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Apple M1 WDT support #4
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Alright, let's see how this workflow works for us. Thanks for the first PR :-)
I don't know much about the watchdog subsystem. I've essentially just commented on general things based on the reviews I got on my upstreaming attempts so far.
Tested, and it appears to work with the current version.
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Should I squash commits, or would we do that when merging? |
Please squash into the logical series. (We can't do that automatically when merging). For this PR, that means three commits: Subject: [PATCH 1/7] watchdog: apple_wdt: Add support for Apple M1 WDT with the other 4 commits squashed into those 3 as appropriate. |
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/watchdog/apple,t8103-wdt.yaml
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To this best of my abilities |
there's typo in the dt-binding commit message where you have .txt instead of .yml (and I think you can drop the whole "apple,wdt.txt" part anyway). LGTM otherwise! edit: oh, and maybe run checkpatch.pl to be really sure and add the two files under the "ARM/APPLE MACHINE SUPPORT" in MAINTAINERS. |
This is the watchdog timer on Apple M1 systems. It is the standard way of rebooting these systems. Signed-off-by: Pip Cet <pipcet@gmail.com>
Thank you very much! |
Nice! Looks good now i think. I’d merge it but given that Marcan wants to built some automatic rebasing hooks and create some feature branches I think it makes sense to wait for that. I think this could be submitted to upstream as well now :-) |
drivers/watchdog/apple_wdt.c
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wd->ops = &apple_wdt_ops; | ||
wd->info = &apple_wdt_info; | ||
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wdt->reg = devm_ioremap_resource(dev, res); |
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You could use the helper devm_platform_ioremap_resource(pdev, 0)
to replace platform_get_resource
followed by devm_ioremap_resource
.
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Thank you very much! Done, please let me know if you notice anything else that's odd.
This is the watchdog timer on Apple M1 systems. It is the standard way of rebooting these systems. Signed-off-by: Pip Cet <pipcet@gmail.com>
This is the watchdog timer on Apple M1 systems. It is the standard way of rebooting these systems. Signed-off-by: Pip Cet <pipcet@gmail.com>
The ordering of MSI-X enable in hardware is dysfunctional: 1) MSI-X is disabled in the control register 2) Various setup functions 3) pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs() is invoked which ends up accessing the MSI-X table entries 4) MSI-X is enabled and masked in the control register with the comment that enabling is required for some hardware to access the MSI-X table Step #4 obviously contradicts #3. The history of this is an issue with the NIU hardware. When #4 was introduced the table access actually happened in msix_program_entries() which was invoked after enabling and masking MSI-X. This was changed in commit d71d643 ("PCI/MSI: Kill redundant call of irq_set_msi_desc() for MSI-X interrupts") which removed the table write from msix_program_entries(). Interestingly enough nobody noticed and either NIU still works or it did not get any testing with a kernel 3.19 or later. Nevertheless this is inconsistent and there is no reason why MSI-X can't be enabled and masked in the control register early on, i.e. move step #4 above to step #1. This preserves the NIU workaround and has no side effects on other hardware. Fixes: d71d643 ("PCI/MSI: Kill redundant call of irq_set_msi_desc() for MSI-X interrupts") Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210729222542.344136412@linutronix.de
We update the ctime/mtime of a block device when we remove it so that blkid knows the device changed. However we do this by re-opening the block device and calling filp_update_time. This is more correct because it'll call the inode->i_op->update_time if it exists, but the block dev inodes do not do this. Instead call generic_update_time() on the bd_inode in order to avoid the blkdev_open path and get rid of the following lockdep splat: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.14.0-rc2+ torvalds#406 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ losetup/11596 is trying to acquire lock: ffff939640d2f538 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: flush_workqueue+0x67/0x5e0 but task is already holding lock: ffff939655510c68 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x41/0x660 [loop] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #4 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7d/0x750 lo_open+0x28/0x60 [loop] blkdev_get_whole+0x25/0xf0 blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0x168/0x3c0 blkdev_open+0xd2/0xe0 do_dentry_open+0x161/0x390 path_openat+0x3cc/0xa20 do_filp_open+0x96/0x120 do_sys_openat2+0x7b/0x130 __x64_sys_openat+0x46/0x70 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #3 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7d/0x750 blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0x56/0x3c0 blkdev_open+0xd2/0xe0 do_dentry_open+0x161/0x390 path_openat+0x3cc/0xa20 do_filp_open+0x96/0x120 file_open_name+0xc7/0x170 filp_open+0x2c/0x50 btrfs_scratch_superblocks.part.0+0x10f/0x170 btrfs_rm_device.cold+0xe8/0xed btrfs_ioctl+0x2a31/0x2e70 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x80/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #2 (sb_writers#12){.+.+}-{0:0}: lo_write_bvec+0xc2/0x240 [loop] loop_process_work+0x238/0xd00 [loop] process_one_work+0x26b/0x560 worker_thread+0x55/0x3c0 kthread+0x140/0x160 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #1 ((work_completion)(&lo->rootcg_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: process_one_work+0x245/0x560 worker_thread+0x55/0x3c0 kthread+0x140/0x160 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #0 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x10ea/0x1d90 lock_acquire+0xb5/0x2b0 flush_workqueue+0x91/0x5e0 drain_workqueue+0xa0/0x110 destroy_workqueue+0x36/0x250 __loop_clr_fd+0x9a/0x660 [loop] block_ioctl+0x3f/0x50 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x80/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (wq_completion)loop0 --> &disk->open_mutex --> &lo->lo_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&lo->lo_mutex); lock(&disk->open_mutex); lock(&lo->lo_mutex); lock((wq_completion)loop0); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by losetup/11596: #0: ffff939655510c68 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x41/0x660 [loop] stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 11596 Comm: losetup Not tainted 5.14.0-rc2+ torvalds#406 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x72 check_noncircular+0xcf/0xf0 ? stack_trace_save+0x3b/0x50 __lock_acquire+0x10ea/0x1d90 lock_acquire+0xb5/0x2b0 ? flush_workqueue+0x67/0x5e0 ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x47/0x220 flush_workqueue+0x91/0x5e0 ? flush_workqueue+0x67/0x5e0 ? verify_cpu+0xf0/0x100 drain_workqueue+0xa0/0x110 destroy_workqueue+0x36/0x250 __loop_clr_fd+0x9a/0x660 [loop] ? blkdev_ioctl+0x8d/0x2a0 block_ioctl+0x3f/0x50 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x80/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
When removing the device we call blkdev_put() on the device once we've removed it, and because we have an EXCL open we need to take the ->open_mutex on the block device to clean it up. Unfortunately during device remove we are holding the sb writers lock, which results in the following lockdep splat: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.14.0-rc2+ torvalds#407 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ losetup/11595 is trying to acquire lock: ffff973ac35dd138 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: flush_workqueue+0x67/0x5e0 but task is already holding lock: ffff973ac9812c68 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x41/0x660 [loop] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #4 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7d/0x750 lo_open+0x28/0x60 [loop] blkdev_get_whole+0x25/0xf0 blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0x168/0x3c0 blkdev_open+0xd2/0xe0 do_dentry_open+0x161/0x390 path_openat+0x3cc/0xa20 do_filp_open+0x96/0x120 do_sys_openat2+0x7b/0x130 __x64_sys_openat+0x46/0x70 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #3 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7d/0x750 blkdev_put+0x3a/0x220 btrfs_rm_device.cold+0x62/0xe5 btrfs_ioctl+0x2a31/0x2e70 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x80/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #2 (sb_writers#12){.+.+}-{0:0}: lo_write_bvec+0xc2/0x240 [loop] loop_process_work+0x238/0xd00 [loop] process_one_work+0x26b/0x560 worker_thread+0x55/0x3c0 kthread+0x140/0x160 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #1 ((work_completion)(&lo->rootcg_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: process_one_work+0x245/0x560 worker_thread+0x55/0x3c0 kthread+0x140/0x160 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #0 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x10ea/0x1d90 lock_acquire+0xb5/0x2b0 flush_workqueue+0x91/0x5e0 drain_workqueue+0xa0/0x110 destroy_workqueue+0x36/0x250 __loop_clr_fd+0x9a/0x660 [loop] block_ioctl+0x3f/0x50 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x80/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (wq_completion)loop0 --> &disk->open_mutex --> &lo->lo_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&lo->lo_mutex); lock(&disk->open_mutex); lock(&lo->lo_mutex); lock((wq_completion)loop0); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by losetup/11595: #0: ffff973ac9812c68 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x41/0x660 [loop] stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 11595 Comm: losetup Not tainted 5.14.0-rc2+ torvalds#407 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x72 check_noncircular+0xcf/0xf0 ? stack_trace_save+0x3b/0x50 __lock_acquire+0x10ea/0x1d90 lock_acquire+0xb5/0x2b0 ? flush_workqueue+0x67/0x5e0 ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x47/0x220 flush_workqueue+0x91/0x5e0 ? flush_workqueue+0x67/0x5e0 ? verify_cpu+0xf0/0x100 drain_workqueue+0xa0/0x110 destroy_workqueue+0x36/0x250 __loop_clr_fd+0x9a/0x660 [loop] ? blkdev_ioctl+0x8d/0x2a0 block_ioctl+0x3f/0x50 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x80/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7fc21255d4cb So instead save the bdev and do the put once we've dropped the sb writers lock in order to avoid the lockdep recursion. Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
If CONFIG_BLK_DEV_LOOP && CONFIG_MTD (at least; there might be other combinations), lockdep complains circular locking dependency at __loop_clr_fd(), for major_names_lock serves as a locking dependency aggregating hub across multiple block modules. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.14.0+ torvalds#757 Tainted: G E ------------------------------------------------------ systemd-udevd/7568 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88800f334d48 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 but task is already holding lock: ffff888014a7d4a0 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x4d/0x400 [loop] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #6 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_killable_nested+0x17/0x20 lo_open+0x23/0x50 [loop] blkdev_get_by_dev+0x199/0x540 blkdev_open+0x58/0x90 do_dentry_open+0x144/0x3a0 path_openat+0xa57/0xda0 do_filp_open+0x9f/0x140 do_sys_openat2+0x71/0x150 __x64_sys_openat+0x78/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #5 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x20 bd_register_pending_holders+0x20/0x100 device_add_disk+0x1ae/0x390 loop_add+0x29c/0x2d0 [loop] blk_request_module+0x5a/0xb0 blkdev_get_no_open+0x27/0xa0 blkdev_get_by_dev+0x5f/0x540 blkdev_open+0x58/0x90 do_dentry_open+0x144/0x3a0 path_openat+0xa57/0xda0 do_filp_open+0x9f/0x140 do_sys_openat2+0x71/0x150 __x64_sys_openat+0x78/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #4 (major_names_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x20 blkdev_show+0x19/0x80 devinfo_show+0x52/0x60 seq_read_iter+0x2d5/0x3e0 proc_reg_read_iter+0x41/0x80 vfs_read+0x2ac/0x330 ksys_read+0x6b/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #3 (&p->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 __mutex_lock_common+0xb6/0xe10 mutex_lock_nested+0x17/0x20 seq_read_iter+0x37/0x3e0 generic_file_splice_read+0xf3/0x170 splice_direct_to_actor+0x14e/0x350 do_splice_direct+0x84/0xd0 do_sendfile+0x263/0x430 __se_sys_sendfile64+0x96/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #2 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 lo_write_bvec+0x96/0x280 [loop] loop_process_work+0xa68/0xc10 [loop] process_one_work+0x293/0x480 worker_thread+0x23d/0x4b0 kthread+0x163/0x180 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #1 ((work_completion)(&lo->rootcg_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 process_one_work+0x280/0x480 worker_thread+0x23d/0x4b0 kthread+0x163/0x180 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #0 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}: validate_chain+0x1f0d/0x33e0 __lock_acquire+0x92d/0x1030 lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 flush_workqueue+0x8c/0x560 drain_workqueue+0x80/0x140 destroy_workqueue+0x47/0x4f0 __loop_clr_fd+0xb4/0x400 [loop] blkdev_put+0x14a/0x1d0 blkdev_close+0x1c/0x20 __fput+0xfd/0x220 task_work_run+0x69/0xc0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1ce/0x1f0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (wq_completion)loop0 --> &disk->open_mutex --> &lo->lo_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&lo->lo_mutex); lock(&disk->open_mutex); lock(&lo->lo_mutex); lock((wq_completion)loop0); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by systemd-udevd/7568: #0: ffff888012554128 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: blkdev_put+0x4c/0x1d0 #1: ffff888014a7d4a0 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x4d/0x400 [loop] stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 7568 Comm: systemd-udevd Tainted: G E 5.14.0+ torvalds#757 Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 02/27/2020 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x79/0xbf print_circular_bug+0x5d6/0x5e0 ? stack_trace_save+0x42/0x60 ? save_trace+0x3d/0x2d0 check_noncircular+0x10b/0x120 validate_chain+0x1f0d/0x33e0 ? __lock_acquire+0x953/0x1030 ? __lock_acquire+0x953/0x1030 __lock_acquire+0x92d/0x1030 ? flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 lock_acquire+0xbe/0x1f0 ? flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 flush_workqueue+0x8c/0x560 ? flush_workqueue+0x70/0x560 ? sched_clock_cpu+0xe/0x1a0 ? drain_workqueue+0x41/0x140 drain_workqueue+0x80/0x140 destroy_workqueue+0x47/0x4f0 ? blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait+0xac/0xd0 __loop_clr_fd+0xb4/0x400 [loop] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x35/0x230 blkdev_put+0x14a/0x1d0 blkdev_close+0x1c/0x20 __fput+0xfd/0x220 task_work_run+0x69/0xc0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1ce/0x1f0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f0fd4c661f7 Code: 00 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 41 c3 48 83 ec 18 89 7c 24 0c e8 13 fc ff ff RSP: 002b:00007ffd1c9e9fd8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007f0fd46be6c8 RCX: 00007f0fd4c661f7 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 0000000000000006 R08: 000055fff1eaf400 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f0fd46be6c8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000002f08 R15: 00007ffd1c9ea050 Commit 1c500ad ("loop: reduce the loop_ctl_mutex scope") is for breaking "loop_ctl_mutex => &lo->lo_mutex" dependency chain. But enabling a different block module results in forming circular locking dependency due to shared major_names_lock mutex. The simplest fix is to call probe function without holding major_names_lock [1], but Christoph Hellwig does not like such idea. Therefore, instead of holding major_names_lock in blkdev_show(), introduce a different lock for blkdev_show() in order to break "sb_writers#$N => &p->lock => major_names_lock" dependency chain. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b2af8a5b-3c1b-204e-7f56-bea0b15848d6@i-love.sakura.ne.jp [1] Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/18a02da2-0bf3-550e-b071-2b4ab13c49f0@i-love.sakura.ne.jp Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
The tcpci_irq() may meet below NULL pointer dereference issue: [ 2.641851] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000010 [ 2.641951] status 0x1, 0x37f [ 2.650659] Mem abort info: [ 2.656490] ESR = 0x0000000096000004 [ 2.660230] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 2.665532] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 2.668579] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 2.671715] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 2.676584] Data abort info: [ 2.679459] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 2.684936] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 2.689980] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 2.695284] [0000000000000010] user address but active_mm is swapper [ 2.701632] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 2.707883] Modules linked in: [ 2.710936] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 87 Comm: irq/111-2-0051 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-06316-g7f63786ad3d1-dirty #4 [ 2.720570] Hardware name: NXP i.MX93 11X11 EVK board (DT) [ 2.726040] pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 2.732989] pc : tcpci_irq+0x38/0x318 [ 2.736647] lr : _tcpci_irq+0x14/0x20 [ 2.740295] sp : ffff80008324bd30 [ 2.743597] x29: ffff80008324bd70 x28: ffff800080107894 x27: ffff800082198f70 [ 2.750721] x26: ffff0000050e6680 x25: ffff000004d172ac x24: ffff0000050f0000 [ 2.757845] x23: ffff000004d17200 x22: 0000000000000001 x21: ffff0000050f0000 [ 2.764969] x20: ffff000004d17200 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000001 [ 2.772093] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffff80008183d8a0 x15: ffff00007fbab040 [ 2.779217] x14: ffff00007fb918c0 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 000000000000017a [ 2.786341] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: 0000000000000a90 x9 : ffff80008324bd00 [ 2.793465] x8 : ffff0000050f0af0 x7 : ffff00007fbaa840 x6 : 0000000000000031 [ 2.800589] x5 : 000000000000017a x4 : 0000000000000002 x3 : 0000000000000002 [ 2.807713] x2 : ffff80008324bd3a x1 : 0000000000000010 x0 : 0000000000000000 [ 2.814838] Call trace: [ 2.817273] tcpci_irq+0x38/0x318 [ 2.820583] _tcpci_irq+0x14/0x20 [ 2.823885] irq_thread_fn+0x2c/0xa8 [ 2.827456] irq_thread+0x16c/0x2f4 [ 2.830940] kthread+0x110/0x114 [ 2.834164] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 2.837738] Code: f9426420 f9001fe0 d2800000 52800201 (f9400a60) This may happen on shared irq case. Such as two Type-C ports share one irq. After the first port finished tcpci_register_port(), it may trigger interrupt. However, if the interrupt comes by chance the 2nd port finishes devm_request_threaded_irq(), the 2nd port interrupt handler will run at first. Then the above issue happens due to tcpci is still a NULL pointer in tcpci_irq() when dereference to regmap. devm_request_threaded_irq() <-- port1 irq comes disable_irq(client->irq); tcpci_register_port() This will restore the logic to the state before commit (77e8510 "usb: typec: tcpci: support edge irq"). However, moving tcpci_register_port() earlier creates a problem when use edge irq because tcpci_init() will be called before devm_request_threaded_irq(). The tcpci_init() writes the ALERT_MASK to the hardware to tell it to start generating interrupts but we're not ready to deal with them yet, then the ALERT events may be missed and ALERT line will not recover to high level forever. To avoid the issue, this will also set ALERT_MASK register after devm_request_threaded_irq() return. Fixes: 77e8510 ("usb: typec: tcpci: support edge irq") Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> Tested-by: Emanuele Ghidoli <emanuele.ghidoli@toradex.com> Signed-off-by: Xu Yang <xu.yang_2@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Francesco Dolcini <francesco.dolcini@toradex.com> Reviewed-by: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241218095328.2604607-1-xu.yang_2@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
syzbot reports that a recent fix causes nesting issues between the (now) raw timeoutlock and the eventfd locking: ============================= [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] 6.13.0-rc4-00080-g9828a4c0901f #29 Not tainted ----------------------------- kworker/u32:0/68094 is trying to lock: ffff000014d7a520 (&ctx->wqh#2){..-.}-{3:3}, at: eventfd_signal_mask+0x64/0x180 other info that might help us debug this: context-{5:5} 6 locks held by kworker/u32:0/68094: #0: ffff0000c1d98148 ((wq_completion)iou_exit){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x4e8/0xfc0 #1: ffff80008d927c78 ((work_completion)(&ctx->exit_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x53c/0xfc0 #2: ffff0000c59bc3d8 (&ctx->completion_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: io_kill_timeouts+0x40/0x180 #3: ffff0000c59bc358 (&ctx->timeout_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: io_kill_timeouts+0x48/0x180 #4: ffff800085127aa0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire+0x8/0x38 #5: ffff800085127aa0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire+0x8/0x38 stack backtrace: CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 68094 Comm: kworker/u32:0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4-00080-g9828a4c0901f #29 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Workqueue: iou_exit io_ring_exit_work Call trace: show_stack+0x1c/0x30 (C) __dump_stack+0x24/0x30 dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x80 dump_stack+0x14/0x20 __lock_acquire+0x19f8/0x60c8 lock_acquire+0x1a4/0x540 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x90/0xd0 eventfd_signal_mask+0x64/0x180 io_eventfd_signal+0x64/0x108 io_req_local_work_add+0x294/0x430 __io_req_task_work_add+0x1c0/0x270 io_kill_timeout+0x1f0/0x288 io_kill_timeouts+0xd4/0x180 io_uring_try_cancel_requests+0x2e8/0x388 io_ring_exit_work+0x150/0x550 process_one_work+0x5e8/0xfc0 worker_thread+0x7ec/0xc80 kthread+0x24c/0x300 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 because after the preempt-rt fix for the timeout lock nesting inside the io-wq lock, we now have the eventfd spinlock nesting inside the raw timeout spinlock. Rather than play whack-a-mole with other nesting on the timeout lock, split the deletion and killing of timeouts so queueing the task_work for the timeout cancelations can get done outside of the timeout lock. Reported-by: syzbot+b1fc199a40b65d601b65@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 020b40f ("io_uring: make ctx->timeout_lock a raw spinlock") Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
…le_direct_reclaim() The task sometimes continues looping in throttle_direct_reclaim() because allow_direct_reclaim(pgdat) keeps returning false. #0 [ffff80002cb6f8d0] __switch_to at ffff8000080095ac #1 [ffff80002cb6f900] __schedule at ffff800008abbd1c #2 [ffff80002cb6f990] schedule at ffff800008abc50c #3 [ffff80002cb6f9b0] throttle_direct_reclaim at ffff800008273550 #4 [ffff80002cb6fa20] try_to_free_pages at ffff800008277b68 #5 [ffff80002cb6fae0] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffff8000082c4660 #6 [ffff80002cb6fc50] alloc_pages_vma at ffff8000082e4a98 #7 [ffff80002cb6fca0] do_anonymous_page at ffff80000829f5a8 #8 [ffff80002cb6fce0] __handle_mm_fault at ffff8000082a5974 #9 [ffff80002cb6fd90] handle_mm_fault at ffff8000082a5bd4 At this point, the pgdat contains the following two zones: NODE: 4 ZONE: 0 ADDR: ffff00817fffe540 NAME: "DMA32" SIZE: 20480 MIN/LOW/HIGH: 11/28/45 VM_STAT: NR_FREE_PAGES: 359 NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_ANON: 18813 NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_ANON: 0 NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_FILE: 50 NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_FILE: 0 NR_ZONE_UNEVICTABLE: 0 NR_ZONE_WRITE_PENDING: 0 NR_MLOCK: 0 NR_BOUNCE: 0 NR_ZSPAGES: 0 NR_FREE_CMA_PAGES: 0 NODE: 4 ZONE: 1 ADDR: ffff00817fffec00 NAME: "Normal" SIZE: 8454144 PRESENT: 98304 MIN/LOW/HIGH: 68/166/264 VM_STAT: NR_FREE_PAGES: 146 NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_ANON: 94668 NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_ANON: 3 NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_FILE: 735 NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_FILE: 78 NR_ZONE_UNEVICTABLE: 0 NR_ZONE_WRITE_PENDING: 0 NR_MLOCK: 0 NR_BOUNCE: 0 NR_ZSPAGES: 0 NR_FREE_CMA_PAGES: 0 In allow_direct_reclaim(), while processing ZONE_DMA32, the sum of inactive/active file-backed pages calculated in zone_reclaimable_pages() based on the result of zone_page_state_snapshot() is zero. Additionally, since this system lacks swap, the calculation of inactive/ active anonymous pages is skipped. crash> p nr_swap_pages nr_swap_pages = $1937 = { counter = 0 } As a result, ZONE_DMA32 is deemed unreclaimable and skipped, moving on to the processing of the next zone, ZONE_NORMAL, despite ZONE_DMA32 having free pages significantly exceeding the high watermark. The problem is that the pgdat->kswapd_failures hasn't been incremented. crash> px ((struct pglist_data *) 0xffff00817fffe540)->kswapd_failures $1935 = 0x0 This is because the node deemed balanced. The node balancing logic in balance_pgdat() evaluates all zones collectively. If one or more zones (e.g., ZONE_DMA32) have enough free pages to meet their watermarks, the entire node is deemed balanced. This causes balance_pgdat() to exit early before incrementing the kswapd_failures, as it considers the overall memory state acceptable, even though some zones (like ZONE_NORMAL) remain under significant pressure. The patch ensures that zone_reclaimable_pages() includes free pages (NR_FREE_PAGES) in its calculation when no other reclaimable pages are available (e.g., file-backed or anonymous pages). This change prevents zones like ZONE_DMA32, which have sufficient free pages, from being mistakenly deemed unreclaimable. By doing so, the patch ensures proper node balancing, avoids masking pressure on other zones like ZONE_NORMAL, and prevents infinite loops in throttle_direct_reclaim() caused by allow_direct_reclaim(pgdat) repeatedly returning false. The kernel hangs due to a task stuck in throttle_direct_reclaim(), caused by a node being incorrectly deemed balanced despite pressure in certain zones, such as ZONE_NORMAL. This issue arises from zone_reclaimable_pages() returning 0 for zones without reclaimable file- backed or anonymous pages, causing zones like ZONE_DMA32 with sufficient free pages to be skipped. The lack of swap or reclaimable pages results in ZONE_DMA32 being ignored during reclaim, masking pressure in other zones. Consequently, pgdat->kswapd_failures remains 0 in balance_pgdat(), preventing fallback mechanisms in allow_direct_reclaim() from being triggered, leading to an infinite loop in throttle_direct_reclaim(). This patch modifies zone_reclaimable_pages() to account for free pages (NR_FREE_PAGES) when no other reclaimable pages exist. This ensures zones with sufficient free pages are not skipped, enabling proper balancing and reclaim behavior. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style cleanups] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241130164346.436469-1-snishika@redhat.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241130161236.433747-2-snishika@redhat.com Fixes: 5a1c84b ("mm: remove reclaim and compaction retry approximations") Signed-off-by: Seiji Nishikawa <snishika@redhat.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
…nt message Address a bug in the kernel that triggers a "sleeping function called from invalid context" warning when /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak is printed under specific conditions: - CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT=y - Set SELinux as the LSM for the system - Set kptr_restrict to 1 - kmemleak buffer contains at least one item BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:48 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 136, name: cat preempt_count: 1, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 2, expected: 2 6 locks held by cat/136: #0: ffff32e64bcbf950 (&p->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: seq_read_iter+0xb8/0xe30 #1: ffffafe6aaa9dea0 (scan_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kmemleak_seq_start+0x34/0x128 #3: ffff32e6546b1cd0 (&object->lock){....}-{2:2}, at: kmemleak_seq_show+0x3c/0x1e0 #4: ffffafe6aa8d8560 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: has_ns_capability_noaudit+0x8/0x1b0 #5: ffffafe6aabbc0f8 (notif_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: avc_compute_av+0xc4/0x3d0 irq event stamp: 136660 hardirqs last enabled at (136659): [<ffffafe6a80fd7a0>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0xa8/0xd8 hardirqs last disabled at (136660): [<ffffafe6a80fd85c>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x8c/0xb0 softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffafe6a5d50b28>] copy_process+0x11d8/0x3df8 softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 Preemption disabled at: [<ffffafe6a6598a4c>] kmemleak_seq_show+0x3c/0x1e0 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 136 Comm: cat Tainted: G E 6.11.0-rt7+ #34 Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0xa0/0x128 show_stack+0x1c/0x30 dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x198 dump_stack+0x18/0x20 rt_spin_lock+0x8c/0x1a8 avc_perm_nonode+0xa0/0x150 cred_has_capability.isra.0+0x118/0x218 selinux_capable+0x50/0x80 security_capable+0x7c/0xd0 has_ns_capability_noaudit+0x94/0x1b0 has_capability_noaudit+0x20/0x30 restricted_pointer+0x21c/0x4b0 pointer+0x298/0x760 vsnprintf+0x330/0xf70 seq_printf+0x178/0x218 print_unreferenced+0x1a4/0x2d0 kmemleak_seq_show+0xd0/0x1e0 seq_read_iter+0x354/0xe30 seq_read+0x250/0x378 full_proxy_read+0xd8/0x148 vfs_read+0x190/0x918 ksys_read+0xf0/0x1e0 __arm64_sys_read+0x70/0xa8 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0xd4/0x1d8 el0_svc+0x50/0x158 el0t_64_sync+0x17c/0x180 %pS and %pK, in the same back trace line, are redundant, and %pS can void %pK service in certain contexts. %pS alone already provides the necessary information, and if it cannot resolve the symbol, it falls back to printing the raw address voiding the original intent behind the %pK. Additionally, %pK requires a privilege check CAP_SYSLOG enforced through the LSM, which can trigger a "sleeping function called from invalid context" warning under RT_PREEMPT kernels when the check occurs in an atomic context. This issue may also affect other LSMs. This change avoids the unnecessary privilege check and resolves the sleeping function warning without any loss of information. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241217142032.55793-1-acarmina@redhat.com Fixes: 3a6f33d ("mm/kmemleak: use %pK to display kernel pointers in backtrace") Signed-off-by: Alessandro Carminati <acarmina@redhat.com> Acked-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Clément Léger <clement.leger@bootlin.com> Cc: Alessandro Carminati <acarmina@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Chanudet <echanude@redhat.com> Cc: Gabriele Paoloni <gpaoloni@redhat.com> Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
irq_chip functions may be called in raw spinlock context. Therefore, we must also use a raw spinlock for our own internal locking. This fixes the following lockdep splat: [ 5.349336] ============================= [ 5.353349] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] [ 5.357361] 6.13.0-rc5+ #69 Tainted: G W [ 5.363031] ----------------------------- [ 5.367045] kworker/u17:1/44 is trying to lock: [ 5.371587] ffffff88018b02c0 (&chip->gpio_lock){....}-{3:3}, at: xgpio_irq_unmask (drivers/gpio/gpio-xilinx.c:433 (discriminator 8)) [ 5.380079] other info that might help us debug this: [ 5.385138] context-{5:5} [ 5.387762] 5 locks held by kworker/u17:1/44: [ 5.392123] #0: ffffff8800014958 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3204) [ 5.402260] #1: ffffffc082fcbdd8 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3205) [ 5.411528] #2: ffffff880172c900 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __device_attach (drivers/base/dd.c:1006) [ 5.419929] #3: ffffff88039c8268 (request_class#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __setup_irq (kernel/irq/internals.h:156 kernel/irq/manage.c:1596) [ 5.428331] #4: ffffff88039c80c8 (lock_class#2){....}-{2:2}, at: __setup_irq (kernel/irq/manage.c:1614) [ 5.436472] stack backtrace: [ 5.439359] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 44 Comm: kworker/u17:1 Tainted: G W 6.13.0-rc5+ #69 [ 5.448690] Tainted: [W]=WARN [ 5.451656] Hardware name: xlnx,zynqmp (DT) [ 5.455845] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func [ 5.461699] Call trace: [ 5.464147] show_stack+0x18/0x24 C [ 5.467821] dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123) [ 5.471501] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:130) [ 5.474824] __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4828 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4898 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5176) [ 5.478758] lock_acquire (arch/arm64/include/asm/percpu.h:40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:467 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5814) [ 5.482429] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave (include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:111 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162) [ 5.486797] xgpio_irq_unmask (drivers/gpio/gpio-xilinx.c:433 (discriminator 8)) [ 5.490737] irq_enable (kernel/irq/internals.h:236 kernel/irq/chip.c:170 kernel/irq/chip.c:439 kernel/irq/chip.c:432 kernel/irq/chip.c:345) [ 5.494060] __irq_startup (kernel/irq/internals.h:241 kernel/irq/chip.c:180 kernel/irq/chip.c:250) [ 5.497645] irq_startup (kernel/irq/chip.c:270) [ 5.501143] __setup_irq (kernel/irq/manage.c:1807) [ 5.504728] request_threaded_irq (kernel/irq/manage.c:2208) Fixes: a32c7ca ("gpio: gpio-xilinx: Add interrupt support") Signed-off-by: Sean Anderson <sean.anderson@linux.dev> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250110163354.2012654-1-sean.anderson@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@linaro.org>
This commit addresses a circular locking dependency issue within the GFX isolation mechanism. The problem was identified by a warning indicating a potential deadlock due to inconsistent lock acquisition order. - The `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use` and `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_end_use` functions previously acquired `enforce_isolation_mutex` and called `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl`, leading to potential deadlocks. ie., If `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` is called while `enforce_isolation_mutex` is held, and `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler` is called while `kfd_sch_mutex` is held, it can create a circular dependency. By ensuring consistent lock usage, this fix resolves the issue: [ 606.297333] ====================================================== [ 606.297343] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 606.297353] 6.10.0-amd-mlkd-610-311224-lof #19 Tainted: G OE [ 606.297365] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 606.297375] kworker/u96:3/3825 is trying to acquire lock: [ 606.297385] ffff9aa64e431cb8 ((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x232/0x610 [ 606.297413] but task is already holding lock: [ 606.297423] ffff9aa64e432338 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.297725] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 606.297738] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 606.297749] -> #2 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 606.297765] __mutex_lock+0x85/0x930 [ 606.297776] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 606.297786] amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.298007] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.298225] amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu] [ 606.298412] amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu] [ 606.298603] amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu] [ 606.298866] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched] [ 606.298880] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680 [ 606.298890] worker_thread+0x190/0x350 [ 606.298899] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 606.298908] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 606.298919] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 606.298929] -> #1 (&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 606.298947] __mutex_lock+0x85/0x930 [ 606.298956] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 606.298966] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler+0x87/0x370 [amdgpu] [ 606.299190] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680 [ 606.299199] worker_thread+0x190/0x350 [ 606.299208] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 606.299217] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 606.299227] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 606.299236] -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 606.299257] __lock_acquire+0x16f9/0x2810 [ 606.299267] lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300 [ 606.299276] __flush_work+0x250/0x610 [ 606.299286] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x71/0x80 [ 606.299296] amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x287/0x4d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.299509] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.299723] amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu] [ 606.299909] amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu] [ 606.300101] amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu] [ 606.300355] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched] [ 606.300369] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680 [ 606.300378] worker_thread+0x190/0x350 [ 606.300387] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 606.300396] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 606.300406] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 606.300416] other info that might help us debug this: [ 606.300428] Chain exists of: (work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work) --> &adev->enforce_isolation_mutex --> &adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex [ 606.300458] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 606.300468] CPU0 CPU1 [ 606.300476] ---- ---- [ 606.300484] lock(&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex); [ 606.300494] lock(&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex); [ 606.300508] lock(&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex); [ 606.300521] lock((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)); [ 606.300536] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 606.300546] 5 locks held by kworker/u96:3/3825: [ 606.300555] #0: ffff9aa5aa1f5d58 ((wq_completion)comp_1.1.0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x3f5/0x680 [ 606.300577] #1: ffffaa53c3c97e40 ((work_completion)(&sched->work_run_job)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1d6/0x680 [ 606.300600] #2: ffff9aa64e463c98 (&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x1c3/0x5d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.300837] #3: ffff9aa64e432338 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.301062] #4: ffffffff8c1a5660 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __flush_work+0x70/0x610 [ 606.301083] stack backtrace: [ 606.301092] CPU: 14 PID: 3825 Comm: kworker/u96:3 Tainted: G OE 6.10.0-amd-mlkd-610-311224-lof #19 [ 606.301109] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. X570S GAMING X/X570S GAMING X, BIOS F7 03/22/2024 [ 606.301124] Workqueue: comp_1.1.0 drm_sched_run_job_work [gpu_sched] [ 606.301140] Call Trace: [ 606.301146] <TASK> [ 606.301154] dump_stack_lvl+0x9b/0xf0 [ 606.301166] dump_stack+0x10/0x20 [ 606.301175] print_circular_bug+0x26c/0x340 [ 606.301187] check_noncircular+0x157/0x170 [ 606.301197] ? register_lock_class+0x48/0x490 [ 606.301213] __lock_acquire+0x16f9/0x2810 [ 606.301230] lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300 [ 606.301239] ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610 [ 606.301250] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 606.301261] ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90 [ 606.301274] ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610 [ 606.301284] __flush_work+0x250/0x610 [ 606.301293] ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610 [ 606.301305] ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10 [ 606.301318] ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90 [ 606.301331] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 606.301345] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x71/0x80 [ 606.301356] amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x287/0x4d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.301661] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.302050] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 606.302069] amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu] [ 606.302452] amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu] [ 606.302862] ? drm_sched_entity_error+0x82/0x190 [gpu_sched] [ 606.302890] amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu] [ 606.303366] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched] [ 606.303388] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680 [ 606.303409] worker_thread+0x190/0x350 [ 606.303424] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 606.303437] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 606.303449] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 606.303463] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 606.303476] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 606.303489] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 606.303512] </TASK> v2: Refactor lock handling to resolve circular dependency (Alex) - Introduced a `sched_work` flag to defer the call to `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` until after releasing `enforce_isolation_mutex`. - This change ensures that `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` is called outside the critical section, preventing the circular dependency and deadlock. - The `sched_work` flag is set within the mutex-protected section if conditions are met, and the actual function call is made afterward. - This approach ensures consistent lock acquisition order. Fixes: afefd6f ("drm/amdgpu: Implement Enforce Isolation Handler for KGD/KFD serialization") Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam <srinivasan.shanmugam@amd.com> Suggested-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> (cherry picked from commit 0b6b2dd) Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Attempt to enable IPsec packet offload in tunnel mode in debug kernel generates the following kernel panic, which is happening due to two issues: 1. In SA add section, the should be _bh() variant when marking SA mode. 2. There is not needed flush_workqueue in SA delete routine. It is not needed as at this stage as it is removed from SADB and the running work will be canceled later in SA free. ===================================================== WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected 6.12.0+ #4 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- charon/1337 [HC0[0]:SC0[4]:HE1:SE0] is trying to acquire: ffff88810f365020 (&xa->xa_lock#24){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_xfrm_del_state+0xca/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] and this task is already holding: ffff88813e0f0d48 (&x->lock){+.-.}-{3:3}, at: xfrm_state_delete+0x16/0x30 which would create a new lock dependency: (&x->lock){+.-.}-{3:3} -> (&xa->xa_lock#24){+.+.}-{3:3} but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock: (&x->lock){+.-.}-{3:3} ... which became SOFTIRQ-irq-safe at: lock_acquire+0x1be/0x520 _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40 xfrm_timer_handler+0x91/0xd70 __hrtimer_run_queues+0x1dd/0xa60 hrtimer_run_softirq+0x146/0x2e0 handle_softirqs+0x266/0x860 irq_exit_rcu+0x115/0x1a0 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6e/0x90 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20 default_idle+0x13/0x20 default_idle_call+0x67/0xa0 do_idle+0x2da/0x320 cpu_startup_entry+0x50/0x60 start_secondary+0x213/0x2a0 common_startup_64+0x129/0x138 to a SOFTIRQ-irq-unsafe lock: (&xa->xa_lock#24){+.+.}-{3:3} ... which became SOFTIRQ-irq-unsafe at: ... lock_acquire+0x1be/0x520 _raw_spin_lock+0x2c/0x40 xa_set_mark+0x70/0x110 mlx5e_xfrm_add_state+0xe48/0x2290 [mlx5_core] xfrm_dev_state_add+0x3bb/0xd70 xfrm_add_sa+0x2451/0x4a90 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x493/0x880 netlink_rcv_skb+0x12e/0x380 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x6d/0x90 netlink_unicast+0x42f/0x740 netlink_sendmsg+0x745/0xbe0 __sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 __sys_sendto+0x1fe/0x2c0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 other info that might help us debug this: Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&xa->xa_lock#24); local_irq_disable(); lock(&x->lock); lock(&xa->xa_lock#24); <Interrupt> lock(&x->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by charon/1337: #0: ffffffff87f8f858 (&net->xfrm.xfrm_cfg_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x5e/0x90 #1: ffff88813e0f0d48 (&x->lock){+.-.}-{3:3}, at: xfrm_state_delete+0x16/0x30 the dependencies between SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock and the holding lock: -> (&x->lock){+.-.}-{3:3} ops: 29 { HARDIRQ-ON-W at: lock_acquire+0x1be/0x520 _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40 xfrm_alloc_spi+0xc0/0xe60 xfrm_alloc_userspi+0x5f6/0xbc0 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x493/0x880 netlink_rcv_skb+0x12e/0x380 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x6d/0x90 netlink_unicast+0x42f/0x740 netlink_sendmsg+0x745/0xbe0 __sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 __sys_sendto+0x1fe/0x2c0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 IN-SOFTIRQ-W at: lock_acquire+0x1be/0x520 _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40 xfrm_timer_handler+0x91/0xd70 __hrtimer_run_queues+0x1dd/0xa60 hrtimer_run_softirq+0x146/0x2e0 handle_softirqs+0x266/0x860 irq_exit_rcu+0x115/0x1a0 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6e/0x90 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20 default_idle+0x13/0x20 default_idle_call+0x67/0xa0 do_idle+0x2da/0x320 cpu_startup_entry+0x50/0x60 start_secondary+0x213/0x2a0 common_startup_64+0x129/0x138 INITIAL USE at: lock_acquire+0x1be/0x520 _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40 xfrm_alloc_spi+0xc0/0xe60 xfrm_alloc_userspi+0x5f6/0xbc0 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x493/0x880 netlink_rcv_skb+0x12e/0x380 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x6d/0x90 netlink_unicast+0x42f/0x740 netlink_sendmsg+0x745/0xbe0 __sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 __sys_sendto+0x1fe/0x2c0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 } ... key at: [<ffffffff87f9cd20>] __key.18+0x0/0x40 the dependencies between the lock to be acquired and SOFTIRQ-irq-unsafe lock: -> (&xa->xa_lock#24){+.+.}-{3:3} ops: 9 { HARDIRQ-ON-W at: lock_acquire+0x1be/0x520 _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40 mlx5e_xfrm_add_state+0xc5b/0x2290 [mlx5_core] xfrm_dev_state_add+0x3bb/0xd70 xfrm_add_sa+0x2451/0x4a90 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x493/0x880 netlink_rcv_skb+0x12e/0x380 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x6d/0x90 netlink_unicast+0x42f/0x740 netlink_sendmsg+0x745/0xbe0 __sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 __sys_sendto+0x1fe/0x2c0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 SOFTIRQ-ON-W at: lock_acquire+0x1be/0x520 _raw_spin_lock+0x2c/0x40 xa_set_mark+0x70/0x110 mlx5e_xfrm_add_state+0xe48/0x2290 [mlx5_core] xfrm_dev_state_add+0x3bb/0xd70 xfrm_add_sa+0x2451/0x4a90 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x493/0x880 netlink_rcv_skb+0x12e/0x380 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x6d/0x90 netlink_unicast+0x42f/0x740 netlink_sendmsg+0x745/0xbe0 __sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 __sys_sendto+0x1fe/0x2c0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 INITIAL USE at: lock_acquire+0x1be/0x520 _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40 mlx5e_xfrm_add_state+0xc5b/0x2290 [mlx5_core] xfrm_dev_state_add+0x3bb/0xd70 xfrm_add_sa+0x2451/0x4a90 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x493/0x880 netlink_rcv_skb+0x12e/0x380 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x6d/0x90 netlink_unicast+0x42f/0x740 netlink_sendmsg+0x745/0xbe0 __sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 __sys_sendto+0x1fe/0x2c0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 } ... key at: [<ffffffffa078ff60>] __key.48+0x0/0xfffffffffff210a0 [mlx5_core] ... acquired at: __lock_acquire+0x30a0/0x5040 lock_acquire+0x1be/0x520 _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40 mlx5e_xfrm_del_state+0xca/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] xfrm_dev_state_delete+0x90/0x160 __xfrm_state_delete+0x662/0xae0 xfrm_state_delete+0x1e/0x30 xfrm_del_sa+0x1c2/0x340 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x493/0x880 netlink_rcv_skb+0x12e/0x380 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x6d/0x90 netlink_unicast+0x42f/0x740 netlink_sendmsg+0x745/0xbe0 __sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 __sys_sendto+0x1fe/0x2c0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 stack backtrace: CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 1337 Comm: charon Not tainted 6.12.0+ #4 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x74/0xd0 check_irq_usage+0x12e8/0x1d90 ? print_shortest_lock_dependencies_backwards+0x1b0/0x1b0 ? check_chain_key+0x1bb/0x4c0 ? __lockdep_reset_lock+0x180/0x180 ? check_path.constprop.0+0x24/0x50 ? mark_lock+0x108/0x2fb0 ? print_circular_bug+0x9b0/0x9b0 ? mark_lock+0x108/0x2fb0 ? print_usage_bug.part.0+0x670/0x670 ? check_prev_add+0x1c4/0x2310 check_prev_add+0x1c4/0x2310 __lock_acquire+0x30a0/0x5040 ? lockdep_set_lock_cmp_fn+0x190/0x190 ? lockdep_set_lock_cmp_fn+0x190/0x190 lock_acquire+0x1be/0x520 ? mlx5e_xfrm_del_state+0xca/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400 ? __xfrm_state_delete+0x5f0/0xae0 ? lock_downgrade+0x6b0/0x6b0 _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x34/0x40 ? mlx5e_xfrm_del_state+0xca/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_xfrm_del_state+0xca/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] xfrm_dev_state_delete+0x90/0x160 __xfrm_state_delete+0x662/0xae0 xfrm_state_delete+0x1e/0x30 xfrm_del_sa+0x1c2/0x340 ? xfrm_get_sa+0x250/0x250 ? check_chain_key+0x1bb/0x4c0 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x493/0x880 ? copy_sec_ctx+0x270/0x270 ? check_chain_key+0x1bb/0x4c0 ? lockdep_set_lock_cmp_fn+0x190/0x190 ? lockdep_set_lock_cmp_fn+0x190/0x190 netlink_rcv_skb+0x12e/0x380 ? copy_sec_ctx+0x270/0x270 ? netlink_ack+0xd90/0xd90 ? netlink_deliver_tap+0xcd/0xb60 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x6d/0x90 netlink_unicast+0x42f/0x740 ? netlink_attachskb+0x730/0x730 ? lock_acquire+0x1be/0x520 netlink_sendmsg+0x745/0xbe0 ? netlink_unicast+0x740/0x740 ? __might_fault+0xbb/0x170 ? netlink_unicast+0x740/0x740 __sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 ? fdget+0x163/0x1d0 __sys_sendto+0x1fe/0x2c0 ? __x64_sys_getpeername+0xb0/0xb0 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x856/0xe30 ? lock_acquire+0x1be/0x520 ? __task_pid_nr_ns+0x117/0x410 ? lock_downgrade+0x6b0/0x6b0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x284/0x400 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7f7d31291ba4 Code: 7d e8 89 4d d4 e8 4c 42 f7 ff 44 8b 4d d0 4c 8b 45 c8 89 c3 44 8b 55 d4 8b 7d e8 b8 2c 00 00 00 48 8b 55 d8 48 8b 75 e0 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 34 89 df 48 89 45 e8 e8 99 42 f7 ff 48 8b 45 RSP: 002b:00007f7d2ccd94f0 EFLAGS: 00000297 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007f7d31291ba4 RDX: 0000000000000028 RSI: 00007f7d2ccd96a0 RDI: 000000000000000a RBP: 00007f7d2ccd9530 R08: 00007f7d2ccd9598 R09: 000000000000000c R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000297 R12: 0000000000000028 R13: 00007f7d2ccd9598 R14: 00007f7d2ccd96a0 R15: 00000000000000e1 </TASK> Fixes: 4c24272 ("net/mlx5e: Listen to ARP events to update IPsec L2 headers in tunnel mode") Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
[ Upstream commit a216542 ] When COWing a relocation tree path, at relocation.c:replace_path(), we can trigger a lockdep splat while we are in the btrfs_search_slot() call against the relocation root. This happens in that callchain at ctree.c:read_block_for_search() when we happen to find a child extent buffer already loaded through the fs tree with a lockdep class set to the fs tree. So when we attempt to lock that extent buffer through a relocation tree we have to reset the lockdep class to the class for a relocation tree, since a relocation tree has extent buffers that used to belong to a fs tree and may currently be already loaded (we swap extent buffers between the two trees at the end of replace_path()). However we are missing calls to btrfs_maybe_reset_lockdep_class() to reset the lockdep class at ctree.c:read_block_for_search() before we read lock an extent buffer, just like we did for btrfs_search_slot() in commit b40130b ("btrfs: fix lockdep splat with reloc root extent buffers"). So add the missing btrfs_maybe_reset_lockdep_class() calls before the attempts to read lock an extent buffer at ctree.c:read_block_for_search(). The lockdep splat was reported by syzbot and it looks like this: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.13.0-rc5-syzkaller-00163-gab75170520d4 #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz.0.0/5335 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8880545dbc38 (btrfs-tree-01){++++}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_read_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:146 but task is already holding lock: ffff8880545dba58 (btrfs-treloc-02/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:189 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (btrfs-treloc-02/1){+.+.}-{4:4}: reacquire_held_locks+0x3eb/0x690 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5374 __lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5563 [inline] lock_release+0x396/0xa30 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5870 up_write+0x79/0x590 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1629 btrfs_force_cow_block+0x14b3/0x1fd0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:660 btrfs_cow_block+0x371/0x830 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:755 btrfs_search_slot+0xc01/0x3180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2153 replace_path+0x1243/0x2740 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1224 merge_reloc_root+0xc46/0x1ad0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1692 merge_reloc_roots+0x3b3/0x980 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1942 relocate_block_group+0xb0a/0xd40 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3754 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x77d/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4087 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x12c/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3494 __btrfs_balance+0x1b0f/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4278 btrfs_balance+0xbdc/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4655 btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x493/0x7c0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3670 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xf5/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #1 (btrfs-tree-01/1){+.+.}-{4:4}: lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849 down_write_nested+0xa2/0x220 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1693 btrfs_tree_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:189 btrfs_init_new_buffer fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:5052 [inline] btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x41c/0x1440 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:5132 btrfs_force_cow_block+0x526/0x1fd0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:573 btrfs_cow_block+0x371/0x830 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:755 btrfs_search_slot+0xc01/0x3180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2153 btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x9c/0x1a0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:4351 btrfs_insert_empty_item fs/btrfs/ctree.h:688 [inline] btrfs_insert_inode_ref+0x2bb/0xf80 fs/btrfs/inode-item.c:330 btrfs_rename_exchange fs/btrfs/inode.c:7990 [inline] btrfs_rename2+0xcb7/0x2b90 fs/btrfs/inode.c:8374 vfs_rename+0xbdb/0xf00 fs/namei.c:5067 do_renameat2+0xd94/0x13f0 fs/namei.c:5224 __do_sys_renameat2 fs/namei.c:5258 [inline] __se_sys_renameat2 fs/namei.c:5255 [inline] __x64_sys_renameat2+0xce/0xe0 fs/namei.c:5255 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (btrfs-tree-01){++++}-{4:4}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3161 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3280 [inline] validate_chain+0x18ef/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3904 __lock_acquire+0x1397/0x2100 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5226 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849 down_read_nested+0xb5/0xa50 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1649 btrfs_tree_read_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:146 btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.h:188 [inline] read_block_for_search+0x718/0xbb0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1610 btrfs_search_slot+0x1274/0x3180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2237 replace_path+0x1243/0x2740 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1224 merge_reloc_root+0xc46/0x1ad0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1692 merge_reloc_roots+0x3b3/0x980 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1942 relocate_block_group+0xb0a/0xd40 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3754 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x77d/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4087 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x12c/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3494 __btrfs_balance+0x1b0f/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4278 btrfs_balance+0xbdc/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4655 btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x493/0x7c0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3670 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xf5/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: btrfs-tree-01 --> btrfs-tree-01/1 --> btrfs-treloc-02/1 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(btrfs-treloc-02/1); lock(btrfs-tree-01/1); lock(btrfs-treloc-02/1); rlock(btrfs-tree-01); *** DEADLOCK *** 8 locks held by syz.0.0/5335: #0: ffff88801e3ae420 (sb_writers#13){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write_file+0x5e/0x200 fs/namespace.c:559 #1: ffff888052c760d0 (&fs_info->reclaim_bgs_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __btrfs_balance+0x4c2/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4183 #2: ffff888052c74850 (&fs_info->cleaner_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x775/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4086 #3: ffff88801e3ae610 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: merge_reloc_root+0xf11/0x1ad0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1659 #4: ffff888052c76470 (btrfs_trans_num_writers){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0x405/0xda0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:288 #5: ffff888052c76498 (btrfs_trans_num_extwriters){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0x405/0xda0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:288 #6: ffff8880545db878 (btrfs-tree-01/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:189 #7: ffff8880545dba58 (btrfs-treloc-02/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:189 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5335 Comm: syz.0.0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc5-syzkaller-00163-gab75170520d4 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_circular_bug+0x13a/0x1b0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2074 check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2206 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3161 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3280 [inline] validate_chain+0x18ef/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3904 __lock_acquire+0x1397/0x2100 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5226 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849 down_read_nested+0xb5/0xa50 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1649 btrfs_tree_read_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:146 btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.h:188 [inline] read_block_for_search+0x718/0xbb0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1610 btrfs_search_slot+0x1274/0x3180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2237 replace_path+0x1243/0x2740 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1224 merge_reloc_root+0xc46/0x1ad0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1692 merge_reloc_roots+0x3b3/0x980 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1942 relocate_block_group+0xb0a/0xd40 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3754 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x77d/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4087 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x12c/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3494 __btrfs_balance+0x1b0f/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4278 btrfs_balance+0xbdc/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4655 btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x493/0x7c0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3670 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xf5/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f1ac6985d29 Code: ff ff c3 (...) RSP: 002b:00007f1ac63fe038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f1ac6b76160 RCX: 00007f1ac6985d29 RDX: 0000000020000180 RSI: 00000000c4009420 RDI: 0000000000000007 RBP: 00007f1ac6a01b08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 00007f1ac6b76160 R15: 00007fffda145a88 </TASK> Reported-by: syzbot+63913e558c084f7f8fdc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/677b3014.050a0220.3b53b0.0064.GAE@google.com/ Fixes: 9978599 ("btrfs: reduce lock contention when eb cache miss for btree search") Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
When COWing a relocation tree path, at relocation.c:replace_path(), we can trigger a lockdep splat while we are in the btrfs_search_slot() call against the relocation root. This happens in that callchain at ctree.c:read_block_for_search() when we happen to find a child extent buffer already loaded through the fs tree with a lockdep class set to the fs tree. So when we attempt to lock that extent buffer through a relocation tree we have to reset the lockdep class to the class for a relocation tree, since a relocation tree has extent buffers that used to belong to a fs tree and may currently be already loaded (we swap extent buffers between the two trees at the end of replace_path()). However we are missing calls to btrfs_maybe_reset_lockdep_class() to reset the lockdep class at ctree.c:read_block_for_search() before we read lock an extent buffer, just like we did for btrfs_search_slot() in commit b40130b ("btrfs: fix lockdep splat with reloc root extent buffers"). So add the missing btrfs_maybe_reset_lockdep_class() calls before the attempts to read lock an extent buffer at ctree.c:read_block_for_search(). The lockdep splat was reported by syzbot and it looks like this: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.13.0-rc5-syzkaller-00163-gab75170520d4 #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz.0.0/5335 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8880545dbc38 (btrfs-tree-01){++++}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_read_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:146 but task is already holding lock: ffff8880545dba58 (btrfs-treloc-02/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:189 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (btrfs-treloc-02/1){+.+.}-{4:4}: reacquire_held_locks+0x3eb/0x690 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5374 __lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5563 [inline] lock_release+0x396/0xa30 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5870 up_write+0x79/0x590 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1629 btrfs_force_cow_block+0x14b3/0x1fd0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:660 btrfs_cow_block+0x371/0x830 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:755 btrfs_search_slot+0xc01/0x3180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2153 replace_path+0x1243/0x2740 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1224 merge_reloc_root+0xc46/0x1ad0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1692 merge_reloc_roots+0x3b3/0x980 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1942 relocate_block_group+0xb0a/0xd40 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3754 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x77d/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4087 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x12c/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3494 __btrfs_balance+0x1b0f/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4278 btrfs_balance+0xbdc/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4655 btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x493/0x7c0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3670 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xf5/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #1 (btrfs-tree-01/1){+.+.}-{4:4}: lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849 down_write_nested+0xa2/0x220 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1693 btrfs_tree_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:189 btrfs_init_new_buffer fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:5052 [inline] btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x41c/0x1440 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:5132 btrfs_force_cow_block+0x526/0x1fd0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:573 btrfs_cow_block+0x371/0x830 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:755 btrfs_search_slot+0xc01/0x3180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2153 btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x9c/0x1a0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:4351 btrfs_insert_empty_item fs/btrfs/ctree.h:688 [inline] btrfs_insert_inode_ref+0x2bb/0xf80 fs/btrfs/inode-item.c:330 btrfs_rename_exchange fs/btrfs/inode.c:7990 [inline] btrfs_rename2+0xcb7/0x2b90 fs/btrfs/inode.c:8374 vfs_rename+0xbdb/0xf00 fs/namei.c:5067 do_renameat2+0xd94/0x13f0 fs/namei.c:5224 __do_sys_renameat2 fs/namei.c:5258 [inline] __se_sys_renameat2 fs/namei.c:5255 [inline] __x64_sys_renameat2+0xce/0xe0 fs/namei.c:5255 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (btrfs-tree-01){++++}-{4:4}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3161 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3280 [inline] validate_chain+0x18ef/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3904 __lock_acquire+0x1397/0x2100 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5226 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849 down_read_nested+0xb5/0xa50 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1649 btrfs_tree_read_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:146 btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.h:188 [inline] read_block_for_search+0x718/0xbb0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1610 btrfs_search_slot+0x1274/0x3180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2237 replace_path+0x1243/0x2740 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1224 merge_reloc_root+0xc46/0x1ad0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1692 merge_reloc_roots+0x3b3/0x980 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1942 relocate_block_group+0xb0a/0xd40 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3754 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x77d/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4087 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x12c/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3494 __btrfs_balance+0x1b0f/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4278 btrfs_balance+0xbdc/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4655 btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x493/0x7c0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3670 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xf5/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: btrfs-tree-01 --> btrfs-tree-01/1 --> btrfs-treloc-02/1 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(btrfs-treloc-02/1); lock(btrfs-tree-01/1); lock(btrfs-treloc-02/1); rlock(btrfs-tree-01); *** DEADLOCK *** 8 locks held by syz.0.0/5335: #0: ffff88801e3ae420 (sb_writers#13){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write_file+0x5e/0x200 fs/namespace.c:559 #1: ffff888052c760d0 (&fs_info->reclaim_bgs_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __btrfs_balance+0x4c2/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4183 #2: ffff888052c74850 (&fs_info->cleaner_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x775/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4086 #3: ffff88801e3ae610 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: merge_reloc_root+0xf11/0x1ad0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1659 #4: ffff888052c76470 (btrfs_trans_num_writers){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0x405/0xda0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:288 #5: ffff888052c76498 (btrfs_trans_num_extwriters){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0x405/0xda0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:288 #6: ffff8880545db878 (btrfs-tree-01/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:189 #7: ffff8880545dba58 (btrfs-treloc-02/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:189 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5335 Comm: syz.0.0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc5-syzkaller-00163-gab75170520d4 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_circular_bug+0x13a/0x1b0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2074 check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2206 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3161 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3280 [inline] validate_chain+0x18ef/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3904 __lock_acquire+0x1397/0x2100 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5226 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849 down_read_nested+0xb5/0xa50 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1649 btrfs_tree_read_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:146 btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.h:188 [inline] read_block_for_search+0x718/0xbb0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1610 btrfs_search_slot+0x1274/0x3180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2237 replace_path+0x1243/0x2740 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1224 merge_reloc_root+0xc46/0x1ad0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1692 merge_reloc_roots+0x3b3/0x980 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1942 relocate_block_group+0xb0a/0xd40 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3754 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x77d/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4087 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x12c/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3494 __btrfs_balance+0x1b0f/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4278 btrfs_balance+0xbdc/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4655 btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x493/0x7c0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3670 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xf5/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f1ac6985d29 Code: ff ff c3 (...) RSP: 002b:00007f1ac63fe038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f1ac6b76160 RCX: 00007f1ac6985d29 RDX: 0000000020000180 RSI: 00000000c4009420 RDI: 0000000000000007 RBP: 00007f1ac6a01b08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 00007f1ac6b76160 R15: 00007fffda145a88 </TASK> Reported-by: syzbot+63913e558c084f7f8fdc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/677b3014.050a0220.3b53b0.0064.GAE@google.com/ Fixes: 9978599 ("btrfs: reduce lock contention when eb cache miss for btree search") Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
We have several places across the kernel where we want to access another task's syscall arguments, such as ptrace(2), seccomp(2), etc., by making a call to syscall_get_arguments(). This works for register arguments right away by accessing the task's `regs' member of `struct pt_regs', however for stack arguments seen with 32-bit/o32 kernels things are more complicated. Technically they ought to be obtained from the user stack with calls to an access_remote_vm(), but we have an easier way available already. So as to be able to access syscall stack arguments as regular function arguments following the MIPS calling convention we copy them over from the user stack to the kernel stack in arch/mips/kernel/scall32-o32.S, in handle_sys(), to the current stack frame's outgoing argument space at the top of the stack, which is where the handler called expects to see its incoming arguments. This area is also pointed at by the `pt_regs' pointer obtained by task_pt_regs(). Make the o32 stack argument space a proper member of `struct pt_regs' then, by renaming the existing member from `pad0' to `args' and using generated offsets to access the space. No functional change though. With the change in place the o32 kernel stack frame layout at the entry to a syscall handler invoked by handle_sys() is therefore as follows: $sp + 68 -> | ... | <- pt_regs.regs[9] +---------------------+ $sp + 64 -> | $t0 | <- pt_regs.regs[8] +---------------------+ $sp + 60 -> | $a3/argument #4 | <- pt_regs.regs[7] +---------------------+ $sp + 56 -> | $a2/argument #3 | <- pt_regs.regs[6] +---------------------+ $sp + 52 -> | $a1/argument #2 | <- pt_regs.regs[5] +---------------------+ $sp + 48 -> | $a0/argument #1 | <- pt_regs.regs[4] +---------------------+ $sp + 44 -> | $v1 | <- pt_regs.regs[3] +---------------------+ $sp + 40 -> | $v0 | <- pt_regs.regs[2] +---------------------+ $sp + 36 -> | $at | <- pt_regs.regs[1] +---------------------+ $sp + 32 -> | $zero | <- pt_regs.regs[0] +---------------------+ $sp + 28 -> | stack argument #8 | <- pt_regs.args[7] +---------------------+ $sp + 24 -> | stack argument #7 | <- pt_regs.args[6] +---------------------+ $sp + 20 -> | stack argument #6 | <- pt_regs.args[5] +---------------------+ $sp + 16 -> | stack argument #5 | <- pt_regs.args[4] +---------------------+ $sp + 12 -> | psABI space for $a3 | <- pt_regs.args[3] +---------------------+ $sp + 8 -> | psABI space for $a2 | <- pt_regs.args[2] +---------------------+ $sp + 4 -> | psABI space for $a1 | <- pt_regs.args[1] +---------------------+ $sp + 0 -> | psABI space for $a0 | <- pt_regs.args[0] +---------------------+ holding user data received and with the first 4 frame slots reserved by the psABI for the compiler to spill the incoming arguments from $a0-$a3 registers (which it sometimes does according to its needs) and the next 4 frame slots designated by the psABI for any stack function arguments that follow. This data is also available for other tasks to peek/poke at as reqired and where permitted. Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@orcam.me.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
commit f02c41f upstream. Use raw_spinlock in order to fix spurious messages about invalid context when spinlock debugging is enabled. The lock is only used to serialize register access. [ 4.239592] ============================= [ 4.239595] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] [ 4.239599] 6.13.0-rc7-arm64-renesas-05496-gd088502a519f #35 Not tainted [ 4.239603] ----------------------------- [ 4.239606] kworker/u8:5/76 is trying to lock: [ 4.239609] ffff0000091898a0 (&p->lock){....}-{3:3}, at: gpio_rcar_config_interrupt_input_mode+0x34/0x164 [ 4.239641] other info that might help us debug this: [ 4.239643] context-{5:5} [ 4.239646] 5 locks held by kworker/u8:5/76: [ 4.239651] #0: ffff0000080fb148 ((wq_completion)async){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x190/0x62c [ 4.250180] OF: /soc/sound@ec500000/ports/port@0/endpoint: Read of boolean property 'frame-master' with a value. [ 4.254094] #1: ffff80008299bd80 ((work_completion)(&entry->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1b8/0x62c [ 4.254109] #2: ffff00000920c8f8 [ 4.258345] OF: /soc/sound@ec500000/ports/port@1/endpoint: Read of boolean property 'bitclock-master' with a value. [ 4.264803] (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __device_attach_async_helper+0x3c/0xdc [ 4.264820] #3: ffff00000a50ca40 (request_class#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __setup_irq+0xa0/0x690 [ 4.264840] #4: [ 4.268872] OF: /soc/sound@ec500000/ports/port@1/endpoint: Read of boolean property 'frame-master' with a value. [ 4.273275] ffff00000a50c8c8 (lock_class){....}-{2:2}, at: __setup_irq+0xc4/0x690 [ 4.296130] renesas_sdhi_internal_dmac ee10000.mmc: mmc1 base at 0x00000000ee100000, max clock rate 200 MHz [ 4.304082] stack backtrace: [ 4.304086] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 76 Comm: kworker/u8:5 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc7-arm64-renesas-05496-gd088502a519f #35 [ 4.304092] Hardware name: Renesas Salvator-X 2nd version board based on r8a77965 (DT) [ 4.304097] Workqueue: async async_run_entry_fn [ 4.304106] Call trace: [ 4.304110] show_stack+0x14/0x20 (C) [ 4.304122] dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x90 [ 4.304131] dump_stack+0x14/0x1c [ 4.304138] __lock_acquire+0xdfc/0x1584 [ 4.426274] lock_acquire+0x1c4/0x33c [ 4.429942] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80 [ 4.434307] gpio_rcar_config_interrupt_input_mode+0x34/0x164 [ 4.440061] gpio_rcar_irq_set_type+0xd4/0xd8 [ 4.444422] __irq_set_trigger+0x5c/0x178 [ 4.448435] __setup_irq+0x2e4/0x690 [ 4.452012] request_threaded_irq+0xc4/0x190 [ 4.456285] devm_request_threaded_irq+0x7c/0xf4 [ 4.459398] ata1: link resume succeeded after 1 retries [ 4.460902] mmc_gpiod_request_cd_irq+0x68/0xe0 [ 4.470660] mmc_start_host+0x50/0xac [ 4.474327] mmc_add_host+0x80/0xe4 [ 4.477817] tmio_mmc_host_probe+0x2b0/0x440 [ 4.482094] renesas_sdhi_probe+0x488/0x6f4 [ 4.486281] renesas_sdhi_internal_dmac_probe+0x60/0x78 [ 4.491509] platform_probe+0x64/0xd8 [ 4.495178] really_probe+0xb8/0x2a8 [ 4.498756] __driver_probe_device+0x74/0x118 [ 4.503116] driver_probe_device+0x3c/0x154 [ 4.507303] __device_attach_driver+0xd4/0x160 [ 4.511750] bus_for_each_drv+0x84/0xe0 [ 4.515588] __device_attach_async_helper+0xb0/0xdc [ 4.520470] async_run_entry_fn+0x30/0xd8 [ 4.524481] process_one_work+0x210/0x62c [ 4.528494] worker_thread+0x1ac/0x340 [ 4.532245] kthread+0x10c/0x110 [ 4.535476] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Signed-off-by: Niklas Söderlund <niklas.soderlund+renesas@ragnatech.se> Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250121135833.3769310-1-niklas.soderlund+renesas@ragnatech.se Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Use raw_spinlock in order to fix spurious messages about invalid context when spinlock debugging is enabled. The lock is only used to serialize register access. [ 4.239592] ============================= [ 4.239595] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] [ 4.239599] 6.13.0-rc7-arm64-renesas-05496-gd088502a519f AsahiLinux#35 Not tainted [ 4.239603] ----------------------------- [ 4.239606] kworker/u8:5/76 is trying to lock: [ 4.239609] ffff0000091898a0 (&p->lock){....}-{3:3}, at: gpio_rcar_config_interrupt_input_mode+0x34/0x164 [ 4.239641] other info that might help us debug this: [ 4.239643] context-{5:5} [ 4.239646] 5 locks held by kworker/u8:5/76: [ 4.239651] #0: ffff0000080fb148 ((wq_completion)async){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x190/0x62c [ 4.250180] OF: /soc/sound@ec500000/ports/port@0/endpoint: Read of boolean property 'frame-master' with a value. [ 4.254094] #1: ffff80008299bd80 ((work_completion)(&entry->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1b8/0x62c [ 4.254109] AsahiLinux#2: ffff00000920c8f8 [ 4.258345] OF: /soc/sound@ec500000/ports/port@1/endpoint: Read of boolean property 'bitclock-master' with a value. [ 4.264803] (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __device_attach_async_helper+0x3c/0xdc [ 4.264820] AsahiLinux#3: ffff00000a50ca40 (request_class#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __setup_irq+0xa0/0x690 [ 4.264840] AsahiLinux#4: [ 4.268872] OF: /soc/sound@ec500000/ports/port@1/endpoint: Read of boolean property 'frame-master' with a value. [ 4.273275] ffff00000a50c8c8 (lock_class){....}-{2:2}, at: __setup_irq+0xc4/0x690 [ 4.296130] renesas_sdhi_internal_dmac ee10000.mmc: mmc1 base at 0x00000000ee100000, max clock rate 200 MHz [ 4.304082] stack backtrace: [ 4.304086] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 76 Comm: kworker/u8:5 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc7-arm64-renesas-05496-gd088502a519f AsahiLinux#35 [ 4.304092] Hardware name: Renesas Salvator-X 2nd version board based on r8a77965 (DT) [ 4.304097] Workqueue: async async_run_entry_fn [ 4.304106] Call trace: [ 4.304110] show_stack+0x14/0x20 (C) [ 4.304122] dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x90 [ 4.304131] dump_stack+0x14/0x1c [ 4.304138] __lock_acquire+0xdfc/0x1584 [ 4.426274] lock_acquire+0x1c4/0x33c [ 4.429942] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80 [ 4.434307] gpio_rcar_config_interrupt_input_mode+0x34/0x164 [ 4.440061] gpio_rcar_irq_set_type+0xd4/0xd8 [ 4.444422] __irq_set_trigger+0x5c/0x178 [ 4.448435] __setup_irq+0x2e4/0x690 [ 4.452012] request_threaded_irq+0xc4/0x190 [ 4.456285] devm_request_threaded_irq+0x7c/0xf4 [ 4.459398] ata1: link resume succeeded after 1 retries [ 4.460902] mmc_gpiod_request_cd_irq+0x68/0xe0 [ 4.470660] mmc_start_host+0x50/0xac [ 4.474327] mmc_add_host+0x80/0xe4 [ 4.477817] tmio_mmc_host_probe+0x2b0/0x440 [ 4.482094] renesas_sdhi_probe+0x488/0x6f4 [ 4.486281] renesas_sdhi_internal_dmac_probe+0x60/0x78 [ 4.491509] platform_probe+0x64/0xd8 [ 4.495178] really_probe+0xb8/0x2a8 [ 4.498756] __driver_probe_device+0x74/0x118 [ 4.503116] driver_probe_device+0x3c/0x154 [ 4.507303] __device_attach_driver+0xd4/0x160 [ 4.511750] bus_for_each_drv+0x84/0xe0 [ 4.515588] __device_attach_async_helper+0xb0/0xdc [ 4.520470] async_run_entry_fn+0x30/0xd8 [ 4.524481] process_one_work+0x210/0x62c [ 4.528494] worker_thread+0x1ac/0x340 [ 4.532245] kthread+0x10c/0x110 [ 4.535476] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Signed-off-by: Niklas Söderlund <niklas.soderlund+renesas@ragnatech.se> Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250121135833.3769310-1-niklas.soderlund+renesas@ragnatech.se Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@linaro.org>
…cal section A circular lock dependency splat has been seen involving down_trylock(): ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.12.0-41.el10.s390x+debug ------------------------------------------------------ dd/32479 is trying to acquire lock: 0015a20accd0d4f8 ((console_sem).lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: down_trylock+0x26/0x90 but task is already holding lock: 000000017e461698 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: rmqueue_bulk+0xac/0x8f0 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> AsahiLinux#4 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> AsahiLinux#3 (hrtimer_bases.lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> AsahiLinux#2 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #1 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: -> #0 ((console_sem).lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: The console_sem -> pi_lock dependency is due to calling try_to_wake_up() while holding the console_sem raw_spinlock. This dependency can be broken by using wake_q to do the wakeup instead of calling try_to_wake_up() under the console_sem lock. This will also make the semaphore's raw_spinlock become a terminal lock without taking any further locks underneath it. The hrtimer_bases.lock is a raw_spinlock while zone->lock is a spinlock. The hrtimer_bases.lock -> zone->lock dependency happens via the debug_objects_fill_pool() helper function in the debugobjects code. -> AsahiLinux#4 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: __lock_acquire+0xe86/0x1cc0 lock_acquire.part.0+0x258/0x630 lock_acquire+0xb8/0xe0 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xb4/0x120 rmqueue_bulk+0xac/0x8f0 __rmqueue_pcplist+0x580/0x830 rmqueue_pcplist+0xfc/0x470 rmqueue.isra.0+0xdec/0x11b0 get_page_from_freelist+0x2ee/0xeb0 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x2c2/0x520 alloc_pages_mpol_noprof+0x1fc/0x4d0 alloc_pages_noprof+0x8c/0xe0 allocate_slab+0x320/0x460 ___slab_alloc+0xa58/0x12b0 __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x42/0x60 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x304/0x350 fill_pool+0xf6/0x450 debug_object_activate+0xfe/0x360 enqueue_hrtimer+0x34/0x190 __run_hrtimer+0x3c8/0x4c0 __hrtimer_run_queues+0x1b2/0x260 hrtimer_interrupt+0x316/0x760 do_IRQ+0x9a/0xe0 do_irq_async+0xf6/0x160 Normally a raw_spinlock to spinlock dependency is not legitimate and will be warned if CONFIG_PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING is enabled, but debug_objects_fill_pool() is an exception as it explicitly allows this dependency for non-PREEMPT_RT kernel without causing PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING lockdep splat. As a result, this dependency is legitimate and not a bug. Anyway, semaphore is the only locking primitive left that is still using try_to_wake_up() to do wakeup inside critical section, all the other locking primitives had been migrated to use wake_q to do wakeup outside of the critical section. It is also possible that there are other circular locking dependencies involving printk/console_sem or other existing/new semaphores lurking somewhere which may show up in the future. Let just do the migration now to wake_q to avoid headache like this. Reported-by: yzbot+ed801a886dfdbfe7136d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250307232717.1759087-3-boqun.feng@gmail.com
…/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.14, take AsahiLinux#4 - Fix a couple of bugs affecting pKVM's PSCI relay implementation when running in the hVHE mode, resulting in the host being entered with the MMU in an unknown state, and EL2 being in the wrong mode.
…ate_pagetables' [ Upstream commit fddc450 ] This commit addresses a circular locking dependency in the svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables function. The function previously held a lock while determining whether to perform an unmap or eviction operation, which could lead to deadlocks. Fixes the below: [ 223.418794] ====================================================== [ 223.418820] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 223.418845] 6.12.0-amdstaging-drm-next-lol-050225 #14 Tainted: G U OE [ 223.418869] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 223.418889] kfdtest/3939 is trying to acquire lock: [ 223.418906] ffff8957552eae38 (&dqm->lock_hidden){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 223.419302] but task is already holding lock: [ 223.419303] ffff8957556b83b0 (&prange->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables+0x9d/0x850 [amdgpu] [ 223.419447] Console: switching to colour dummy device 80x25 [ 223.419477] [IGT] amd_basic: executing [ 223.419599] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 223.419611] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 223.419621] -> #2 (&prange->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 223.419636] __mutex_lock+0x85/0xe20 [ 223.419647] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 223.419656] svm_range_validate_and_map+0x2f1/0x15b0 [amdgpu] [ 223.419954] svm_range_set_attr+0xe8c/0x1710 [amdgpu] [ 223.420236] svm_ioctl+0x46/0x50 [amdgpu] [ 223.420503] kfd_ioctl_svm+0x50/0x90 [amdgpu] [ 223.420763] kfd_ioctl+0x409/0x6d0 [amdgpu] [ 223.421024] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x95/0xd0 [ 223.421036] x64_sys_call+0x1205/0x20d0 [ 223.421047] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x140 [ 223.421056] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 223.421068] -> #1 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 223.421084] __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.0+0xab/0x1560 [ 223.421095] ww_mutex_lock+0x2b/0x90 [ 223.421103] amdgpu_amdkfd_alloc_gtt_mem+0xcc/0x2b0 [amdgpu] [ 223.421361] add_queue_mes+0x3bc/0x440 [amdgpu] [ 223.421623] unhalt_cpsch+0x1ae/0x240 [amdgpu] [ 223.421888] kgd2kfd_start_sched+0x5e/0xd0 [amdgpu] [ 223.422148] amdgpu_amdkfd_start_sched+0x3d/0x50 [amdgpu] [ 223.422414] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler+0x132/0x270 [amdgpu] [ 223.422662] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680 [ 223.422673] worker_thread+0x190/0x330 [ 223.422682] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 223.422690] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 223.422699] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 223.422708] -> #0 (&dqm->lock_hidden){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 223.422723] __lock_acquire+0x16f4/0x2810 [ 223.422734] lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300 [ 223.422742] __mutex_lock+0x85/0xe20 [ 223.422751] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 223.422760] evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 223.423025] kfd_process_evict_queues+0x8a/0x1d0 [amdgpu] [ 223.423285] kgd2kfd_quiesce_mm+0x43/0x90 [amdgpu] [ 223.423540] svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables+0x4a7/0x850 [amdgpu] [ 223.423807] __mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start+0x1f5/0x250 [ 223.423819] copy_page_range+0x1e94/0x1ea0 [ 223.423829] copy_process+0x172f/0x2ad0 [ 223.423839] kernel_clone+0x9c/0x3f0 [ 223.423847] __do_sys_clone+0x66/0x90 [ 223.423856] __x64_sys_clone+0x25/0x30 [ 223.423864] x64_sys_call+0x1d7c/0x20d0 [ 223.423872] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x140 [ 223.423880] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 223.423891] other info that might help us debug this: [ 223.423903] Chain exists of: &dqm->lock_hidden --> reservation_ww_class_mutex --> &prange->lock [ 223.423926] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 223.423935] CPU0 CPU1 [ 223.423942] ---- ---- [ 223.423949] lock(&prange->lock); [ 223.423958] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [ 223.423970] lock(&prange->lock); [ 223.423981] lock(&dqm->lock_hidden); [ 223.423990] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 223.423999] 5 locks held by kfdtest/3939: [ 223.424006] #0: ffffffffb82b4fc0 (dup_mmap_sem){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: copy_process+0x1387/0x2ad0 [ 223.424026] #1: ffff89575eda81b0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: copy_process+0x13a8/0x2ad0 [ 223.424046] #2: ffff89575edaf3b0 (&mm->mmap_lock/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: copy_process+0x13e4/0x2ad0 [ 223.424066] #3: ffffffffb82e76e0 (mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: copy_page_range+0x1cea/0x1ea0 [ 223.424088] #4: ffff8957556b83b0 (&prange->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables+0x9d/0x850 [amdgpu] [ 223.424365] stack backtrace: [ 223.424374] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3939 Comm: kfdtest Tainted: G U OE 6.12.0-amdstaging-drm-next-lol-050225 #14 [ 223.424392] Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [ 223.424401] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. X570 AORUS PRO WIFI/X570 AORUS PRO WIFI, BIOS F36a 02/16/2022 [ 223.424416] Call Trace: [ 223.424423] <TASK> [ 223.424430] dump_stack_lvl+0x9b/0xf0 [ 223.424441] dump_stack+0x10/0x20 [ 223.424449] print_circular_bug+0x275/0x350 [ 223.424460] check_noncircular+0x157/0x170 [ 223.424469] ? __bfs+0xfd/0x2c0 [ 223.424481] __lock_acquire+0x16f4/0x2810 [ 223.424490] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.424505] lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300 [ 223.424514] ? evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 223.424783] __mutex_lock+0x85/0xe20 [ 223.424792] ? evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 223.425058] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.425067] ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90 [ 223.425076] ? evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 223.425339] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.425350] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 223.425358] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 223.425367] evict_process_queues_cpsch+0x43/0x210 [amdgpu] [ 223.425631] kfd_process_evict_queues+0x8a/0x1d0 [amdgpu] [ 223.425893] kgd2kfd_quiesce_mm+0x43/0x90 [amdgpu] [ 223.426156] svm_range_cpu_invalidate_pagetables+0x4a7/0x850 [amdgpu] [ 223.426423] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426436] __mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start+0x1f5/0x250 [ 223.426450] copy_page_range+0x1e94/0x1ea0 [ 223.426461] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426474] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426484] ? lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300 [ 223.426494] ? copy_process+0x1718/0x2ad0 [ 223.426502] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426510] ? sched_clock_noinstr+0x9/0x10 [ 223.426519] ? local_clock_noinstr+0xe/0xc0 [ 223.426528] ? copy_process+0x1718/0x2ad0 [ 223.426537] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426550] copy_process+0x172f/0x2ad0 [ 223.426569] kernel_clone+0x9c/0x3f0 [ 223.426577] ? __schedule+0x4c9/0x1b00 [ 223.426586] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426594] ? sched_clock_noinstr+0x9/0x10 [ 223.426602] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426610] ? local_clock_noinstr+0xe/0xc0 [ 223.426619] ? schedule+0x107/0x1a0 [ 223.426629] __do_sys_clone+0x66/0x90 [ 223.426643] __x64_sys_clone+0x25/0x30 [ 223.426652] x64_sys_call+0x1d7c/0x20d0 [ 223.426661] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x140 [ 223.426671] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426679] ? common_nsleep+0x44/0x50 [ 223.426690] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426698] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0x52/0xd0 [ 223.426709] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426717] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xcc/0x200 [ 223.426727] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426736] ? do_syscall_64+0x93/0x140 [ 223.426748] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426756] ? up_write+0x1c/0x1e0 [ 223.426765] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426775] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426783] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0x52/0xd0 [ 223.426792] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426800] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xcc/0x200 [ 223.426810] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426818] ? do_syscall_64+0x93/0x140 [ 223.426826] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xcc/0x200 [ 223.426836] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426844] ? do_syscall_64+0x93/0x140 [ 223.426853] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426861] ? irqentry_exit+0x6b/0x90 [ 223.426869] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 223.426877] ? exc_page_fault+0xa7/0x2c0 [ 223.426888] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 223.426898] RIP: 0033:0x7f46758eab57 [ 223.426906] Code: ba 04 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 48 8b 04 25 10 00 00 00 45 31 c0 31 d2 31 f6 bf 11 00 20 01 4c 8d 90 d0 02 00 00 b8 38 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 41 41 89 c0 85 c0 75 2c 64 48 8b 04 25 10 00 [ 223.426930] RSP: 002b:00007fff5c3e5188 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000038 [ 223.426943] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f4675f8c040 RCX: 00007f46758eab57 [ 223.426954] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000001200011 [ 223.426965] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 223.426975] R10: 00007f4675e81a50 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 223.426986] R13: 00007fff5c3e5470 R14: 00007fff5c3e53e0 R15: 00007fff5c3e5410 [ 223.427004] </TASK> v2: To resolve this issue, the allocation of the process context buffer (`proc_ctx_bo`) has been moved from the `add_queue_mes` function to the `pqm_create_queue` function. This change ensures that the buffer is allocated only when the first queue for a process is created and only if the Micro Engine Scheduler (MES) is enabled. (Felix) v3: Fix typo s/Memory Execution Scheduler (MES)/Micro Engine Scheduler in commit message. (Lijo) Fixes: 438b39a ("drm/amdkfd: pause autosuspend when creating pdd") Cc: Jesse Zhang <jesse.zhang@amd.com> Cc: Yunxiang Li <Yunxiang.Li@amd.com> Cc: Philip Yang <Philip.Yang@amd.com> Cc: Alex Sierra <alex.sierra@amd.com> Cc: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com> Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam <srinivasan.shanmugam@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Felix Kuehling <felix.kuehling@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 888751e ] perf test 11 hwmon fails on s390 with this error # ./perf test -Fv 11 --- start --- ---- end ---- 11.1: Basic parsing test : Ok --- start --- Testing 'temp_test_hwmon_event1' Using CPUID IBM,3931,704,A01,3.7,002f temp_test_hwmon_event1 -> hwmon_a_test_hwmon_pmu/temp_test_hwmon_event1/ FAILED tests/hwmon_pmu.c:189 Unexpected config for 'temp_test_hwmon_event1', 292470092988416 != 655361 ---- end ---- 11.2: Parsing without PMU name : FAILED! --- start --- Testing 'hwmon_a_test_hwmon_pmu/temp_test_hwmon_event1/' FAILED tests/hwmon_pmu.c:189 Unexpected config for 'hwmon_a_test_hwmon_pmu/temp_test_hwmon_event1/', 292470092988416 != 655361 ---- end ---- 11.3: Parsing with PMU name : FAILED! # The root cause is in member test_event::config which is initialized to 0xA0001 or 655361. During event parsing a long list event parsing functions are called and end up with this gdb call stack: #0 hwmon_pmu__config_term (hwm=0x168dfd0, attr=0x3ffffff5ee8, term=0x168db60, err=0x3ffffff81c8) at util/hwmon_pmu.c:623 #1 hwmon_pmu__config_terms (pmu=0x168dfd0, attr=0x3ffffff5ee8, terms=0x3ffffff5ea8, err=0x3ffffff81c8) at util/hwmon_pmu.c:662 #2 0x00000000012f870c in perf_pmu__config_terms (pmu=0x168dfd0, attr=0x3ffffff5ee8, terms=0x3ffffff5ea8, zero=false, apply_hardcoded=false, err=0x3ffffff81c8) at util/pmu.c:1519 #3 0x00000000012f88a4 in perf_pmu__config (pmu=0x168dfd0, attr=0x3ffffff5ee8, head_terms=0x3ffffff5ea8, apply_hardcoded=false, err=0x3ffffff81c8) at util/pmu.c:1545 #4 0x00000000012680c4 in parse_events_add_pmu (parse_state=0x3ffffff7fb8, list=0x168dc00, pmu=0x168dfd0, const_parsed_terms=0x3ffffff6090, auto_merge_stats=true, alternate_hw_config=10) at util/parse-events.c:1508 #5 0x00000000012684c6 in parse_events_multi_pmu_add (parse_state=0x3ffffff7fb8, event_name=0x168ec10 "temp_test_hwmon_event1", hw_config=10, const_parsed_terms=0x0, listp=0x3ffffff6230, loc_=0x3ffffff70e0) at util/parse-events.c:1592 #6 0x00000000012f0e4e in parse_events_parse (_parse_state=0x3ffffff7fb8, scanner=0x16878c0) at util/parse-events.y:293 #7 0x00000000012695a0 in parse_events__scanner (str=0x3ffffff81d8 "temp_test_hwmon_event1", input=0x0, parse_state=0x3ffffff7fb8) at util/parse-events.c:1867 #8 0x000000000126a1e8 in __parse_events (evlist=0x168b580, str=0x3ffffff81d8 "temp_test_hwmon_event1", pmu_filter=0x0, err=0x3ffffff81c8, fake_pmu=false, warn_if_reordered=true, fake_tp=false) at util/parse-events.c:2136 #9 0x00000000011e36aa in parse_events (evlist=0x168b580, str=0x3ffffff81d8 "temp_test_hwmon_event1", err=0x3ffffff81c8) at /root/linux/tools/perf/util/parse-events.h:41 #10 0x00000000011e3e64 in do_test (i=0, with_pmu=false, with_alias=false) at tests/hwmon_pmu.c:164 #11 0x00000000011e422c in test__hwmon_pmu (with_pmu=false) at tests/hwmon_pmu.c:219 #12 0x00000000011e431c in test__hwmon_pmu_without_pmu (test=0x1610368 <suite.hwmon_pmu>, subtest=1) at tests/hwmon_pmu.c:23 where the attr::config is set to value 292470092988416 or 0x10a0000000000 in line 625 of file ./util/hwmon_pmu.c: attr->config = key.type_and_num; However member key::type_and_num is defined as union and bit field: union hwmon_pmu_event_key { long type_and_num; struct { int num :16; enum hwmon_type type :8; }; }; s390 is big endian and Intel is little endian architecture. The events for the hwmon dummy pmu have num = 1 or num = 2 and type is set to HWMON_TYPE_TEMP (which is 10). On s390 this assignes member key::type_and_num the value of 0x10a0000000000 (which is 292470092988416) as shown in above trace output. Fix this and export the structure/union hwmon_pmu_event_key so the test shares the same implementation as the event parsing functions for union and bit fields. This should avoid endianess issues on all platforms. Output after: # ./perf test -F 11 11.1: Basic parsing test : Ok 11.2: Parsing without PMU name : Ok 11.3: Parsing with PMU name : Ok # Fixes: 531ee0f ("perf test: Add hwmon "PMU" test") Signed-off-by: Thomas Richter <tmricht@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250131112400.568975-1-tmricht@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 053f3ff ] v2: - Created a single error handling unlock and exit in veth_pool_store - Greatly expanded commit message with previous explanatory-only text Summary: Use rtnl_mutex to synchronize veth_pool_store with itself, ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open, preventing multiple calls in a row to napi_disable. Background: Two (or more) threads could call veth_pool_store through writing to /sys/devices/vio/30000002/pool*/*. You can do this easily with a little shell script. This causes a hang. I configured LOCKDEP, compiled ibmveth.c with DEBUG, and built a new kernel. I ran this test again and saw: Setting pool0/active to 0 Setting pool1/active to 1 [ 73.911067][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting Setting pool1/active to 1 Setting pool1/active to 0 [ 73.911367][ T4366] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting [ 73.916056][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close complete [ 73.916064][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: open starting [ 110.808564][ T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification. [ 230.808495][ T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification. [ 243.683786][ T123] INFO: task stress.sh:4365 blocked for more than 122 seconds. [ 243.683827][ T123] Not tainted 6.14.0-01103-g2df0c02dab82-dirty #8 [ 243.683833][ T123] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 243.683838][ T123] task:stress.sh state:D stack:28096 pid:4365 tgid:4365 ppid:4364 task_flags:0x400040 flags:0x00042000 [ 243.683852][ T123] Call Trace: [ 243.683857][ T123] [c00000000c38f690] [0000000000000001] 0x1 (unreliable) [ 243.683868][ T123] [c00000000c38f840] [c00000000001f908] __switch_to+0x318/0x4e0 [ 243.683878][ T123] [c00000000c38f8a0] [c000000001549a70] __schedule+0x500/0x12a0 [ 243.683888][ T123] [c00000000c38f9a0] [c00000000154a878] schedule+0x68/0x210 [ 243.683896][ T123] [c00000000c38f9d0] [c00000000154ac80] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x30/0x50 [ 243.683904][ T123] [c00000000c38fa00] [c00000000154dbb0] __mutex_lock+0x730/0x10f0 [ 243.683913][ T123] [c00000000c38fb10] [c000000001154d40] napi_enable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.683921][ T123] [c00000000c38fb40] [c000000000f4ae94] ibmveth_open+0x68/0x5dc [ 243.683928][ T123] [c00000000c38fbe0] [c000000000f4aa20] veth_pool_store+0x220/0x270 [ 243.683936][ T123] [c00000000c38fc70] [c000000000826278] sysfs_kf_write+0x68/0xb0 [ 243.683944][ T123] [c00000000c38fcb0] [c0000000008240b8] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x198/0x2d0 [ 243.683951][ T123] [c00000000c38fd00] [c00000000071b9ac] vfs_write+0x34c/0x650 [ 243.683958][ T123] [c00000000c38fdc0] [c00000000071bea8] ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.683966][ T123] [c00000000c38fe10] [c0000000000317f4] system_call_exception+0x124/0x340 [ 243.683973][ T123] [c00000000c38fe50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec ... [ 243.684087][ T123] Showing all locks held in the system: [ 243.684095][ T123] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/123: [ 243.684099][ T123] #0: c00000000278e370 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x50/0x248 [ 243.684114][ T123] 4 locks held by stress.sh/4365: [ 243.684119][ T123] #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.684132][ T123] #1: c000000041aea888 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0 [ 243.684143][ T123] #2: c0000000366fb9a8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0 [ 243.684155][ T123] #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_enable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.684166][ T123] 5 locks held by stress.sh/4366: [ 243.684170][ T123] #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.684183][ T123] #1: c00000000aee2288 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0 [ 243.684194][ T123] #2: c0000000366f4ba8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0 [ 243.684205][ T123] #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_disable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.684216][ T123] #4: c0000003ff9bbf18 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __schedule+0x138/0x12a0 From the ibmveth debug, two threads are calling veth_pool_store, which calls ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open. Here's the sequence: T4365 T4366 ----------------- ----------------- --------- veth_pool_store veth_pool_store ibmveth_close ibmveth_close napi_disable napi_disable ibmveth_open napi_enable <- HANG ibmveth_close calls napi_disable at the top and ibmveth_open calls napi_enable at the top. https://docs.kernel.org/networking/napi.html]] says The control APIs are not idempotent. Control API calls are safe against concurrent use of datapath APIs but an incorrect sequence of control API calls may result in crashes, deadlocks, or race conditions. For example, calling napi_disable() multiple times in a row will deadlock. In the normal open and close paths, rtnl_mutex is acquired to prevent other callers. This is missing from veth_pool_store. Use rtnl_mutex in veth_pool_store fixes these hangs. Signed-off-by: Dave Marquardt <davemarq@linux.ibm.com> Fixes: 860f242 ("[PATCH] ibmveth change buffer pools dynamically") Reviewed-by: Nick Child <nnac123@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250402154403.386744-1-davemarq@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
v2: - Created a single error handling unlock and exit in veth_pool_store - Greatly expanded commit message with previous explanatory-only text Summary: Use rtnl_mutex to synchronize veth_pool_store with itself, ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open, preventing multiple calls in a row to napi_disable. Background: Two (or more) threads could call veth_pool_store through writing to /sys/devices/vio/30000002/pool*/*. You can do this easily with a little shell script. This causes a hang. I configured LOCKDEP, compiled ibmveth.c with DEBUG, and built a new kernel. I ran this test again and saw: Setting pool0/active to 0 Setting pool1/active to 1 [ 73.911067][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting Setting pool1/active to 1 Setting pool1/active to 0 [ 73.911367][ T4366] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting [ 73.916056][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close complete [ 73.916064][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: open starting [ 110.808564][ T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification. [ 230.808495][ T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification. [ 243.683786][ T123] INFO: task stress.sh:4365 blocked for more than 122 seconds. [ 243.683827][ T123] Not tainted 6.14.0-01103-g2df0c02dab82-dirty #8 [ 243.683833][ T123] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 243.683838][ T123] task:stress.sh state:D stack:28096 pid:4365 tgid:4365 ppid:4364 task_flags:0x400040 flags:0x00042000 [ 243.683852][ T123] Call Trace: [ 243.683857][ T123] [c00000000c38f690] [0000000000000001] 0x1 (unreliable) [ 243.683868][ T123] [c00000000c38f840] [c00000000001f908] __switch_to+0x318/0x4e0 [ 243.683878][ T123] [c00000000c38f8a0] [c000000001549a70] __schedule+0x500/0x12a0 [ 243.683888][ T123] [c00000000c38f9a0] [c00000000154a878] schedule+0x68/0x210 [ 243.683896][ T123] [c00000000c38f9d0] [c00000000154ac80] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x30/0x50 [ 243.683904][ T123] [c00000000c38fa00] [c00000000154dbb0] __mutex_lock+0x730/0x10f0 [ 243.683913][ T123] [c00000000c38fb10] [c000000001154d40] napi_enable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.683921][ T123] [c00000000c38fb40] [c000000000f4ae94] ibmveth_open+0x68/0x5dc [ 243.683928][ T123] [c00000000c38fbe0] [c000000000f4aa20] veth_pool_store+0x220/0x270 [ 243.683936][ T123] [c00000000c38fc70] [c000000000826278] sysfs_kf_write+0x68/0xb0 [ 243.683944][ T123] [c00000000c38fcb0] [c0000000008240b8] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x198/0x2d0 [ 243.683951][ T123] [c00000000c38fd00] [c00000000071b9ac] vfs_write+0x34c/0x650 [ 243.683958][ T123] [c00000000c38fdc0] [c00000000071bea8] ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.683966][ T123] [c00000000c38fe10] [c0000000000317f4] system_call_exception+0x124/0x340 [ 243.683973][ T123] [c00000000c38fe50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec ... [ 243.684087][ T123] Showing all locks held in the system: [ 243.684095][ T123] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/123: [ 243.684099][ T123] #0: c00000000278e370 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x50/0x248 [ 243.684114][ T123] 4 locks held by stress.sh/4365: [ 243.684119][ T123] #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.684132][ T123] #1: c000000041aea888 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0 [ 243.684143][ T123] #2: c0000000366fb9a8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0 [ 243.684155][ T123] #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_enable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.684166][ T123] 5 locks held by stress.sh/4366: [ 243.684170][ T123] #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150 [ 243.684183][ T123] #1: c00000000aee2288 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0 [ 243.684194][ T123] #2: c0000000366f4ba8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0 [ 243.684205][ T123] #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_disable+0x30/0x60 [ 243.684216][ T123] #4: c0000003ff9bbf18 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __schedule+0x138/0x12a0 From the ibmveth debug, two threads are calling veth_pool_store, which calls ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open. Here's the sequence: T4365 T4366 ----------------- ----------------- --------- veth_pool_store veth_pool_store ibmveth_close ibmveth_close napi_disable napi_disable ibmveth_open napi_enable <- HANG ibmveth_close calls napi_disable at the top and ibmveth_open calls napi_enable at the top. https://docs.kernel.org/networking/napi.html]] says The control APIs are not idempotent. Control API calls are safe against concurrent use of datapath APIs but an incorrect sequence of control API calls may result in crashes, deadlocks, or race conditions. For example, calling napi_disable() multiple times in a row will deadlock. In the normal open and close paths, rtnl_mutex is acquired to prevent other callers. This is missing from veth_pool_store. Use rtnl_mutex in veth_pool_store fixes these hangs. Signed-off-by: Dave Marquardt <davemarq@linux.ibm.com> Fixes: 860f242 ("[PATCH] ibmveth change buffer pools dynamically") Reviewed-by: Nick Child <nnac123@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250402154403.386744-1-davemarq@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b61e69b ] syzbot report a deadlock in diFree. [1] When calling "ioctl$LOOP_SET_STATUS64", the offset value passed in is 4, which does not match the mounted loop device, causing the mapping of the mounted loop device to be invalidated. When creating the directory and creating the inode of iag in diReadSpecial(), read the page of fixed disk inode (AIT) in raw mode in read_metapage(), the metapage data it returns is corrupted, which causes the nlink value of 0 to be assigned to the iag inode when executing copy_from_dinode(), which ultimately causes a deadlock when entering diFree(). To avoid this, first check the nlink value of dinode before setting iag inode. [1] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.12.0-rc7-syzkaller-00212-g4a5df3796467 #0 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- syz-executor301/5309 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888044548920 (&(imap->im_aglock[index])){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diFree+0x37c/0x2fb0 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:889 but task is already holding lock: ffff888044548920 (&(imap->im_aglock[index])){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAlloc+0x1b6/0x1630 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&(imap->im_aglock[index])); lock(&(imap->im_aglock[index])); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 5 locks held by syz-executor301/5309: #0: ffff8880422a4420 (sb_writers#9){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write+0x3f/0x90 fs/namespace.c:515 #1: ffff88804755b390 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#6/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: inode_lock_nested include/linux/fs.h:850 [inline] #1: ffff88804755b390 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#6/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: filename_create+0x260/0x540 fs/namei.c:4026 #2: ffff888044548920 (&(imap->im_aglock[index])){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAlloc+0x1b6/0x1630 #3: ffff888044548890 (&imap->im_freelock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diNewIAG fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:2460 [inline] #3: ffff888044548890 (&imap->im_freelock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAllocExt fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1905 [inline] #3: ffff888044548890 (&imap->im_freelock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: diAllocAG+0x4b7/0x1e50 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1669 #4: ffff88804755a618 (&jfs_ip->rdwrlock/1){++++}-{3:3}, at: diNewIAG fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:2477 [inline] #4: ffff88804755a618 (&jfs_ip->rdwrlock/1){++++}-{3:3}, at: diAllocExt fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1905 [inline] #4: ffff88804755a618 (&jfs_ip->rdwrlock/1){++++}-{3:3}, at: diAllocAG+0x869/0x1e50 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1669 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5309 Comm: syz-executor301 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7-syzkaller-00212-g4a5df3796467 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_deadlock_bug+0x483/0x620 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3037 check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3089 [inline] validate_chain+0x15e2/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3891 __lock_acquire+0x1384/0x2050 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5202 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:608 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x136/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752 diFree+0x37c/0x2fb0 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:889 jfs_evict_inode+0x32d/0x440 fs/jfs/inode.c:156 evict+0x4e8/0x9b0 fs/inode.c:725 diFreeSpecial fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:552 [inline] duplicateIXtree+0x3c6/0x550 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:3022 diNewIAG fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:2597 [inline] diAllocExt fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1905 [inline] diAllocAG+0x17dc/0x1e50 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1669 diAlloc+0x1d2/0x1630 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:1590 ialloc+0x8f/0x900 fs/jfs/jfs_inode.c:56 jfs_mkdir+0x1c5/0xba0 fs/jfs/namei.c:225 vfs_mkdir+0x2f9/0x4f0 fs/namei.c:4257 do_mkdirat+0x264/0x3a0 fs/namei.c:4280 __do_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:4295 [inline] __se_sys_mkdirat fs/namei.c:4293 [inline] __x64_sys_mkdirat+0x87/0xa0 fs/namei.c:4293 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Reported-by: syzbot+355da3b3a74881008e8f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=355da3b3a74881008e8f Signed-off-by: Edward Adam Davis <eadavis@qq.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 93ae6e6 upstream. We have recently seen report of lockdep circular lock dependency warnings on platforms like Skylake and Kabylake: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.14.0-rc6-CI_DRM_16276-gca2c04fe76e8+ #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ swapper/0/1 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffff8360ee48 (iommu_probe_device_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: iommu_probe_device+0x1d/0x70 but task is already holding lock: ffff888102c7efa8 (&device->physical_node_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: intel_iommu_init+0xe75/0x11f0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #6 (&device->physical_node_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 intel_iommu_init+0xe75/0x11f0 pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70 do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0 kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0 kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #5 (dmar_global_lock){++++}-{3:3}: down_read+0x43/0x1d0 enable_drhd_fault_handling+0x21/0x110 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x4c6/0x870 cpuhp_issue_call+0xbf/0x1f0 __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x111/0x320 __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 irq_remap_enable_fault_handling+0x3f/0xa0 apic_intr_mode_init+0x5c/0x110 x86_late_time_init+0x24/0x40 start_kernel+0x895/0xbd0 x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30 x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110 common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 -> #4 (cpuhp_state_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x67/0x320 __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 page_alloc_init_cpuhp+0x2d/0x60 mm_core_init+0x18/0x2c0 start_kernel+0x576/0xbd0 x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30 x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110 common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 -> #3 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: __cpuhp_state_add_instance+0x4f/0x220 iova_domain_init_rcaches+0x214/0x280 iommu_setup_dma_ops+0x1a4/0x710 iommu_device_register+0x17d/0x260 intel_iommu_init+0xda4/0x11f0 pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70 do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0 kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0 kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #2 (&domain->iova_cookie->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 iommu_setup_dma_ops+0x16b/0x710 iommu_device_register+0x17d/0x260 intel_iommu_init+0xda4/0x11f0 pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70 do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0 kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0 kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #1 (&group->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 __iommu_probe_device+0x24c/0x4e0 probe_iommu_group+0x2b/0x50 bus_for_each_dev+0x7d/0xe0 iommu_device_register+0xe1/0x260 intel_iommu_init+0xda4/0x11f0 pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70 do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0 kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0 kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 (iommu_probe_device_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x1637/0x2810 lock_acquire+0xc9/0x300 __mutex_lock+0xb4/0xe40 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 iommu_probe_device+0x1d/0x70 intel_iommu_init+0xe90/0x11f0 pci_iommu_init+0x13/0x70 do_one_initcall+0x62/0x3f0 kernel_init_freeable+0x3da/0x6a0 kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: iommu_probe_device_lock --> dmar_global_lock --> &device->physical_node_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&device->physical_node_lock); lock(dmar_global_lock); lock(&device->physical_node_lock); lock(iommu_probe_device_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** This driver uses a global lock to protect the list of enumerated DMA remapping units. It is necessary due to the driver's support for dynamic addition and removal of remapping units at runtime. Two distinct code paths require iteration over this remapping unit list: - Device registration and probing: the driver iterates the list to register each remapping unit with the upper layer IOMMU framework and subsequently probe the devices managed by that unit. - Global configuration: Upper layer components may also iterate the list to apply configuration changes. The lock acquisition order between these two code paths was reversed. This caused lockdep warnings, indicating a risk of deadlock. Fix this warning by releasing the global lock before invoking upper layer interfaces for device registration. Fixes: b150654 ("iommu/vt-d: Fix suspicious RCU usage") Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-iommu/SJ1PR11MB612953431F94F18C954C4A9CB9D32@SJ1PR11MB6129.namprd11.prod.outlook.com/ Tested-by: Chaitanya Kumar Borah <chaitanya.kumar.borah@intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250317035714.1041549-1-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2ccd42b upstream. If we finds a vq without a name in our input array in virtio_ccw_find_vqs(), we treat it as "non-existing" and set the vq pointer to NULL; we will not call virtio_ccw_setup_vq() to allocate/setup a vq. Consequently, we create only a queue if it actually exists (name != NULL) and assign an incremental queue index to each such existing queue. However, in virtio_ccw_register_adapter_ind()->get_airq_indicator() we will not ignore these "non-existing queues", but instead assign an airq indicator to them. Besides never releasing them in virtio_ccw_drop_indicators() (because there is no virtqueue), the bigger issue seems to be that there will be a disagreement between the device and the Linux guest about the airq indicator to be used for notifying a queue, because the indicator bit for adapter I/O interrupt is derived from the queue index. The virtio spec states under "Setting Up Two-Stage Queue Indicators": ... indicator contains the guest address of an area wherein the indicators for the devices are contained, starting at bit_nr, one bit per virtqueue of the device. And further in "Notification via Adapter I/O Interrupts": For notifying the driver of virtqueue buffers, the device sets the bit in the guest-provided indicator area at the corresponding offset. For example, QEMU uses in virtio_ccw_notify() the queue index (passed as "vector") to select the relevant indicator bit. If a queue does not exist, it does not have a corresponding indicator bit assigned, because it effectively doesn't have a queue index. Using a virtio-balloon-ccw device under QEMU with free-page-hinting disabled ("free-page-hint=off") but free-page-reporting enabled ("free-page-reporting=on") will result in free page reporting not working as expected: in the virtio_balloon driver, we'll be stuck forever in virtballoon_free_page_report()->wait_event(), because the waitqueue will not be woken up as the notification from the device is lost: it would use the wrong indicator bit. Free page reporting stops working and we get splats (when configured to detect hung wqs) like: INFO: task kworker/1:3:463 blocked for more than 61 seconds. Not tainted 6.14.0 #4 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:kworker/1:3 [...] Workqueue: events page_reporting_process Call Trace: [<000002f404e6dfb2>] __schedule+0x402/0x1640 [<000002f404e6f22e>] schedule+0x3e/0xe0 [<000002f3846a88fa>] virtballoon_free_page_report+0xaa/0x110 [virtio_balloon] [<000002f40435c8a4>] page_reporting_process+0x2e4/0x740 [<000002f403fd3ee2>] process_one_work+0x1c2/0x400 [<000002f403fd4b96>] worker_thread+0x296/0x420 [<000002f403fe10b4>] kthread+0x124/0x290 [<000002f403f4e0dc>] __ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [<000002f404e77272>] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x38 There was recently a discussion [1] whether the "holes" should be treated differently again, effectively assigning also non-existing queues a queue index: that should also fix the issue, but requires other workarounds to not break existing setups. Let's fix it without affecting existing setups for now by properly ignoring the non-existing queues, so the indicator bits will match the queue indexes. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1720611677.git.mst@redhat.com/ Fixes: a229989 ("virtio: don't allocate vqs when names[i] = NULL") Reported-by: Chandra Merla <cmerla@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Tested-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250402203621.940090-1-david@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Commit 7da55c2 ("drm/amd/display: Remove incorrect FP context start") removes the FP context protection of dml2_create(), and it said "All the DC_FP_START/END should be used before call anything from DML2". However, dml2_validate()/dml21_validate() are not protected from their callers, causing such errors: do_fpu invoked from kernel context![#1]: CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 331 Comm: kworker/10:1H Not tainted 6.14.0-rc6+ #4 Workqueue: events_highpri dm_irq_work_func [amdgpu] pc ffff800003191eb0 ra ffff800003191e60 tp 9000000107a94000 sp 9000000107a975b0 a0 9000000140ce4910 a1 0000000000000000 a2 9000000140ce49b0 a3 9000000140ce49a8 a4 9000000140ce49a8 a5 0000000100000000 a6 0000000000000001 a7 9000000107a97660 t0 ffff800003790000 t1 9000000140ce5000 t2 0000000000000001 t3 0000000000000000 t4 0000000000000004 t5 0000000000000000 t6 0000000000000000 t7 0000000000000000 t8 0000000100000000 u0 ffff8000031a3b9c s9 9000000130bc0000 s0 9000000132400000 s1 9000000140ec0000 s2 9000000132400000 s3 9000000140ce0000 s4 90000000057f8b88 s5 9000000140ec0000 s6 9000000140ce4910 s7 0000000000000001 s8 9000000130d45010 ra: ffff800003191e60 dml21_map_dc_state_into_dml_display_cfg+0x40/0x1140 [amdgpu] ERA: ffff800003191eb0 dml21_map_dc_state_into_dml_display_cfg+0x90/0x1140 [amdgpu] CRMD: 000000b0 (PLV0 -IE -DA +PG DACF=CC DACM=CC -WE) PRMD: 00000004 (PPLV0 +PIE -PWE) EUEN: 00000000 (-FPE -SXE -ASXE -BTE) ECFG: 00071c1d (LIE=0,2-4,10-12 VS=7) ESTAT: 000f0000 [FPD] (IS= ECode=15 EsubCode=0) PRID: 0014d010 (Loongson-64bit, Loongson-3C6000/S) Process kworker/10:1H (pid: 331, threadinfo=000000007bf9ddb0, task=00000000cc4ab9f3) Stack : 0000000100000000 0000043800000780 0000000100000001 0000000100000001 0000000000000000 0000078000000000 0000000000000438 0000078000000000 0000000000000438 0000078000000000 0000000000000438 0000000100000000 0000000100000000 0000000100000000 0000000100000000 0000000100000000 0000000000000001 9000000140ec0000 9000000132400000 9000000132400000 ffff800003408000 ffff800003408000 9000000132400000 9000000140ce0000 9000000140ce0000 ffff800003193850 0000000000000001 9000000140ec0000 9000000132400000 9000000140ec0860 9000000140ec0738 0000000000000001 90000001405e8000 9000000130bc0000 9000000140ec02a8 ffff8000031b5db8 0000000000000000 0000043800000780 0000000000000003 ffff8000031b79cc ... Call Trace: [<ffff800003191eb0>] dml21_map_dc_state_into_dml_display_cfg+0x90/0x1140 [amdgpu] [<ffff80000319384c>] dml21_validate+0xcc/0x520 [amdgpu] [<ffff8000031b8948>] dc_validate_global_state+0x2e8/0x460 [amdgpu] [<ffff800002e94034>] create_validate_stream_for_sink+0x3d4/0x420 [amdgpu] [<ffff800002e940e4>] amdgpu_dm_connector_mode_valid+0x64/0x240 [amdgpu] [<900000000441d6b8>] drm_connector_mode_valid+0x38/0x80 [<900000000441d824>] __drm_helper_update_and_validate+0x124/0x3e0 [<900000000441ddc0>] drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes+0x2e0/0x620 [<90000000044050dc>] drm_client_modeset_probe+0x23c/0x1780 [<9000000004420384>] __drm_fb_helper_initial_config_and_unlock+0x44/0x5a0 [<9000000004403acc>] drm_client_dev_hotplug+0xcc/0x140 [<ffff800002e9ab50>] handle_hpd_irq_helper+0x1b0/0x1e0 [amdgpu] [<90000000038f5da0>] process_one_work+0x160/0x300 [<90000000038f6718>] worker_thread+0x318/0x440 [<9000000003901b8c>] kthread+0x12c/0x220 [<90000000038b1484>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x8/0xa4 Unfortunately, protecting dml2_validate()/dml21_validate() out of DML2 causes "sleeping function called from invalid context", so protect them with DC_FP_START() and DC_FP_END() inside. Fixes: 7da55c2 ("drm/amd/display: Remove incorrect FP context start") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn> Tested-by: Dongyan Qian <qiandongyan@loongson.cn> Reviewed-by: Aurabindo Pillai <aurabindo.pillai@amd.com> Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
If we finds a vq without a name in our input array in virtio_ccw_find_vqs(), we treat it as "non-existing" and set the vq pointer to NULL; we will not call virtio_ccw_setup_vq() to allocate/setup a vq. Consequently, we create only a queue if it actually exists (name != NULL) and assign an incremental queue index to each such existing queue. However, in virtio_ccw_register_adapter_ind()->get_airq_indicator() we will not ignore these "non-existing queues", but instead assign an airq indicator to them. Besides never releasing them in virtio_ccw_drop_indicators() (because there is no virtqueue), the bigger issue seems to be that there will be a disagreement between the device and the Linux guest about the airq indicator to be used for notifying a queue, because the indicator bit for adapter I/O interrupt is derived from the queue index. The virtio spec states under "Setting Up Two-Stage Queue Indicators": ... indicator contains the guest address of an area wherein the indicators for the devices are contained, starting at bit_nr, one bit per virtqueue of the device. And further in "Notification via Adapter I/O Interrupts": For notifying the driver of virtqueue buffers, the device sets the bit in the guest-provided indicator area at the corresponding offset. For example, QEMU uses in virtio_ccw_notify() the queue index (passed as "vector") to select the relevant indicator bit. If a queue does not exist, it does not have a corresponding indicator bit assigned, because it effectively doesn't have a queue index. Using a virtio-balloon-ccw device under QEMU with free-page-hinting disabled ("free-page-hint=off") but free-page-reporting enabled ("free-page-reporting=on") will result in free page reporting not working as expected: in the virtio_balloon driver, we'll be stuck forever in virtballoon_free_page_report()->wait_event(), because the waitqueue will not be woken up as the notification from the device is lost: it would use the wrong indicator bit. Free page reporting stops working and we get splats (when configured to detect hung wqs) like: INFO: task kworker/1:3:463 blocked for more than 61 seconds. Not tainted 6.14.0 #4 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:kworker/1:3 [...] Workqueue: events page_reporting_process Call Trace: [<000002f404e6dfb2>] __schedule+0x402/0x1640 [<000002f404e6f22e>] schedule+0x3e/0xe0 [<000002f3846a88fa>] virtballoon_free_page_report+0xaa/0x110 [virtio_balloon] [<000002f40435c8a4>] page_reporting_process+0x2e4/0x740 [<000002f403fd3ee2>] process_one_work+0x1c2/0x400 [<000002f403fd4b96>] worker_thread+0x296/0x420 [<000002f403fe10b4>] kthread+0x124/0x290 [<000002f403f4e0dc>] __ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [<000002f404e77272>] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x38 There was recently a discussion [1] whether the "holes" should be treated differently again, effectively assigning also non-existing queues a queue index: that should also fix the issue, but requires other workarounds to not break existing setups. Let's fix it without affecting existing setups for now by properly ignoring the non-existing queues, so the indicator bits will match the queue indexes. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1720611677.git.mst@redhat.com/ Fixes: a229989 ("virtio: don't allocate vqs when names[i] = NULL") Reported-by: Chandra Merla <cmerla@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Tested-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250402203621.940090-1-david@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
There is a potential deadlock if we do report zones in an IO context, detailed in below lockdep report. When one process do a report zones and another process freezes the block device, the report zones side cannot allocate a tag because the freeze is already started. This can thus result in new block group creation to hang forever, blocking the write path. Thankfully, a new block group should be created on empty zones. So, reporting the zones is not necessary and we can set the write pointer = 0 and load the zone capacity from the block layer using bdev_zone_capacity() helper. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.14.0-rc1 AsahiLinux#252 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ modprobe/1110 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888100ac83e0 ((work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x38f/0xb60 but task is already holding lock: ffff8881205b6f20 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)AsahiLinux#16){++++}-{0:0}, at: sd_remove+0x85/0x130 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> AsahiLinux#3 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)AsahiLinux#16){++++}-{0:0}: blk_queue_enter+0x3d9/0x500 blk_mq_alloc_request+0x47d/0x8e0 scsi_execute_cmd+0x14f/0xb80 sd_zbc_do_report_zones+0x1c1/0x470 sd_zbc_report_zones+0x362/0xd60 blkdev_report_zones+0x1b1/0x2e0 btrfs_get_dev_zones+0x215/0x7e0 [btrfs] btrfs_load_block_group_zone_info+0x6d2/0x2c10 [btrfs] btrfs_make_block_group+0x36b/0x870 [btrfs] btrfs_create_chunk+0x147d/0x2320 [btrfs] btrfs_chunk_alloc+0x2ce/0xcf0 [btrfs] start_transaction+0xce6/0x1620 [btrfs] btrfs_uuid_scan_kthread+0x4ee/0x5b0 [btrfs] kthread+0x39d/0x750 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> AsahiLinux#2 (&fs_info->dev_replace.rwsem){++++}-{4:4}: down_read+0x9b/0x470 btrfs_map_block+0x2ce/0x2ce0 [btrfs] btrfs_submit_chunk+0x2d4/0x16c0 [btrfs] btrfs_submit_bbio+0x16/0x30 [btrfs] btree_write_cache_pages+0xb5a/0xf90 [btrfs] do_writepages+0x17f/0x7b0 __writeback_single_inode+0x114/0xb00 writeback_sb_inodes+0x52b/0xe00 wb_writeback+0x1a7/0x800 wb_workfn+0x12a/0xbd0 process_one_work+0x85a/0x1460 worker_thread+0x5e2/0xfc0 kthread+0x39d/0x750 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> AsahiLinux#1 (&fs_info->zoned_meta_io_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0x1aa/0x1360 btree_write_cache_pages+0x252/0xf90 [btrfs] do_writepages+0x17f/0x7b0 __writeback_single_inode+0x114/0xb00 writeback_sb_inodes+0x52b/0xe00 wb_writeback+0x1a7/0x800 wb_workfn+0x12a/0xbd0 process_one_work+0x85a/0x1460 worker_thread+0x5e2/0xfc0 kthread+0x39d/0x750 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x2f52/0x5ea0 lock_acquire+0x1b1/0x540 __flush_work+0x3ac/0xb60 wb_shutdown+0x15b/0x1f0 bdi_unregister+0x172/0x5b0 del_gendisk+0x841/0xa20 sd_remove+0x85/0x130 device_release_driver_internal+0x368/0x520 bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0 device_del+0x3bd/0x9c0 __scsi_remove_device+0x272/0x340 scsi_forget_host+0xf7/0x170 scsi_remove_host+0xd2/0x2a0 sdebug_driver_remove+0x52/0x2f0 [scsi_debug] device_release_driver_internal+0x368/0x520 bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0 device_del+0x3bd/0x9c0 device_unregister+0x13/0xa0 sdebug_do_remove_host+0x1fb/0x290 [scsi_debug] scsi_debug_exit+0x17/0x70 [scsi_debug] __do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x321/0x520 do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work) --> &fs_info->dev_replace.rwsem --> &q->q_usage_counter(queue)AsahiLinux#16 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&q->q_usage_counter(queue)AsahiLinux#16); lock(&fs_info->dev_replace.rwsem); lock(&q->q_usage_counter(queue)AsahiLinux#16); lock((work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work)); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by modprobe/1110: #0: ffff88811f7bc108 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x8f/0x520 AsahiLinux#1: ffff8881022ee0e0 (&shost->scan_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: scsi_remove_host+0x20/0x2a0 AsahiLinux#2: ffff88811b4c4378 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x8f/0x520 AsahiLinux#3: ffff8881205b6f20 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)AsahiLinux#16){++++}-{0:0}, at: sd_remove+0x85/0x130 AsahiLinux#4: ffffffffa3284360 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: __flush_work+0xda/0xb60 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1110 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.14.0-rc1 AsahiLinux#252 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6a/0x90 print_circular_bug.cold+0x1e0/0x274 check_noncircular+0x306/0x3f0 ? __pfx_check_noncircular+0x10/0x10 ? mark_lock+0xf5/0x1650 ? __pfx_check_irq_usage+0x10/0x10 ? lockdep_lock+0xca/0x1c0 ? __pfx_lockdep_lock+0x10/0x10 __lock_acquire+0x2f52/0x5ea0 ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_mark_lock+0x10/0x10 lock_acquire+0x1b1/0x540 ? __flush_work+0x38f/0xb60 ? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10 ? mark_held_locks+0x94/0xe0 ? __flush_work+0x38f/0xb60 __flush_work+0x3ac/0xb60 ? __flush_work+0x38f/0xb60 ? __pfx_mark_lock+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___flush_work+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___might_resched+0x10/0x10 ? mark_held_locks+0x94/0xe0 wb_shutdown+0x15b/0x1f0 bdi_unregister+0x172/0x5b0 ? __pfx_bdi_unregister+0x10/0x10 ? up_write+0x1ba/0x510 del_gendisk+0x841/0xa20 ? __pfx_del_gendisk+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x35/0x60 ? __pm_runtime_resume+0x79/0x110 sd_remove+0x85/0x130 device_release_driver_internal+0x368/0x520 ? kobject_put+0x5d/0x4a0 bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0 device_del+0x3bd/0x9c0 ? __pfx_device_del+0x10/0x10 __scsi_remove_device+0x272/0x340 scsi_forget_host+0xf7/0x170 scsi_remove_host+0xd2/0x2a0 sdebug_driver_remove+0x52/0x2f0 [scsi_debug] ? kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0xc0/0xf0 device_release_driver_internal+0x368/0x520 ? kobject_put+0x5d/0x4a0 bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0 device_del+0x3bd/0x9c0 ? __pfx_device_del+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x10/0x10 device_unregister+0x13/0xa0 sdebug_do_remove_host+0x1fb/0x290 [scsi_debug] scsi_debug_exit+0x17/0x70 [scsi_debug] __do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x321/0x520 ? __pfx___do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_slab_free_after_rcu_debug+0x10/0x10 ? kasan_save_stack+0x2c/0x50 ? kasan_record_aux_stack+0xa3/0xb0 ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0xc4/0xfb0 ? kmem_cache_free+0x3a0/0x590 ? __x64_sys_close+0x78/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180 ? lock_is_held_type+0xd5/0x130 ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x3c0/0xfb0 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100 ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x3c0/0xfb0 ? __pfx___call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x10/0x10 ? kmem_cache_free+0x3a0/0x590 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x16d/0x400 ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100 ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180 ? __pfx___x64_sys_openat+0x10/0x10 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x16d/0x400 ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100 ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f436712b68b RSP: 002b:00007ffe9f1a8658 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005559b367fd80 RCX: 00007f436712b68b RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 00005559b367fde8 RBP: 00007ffe9f1a8680 R08: 1999999999999999 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f43671a5fe0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffe9f1a86b0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> Reported-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com> CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 6.13+ Tested-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota <naohiro.aota@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ Upstream commit 866bafa ] There is a potential deadlock if we do report zones in an IO context, detailed in below lockdep report. When one process do a report zones and another process freezes the block device, the report zones side cannot allocate a tag because the freeze is already started. This can thus result in new block group creation to hang forever, blocking the write path. Thankfully, a new block group should be created on empty zones. So, reporting the zones is not necessary and we can set the write pointer = 0 and load the zone capacity from the block layer using bdev_zone_capacity() helper. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.14.0-rc1 #252 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ modprobe/1110 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888100ac83e0 ((work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x38f/0xb60 but task is already holding lock: ffff8881205b6f20 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#16){++++}-{0:0}, at: sd_remove+0x85/0x130 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#16){++++}-{0:0}: blk_queue_enter+0x3d9/0x500 blk_mq_alloc_request+0x47d/0x8e0 scsi_execute_cmd+0x14f/0xb80 sd_zbc_do_report_zones+0x1c1/0x470 sd_zbc_report_zones+0x362/0xd60 blkdev_report_zones+0x1b1/0x2e0 btrfs_get_dev_zones+0x215/0x7e0 [btrfs] btrfs_load_block_group_zone_info+0x6d2/0x2c10 [btrfs] btrfs_make_block_group+0x36b/0x870 [btrfs] btrfs_create_chunk+0x147d/0x2320 [btrfs] btrfs_chunk_alloc+0x2ce/0xcf0 [btrfs] start_transaction+0xce6/0x1620 [btrfs] btrfs_uuid_scan_kthread+0x4ee/0x5b0 [btrfs] kthread+0x39d/0x750 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #2 (&fs_info->dev_replace.rwsem){++++}-{4:4}: down_read+0x9b/0x470 btrfs_map_block+0x2ce/0x2ce0 [btrfs] btrfs_submit_chunk+0x2d4/0x16c0 [btrfs] btrfs_submit_bbio+0x16/0x30 [btrfs] btree_write_cache_pages+0xb5a/0xf90 [btrfs] do_writepages+0x17f/0x7b0 __writeback_single_inode+0x114/0xb00 writeback_sb_inodes+0x52b/0xe00 wb_writeback+0x1a7/0x800 wb_workfn+0x12a/0xbd0 process_one_work+0x85a/0x1460 worker_thread+0x5e2/0xfc0 kthread+0x39d/0x750 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #1 (&fs_info->zoned_meta_io_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0x1aa/0x1360 btree_write_cache_pages+0x252/0xf90 [btrfs] do_writepages+0x17f/0x7b0 __writeback_single_inode+0x114/0xb00 writeback_sb_inodes+0x52b/0xe00 wb_writeback+0x1a7/0x800 wb_workfn+0x12a/0xbd0 process_one_work+0x85a/0x1460 worker_thread+0x5e2/0xfc0 kthread+0x39d/0x750 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x2f52/0x5ea0 lock_acquire+0x1b1/0x540 __flush_work+0x3ac/0xb60 wb_shutdown+0x15b/0x1f0 bdi_unregister+0x172/0x5b0 del_gendisk+0x841/0xa20 sd_remove+0x85/0x130 device_release_driver_internal+0x368/0x520 bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0 device_del+0x3bd/0x9c0 __scsi_remove_device+0x272/0x340 scsi_forget_host+0xf7/0x170 scsi_remove_host+0xd2/0x2a0 sdebug_driver_remove+0x52/0x2f0 [scsi_debug] device_release_driver_internal+0x368/0x520 bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0 device_del+0x3bd/0x9c0 device_unregister+0x13/0xa0 sdebug_do_remove_host+0x1fb/0x290 [scsi_debug] scsi_debug_exit+0x17/0x70 [scsi_debug] __do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x321/0x520 do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work) --> &fs_info->dev_replace.rwsem --> &q->q_usage_counter(queue)#16 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#16); lock(&fs_info->dev_replace.rwsem); lock(&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#16); lock((work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work)); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by modprobe/1110: #0: ffff88811f7bc108 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x8f/0x520 #1: ffff8881022ee0e0 (&shost->scan_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: scsi_remove_host+0x20/0x2a0 #2: ffff88811b4c4378 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x8f/0x520 #3: ffff8881205b6f20 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#16){++++}-{0:0}, at: sd_remove+0x85/0x130 #4: ffffffffa3284360 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: __flush_work+0xda/0xb60 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1110 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.14.0-rc1 #252 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6a/0x90 print_circular_bug.cold+0x1e0/0x274 check_noncircular+0x306/0x3f0 ? __pfx_check_noncircular+0x10/0x10 ? mark_lock+0xf5/0x1650 ? __pfx_check_irq_usage+0x10/0x10 ? lockdep_lock+0xca/0x1c0 ? __pfx_lockdep_lock+0x10/0x10 __lock_acquire+0x2f52/0x5ea0 ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_mark_lock+0x10/0x10 lock_acquire+0x1b1/0x540 ? __flush_work+0x38f/0xb60 ? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10 ? mark_held_locks+0x94/0xe0 ? __flush_work+0x38f/0xb60 __flush_work+0x3ac/0xb60 ? __flush_work+0x38f/0xb60 ? __pfx_mark_lock+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___flush_work+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___might_resched+0x10/0x10 ? mark_held_locks+0x94/0xe0 wb_shutdown+0x15b/0x1f0 bdi_unregister+0x172/0x5b0 ? __pfx_bdi_unregister+0x10/0x10 ? up_write+0x1ba/0x510 del_gendisk+0x841/0xa20 ? __pfx_del_gendisk+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x35/0x60 ? __pm_runtime_resume+0x79/0x110 sd_remove+0x85/0x130 device_release_driver_internal+0x368/0x520 ? kobject_put+0x5d/0x4a0 bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0 device_del+0x3bd/0x9c0 ? __pfx_device_del+0x10/0x10 __scsi_remove_device+0x272/0x340 scsi_forget_host+0xf7/0x170 scsi_remove_host+0xd2/0x2a0 sdebug_driver_remove+0x52/0x2f0 [scsi_debug] ? kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0xc0/0xf0 device_release_driver_internal+0x368/0x520 ? kobject_put+0x5d/0x4a0 bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0 device_del+0x3bd/0x9c0 ? __pfx_device_del+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x10/0x10 device_unregister+0x13/0xa0 sdebug_do_remove_host+0x1fb/0x290 [scsi_debug] scsi_debug_exit+0x17/0x70 [scsi_debug] __do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x321/0x520 ? __pfx___do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_slab_free_after_rcu_debug+0x10/0x10 ? kasan_save_stack+0x2c/0x50 ? kasan_record_aux_stack+0xa3/0xb0 ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0xc4/0xfb0 ? kmem_cache_free+0x3a0/0x590 ? __x64_sys_close+0x78/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180 ? lock_is_held_type+0xd5/0x130 ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x3c0/0xfb0 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100 ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x3c0/0xfb0 ? __pfx___call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x10/0x10 ? kmem_cache_free+0x3a0/0x590 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x16d/0x400 ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100 ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180 ? __pfx___x64_sys_openat+0x10/0x10 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x16d/0x400 ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100 ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f436712b68b RSP: 002b:00007ffe9f1a8658 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005559b367fd80 RCX: 00007f436712b68b RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 00005559b367fde8 RBP: 00007ffe9f1a8680 R08: 1999999999999999 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f43671a5fe0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffe9f1a86b0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> Reported-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com> CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 6.13+ Tested-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota <naohiro.aota@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit be6e843 upstream. When migrating a THP, concurrent access to the PMD migration entry during a deferred split scan can lead to an invalid address access, as illustrated below. To prevent this invalid access, it is necessary to check the PMD migration entry and return early. In this context, there is no need to use pmd_to_swp_entry and pfn_swap_entry_to_page to verify the equality of the target folio. Since the PMD migration entry is locked, it cannot be served as the target. Mailing list discussion and explanation from Hugh Dickins: "An anon_vma lookup points to a location which may contain the folio of interest, but might instead contain another folio: and weeding out those other folios is precisely what the "folio != pmd_folio((*pmd)" check (and the "risk of replacing the wrong folio" comment a few lines above it) is for." BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffea60001db008 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 2199114 Comm: tee Not tainted 6.14.0+ #4 NONE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:split_huge_pmd_locked+0x3b5/0x2b60 Call Trace: <TASK> try_to_migrate_one+0x28c/0x3730 rmap_walk_anon+0x4f6/0x770 unmap_folio+0x196/0x1f0 split_huge_page_to_list_to_order+0x9f6/0x1560 deferred_split_scan+0xac5/0x12a0 shrinker_debugfs_scan_write+0x376/0x470 full_proxy_write+0x15c/0x220 vfs_write+0x2fc/0xcb0 ksys_write+0x146/0x250 do_syscall_64+0x6a/0x120 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e The bug is found by syzkaller on an internal kernel, then confirmed on upstream. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250421113536.3682201-1-gavinguo@igalia.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250414072737.1698513-1-gavinguo@igalia.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250418085802.2973519-1-gavinguo@igalia.com/ Fixes: 84c3fc4 ("mm: thp: check pmd migration entry in common path") Signed-off-by: Gavin Guo <gavinguo@igalia.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Acked-by: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com> Cc: Florent Revest <revest@google.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
When migrating a THP, concurrent access to the PMD migration entry during a deferred split scan can lead to an invalid address access, as illustrated below. To prevent this invalid access, it is necessary to check the PMD migration entry and return early. In this context, there is no need to use pmd_to_swp_entry and pfn_swap_entry_to_page to verify the equality of the target folio. Since the PMD migration entry is locked, it cannot be served as the target. Mailing list discussion and explanation from Hugh Dickins: "An anon_vma lookup points to a location which may contain the folio of interest, but might instead contain another folio: and weeding out those other folios is precisely what the "folio != pmd_folio((*pmd)" check (and the "risk of replacing the wrong folio" comment a few lines above it) is for." BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffea60001db008 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 2199114 Comm: tee Not tainted 6.14.0+ AsahiLinux#4 NONE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:split_huge_pmd_locked+0x3b5/0x2b60 Call Trace: <TASK> try_to_migrate_one+0x28c/0x3730 rmap_walk_anon+0x4f6/0x770 unmap_folio+0x196/0x1f0 split_huge_page_to_list_to_order+0x9f6/0x1560 deferred_split_scan+0xac5/0x12a0 shrinker_debugfs_scan_write+0x376/0x470 full_proxy_write+0x15c/0x220 vfs_write+0x2fc/0xcb0 ksys_write+0x146/0x250 do_syscall_64+0x6a/0x120 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e The bug is found by syzkaller on an internal kernel, then confirmed on upstream. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250421113536.3682201-1-gavinguo@igalia.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250414072737.1698513-1-gavinguo@igalia.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250418085802.2973519-1-gavinguo@igalia.com/ Fixes: 84c3fc4 ("mm: thp: check pmd migration entry in common path") Signed-off-by: Gavin Guo <gavinguo@igalia.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Acked-by: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com> Cc: Florent Revest <revest@google.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
A warning on driver removal started occurring after commit 9dd05df ("net: warn if NAPI instance wasn't shut down"). Disable tx napi before deleting it in mt76_dma_cleanup(). WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 18828 at net/core/dev.c:7288 __netif_napi_del_locked+0xf0/0x100 CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 18828 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.15.0-rc4 AsahiLinux#4 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME X670E-PRO WIFI, BIOS 3035 09/05/2024 RIP: 0010:__netif_napi_del_locked+0xf0/0x100 Call Trace: <TASK> mt76_dma_cleanup+0x54/0x2f0 [mt76] mt7921_pci_remove+0xd5/0x190 [mt7921e] pci_device_remove+0x47/0xc0 device_release_driver_internal+0x19e/0x200 driver_detach+0x48/0x90 bus_remove_driver+0x6d/0xf0 pci_unregister_driver+0x2e/0xb0 __do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x197/0x2e0 do_syscall_64+0x7b/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Tested with mt7921e but the same pattern can be actually applied to other mt76 drivers calling mt76_dma_cleanup() during removal. Tx napi is enabled in their *_dma_init() functions and only toggled off and on again inside their suspend/resume/reset paths. So it should be okay to disable tx napi in such a generic way. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org). Fixes: 2ac515a ("mt76: mt76x02: use napi polling for tx cleanup") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru> Tested-by: Ming Yen Hsieh <mingyen.hsieh@mediatek.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250506115540.19045-1-pchelkin@ispras.ru Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
commit 78ab4be upstream. A warning on driver removal started occurring after commit 9dd05df ("net: warn if NAPI instance wasn't shut down"). Disable tx napi before deleting it in mt76_dma_cleanup(). WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 18828 at net/core/dev.c:7288 __netif_napi_del_locked+0xf0/0x100 CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 18828 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.15.0-rc4 #4 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME X670E-PRO WIFI, BIOS 3035 09/05/2024 RIP: 0010:__netif_napi_del_locked+0xf0/0x100 Call Trace: <TASK> mt76_dma_cleanup+0x54/0x2f0 [mt76] mt7921_pci_remove+0xd5/0x190 [mt7921e] pci_device_remove+0x47/0xc0 device_release_driver_internal+0x19e/0x200 driver_detach+0x48/0x90 bus_remove_driver+0x6d/0xf0 pci_unregister_driver+0x2e/0xb0 __do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x197/0x2e0 do_syscall_64+0x7b/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Tested with mt7921e but the same pattern can be actually applied to other mt76 drivers calling mt76_dma_cleanup() during removal. Tx napi is enabled in their *_dma_init() functions and only toggled off and on again inside their suspend/resume/reset paths. So it should be okay to disable tx napi in such a generic way. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org). Fixes: 2ac515a ("mt76: mt76x02: use napi polling for tx cleanup") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru> Tested-by: Ming Yen Hsieh <mingyen.hsieh@mediatek.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250506115540.19045-1-pchelkin@ispras.ru Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This patch enables support for DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_CALL_OPS on RISC-V. This allows each ftrace callsite to provide an ftrace_ops to the common ftrace trampoline, allowing each callsite to invoke distinct tracer functions without the need to fall back to list processing or to allocate custom trampolines for each callsite. This significantly speeds up cases where multiple distinct trace functions are used and callsites are mostly traced by a single tracer. The idea and most of the implementation is taken from the ARM64's implementation of the same feature. The idea is to place a pointer to the ftrace_ops as a literal at a fixed offset from the function entry point, which can be recovered by the common ftrace trampoline. We use -fpatchable-function-entry to reserve 8 bytes above the function entry by emitting 2 4 byte or 4 2 byte nops depending on the presence of CONFIG_RISCV_ISA_C. These 8 bytes are patched at runtime with a pointer to the associated ftrace_ops for that callsite. Functions are aligned to 8 bytes to make sure that the accesses to this literal are atomic. This approach allows for directly invoking ftrace_ops::func even for ftrace_ops which are dynamically-allocated (or part of a module), without going via ftrace_ops_list_func. We've benchamrked this with the ftrace_ops sample module on Spacemit K1 Jupiter: Without this patch: baseline (Linux rivos 6.14.0-09584-g7d06015d936c AsahiLinux#3 SMP Sat Mar 29 +-----------------------+-----------------+----------------------------+ | Number of tracers | Total time (ns) | Per-call average time | |-----------------------+-----------------+----------------------------| | Relevant | Irrelevant | 100000 calls | Total (ns) | Overhead (ns) | |----------+------------+-----------------+------------+---------------| | 0 | 0 | 1357958 | 13 | - | | 0 | 1 | 1302375 | 13 | - | | 0 | 2 | 1302375 | 13 | - | | 0 | 10 | 1379084 | 13 | - | | 0 | 100 | 1302458 | 13 | - | | 0 | 200 | 1302333 | 13 | - | |----------+------------+-----------------+------------+---------------| | 1 | 0 | 13677833 | 136 | 123 | | 1 | 1 | 18500916 | 185 | 172 | | 1 | 2 | 2285645 | 228 | 215 | | 1 | 10 | 58824709 | 588 | 575 | | 1 | 100 | 505141584 | 5051 | 5038 | | 1 | 200 | 1580473126 | 15804 | 15791 | |----------+------------+-----------------+------------+---------------| | 1 | 0 | 13561000 | 135 | 122 | | 2 | 0 | 19707292 | 197 | 184 | | 10 | 0 | 67774750 | 677 | 664 | | 100 | 0 | 714123125 | 7141 | 7128 | | 200 | 0 | 1918065668 | 19180 | 19167 | +----------+------------+-----------------+------------+---------------+ Note: per-call overhead is estimated relative to the baseline case with 0 relevant tracers and 0 irrelevant tracers. With this patch: v4-rc4 (Linux rivos 6.14.0-09598-gd75747611c93 AsahiLinux#4 SMP Sat Mar 29 +-----------------------+-----------------+----------------------------+ | Number of tracers | Total time (ns) | Per-call average time | |-----------------------+-----------------+----------------------------| | Relevant | Irrelevant | 100000 calls | Total (ns) | Overhead (ns) | |----------+------------+-----------------+------------+---------------| | 0 | 0 | 1459917 | 14 | - | | 0 | 1 | 1408000 | 14 | - | | 0 | 2 | 1383792 | 13 | - | | 0 | 10 | 1430709 | 14 | - | | 0 | 100 | 1383791 | 13 | - | | 0 | 200 | 1383750 | 13 | - | |----------+------------+-----------------+------------+---------------| | 1 | 0 | 5238041 | 52 | 38 | | 1 | 1 | 5228542 | 52 | 38 | | 1 | 2 | 5325917 | 53 | 40 | | 1 | 10 | 5299667 | 52 | 38 | | 1 | 100 | 5245250 | 52 | 39 | | 1 | 200 | 5238459 | 52 | 39 | |----------+------------+-----------------+------------+---------------| | 1 | 0 | 5239083 | 52 | 38 | | 2 | 0 | 19449417 | 194 | 181 | | 10 | 0 | 67718584 | 677 | 663 | | 100 | 0 | 709840708 | 7098 | 7085 | | 200 | 0 | 2203580626 | 22035 | 22022 | +----------+------------+-----------------+------------+---------------+ Note: per-call overhead is estimated relative to the baseline case with 0 relevant tracers and 0 irrelevant tracers. As can be seen from the above: a) Whenever there is a single relevant tracer function associated with a tracee, the overhead of invoking the tracer is constant, and does not scale with the number of tracers which are *not* associated with that tracee. b) The overhead for a single relevant tracer has dropped to ~1/3 of the overhead prior to this series (from 122ns to 38ns). This is largely due to permitting calls to dynamically-allocated ftrace_ops without going through ftrace_ops_list_func. Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay12@gmail.com> [update kconfig, asm, refactor] Signed-off-by: Andy Chiu <andybnac@gmail.com> Tested-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250407180838.42877-10-andybnac@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com> Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
(Currently untested; will comment once I can test it).
This should be useful as it allows rebooting both automatically and per SysRq.