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CryptoKey.cpp
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/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "mozilla/dom/CryptoKey.h"
#include <cstddef>
#include <cstring>
#include <memory>
#include <new>
#include <utility>
#include "blapit.h"
#include "certt.h"
#include "js/StructuredClone.h"
#include "js/TypeDecls.h"
#include "keyhi.h"
#include "mozilla/ArrayUtils.h"
#include "mozilla/ErrorResult.h"
#include "mozilla/MacroForEach.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/KeyAlgorithmBinding.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/RootedDictionary.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/SubtleCryptoBinding.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/ToJSValue.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/WebCryptoCommon.h"
#include "nsDebug.h"
#include "nsError.h"
#include "nsLiteralString.h"
#include "nsNSSComponent.h"
#include "nsStringFlags.h"
#include "nsTArray.h"
#include "pk11pub.h"
#include "pkcs11t.h"
#include "plarena.h"
#include "prtypes.h"
#include "secasn1.h"
#include "secasn1t.h"
#include "seccomon.h"
#include "secdert.h"
#include "secitem.h"
#include "secmodt.h"
#include "secoid.h"
#include "secoidt.h"
namespace mozilla::dom {
NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_WRAPPERCACHE(CryptoKey, mGlobal)
NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTING_ADDREF(CryptoKey)
NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTING_RELEASE(CryptoKey)
NS_INTERFACE_MAP_BEGIN_CYCLE_COLLECTION(CryptoKey)
NS_WRAPPERCACHE_INTERFACE_MAP_ENTRY
NS_INTERFACE_MAP_ENTRY(nsISupports)
NS_INTERFACE_MAP_END
nsresult StringToUsage(const nsString& aUsage, CryptoKey::KeyUsage& aUsageOut) {
if (aUsage.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT)) {
aUsageOut = CryptoKey::ENCRYPT;
} else if (aUsage.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT)) {
aUsageOut = CryptoKey::DECRYPT;
} else if (aUsage.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_USAGE_SIGN)) {
aUsageOut = CryptoKey::SIGN;
} else if (aUsage.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY)) {
aUsageOut = CryptoKey::VERIFY;
} else if (aUsage.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_USAGE_DERIVEKEY)) {
aUsageOut = CryptoKey::DERIVEKEY;
} else if (aUsage.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_USAGE_DERIVEBITS)) {
aUsageOut = CryptoKey::DERIVEBITS;
} else if (aUsage.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_USAGE_WRAPKEY)) {
aUsageOut = CryptoKey::WRAPKEY;
} else if (aUsage.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_USAGE_UNWRAPKEY)) {
aUsageOut = CryptoKey::UNWRAPKEY;
} else {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
return NS_OK;
}
// This helper function will release the memory backing a SECKEYPrivateKey and
// any resources acquired in its creation. It will leave the backing PKCS#11
// object untouched, however. This should only be called from
// PrivateKeyFromPrivateKeyTemplate.
static void DestroyPrivateKeyWithoutDestroyingPKCS11Object(
SECKEYPrivateKey* key) {
PK11_FreeSlot(key->pkcs11Slot);
PORT_FreeArena(key->arena, PR_TRUE);
}
// To protect against key ID collisions, PrivateKeyFromPrivateKeyTemplate
// generates a random ID for each key. The given template must contain an
// attribute slot for a key ID, but it must consist of a null pointer and have a
// length of 0.
UniqueSECKEYPrivateKey PrivateKeyFromPrivateKeyTemplate(
CK_ATTRIBUTE* aTemplate, CK_ULONG aTemplateSize) {
// Create a generic object with the contents of the key
UniquePK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalSlot());
if (!slot) {
return nullptr;
}
// Generate a random 160-bit object ID. This ID must be unique.
UniqueSECItem objID(::SECITEM_AllocItem(nullptr, nullptr, 20));
SECStatus rv = PK11_GenerateRandomOnSlot(slot.get(), objID->data, objID->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return nullptr;
}
// Check if something is already using this ID.
SECKEYPrivateKey* preexistingKey =
PK11_FindKeyByKeyID(slot.get(), objID.get(), nullptr);
if (preexistingKey) {
// Note that we can't just call SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey here because that
// will destroy the PKCS#11 object that is backing a preexisting key (that
// we still have a handle on somewhere else in memory). If that object were
// destroyed, cryptographic operations performed by that other key would
// fail.
DestroyPrivateKeyWithoutDestroyingPKCS11Object(preexistingKey);
// Try again with a new ID (but only once - collisions are very unlikely).
rv = PK11_GenerateRandomOnSlot(slot.get(), objID->data, objID->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return nullptr;
}
preexistingKey = PK11_FindKeyByKeyID(slot.get(), objID.get(), nullptr);
if (preexistingKey) {
DestroyPrivateKeyWithoutDestroyingPKCS11Object(preexistingKey);
return nullptr;
}
}
CK_ATTRIBUTE* idAttributeSlot = nullptr;
for (CK_ULONG i = 0; i < aTemplateSize; i++) {
if (aTemplate[i].type == CKA_ID) {
if (aTemplate[i].pValue != nullptr || aTemplate[i].ulValueLen != 0) {
return nullptr;
}
idAttributeSlot = aTemplate + i;
break;
}
}
if (!idAttributeSlot) {
return nullptr;
}
idAttributeSlot->pValue = objID->data;
idAttributeSlot->ulValueLen = objID->len;
UniquePK11GenericObject obj(
PK11_CreateGenericObject(slot.get(), aTemplate, aTemplateSize, PR_FALSE));
// Unset the ID attribute slot's pointer and length so that data that only
// lives for the scope of this function doesn't escape.
idAttributeSlot->pValue = nullptr;
idAttributeSlot->ulValueLen = 0;
if (!obj) {
return nullptr;
}
// Have NSS translate the object to a private key.
return UniqueSECKEYPrivateKey(
PK11_FindKeyByKeyID(slot.get(), objID.get(), nullptr));
}
CryptoKey::CryptoKey(nsIGlobalObject* aGlobal)
: mGlobal(aGlobal),
mAttributes(0),
mSymKey(),
mPrivateKey(nullptr),
mPublicKey(nullptr) {}
JSObject* CryptoKey::WrapObject(JSContext* aCx,
JS::Handle<JSObject*> aGivenProto) {
return CryptoKey_Binding::Wrap(aCx, this, aGivenProto);
}
void CryptoKey::GetType(nsString& aRetVal) const {
uint32_t type = mAttributes & TYPE_MASK;
switch (type) {
case PUBLIC:
aRetVal.AssignLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC);
break;
case PRIVATE:
aRetVal.AssignLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_TYPE_PRIVATE);
break;
case SECRET:
aRetVal.AssignLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_TYPE_SECRET);
break;
}
}
bool CryptoKey::Extractable() const { return (mAttributes & EXTRACTABLE); }
void CryptoKey::GetAlgorithm(JSContext* cx,
JS::MutableHandle<JSObject*> aRetVal,
ErrorResult& aRv) const {
bool converted = false;
JS::Rooted<JS::Value> val(cx);
switch (mAlgorithm.mType) {
case KeyAlgorithmProxy::AES:
converted = ToJSValue(cx, mAlgorithm.mAes, &val);
break;
case KeyAlgorithmProxy::HMAC:
converted = ToJSValue(cx, mAlgorithm.mHmac, &val);
break;
case KeyAlgorithmProxy::RSA: {
RootedDictionary<RsaHashedKeyAlgorithm> rsa(cx);
converted = mAlgorithm.mRsa.ToKeyAlgorithm(cx, rsa);
if (converted) {
converted = ToJSValue(cx, rsa, &val);
}
break;
}
case KeyAlgorithmProxy::EC:
converted = ToJSValue(cx, mAlgorithm.mEc, &val);
break;
}
if (!converted) {
aRv.Throw(NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
return;
}
aRetVal.set(&val.toObject());
}
void CryptoKey::GetUsages(nsTArray<nsString>& aRetVal) const {
if (mAttributes & ENCRYPT) {
aRetVal.AppendElement(
NS_LITERAL_STRING_FROM_CSTRING(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT));
}
if (mAttributes & DECRYPT) {
aRetVal.AppendElement(
NS_LITERAL_STRING_FROM_CSTRING(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT));
}
if (mAttributes & SIGN) {
aRetVal.AppendElement(
NS_LITERAL_STRING_FROM_CSTRING(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_USAGE_SIGN));
}
if (mAttributes & VERIFY) {
aRetVal.AppendElement(
NS_LITERAL_STRING_FROM_CSTRING(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY));
}
if (mAttributes & DERIVEKEY) {
aRetVal.AppendElement(
NS_LITERAL_STRING_FROM_CSTRING(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_USAGE_DERIVEKEY));
}
if (mAttributes & DERIVEBITS) {
aRetVal.AppendElement(
NS_LITERAL_STRING_FROM_CSTRING(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_USAGE_DERIVEBITS));
}
if (mAttributes & WRAPKEY) {
aRetVal.AppendElement(
NS_LITERAL_STRING_FROM_CSTRING(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_USAGE_WRAPKEY));
}
if (mAttributes & UNWRAPKEY) {
aRetVal.AppendElement(
NS_LITERAL_STRING_FROM_CSTRING(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_USAGE_UNWRAPKEY));
}
}
KeyAlgorithmProxy& CryptoKey::Algorithm() { return mAlgorithm; }
const KeyAlgorithmProxy& CryptoKey::Algorithm() const { return mAlgorithm; }
CryptoKey::KeyType CryptoKey::GetKeyType() const {
return static_cast<CryptoKey::KeyType>(mAttributes & TYPE_MASK);
}
nsresult CryptoKey::SetType(const nsString& aType) {
mAttributes &= CLEAR_TYPE;
if (aType.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_TYPE_SECRET)) {
mAttributes |= SECRET;
} else if (aType.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC)) {
mAttributes |= PUBLIC;
} else if (aType.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_TYPE_PRIVATE)) {
mAttributes |= PRIVATE;
} else {
mAttributes |= UNKNOWN;
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
return NS_OK;
}
void CryptoKey::SetType(CryptoKey::KeyType aType) {
mAttributes &= CLEAR_TYPE;
mAttributes |= aType;
}
void CryptoKey::SetExtractable(bool aExtractable) {
mAttributes &= CLEAR_EXTRACTABLE;
if (aExtractable) {
mAttributes |= EXTRACTABLE;
}
}
// NSS exports private EC keys without the CKA_EC_POINT attribute, i.e. the
// public value. To properly export the private key to JWK or PKCS #8 we need
// the public key data though and so we use this method to augment a private
// key with data from the given public key.
nsresult CryptoKey::AddPublicKeyData(SECKEYPublicKey* aPublicKey) {
// This should be a private key.
MOZ_ASSERT(GetKeyType() == PRIVATE);
// There should be a private NSS key with type 'EC'.
MOZ_ASSERT(mPrivateKey && mPrivateKey->keyType == ecKey);
// The given public key should have the same key type.
MOZ_ASSERT(aPublicKey->keyType == mPrivateKey->keyType);
// Read EC params.
ScopedAutoSECItem params;
SECStatus rv = PK11_ReadRawAttribute(PK11_TypePrivKey, mPrivateKey.get(),
CKA_EC_PARAMS, ¶ms);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// Read private value.
ScopedAutoSECItem value;
rv = PK11_ReadRawAttribute(PK11_TypePrivKey, mPrivateKey.get(), CKA_VALUE,
&value);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
SECItem* point = &aPublicKey->u.ec.publicValue;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS privateKeyValue = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
CK_BBOOL falseValue = CK_FALSE;
CK_KEY_TYPE ecValue = CKK_EC;
CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[9] = {
{CKA_CLASS, &privateKeyValue, sizeof(privateKeyValue)},
{CKA_KEY_TYPE, &ecValue, sizeof(ecValue)},
{CKA_TOKEN, &falseValue, sizeof(falseValue)},
{CKA_SENSITIVE, &falseValue, sizeof(falseValue)},
{CKA_PRIVATE, &falseValue, sizeof(falseValue)},
// PrivateKeyFromPrivateKeyTemplate sets the ID.
{CKA_ID, nullptr, 0},
{CKA_EC_PARAMS, params.data, params.len},
{CKA_EC_POINT, point->data, point->len},
{CKA_VALUE, value.data, value.len},
};
mPrivateKey =
PrivateKeyFromPrivateKeyTemplate(keyTemplate, ArrayLength(keyTemplate));
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(mPrivateKey, NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
return NS_OK;
}
void CryptoKey::ClearUsages() { mAttributes &= CLEAR_USAGES; }
nsresult CryptoKey::AddUsage(const nsString& aUsage) {
KeyUsage usage;
if (NS_FAILED(StringToUsage(aUsage, usage))) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
MOZ_ASSERT(usage & USAGES_MASK, "Usages should be valid");
// This is harmless if usage is 0, so we don't repeat the assertion check
AddUsage(usage);
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult CryptoKey::AddAllowedUsage(const nsString& aUsage,
const nsString& aAlgorithm) {
return AddAllowedUsageIntersecting(aUsage, aAlgorithm, USAGES_MASK);
}
nsresult CryptoKey::AddAllowedUsageIntersecting(const nsString& aUsage,
const nsString& aAlgorithm,
uint32_t aUsageMask) {
uint32_t allowedUsages = GetAllowedUsagesForAlgorithm(aAlgorithm);
KeyUsage usage;
if (NS_FAILED(StringToUsage(aUsage, usage))) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
if ((usage & allowedUsages) != usage) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
MOZ_ASSERT(usage & USAGES_MASK, "Usages should be valid");
// This is harmless if usage is 0, so we don't repeat the assertion check
if (usage & aUsageMask) {
AddUsage(usage);
return NS_OK;
}
return NS_OK;
}
void CryptoKey::AddUsage(CryptoKey::KeyUsage aUsage) { mAttributes |= aUsage; }
bool CryptoKey::HasAnyUsage() { return !!(mAttributes & USAGES_MASK); }
bool CryptoKey::HasUsage(CryptoKey::KeyUsage aUsage) {
return !!(mAttributes & aUsage);
}
bool CryptoKey::HasUsageOtherThan(uint32_t aUsages) {
return !!(mAttributes & USAGES_MASK & ~aUsages);
}
bool CryptoKey::IsRecognizedUsage(const nsString& aUsage) {
KeyUsage dummy;
nsresult rv = StringToUsage(aUsage, dummy);
return NS_SUCCEEDED(rv);
}
bool CryptoKey::AllUsagesRecognized(const Sequence<nsString>& aUsages) {
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < aUsages.Length(); ++i) {
if (!IsRecognizedUsage(aUsages[i])) {
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
uint32_t CryptoKey::GetAllowedUsagesForAlgorithm(const nsString& aAlgorithm) {
uint32_t allowedUsages = 0;
if (aAlgorithm.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR) ||
aAlgorithm.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC) ||
aAlgorithm.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM) ||
aAlgorithm.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP)) {
allowedUsages = ENCRYPT | DECRYPT | WRAPKEY | UNWRAPKEY;
} else if (aAlgorithm.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_KW)) {
allowedUsages = WRAPKEY | UNWRAPKEY;
} else if (aAlgorithm.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HMAC) ||
aAlgorithm.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1) ||
aAlgorithm.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_PSS) ||
aAlgorithm.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDSA)) {
allowedUsages = SIGN | VERIFY;
} else if (aAlgorithm.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDH) ||
aAlgorithm.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HKDF) ||
aAlgorithm.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_PBKDF2)) {
allowedUsages = DERIVEBITS | DERIVEKEY;
}
return allowedUsages;
}
nsresult CryptoKey::SetSymKey(const CryptoBuffer& aSymKey) {
if (!mSymKey.Assign(aSymKey)) {
return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult CryptoKey::SetPrivateKey(SECKEYPrivateKey* aPrivateKey) {
if (!aPrivateKey) {
mPrivateKey = nullptr;
return NS_OK;
}
mPrivateKey = UniqueSECKEYPrivateKey(SECKEY_CopyPrivateKey(aPrivateKey));
return mPrivateKey ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
nsresult CryptoKey::SetPublicKey(SECKEYPublicKey* aPublicKey) {
if (!aPublicKey) {
mPublicKey = nullptr;
return NS_OK;
}
mPublicKey = UniqueSECKEYPublicKey(SECKEY_CopyPublicKey(aPublicKey));
return mPublicKey ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
const CryptoBuffer& CryptoKey::GetSymKey() const { return mSymKey; }
UniqueSECKEYPrivateKey CryptoKey::GetPrivateKey() const {
if (!mPrivateKey) {
return nullptr;
}
return UniqueSECKEYPrivateKey(SECKEY_CopyPrivateKey(mPrivateKey.get()));
}
UniqueSECKEYPublicKey CryptoKey::GetPublicKey() const {
if (!mPublicKey) {
return nullptr;
}
return UniqueSECKEYPublicKey(SECKEY_CopyPublicKey(mPublicKey.get()));
}
// Serialization and deserialization convenience methods
UniqueSECKEYPrivateKey CryptoKey::PrivateKeyFromPkcs8(CryptoBuffer& aKeyData) {
UniquePK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalSlot());
if (!slot) {
return nullptr;
}
UniquePLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
if (!arena) {
return nullptr;
}
SECItem pkcs8Item = {siBuffer, nullptr, 0};
if (!aKeyData.ToSECItem(arena.get(), &pkcs8Item)) {
return nullptr;
}
// Allow everything, we enforce usage ourselves
unsigned int usage = KU_ALL;
SECKEYPrivateKey* privKey;
SECStatus rv = PK11_ImportDERPrivateKeyInfoAndReturnKey(
slot.get(), &pkcs8Item, nullptr, nullptr, false, false, usage, &privKey,
nullptr);
if (rv == SECFailure) {
return nullptr;
}
return UniqueSECKEYPrivateKey(privKey);
}
UniqueSECKEYPublicKey CryptoKey::PublicKeyFromSpki(CryptoBuffer& aKeyData) {
UniquePLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
if (!arena) {
return nullptr;
}
SECItem spkiItem = {siBuffer, nullptr, 0};
if (!aKeyData.ToSECItem(arena.get(), &spkiItem)) {
return nullptr;
}
UniqueCERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo spki(
SECKEY_DecodeDERSubjectPublicKeyInfo(&spkiItem));
if (!spki) {
return nullptr;
}
bool isECDHAlgorithm =
SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual(&SEC_OID_DATA_EC_DH, &spki->algorithm.algorithm);
// Check for |id-ecDH|. Per old versions of the WebCrypto spec we must
// support this OID but NSS does unfortunately not know it. Let's
// change the algorithm to |id-ecPublicKey| to make NSS happy.
if (isECDHAlgorithm) {
SECOidTag oid = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY;
SECOidData* oidData = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(oid);
if (!oidData) {
return nullptr;
}
SECStatus rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(spki->arena, &spki->algorithm.algorithm,
&oidData->oid);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return nullptr;
}
}
UniqueSECKEYPublicKey tmp(SECKEY_ExtractPublicKey(spki.get()));
if (!tmp.get() || !PublicKeyValid(tmp.get())) {
return nullptr;
}
return UniqueSECKEYPublicKey(SECKEY_CopyPublicKey(tmp.get()));
}
nsresult CryptoKey::PrivateKeyToPkcs8(SECKEYPrivateKey* aPrivKey,
CryptoBuffer& aRetVal) {
UniqueSECItem pkcs8Item(PK11_ExportDERPrivateKeyInfo(aPrivKey, nullptr));
if (!pkcs8Item.get()) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
}
if (!aRetVal.Assign(pkcs8Item.get())) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult CryptoKey::PublicKeyToSpki(SECKEYPublicKey* aPubKey,
CryptoBuffer& aRetVal) {
UniqueCERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo spki;
spki.reset(SECKEY_CreateSubjectPublicKeyInfo(aPubKey));
if (!spki) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
const SEC_ASN1Template* tpl = SEC_ASN1_GET(CERT_SubjectPublicKeyInfoTemplate);
UniqueSECItem spkiItem(SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(nullptr, nullptr, spki.get(), tpl));
if (!aRetVal.Assign(spkiItem.get())) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
return NS_OK;
}
SECItem* CreateECPointForCoordinates(const CryptoBuffer& aX,
const CryptoBuffer& aY,
PLArenaPool* aArena) {
// Check that both points have the same length.
if (aX.Length() != aY.Length()) {
return nullptr;
}
// Create point.
SECItem* point =
::SECITEM_AllocItem(aArena, nullptr, aX.Length() + aY.Length() + 1);
if (!point) {
return nullptr;
}
// Set point data.
point->data[0] = EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED;
memcpy(point->data + 1, aX.Elements(), aX.Length());
memcpy(point->data + 1 + aX.Length(), aY.Elements(), aY.Length());
return point;
}
UniqueSECKEYPrivateKey CryptoKey::PrivateKeyFromJwk(const JsonWebKey& aJwk) {
CK_OBJECT_CLASS privateKeyValue = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
CK_BBOOL falseValue = CK_FALSE;
if (aJwk.mKty.EqualsLiteral(JWK_TYPE_EC)) {
// Verify that all of the required parameters are present
CryptoBuffer x, y, d;
if (!aJwk.mCrv.WasPassed() || !aJwk.mX.WasPassed() ||
NS_FAILED(x.FromJwkBase64(aJwk.mX.Value())) || !aJwk.mY.WasPassed() ||
NS_FAILED(y.FromJwkBase64(aJwk.mY.Value())) || !aJwk.mD.WasPassed() ||
NS_FAILED(d.FromJwkBase64(aJwk.mD.Value()))) {
return nullptr;
}
nsString namedCurve;
if (!NormalizeToken(aJwk.mCrv.Value(), namedCurve)) {
return nullptr;
}
UniquePLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
if (!arena) {
return nullptr;
}
// Create parameters.
SECItem* params = CreateECParamsForCurve(namedCurve, arena.get());
if (!params) {
return nullptr;
}
SECItem* ecPoint = CreateECPointForCoordinates(x, y, arena.get());
if (!ecPoint) {
return nullptr;
}
// Populate template from parameters
CK_KEY_TYPE ecValue = CKK_EC;
CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[9] = {
{CKA_CLASS, &privateKeyValue, sizeof(privateKeyValue)},
{CKA_KEY_TYPE, &ecValue, sizeof(ecValue)},
{CKA_TOKEN, &falseValue, sizeof(falseValue)},
{CKA_SENSITIVE, &falseValue, sizeof(falseValue)},
{CKA_PRIVATE, &falseValue, sizeof(falseValue)},
// PrivateKeyFromPrivateKeyTemplate sets the ID.
{CKA_ID, nullptr, 0},
{CKA_EC_PARAMS, params->data, params->len},
{CKA_EC_POINT, ecPoint->data, ecPoint->len},
{CKA_VALUE, (void*)d.Elements(), (CK_ULONG)d.Length()},
};
return PrivateKeyFromPrivateKeyTemplate(keyTemplate,
ArrayLength(keyTemplate));
}
if (aJwk.mKty.EqualsLiteral(JWK_TYPE_RSA)) {
// Verify that all of the required parameters are present
CryptoBuffer n, e, d, p, q, dp, dq, qi;
if (!aJwk.mN.WasPassed() || NS_FAILED(n.FromJwkBase64(aJwk.mN.Value())) ||
!aJwk.mE.WasPassed() || NS_FAILED(e.FromJwkBase64(aJwk.mE.Value())) ||
!aJwk.mD.WasPassed() || NS_FAILED(d.FromJwkBase64(aJwk.mD.Value())) ||
!aJwk.mP.WasPassed() || NS_FAILED(p.FromJwkBase64(aJwk.mP.Value())) ||
!aJwk.mQ.WasPassed() || NS_FAILED(q.FromJwkBase64(aJwk.mQ.Value())) ||
!aJwk.mDp.WasPassed() ||
NS_FAILED(dp.FromJwkBase64(aJwk.mDp.Value())) ||
!aJwk.mDq.WasPassed() ||
NS_FAILED(dq.FromJwkBase64(aJwk.mDq.Value())) ||
!aJwk.mQi.WasPassed() ||
NS_FAILED(qi.FromJwkBase64(aJwk.mQi.Value()))) {
return nullptr;
}
// Populate template from parameters
CK_KEY_TYPE rsaValue = CKK_RSA;
CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[14] = {
{CKA_CLASS, &privateKeyValue, sizeof(privateKeyValue)},
{CKA_KEY_TYPE, &rsaValue, sizeof(rsaValue)},
{CKA_TOKEN, &falseValue, sizeof(falseValue)},
{CKA_SENSITIVE, &falseValue, sizeof(falseValue)},
{CKA_PRIVATE, &falseValue, sizeof(falseValue)},
// PrivateKeyFromPrivateKeyTemplate sets the ID.
{CKA_ID, nullptr, 0},
{CKA_MODULUS, (void*)n.Elements(), (CK_ULONG)n.Length()},
{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void*)e.Elements(), (CK_ULONG)e.Length()},
{CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void*)d.Elements(), (CK_ULONG)d.Length()},
{CKA_PRIME_1, (void*)p.Elements(), (CK_ULONG)p.Length()},
{CKA_PRIME_2, (void*)q.Elements(), (CK_ULONG)q.Length()},
{CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void*)dp.Elements(), (CK_ULONG)dp.Length()},
{CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void*)dq.Elements(), (CK_ULONG)dq.Length()},
{CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void*)qi.Elements(), (CK_ULONG)qi.Length()},
};
return PrivateKeyFromPrivateKeyTemplate(keyTemplate,
ArrayLength(keyTemplate));
}
return nullptr;
}
bool ReadAndEncodeAttribute(SECKEYPrivateKey* aKey,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE aAttribute,
Optional<nsString>& aDst) {
ScopedAutoSECItem item;
if (PK11_ReadRawAttribute(PK11_TypePrivKey, aKey, aAttribute, &item) !=
SECSuccess) {
return false;
}
CryptoBuffer buffer;
if (!buffer.Assign(&item)) {
return false;
}
if (NS_FAILED(buffer.ToJwkBase64(aDst.Value()))) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
bool ECKeyToJwk(const PK11ObjectType aKeyType, void* aKey,
const SECItem* aEcParams, const SECItem* aPublicValue,
JsonWebKey& aRetVal) {
aRetVal.mX.Construct();
aRetVal.mY.Construct();
// Check that the given EC parameters are valid.
if (!CheckEncodedECParameters(aEcParams)) {
return false;
}
// Construct the OID tag.
SECItem oid = {siBuffer, nullptr, 0};
oid.len = aEcParams->data[1];
oid.data = aEcParams->data + 2;
uint32_t flen;
switch (SECOID_FindOIDTag(&oid)) {
case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP256R1:
flen = 32; // bytes
aRetVal.mCrv.Construct(
NS_LITERAL_STRING_FROM_CSTRING(WEBCRYPTO_NAMED_CURVE_P256));
break;
case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP384R1:
flen = 48; // bytes
aRetVal.mCrv.Construct(
NS_LITERAL_STRING_FROM_CSTRING(WEBCRYPTO_NAMED_CURVE_P384));
break;
case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP521R1:
flen = 66; // bytes
aRetVal.mCrv.Construct(
NS_LITERAL_STRING_FROM_CSTRING(WEBCRYPTO_NAMED_CURVE_P521));
break;
default:
return false;
}
// No support for compressed points.
if (aPublicValue->data[0] != EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED) {
return false;
}
// Check length of uncompressed point coordinates.
if (aPublicValue->len != (2 * flen + 1)) {
return false;
}
UniqueSECItem ecPointX(::SECITEM_AllocItem(nullptr, nullptr, flen));
UniqueSECItem ecPointY(::SECITEM_AllocItem(nullptr, nullptr, flen));
if (!ecPointX || !ecPointY) {
return false;
}
// Extract point data.
memcpy(ecPointX->data, aPublicValue->data + 1, flen);
memcpy(ecPointY->data, aPublicValue->data + 1 + flen, flen);
CryptoBuffer x, y;
if (!x.Assign(ecPointX.get()) ||
NS_FAILED(x.ToJwkBase64(aRetVal.mX.Value())) ||
!y.Assign(ecPointY.get()) ||
NS_FAILED(y.ToJwkBase64(aRetVal.mY.Value()))) {
return false;
}
aRetVal.mKty = NS_LITERAL_STRING_FROM_CSTRING(JWK_TYPE_EC);
return true;
}
nsresult CryptoKey::PrivateKeyToJwk(SECKEYPrivateKey* aPrivKey,
JsonWebKey& aRetVal) {
switch (aPrivKey->keyType) {
case rsaKey: {
aRetVal.mN.Construct();
aRetVal.mE.Construct();
aRetVal.mD.Construct();
aRetVal.mP.Construct();
aRetVal.mQ.Construct();
aRetVal.mDp.Construct();
aRetVal.mDq.Construct();
aRetVal.mQi.Construct();
if (!ReadAndEncodeAttribute(aPrivKey, CKA_MODULUS, aRetVal.mN) ||
!ReadAndEncodeAttribute(aPrivKey, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, aRetVal.mE) ||
!ReadAndEncodeAttribute(aPrivKey, CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, aRetVal.mD) ||
!ReadAndEncodeAttribute(aPrivKey, CKA_PRIME_1, aRetVal.mP) ||
!ReadAndEncodeAttribute(aPrivKey, CKA_PRIME_2, aRetVal.mQ) ||
!ReadAndEncodeAttribute(aPrivKey, CKA_EXPONENT_1, aRetVal.mDp) ||
!ReadAndEncodeAttribute(aPrivKey, CKA_EXPONENT_2, aRetVal.mDq) ||
!ReadAndEncodeAttribute(aPrivKey, CKA_COEFFICIENT, aRetVal.mQi)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
aRetVal.mKty = NS_LITERAL_STRING_FROM_CSTRING(JWK_TYPE_RSA);
return NS_OK;
}
case ecKey: {
// Read EC params.
ScopedAutoSECItem params;
SECStatus rv = PK11_ReadRawAttribute(PK11_TypePrivKey, aPrivKey,
CKA_EC_PARAMS, ¶ms);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// Read public point Q.
ScopedAutoSECItem ecPoint;
rv = PK11_ReadRawAttribute(PK11_TypePrivKey, aPrivKey, CKA_EC_POINT,
&ecPoint);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
if (!ECKeyToJwk(PK11_TypePrivKey, aPrivKey, ¶ms, &ecPoint, aRetVal)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
aRetVal.mD.Construct();
// Read private value.
if (!ReadAndEncodeAttribute(aPrivKey, CKA_VALUE, aRetVal.mD)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
return NS_OK;
}
default:
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
}
}
UniqueSECKEYPublicKey CreateECPublicKey(const SECItem* aKeyData,
const nsAString& aNamedCurve) {
UniquePLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
if (!arena) {
return nullptr;
}
// It's important that this be a UniqueSECKEYPublicKey, as this ensures that
// SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey will be called on it. If this doesn't happen, when
// CryptoKey::PublicKeyValid is called on it and it gets moved to the internal
// PKCS#11 slot, it will leak a reference to the slot.
UniqueSECKEYPublicKey key(PORT_ArenaZNew(arena.get(), SECKEYPublicKey));
if (!key) {
return nullptr;
}
// Transfer arena ownership to the key.
key->arena = arena.release();
key->keyType = ecKey;
key->pkcs11Slot = nullptr;
key->pkcs11ID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
// Create curve parameters.
SECItem* params = CreateECParamsForCurve(aNamedCurve, key->arena);
if (!params) {
return nullptr;
}
key->u.ec.DEREncodedParams = *params;
// Set public point.
SECStatus ret =
SECITEM_CopyItem(key->arena, &key->u.ec.publicValue, aKeyData);
if (NS_WARN_IF(ret != SECSuccess)) {
return nullptr;
}
// Ensure the given point is on the curve.
if (!CryptoKey::PublicKeyValid(key.get())) {
return nullptr;
}
return key;
}
UniqueSECKEYPublicKey CryptoKey::PublicKeyFromJwk(const JsonWebKey& aJwk) {
if (aJwk.mKty.EqualsLiteral(JWK_TYPE_RSA)) {
// Verify that all of the required parameters are present
CryptoBuffer n, e;
if (!aJwk.mN.WasPassed() || NS_FAILED(n.FromJwkBase64(aJwk.mN.Value())) ||
!aJwk.mE.WasPassed() || NS_FAILED(e.FromJwkBase64(aJwk.mE.Value()))) {
return nullptr;
}
// Transcode to a DER RSAPublicKey structure
struct RSAPublicKeyData {
SECItem n;
SECItem e;
};
const RSAPublicKeyData input = {
{siUnsignedInteger, n.Elements(), (unsigned int)n.Length()},
{siUnsignedInteger, e.Elements(), (unsigned int)e.Length()}};
const SEC_ASN1Template rsaPublicKeyTemplate[] = {
{SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE, 0, nullptr, sizeof(RSAPublicKeyData)},
{
SEC_ASN1_INTEGER,
offsetof(RSAPublicKeyData, n),
},
{
SEC_ASN1_INTEGER,
offsetof(RSAPublicKeyData, e),
},
{
0,
}};
UniqueSECItem pkDer(
SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(nullptr, nullptr, &input, rsaPublicKeyTemplate));
if (!pkDer.get()) {
return nullptr;
}
return UniqueSECKEYPublicKey(
SECKEY_ImportDERPublicKey(pkDer.get(), CKK_RSA));
}
if (aJwk.mKty.EqualsLiteral(JWK_TYPE_EC)) {
// Verify that all of the required parameters are present
CryptoBuffer x, y;
if (!aJwk.mCrv.WasPassed() || !aJwk.mX.WasPassed() ||
NS_FAILED(x.FromJwkBase64(aJwk.mX.Value())) || !aJwk.mY.WasPassed() ||
NS_FAILED(y.FromJwkBase64(aJwk.mY.Value()))) {
return nullptr;
}
UniquePLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
if (!arena) {
return nullptr;
}
// Create point.
SECItem* point = CreateECPointForCoordinates(x, y, arena.get());
if (!point) {
return nullptr;
}
nsString namedCurve;
if (!NormalizeToken(aJwk.mCrv.Value(), namedCurve)) {
return nullptr;
}
return CreateECPublicKey(point, namedCurve);
}
return nullptr;
}
nsresult CryptoKey::PublicKeyToJwk(SECKEYPublicKey* aPubKey,
JsonWebKey& aRetVal) {
switch (aPubKey->keyType) {
case rsaKey: {
CryptoBuffer n, e;
aRetVal.mN.Construct();
aRetVal.mE.Construct();
if (!n.Assign(&aPubKey->u.rsa.modulus) ||
!e.Assign(&aPubKey->u.rsa.publicExponent) ||
NS_FAILED(n.ToJwkBase64(aRetVal.mN.Value())) ||
NS_FAILED(e.ToJwkBase64(aRetVal.mE.Value()))) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
aRetVal.mKty = NS_LITERAL_STRING_FROM_CSTRING(JWK_TYPE_RSA);
return NS_OK;
}
case ecKey:
if (!ECKeyToJwk(PK11_TypePubKey, aPubKey, &aPubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams,
&aPubKey->u.ec.publicValue, aRetVal)) {