Clarification: patient re-id in MBS-PBS data

Author: vteague

README.md

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ If you are one of the many people who gave up their spare time to find and fix b
 
 But the important point is this: **Not one thing that has dismayed the tech community about COVIDSafe is unique to COVIDSafe.** 
 
-Rejection of superior technology to select an inferior design for political reasons?  Consider the [Trusted Digital Identity Framework’s](https://www.dta.gov.au/our-projects/digital-identity/trusted-digital-identity-framework) rejection of a public key infrastructure.  Lying to Parliament?  When an official from the commonwealth Department of Health was [asked by a Senate committee about the easy re-identification of Medicare-PBS data published by her department](https://t.co/cdzlOJVRrT?amp=1), she denied it was easily re-identifiable and admitted only that “it was asserted to be possible to access some very limited encryption,” despite re-identification being a [simple matter of basic database querying that had nothing to do with encryption](https://arxiv.org/abs/1712.05627).  [Dismissing concerns](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-08-14/voters-in-act-election-could-have-ballot-choices-identified/10115670) even after they were conclusively demonstrated? [Misleading users?](https://www.elections.nsw.gov.au/About-us/Media-centre/News-media-releases/NSW-Electoral-Commission-iVote-and-Swiss-Post) Pressuring a university into silencing open discussion of its flaws? None of these are COVIDSafe-related innovations.
+Rejection of superior technology to select an inferior design for political reasons?  Consider the [Trusted Digital Identity Framework’s](https://www.dta.gov.au/our-projects/digital-identity/trusted-digital-identity-framework) rejection of a public key infrastructure.  Lying to Parliament?  When an official from the commonwealth Department of Health was [asked by a Senate committee about the easy re-identification of patients in Medicare-PBS data published by her department](https://t.co/cdzlOJVRrT?amp=1), she denied it was easily re-identifiable and admitted only that “it was asserted to be possible to access some very limited encryption,” despite re-identification being a [simple matter of basic database querying that had nothing to do with encryption](https://arxiv.org/abs/1712.05627).  [Dismissing concerns](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-08-14/voters-in-act-election-could-have-ballot-choices-identified/10115670) even after they were conclusively demonstrated? [Misleading users?](https://www.elections.nsw.gov.au/About-us/Media-centre/News-media-releases/NSW-Electoral-Commission-iVote-and-Swiss-Post) Pressuring a university into silencing open discussion of its flaws? None of these are COVIDSafe-related innovations.
 
 Not even the decision to throw out months of free expert labour and corrected bugs, and start again from scratch, is unique to COVIDSafe.  Elections ACT did exactly the same thing this year, replacing an open-source version of their counting code that had been extensively reviewed and corrected, with a hastily-implemented [buggy version](https://github.com/SiliconEconometrics/PublicService/blob/master/CountVotes/2020%20Errors%20In%20ACT%20Counting.pdf) just before the election.