b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3321 worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3402 kthread+0x70e/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:464 ret_from_fork+0x3fc/0x770 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 home/kwqcheii/source/fuzzing/kernel/kasan/linux-6.16-rc7/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 Freed by task 9572: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 kasan_save_free_info+0x46/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:576 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x62/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:264 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2381 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4643 [inline] kfree+0x18e/0x440 mm/slub.c:4842 device_release+0x9c/0x1c0 kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:689 [inline] kobject_release lib/kobject.c:720 [inline] kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] kobject_put+0x22b/0x480 lib/kobject.c:737 hci_conn_cleanup net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:175 [inline] hci_conn_del+0x8ff/0xcb0 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1173 hci_abort_conn_sync+0x5d1/0xdf0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5689 hci_cmd_sync_work+0x210/0x3a0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:332 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3238 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xae1/0x17b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3321 worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3402 kthread+0x70e/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:464 ret_from_fork+0x3fc/0x770 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 home/kwqcheii/source/fuzzing/kernel/kasan/linux-6.16-rc7/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 Fixes: 134f4b3 ("Bluetooth: add support for skb TX SND/COMPLETION timestamping") Reported-by: Junvyyang, Tencent Zhuque Lab <zhuque@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
ptr1337
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This fixes the following UFA in hci_acl_create_conn_sync where a connection still pending is command submission (conn->state == BT_OPEN) maybe freed, also since this also can happen with the likes of hci_le_create_conn_sync fix it as well: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hci_acl_create_conn_sync+0x5ef/0x790 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:6861 Write of size 2 at addr ffff88805ffcc038 by task kworker/u11:2/9541 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 9541 Comm: kworker/u11:2 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc7 #3 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: hci3 hci_cmd_sync_work Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xca/0x230 mm/kasan/report.c:480 kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:593 hci_acl_create_conn_sync+0x5ef/0x790 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:6861 hci_cmd_sync_work+0x210/0x3a0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:332 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3238 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xae1/0x17b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3321 worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3402 kthread+0x70e/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:464 ret_from_fork+0x3fc/0x770 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 home/kwqcheii/source/fuzzing/kernel/kasan/linux-6.16-rc7/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK> Allocated by task 123736: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x230/0x3d0 mm/slub.c:4359 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:905 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1039 [inline] __hci_conn_add+0x233/0x1b30 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:939 hci_conn_add_unset net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1051 [inline] hci_connect_acl+0x16c/0x4e0 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1634 pair_device+0x418/0xa70 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:3556 hci_mgmt_cmd+0x9c9/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1719 hci_sock_sendmsg+0x6ca/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1839 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:712 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x219/0x270 net/socket.c:727 sock_write_iter+0x258/0x330 net/socket.c:1131 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline] vfs_write+0x54b/0xa90 fs/read_write.c:686 ksys_write+0x145/0x250 fs/read_write.c:738 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Freed by task 103680: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 kasan_save_free_info+0x46/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:576 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x62/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:264 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2381 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4643 [inline] kfree+0x18e/0x440 mm/slub.c:4842 device_release+0x9c/0x1c0 kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:689 [inline] kobject_release lib/kobject.c:720 [inline] kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] kobject_put+0x22b/0x480 lib/kobject.c:737 hci_conn_cleanup net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:175 [inline] hci_conn_del+0x8ff/0xcb0 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1173 hci_conn_complete_evt+0x3c7/0x1040 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:3199 hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7477 [inline] hci_event_packet+0x7e0/0x1200 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7531 hci_rx_work+0x46a/0xe80 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4070 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3238 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xae1/0x17b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3321 worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3402 kthread+0x70e/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:464 ret_from_fork+0x3fc/0x770 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 home/kwqcheii/source/fuzzing/kernel/kasan/linux-6.16-rc7/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 Last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x3e/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:47 kasan_record_aux_stack+0xbd/0xd0 mm/kasan/generic.c:548 insert_work+0x3d/0x330 kernel/workqueue.c:2183 __queue_work+0xbd9/0xfe0 kernel/workqueue.c:2345 queue_delayed_work_on+0x18b/0x280 kernel/workqueue.c:2561 pairing_complete+0x1e7/0x2b0 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:3451 pairing_complete_cb+0x1ac/0x230 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:3487 hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2064 [inline] hci_conn_failed+0x24d/0x310 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1275 hci_conn_complete_evt+0x3c7/0x1040 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:3199 hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7477 [inline] hci_event_packet+0x7e0/0x1200 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7531 hci_rx_work+0x46a/0xe80 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4070 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3238 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xae1/0x17b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3321 worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3402 kthread+0x70e/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:464 ret_from_fork+0x3fc/0x770 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 home/kwqcheii/source/fuzzing/kernel/kasan/linux-6.16-rc7/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 Fixes: aef2aa4 ("Bluetooth: hci_event: Fix creating hci_conn object on error status") Reported-by: Junvyyang, Tencent Zhuque Lab <zhuque@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
ptr1337
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Ido Schimmel says: ==================== nexthop: Various fixes Patch #1 fixes a NPD that was recently reported by syzbot. Patch #2 fixes an issue in the existing FIB nexthop selftest. Patch #3 extends the selftest with test cases for the bug that was fixed in the first patch. ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250921150824.149157-1-idosch@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
pongo1231
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Oct 6, 2025
The ns_bpf_qdisc selftest triggers a kernel panic: Oops[CachyOS#1]: CPU 0 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000000000741d58, era == 90000000851b5ac0, ra == 90000000851b5aa4 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 449 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G OE 6.16.0+ CachyOS#3 PREEMPT(full) Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 2/2/2022 pc 90000000851b5ac0 ra 90000000851b5aa4 tp 90000001076b8000 sp 90000001076bb600 a0 0000000000741ce8 a1 0000000000000001 a2 90000001076bb5c0 a3 0000000000000008 a4 90000001004c4620 a5 9000000100741ce8 a6 0000000000000000 a7 0100000000000000 t0 0000000000000010 t1 0000000000000000 t2 9000000104d24d30 t3 0000000000000001 t4 4f2317da8a7e08c4 t5 fffffefffc002f00 t6 90000001004c4620 t7 ffffffffc61c5b3d t8 0000000000000000 u0 0000000000000001 s9 0000000000000050 s0 90000001075bc800 s1 0000000000000040 s2 900000010597c400 s3 0000000000000008 s4 90000001075bc880 s5 90000001075bc8f0 s6 0000000000000000 s7 0000000000741ce8 s8 0000000000000000 ra: 90000000851b5aa4 __qdisc_run+0xac/0x8d8 ERA: 90000000851b5ac0 __qdisc_run+0xc8/0x8d8 CRMD: 000000b0 (PLV0 -IE -DA +PG DACF=CC DACM=CC -WE) PRMD: 00000004 (PPLV0 +PIE -PWE) EUEN: 00000007 (+FPE +SXE +ASXE -BTE) ECFG: 00071c1d (LIE=0,2-4,10-12 VS=7) ESTAT: 00010000 [PIL] (IS= ECode=1 EsubCode=0) BADV: 0000000000741d58 PRID: 0014c010 (Loongson-64bit, Loongson-3A5000) Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(OE) [last unloaded: bpf_testmod(OE)] Process test_progs (pid: 449, threadinfo=000000009af02b3a, task=00000000e9ba4956) Stack : 0000000000000000 90000001075bc8ac 90000000869524a8 9000000100741ce8 90000001075bc800 9000000100415300 90000001075bc8ac 0000000000000000 900000010597c400 900000008694a000 0000000000000000 9000000105b59000 90000001075bc800 9000000100741ce8 0000000000000050 900000008513000c 9000000086936000 0000000100094d4c fffffff400676208 0000000000000000 9000000105b59000 900000008694a000 9000000086bf0dc0 9000000105b59000 9000000086bf0d68 9000000085147010 90000001075be788 0000000000000000 9000000086bf0f98 0000000000000001 0000000000000010 9000000006015840 0000000000000000 9000000086be6c40 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 4f2317da8a7e08c4 0000000000000101 4f2317da8a7e08c4 ... Call Trace: [<90000000851b5ac0>] __qdisc_run+0xc8/0x8d8 [<9000000085130008>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x578/0x10f0 [<90000000853701c0>] ip6_finish_output2+0x2f0/0x950 [<9000000085374bc8>] ip6_finish_output+0x2b8/0x448 [<9000000085370b24>] ip6_xmit+0x304/0x858 [<90000000853c4438>] inet6_csk_xmit+0x100/0x170 [<90000000852b32f0>] __tcp_transmit_skb+0x490/0xdd0 [<90000000852b47fc>] tcp_connect+0xbcc/0x1168 [<90000000853b9088>] tcp_v6_connect+0x580/0x8a0 [<90000000852e7738>] __inet_stream_connect+0x170/0x480 [<90000000852e7a98>] inet_stream_connect+0x50/0x88 [<90000000850f2814>] __sys_connect+0xe4/0x110 [<90000000850f2858>] sys_connect+0x18/0x28 [<9000000085520c94>] do_syscall+0x94/0x1a0 [<9000000083df1fb8>] handle_syscall+0xb8/0x158 Code: 4001ad80 2400873 2400832d <240073cc> 001137ff 001133ff 6407b41f 001503cc 0280041d ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- The bpf_fifo_dequeue prog returns a skb which is a pointer. The pointer is treated as a 32bit value and sign extend to 64bit in epilogue. This behavior is right for most bpf prog types but wrong for struct ops which requires LoongArch ABI. So let's sign extend struct ops return values according to the LoongArch ABI ([1]) and return value spec in function model. [1]: https://loongson.github.io/LoongArch-Documentation/LoongArch-ELF-ABI-EN.html Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 6abf17d ("LoongArch: BPF: Add struct ops support for trampoline") Signed-off-by: Hengqi Chen <hengqi.chen@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
pongo1231
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Oct 6, 2025
Don't emulate branch instructions, e.g. CALL/RET/JMP etc., that are affected by Shadow Stacks and/or Indirect Branch Tracking when said features are enabled in the guest, as fully emulating CET would require significant complexity for no practical benefit (KVM shouldn't need to emulate branch instructions on modern hosts). Simply doing nothing isn't an option as that would allow a malicious entity to subvert CET protections via the emulator. To detect instructions that are subject to IBT or affect IBT state, use the existing IsBranch flag along with the source operand type to detect indirect branches, and the existing NearBranch flag to detect far JMPs and CALLs, all of which are effectively indirect. Explicitly check for emulation of IRET, FAR RET (IMM), and SYSEXIT (the ret-like far branches) instead of adding another flag, e.g. IsRet, as it's unlikely the emulator will ever need to check for return-like instructions outside of this one specific flow. Use an allow-list instead of a deny-list because (a) it's a shorter list and (b) so that a missed entry gets a false positive, not a false negative (i.e. reject emulation instead of clobbering CET state). For Shadow Stacks, explicitly track instructions that directly affect the current SSP, as KVM's emulator doesn't have existing flags that can be used to precisely detect such instructions. Alternatively, the em_xxx() helpers could directly check for ShadowStack interactions, but using a dedicated flag is arguably easier to audit, and allows for handling both IBT and SHSTK in one fell swoop. Note! On far transfers, do NOT consult the current privilege level and instead treat SHSTK/IBT as being enabled if they're enabled for User *or* Supervisor mode. On inter-privilege level far transfers, SHSTK and IBT can be in play for the target privilege level, i.e. checking the current privilege could get a false negative, and KVM doesn't know the target privilege level until emulation gets under way. Note CachyOS#2, FAR JMP from 64-bit mode to compatibility mode interacts with the current SSP, but only to ensure SSP[63:32] == 0. Don't tag FAR JMP as SHSTK, which would be rather confusing and would result in FAR JMP being rejected unnecessarily the vast majority of the time (ignoring that it's unlikely to ever be emulated). A future commit will add the #GP(0) check for the specific FAR JMP scenario. Note CachyOS#3, task switches also modify SSP and so need to be rejected. That too will be addressed in a future commit. Suggested-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com> Originally-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com> Cc: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net> Cc: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250919223258.1604852-19-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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Oct 11, 2025
The test starts a workload and then opens events. If the events fail
to open, for example because of perf_event_paranoid, the gopipe of the
workload is leaked and the file descriptor leak check fails when the
test exits. To avoid this cancel the workload when opening the events
fails.
Before:
```
$ perf test -vv 7
7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields:
--- start ---
test child forked, pid 1189568
Using CPUID GenuineIntel-6-B7-1
------------------------------------------------------------
perf_event_attr:
type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE)
config 0xa00000000 (cpu_atom/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/)
disabled 1
------------------------------------------------------------
sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8
sys_perf_event_open failed, error -13
------------------------------------------------------------
perf_event_attr:
type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE)
config 0xa00000000 (cpu_atom/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/)
disabled 1
exclude_kernel 1
------------------------------------------------------------
sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 = 3
------------------------------------------------------------
perf_event_attr:
type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE)
config 0x400000000 (cpu_core/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/)
disabled 1
------------------------------------------------------------
sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8
sys_perf_event_open failed, error -13
------------------------------------------------------------
perf_event_attr:
type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE)
config 0x400000000 (cpu_core/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/)
disabled 1
exclude_kernel 1
------------------------------------------------------------
sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 = 3
Attempt to add: software/cpu-clock/
..after resolving event: software/config=0/
cpu-clock -> software/cpu-clock/
------------------------------------------------------------
perf_event_attr:
type 1 (PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE)
size 136
config 0x9 (PERF_COUNT_SW_DUMMY)
sample_type IP|TID|TIME|CPU
read_format ID|LOST
disabled 1
inherit 1
mmap 1
comm 1
enable_on_exec 1
task 1
sample_id_all 1
mmap2 1
comm_exec 1
ksymbol 1
bpf_event 1
{ wakeup_events, wakeup_watermark } 1
------------------------------------------------------------
sys_perf_event_open: pid 1189569 cpu 0 group_fd -1 flags 0x8
sys_perf_event_open failed, error -13
perf_evlist__open: Permission denied
---- end(-2) ----
Leak of file descriptor 6 that opened: 'pipe:[14200347]'
---- unexpected signal (6) ----
iFailed to read build ID for //anon
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#0 0x565358f6666e in child_test_sig_handler builtin-test.c:311
CachyOS#1 0x7f29ce849df0 in __restore_rt libc_sigaction.c:0
CachyOS#2 0x7f29ce89e95c in __pthread_kill_implementation pthread_kill.c:44
CachyOS#3 0x7f29ce849cc2 in raise raise.c:27
CachyOS#4 0x7f29ce8324ac in abort abort.c:81
CachyOS#5 0x565358f662d4 in check_leaks builtin-test.c:226
CachyOS#6 0x565358f6682e in run_test_child builtin-test.c:344
torvalds#7 0x565358ef7121 in start_command run-command.c:128
torvalds#8 0x565358f67273 in start_test builtin-test.c:545
torvalds#9 0x565358f6771d in __cmd_test builtin-test.c:647
torvalds#10 0x565358f682bd in cmd_test builtin-test.c:849
torvalds#11 0x565358ee5ded in run_builtin perf.c:349
torvalds#12 0x565358ee6085 in handle_internal_command perf.c:401
torvalds#13 0x565358ee61de in run_argv perf.c:448
torvalds#14 0x565358ee6527 in main perf.c:555
torvalds#15 0x7f29ce833ca8 in __libc_start_call_main libc_start_call_main.h:74
torvalds#16 0x7f29ce833d65 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 libc-start.c:128
torvalds#17 0x565358e391c1 in _start perf[851c1]
7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields : FAILED!
```
After:
```
$ perf test 7
7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields : Skip (permissions)
```
Fixes: 16d00fe ("perf tests: Move test__PERF_RECORD into separate object")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Chun-Tse Shao <ctshao@google.com>
Cc: Howard Chu <howardchu95@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@linaro.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
ptr1337
pushed a commit
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Oct 15, 2025
[ Upstream commit 0b2cd50 ] generic/091 may fail, then it bisects to the bad commit ba8dac3 ("f2fs: fix to zero post-eof page"). What will cause generic/091 to fail is something like below Testcase #1: 1. write 16k as compressed blocks 2. truncate to 12k 3. truncate to 20k 4. verify data in range of [12k, 16k], however data is not zero as expected Script of Testcase #1 mkfs.f2fs -f -O extra_attr,compression /dev/vdb mount -t f2fs -o compress_extension=* /dev/vdb /mnt/f2fs dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/f2fs/file bs=12k count=1 dd if=/dev/random of=/mnt/f2fs/file bs=4k count=1 seek=3 conv=notrunc sync truncate -s $((12*1024)) /mnt/f2fs/file truncate -s $((20*1024)) /mnt/f2fs/file dd if=/mnt/f2fs/file of=/mnt/f2fs/data bs=4k count=1 skip=3 od /mnt/f2fs/data umount /mnt/f2fs Analisys: in step 2), we will redirty all data pages from #0 to #3 in compressed cluster, and zero page #3, in step 3), f2fs_setattr() will call f2fs_zero_post_eof_page() to drop all page cache post eof, includeing dirtied page #3, in step 4) when we read data from page #3, it will decompressed cluster and extra random data to page #3, finally, we hit the non-zeroed data post eof. However, the commit ba8dac3 ("f2fs: fix to zero post-eof page") just let the issue be reproduced easily, w/o the commit, it can reproduce this bug w/ below Testcase #2: 1. write 16k as compressed blocks 2. truncate to 8k 3. truncate to 12k 4. truncate to 20k 5. verify data in range of [12k, 16k], however data is not zero as expected Script of Testcase #2 mkfs.f2fs -f -O extra_attr,compression /dev/vdb mount -t f2fs -o compress_extension=* /dev/vdb /mnt/f2fs dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/f2fs/file bs=12k count=1 dd if=/dev/random of=/mnt/f2fs/file bs=4k count=1 seek=3 conv=notrunc sync truncate -s $((8*1024)) /mnt/f2fs/file truncate -s $((12*1024)) /mnt/f2fs/file truncate -s $((20*1024)) /mnt/f2fs/file echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches dd if=/mnt/f2fs/file of=/mnt/f2fs/data bs=4k count=1 skip=3 od /mnt/f2fs/data umount /mnt/f2fs Anlysis: in step 2), we will redirty all data pages from #0 to #3 in compressed cluster, and zero page #2 and #3, in step 3), we will truncate page #3 in page cache, in step 4), expand file size, in step 5), hit random data post eof w/ the same reason in Testcase #1. Root Cause: In f2fs_truncate_partial_cluster(), after we truncate partial data block on compressed cluster, all pages in cluster including the one post eof will be dirtied, after another tuncation, dirty page post eof will be dropped, however on-disk compressed cluster is still valid, it may include non-zero data post eof, result in exposing previous non-zero data post eof while reading. Fix: In f2fs_truncate_partial_cluster(), let change as below to fix: - call filemap_write_and_wait_range() to flush dirty page - call truncate_pagecache() to drop pages or zero partial page post eof - call f2fs_do_truncate_blocks() to truncate non-compress cluster to last valid block Fixes: 3265d3d ("f2fs: support partial truncation on compressed inode") Reported-by: Jan Prusakowski <jprusakowski@google.com> Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
ptr1337
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Oct 15, 2025
[ Upstream commit f028bca ] The drm_gem_for_each_gpuvm_bo() call from lookup_vma() accesses drm_gem_obj.gpuva.list, which is not initialized when the drm driver does not support DRIVER_GEM_GPUVA feature. Enable it for msm_kms drm driver to fix the splat seen when msm.separate_gpu_drm=1 modparam is set: [ 9.506020] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fffffffffffffff0 [ 9.523160] Mem abort info: [ 9.523161] ESR = 0x0000000096000006 [ 9.523163] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 9.523165] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 9.523166] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 9.523167] FSC = 0x06: level 2 translation fault [ 9.523169] Data abort info: [ 9.523170] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000006, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 9.523171] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 9.523172] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 9.523174] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000ad370f000 [ 9.523176] [fffffffffffffff0] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000ad4787403, pud=0000000ad4788403, pmd=0000000000000000 [ 9.523184] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000006 [#1] SMP [ 9.592968] CPU: 9 UID: 0 PID: 448 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.17.0-rc4-assorted-fix-00005-g0e9bb53a2282-dirty #3 PREEMPT [ 9.592970] Hardware name: Qualcomm CRD, BIOS 6.0.240718.BOOT.MXF.2.4-00515-HAMOA-1 07/18/2024 [ 9.592971] pstate: a140000 (NzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 9.592973] pc : lookup_vma+0x28/0xe0 [msm] [ 9.592996] lr : get_vma_locked+0x2c/0x128 [msm] [ 9.763632] sp : ffff800082dab460 [ 9.763666] Call trace: [ 9.763668] lookup_vma+0x28/0xe0 [msm] (P) [ 9.763688] get_vma_locked+0x2c/0x128 [msm] [ 9.763706] msm_gem_get_and_pin_iova_range+0x68/0x11c [msm] [ 9.763723] msm_gem_get_and_pin_iova+0x18/0x24 [msm] [ 9.763740] msm_fbdev_driver_fbdev_probe+0xd0/0x258 [msm] [ 9.763760] __drm_fb_helper_initial_config_and_unlock+0x288/0x528 [drm_kms_helper] [ 9.763771] drm_fb_helper_initial_config+0x44/0x54 [drm_kms_helper] [ 9.763779] drm_fbdev_client_hotplug+0x84/0xd4 [drm_client_lib] [ 9.763782] drm_client_register+0x58/0x9c [drm] [ 9.763806] drm_fbdev_client_setup+0xe8/0xcf0 [drm_client_lib] [ 9.763809] drm_client_setup+0xb4/0xd8 [drm_client_lib] [ 9.763811] msm_drm_kms_post_init+0x2c/0x3c [msm] [ 9.763830] msm_drm_init+0x1a8/0x22c [msm] [ 9.763848] msm_drm_bind+0x30/0x3c [msm] [ 9.919273] try_to_bring_up_aggregate_device+0x168/0x1d4 [ 9.919283] __component_add+0xa4/0x170 [ 9.919286] component_add+0x14/0x20 [ 9.919288] msm_dp_display_probe_tail+0x4c/0xac [msm] [ 9.919315] msm_dp_auxbus_done_probe+0x14/0x20 [msm] [ 9.919335] dp_aux_ep_probe+0x4c/0xf0 [drm_dp_aux_bus] [ 9.919341] really_probe+0xbc/0x298 [ 9.919345] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x12c [ 9.919348] driver_probe_device+0x40/0x160 [ 9.919350] __driver_attach+0x94/0x19c [ 9.919353] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xd4 [ 9.919355] driver_attach+0x24/0x30 [ 9.919358] bus_add_driver+0xe4/0x208 [ 9.919360] driver_register+0x60/0x128 [ 9.919363] __dp_aux_dp_driver_register+0x24/0x30 [drm_dp_aux_bus] [ 9.919365] atana33xc20_init+0x20/0x1000 [panel_samsung_atna33xc20] [ 9.919370] do_one_initcall+0x6c/0x1b0 [ 9.919374] do_init_module+0x58/0x234 [ 9.919377] load_module+0x19cc/0x1bd4 [ 9.919380] init_module_from_file+0x84/0xc4 [ 9.919382] __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x1b8/0x2cc [ 9.919384] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110 [ 9.919389] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xe8 [ 9.919393] do_el0_svc+0x20/0x2c [ 9.919396] el0_svc+0x34/0xf0 [ 9.919401] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe4 [ 9.919403] el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c [ 9.919407] Code: eb0000bf 54000480 d100a003 aa0303e2 (f8418c44) [ 9.919410] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fixes: 217ed15 ("drm/msm: enable separate binding of GPU and display devices") Signed-off-by: Akhil P Oommen <akhilpo@oss.qualcomm.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@oss.qualcomm.com> Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/672257/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250902-assorted-sept-1-v1-1-f3ec9baed513@oss.qualcomm.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@oss.qualcomm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
ptr1337
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that referenced
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Oct 15, 2025
commit 8b51b11 upstream. The ns_bpf_qdisc selftest triggers a kernel panic: Oops[#1]: CPU 0 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000000000741d58, era == 90000000851b5ac0, ra == 90000000851b5aa4 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 449 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G OE 6.16.0+ #3 PREEMPT(full) Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 2/2/2022 pc 90000000851b5ac0 ra 90000000851b5aa4 tp 90000001076b8000 sp 90000001076bb600 a0 0000000000741ce8 a1 0000000000000001 a2 90000001076bb5c0 a3 0000000000000008 a4 90000001004c4620 a5 9000000100741ce8 a6 0000000000000000 a7 0100000000000000 t0 0000000000000010 t1 0000000000000000 t2 9000000104d24d30 t3 0000000000000001 t4 4f2317da8a7e08c4 t5 fffffefffc002f00 t6 90000001004c4620 t7 ffffffffc61c5b3d t8 0000000000000000 u0 0000000000000001 s9 0000000000000050 s0 90000001075bc800 s1 0000000000000040 s2 900000010597c400 s3 0000000000000008 s4 90000001075bc880 s5 90000001075bc8f0 s6 0000000000000000 s7 0000000000741ce8 s8 0000000000000000 ra: 90000000851b5aa4 __qdisc_run+0xac/0x8d8 ERA: 90000000851b5ac0 __qdisc_run+0xc8/0x8d8 CRMD: 000000b0 (PLV0 -IE -DA +PG DACF=CC DACM=CC -WE) PRMD: 00000004 (PPLV0 +PIE -PWE) EUEN: 00000007 (+FPE +SXE +ASXE -BTE) ECFG: 00071c1d (LIE=0,2-4,10-12 VS=7) ESTAT: 00010000 [PIL] (IS= ECode=1 EsubCode=0) BADV: 0000000000741d58 PRID: 0014c010 (Loongson-64bit, Loongson-3A5000) Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(OE) [last unloaded: bpf_testmod(OE)] Process test_progs (pid: 449, threadinfo=000000009af02b3a, task=00000000e9ba4956) Stack : 0000000000000000 90000001075bc8ac 90000000869524a8 9000000100741ce8 90000001075bc800 9000000100415300 90000001075bc8ac 0000000000000000 900000010597c400 900000008694a000 0000000000000000 9000000105b59000 90000001075bc800 9000000100741ce8 0000000000000050 900000008513000c 9000000086936000 0000000100094d4c fffffff400676208 0000000000000000 9000000105b59000 900000008694a000 9000000086bf0dc0 9000000105b59000 9000000086bf0d68 9000000085147010 90000001075be788 0000000000000000 9000000086bf0f98 0000000000000001 0000000000000010 9000000006015840 0000000000000000 9000000086be6c40 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 4f2317da8a7e08c4 0000000000000101 4f2317da8a7e08c4 ... Call Trace: [<90000000851b5ac0>] __qdisc_run+0xc8/0x8d8 [<9000000085130008>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x578/0x10f0 [<90000000853701c0>] ip6_finish_output2+0x2f0/0x950 [<9000000085374bc8>] ip6_finish_output+0x2b8/0x448 [<9000000085370b24>] ip6_xmit+0x304/0x858 [<90000000853c4438>] inet6_csk_xmit+0x100/0x170 [<90000000852b32f0>] __tcp_transmit_skb+0x490/0xdd0 [<90000000852b47fc>] tcp_connect+0xbcc/0x1168 [<90000000853b9088>] tcp_v6_connect+0x580/0x8a0 [<90000000852e7738>] __inet_stream_connect+0x170/0x480 [<90000000852e7a98>] inet_stream_connect+0x50/0x88 [<90000000850f2814>] __sys_connect+0xe4/0x110 [<90000000850f2858>] sys_connect+0x18/0x28 [<9000000085520c94>] do_syscall+0x94/0x1a0 [<9000000083df1fb8>] handle_syscall+0xb8/0x158 Code: 4001ad80 2400873 2400832d <240073cc> 001137ff 001133ff 6407b41f 001503cc 0280041d ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- The bpf_fifo_dequeue prog returns a skb which is a pointer. The pointer is treated as a 32bit value and sign extend to 64bit in epilogue. This behavior is right for most bpf prog types but wrong for struct ops which requires LoongArch ABI. So let's sign extend struct ops return values according to the LoongArch ABI ([1]) and return value spec in function model. [1]: https://loongson.github.io/LoongArch-Documentation/LoongArch-ELF-ABI-EN.html Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 6abf17d ("LoongArch: BPF: Add struct ops support for trampoline") Signed-off-by: Hengqi Chen <hengqi.chen@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
pongo1231
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to pongo1231/linux
that referenced
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Oct 16, 2025
Since blamed commit, unregister_netdevice_many_notify() takes the netdev
mutex if the device needs it.
If the device list is too long, this will lock more device mutexes than
lockdep can handle:
unshare -n \
bash -c 'for i in $(seq 1 100);do ip link add foo$i type dummy;done'
BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low!
turning off the locking correctness validator.
depth: 48 max: 48!
48 locks held by kworker/u16:1/69:
#0: ..148 ((wq_completion)netns){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work
CachyOS#1: ..d40 (net_cleanup_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work
CachyOS#2: ..bd0 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: cleanup_net
CachyOS#3: ..aa8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: default_device_exit_batch
CachyOS#4: ..cb0 (&dev_instance_lock_key#3){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: unregister_netdevice_many_notify
[..]
Add a helper to close and then unlock a list of net_devices.
Devices that are not up have to be skipped - netif_close_many always
removes them from the list without any other actions taken, so they'd
remain in locked state.
Close devices whenever we've used up half of the tracking slots or we
processed entire list without hitting the limit.
Fixes: 7e4d784 ("net: hold netdev instance lock during rtnetlink operations")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251013185052.14021-1-fw@strlen.de
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
1Naim
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Oct 20, 2025
Expand the prefault memory selftest to add a regression test for a KVM bug where KVM's retry logic would result in (breakable) deadlock due to the memslot deletion waiting on prefaulting to release SRCU, and prefaulting waiting on the memslot to fully disappear (KVM uses a two-step process to delete memslots, and KVM x86 retries page faults if a to-be-deleted, a.k.a. INVALID, memslot is encountered). To exercise concurrent memslot remove, spawn a second thread to initiate memslot removal at roughly the same time as prefaulting. Test memslot removal for all testcases, i.e. don't limit concurrent removal to only the success case. There are essentially three prefault scenarios (so far) that are of interest: 1. Success 2. ENOENT due to no memslot 3. EAGAIN due to INVALID memslot For all intents and purposes, #1 and #2 are mutually exclusive, or rather, easier to test via separate testcases since writing to non-existent memory is trivial. But for #3, making it mutually exclusive with #1 _or_ #2 is actually more complex than testing memslot removal for all scenarios. The only requirement to let memslot removal coexist with other scenarios is a way to guarantee a stable result, e.g. that the "no memslot" test observes ENOENT, not EAGAIN, for the final checks. So, rather than make memslot removal mutually exclusive with the ENOENT scenario, simply restore the memslot and retry prefaulting. For the "no memslot" case, KVM_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY should be idempotent, i.e. should always fail with ENOENT regardless of how many times userspace attempts prefaulting. Pass in both the base GPA and the offset (instead of the "full" GPA) so that the worker can recreate the memslot. Signed-off-by: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com> Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250924174255.2141847-1-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
ptr1337
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Oct 20, 2025
[ Upstream commit 48918ca ] The test starts a workload and then opens events. If the events fail to open, for example because of perf_event_paranoid, the gopipe of the workload is leaked and the file descriptor leak check fails when the test exits. To avoid this cancel the workload when opening the events fails. Before: ``` $ perf test -vv 7 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields: --- start --- test child forked, pid 1189568 Using CPUID GenuineIntel-6-B7-1 ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) config 0xa00000000 (cpu_atom/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/) disabled 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 sys_perf_event_open failed, error -13 ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) config 0xa00000000 (cpu_atom/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/) disabled 1 exclude_kernel 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 = 3 ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) config 0x400000000 (cpu_core/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/) disabled 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 sys_perf_event_open failed, error -13 ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE) config 0x400000000 (cpu_core/PERF_COUNT_HW_CPU_CYCLES/) disabled 1 exclude_kernel 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 = 3 Attempt to add: software/cpu-clock/ ..after resolving event: software/config=0/ cpu-clock -> software/cpu-clock/ ------------------------------------------------------------ perf_event_attr: type 1 (PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE) size 136 config 0x9 (PERF_COUNT_SW_DUMMY) sample_type IP|TID|TIME|CPU read_format ID|LOST disabled 1 inherit 1 mmap 1 comm 1 enable_on_exec 1 task 1 sample_id_all 1 mmap2 1 comm_exec 1 ksymbol 1 bpf_event 1 { wakeup_events, wakeup_watermark } 1 ------------------------------------------------------------ sys_perf_event_open: pid 1189569 cpu 0 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 sys_perf_event_open failed, error -13 perf_evlist__open: Permission denied ---- end(-2) ---- Leak of file descriptor 6 that opened: 'pipe:[14200347]' ---- unexpected signal (6) ---- iFailed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon Failed to read build ID for //anon #0 0x565358f6666e in child_test_sig_handler builtin-test.c:311 #1 0x7f29ce849df0 in __restore_rt libc_sigaction.c:0 #2 0x7f29ce89e95c in __pthread_kill_implementation pthread_kill.c:44 #3 0x7f29ce849cc2 in raise raise.c:27 #4 0x7f29ce8324ac in abort abort.c:81 #5 0x565358f662d4 in check_leaks builtin-test.c:226 #6 0x565358f6682e in run_test_child builtin-test.c:344 torvalds#7 0x565358ef7121 in start_command run-command.c:128 torvalds#8 0x565358f67273 in start_test builtin-test.c:545 torvalds#9 0x565358f6771d in __cmd_test builtin-test.c:647 torvalds#10 0x565358f682bd in cmd_test builtin-test.c:849 torvalds#11 0x565358ee5ded in run_builtin perf.c:349 torvalds#12 0x565358ee6085 in handle_internal_command perf.c:401 torvalds#13 0x565358ee61de in run_argv perf.c:448 torvalds#14 0x565358ee6527 in main perf.c:555 torvalds#15 0x7f29ce833ca8 in __libc_start_call_main libc_start_call_main.h:74 torvalds#16 0x7f29ce833d65 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 libc-start.c:128 torvalds#17 0x565358e391c1 in _start perf[851c1] 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields : FAILED! ``` After: ``` $ perf test 7 7: PERF_RECORD_* events & perf_sample fields : Skip (permissions) ``` Fixes: 16d00fe ("perf tests: Move test__PERF_RECORD into separate object") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Chun-Tse Shao <ctshao@google.com> Cc: Howard Chu <howardchu95@gmail.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Clark <james.clark@linaro.org> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
ptr1337
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Oct 20, 2025
commit 0570327 upstream. Before disabling SR-IOV via config space accesses to the parent PF, sriov_disable() first removes the PCI devices representing the VFs. Since commit 9d16947 ("PCI: Add global pci_lock_rescan_remove()") such removal operations are serialized against concurrent remove and rescan using the pci_rescan_remove_lock. No such locking was ever added in sriov_disable() however. In particular when commit 18f9e9d ("PCI/IOV: Factor out sriov_add_vfs()") factored out the PCI device removal into sriov_del_vfs() there was still no locking around the pci_iov_remove_virtfn() calls. On s390 the lack of serialization in sriov_disable() may cause double remove and list corruption with the below (amended) trace being observed: PSW: 0704c00180000000 0000000c914e4b38 (klist_put+56) GPRS: 000003800313fb48 0000000000000000 0000000100000001 0000000000000001 00000000f9b520a8 0000000000000000 0000000000002fbd 00000000f4cc9480 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000180692828 00000000818e8000 000003800313fe2c 000003800313fb20 000003800313fad8 #0 [3800313fb20] device_del at c9158ad5c #1 [3800313fb88] pci_remove_bus_device at c915105ba #2 [3800313fbd0] pci_iov_remove_virtfn at c9152f198 #3 [3800313fc28] zpci_iov_remove_virtfn at c90fb67c0 #4 [3800313fc60] zpci_bus_remove_device at c90fb6104 #5 [3800313fca0] __zpci_event_availability at c90fb3dca #6 [3800313fd08] chsc_process_sei_nt0 at c918fe4a2 torvalds#7 [3800313fd60] crw_collect_info at c91905822 torvalds#8 [3800313fe10] kthread at c90feb390 torvalds#9 [3800313fe68] __ret_from_fork at c90f6aa64 torvalds#10 [3800313fe98] ret_from_fork at c9194f3f2. This is because in addition to sriov_disable() removing the VFs, the platform also generates hot-unplug events for the VFs. This being the reverse operation to the hotplug events generated by sriov_enable() and handled via pdev->no_vf_scan. And while the event processing takes pci_rescan_remove_lock and checks whether the struct pci_dev still exists, the lack of synchronization makes this checking racy. Other races may also be possible of course though given that this lack of locking persisted so long observable races seem very rare. Even on s390 the list corruption was only observed with certain devices since the platform events are only triggered by config accesses after the removal, so as long as the removal finished synchronously they would not race. Either way the locking is missing so fix this by adding it to the sriov_del_vfs() helper. Just like PCI rescan-remove, locking is also missing in sriov_add_vfs() including for the error case where pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device() is called without the PCI rescan-remove lock being held. Even in the non-error case, adding new PCI devices and buses should be serialized via the PCI rescan-remove lock. Add the necessary locking. Fixes: 18f9e9d ("PCI/IOV: Factor out sriov_add_vfs()") Signed-off-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Reviewed-by: Benjamin Block <bblock@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Farhan Ali <alifm@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Julian Ruess <julianr@linux.ibm.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250826-pci_fix_sriov_disable-v1-1-2d0bc938f2a3@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ptr1337
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Oct 25, 2025
[ Upstream commit 7f0fddd ] Since blamed commit, unregister_netdevice_many_notify() takes the netdev mutex if the device needs it. If the device list is too long, this will lock more device mutexes than lockdep can handle: unshare -n \ bash -c 'for i in $(seq 1 100);do ip link add foo$i type dummy;done' BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low! turning off the locking correctness validator. depth: 48 max: 48! 48 locks held by kworker/u16:1/69: #0: ..148 ((wq_completion)netns){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work #1: ..d40 (net_cleanup_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work #2: ..bd0 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: cleanup_net #3: ..aa8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: default_device_exit_batch #4: ..cb0 (&dev_instance_lock_key#3){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: unregister_netdevice_many_notify [..] Add a helper to close and then unlock a list of net_devices. Devices that are not up have to be skipped - netif_close_many always removes them from the list without any other actions taken, so they'd remain in locked state. Close devices whenever we've used up half of the tracking slots or we processed entire list without hitting the limit. Fixes: 7e4d784 ("net: hold netdev instance lock during rtnetlink operations") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251013185052.14021-1-fw@strlen.de Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
pongo1231
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Oct 26, 2025
The original code causes a circular locking dependency found by lockdep. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.16.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-pw-151626v3+ CachyOS#1 Tainted: G S U ------------------------------------------------------ xe_fault_inject/5091 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888156815688 ((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 but task is already holding lock: ffff888156815620 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_coredump_put+0x3f/0xa0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> CachyOS#2 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: mutex_lock_nested+0x4e/0xc0 devcd_data_write+0x27/0x90 sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x80/0xf0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> CachyOS#1 (kn->active#236){++++}-{0:0}: kernfs_drain+0x1e2/0x200 __kernfs_remove+0xae/0x400 kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x5d/0xc0 remove_files+0x54/0x70 sysfs_remove_group+0x3d/0xa0 sysfs_remove_groups+0x2e/0x60 device_remove_attrs+0xc7/0x100 device_del+0x15d/0x3b0 devcd_del+0x19/0x30 process_one_work+0x22b/0x6f0 worker_thread+0x1e8/0x3d0 kthread+0x11c/0x250 ret_from_fork+0x26c/0x2e0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x1661/0x2860 lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 __flush_work+0x27a/0x660 flush_delayed_work+0x5d/0xa0 dev_coredump_put+0x63/0xa0 xe_driver_devcoredump_fini+0x12/0x20 [xe] devm_action_release+0x12/0x30 release_nodes+0x3a/0x120 devres_release_all+0x8a/0xd0 device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x23a/0x280 device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20 unbind_store+0xaf/0xc0 drv_attr_store+0x21/0x50 sysfs_kf_write+0x4a/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work) --> kn->active#236 --> &devcd->mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&devcd->mutex); lock(kn->active#236); lock(&devcd->mutex); lock((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by xe_fault_inject/5091: #0: ffff8881129f9488 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 CachyOS#1: ffff88810c755078 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x123/0x220 CachyOS#2: ffff8881054811a0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x55/0x280 CachyOS#3: ffff888156815620 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_coredump_put+0x3f/0xa0 CachyOS#4: ffffffff8359e020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __flush_work+0x72/0x660 stack backtrace: CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 5091 Comm: xe_fault_inject Tainted: G S U 6.16.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-pw-151626v3+ CachyOS#1 PREEMPT_{RT,(lazy)} Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [U]=USER Hardware name: Micro-Star International Co., Ltd. MS-7D25/PRO Z690-A DDR4(MS-7D25), BIOS 1.10 12/13/2021 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 dump_stack+0x10/0x20 print_circular_bug+0x285/0x360 check_noncircular+0x135/0x150 ? register_lock_class+0x48/0x4a0 __lock_acquire+0x1661/0x2860 lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 ? mark_held_locks+0x46/0x90 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 __flush_work+0x27a/0x660 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1e/0xd0 ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10 flush_delayed_work+0x5d/0xa0 dev_coredump_put+0x63/0xa0 xe_driver_devcoredump_fini+0x12/0x20 [xe] devm_action_release+0x12/0x30 release_nodes+0x3a/0x120 devres_release_all+0x8a/0xd0 device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x23a/0x280 ? bus_find_device+0xa8/0xe0 device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20 unbind_store+0xaf/0xc0 drv_attr_store+0x21/0x50 sysfs_kf_write+0x4a/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 ? __f_unlock_pos+0x15/0x20 ? __x64_sys_getdents64+0x9b/0x130 ? __pfx_filldir64+0x10/0x10 ? do_syscall_64+0x1a2/0xb60 ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x76e292edd574 Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d d5 ea 0e 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 48 89 RSP: 002b:00007fffe247a828 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000076e292edd574 RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: 00006267f6306063 RDI: 000000000000000b RBP: 000000000000000c R08: 000076e292fc4b20 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00006267f6306063 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00006267e6859c00 R15: 000076e29322a000 </TASK> xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] Xe device coredump has been deleted. Fixes: 01daccf ("devcoredump : Serialize devcd_del work") Cc: Mukesh Ojha <quic_mojha@quicinc.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael@kernel.org> Cc: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.1+ Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <dev@lankhorst.se> Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com> Acked-by: Mukesh Ojha <mukesh.ojha@oss.qualcomm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250723142416.1020423-1-dev@lankhorst.se Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ptr1337
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Oct 31, 2025
commit a91c809 upstream. The original code causes a circular locking dependency found by lockdep. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.16.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-pw-151626v3+ #1 Tainted: G S U ------------------------------------------------------ xe_fault_inject/5091 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888156815688 ((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 but task is already holding lock: ffff888156815620 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_coredump_put+0x3f/0xa0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: mutex_lock_nested+0x4e/0xc0 devcd_data_write+0x27/0x90 sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x80/0xf0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #1 (kn->active#236){++++}-{0:0}: kernfs_drain+0x1e2/0x200 __kernfs_remove+0xae/0x400 kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x5d/0xc0 remove_files+0x54/0x70 sysfs_remove_group+0x3d/0xa0 sysfs_remove_groups+0x2e/0x60 device_remove_attrs+0xc7/0x100 device_del+0x15d/0x3b0 devcd_del+0x19/0x30 process_one_work+0x22b/0x6f0 worker_thread+0x1e8/0x3d0 kthread+0x11c/0x250 ret_from_fork+0x26c/0x2e0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x1661/0x2860 lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 __flush_work+0x27a/0x660 flush_delayed_work+0x5d/0xa0 dev_coredump_put+0x63/0xa0 xe_driver_devcoredump_fini+0x12/0x20 [xe] devm_action_release+0x12/0x30 release_nodes+0x3a/0x120 devres_release_all+0x8a/0xd0 device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x23a/0x280 device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20 unbind_store+0xaf/0xc0 drv_attr_store+0x21/0x50 sysfs_kf_write+0x4a/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work) --> kn->active#236 --> &devcd->mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&devcd->mutex); lock(kn->active#236); lock(&devcd->mutex); lock((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by xe_fault_inject/5091: #0: ffff8881129f9488 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 #1: ffff88810c755078 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x123/0x220 #2: ffff8881054811a0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x55/0x280 #3: ffff888156815620 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_coredump_put+0x3f/0xa0 #4: ffffffff8359e020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __flush_work+0x72/0x660 stack backtrace: CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 5091 Comm: xe_fault_inject Tainted: G S U 6.16.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-pw-151626v3+ #1 PREEMPT_{RT,(lazy)} Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [U]=USER Hardware name: Micro-Star International Co., Ltd. MS-7D25/PRO Z690-A DDR4(MS-7D25), BIOS 1.10 12/13/2021 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 dump_stack+0x10/0x20 print_circular_bug+0x285/0x360 check_noncircular+0x135/0x150 ? register_lock_class+0x48/0x4a0 __lock_acquire+0x1661/0x2860 lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 ? mark_held_locks+0x46/0x90 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 __flush_work+0x27a/0x660 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1e/0xd0 ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10 flush_delayed_work+0x5d/0xa0 dev_coredump_put+0x63/0xa0 xe_driver_devcoredump_fini+0x12/0x20 [xe] devm_action_release+0x12/0x30 release_nodes+0x3a/0x120 devres_release_all+0x8a/0xd0 device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x23a/0x280 ? bus_find_device+0xa8/0xe0 device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20 unbind_store+0xaf/0xc0 drv_attr_store+0x21/0x50 sysfs_kf_write+0x4a/0x80 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220 vfs_write+0x293/0x560 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60 ? __f_unlock_pos+0x15/0x20 ? __x64_sys_getdents64+0x9b/0x130 ? __pfx_filldir64+0x10/0x10 ? do_syscall_64+0x1a2/0xb60 ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x76e292edd574 Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d d5 ea 0e 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 48 89 RSP: 002b:00007fffe247a828 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000076e292edd574 RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: 00006267f6306063 RDI: 000000000000000b RBP: 000000000000000c R08: 000076e292fc4b20 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00006267f6306063 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00006267e6859c00 R15: 000076e29322a000 </TASK> xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] Xe device coredump has been deleted. Fixes: 01daccf ("devcoredump : Serialize devcd_del work") Cc: Mukesh Ojha <quic_mojha@quicinc.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael@kernel.org> Cc: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.1+ Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <dev@lankhorst.se> Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com> Acked-by: Mukesh Ojha <mukesh.ojha@oss.qualcomm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250723142416.1020423-1-dev@lankhorst.se Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ptr1337
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Oct 31, 2025
[ Upstream commit 2e12868 ] This fixes the following UAF caused by not properly locking hdev when processing HCI_EV_NUM_COMP_PKTS: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hci_conn_tx_dequeue+0x1be/0x220 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:3036 Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880740f0940 by task kworker/u11:0/54 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 54 Comm: kworker/u11:0 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc7 #3 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: hci1 hci_rx_work Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xca/0x230 mm/kasan/report.c:480 kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:593 hci_conn_tx_dequeue+0x1be/0x220 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:3036 hci_num_comp_pkts_evt+0x1c8/0xa50 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:4404 hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7477 [inline] hci_event_packet+0x7e0/0x1200 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7531 hci_rx_work+0x46a/0xe80 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4070 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3238 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xae1/0x17b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3321 worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3402 kthread+0x70e/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:464 ret_from_fork+0x3fc/0x770 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 home/kwqcheii/source/fuzzing/kernel/kasan/linux-6.16-rc7/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK> Allocated by task 54: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x230/0x3d0 mm/slub.c:4359 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:905 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1039 [inline] __hci_conn_add+0x233/0x1b30 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:939 le_conn_complete_evt+0x3d6/0x1220 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:5628 hci_le_enh_conn_complete_evt+0x189/0x470 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:5794 hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7474 [inline] hci_event_packet+0x78c/0x1200 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7531 hci_rx_work+0x46a/0xe80 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4070 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3238 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xae1/0x17b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3321 worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3402 kthread+0x70e/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:464 ret_from_fork+0x3fc/0x770 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 home/kwqcheii/source/fuzzing/kernel/kasan/linux-6.16-rc7/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 Freed by task 9572: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 kasan_save_free_info+0x46/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:576 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x62/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:264 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2381 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4643 [inline] kfree+0x18e/0x440 mm/slub.c:4842 device_release+0x9c/0x1c0 kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:689 [inline] kobject_release lib/kobject.c:720 [inline] kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] kobject_put+0x22b/0x480 lib/kobject.c:737 hci_conn_cleanup net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:175 [inline] hci_conn_del+0x8ff/0xcb0 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1173 hci_abort_conn_sync+0x5d1/0xdf0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5689 hci_cmd_sync_work+0x210/0x3a0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:332 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3238 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xae1/0x17b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3321 worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3402 kthread+0x70e/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:464 ret_from_fork+0x3fc/0x770 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 home/kwqcheii/source/fuzzing/kernel/kasan/linux-6.16-rc7/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 Fixes: 134f4b3 ("Bluetooth: add support for skb TX SND/COMPLETION timestamping") Reported-by: Junvyyang, Tencent Zhuque Lab <zhuque@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
ptr1337
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Oct 31, 2025
[ Upstream commit 9e62280 ] This fixes the following UFA in hci_acl_create_conn_sync where a connection still pending is command submission (conn->state == BT_OPEN) maybe freed, also since this also can happen with the likes of hci_le_create_conn_sync fix it as well: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hci_acl_create_conn_sync+0x5ef/0x790 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:6861 Write of size 2 at addr ffff88805ffcc038 by task kworker/u11:2/9541 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 9541 Comm: kworker/u11:2 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc7 #3 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: hci3 hci_cmd_sync_work Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xca/0x230 mm/kasan/report.c:480 kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:593 hci_acl_create_conn_sync+0x5ef/0x790 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:6861 hci_cmd_sync_work+0x210/0x3a0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:332 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3238 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xae1/0x17b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3321 worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3402 kthread+0x70e/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:464 ret_from_fork+0x3fc/0x770 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 home/kwqcheii/source/fuzzing/kernel/kasan/linux-6.16-rc7/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK> Allocated by task 123736: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x230/0x3d0 mm/slub.c:4359 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:905 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1039 [inline] __hci_conn_add+0x233/0x1b30 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:939 hci_conn_add_unset net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1051 [inline] hci_connect_acl+0x16c/0x4e0 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1634 pair_device+0x418/0xa70 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:3556 hci_mgmt_cmd+0x9c9/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1719 hci_sock_sendmsg+0x6ca/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1839 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:712 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x219/0x270 net/socket.c:727 sock_write_iter+0x258/0x330 net/socket.c:1131 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline] vfs_write+0x54b/0xa90 fs/read_write.c:686 ksys_write+0x145/0x250 fs/read_write.c:738 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Freed by task 103680: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 kasan_save_free_info+0x46/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:576 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x62/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:264 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2381 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4643 [inline] kfree+0x18e/0x440 mm/slub.c:4842 device_release+0x9c/0x1c0 kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:689 [inline] kobject_release lib/kobject.c:720 [inline] kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] kobject_put+0x22b/0x480 lib/kobject.c:737 hci_conn_cleanup net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:175 [inline] hci_conn_del+0x8ff/0xcb0 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1173 hci_conn_complete_evt+0x3c7/0x1040 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:3199 hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7477 [inline] hci_event_packet+0x7e0/0x1200 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7531 hci_rx_work+0x46a/0xe80 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4070 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3238 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xae1/0x17b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3321 worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3402 kthread+0x70e/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:464 ret_from_fork+0x3fc/0x770 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 home/kwqcheii/source/fuzzing/kernel/kasan/linux-6.16-rc7/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 Last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x3e/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:47 kasan_record_aux_stack+0xbd/0xd0 mm/kasan/generic.c:548 insert_work+0x3d/0x330 kernel/workqueue.c:2183 __queue_work+0xbd9/0xfe0 kernel/workqueue.c:2345 queue_delayed_work_on+0x18b/0x280 kernel/workqueue.c:2561 pairing_complete+0x1e7/0x2b0 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:3451 pairing_complete_cb+0x1ac/0x230 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:3487 hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2064 [inline] hci_conn_failed+0x24d/0x310 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1275 hci_conn_complete_evt+0x3c7/0x1040 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:3199 hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7477 [inline] hci_event_packet+0x7e0/0x1200 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7531 hci_rx_work+0x46a/0xe80 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4070 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3238 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xae1/0x17b0 kernel/workqueue.c:3321 worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3402 kthread+0x70e/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:464 ret_from_fork+0x3fc/0x770 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 home/kwqcheii/source/fuzzing/kernel/kasan/linux-6.16-rc7/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 Fixes: aef2aa4 ("Bluetooth: hci_event: Fix creating hci_conn object on error status") Reported-by: Junvyyang, Tencent Zhuque Lab <zhuque@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
pongo1231
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Nov 7, 2025
Michael Chan says: ==================== bnxt_en: Bug fixes Patches 1, 3, and 4 are bug fixes related to the FW log tracing driver coredump feature recently added in 6.13. Patch CachyOS#1 adds the necessary call to shutdown the FW logging DMA during PCI shutdown. Patch CachyOS#3 fixes a possible null pointer derefernce when using early versions of the FW with this feature. Patch CachyOS#4 adds the coredump header information unconditionally to make it more robust. Patch CachyOS#2 fixes a possible memory leak during PTP shutdown. Patch CachyOS#5 eliminates a dmesg warning when doing devlink reload. ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251104005700.542174-1-michael.chan@broadcom.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
1Naim
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Nov 10, 2025
On completion of i915_vma_pin_ww(), a synchronous variant of dma_fence_work_commit() is called. When pinning a VMA to GGTT address space on a Cherry View family processor, or on a Broxton generation SoC with VTD enabled, i.e., when stop_machine() is then called from intel_ggtt_bind_vma(), that can potentially lead to lock inversion among reservation_ww and cpu_hotplug locks. [86.861179] ====================================================== [86.861193] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [86.861209] 6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ #1 Tainted: G U [86.861226] ------------------------------------------------------ [86.861238] i915_module_loa/1432 is trying to acquire lock: [86.861252] ffffffff83489090 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.861290] but task is already holding lock: [86.861303] ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.862233] which lock already depends on the new lock. [86.862251] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [86.862265] -> #5 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [86.862292] dma_resv_lockdep+0x19a/0x390 [86.862315] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862334] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862353] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862369] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862383] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862399] -> #4 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}: [86.862425] dma_resv_lockdep+0x178/0x390 [86.862440] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862454] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862470] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862482] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862495] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862509] -> #3 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}: [86.862531] down_read_killable+0x46/0x1e0 [86.862546] lock_mm_and_find_vma+0xa2/0x280 [86.862561] do_user_addr_fault+0x266/0x8e0 [86.862578] exc_page_fault+0x8a/0x2f0 [86.862593] asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 [86.862607] filldir64+0xeb/0x180 [86.862620] kernfs_fop_readdir+0x118/0x480 [86.862635] iterate_dir+0xcf/0x2b0 [86.862648] __x64_sys_getdents64+0x84/0x140 [86.862661] x64_sys_call+0x1058/0x2660 [86.862675] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.862689] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.862703] -> #2 (&root->kernfs_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}: [86.862725] down_write+0x3e/0xf0 [86.862738] kernfs_add_one+0x30/0x3c0 [86.862751] kernfs_create_dir_ns+0x53/0xb0 [86.862765] internal_create_group+0x134/0x4c0 [86.862779] sysfs_create_group+0x13/0x20 [86.862792] topology_add_dev+0x1d/0x30 [86.862806] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x4b5/0x850 [86.862822] cpuhp_issue_call+0xbf/0x1f0 [86.862836] __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x111/0x320 [86.862852] __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 [86.862866] topology_sysfs_init+0x30/0x50 [86.862879] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862893] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862908] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862921] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862934] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862947] -> #1 (cpuhp_state_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [86.862969] __mutex_lock+0xaa/0xed0 [86.862982] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [86.862995] __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x67/0x320 [86.863012] __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 [86.863026] page_alloc_init_cpuhp+0x2d/0x60 [86.863041] mm_core_init+0x22/0x2d0 [86.863054] start_kernel+0x576/0xbd0 [86.863068] x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30 [86.863084] x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110 [86.863098] common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 [86.863114] -> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: [86.863135] __lock_acquire+0x1635/0x2810 [86.863152] lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 [86.863166] cpus_read_lock+0x41/0x100 [86.863180] stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.863194] bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x3b/0x60 [i915] [86.863987] intel_ggtt_bind_vma+0x43/0x70 [i915] [86.864735] __vma_bind+0x55/0x70 [i915] [86.865510] fence_work+0x26/0xa0 [i915] [86.866248] fence_notify+0xa1/0x140 [i915] [86.866983] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x8f/0x270 [i915] [86.867719] i915_sw_fence_commit+0x39/0x60 [i915] [86.868453] i915_vma_pin_ww+0x462/0x1360 [i915] [86.869228] i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x133/0x1d0 [i915] [86.870001] initial_plane_vma+0x307/0x840 [i915] [86.870774] intel_initial_plane_config+0x33f/0x670 [i915] [86.871546] intel_display_driver_probe_nogem+0x1c6/0x260 [i915] [86.872330] i915_driver_probe+0x7fa/0xe80 [i915] [86.873057] i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915] [86.873782] local_pci_probe+0x47/0xb0 [86.873802] pci_device_probe+0xf3/0x260 [86.873817] really_probe+0xf1/0x3c0 [86.873833] __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180 [86.873848] driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0 [86.873862] __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220 [86.873876] bus_for_each_dev+0x7f/0xe0 [86.873892] driver_attach+0x1e/0x30 [86.873904] bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290 [86.873917] driver_register+0x5e/0x130 [86.873931] __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90 [86.873945] i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915] [86.874678] i915_init+0x37/0x120 [i915] [86.875347] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.875369] do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0 [86.875385] load_module+0x2c54/0x2d80 [86.875398] init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.875413] idempotent_init_module+0x117/0x330 [86.875426] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100 [86.875440] x64_sys_call+0x24de/0x2660 [86.875454] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.875470] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.875486] other info that might help us debug this: [86.875502] Chain exists of: cpu_hotplug_lock --> reservation_ww_class_acquire --> reservation_ww_class_mutex [86.875539] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [86.875552] CPU0 CPU1 [86.875563] ---- ---- [86.875573] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [86.875588] lock(reservation_ww_class_acquire); [86.875606] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [86.875624] rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock); [86.875637] *** DEADLOCK *** [86.875650] 3 locks held by i915_module_loa/1432: [86.875663] #0: ffff888101f5c1b0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __driver_attach+0x104/0x220 [86.875699] #1: ffffc90002e0b4a0 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.876512] #2: ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.877305] stack backtrace: [86.877326] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1432 Comm: i915_module_loa Tainted: G U 6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) [86.877334] Tainted: [U]=USER [86.877336] Hardware name: /NUC5CPYB, BIOS PYBSWCEL.86A.0079.2020.0420.1316 04/20/2020 [86.877339] Call Trace: [86.877344] <TASK> [86.877353] dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 [86.877364] dump_stack+0x10/0x20 [86.877369] print_circular_bug+0x285/0x360 [86.877379] check_noncircular+0x135/0x150 [86.877390] __lock_acquire+0x1635/0x2810 [86.877403] lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 [86.877408] ? stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.877422] ? __pfx_bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__cb+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.878173] cpus_read_lock+0x41/0x100 [86.878182] ? stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.878191] ? __pfx_bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__cb+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.878916] stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.878927] bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x3b/0x60 [i915] [86.879652] intel_ggtt_bind_vma+0x43/0x70 [i915] [86.880375] __vma_bind+0x55/0x70 [i915] [86.881133] fence_work+0x26/0xa0 [i915] [86.881851] fence_notify+0xa1/0x140 [i915] [86.882566] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x8f/0x270 [i915] [86.883286] i915_sw_fence_commit+0x39/0x60 [i915] [86.884003] i915_vma_pin_ww+0x462/0x1360 [i915] [86.884756] ? i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x6c/0x1d0 [i915] [86.885513] i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x133/0x1d0 [i915] [86.886281] initial_plane_vma+0x307/0x840 [i915] [86.887049] intel_initial_plane_config+0x33f/0x670 [i915] [86.887819] intel_display_driver_probe_nogem+0x1c6/0x260 [i915] [86.888587] i915_driver_probe+0x7fa/0xe80 [i915] [86.889293] ? mutex_unlock+0x12/0x20 [86.889301] ? drm_privacy_screen_get+0x171/0x190 [86.889308] ? acpi_dev_found+0x66/0x80 [86.889321] i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915] [86.890038] local_pci_probe+0x47/0xb0 [86.890049] pci_device_probe+0xf3/0x260 [86.890058] really_probe+0xf1/0x3c0 [86.890067] __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180 [86.890072] driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0 [86.890078] __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220 [86.890083] ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10 [86.890088] bus_for_each_dev+0x7f/0xe0 [86.890097] driver_attach+0x1e/0x30 [86.890101] bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290 [86.890107] driver_register+0x5e/0x130 [86.890113] __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90 [86.890119] i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915] [86.890833] i915_init+0x37/0x120 [i915] [86.891482] ? __pfx_i915_init+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.892135] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.892145] ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x33f/0x470 [86.892157] do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0 [86.892164] load_module+0x2c54/0x2d80 [86.892168] ? __kernel_read+0x15c/0x300 [86.892185] ? kernel_read_file+0x2b1/0x320 [86.892195] init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.892199] ? init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.892211] idempotent_init_module+0x117/0x330 [86.892224] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100 [86.892230] x64_sys_call+0x24de/0x2660 [86.892236] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.892243] ? irqentry_exit+0x77/0xb0 [86.892249] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x57/0xc0 [86.892256] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.892261] RIP: 0033:0x7303e1b2725d [86.892271] Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 8b bb 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [86.892276] RSP: 002b:00007ffddd1fdb38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 [86.892281] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005d771d88fd90 RCX: 00007303e1b2725d [86.892285] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00005d771d893aa0 RDI: 000000000000000c [86.892287] RBP: 00007ffddd1fdbf0 R08: 0000000000000040 R09: 00007ffddd1fdb80 [86.892289] R10: 00007303e1c03b20 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005d771d893aa0 [86.892292] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00005d771d88f0d0 R15: 00005d771d895710 [86.892304] </TASK> Call asynchronous variant of dma_fence_work_commit() in that case. v3: Provide more verbose in-line comment (Andi), - mention target environments in commit message. Fixes: 7d1c261 ("drm/i915: Take reservation lock around i915_vma_pin.") Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/i915/kernel/-/issues/14985 Cc: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Janusz Krzysztofik <janusz.krzysztofik@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Sebastian Brzezinka <sebastian.brzezinka@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Karas <krzysztof.karas@intel.com> Acked-by: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251023082925.351307-6-janusz.krzysztofik@linux.intel.com (cherry picked from commit 648ef13) Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
pongo1231
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Nov 10, 2025
Add VMX exit handlers for SEAMCALL and TDCALL to inject a #UD if a non-TD guest attempts to execute SEAMCALL or TDCALL. Neither SEAMCALL nor TDCALL is gated by any software enablement other than VMXON, and so will generate a VM-Exit instead of e.g. a native #UD when executed from the guest kernel. Note! No unprivileged DoS of the L1 kernel is possible as TDCALL and SEAMCALL #GP at CPL > 0, and the CPL check is performed prior to the VMX non-root (VM-Exit) check, i.e. userspace can't crash the VM. And for a nested guest, KVM forwards unknown exits to L1, i.e. an L2 kernel can crash itself, but not L1. Note CachyOS#2! The Intel® Trust Domain CPU Architectural Extensions spec's pseudocode shows the CPL > 0 check for SEAMCALL coming _after_ the VM-Exit, but that appears to be a documentation bug (likely because the CPL > 0 check was incorrectly bundled with other lower-priority #GP checks). Testing on SPR and EMR shows that the CPL > 0 check is performed before the VMX non-root check, i.e. SEAMCALL #GPs when executed in usermode. Note CachyOS#3! The aforementioned Trust Domain spec uses confusing pseudocode that says that SEAMCALL will #UD if executed "inSEAM", but "inSEAM" specifically means in SEAM Root Mode, i.e. in the TDX-Module. The long- form description explicitly states that SEAMCALL generates an exit when executed in "SEAM VMX non-root operation". But that's a moot point as the TDX-Module injects #UD if the guest attempts to execute SEAMCALL, as documented in the "Unconditionally Blocked Instructions" section of the TDX-Module base specification. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Cc: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251016182148.69085-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
1Naim
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Nov 14, 2025
[ Upstream commit 5d726c4 ] Following deadlock can be triggered easily by lockdep: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.17.0-rc3-00124-ga12c2658ced0 #1665 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ check/1334 is trying to acquire lock: ff1100011d9d0678 (&q->sysfs_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: blk_unregister_queue+0x53/0x180 but task is already holding lock: ff1100011d9d00e0 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3){++++}-{0:0}, at: del_gendisk+0xba/0x110 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3){++++}-{0:0}: blk_queue_enter+0x40b/0x470 blkg_conf_prep+0x7b/0x3c0 tg_set_limit+0x10a/0x3e0 cgroup_file_write+0xc6/0x420 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x189/0x280 vfs_write+0x256/0x490 ksys_write+0x83/0x190 __x64_sys_write+0x21/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x4608/0x4630 do_syscall_64+0xdb/0x6b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #1 (&q->rq_qos_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0xd8/0xf50 mutex_lock_nested+0x2b/0x40 wbt_init+0x17e/0x280 wbt_enable_default+0xe9/0x140 blk_register_queue+0x1da/0x2e0 __add_disk+0x38c/0x5d0 add_disk_fwnode+0x89/0x250 device_add_disk+0x18/0x30 virtblk_probe+0x13a3/0x1800 virtio_dev_probe+0x389/0x610 really_probe+0x136/0x620 __driver_probe_device+0xb3/0x230 driver_probe_device+0x2f/0xe0 __driver_attach+0x158/0x250 bus_for_each_dev+0xa9/0x130 driver_attach+0x26/0x40 bus_add_driver+0x178/0x3d0 driver_register+0x7d/0x1c0 __register_virtio_driver+0x2c/0x60 virtio_blk_init+0x6f/0xe0 do_one_initcall+0x94/0x540 kernel_init_freeable+0x56a/0x7b0 kernel_init+0x2b/0x270 ret_from_fork+0x268/0x4c0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 (&q->sysfs_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __lock_acquire+0x1835/0x2940 lock_acquire+0xf9/0x450 __mutex_lock+0xd8/0xf50 mutex_lock_nested+0x2b/0x40 blk_unregister_queue+0x53/0x180 __del_gendisk+0x226/0x690 del_gendisk+0xba/0x110 sd_remove+0x49/0xb0 [sd_mod] device_remove+0x87/0xb0 device_release_driver_internal+0x11e/0x230 device_release_driver+0x1a/0x30 bus_remove_device+0x14d/0x220 device_del+0x1e1/0x5a0 __scsi_remove_device+0x1ff/0x2f0 scsi_remove_device+0x37/0x60 sdev_store_delete+0x77/0x100 dev_attr_store+0x1f/0x40 sysfs_kf_write+0x65/0x90 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x189/0x280 vfs_write+0x256/0x490 ksys_write+0x83/0x190 __x64_sys_write+0x21/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x4608/0x4630 do_syscall_64+0xdb/0x6b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &q->sysfs_lock --> &q->rq_qos_mutex --> &q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3); lock(&q->rq_qos_mutex); lock(&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3); lock(&q->sysfs_lock); Root cause is that queue_usage_counter is grabbed with rq_qos_mutex held in blkg_conf_prep(), while queue should be freezed before rq_qos_mutex from other context. The blk_queue_enter() from blkg_conf_prep() is used to protect against policy deactivation, which is already protected with blkcg_mutex, hence convert blk_queue_enter() to blkcg_mutex to fix this problem. Meanwhile, consider that blkcg_mutex is held after queue is freezed from policy deactivation, also convert blkg_alloc() to use GFP_NOIO. Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
pongo1231
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Nov 23, 2025
…/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.18, take CachyOS#3 - Only adjust the ID registers when no irqchip has been created once per VM run, instead of doing it once per vcpu, as this otherwise triggers a pretty bad conbsistency check failure in the sysreg code. - Make sure the per-vcpu Fine Grain Traps are computed before we load the system registers on the HW, as we otherwise start running without anything set until the first preemption of the vcpu.
ptr1337
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Nov 24, 2025
[ Upstream commit 84bbe32 ] On completion of i915_vma_pin_ww(), a synchronous variant of dma_fence_work_commit() is called. When pinning a VMA to GGTT address space on a Cherry View family processor, or on a Broxton generation SoC with VTD enabled, i.e., when stop_machine() is then called from intel_ggtt_bind_vma(), that can potentially lead to lock inversion among reservation_ww and cpu_hotplug locks. [86.861179] ====================================================== [86.861193] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [86.861209] 6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ #1 Tainted: G U [86.861226] ------------------------------------------------------ [86.861238] i915_module_loa/1432 is trying to acquire lock: [86.861252] ffffffff83489090 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.861290] but task is already holding lock: [86.861303] ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.862233] which lock already depends on the new lock. [86.862251] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [86.862265] -> #5 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [86.862292] dma_resv_lockdep+0x19a/0x390 [86.862315] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862334] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862353] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862369] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862383] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862399] -> #4 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}: [86.862425] dma_resv_lockdep+0x178/0x390 [86.862440] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862454] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862470] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862482] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862495] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862509] -> #3 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}: [86.862531] down_read_killable+0x46/0x1e0 [86.862546] lock_mm_and_find_vma+0xa2/0x280 [86.862561] do_user_addr_fault+0x266/0x8e0 [86.862578] exc_page_fault+0x8a/0x2f0 [86.862593] asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 [86.862607] filldir64+0xeb/0x180 [86.862620] kernfs_fop_readdir+0x118/0x480 [86.862635] iterate_dir+0xcf/0x2b0 [86.862648] __x64_sys_getdents64+0x84/0x140 [86.862661] x64_sys_call+0x1058/0x2660 [86.862675] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.862689] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.862703] -> #2 (&root->kernfs_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}: [86.862725] down_write+0x3e/0xf0 [86.862738] kernfs_add_one+0x30/0x3c0 [86.862751] kernfs_create_dir_ns+0x53/0xb0 [86.862765] internal_create_group+0x134/0x4c0 [86.862779] sysfs_create_group+0x13/0x20 [86.862792] topology_add_dev+0x1d/0x30 [86.862806] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x4b5/0x850 [86.862822] cpuhp_issue_call+0xbf/0x1f0 [86.862836] __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x111/0x320 [86.862852] __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 [86.862866] topology_sysfs_init+0x30/0x50 [86.862879] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862893] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862908] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862921] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862934] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862947] -> #1 (cpuhp_state_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [86.862969] __mutex_lock+0xaa/0xed0 [86.862982] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [86.862995] __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x67/0x320 [86.863012] __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 [86.863026] page_alloc_init_cpuhp+0x2d/0x60 [86.863041] mm_core_init+0x22/0x2d0 [86.863054] start_kernel+0x576/0xbd0 [86.863068] x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30 [86.863084] x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110 [86.863098] common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 [86.863114] -> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: [86.863135] __lock_acquire+0x1635/0x2810 [86.863152] lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 [86.863166] cpus_read_lock+0x41/0x100 [86.863180] stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.863194] bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x3b/0x60 [i915] [86.863987] intel_ggtt_bind_vma+0x43/0x70 [i915] [86.864735] __vma_bind+0x55/0x70 [i915] [86.865510] fence_work+0x26/0xa0 [i915] [86.866248] fence_notify+0xa1/0x140 [i915] [86.866983] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x8f/0x270 [i915] [86.867719] i915_sw_fence_commit+0x39/0x60 [i915] [86.868453] i915_vma_pin_ww+0x462/0x1360 [i915] [86.869228] i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x133/0x1d0 [i915] [86.870001] initial_plane_vma+0x307/0x840 [i915] [86.870774] intel_initial_plane_config+0x33f/0x670 [i915] [86.871546] intel_display_driver_probe_nogem+0x1c6/0x260 [i915] [86.872330] i915_driver_probe+0x7fa/0xe80 [i915] [86.873057] i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915] [86.873782] local_pci_probe+0x47/0xb0 [86.873802] pci_device_probe+0xf3/0x260 [86.873817] really_probe+0xf1/0x3c0 [86.873833] __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180 [86.873848] driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0 [86.873862] __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220 [86.873876] bus_for_each_dev+0x7f/0xe0 [86.873892] driver_attach+0x1e/0x30 [86.873904] bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290 [86.873917] driver_register+0x5e/0x130 [86.873931] __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90 [86.873945] i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915] [86.874678] i915_init+0x37/0x120 [i915] [86.875347] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.875369] do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0 [86.875385] load_module+0x2c54/0x2d80 [86.875398] init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.875413] idempotent_init_module+0x117/0x330 [86.875426] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100 [86.875440] x64_sys_call+0x24de/0x2660 [86.875454] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.875470] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.875486] other info that might help us debug this: [86.875502] Chain exists of: cpu_hotplug_lock --> reservation_ww_class_acquire --> reservation_ww_class_mutex [86.875539] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [86.875552] CPU0 CPU1 [86.875563] ---- ---- [86.875573] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [86.875588] lock(reservation_ww_class_acquire); [86.875606] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [86.875624] rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock); [86.875637] *** DEADLOCK *** [86.875650] 3 locks held by i915_module_loa/1432: [86.875663] #0: ffff888101f5c1b0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __driver_attach+0x104/0x220 [86.875699] #1: ffffc90002e0b4a0 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.876512] #2: ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.877305] stack backtrace: [86.877326] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1432 Comm: i915_module_loa Tainted: G U 6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) [86.877334] Tainted: [U]=USER [86.877336] Hardware name: /NUC5CPYB, BIOS PYBSWCEL.86A.0079.2020.0420.1316 04/20/2020 [86.877339] Call Trace: [86.877344] <TASK> [86.877353] dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 [86.877364] dump_stack+0x10/0x20 [86.877369] print_circular_bug+0x285/0x360 [86.877379] check_noncircular+0x135/0x150 [86.877390] __lock_acquire+0x1635/0x2810 [86.877403] lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 [86.877408] ? stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.877422] ? __pfx_bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__cb+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.878173] cpus_read_lock+0x41/0x100 [86.878182] ? stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.878191] ? __pfx_bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__cb+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.878916] stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.878927] bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x3b/0x60 [i915] [86.879652] intel_ggtt_bind_vma+0x43/0x70 [i915] [86.880375] __vma_bind+0x55/0x70 [i915] [86.881133] fence_work+0x26/0xa0 [i915] [86.881851] fence_notify+0xa1/0x140 [i915] [86.882566] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x8f/0x270 [i915] [86.883286] i915_sw_fence_commit+0x39/0x60 [i915] [86.884003] i915_vma_pin_ww+0x462/0x1360 [i915] [86.884756] ? i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x6c/0x1d0 [i915] [86.885513] i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x133/0x1d0 [i915] [86.886281] initial_plane_vma+0x307/0x840 [i915] [86.887049] intel_initial_plane_config+0x33f/0x670 [i915] [86.887819] intel_display_driver_probe_nogem+0x1c6/0x260 [i915] [86.888587] i915_driver_probe+0x7fa/0xe80 [i915] [86.889293] ? mutex_unlock+0x12/0x20 [86.889301] ? drm_privacy_screen_get+0x171/0x190 [86.889308] ? acpi_dev_found+0x66/0x80 [86.889321] i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915] [86.890038] local_pci_probe+0x47/0xb0 [86.890049] pci_device_probe+0xf3/0x260 [86.890058] really_probe+0xf1/0x3c0 [86.890067] __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180 [86.890072] driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0 [86.890078] __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220 [86.890083] ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10 [86.890088] bus_for_each_dev+0x7f/0xe0 [86.890097] driver_attach+0x1e/0x30 [86.890101] bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290 [86.890107] driver_register+0x5e/0x130 [86.890113] __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90 [86.890119] i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915] [86.890833] i915_init+0x37/0x120 [i915] [86.891482] ? __pfx_i915_init+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.892135] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.892145] ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x33f/0x470 [86.892157] do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0 [86.892164] load_module+0x2c54/0x2d80 [86.892168] ? __kernel_read+0x15c/0x300 [86.892185] ? kernel_read_file+0x2b1/0x320 [86.892195] init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.892199] ? init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.892211] idempotent_init_module+0x117/0x330 [86.892224] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100 [86.892230] x64_sys_call+0x24de/0x2660 [86.892236] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.892243] ? irqentry_exit+0x77/0xb0 [86.892249] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x57/0xc0 [86.892256] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.892261] RIP: 0033:0x7303e1b2725d [86.892271] Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 8b bb 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [86.892276] RSP: 002b:00007ffddd1fdb38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 [86.892281] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005d771d88fd90 RCX: 00007303e1b2725d [86.892285] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00005d771d893aa0 RDI: 000000000000000c [86.892287] RBP: 00007ffddd1fdbf0 R08: 0000000000000040 R09: 00007ffddd1fdb80 [86.892289] R10: 00007303e1c03b20 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005d771d893aa0 [86.892292] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00005d771d88f0d0 R15: 00005d771d895710 [86.892304] </TASK> Call asynchronous variant of dma_fence_work_commit() in that case. v3: Provide more verbose in-line comment (Andi), - mention target environments in commit message. Fixes: 7d1c261 ("drm/i915: Take reservation lock around i915_vma_pin.") Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/i915/kernel/-/issues/14985 Cc: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Janusz Krzysztofik <janusz.krzysztofik@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Sebastian Brzezinka <sebastian.brzezinka@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Karas <krzysztof.karas@intel.com> Acked-by: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251023082925.351307-6-janusz.krzysztofik@linux.intel.com (cherry picked from commit 648ef13) Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
ptr1337
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Nov 24, 2025
[ Upstream commit 9d7dfb9 ] Add VMX exit handlers for SEAMCALL and TDCALL to inject a #UD if a non-TD guest attempts to execute SEAMCALL or TDCALL. Neither SEAMCALL nor TDCALL is gated by any software enablement other than VMXON, and so will generate a VM-Exit instead of e.g. a native #UD when executed from the guest kernel. Note! No unprivileged DoS of the L1 kernel is possible as TDCALL and SEAMCALL #GP at CPL > 0, and the CPL check is performed prior to the VMX non-root (VM-Exit) check, i.e. userspace can't crash the VM. And for a nested guest, KVM forwards unknown exits to L1, i.e. an L2 kernel can crash itself, but not L1. Note #2! The Intel® Trust Domain CPU Architectural Extensions spec's pseudocode shows the CPL > 0 check for SEAMCALL coming _after_ the VM-Exit, but that appears to be a documentation bug (likely because the CPL > 0 check was incorrectly bundled with other lower-priority #GP checks). Testing on SPR and EMR shows that the CPL > 0 check is performed before the VMX non-root check, i.e. SEAMCALL #GPs when executed in usermode. Note #3! The aforementioned Trust Domain spec uses confusing pseudocode that says that SEAMCALL will #UD if executed "inSEAM", but "inSEAM" specifically means in SEAM Root Mode, i.e. in the TDX-Module. The long- form description explicitly states that SEAMCALL generates an exit when executed in "SEAM VMX non-root operation". But that's a moot point as the TDX-Module injects #UD if the guest attempts to execute SEAMCALL, as documented in the "Unconditionally Blocked Instructions" section of the TDX-Module base specification. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Cc: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251016182148.69085-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
pongo1231
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Nov 28, 2025
For some reason, of_find_node_with_property() is creating a spinlock recursion issue along with fwnode_count_parents(), and this issue is making all MediaTek boards unbootable. As of kernel v6.18-rc6, there are only three users of this function, one of which is this driver. Migrate away from of_find_node_with_property() by adding a local scpsys_get_legacy_regmap_node() function, which acts similarly to of_find_node_with_property(), and calling the former in place of the latter. This resolves the following spinlock recursion issue: [ 1.773979] BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#2, kworker/u24:1/60 [ 1.790485] lock: devtree_lock+0x0/0x40, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: kworker/u24:1/60, .owner_cpu: 2 [ 1.791644] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 60 Comm: kworker/u24:1 Tainted: G W 6.18.0-rc6 CachyOS#3 PREEMPT [ 1.791649] Tainted: [W]=WARN [ 1.791650] Hardware name: MediaTek Genio-510 EVK (DT) [ 1.791653] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func [ 1.791658] Call trace: [ 1.791659] show_stack+0x18/0x30 (C) [ 1.791664] dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x94 [ 1.791668] dump_stack+0x18/0x24 [ 1.791672] spin_dump+0x78/0x88 [ 1.791678] do_raw_spin_lock+0x110/0x140 [ 1.791684] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x58/0x6c [ 1.791690] of_get_parent+0x28/0x74 [ 1.791694] of_fwnode_get_parent+0x38/0x7c [ 1.791700] fwnode_count_parents+0x34/0xf0 [ 1.791705] fwnode_full_name_string+0x28/0x120 [ 1.791710] device_node_string+0x3e4/0x50c [ 1.791715] pointer+0x294/0x430 [ 1.791718] vsnprintf+0x21c/0x5bc [ 1.791722] vprintk_store+0x108/0x47c [ 1.791728] vprintk_emit+0xc4/0x350 [ 1.791732] vprintk_default+0x34/0x40 [ 1.791736] vprintk+0x24/0x30 [ 1.791740] _printk+0x60/0x8c [ 1.791744] of_node_release+0x154/0x194 [ 1.791749] kobject_put+0xa0/0x120 [ 1.791753] of_node_put+0x18/0x28 [ 1.791756] of_find_node_with_property+0x74/0x100 [ 1.791761] scpsys_probe+0x338/0x5e0 [ 1.791765] platform_probe+0x5c/0xa4 [ 1.791770] really_probe+0xbc/0x2ac [ 1.791774] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x118 [ 1.791779] driver_probe_device+0x3c/0x170 [ 1.791783] __device_attach_driver+0xb8/0x150 [ 1.791788] bus_for_each_drv+0x88/0xe8 [ 1.791792] __device_attach+0x9c/0x1a0 [ 1.791796] device_initial_probe+0x14/0x20 [ 1.791801] bus_probe_device+0xa0/0xa4 [ 1.791805] deferred_probe_work_func+0x88/0xd0 [ 1.791809] process_one_work+0x1e8/0x448 [ 1.791813] worker_thread+0x1ac/0x340 [ 1.791816] kthread+0x138/0x220 [ 1.791821] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Fixes: c29345f ("pmdomain: mediatek: Refactor bus protection regmaps retrieval") Signed-off-by: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno <angelogioacchino.delregno@collabora.com> Tested-by: Louis-Alexis Eyraud <louisalexis.eyraud@collabora.com> Tested-by: Macpaul Lin <macpaul.lin@mediatek.com> Reviewed-by: Macpaul Lin <macpaul.lin@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
pongo1231
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Nov 28, 2025
The U-Blox EVK-M101 enumerates as 1546:0506 [1] with four FTDI interfaces: - EVK-M101 current sensors - EVK-M101 I2C - EVK-M101 UART - EVK-M101 port D Only the third USB interface is a UART. This change lets ftdi_sio probe the VID/PID and registers only interface CachyOS#3 as a TTY, leaving the rest available for other drivers. [1] usb 5-1.3: new high-speed USB device number 11 using xhci_hcd usb 5-1.3: New USB device found, idVendor=1546, idProduct=0506, bcdDevice= 8.00 usb 5-1.3: New USB device strings: Mfr=1, Product=2, SerialNumber=0 usb 5-1.3: Product: EVK-M101 usb 5-1.3: Manufacturer: u-blox AG Datasheet: https://content.u-blox.com/sites/default/files/documents/EVK-M10_UserGuide_UBX-21003949.pdf Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Suvorov <cryosay@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250926060235.3442748-1-cryosay@gmail.com/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
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